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HISTORY    OF    GREECE 

FROM  THE 

EARLIEST  PERIOD  TO  THE  CLOSE  OF  THE 

GENERATION  CONTEMPORARY  WITH 

ALEXANDER  THE  GREAT. 

BY 

GEORGE  GROTE. 


IN  FOUR  VOLUMES---VOL.  II. 


j»>      tJ>K.£!4     xVk 


WMw 


New  York: 

W.   L.   ALLISON   CO., 

Publishers. 


52793 


CONTENTS  OF  YOLUME  II. 


PART  II.— CONTINUATION  OF  HISTORICAL  GREECE. 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 

Lyric  Poetry.— The  Seven  Wise  Men. 

pa  ok 

Age  and  duration  of  the  Greek  lyric  poetry 43 

Epical  age  preceding  the  lyrical 43 

wider  range  of  subjects  for  poetry— new  meters— enlarged  musical  scale. .  44 

Improvement  of  the  harp  by  Terpander— of  the  flute  by  Olympus  and  others  44 

Archilochus,  Kallinus,  Tyrtseus,  and  Alkman— G70-600  b.c 45 

New  meters  superadded  to  the  Hexameter— Elegiac,  Iambic,  Trochaic 45 

Archilochus 46 

Simonides  of  Amorgos,  Kallinus,  Tyrtaeus 47 

Musical  and  poetical  tendencies  at  Sparta 47 

Choric  training  — Alkman,  Thaletas     49 

Doric  dialect  employed  in  the  choric  compositions 50 

Arion  and  Stesichorus— substitution  of  the  professional  in  place  of  the 

popular  chorus 50 

Distribution  of  the  chorus  by  Stesichorus— Strophe,— Antistrophe,— Epodus  51 

Alkeeus  and  Sappho 51 

Gnomic  or  moralizing  poets 52 

Solon  and  Theognis 52 

Subordination  of  musical  and  orchestrical  accompaniment  to  the  words  and 

meaning 53 

Seven  Wise  Men 53 

They  were  the  first  men  who  acquired  an  Hellenic  reputation,  without 

poetical  genius 54 

Early  manifestation  of  philosophy— in  the  form  of  maxims 54 

Subsequent  growth  of  dialectics  and  discussion 65 

Increase  of  the  habit  of  writing — commencement  of  prose  compositions 55 

First  beginnings  of  Grecian  art 56 

Restricted  character  of  early  art  from  religious  associations 56 

Monumental  ornaments  in  the  cities— begin  in  the  sixth  century  b.o 67 

Importance  of  Grecian  art  as  a  means  of  Hellenic  union 67 

CHAPTER  XXX. 

Grecian  Affairs  during  the  Government  of  Peisistratus  and  his  Sons  at 

Athens. 

Peisistratus  and  his  sons  at  Athens— b.c.  5G0-510— uncertain  chronology  as  to 

Peisistratus 58 

State  of  feeling  in  Attica  at  the  accession  of  Peisistratus 69 

Retirement  of  Peisistratus,  and  stratagem  whereby  he  is  reinstated 69 

5 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  II. 


PAGE 

Quarrel  of  Peisistratus  with  the  Alkmaeonids— his  second  retirement 60 

His  second  and  final  restoration 60 

His  strong  government — mercenaries — purification  of  Delos 61 

Mild  despotism  of  Peisistratus 61 

His  sons  Hippias  and  Hipparchus 63 

Harmodius  and  Aristogeiton 63 

They  conspire  and  kill  Hipparchus,  B.C.  514 64 

Strong  and  lasting  sentiment,  coupled  with  great  historical  mistake,  in  the 

Athenian  public 64 

Hippias  despot  alone — 514-510  B.C.— his  cruelty  and  conscious  insecurity 65 

Connection  of  Athens  with  the  Thracian  Chersonesus  and  the  Asiatic  coast 

of  the  Hellespont 66 

First  Miltiades— cekist  of  the  Chersonese 66 

Second  Miltiades— sent  out  thither  by  the  Peisistratids 67 

Proceedings  of  the  exiled  Alkmaeonidse  against  Hippias 67 

Conflagration  and  rebuilding  of  the  Delphian  temple 68 

The  Alkmaeonidse  rebuild  the  temple  with  magnificence 68 

Gratitude  of  the  Delphian   toward  them — they  procure  from  the  oracle 

directions  to  Sparta,  enjoining  the  expulsion  of  Hippias 68 

Spartan  expeditions  into  Attica 69 

Expulsion  of  Hippias,  and  liberation  of  Athens 69 

CHAPTER  XXXI. 

Grecian  Apfatrs  after  the  Expulsion  of  the  Peisistratids.— Revolution 
of  Kleisthenes  and  Establishment  of  Democracy  at  Athens. 

State  of  Athens  after  the  expulsion  of  Hippias 70 

Opposing  party-leaders — Kleisthenes — Isagoras 70 

Democratical  revolution  headed  by  Kleisthenes 71 

Re-arrangement  and  extension  of  the  political  franchise.    Formation  of  ten 

new  tribes,  including  an  increased  number  of  the  population 71 

Imperfect  description  of  this  event  in  Herodotus— its  real  bearing 71 

Grounds  of  opposition  to  it  in  ancient  Athenian  feeling  72 

Names  of  the  tribes— their  relation  to  the  demes 73 

Demes  belonging  to  each  tribe  usually  not  adjacent  to  each  other 74 

Arrangements  and  functions  of  the  deme 75 

Solonian  constitution  preserved  with  modifications 75 

Change  of  military  arrangement  in  the  state.    The  ten  strategi  or  generals.  75 
The  judicial  assembly  of  citizens— or  Heliaea— subsequently  divided  into 

bodies  judging  apart.    The  political  assembly,  or  Ekklesia 76 

Financial  arrangements 

Senate  of  Five  Hundred 77 

Ekklesia,  or  political  assembly 

Kleisthenes  the  real  author  of  the  Athenian  democracy  

Judicial  attributes  of  the  people— their  gradual  enlargement 

Three  points  in  Athenian  constitutional  law,  hanging  together:— Universal 
admissibility  of  citizens— Choice  by  lot — Reduced  functions  of  the  magis- 
trates chosen  by  lot 80 

Universal  admissibility  of  citizens  to  the  archonship— not  introduced  until 

after  the  battle  of  Platsea 82 

Constitution  of  Kleisthenes  retained  the  Solonian  law  of  exclusion  as  to 

individual  office 88 

Difference  between  that  constitution  and  the  political  state  of  Athens  after 

Perikles 83 

Senate  of  Areopagus 84 

The  ostracism 84 

Weakness  of  the  public  force  in  the  Grecian  governments 86 

Past  violences  of  the  Athenian  nobles  89 

Necessity  of  creating  a  constitutional  morality 86 

Purpose  and  working  of  the  ostracism 8T 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  II. 


PAGB 

Securities  against  its  abuse 88 

Ostracism  necessary  as  a  protection  to  the  early  democracy — afterward 

dispensed  with 89 

Ostracism  analogous  to  the  exclusion  of  a  known  pretender  to  the  throne  in 

a  monarchy 90 

Effect  of  the  long  ascendency  of  Perikles  in  strengthening  constitutional 

morality 90 

Ostracism  in  other  Grecian  cities 91 

Striking  effect  of  the  revolution  of  Kleisthenes  on  the  minds  of  the  citizens.  92 

Isagoras  calls  in  Kleomenes  and  the  Lacedaemonians  against  it 92 

Kleomenes  and  Isagoras  expelled  from  Athens 93 

Recall  of  Kleisthenes — Athens  solicits  the  alliance  of  the  Persians 93 

First  connection  between  Athens  and  Plataea 93 

Disputes  between  Plataea  and  Thebes — decision  of  Corinth 94 

Second  march  of  Kleomenes  against  Athens— desertion  of  his  allies 94 

First  appearance  of  Sparta  as  acting  head  of  Peloponnesian  allies 95 

Signal  successes  of  Athens  against  Boeotians  and  Chalkidians 95 

Plantation  of  Athenian  settlers  or  Kleruchs  in  the  territory  of  Chalkis 96 

Distress  of  the  Thebans— they  ask  assistance  from  ^Sgina 97 

The  Mginetuns  make  war  on  Athens 97 

Preparations  at  Sparta  to  attack  Athens  anew — the  Spartan  allies  summoned, 

together  with  Hippias 98 

First  formal  convocation  at  Sparta— march  of  Greece  toward  a  political 

system 98 

Proceedings  of  the  convocation— animated  protest  of  Corinth  against  any 

interference  in  favor  of  Hippias— the  Spartan  allies  refuse  to  interfere 99 

Aversion  to  single-headed  rule — now  predominant  in  Greece 99 

Striking  development  of  Athenian  energy  after  the  revolution  of  Kleisthenes 

—language  of  Herodotus 100 

Effect  upon  their  minds  of  the  idea  or  theory  of  democracy 101 

Patriotism  of  an  Athenian  between  500-100  B.C. — combined  with  an  eager 

spirit  of  personal  military  exertion  and  sacrifice 108 

Diminution  of  this  active  sentiment  in  the  restored  democracy  after  the 

Thirty  Tyrants 108 

CHAPTER  XXXH. 

Rise  op  the  Persian  Empire. — Cyrus. 

State  of  Asia  before  the  rise  of  the  Persian  monarchy 103 

Great  power  and  alliances  of  Croesus 104 

Rise  of  Cyrus— uncertainty  of  his  early  history 104 

Story  of  Astyages  105 

Herodotus  and  Ktesias : 105 

Condition  of  the  native  Persians  at  the  first  rise  of  Cyrus 106 

Territory  of  Iran — between  Tigris  and  Indus 106 

War  between  Cyrus  and  Croesus  107 

Croesus  tests  the  oracles— triumphant  reply  from  Delphi— munificence  of 

Croesus  to  the  oracle .*. 108 

Advice  given  to  him  by  the  oracle 108 

He  solicits  the  alliance  of  Sparta 109 

He  crosses  the  Halys  and  attacks  the  Persians 109 

Rapid  march  of  Cyrus  to  Sardis 109 

Siege  and  capture  of  Sardis 110 

Crcasus  becomes  prisoner  of  Cyrus — how  treated 110 

Remonstrance  addressed  by  Croesus  to  the  Delphian  god 110 

Successful  justification  of  the  oracle  Ill 

Fate  of  Croesus  impressive  to  the  Greek  mind Ill 

The  Mcerse  or  Fates 112 

State  of  the  Asiatic  Greeks  after  the  conquest  of  Lydia  by  Cyrus 112 

They  apply  in  vain  to  Sparta  for  aid 113 


8  CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  II. 

PAGB 

Cyrus  quits  Sardis— revolt  of  the  Lydians  suppressed 113 

The  Persian  general  Mazares  attacks  Ionia— the  Lydian  Paktyas 114 

Harpagus  succeeds  Mazares— conquest  of  Ionia  by  the  Persians 115 

Fate  of  Phokaea 115 

Emigration  of  the  Phokseans  vowed  by  all,  executed  only  by  one-half 116 

Phoksean  colony  first  at  Alalia,  then  at  Elea 117 

Proposition  of  Bias  for  a  Pan-Ionic  emigration  not  adopted 118 

.  Entire  conquest  of  Asia  Minor  by  the  Persians 118 

CHAPTER  XXXm. 

Growth  of  the  Persian  Empire. 

Conquest  of  Cyrus  in  Asia 119 

His  attack  of  Babylon 120 

Difficult  approach  to  Babylon— no  resistance  made  to  the  invaders 120 

Cyrus  distributes  the  river  Gyndes  into  many  channels 121 

He  takes  Babylon,  by  drawing  off  for  a  time  the  waters  of  the  Euphrates. .  121 

Babylon  left  in  undiminished  strength  and  population 122 

Cyrus  attacks  the  3Iassagetas — is  defeated  and  slain 122 

Extraordinary  stimulus  to  the  Persians,  from  the  conquests  of  Cyrus 123 

Character  of  the  Persians 124 

Thirst  for  foreign  conquest  among  the  Persians,  for  three  reigns  after 

Cyrus 124 

Kambyses  succeeds  his  father  Cyrus— his  invasion  of  Egypt 1 25 

Death  "of  Amasis,  king  of  Egypt,"  at  the  time  when  the  Persian  expedition 

was  preparing— his  son  Psammenitus  succeeds 125 

Conquest  of  Egypt  by  Kambyses 125 

Submission  of  Kyrene  and  Barka  to  Kambyses— his  projects  for  conquering 

Libya  and  Ethiopia. disappointed 125 

Insults  of  Kambyses  to  the  Egyptian  religion 126 

Madness  of  Kambyses— he  puts  to  death  his  younger  brother,  Smerdis 126 

Conspiracy  of  the  Magian  Patizeithes,  who  sets  up  his  brother  as  king  under 

the  name  of  Smerdis 127 

Death  of  Kambyses  127 

Reign  of  the  false  Smerdis — conspiracy  of  the  seven  Persian  noblemen 

against  him— he  is  slain— Darius  succeeds  to  the  throne 127 

Political  bearing  of  this  conspiracy— Smerdis  represents  Median  preponder- 
ance, which  is  again  put  down  by  Darius 128 

Revolt  of  the  Medes— suppressed.    Discontents  of  the  satraps 129 

Revolt  of  Babylon 130 

Reconquered  and  dismantled  by  Darius 131 

Organization  of  the  Persian  empire  by  Darius 132 

Twenty  satrapies  with  a  fixed  tribute  apportioned  to  each 133 

Imposts  upon  the  different  satrapies 134 

Organizing  tendency  of  Darius— first  imperial  coinage— imperial  roads  and 

posts 135 

Island  of  Samos— its  condition  at  the  accession  of  Darius.    Polykrates 135 

Polykrates  breaks  with  Amasis,  king  of  Egypt,  and  allies  himself  with 

Ka  mbyses 136 

The  Saniian  exiles,  expelled  by  Polykrates.  apply  to  Sparta  for  aid.  137 

The  Lacedaemonians  attack  Samos,  but  are  repulsed 137 

Attack  on  Siphnos  by  the  Sarnian  exiles 138 

Prosperity  of  Polykrates 138 

He  is  slain  by  the"  Persian  satrap  Orcetes 139 

Maeandrius,  lieutenant  of  Polykrates  in  Samos— he  desires  to  establish  a  free 

government  after  the  death  of  Polykrates — conduct  of  the  Samians 139 

Maeandrius  becomes  despot.     Contrast  between  the  Athenians  and  the 

Samians 140 

Syloson,  brother  of  Polykrates,  lands  with  a  Persian  army  in  Samos— his 

history 141 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  IL 


PAGK 

Maeandrius  agrees  to  evacuate  the  island 141 

Many  Persian  officers  slain— slaughter  of  the  Samians 14:> 

Syloson  despot  at  Samoa 143 

Application  of  Maeandrius  to  Sparta  for  aid— refused 143 

CHAPTER  XXXTV. 

Demokedes.— Darivs  ikvades  Scythia. 

Conquering  dispositions  of  Darius 143 

Influence  of  his  wife  Atossa  144 

Demokedes— the  Krototiiate  surgeon — his  adventures— he  is  carried  as  a 

slave  to  Susa  144 

He  cures  Darius,  who  rewards  him  munificently 145 

He  procures .permission,  by  artifice  and  through  the  influence  of  Atossoa,  to 

return  to  Greece 145 

>  Darius  an  expedition  against  Greece — Demokedes  with 

some  Persians  is  sent  to  procure  information  for  him  146 

•  of  Demokedes  along  the  coast  of  Greece — he  stays  at  Kroton— fate 

of  his  Persian  companions    ." 147 

Consequences  which  might   have  been  expected  to  happen  if  Darius  had 

then  undertaken  his  expedition  against  <  treece.  147 

Darius  marches  against  S<\  thia 14'J 

His  naval  force  formed  of  Asiatic  and  insular  Creeks 150 

He  directs  the  Greek-.  to  throw  a  bridge  over  the  Danube  and  crosses  the 

river 150 

He  marches  Into  Scythia— narrative  of  his  march  impossible  and  unintelli- 
gible, considered  as  history 151 

Tin-  description  of  his  march  i-  rather  to  be  looked  upon  as  a  fancy  picture, 

Illustrative  of  Scythian  warfare i"i 

Poetical  grouping  of  the  Scythians  and  their  neighbors  by  Hit...  lot  us 152 

Strong  Impression  produced  upon  the  imagination  of  Herodotus  by  the  Scy- 
thians    " 153 

Orders  given  by  Darius  to  the  [onians  at  the  bridge  over  the  Danube 153 

The  Iomans  left  in  guard  of  the  bridge;  their  conduct  when  Darius'a  return 

is  delayed 155 

The  Ionion  despots  preserve  the  bridge  and  enable  Darius  to  recross  the 

river,  as  a  means  of  support  to  their  own  'loin  in  ion  at  home 155 

Opportunity  lost  of  emancipation  from  the  Persians  156 

Conquest  of  Thrace  bj  the  Persians  as  far  as  the  river  Strymon — Myrkinus 

near  that  river  riven  to  Histiseus  ". 156 

Macedonians and  Paeonian-  conquered  by  ftfegabazus 157 

Insolence  and  murder  of  the  Persian  envoi  a  in  Macedonia 157 

Histiauis  founds  a  prosperous  colony  at  Myrkinus — Darius  sends  for  him 

into  Asia 157 

(  ttanes  Persian  general  on  the  Hellespont— he  conquers  the  Pelasgian  popu- 
lation of  Lemnos,  Imbros.  etc 157 

Lemnos  and  Dnbros  captured  by  the  Athenians  and  Miltiades 158 

CHAPTER  XXXV. 

Ionic  Revolt. 

Darius  carries  Histiaeus  to  Susa  159 

Application  of  the  banished  Hippias  to  Artaphernes,  satrap  of  Sardis 160 

State  of  the  island  of  Naxos— Xaxian  exiles  solicit  aid  from  Aristagoras  of 

Miletus 100 

Expedition  against  Naxos,  undertaken  by  Aristagoras  with  the  assistance 

of  Artaphernes  the  satrap 161 

Its  failure  through  dispute  between  Aristagoras  and  the  Persian  general 

llegates  161 


10  CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  IL 

PAOH 

Alarm  of  Aristagoras— he  determines  to  revolt  against  Persia— instigation 

to  the  same  effect  from  Histiaeus 161 

Revolt  of  Aristagoras  and  the  Milesians— the  despots  in  the  various  cities 

deposed  and  seized 162 

Extension  of  the  revolt  throughout  Asiatic  Greece — Aristagoras  goes  to 

solicit  aid  from  Sparta 163 

Refusal  of  the  Spartans  to  assist  him  164 

Aristagoras  applies  to  Athens— obtains  aid  both  from  Athens  and  Eretria. .  164 
March  of  Aristagoras  up  to  Sardis  with  the  Athenian  and  Eretrian  allies- 
burning  of  the  town— retreat  and  defeat  of  these  Greeks  by  the  Persians.  165 

The  Athenians  abandon  the  alliance 16fi 

Extension  of  the  revolt  to  Cyprus  and  Byzantium 166 

Phenician  fleet  called  forth  by  the  Persians 166 

Persian  and  Phenician  armament  sent  against  Cyprus — the  Ionians  sent  aid 

thither — victory  of  the  Persians— they  reconquer  the  island 167 

Successes  of  the  Persians  against  the  revolted  coast  of  Asia  Minor 167 

Aristagoras  loses  courage  and  abandons  the  country : 168 

Appearance  of  Histiaeus,  who  had  obtained  leave  of  departure  from  Susa.  169 

Histiaeus  suspected  by  Artaphernes— flees  to  Chios 170 

He  attempts  in  vain  to  procure  admission  into  Miletus— puts  himself  at  the 

head  of  a  small  piratical  squadron 170 

Large  Persian  force  assembled,  aided  by  the  Phenician  fleet,  for  the  siege 

of  Miletus 171 

The  allied  Grecian  fleet  mustered  at  Lade 171 

Attempts  of  the  Persians  to  disunite  the  allies,  by  means  of  the  exiled 

despots 171 

Want  of  command  and  discipline  in  the  Grecian  fleet 172 

Energy  of  the  Phoka>an  Dionysius— he  is  allowed  to  assume  the  command.  172 

Discontent  of  the  Grecian  crews— they  refuse  to  act  under  Dionysius 172 

Contrast  of  this  incapacity  of  the  Ionic  crews  with  the  subsequent  severe 

discipline  of  the  Athenian  seamen 173 

Disorder  and  mistrust  grow  up  in  the  fleet— treachery  of  the  Samian  cap- 
tains    173 

Complete  victory  of  the  Persian  fleet  at  Lade— ruin  of  the  Ionic  fleet^severe 

loss  of  the  Chians 174 

Voluntary  exile  and  adventures  of  Dionysius 174 

Siege,  capture,  and  ruin  of  Miletus  by  the  Persians 175 

The  Phenician  fleet  reconquers  all  the  coast  towns  and  islands 175 

Narrow  escape  of  Miltiades  from  their  pursuit 175 

Cruelties  of  the  Persians  after  the  reconquest 176 

Movements  and  death  of  Histiaeus 176 

Sympathy  and  terror  of  the  Athenians  at  the  capture  of  Miletus— the  tragic 
writer  Phrynichus  is  fined 177 

CHAPTER  XXXVI. 

From  Ionic  Revolt  to  Battle  of  Marathon. 

Proceedings  of  the  satrap  Artaphernes  after  the  reconquest  of  Ionia 178 

Mardonius  comes  with  an  army  into  Ionia — he  puts  down  the  despots  in  the 

Greek  cities 179 

He  marches  into  Thrace  and  Macedonia — his  fleet  destroyed  by  a  terrible 

storm  near  Mount  Athos— he  returns  into  Asia 179 

Island  of  Thasos — prepares  to  revolt  from  the  Persians — forced  to  submit. .  180 
Preparations  of  Darius  for  invading  Greece — he  sends  heralds  round  the 

Grecian  towns  to  demand  earth  and  water — many  of  them  submit 180 

.3Sgina  among  those  towns  which  submitted — state  and  relations  of  this 

island 181 

Heralds  from  Darius  are  put  to  death  both  at  Athens  and  Sparta 181 

Effects  of  this  act  in  throwing  Sparta  into  a  state  of  hostility  against  Persia  182 
The  Athenians  appeal  to  Sparta,  in  consequence  of  the  medism  of  ^Egina . .  182 


CONTENTS   OF  VOL.   IL  \\ 

PAGE 

Interference  of  Sparta— her  distinct  acquisition  and  acceptance  of  the  lead- 
ership of  Greece 182 

One  condition  of  recognized  Spartan  leadership  was— the  extreme  weakness 

of  Argos  at  this  moment 183 

Victorious  war  of  Sparta  against  Argos \<\ 

Destruction  of  the  Argeians  by  Kleomenes  in  the  grove  of  the  hero  Argus.  184 

Kleomenes  returns  without  having  attacked  Argos 184 

He  is  tried— his  peculiar  mode  of  defense— acquitted 185 

Argos  unable  to  interfere  with  Sparta  In  the  affair  of  iEgina  and   in  her 

presidential  power  185 

Kleomenes  goes  to  ..•Egina  to  seize  the  medizing  leaders— resistance  made 

to  him,  at  the  instigation  of  his  colleague  Demaratus 186 

Demaratus  deposed,  and  Leotychides  chosen  King,  by  the  intrigues  of  Kleo- 
menes    187 

Demaratus  leaves  Sparta  and  goes  to  Darius 187 

Kleomenes  and  Leotychides  go  to  .Egina,  seize  ten  hostages,  and  convey 

them  as  prisoners  to  Athens 188 

Important  effect  of  this  proceeding  npon  the  result  of  the  first  Persian  inva- 
sion of  Greece 188 

Assemblage  of  the  vast  Persian  armament  under  Datisal  Samoa 188 

He  crosses  the  -Hgean— carries  the  island  of  Naxos  without   resistance — 

respects  Delos 189 

He  reaches  Euboea— siege  and  capture  of  Eretria    190 

Datis  lands  at  Marathon   191 

Existing  condition  and  character  of  the  Athenians  191 

Miltiades— his  adventures— chosen  one  of  the  ten  generals  in  the  year  in 

which  the  Persians  landed  at  Marathon 192 

Themistokles 193 

Aristeides 195 

Miltiades,  Aristeides,  and  perhaps  Themistokles,  were  among  the  ten  Strat- 

egiin490B.c  196 

The  Athenians  ask  aid  from  Sparta— delay  of  the  Spartans 197 

Difference  of  opinion  among  the  ten  generals— five  of  them  recommend  an 

immediate  battle,  the  other  five  are  adverse  to  it     197 

Urgent  instances  of  Miltiades  in  favor  of  an  immediate  battle — casting-vote 

of  the  polemarch  determines  it 198 

March  or  the  Athenians  to  Marathon— the  Plataeans  spontaneously  join 

them  there 198 

Numbers  of  the  armies 199 

Locality  of  Marathon 199 

Battle  of  Marathon— rapid  charge  of  Miltiades— defeat  of  the  Persians 200 

Loss  on  both  sides 201 

Ulterior  plans  of  the  Persians  against  Athens— party  in  Attica  favorable  to 

them 202 

Rapid  march  of  Miltiades  back  to  Athens  on  the  day  of  the  battle 202 

The  Persians  abandon  the  enterprise,  and  return  home 203 

Athens  rescued  by  the  speedy  battle  brought  on  by  Miltiades 203 

Change  of  Grecian  feeling  as  the  Persians — terror  which  the  latter  inspired 

at  the  time  of  the  battle  of  Marathon r 204 

Immense  effect  of  the  Marathonian  victory  on  the  feelings  of  the  Greeks — 

especially  of  the  Athenians  205 

Who  were  the  traitors  that  invited  the  Persians  to  Athens  after  the  battle- 
false  imputation  on  the  Alkmaeonids  205 

Supernatural  belief  connected  witli  the  battle— commemorations  of  it 206 

Return  of  Datis  to  Asia— fate  of  the  Eretrian  captives  207 

Glory   of    Miltiades— his   subsequent    conduct — unsuccessful    expedition 

against  Paros— bad  hurt  of  Miltiades 207 

Disgrace  of  Miltiades  on  his  return 208 

He  is  fined— dies  of  his  wound— the  fine  is  paid  by  his  son  Kimon 209 

Reflections  on  the  closing  adventures  of  the  life  of  Miltiades 210 


n 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  IL 


PAGE 

Fickleness  and  ingratitude  imputed  to  the  Athenians— how  far  they  deserve 

the  charge 210 

Usual  temper  of  the  Athenian  dikasts  in  estimating  previous  services 212 

Tendency  of  eminent  Greeks  to  be  corrupted  by  success 212 

In  what  sense  it  is  true  that  fickleness  is  an  attribute  of  the  Athenian  democ- 
racy   214 

CHAPTER  XXXVII. 

Ionic  Philosophers.—  Pythagoras.—  Kroton  and  Stbaris. 

Phalaris,  despot  of  Agrigentum 216 

Thales 216 

Ionic  philosophers — not  a  school  or  succession 217 

Step  in  philosophy  commenced  by  Thales 217 

Vast  problems  with  scanty  means  of  solution 218 

One  cause  of  the  vein  of  sckepticism  which  runs  through  Grecian  phi- 
losophy    218 

Thales— primeval  element  of  water  or  the  fluid 21 9 

Anaximander 219 

Problem  of  the  One  and  the  Many— the  Permanent  and  the  Variable 220 

Xenophanes — his  doctrine  the  opposite  of  that  of  Anaximander 221 

The  Eleatic  school.    Parmenides  and  Zeno,  springing  from  Xenophanes — 

their  dialectics— their  great  influence  on  Grecian  speculation : 222 

Pherekydes 222 

History  of  Pythagoras 223 

His  character  and  doctrines 224 

Pythagoras  more  a  missionary  and  schoolmaster  than  a  politician — his  poli- 
tical efficiency  exaggerated  by  later  witnesses 225 

His  ethical  training— probably  not  applied  to  all  the  members  of  his  order.  225 

Decline  and  subsequent  renovation  of  the  Pythagorean  order 226 

Pythagoras  not  merely  a  borrower,  but  an  original  and  ascendant  mind. — 

He  passes  from  Sanios  to  Kroton 226 

State  of  Kroton— oligarchical  government — excellent  gymnastic  training 

and  medical  skill 227 

Rapid  and  wonderful  effects  said  to  have  been  produced  by  the  exhorta- 
tions of  Pythagoras 228 

He  forms  a  powerful  club  or  society,  consisting  of  three  hundred  men 

taken  from  the  wealthy  classes  at  Kroton 228 

Political  influence  of  Pythagoras— was  an  indirect  result  of  the  constitution 

of  the  order 229 

Causes  which  led  to  the  subversion  of  the  Pythagorean  order 230 

Violences  which  accompanied  its  subversion 231 

The  Pythagorean  order  is  reduced  to  a  religious  and  philosophical  sect,  in 

which  character  it  continues 232 

War  between  Sybaris  and  Kroton 232 

Defeat  of  the  Sybarites,  and  destruction  of  their  city,  partly  through  the 

aid  of  the  Spartan  Dorians 233 

Sensation  excited  in  the  Hellenic  world  by  the  destruction  of  Sybaris.  Grad- 
ual decline  of  the  Greek  power  in  Italy 234 

Contradictory   statements   and    arguments    respecting   the   presence   of 

Doricus 234 

Herodotus  does  not  mention  the  Pythagoreans,  when  he  alludes  to  the  war 

between  Sybaris  and  Kroton 235 

Charondas,  lawgiver  of  Katana,  Naxos,  Zankle,  Rhegium,  etc 236 

CHAPTER  XXXVHI. 
From  the  Battle  op  Marathon  to  the  March  op  Xerxes  against  Greece. 

Resolutions  of  Darius  to  invade  Greece  a  second  time.    His  death 236 

Succeeded  by  his  son  Xerxes 887 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  II.  13 

FAGH 

Revolt  and  reconquest  of  Egypt  by  the  Persians 237 

Indifference  of  Xerxes  to  the  invasion  of  Greece — persons  who  advised  and 
instigated  him — persuasions  which  they  employed— prophecies  produced 

by  Onomakritus 237 

Xerxes  resolves  to  invade  Greece 238 

Historical  manner  and  conception  of  Herodotus 239 

Xerxes  announces  his  project  to  an  assembly  of  Persian  counselors — Mar- 

donius  and  Artabanus— the  evil  and  good  genius 240 

Xerxes  is  induced  by  Artabanus  to  renounce  his  project— his  repeated 

dreams — divine  command  to  invade  Greece '.  240 

Religious  conception  of  the  sequences  of  history — common  both  to  Persians 

and  Greeks 241 

Vast  preparations  of  Xerxes 242 

March  of  Xerxes  from  the  interior  of  Asia — collection  of  the  invading  army 
at  Sardis— his  numerous  fleet  and  large  magazines  of  provision  before- 
hand   243 

He  throws  a  bridge  of  boats  across  the  Hellespont 243 

The  bridge  is  destroyed  by  a  storm— wrath  of  Xerxes— he  puts  to  death  the 

engineers  and  punishes  the  Hellespont 244 

Remarks  on  this  story  of  the  punishment  inflicted  on  the  Hellespont;  there 

is  no  sufficient  reason  for  disbelieving  its  reality 244 

Reconstruction  of  the  bridge— description  of  it  in  detail 245 

Xerxes  cuts  a  ship-canal  across  the  isthmus  of  Mount  Athos 246 

Superior  intelligence  of  the  Phoenicians 246 

Employment  of  the  lash  over  the  workmen  engaged  on  the  canal— impres- 
sion made  thereby  on  the  Greeks 247 

Bridge  of  boats  thrown  across  the  Strymon ». .  247 

March  of  Xerxes  from  Sardis — disposition  of  his  army 248 

Story  of  the  rich  Eappadokian  Pythius— his  son  put  to  death  by  order  of 

Xerxes 248 

March  to  Abydos— respect  shown  to  Ilium  by  Xerxes 250 

Xerxes  and  his  army  cross  over  the  Hellespbntine  bridges 251 

March  to  Doriskus  in  Thrace  near  the  mouth  of  the  Hebrus — his  fleet  joins 

him  here 251 

Review  and  muster  on  the  plain  of  Doriskus— immense  variety  of  the  nations 

brought  together 251 

Numbering  of  the  army— method  employed 253 

Immense  and  incredible  totals  brought  out  by  Herodotus 253 

Comments  upon  the  evidence  of  Herodotus  and  upon  himself  as  witness 

and  judge 254 

Other  testimonies  about  che  number  of  the  Persians 255 

Xerxes  passes  in  revipvr  *ne  land  force  and  the  fleet  at  Doriskus — his  conver- 
sation with  the  Spartan  king  Demaratus 255 

March  of  Xerxe?  from  Doriskus  westward  along  Thrace — contributions 
levied  on  the  Grecian  towns  on  the  coast  of  Thrace — particularly  Thasus 

and  Abdera 256 

Xerxes  crosses  the  Strymon— marches  to  Akanthus— zeal  of  the  Akanthians 

in  regard  to  the  canal  of  Athos 257 

Marc  j  of  Xerxas  to  Therma — his  fleet  join  him  in  the  Thermaic  Gulf 257 

Favorable  prospects  of  the  invasion— zeal  of  the  Macedonian  prince  to  assist 
Xerxes 258 

CHAPTER  XXXTT, 

Proceedings  in  Greece  from  the  Battle  of  Marathon  to  the  time  of  the 
Battle  of  Thermopyl^:. 

Violent  proceedings  and  death  of  Kleomenes,  king  of  Sparta 858 

Complaint  of  the  vEginetans  at  Sparta  against  Kleomenes  and  Leotychides, 
on  the  subject  of  the  hostages  which  those  two  kings  had  taken  from 
JEgina 359 


14  CONTEXTS  OF  VOL.  II. 

PAGK 

The  Spartans  deliver  Leotyehides  to  the  -Eginetans.  who  require  him  to  go 

with  them  to  Athens,  toget  back  the  hostages 259 

Refusal  of  the  Athenians  to  give  up  the  hostages— reprisals  of  the  -Egine- 

tans X>9 

The  .Egtnetan  Xikodromus  lays  a  scheme  for  a  democratical  revolution  in 

JEgina.  in  concert  with  Athens — the  movement  fails 260 

Treatment  of  the  defeated  conspirators — sacrilege 860 

The  Athenians  land  a  force  in  _Egina — war  which  ensues 960 

Effect  of  this  war  in  inducing  the  Athenians  to  enlarge  their  military  force.  261 
Themistokles  and  .  -  the  chief  men  at  Athens — intense  rivalry  be- 
tween them— Banishment  of  the  lawer  by  ostracism 261 

Conversion  of  Athens  from  a  land  power  into  a  naval  power  proposed  and 

urged  bv  Themistokles 06J 

Views  and  long-sighted  calculations  of  Themistokles— he  was  at  this  time 

more  essential  to  his  country  than  Aristeides 262 

Fleet  of  Athens— the  salvation  of  Greece  as  well  as  of  herself 203 

Valuable  fund  now  first  available  to  Athens  from  the  silver-mines  of  Lau- 

rium  in  Attica 263 

Themistokles  prevails  upon  the  Athenian  people  to  forego  the  distribution 

of  this  fund,  and  employ  it  in  building  an  increased  number  of  ships 264 

Preparations  of  Xerxes— known  beforehand  in  Greece 264 

Heralds  from  Persia  to  demand  earth  and  water  from  the  Grecian  cities — 

many  of  them  comply  and  submit 264 

Pan-hellenic  congress  convened  jointly  by  Athens  and  Sparta  at  the  Isthmus 

of  Corinth. — Important  effect  on  Grecian  mind 265 

Effects  of  the  congress  in  healing  feuds  among  the  different  Greeks— espe- 
cially between  Athens  and  .Egina 265 

Alarm  and  mistrust  prevalent  throughout  Greece 266 

Terror  conveyed  in  the  reply  of  the  Delphian  oracle  to  the  Athenian  envoys.  266 
Sentence  of  the  oracle  frightful,  yet  obscure:  efforts  of  the  Athenians" to 

interpret  it :  ingenuity  and  success  of  Themistokles 267 

Great   and   genuine   Pan-hellenic  patriotism  of  the  Athenians— stronglv 

attested  bv  Herodotus,  as  his  own  judgment ".  263 

Unwillingness  or  inability,  on  the  part  of  a  large  proportion  of  Greeks,  to 

resist  the  Persians 263 

Ambiguous  neutrality  of  Argos 269 

Different  stories  current  in  Greece  about  Argos — opinion  of  Herodotus 269 

Refusal  or  equivocation  of  the  Kretans  and  Korkyrseans 270 

Mission  to  Gelon  at  Syracuse— his  reply 270 

Grecian  army  sent  into  Thessalv.  to  defend  the  defile  of  Tempe  against 

Xerxes 270 

On  arriving  thev  find  that  it  cannot  be  successfully  held  against  him, — and 

retire 871 

Consequences  of  this  retreat— the  Thessalians.  and  nearly  all  Hellas  north 

of  Kithseron,  either  submit  to  Xerxes,  or  waver 272 

CHAPTER  XL. 

Battles  op  Therjioptle  a>t>  Artemisit-m. 

Engagement  taken  by  the  confederate  Greeks  against  such  Greeks  as  joined 

the  Persians 272 

Resolution  taken  to  defend  Thermopvla?  as  well  as  the  adjoining  strait  of 

Eubcea 272 

Pass  of  Thermopylae  and  its  neighborhood 273 

The  Greeks  take  post  at  Thermopylae 274 

Leonidas.  king  of  Sparta,  conducts  the  force  thither— the  combined  fleet 

under  Eurybiades  occupy  the  Eubcean  strait 274 

Numbers  and  composition  of  the  force  of  Leonidas 275 

Phokians  and  Lokrians 275 


CONTEXTS  OF  VOL.  II.  15 

PAGE 

Olympian  and  Karneian  festivals — the  Greeks  could  not  bring  themselves  to 

postpone  these,  even  under  such  imminent  danger 276 

Path  over  Mount  CEta  by  which  Thermopylae  .might  be  evaded— Leonidas 
first  informed  of  it  on  reaching  the  spot^the  Phokians  engaged  to  defend 

it  276 

Numbers  and  composition  of  the  Greek  fleet  at  Artemisium 277 

Three   triremes  of  the   Grecian   fleet  sent  forward  as  scouts— their  first 

encounter  with  the  Persian  fleet 277 

Capture  of  these  three  triremes— panic  of  the  general  Grecian  fleet,  who 

abandon  Artemisium.  and  retire  to  Chalkis 278 

Imminent  danger  of  the  Greek  scheme  of  def  ense — they  are  rescued  by  a  ter- 
rific storm 278 

Movement  of  Xerxes  from  Therma .. 279 

He  arrives  with  his  army  in  the  Malian  territory,  close  upon  the  pass  of 

Thermopylae 279 

Advance  of  the  Persian  fleet — it  is  overtaken  by  a  destructive  storm  and 

hurricane  on  the  coast  of  Magnesia 279 

Immense  damage  inflicted  upon  it  by  the  storm 280 

Encouragement  occasioned  to  the  Greek  fleet — they  return  from  Chalkis  to 

Artemisium 280 

Delay  of  Xerxes  with  his  land  force  near  Trachis  281 

Impressions  of  Xerxes  about  the  defenders  at  Thermopylae — conversation 

with  Demaratus.  whom  he  will  not  believe ' 281 

Doubts  about  the  motives  ascribed  by  Herodotus  to  Xerxes 282 

First  attack  upon  Thermopylae— made  by  the  Median  troops — repulsed 282 

Kepeated  attacks,  by  the  best  troops  in  the  Persian  army,  all  repulsed  with 

slaughter ." 2>2 

Embarrassment  of  Xerxes — he  is  relieved  from  it  by  hearing  of  the  path 

over  the  mountain 2S2 

A  Persian  detachment  under  Hydarnes  march  over  the  mountain  path,  driv- 
ing away  the  Phokian  guard >83 

They  arrive  in  the  rear  of  Leonidas 283 

Debate  among  the  defenders  of  Thermopylae  when  it  became  known  that 

the  Persians  were  approaching  their  rear  283 

Resolution  of  Leonidas  to  stay  and  die  iu  the  pass 2S4 

The  three  hundred  Spartans,  together  with  the  Thespians,  remain  with 

Leonidas:  the  rest  or  the  detachment  retire 284 

Doubts  about  the  Theban  contingent 284 

Last  exploits  and  death  of  Leonidas  and  his  band 2S5 

Individuals  amongst  them  distinguished — scorn  exhibited  toward  Aristode- 

mus  who  did  not  fight  285 

Fate  of  the  Theban  contingent 286 

Depressions  of  Xerxes  after  the  combat — advice  given  to  him  by  Demara- 
tus—he  rejects  it     ". 286 

Proceedings  of  the  two  fleets,  at  Artemisium  and  Aphetae— alarm  among 
the  Grecian  fleet— Themistokles  determines  them  to  stay  and  fight,  at  the 

urgent  instance  of  the  Euboeans 287 

Dnportant  service  thus  rendered  by  Themistokles 288 

Confident  hopes  of  the  Persian  fleet — they^detach  a  squadron  to  sail  round 

Eubcea,  and  take  the  Greeks  in  the  rear.  * 288 

Sea-fight  off  Artemisium— advantage  gained  by  the  Greeks 2S9 

Second  storm— increased   damage  to  the  Persian  fleet,  and  ruin  to  the 

detachment  sent  round  Eubaea 289 

Renewed  sea-fight  off  Artemisium— indecisive— but  the  Greek  fleet  resolves 

to  retreat 290 

They  retreat  immediately  on  hearing  of  the  disaster  at  Thermopylae— they 

fo  to  Salamis 290 
vance  of  the  Persian  fleet  to  Euboea— maneuvers  ascribed  to  Xerxes  in 

respect  to  the  dead  bodies  at  Thermopylas 291 

Numbers  of  dead  on  both  sides.    Subsequent  commemorating  inscriptions.  991 
Dnpressive  epigram  of  Simonides 293 


16  CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  H. 


CHAPTER  XLI. 

Battle  op  Salamis.— Retreat  of  Xerxes. 

PAGE 

Surprise  and  terror  of  the  Greeks  immediately  after  the  battle  of  Ther- 
mopylae    292 

No  ulterior  plan  of  defense  formed— no  new  position  to  be  found  capable  of 
defending  Attica — the  Peloponnesians  crowd  to  fortify  the  Isthmus  of 
Corinth 293 

Hopeless  situation  of  the  Athenians— no  measures  yet  taken  to  remove  their 
families  from  Attica 294 

The  Athenians  abandon  Attica,  removing  their  families  and  property  to  Sal- 
amis,  JEg'ma,,  Trcezen,  etc 294 

Unavoidable  hurry  and  sufferings  of  the  emigrants 295 

Energy  of  the  Athenians,  and  unanimity  of  the  leaders — Themistokles  pro- 
poses the  restoration  of  Aristeides  from  exile 295 

Numbers  and  composition  of  the  combined  Greek  fleet  at  Salamis 296 

Xerxes  occupies  Athens  and  Attica — the  Persian  fleet  enters  the  road  of 
Phalerum 296 

The  Persian  army  ravage  the  Phokian  townships  in  their  march  from  Ther- 
mopylae to  Attica— pillage  of  the  temple  at  Abae 297 

Persian  division  detached  against  the  Temple  of  Delphi 297 

Failure,  flight,  and  ruin  of  the  detachment . . 298 

Xerxes  with  the  Peisistratids  in  Athens — the  Acropolis  holds  out— is  taken 
and  sacked 298 

Atoning  visit  of  the  Peisistratids  to  the  ruined  Acropolis 299 

Xerxes  reviews  his  fleet  at  Phalerum— debate  about  the  policy  of  fighting  a 
naval  battle  of  Salamis— prudent  counsel  of  Queen  Artemisia 300 

Resolution  taken  by  Xerxes  to  fight  at  Salamis 300 

Dissensions  among  the  Greeks  in  the  fleet  at  Salamis.  Resolution  taken  to 
remove  the  fleet  to  the  Isthmus 301 

Ruinous  consequences  if  that  resolution  had  been  executed 301 

Themistokles  opposes  the  resolution,  persuades  Eurybiades  and  prevails 
upon  him  to  reopen  the  debate 302 

Synod  of  Grecian  chiefs  again  convened — Themistokles  tries  to  get  the  for- 
mer resolution  rescinded — the  Peloponnesians  adhere  to  it — angry  words.  303 

Menace  of  Themistokles  to  retire  with  the  Athenian  squadron,  unless  a  bat- 
tle were  to  be  fought  at  Salamis— Eurybiades  takes  upon  him  to  adopt 
this  measure 303 

The  Peloponnesian  chiefs,  silenced  for  the  moment,  afterward  refuse 
obedience.  Third  synod  convened — renewed  disputes;  the  majority 
opposed  to  Themistokles  and  determined  on  retreating  to  the  Isthmus. . .  304 

Desperate  stratagem  of  Themistokles — he  sends  a  private  message  across 
to  Xerxes,  persuading  him  to  surround  the  Greek  fleet  in  the  night,  and 
thus  render  retirement  impossible 304 

Impatient  haste  of  Xerxes  to  prevent  any  of  the  Greeks  from  escaping— 
his  fleet  incloses  the  Greeks  during  the  night 305 

Aristeides  comes  in  the  night  to  the  Greek  fleet  from  ^Egina— informs  the 
chiefs  that  they  are  inclosed  by  the  Persians,  and  that  escape  has  become 
impossible 305 

Position  of  Xerxes— order  of  the  fleets  and  plan  of  attack 306 

Battle  of  Salamis — confusion  and  complete  defeat  of  the  Persians 307 

Distinguished  gallantry  of  Queen  Artemisia 308 

Expectations  of  the  Greeks  that  the  conflict  would  be  renewed— fears  of 
Xerxes  for  his  own  personal  safety— he  sends  his  fleet  away  to  Asia 309 

Xerxes  resolves  to  go  back  himself  to  Asia— advice  and  recommendation  of 
Mardonius,  who  is  left  behind  as  general  to  finish  the  conquest  of  Greece.  310 

The  Greeks  pursue  the  Persian  fleet  as  far  as  Andros— second  stratagem  of 
Themistokles  by  secret  message  of  Xerxes 31 1 

Themistokles  with  the  fleet— levying  money  in  the  Cyclades 312 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  II. 


17 


PAGE 

Xerxes  evacuates  Attica  and  returns  home  by  land,  with  the  larger  portion 
of  his  army 312 

Retreating  march  of  Xerxes  to  the  Hellespont — sufferings  of  his  troops. 
He  finds  the  bridge  broken,  and  crosses  the  strait  on  shipboard  into  Asia.  312 

Joy  of  the  Greeks — distribution  of  honors  and  prizes 313 

Honors  rendered  to  Themistokles 314 

CHAPTKR  XLII. 
Battles  of  Plat^a  and  Myk  ale. --Final  Repulse  of  the  Persians. 

The  Persian  fleet,  after  retiring  from  Greece,  winters  at  Kyme,  and  collects 
in  the  spring  at  Samos 314 

The  Greek  fleet  assembles  in  the  spring  at  iEgina 315 

General  adherence  of  the  Medizmg  Greeks  to  Mardonius— revolt  of  Poti- 
daea — which  is  besieged  in  vain  by  Artabazus 315 

Mardonius,  after  wintering  in  Thessaly,  resumes  operations  in  the  spring 
in  Bceotia.    He  consults  the  Boeotian  oracles 316 

Mardonius  sends  Alexander  of  Macedon  to  Athens,  to  offer  the  most  honor- 
able terms  of  peace 316 

Temptations  to  Athens  to  accept  this  offer— fear  of  the  Lacedaemonians 
that  she  woukl  accept  it— Lacedemonian  envoys  sent  to  Athens  to  pre- 
vent it 317 

Resolute  reply  of  the  Athenians,  and  determination  to  carry  on  the  war,  in 
spite  of  great  present  suffering 317 

Selfish  indifference  displayed  by  Sparta  and  the  Peloponnesians  toward 
Athens 317 

The  Spartans,  having  fortified  the  Isthmus,  leave  Attica  undefended:  Mar- 
donius occupies  Athens  a  second  time  318 

Second  migration  of  the  Athenians  to  Salamis— their  bitter  disappointment 
and  anger  against  Sparta  for  deserting  them 318 

Second  offer  of  Mardonius  to  the  Athenians — again  refused — intense  resolu- 
tion which  they  display 319 

Remonstrance  sent  by  the  Athenians  to  Sparta— ungenerous  slackness  of 
the  Spartans 319 

Large  Spartan  force  collected  under  Pausanias  at  the  Isthmus 320 

Mardonius,  after  ravaging  Attica,  retires  into  Boeotia  320 

Discouragement  in  the  army  of  Mardonius  generally:  Thersander  of  Orcho- 
menus  at  the  banquet:  jealousies  between  Mardonius  and  Artabazus,  the 
second  in  command — zeal  and  eagerness  of  the  Thebans 321 

Numbers  of  the  Greeks  collected  under  Pausanias 823 

March  of  Pausanias  over  Kithseron  into  Boeotia 323 

He  is  attacked  by  the  Persian  cavalry  under  Masistius.  and  much  har- 
assed—superior efficiency  of  the  Athenians  against  cavalry— Masistius  is 
slain 324 

The  Greeks  quit  the  protection  of  the  mountain-grounds  and  take  up  a 
position  nearer  to  Platrea,  along  the  Asopus 324 

Mardonius  alters  his  position,  and  posts  himself  nearly  opposite  to  the 
Greeks  on  the  other  side  of  the  Asopus . .  «■. 325 

Unwillingness  of  both  armies  to  begin  the  attack— the  prophets  on  both 
sides  discourage  first  aggression 3i5 

Mardonius  annoys  the  Greeks  with  his  cavalry,  and  cuts  off  their  supplies 
in  the  rear 326 

Impatience  of  Mardonius— in  spite  of  the  reluctance  of  Artabazus  and  other 
officers  he  determines  on  a  general  attack:  he  tries  to  show  that  the 
prophecies  are  favorable  to  him 327 

His  intention  communicated  to  the  Athenians  in  the  night  by  Alexander  of 
Macedon 827 

Pausanias  changes  places  in  the  line  between  the  Spartans  and  Athenians. .  328 

Mardonius  again  attacks  them  with  his  cavalry 828 


18  CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  H 

PAGE 

In  consequence  of  the  annoyance  of  the  Persian  cavalry,  Pausanias  deter- 
mines to  move  in  the  night  into  the  Island 329 

Confusion  of  the  Grecian  army  in  executing  this  night-movement 329 

Refusal  of  the  Spartan  lochage  Amompharetus  to  obey  the  order  for  the 

night-march 330 

Mistrust  of  Pausanias  and  the  Spartans,  exhibited  by  the  Athenians 330 

Pausanias  moves  without  Amompharetus,  who  speedily  follows  him 331 

Astonishment  of  Mardonius  on  discovering  that  the  Greeks  had  retreated 
during  the  night— he  pursues  and  attacks  them  with  disorderly  impa- 
tience     831 

Battle  of  Plataea 332 

Great  personal  bravery  of  the  Persians— they  are  totally  defeated,  and  Mar- 
donius slain 332 

The  Athenians  on  the  left  wing  defeat  the  Thebans 83J 

Artabazus,  with  a  large  Persian  corps,  abandons  the  contest  and  retires  out 
of  Greece— the  rest  of  the  Persian  army  take  up  their  position  in  the  forti- 
fied camp 333 

Small  proportion  of  the  armies  on  each  side  which  really  fought 333 

The  Greeks  attack  and  carry  the  fortified  camp 334 

Loss  on  both  sides 334 

Funeral  obsequies  by  the  Greeks— monuments— dead  body  of  Mardonius— 

distribution  of  booty  335 

Pausanias  summons  Thebes,  requiring  the  surrender  of  the  leaders— these 

men  give  themselves  up,  and  are  put  to  death 338 

Honors  and  distinctions  among  the  Greek  warriors 337 

Reverential  tribute  of  Plataea,  as  the  scene  of  the  victory,  and  to  the  Pla- 
teeans:  solemnities  decreed  to  be  periodically  celebrated  by  the  latter,  in 

honor  of  the  slain 338 

Permanent  Grecian  confederacy  decreed  by  the  victors  to  hold  meetings  at 

Plataea 338 

Proceedings  of  the  Grecian  fleet:  it  moves  to  the  rescue  of  Samos  from  the 

Persians 339 

The  Persian  fleet  abandons  Samos  and  retires  to  Mykale  in  Ionia 339 

Mistrust  of  the  fidelity  of  the  Ionians  entertained  by  the  Persian  generals. .  340 
The  Greeks  land  to  attack  the  Persians  ashore— revelation  of  the  victory  of 
Plataea,  gained  by  their  countrymen  on  the  same  morning,  is  communi- 
cated to  them  before  the  battle 340 

Battle  of  Mykale— revolt  of  the  Ionians  in  the  Persian  camp— complete 

defeat  of  the  Persians 341 

Retirement  of  the  defeated  Persian  army  to  Sardis 342 

Reluctance  of  the  Spartans  to  adopt  the  continental  Ionians  into  their 
alliance — proposition  to  transport  them  across  the  Mgean  into  Western 

Greece— rejected  by  the  Athenians 34* 

The  Grecian  fleet  sails  to  the  Hellespont:  the  Spartans  return  home,  but  the 

Athenians  remain  to  attack  the  Chersonese 343 

Siege  of  Sestus — antipathy  of  the  Chersonesites  against  Artayktes  343 

Capture  of  Sestus— crucifixion  of  Artayktes 344 

Return  of  the  fleet  to  Athens 345 

CHAPTER  XLLH. 

Intents  in  Sicily  down  to  the  Expulsion  of  the  Gelonian  Dynasty  and  thj 
Establishment  of  Popular  Governments  throughout  the  Island. 

Agrigentum  and  Gela  superior  to  Syracuse  before  500  B.C.— Phalaris  despot 
of  Agrigentum 345 

Syracuse  in  500  b.c. — oligarchical  government  under  the  Gamori  or  privi- 
leged descendants  of  the  original  proprietary  colonists— the  Demos— the 
Kyllyrii  or  Serfs 346 

Early  governments  of  the  Greek  cities  in  Sicily — original  oligarchies  sub- 
verted in  many  places  by  despots— attempted  colony  of  the  Spartan  prince 
Dorieus % 346 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  H  19 

PAoa 

Kleander  despot  of  Gela — b.c.  about  500— First  rise  of  GeJo  and  JEneiside- 
mus  in  his  service.    Telines,  the  first  marked  ancestor  of  Gelo 347 

Gelo— in  high  command  among  the  mercenaries  of  Hippokrates  despot  of 
Gela  348 

Fate  of  the  Ionic  town  of  Zankle,  afterward  Messina— it  is  seized  by  the 
Samians — conduct  of  Hippokrates 348 

Hippokrates  is  victorious  over  the  Syracusans— takes  Kamarina— dies— Gelo 
becomes  in  Ms  place  despot  of  Gela 349 

Greatness  of  Gelo — he  gets  possession  of  Syracuse— and  transfers  the  seat 
of  his  power  from  Gela  to  Syracuse    350 

Conquest  of  various  Sicilian  towns  by  Gelo — he  transports  the  oligarchy  to 
Syracuse,  and  sells  the  Demos  for  slaves 351 

Increased  power  and  population  of  Syracuse  under  Gelo— it  becomes  the 
first  city  in  Sicily 351 

Power  of  Gelo  when  the  envoys  from  Sparta  and  Athens  came  to  entreat 
his  aid— B.C.  481 352 

Plans  of  Gelo  for  strengthening  Sicilian  Hellenism  against  the  barbaric 
interests  in  the  island 352 

Spartan  and  Athenian  envoys  apply  to  Gelo— his  answer 352 

Carthaginian  invasion  of  Sicily,  simultaneous  with  the  invasion  of  Greece 
by  Xerxes 353 

The  Carthaginian  army  under  Hamilkar  besiege  Hiinera— battle  of  Himera 
— complete  victory  gained  over  them  by  Gelo 354 

Supremacy  of  Gelo  in  Sicily — he  grants  peace  to  the  Carthaginians 355 

Conduct  of  Gelo  toward  the  confederate  Greeks  who  were  contending 
against  Xerxes 355 

Number  of  prisoners  taken  at  the  battle  of  Himera  and  distributed  among 
the  Carthaginian  cities— their  prosperity,  especially  that  of  Agrigentum. .  356 

Death  and  obsequies  of  Gelo ...  356 

Number  of  new  citizens  whom  Gelo  had  introduced  at  Syracuse 357 

Hiero,  brother  and  successor  of  Gelo  at  Syracuse— jealous  of  his  brother 
Polyzelus— harsh  as  a  ruler — quarrel  between  Hiero  of  Syracuse  and 
Thero  of  Agrigentum— appeased  by  the  poet  Simonides 357 

Severe  treatment  of  the  inhabitants  of  Himera  by  Thero 358 

Power  and  exploits  of  Hiero— against  the  Carthaginians  and  Tyrrhenians — 
against  AnaxiLaus — he  founds  the  city  of  ,-Etna— new  wholesale  trans- 
plantation of  inhabitants    compliments  of  Pindar 358 

Death  of  Anaxilaus  of  Rhegium,  aud  of  Thero  of  Agrigentum.  Thrasy- 
daeus,  son  of  Thero,  rules  Agrigentum  and  Himera.  His  cruel  govern- 
ment— he  is  defeated  by  Hiero  and  expelled  359 

( treat  power  of  Hiero  after  the  defeat  of  Thrasydseus— his  death 360 

Tbrasybulus,  brother  and  successor  of  Hiero— disputes  among  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Gelonian  familj  Cruelties  and  unpopularity  of  Thrasybulus 
— mutiny  against  him  at  Syracuse 860 

Expulsion  of  Thrasj  Indus,  and  extinction  of  the  Gelonian  dynasty 361 

Popular  government  established  in  all  the  Sicilian  cities — confusion  and 
disputes  arising  out  of  the  number  of  new  citizens  and  mercenaries 
domiciliated  by  the  Gelonian  princes 361 

Internal  dissensions  and  e  tmbats  in  Syracuse.  362 

Defeat  of  the  Gelonians— Syracuse  made  into  one  popular  government —  303 

Disorders  in  other  Sicilian  eities,  arising  from  the  return  of  exiles  who  had 
been  dispossessed  under  the  Gelonian  dynasty.    Katana  and  -.Etna 363 

General  congress  and  compromise — the  exiles  are  provided  for — Kamarina 
again  restored  as  a  separate  autonomous  city 363 

Reactionary  feelings  against  the  previous  despotism,  and  in  favor  of  popu- 
lar government,  at  Syracuse  and  in  the  other  cities 364 

Italiot  Greeks— destructive  defeat  of  the  inhabitants  of  Tarentum  and  of 
Rhejiom  364 


20       Vf  CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  JL 


CHAPTER  XLTV. 

From  the  Battles  of  Plat^ia  and  Mykale  down  to  the  Deaths  o» 
Themistokxes  and  Aristeides. 

PAOlB 

Causes  of  the  disgraceful  repulse  of  Xerxes  from  Greece— his  own  defects- 
inferior  quality  and  slackness  of  most  of  his  army.— Tendency  to  exag- 
gerate the  heroism  of  the  Greeks 366 

Comparison  of  the  invasion  of  Greece  by  Xerxes  with  the  invasion  of  Persia 
afterward  by  Alexander  the  Great. — No  improvement  in  warfare  among 
the  Persians  during  that  interval  of  150  years— great  improvement 
among  the  Greeks 865 

Progressive  spirit  in  Greece — operating  through  Athenian  initiative 366 

Conduct  of  Athens  in  the  repulse  of  the  Persians— her  position,  temper, 
and  influence,  after  that  event 366 

Proceedings  of  the  Athenians  to  restore  their  city— jealous  obstructions 
caused  by  the  Peloponnesians 36T 

Stratagem  of  Themistokles  to  procure  for  the  Athenians  the  opportunity  of 
fortifying  their  city 368 

Athens'f  ortified— confusion  of  the  Spartans— disappointment  of  the  allies . .  369 

Effect  of  this  intended,  but  baffled,  intervention  upon  Athenian  feelings 369 

Enlargement  of  The  walls  of  Athens 870 

Large  plans  of  Themistokles  for  the  naval  aggrandizement  of  the  city — 
fortined  town  and  harbor  provided  at  Peirseus — vast  height  and  thickness 
projected  for  the  walls 871 

Advantages  of  the  enlarged  and  fortified  harbor— increase  of  metics  and  of 
commerce  at  Athens 378 

Resolution  to  build  twenty  new  triremes  annually 373 

Expedition  of  the  united  Greek  fleet  against  Asia,  under  the  Spartan 
Pausanias — capture  of  Byzantium 378 

Misconduct  of  Pausanias— refusal  of  the  allies  to  obey  him — his  treasonable 
correspondence  with  Xerxes 373 

Pausanias,  having  assurances  of  aid  from  Xerxes,  becomes  more  intolerable 
in  his  behavior.    He  is  recalled  to  Sparta 374 

The  allies  transfer  the  headship  from  Sparta  to  Athens 875 

Importance  of  this  change  in  the  relations  of  the  Grecian  states 376 

Tendency  of  the  Spartan  kings  to  become  corrupted  on  foreign  service — 
Leotychides 377 

Momentary  Pan-Hellenic  union  under  Sparta,  immediately  after  the  repulse 
of  Xerxes— now  broken  up  and  passing  into  a  schism  with  two  distinct 
parties  and  chiefs,  Sparta  and  Athens  377 

Proceedings  of  Athens  in  her  capacity  of  leader— good  conduct  of  Aris- 
teides 378 

Formation  of  the  confederacy  of  Delos,  under  Athens  as  president— general 
meetings  of  allies  held  in  that  island 379 

Assessment  of  the  confederacy  and  all  its  members  made  by  Aristeides — 
definite  obligation  in  ships  and  money — money-total — Hellenotamiae 379 

Rapid  growth,  early  magnitude,  of  the  confederacy  of  Delos:  willing 
adhesion  of  the  members 380 

State  and  power  of  Persia  at  the  time  when  the  confederacy  of  Delos  was 
first  formed 381 

Conduct  of  Pausanias  after  being  removed  from  the  command — he  prose- 
cutes his  treasonable  designs  in  conjunction  with  Persia 881 

He  is  recalled  to  Sparta— imprisoned— put  on  his  trial— tries  to  provoke  the 
Helots  to  revolt 882 

He  is  detected  by  the  revelation  of  a  slave — incredulity  or  fear  of  the 
Ephors 888 

His  arrest  and  death— atonement  made  for  offended  sanctuary 38< 

Themistokles  is  compromised  in  the  detected  treason  of  Pausanias 885 

Position  of  Themistokles  at  Athens — tendency  of  Athenian  parties  and 
politics 885 


CONTENTS  OF  YOL.  IL  21 

PAGE 

Effect  of  the  events  of  the  Persian  war  upon  Athenian  political  sentiment — 

stimulus  to  democracy 386 

Alteration  of  th^  Kleisthenean  constitution— all  citizens  without  exception 
are  rendered  politically  admissible  to  office:  first,  universal  eligibility  and 

election  of  magistrates— next,  sortition  or  drawing  by  lot 386 

Increase  of  the  power  of  the  Strategi — alteration  in  the  functions  and  dimi- 
nution of  the  importance  of  the  Archons 3S7 

Administration  of  Athens  enlarged— new  functionaries  appointed— distribu- 
tion between  Athens  and  Peineus  388 

Political  career  and  precarious  tenure  of  Themistokles — bitter  rivals  against 

him — Kirnon,  Alkmaeon,  etc.— his  liability  to  charges  of  corruption 388 

Themistokles  is  charged  with  accepting  bribes  from  Persia — acquitted  at 

Athens 389 

Increased  bitterness  of  feud,  between  him  and  his  political  rivals,  after 

this  acquittal.    He  is  ostracized 390 

While  in  banishment  under  ostracism,  the  Lacedaemonians  prefer  a  charge 

of  treason  against  him 390 

Flight  and  adventures  of  Themistokles 391 

Themistokles  gets  over  to  Asia  and  seeks  refuge  with  the  Persian  king 393 

Stories  about  the  relations  between  the  Persian  king  and  Themistokles 392 

Real  treatment  of  Themistokles  in  Persia 393 

Influence  which  he  acquires  with  the  Persian  king  393 

Large  reward  which  he  receives— his  death  at  Magnesia 394 

Death  of  Aristeides — his  poverty 394 

CHAPTER  XLV. 

Proceedings  of  the  Confederacy  under  Athens  as  Head— First  Formation 
and  rapid  Expansion  of  the  Athenian  Empire. 

Consequence  of  the  formation  of  the  confederacy  of  Delos.— Bifurcation  of 

Grecian  politics  between  Sparta  and  Athens 395 

Distinction  betweeen  the  confederacy  of  Delos,  with  Athens  as  president  — 

and  the  Athenian  empire  which  grew  out  of  it 396 

Tendency  to  confuse  these  two,    and  to  impute  to   Athens  long-sighted 

plans  of  ambition 397 

The  early  years,  after  the  formation  of  the  confederacy  of  Delos.  were 
years  of  active  exertions  on  the  part  of  Athens.— Our  imperfect  knowl- 

ledge  of  them 397 

Necessity  of  continued  action  against  ttie  Persians  even  after  the  battles  of 
Plat  sea  and  Mykale.  This  necessity  was  the  cause  both  of  the  willing 
organization  of  the  confederacy  of  Delos,  and  of  the  maritime  improve- 
ment of  Athens 398 

Confederacy  of  Delos— sworn  to  by  all  the  members — perpetual  and  per- 
emptory—not allowing  retirement  nor  evasion 399 

Enforcing  sanction  of  Athens,  strictly  exercised,  in  harmony  with  the  gen- 
eral synod " 399 

Gradual  alteration  in  the  relations  of  the  allies— substitution  of  money- 
payment  for  personal  service,  demanded  by  the  allies  themselves,  suit- 
able to  the  interests  and  feelings  of  Athens 400 

Change  in  the  position  as  well  as  in  the  feelings  of  Athens 400 

Growing  unpopularity  of  Athens  throughout  Greece — causes  of  it 401 

Sj'nod  of  Delos — gradually  declines  in  importance  and  vanishes.  Superior 
qualities  and  merit  of  the  Athenians  as  compared  with  the  confederates 

of  Delos  generally 402 

Tribute  first  raised  by  the  synod  of  Delos— assessment  of  Aristeides 403 

Events  between  b.c.  476-466.    Eion — Skyros— Karystos 403 

Athens  as  guardian  of  the  ^Egean  sea  against  piracy — the  Hero  Theseus 403 

First  revolt  among  the  members  of  the  confederacy  of  Delos— Xaxos 
revolts  and  is  reconquered 404 


22  CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  II. 

PAGH 

Operations  of  Athens  and  the  confederacy  against  Persia.— Defeat  of  the 
Persians  by  Kimon  at  the  river  Euryrnedon 404 

Revolt  of  Thasos  from  the  confederacy  of  Delos.— Siege  of  Thasos  by  the 
Athenians  under  Kimon.— Mines  in  Thrace 405 

First  attempt  of  Athens  to  found  a  city  at  Ennea  Hodoi  on  the  Strymon 
above  Eion.    The  attempt  fails  and  the  settlers  are  slain 406 

Reduction  of  Thasos  after  a  blockade  of  two  years— it  is  disarmed  and  dis- 
mantled    406 

Application  of  the  Thasians  to  Sparta  for  aid— granted,  but  not  carried  into 
effect— glimpse  of  hostilities  between  Sparta  and  Athens 407 

Trial  and  acquittal  of  Kimon  at  Athens 407 

Great  increase  of  the  Athenian  power 407 

Proceedings  in  Central  Greece  between  470-164  B.C.  Thebes  and  the  Boeo- 
tian towns.    Discredit  of  Thebes 408 

Sparta  restores  and  upholds  the  supremacy  of  Thebes  over  the  lesser  Boeo- 
tian towns 408 

Events  in  Peloponnesus— Arcadia— Elis,  etc 409 

Terrible  earthquake  at  Sparta — 464  B.C.— Revolt  of  the  Helots 409 

The  Lacedaemonians  invoke  the  aid  of  their  allies  against  the  revolted 
Helots.— March  of  the  Athenians  under  Kimon  into  Laconia  to  aid  them . .  410 

Mistrust  conceived  by  the  Lacedaemonians  of  their  Athenian  auxiliaries, 
who  are  dismissed  from  Laconia.  Displeasure  and  change  of  policy  at 
Athens 410 

The  Athenians  renounce  the  alliance  of  Sparta,  and  contract  alliance  with 
Argos.    Position  of  Argos — her  conquest  of  Mykenas  and  other  towns 411 

Megara  becomes  allied  with  Athens.  Growing  hatred  of  Corinth  and  the 
neighboring  Peloponnesian  states  toward  Athens 412 

Energetic  simultaneous  action  of  the  Athenians — in  Cyprus,  Phoenicia, 
Egypt,  and  Greece — they  build  the  first  "  Long  Wall  "  from  Megara  to 
Nisa?a 413 

War  of  Athens  against  Corinth,  iEgina,  etc.  Total  defeat  of  the  iEginetans 
at  sea 413 

The  Athenians  besiege  iEgina— the  Corinthians,  Epidaurians,  etc.,  are 
defeated  by  the  Athenians  under  Myronides 414 

The  Long  Walls  between  Athens  and  Peiraeus  are  projected — espoused  by 
Perikles,  opposed  by  Kimon — political  contentions  at  Athens — importance 
of  the  Long  Walls 415 

Expedition  of  the  Lacedaemonians  into  Boeotia— they  restore  the  ascen- 
dency of  Thebes 416 

Intention  of  the  Spartan  army  in  Boeotia  to  threaten  Athens,  and  sustain 
the  Athenian  oligarchical  party  opposed  to  the  Long  Walls 417 

Battle  of  Tanagra— defeat  of  the  Athenians 417 

Effects  of  the  battle — generous  behavior  of  Kimon— he  is  recalled  from 
ostracism 418 

Compromise  and  reconciliation  between  the  rival  leaders  and  parties  at 
Athens 418 

Victory  of  CEnophyta  gained  by  the  Athenians— they  acquire  ascendency 
over  all  Bceotia,  Phokis,  and  Lokris 418 

Completion  of  the  Long  Walls— conquest  of  ^Egina,  which  is  disarmed,  dis- 
mantled, and  rendered  tributary 419 

The  Athenians  first  sail  round  Peloponnesus — their  operations  in  the  Gulf  of 
Corinth 419 

Defeat  and  losses  of  the  Athenians  in  Egypt 420 

The  revolted  Helots  in  Laconia  capitulate  and  leave  the  country 420 

Truce  for  five  years  concluded  between  Athens  and  the  Lacedaemonians, 
through  the  influence  of  Kimon.  Fresh  expeditions  of  Kimon  against 
Persia 421 

Death  of  Kimon  at  Cyprus— victories  of  the  Athenian  fleet — it  returns  home  421 

No  further  expeditions  of  the  Athenians  against  Persia — convention  con- 
cluded between  them 421 

JJistakes  and  exaggerations  respecting  this  convention— doubts  raised  as  to 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  n. 


PAGK 

Its  historical  reality.    Discussion  of  those  doubts— confirmatory  hints  of 

Thucvdides 422 

Thucydides,  son  of  Melesias,  succeeds   Kimon   as   leading  opponent   of 

Perikles 423 

Transfer  of  the  common  fund  of  the  confederacy  from  Delos  to  Athens. — 

Gradual  passage  of  the  confederacy  into  an  Athenian  empire 423 

Transfer  of  the  fund  was  proposed  by  the  Samians 424 

Position  of  Athens  with  a  numerous  alliance  both  of  inland  and  maritime 

states 424 

Commencement  of  reverses  and  decline  of  power  to  Athens 426 

Revolt  of  Boeotia  from  Athens — defeat  of  the  Athenians  at  Koroneia — they 

evai-uate  Boeotia 426 

Revolt  of  Phokis,  Lokris,  Euboea.  and  Megara:  invasion  of  Attica  by  the 

Peloponnesians  under  the  Lacedaemonian  king  Pleistoanax 427 

Euboea  reconquered  by  Perikles 428 

Humiliation  and  despondency  of  Athens.— Conclusion  of  the  thirty  years' 

truce — Diminution  of  Athenian  power 428 

Feud  between  Athens  and  Megara 429 

CHAPTER    XLVI. 
Constitutional  and  Judicial  Changes  at  Athens  under  Perikles. 

First  establishment  of  the  democratical  judicial  system  at  Athens 430 

Union  in  the  same  hands,  of  functions  ooth  administrative  and  judicial  in 
early  Athens— great  powers  of  the  magistrates,  as  well  as  of  the  senate 
of  Areopagus 430 

Magistrates  generally  wealthy  men— oligarchical  tendencies  <>f  the  senate 
or  Areopagus— increase  of  democratical  sentiment  among  the  bulk  of  the 
citizens 431 

Political  parties  in  Athens.  Perikles  and  Ephialtes,  democratical:  Kimon, 
oligarchical  or  conservative 431 

Democratical  Dikasteries  or  Jury  courts  constituted  by  Perikles  and  Ephi- 
altes.   How  these  Dikasteries  were  arranged 432 

Pay  to  the  Dikasts  introduced  and  made  regular 432 

The  magistrates  are  deprived  of  their  judicial,  and  confined  to  administra- 
tive functions 433 

Senate  of  Areopagus— its  antiquity— semi-religious  character— large  and 
undefined  controlling  power 433 

Large  powers  of  the  senate  of  Areopagus,  in  part  abused,  became  incon- 
sistent with  the  feelings  of  the  people  after  the  Persian  invasion.  New 
interests  and  tendencies  then  growing  up  a1  Athens 434 

Senate  of  Areopagus — a  centre  of  action  for  the  conservative  party  and 
Kimon 434 

Opposition  between  Kimon  and  Perikles— inherited  from  their  fathers — 
character  and  working  of  Perikles 435 

Reserved,  philosophical,  and  business-like  habits  of  Perikles— his  little 
pains  to  court  popularity— less  of  the  demagogue  than  Kimon 436 

Ephialtes  belonging  to  the  democratical  party",  and  originally  equal  to 
Perikles  in  influence.    Efforts  of  Ephialtes  against  magisterial  abuse  437 

Kimon  and  his  party  more  powerful  than  Ephialtes  and  Perikles,  until  the 
time  when  the  Athenian  troops  were  dismissed  from  Laconia.  Ostracism 
of  Kimon 487 

Measures  carried  by  Ephialtes  and  Perikles  to  abridge  the  power  of  the 
senate  of  Areopagus  as  well  as  of  individual  magistrates.  Institution  of 
the  paid  dikasteries 438 

Separation  of  judicial  from  administrative  functions 438 

Assassination  of  Ephialtes  by  the  conservative  party 438 

Commencement  of  the  great  ascendency  of  Perikles,  after  the  death  of 
Ephialtes.  Compromise  between  him  and  Kimon.  Brilliant  successes  of 
Athens,  and  era  of  the  maximum  of  her  power. 499 


24  CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  II. 

PAGE 

Other  constitutional  changes.— The  Nomophylakes 440 

The  Nomothetae— distinction  between  laws  and  psephisms  or  special 
decrees— process  by  which  laws  were  enacted  and  repealed 440 

Procedure  in  making  or  repealing  of  laws  assimilated  to  the  procedure  in 
judicial  trials 441 

Graphe  Paranomon— indictment  against  the  mover  of  illegal  or  unconstitu- 
tional propositions 442 

Working  of  the  Graphe  Paranomon.— Conservative  spirit  in  which  it  is 
framed.—  Restraint  upon  new  propositions,  and  upon  the  unlimited 
initiative  belonging  to  every  citizen 443 

Abusive  extension  of  the  Graphe  Paranomon  afterward 444 

It  was  often  used  as  a  simple  way  of  procuring  the  repeal  of  an  existing 
law — without  personal  aim  against  the  author  of  the  law 444 

Numbers  and  pay  of  the  dikasts,  as  provided  by  Perikles 445 

The  Athenian  democracy,  as  constituted  by  Perikles,  remained  substanti- 
ally unaltered  afterward  down  to  the  loss  of  Athenian  independence — 
excepting  the  temporary  interruptions  of  the  Four  Hundred  and  the  Thirty  445 

Working  of  the  numerous  dikasteries—  their  large  numbers  essential  to 
exclude  corruption  or  intimidation — liability  of  individual  magistrates  to 
corruption 446 

The  Athenian  dikasteries  are  Jury-trial  applied  on  the  broadest  scale — 
exhibiting  both  its  excellences  and  its  defects  in  an  exaggerated  form 447 

The  encomiums  usually  pronounced  upon  the  theory  of  jury-trial  would 
apply  yet  more  strongly  to  the  Athenian  dikasteries 448 

Imperfections  of  jury-trial— exaggerated  in  the  procedure  of  the  dikas- 
teries    449 

Powerful  effects  of  the  dikasteries  in  exercising  and  stimulating  the  intel- 
lect and  feelings  of  individual  citizens 450 

Necessity  of  learning  to  speak— growth  of  professional  teachers  of  rhetoric 
—professional  composers  of  speeches  for  others 451 

Rhetors  and  Sophists 451 

Polemics  of  Sokrates,  himself  a  sophist,  against  the  sophists  generally 453 

Sophists  and  rhetors  were  the  natural  product  of  the  age  and  of  the  democ- 
racy    452 

The  dikasteries  were  composed,  not  exclusively  of  poor  men,  but  of 
middling  aad  poorer  citizens  indiscriminately 453 

CHAPTER  XLVH. 

From  the  Thirty  Years'  Truce,  fourteen  years  before  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  War,  down  to  the  Blockade  of  Potidjba,  ra  the  year  before 
the  Peloponnesian  War. 

Personal  activity  now  prevalent  among  the  Athenian  citizens— empire  of 
Athens  again  exclusively  maritime,  after  the  Thirty  years'  truce 454 

Cnios,  Samos,  and  Lesbos  were  now  the  only  free  allies  of  Athens,  on  the 
same  footing  as  the  original  confederates  of  Delos — the  rest  were  subject 
and  tributary 454 

Athens  took  no  pains  to  inspire  her  allies  with  the  idea  of  a  common 
interest — nevertheless  the  allies  were  gainers  by  the  continuance  of  her 
empire 455 

Conception  of  Perikles — Athens,  an  imperial  city,  owing  protection  to  the 
subject-allies;  who  on  their  part  owed  obedience  and  tribute 456 

Large  amount  of  revenue  laid  by  and  accumulated  oy  Athens,  during  the 
years  preceding  the  Peloponnesian  war 457 

Pride  felt  by  Athenian  citizens  in  the  imperial  power  of  their  city 457 

Numerous  Athenian  citizens  planted  out  as  kleruchs  by  Perikles.  Cherso- 
nesus  of  Thrace.    Sinope 457 

Active  personal  and  commercial  relations  between  Athens  and  all  parts  of 
the  iEgean 458 

Amphipolis  in  Thrace  founded  by  Athens.    Agnon  is  sent  out  as  CEkist 450 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  II.  25 

PAGE 

Situation  and  importance  of  Amphipolis 459 

Foundation,  by  the  Athenians,  of  Thurii,  on  the  southern  coast  of  Italy 460 

Conduct  of  the  refugee  inhabitants  of  the  ruined  Sybaris — their  encroach- 
ments in  the  foundation  of  Thurii:  they  are  expelled,  and  Thurii  recon- 
stituted   460 

Herodotus  and  Lysias  —  both  domiciliated  as  citizens  at  Thurii.  Few 
Athenian  citizens  settled  there  as  colonists 461 

Period  from  445-431  B.C.  Athens  at  peace.  Her  political  condition.  Rivalry 
of  Perikles  with  Thucydides  son  of  Melesias 461 

Points  of  contention  between  the  two  parties.  1.  Peace  with  Persia.  2.  Ex- 
penditure of  money  for  the  decoration  of  Athens 463 

Defense  of  Perikles  perfectly  good  against  political  rivals 462 

Pan-Hellenic  schemes  and  sentiment  of  Perikles 468 

Bitter  contention  of  parties  at  Athens — vote  of  ostracism — Thucydides  is 
ostracized — about  443  b.c 464 

New  works  undertaken  at  Athens.  Third  Long  Wall.  Docks  in  Peirasus — 
which  is  newl}-  laid  out  as  a  town,  by  the  architect  Hippodamus  464 

Odeon,  Parthenon,  Propylsea.    Other  temples.    Statues  of  Athene 465 

Illustrious  artists  and  architects — Pheidias,  Iktinus.  Kalikrates 465 

Effect  of  these  creations  of  art  and  architecture  upon  the  minds  of  contem- 
poraries   466 

Attempt  of  Perikles  to  convene  a  general  congress  at  Athens,  of  deputies 
from  all  the  Grecian  states 46? 

Revolt  of  Sarin  is  from  the  Athenians  467 

Athenian  armament  against  Samos,  under  Perikles,  Sophokles  the  tragedian, 
etc 468 

Doubtful  and  prolonged  contest — great  power  of  Samos— it  is  at  last  recon- 
quered, disarmed,  and  dismantled   469 

None  of  the  other  allies  of  Athens,  except  Byzantium,  revolted  at  the  same 
time 469 

Application  of  the  Samians  to  Sparta  for  aid  against  Athens— it  is  refused 
chiefly  through  the  Corinthians  470 

Government  of  Samos  after  the  reconquest — ■ doubWuJ  whether  the  Athenians 
renewed  the  democracy  which  they  had  recently  established 470 

Funeral  oration  pronounced  by  Perikles  upon  the  Athenian  citizens  slain  in 
the  Saniian  war 470 

Position  of  the  Athenian  empire — relation  of  Athens  to  her  subject-allies— 
their  feelings  toward  her  generally  were  those  of  indifference  and  acquies- 
cence, not  of  hatred 471 

Particular  grievances  complained  of  in  the  dealing  of  Athens  with  her  allies  473 

Annual  tribute — changes  made  in  its  amount.  Athenian  officers  and  in- 
spectors throughout  the  empire 473 

Disputes  and  offenses  in  and  among  the  subject-allies,  were  brought  for 
trial  before  the  dikasteries  at  Athens 474 

Productive  of  some  disadvantage,  but  cf  preponderance  of  advantage  to  the 
subject-allies  themselves 474 

Imperial  Athens  compared  with  imperial  Sparta 475 

Numerous  Athenian  citizens  spread  over  the  ^Egean — the  allies  had  no 
redress  against  them,  except  through  the  Athenian  dikasteries 476 

The  dikasteries  afforded  protection  against  misconduct  both  of  Athenian 
citizens  and  Athenian  officers 477 

The  dikasteries,  defective  or  not,  were  the  same  tribunals  under  which 
every  Athenian  held  his  own  security 478 

Athenian  empire  was  affected  for  the  worse  by  the  circumstances  of  the 
Peloponnesian  war:  more  violence  was  introduced  into  it  by  that  war 
than  had  prevailed  before 479 

The  subject-allies  of  Athens  had  few  practical  grievances  to  complain  of 479 

The  Grecian  world  was  now  divided  into  two  great  systems:  with  a  right 
supposed  to  be  vested  in  each,  of  punishing  its  own  refractory  members.    480 

Policy  of  Corinth,  from  being  pacific,  becomes  warlike 480 

Disputes  arise  between  Corinth  and  Korkyra— c*ae  of  Epidamnus 480 


26  CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  II. 

pi.cn 

The  Epidamnians  apply  for  aid  in  their  distress  to  Korkyra  —  they  are 

refused— the  Corinthians  send  aid  to  the  place 481 

The  Korkyraeans  attack  Epidamnus— armament  sent  thither  by  Corinth 482 

Remonstrance  of  the  Korkyraeans  with  Corinth  and  the  Peloponnesians 483 

Hostilities  between  Corinth  and  Korkyra— naval  victory  of  the  latter 483 

Large  preparations  made  by  Corinth  for  renewing  the  war 484 

Application  of  the  Korkyraeans  to  be  received  among  the  allies  of  Athens. . .  485 

Address  of  the  Korkyraean  envoys  to  the  Athenian  public  assembly 485 

Principal  topics  upon  which  it  insists,  as  given  in  Thucydides  486 

Envoys  from  Corinth  address  the  Athenian  assembly  in  reply 487 

Decision   of  the  Athenians— a  qualified  compliance  with  the  request  of 

Korkyra.    The  Athenian  triremes  sent  to  Korkyra 487 

Naval  combat  between  the  Corinthians  and  Korkyraeans;  rude  tactics  on 

both  sides 488 

The  Korkyraeans  are  defeated 489 

Arrival  of  a  reinforcement  from  Athens — the  Corinthian  fleet  retires,  carry- 
ing off  numerous  Korkyrasan  prisoners 490 

Hostilities  not  yet  professedly  begun  between  Athens  and  Corinth 491 

Hatred  conceived  by  the  Corinthians  toward  Athens 492 

They  begin  to  stir  up  revolt  among  the  Athenian  allies — Potidaea,  a  colony 

of  Corinth,  but  ally  of  Athens 492 

Relations  of  Athens  with  Perdikkas,  king  of  Macedonia,  his  intrigues  along 
with  Corinth  against  her — he  induces  the  Chalkidians  to  revolt  from  her— 

increase  of  Olynthus 492 

Revolt  of  Potidaea— armament  sent  thither  from  Athens 493 

Combat  near  Potidaea  between  the  Athenian  force  and  the  allied  Corinthians, 

Potidseans,  and  Chalkidians.    Victory  of  the  Athenians 494 

Potidaea  placed  in  blockade  by  the  Athenians 495 

CHAPTER  XLVTH. 

From  the  Blockade  of  Potidaea  down  to  the  end  of  the  First  Year  of 
the  peloponnesian  war. 

State  of  feeling  in  Greece  between  the  Thirty  years'  truce  and  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  war — recognized  probability  of  war — Athens  at  that  time  not 
encroaching— decree  interdicting  trade  with  the  Megarians 496 

Zealous  importunity  of  the  Corinthians  in  bringing  about  a  general  war,  for 
the  purpose  of  preserving  Potidaea 497 

Relations  of  Sparta  with  her  allies— they  had  a  vote  thus  far— whether  they 
would,  or  would  not,  approve  of  a  course  of  policy  which  had  been  pre- 
viously resolved  by  Sparta  separately 497 

Assembly  of  the  Spartans  separately  addressed  by  envoys  of  the  allied 
powers,  complaining  that  Athens  had  violated  the  truce. .   498 

The  Corinthian  envoys  address  the  assembly  last,  after  the  envoys  of  the 
other  allies  have  inflamed  it  against  Athens 498 

International  customs  of  the  time,  as  bearing  upon  the  points  in  dispute 
between  Athens  and  Corinth-  Athens  in  the  right 498 

Tenor  of  the  Corinthian  address — little  allusion  to  recent  wrong — strong 
efforts  to  raise  hatred  and  alarm  against  Athens 499 

Remarkable  picture  drawn  of  Athens  by  her  enemies 499 

Reply  made  by  an  Athenian  envoy,  accidently  present  in  Sparta 501 

His  account  of  the  empire  of  Athens— how  it  had  been  acquired,  and  how  it 
was  maintained 501 

He  adjures  them  not  to  break  the  truce,  but  to  adjust  all  differences  by  that 
pacific  appeal  which  the  truce  provided 502 

The  Spartans  exclude  strangers,  and  discuss  the  point  among  themselves  in 
the  assembly 502 

Most  Spartan  speakers  are  in  favor  of  war.  King  Archidamus  opposes 
war.    His  speech 503 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  II.  27 

PAGE 

The  speech  of  Archidamus  is  ineffectual.  Short  but  warlike  appeal  of  the 
Ephor  Sthenelaidas 504 

Vote  of  the  Spartan  assembly  in  favor  of  war 505 

The  Spartans  send  to  Delphi — obtain  an  encouraging  reply 505 

General  Congress  of  allies  at  Sparta.  Second  speech  of  the  Corinthian 
envoy,  enforcing  the  necessity  and  propriety  of  war 505 

Vote  of  the  majority  of  the  allies  in  favor  of  war — B.C.  432 506 

Views  and  motives  of  the  opposing  powers 507 

The  hopes  and  confidence  on  the  side  of  Sparta,  the  fears  on  the  side  of 
Athens.  Heralds  sent  from  Sparta  to  Athens  with  complaints  and  requi- 
sitions: meanwhile  the  preparations  for  war  go  on 508 

Requisitions  addressed  by  Sparta  to  Athens — demand  for  the  expulsion  of 
the  Alkmaeonidae  as  impious — aimed  at  Perikles 508 

Position  of  Perikles  at  Athens:  bitter  hostility  of  his  political  opponents: 
attacks  made  upon  him.  Prosecution  of  Aspasia.  Her  character  and 
accomplishments 509 

Family  relations  of  Perikles— his  connection  with  Aspasia.  License  of  the 
comic  writers  in  their  attacks  upon  both 510 

Prosecution  of  Anaxagoras  the  philosopher  as  well  as  of  Aspasia — Anaxag- 
oras  retires  from  Athens— Perikles  defends  Aspasia  before  the  dikastery, 
and  obtains  her  acquittal 510 

Prosecution  of  the  sculptor  Pheidias  for  embezzlement — instituted  by  the 
political  opponents  of  Perikles.  Charge  of  peculation  against  Perikles 
himself ■ 511 

Probability  that  Perikles  was  never  even  tried  for  peculation,  certainly  that 
he  never  was  found  guilty  of  it 512 

Requisition  from  the  Lacedaemonians,  for  the  banishment  of  Perikles — 
arrived  when  Perikles  was  thus  pressed  by  his  political  enemies — rejected  512 

Counter-requisition  sent  by  the  Athenians  to  Sparta  for  expiation  of  sacri- 
lege    512 

Fresh  requisitions  sent  from  Sparta  to  Athens— to  withdraw  the  troops  from 
Potidasa— to  leave  ^Egina  free— to  readmit  the  Megarians  to  Athenian 
harbors 513 

Final  and  peremptory  requisition  of  Sparta — public  assembly  held  at  Athens 
on  the  whole  subject  of  war  and  peace 513 

Great  difference  of  opinion  in  the  assembly— important  speech  of  Perikles. .  513 

Perikles  strenuously  urges  the  Athenians  not  to  yield 514 

His  review  of  the  comparative  forces,  and  probable  chances  of  success  or 
defeat  in  the  war 514 

The  assembly  adopts  the  recommendation  of  Perikles — firm  and  determined 
reply  sent  to  Sparta 516 

Views  of  Thucydides  respecting  the  grounds,  feelings,  and  projects  of  the 
two  parties  now  about  to  embark  in  war 516 

Equivocal  period— war  not  yet  proclaimed— first  blow  struck  not  by  Athens 
but  by  her  enemies 517 

Open  violation  of  the  truce  by  the  Thebans— they  surprise  Plataea  in  the 
night 517 

The  gates  of  Plataea  are  opened  by  an  oligarchical  parly  within— a  Theban 
detachment  are  admitted  into  the  agora  Jit  night— at  first  apparently 
successful,  afterward  overpowered  and  captured 518 

Large  force  intended  to  arrive  from  Thebes  to  support  the  assailants  early 
in  the  morning — they  are  delayed  by  the  rain  and  the  swelling  of  the 
Asopus — they  commence  hostilities  against  the  Plataean  persons  and  prop- 
erty without  the  walls 519 

Parley  between  the  Plataeans  and  the  Theban  force  without— the  latter 
evacuate  the  territory — the  Theban  prisoners  in  Plataea  are  slain 520 

Messages  from  Plataea  to  Athens — answer 520 

Grecian  feeling,  already  predisposed  to  the  war,  was  wound  up  to  the  highest 
pitch  by  the  striking  incident  at  Plataea 521 

Preparations  for  war  on  the  part  of  Athens— intimations  sent  round  to  her 


28  CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  II. 

PAGE 

allies— Akarnanians  recently  acquired  by  Athens  as  allies— recent  capture 

of  the  Amphilochian  Argos  by  the  Athenian  Phormio 521 

Strength  and  resources  of  Athens  and  her  allies— military  and  naval  means 

—treasure 5£2 

Ample  grounds  for  the  confidence  expressed  by  Perikles  in  the  result 523 

Position  and  power  of  Sparta  and  the  Peloponnesian  allies— they  are  full  of 

hope  and  confidence  of  putting  down  Athens  speedily 523 

Efforts  of  Sparta  to  get  up  a  naval  force 524 

Muster  of  the  combined  Peloponnesian  force  at  the  isthmus  of  Corinth, 

under  Archidamus,  to  invade  Attica 524 

Last  envoy  sent  to  Athens— he  is  dismissed  without  being  allowed  to  enter 

the  town 525 

March  of  Archidamus  into  Attica— his  fruitless  siege  of  CEnoe 525 

Expectation  of  Archidamus  that  Athens  would  yield  at  the  last  moment. 
Difficulty  of  Perikles  in  persuading  the  Athenians  to  abandon  their  terri- 
tory and  see  it  all  ravaged 526 

Attica  deserted— the  population  flock  within  the  walls  of  Athens.  Hardships, 

privations,  and  distress  endured 527 

March  of  Archidamus  into  Attica.    Archidamus  advances  to  Acharnae, 

within  seven  miles  of  Athens 527 

Intense  clamor  within  the  walls  of  Athens — eagerness  to  go  forth  and  fight.  5<S 
Trying  position,  firmness,  and  sustained  ascendancy,  of  Perikles,  in  dissuad- 
ing them  from  going  forth 529 

The  Athenians  remain  within  their  walls:  partial  skirmishes  only,  no  gene- 
ral action 529 

Athenian  fleet  is  dispatched  to  ravage  the  coast  of  Peloponnesus— first 
notice  of  the  Spartan  Brasidas— operations  of  the  Athenians  in  Akarnania, 

Kephallenia,  etc 530 

The  Athenians  expel  the  ^Eginetans  from  JEgina,  and  people  the  island  with 

Athenian  kleruchs.    The  JEginetans  settle  at  Thyrea  in  Peloponnesus  . .     531 
The  Athenians  invade  and  ravage  the  Megarid :  suffering's  of  the  Megarians.  531 
Measures  taken  by  Athens  for  permanent  defense.— Sum  put  by  in  the 
acropolis,  against  urgent  need,  not  to  be  touched  unless  under  certain 
defined  dangers — capital  punishment  against  any  one  who  should  propose 

otherwise 539 

Remarks  on  this  decree 533 

Blockade  of  Potidaea— Sitalkes  king  of  the  Odrysian   Thracians—  alliance 

made  between  him  and  Athens 534 

Perikles  is  chosen  orator  to  deliver  the  funeral  discourse  over  the  citizens 

slain  during  the  year 535 

Funeral  oration  of  Perikles 535 

Sketch  of  Athenian  political  constitution,  and  social  fife,  as  conceived  by 

Perikles 536 

Eulogy  upon  Athens  and  the  Athenian  character 537 

Mutual  tolerance  of  diversity  of  tastes  and  pursuits  in  Athens 538 

It  is  only  true  partially  and  in  some  memorable  instances  that  the  state 

interfered  to  an  exorbitant  degree  with  individual  liberty  in  Greece 539 

Free  play  of  individual  taste  and  impulse  in  Athens — importance  of  this 

phenomenon  in  society 539 

Extraordinary  and  many-sided  activity  of  Athens 540 

Peculiar  and  interesting  moment  at  which  the  discourse  of  Perikles  was 
delivered.  Athens  now  at  the  maximum  of  her  power — declining  tendency 
commences  soon  afterward 541 

CHAPTER    XLIX. 

From  the  Beginning  of  the  Second  Year  down  to  the  End  of  the  Third 
Year  of  the  Peloponnesian  War. 

Barren  results  of  the  operations  during  the  first  year  of  war 543 

Second  invasion  of  Attica  by  the  Peloponnesians — more  spreading  and 
ruinous  than  the  first 543 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  H.  29 

PAGE 

Commencement  of  the  pestilence  or  epidemic  at  Athens 543 

Description  of  the  epidemic  by  Thucydides — his  conception  of  the  duty  of 

exactly  observing  and  recording 543 

Extensive  and  terrible  suffering  of  Athens 544 

Inefficacy  of  remedies— despair  and  demoralization  of  the  Athenians 545 

Lawless  recklessness  of  conduct  engendered 54tf 

Great  loss  of  life  among  the  citizens— blow  to  the  power  of  Athens 54J 

Athenian  armament  sent  first  against  Peloponnesus,  next  against  Potidaea 

— it  is  attacked  and  ruined  by  the  epidemic 547 

Irritation  of  the  Athenians  under  their  sufferings  and  losses — they  become 

incensed  against  Perikles— his  unshaken  firmness  in  defending  himself. ..  547 
Athenian  public  assembly— last  speech  of  Perikles— his  high  tone  of  self- 
esteem  against  the  public  discontent 548 

Powerful  effect  of  his  address— new  resolution  shown  for  continuing  the 

war— nevertheless,  the  discontent  against  Perikles  still  continues 549 

He  is  accused  and  condemned  in  a  fine 550 

Old  age  of  Perikles— his  family  misfortunes— and  stiff ering 550 

He  is  re-elected  Strategus— restored  to  power  and  to  the  confidence  of  the 

people 550 

Lust  moments  and  death  of  Perikles 551 

His  life  and  character 553 

Judgment  of  Thucydides  respecting  Perikles 55? 

Earlier  and  later  political  life  of  Perikles— how  far  the  one  differed  from  the 

other    553 

Accusation  against  Perikles   of   having  corrupted  the  Athenian  people — 

untrue  and  not  believed  by  Thucydides 554 

Great  progress  and  improvement  of  the  At  henians  under  Perikles 555 

Perikles  is  not  to  blame  for  the  Peloponnesian  war 556 

Operations  of  war  languid,  under  the  pressure  of  the  epidemic.    Attack  of 

the  Amhrakiots  on  the  Amphilochian  Argos:  the  Athenian  Phormlo  is 

sent  with  a  squadron  to  Naupaktus 557 

Injury  done   to   Athenian  commerce  by  Peloponnesian    privateers.    The 

1 .  1  '■'(laemonians  put  to  death  all  their   prisoners  taken    at    sea,   even 

neutrals 558 

Lacedaemonian  envoys  seized  on  their  way  to  Persia  and  put  to  death  by 

the  Athenians 558 

Surrender  of  Potidaea— indulgent  capitulation  granted  by  the  Athenian 

generals " 559 

Third  year  of  the  war— king  Archidamus  marches  to  the  invasion  of  Attica  500 
Remonstran  e  of  the  Flatajans  to  Archidamus— his  replv— he   summons 

ia  in  vain 560 

The  Plata' ins  resolve  to  stand  out  and  defy  the  Lacedaemonian  force 561 

Invocation  and  excuse  of  Archidamus  on  hearing  the  refusal  of  the  Plataeans  562 

Commencement  of  the  siege  of  I'latnea 562 

Operations  of  attack  and  defense— the  besiegers  make  no  progress,  and  are 

obliged  to  resort  to  blockade 563 

Wall  of  circumvallation  built  round  Platasa— the  place   completely   be- 

leagured  and  a  force  left  to  maintain  the  blockade       564 

Athenian  armament  sent  to  Potidsea  and  ChaHkidic  Thrace— it  is  defeated 

and  returns 564 

Operations  on  the  coast  of  Akarnania.    Joint  attack  upon  Akarnania,  by 

land  and  sea,  concerted  between  the  Amhrakiots  and  Peloponnesians 565 

Assemblage    of    the    Ambrakiots,   Peloponnesians,   and    Epirotic    allies — 

divisions  of  Epirots 565 

They  march  to  attack  the  Akarnanian  town  of  Stratus 566 

Rashness  of  the  Epirots — defeat  and  repulse  of  the  army 567 

The  Peloponnesian  fleet  comes  from  Corinth  to  Akarnania— movements  of 

the  Athenian  Phormio  to  oppose  it 567 

Naval  battle  between  Phormio  and  the  Peloponnesian  fleet — his  complete 

victory 568 

Reflections  upon  these  two  defeats  of  the  Peloponnesians 669 


30  CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  II. 

PAG1 
Indignation  of  the  Lacedaemonians  at  the  late  naval  defeat:  they  collect  a 

r  licet  under  K'ncinus  to  act  against  Phormio 570 

r  numbers  of  Phormio—  his  maneuvering 571 

The  Peleponnesian  fleet  forces  Phormio  to  a  battle  on  the  line  of  coast  near 

Naupaktus.    Dispositions  and  harangues  on  both  sides 571 

Battle  near  Naupaktus 572 

The  1'eloponnesian  fleet  at  first  successful,  but  afterward  defeated 573 

Retirement  of  the  defeated  Peloponnesian  fleet.    Phormio  is  re-enforced — 

his  i  iperations  in  Akarnania— he  returns  to  Athens 574 

Attempt  of  Knemus  and  Brasidas  to  surprise  Peiraeus.  from  Corinth 575 

Alliance  of  the  Athenians  with  the  Odrysian  king  Sitalkes 575 

Power  of  the  Odrysians  in  Thrace — their  extensive  dominion  over  the  other 

Thracian  tribes 576 

Sitalkes,  at  the  instigation  of  Athens,  undertakes  to  attack  Perdikkas  and 

the  Chalkidians  of  Thrace 577 

ITis  vast  and  multifarious  host  of  Thracians  and  other  barbarians 577 

He  invades  and  ravages  Macedonia  and  Chalkidike 577 

lie  is  forced  to  retire  by  the  severity  of  the  season  and  want  of  Athenian 

co-operation 578 

Appendix 679 

CHAPTER  L. 

From  the  Commencement  of  the  Fourth  Year  op  the  Peloponnesiax  Wab 
down  to  the  Revolutionary  Commotions  at  Korkyra. 

Fourth  year  of  the  war— internal  suffering  at  Athens — renewed  invasion  of 

Attica 582 

Revolt  of  Mitylene  and  most  part  of  Lesbos  from  Athens 582 

Proceedings  of  Athens — powerful    condition  of  Mitylene — Athenian  fleet 

sent  thither  under  Kleippides 583 

Kleippides  fails  in  surprising  Mitylene — carries  on  an  imperfect  blockade . .  684 
He  receives  reinforcements,  and  presses  the  siege  with  greater  vigor— want 

of  resolution  on  the  part  of  the  Mit3'lenseans 584 

The  Mitylenaean  envoys  address  themselves  to  the  Spartans  at  the  Olympic 

festival,  entreating  aid 585 

Tone  and  topics  of  their  address 586 

Practical  grounds  of  complaint  on  the  part  of  the  Mitylenaeans  against 

Athens — few  or  none 587 

The  Peloponnesians  promise  assistance  to  Mitylene— energetic  demonstra- 
tion of  the  Athenians 588 

Asopius  son  of  Phormio— in  Akarnania 688 

The  accumulated  treasure  of  Athens  exhausted  by  her  efforts — necessity  for 

her  to  raise  a  direct  contribution 589 

Outbreak  of  the  Plataeans  from  their  blockaded  town 589 

Their  plan  of  escape— its  extraordinary  difficulty  and  danger 690 

Half  the  garrison  of  Plataea  escapes  to  Athens. 591 

Blockade  of  Mitylene  closely  carried  on  by  the  Athenian  general  Paches— 
the  Mitylenaeans  are  encouraged  to  hold  out  by  the  Lacedaemonians,  who 

send  thither  Salaethus 592 

Mitylene  holds  out  till  provisions  are  exhausted— Salaethus  arms  all  the  peo- 
ple of  Mitylene  for  a  jjeneral  sallv— the  people  refuse  to  join— the  city  is 

surrendered  to  Athens,  at  discretion 592 

The  Peloponnesian  fleet  under  Alkidas  arrives  off  the  coast  of  Ionia— aston- 
ishment and  alarm  winch  its  presence  creates 594 

Paches,  after  the  capture  of  Mitylene,  pursues  the  fleet  of  Alkidas,  which 

returns  to  I  without  having  done  anything 595 

Paches  at  Notiuro    he  captures  the  place— his  perfidy  toward  Hippias,  the 

leader  of  the  garrison 595 

Notium  recolonized  from  Athens  as  a  separate  town 506 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  II.  31 

PAGE 

Paches  sends  to  Athens  about  a  thousand  Mitylenaean  prisoners,  the  persons 
chiefly  concerned  in  the  late  revolt,  together  with  Salsethus 597 

Important  debate  in  the  Athenian  assembly  upon  the  treatment  of  the  pris- 
oners    59? 

First  mention  of  Kleon  by  Thucydides — new  class  of  politicians  to  which  he 
belonged 597 

Eukrates,  Kleon,  Lysikles,  Hyperbolus,  etc 598 

Character  of  Kleon 598 

Indignation  of  the  Athenians  against  Mitylene — proposition  of  Kleon  to  put 
to  death  the  whole  male  population  of  military  age  is  carried  and  passed.  600 

Repentance  of  the  Athenians  after  the  decree  is  passed.  A  fresh  assembly 
is  convened  to  reconsider  the  decree 600 

Account  of  the  second  assembly  given  by  Thucydides — speech  of  Kleon  in 
support  of  the  resolution  already  passed 601 

Remarks  on  the  speech  of  Kleon 602 

Speech  of  Diodotus  in  opposition  to  Kleon — second  decree  mitigating  the 
former 603 

Rapid  voyage  of  the  trireme  which  carries  the  second  decree  to  Mitylene — 
it  arrives  just  in  time  to  prevent  the  execution  of  the  first 604 

Those  Mitylenaeans,  whom  Paches  had  sent  to  Athens,  are  put  to  death — 
treatment  of  Mitylene  by  the  Athenians 605 

Enormities  committed  by  Paches  at  Mitylene— his  death  before  the  Athe- 
nian dikastery 605 

Surrender  of  Platasa  to  the  Lacedaemonians 605 

The  Plataean  captive  garrison  are  put  upon  their  trial  before  Lacedaemonian 
judges 606 

Speech  of  the  Plataean  deputies  to  these  judges  on  behalf  of  themselves 
and  their  comrades 606 

Reply  of  the  Thebans 607 

The  Plataeans  are  sentenced  to  death  by  the  Lacedasmonian  judges,  and  all 
slain 608 

Reason  of  the  severity  of  the  Lacedaemonians — cases  of  Plataea  and  Mity- 
lene compared 608 

Circumstances  of  Korkyra— the  Korkyraean  captives  are  sent  back  from 
Corinth,  under  agreement  to  effect  a  revolution  in  the  government  and 
foreign  politics  of  the  island 609 

Their  attempts  to  bring  about  a  revolution — they  prosecute  the  democrati- 
cal  leader  Peithias — he  prosecutes  five  of  them  in  revenge — they  are 
found  guilty 610 

They  assassinate  Peithias  and  several  other  senators,  and  make  themselves 
masters  of  the  government — they  decree  neutrality— their  unavailing  mis- 
sion to  Athens 611 

The  oligarchical  party  at  Korkyra  attack  the  people— obstinate  battle  in 
the  city — victory  of  the  people — arrival  of  the  Athenian  admiral  Nikos- 
tratus 611 

Moderation  of  Nikostratus — proceedings  of  the  people  toward  the  van- 
quished oligarchs 618 

Arrival  of  tne  Lacedaemonian  admiral  Alkidas,  with  a  fleet  of  fifty-three 
triremes.    Renewed  terror  and  struggle  in  the  island 613 

Naval  battle  of  Korkyra  between  Nikostratus  and  Alkidas 614 

Confusion  and  defenseless  state  of  Korkyra— Afkidas  declines  to  attack  it — 
arrival  of  the  Athenian  fleet  under  Eurymedon — flight  of  Alkidas 614 

Vengeance  of  the  victorious  Demos  in  Korkyra  against  the  prostrate  oli- 
garchs— fearful  bloodshed 615 

Lawless  and  ferocious  murders — base  connivance  of  Eurymedon 616 

Band  of  oligarchical  fugitives  escape  to  the  mainland — afterward  land  again 
on  the  mainland,  and  establish  themselves  on  Mount  Istone 616 

Political  reflections  introduced  by  Thucydides  on  occasion  of  the  Korkyraean 
massacre 617 

The  political  enormities  of  Korkyra  were  the  worst  that  occurred  in  the 
whole  war 618 


32  CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  II. 

PAGE 

How  these  enormities  began  and  became  exaggerated.  Conduct  of  the 
opposing  parties 61Q 

Contrail  between  the  bloody  character  of  revolutions  at  Korkyra  and  the 
ii ni. I  character  i  >t  analogous  phenomena  at  Athens 611 

Bad  morality  of  the  rich  and  great  men  throughout  the  Grecian  cities 620 

CHAPTER  LI. 

From  the  Troubles  in  Korkyra,  in  tiie  Fifth  Year  op  the  Peloponnesiah 
War,  down  to  the  end  of  the  Sixth  Year. 

Capture  of  Minoa,  opposite  Megara,  by  the  Athenians  under  Nikias 621 

his  first  introduction,  position,  and  character 621 

:  circumstances  and  condition  of  the  oligarchical  party  at  Athens...  622 

P( tints  i  <f  anal'  igy  between  Nikias  and  Perikles— material  differences 628 

Care  of  Nikias  in  maintaining  his  popularity  and  not  giving  offense ;  his  very 

religious  character 628 

His  diligence  in  increasing  his  fort  me — speculation  in  the  mines  of  Lau- 

rium— letting  out  of  slaves  for  hire 623 

Nikias  first  opposed  to  Kleon— next  to  Alkibiades.    Oligarchical  clubs  or 

Hetseries  at  Athens,  for  political  and  judicial  purposes 624 

Klr<  n  -his  real  function  that  of  opposition — real  power  inferior  to  Nikias. . .  625 
Revii  al  i  if  the  epidemic  distemper  at  Athensfor  another  year— atmospheric 
and  terrestrial  disturbances  in  Greece — Lacedaemonian  invasion  of  Attica 

suspended  for  this  year 626 

Foundation  of  the  colony  of  Herakleia  by  the  Lacedasmonians  near  Ther- 
mi  ipylse  -its  numerous  settlers,  great  promise,  and  unprosperous  career..  626 

Athenian  expedition  against  Melos,  under  Nikias 628 

dings  *>f  the  Athenians  under  Demosthenes  in  Akarnania 628 

Expedition  of  Demosthenes  against  iEtolia — his  large  plans 629 

March  of  Demosthenes— impracticability  of  the  territory  of  iEtolia— rude- 
ness and  bravery  of  the  inhabitants 629 

He  is  completely  beaten  and  obliged  to  retire  with  loss 630 

Attack  of  jSEtolians  and  Peloponnesians  under  Eurylochus  upon  Naupaktus.  630 

Naupaktus  is  saved  by  Demosthenes  and  the  Akarnanians 631 

Eurylochus,  repulsed  from  Naupaktus,  concerts  with  the  Ambrakiots  an 

attack  on  Argos 632 

Demosthenes  and  the  Athenians,  as  well  as  the  Akarnanians,  come  to  the 

prot  eel  ion  of  Argos 632 

March  of  Eurylochus  across  Akarnania  to  join  the  Ambrakiots 633 

Their  united  army  is  defeated  by  Demosthenes  at  Olpae — Eurylochus  slain.  633 
The  surviving  Spartan  commander  makes  a  separate  capitulation  for  him- 
self and  t  he  Peloponnesians,  deserting  the  Ambrakiots 634 

The  Ambrakiots  sustain  much  loss  in  their  retreat 635 

Another  large  body  of  Ambrakiots,  coming  from  the  city  as  a  re-enforce- 
ment, is  intercepted  by  Demosthenes  at  Idomene,  and  cut  to  pieces 635 

Despair  of  the  Ambrakiot  herald  on  seeing  the  great  number  of  slain 63^5 

Defenseless  and  feeble  condition  of  Ambrakia  after  this  ruinous  loss 637 

Attempt  to  calculate  the  loss  of  the  Ambrakiots 637 

Convention  concluded  between  Ambrakia  on  one  side,  and  the  Akarnanians 

and  Ampie'oehians  on  the  other 638 

Return  of  Demosthenes  in  triumph  to  Athens 638 

Purification  of  Delos  by  the  Athenians.  Revival  of  the  Delian  festival  with 
peculiar  splendor 638 

CHAPTER  LH. 

Seventh  Yea_r  of  the  War.— Capture  of  Sphakteria. 

Seventh  year  of  the  war— invasion  of  Attica 639 

Distress  in  Korkyra  from  the  attack  of  th«  oligarchical  exiles.  A  Pelopon- 
nesian  fleet,  and  an  Athenian  fleet,  are  both  sent  thither    639 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  II.  33 

PAGE 

Demosthenes  goes  on  board  the  Athenian  fleet  with  a  separate  command. . .  640 
He  fixes  upon  Pylus  in  Laconia  for  erection  of  a  fort.    Locality  of  Pylus 

ami  Sphakteria 640 

Eurymedon,  the  admiral  of  the  fleet,  insists  upon  going  on  to  Korkyra,  with- 
out stopping  at  Pylus.    The  fleet  are  driven  into  Pylus  by  a  storm 640 

Demosthenes  fortifies  the  place,  through  the  voluntary  zeal  of  the  soldiers. 

He  is  left  there  with  a  garrison  while  the  fleet  goes  on  to  Korkyra 641 

Slow  march  of  the  Lacedaemonians  to  recover  Pylus  641 

Preparations  of  Demosthenes  to  defend  Pylus  against  them 642 

Proceedings  of  the  Lacedaemonian  army— they  send  a  detachment  to  occupy 

the  island  of  Spbakteria,  opposite  Pylus 642 

They  attack  the  place  by  sea  and  land— gallant  conduct  of  Brasidas  in  the 

attack  on  the  sea-side  643 

Return  of  Eurymedon  and  the  Athenian  fleet  to  Pylus 644 

He  defeats  the  Lacedaemonian  fleet  in  the  harbor  of  Pylus 644 

The  Lacedaemonian  detachment  is  blocked  up  by  the  Athenian  fleet  in  the 

island  of  Sphakteria— armistice  concluded  at  Pylus „  645 

Mission  of  Lacedaemonian  envoys  to  Athens,  to  propose  peace,  and  solicit 

the  release  of  their  soldiers  in  Sphakteria 646 

The  Athenians,  at  the  instance  of  Kleon,  require  the  restoration  of  Nisaea, 
Pegae,  Troezen,  and  Achaia,  as  conditions  of  giving  up  the  men  in  Sphak- 
teria and  making  peace 647 

The  envoys  will  not  consent  to  these  demands— Kleon  prevents  negotiation 

—they  are  sent  back  to  Pylus  without  any  result 648 

Remarks  on  this  assembly  and  on  the  conduct  of  Athens 649 

The  armistice  is  terminated,  and  war  resumed  at  Pylus.    Eurymedon  keeps 

possession  of  the  Lacedaemonian  fleet 650 

Blockade  of  Sphakteria  by  the  Athenian  fleet — difficulty  and  hardships  to 

the  seamen  of  the  fleet 651 

Protracted  duration  and  seeming  uncertainty  of  the  blockade — Demosthe- 
nes sends  to  Athens  for  re-enforcements  to  attack  the  island 652 

Proceedings  in  the  Athenian  assembly  on  receiving  this  news — proposition 
of  Kleon — maneuver  of  his  pohtical  enemies  to  send  him  against  his  will 

as  general  to  Pylus 652 

Reflections  upon  this   proceeding,  and  upon  the  conduct  of  parties  at 

Athens 653 

Kleon  goes  to  Pylus  with  a  re-enforcement — condition  of  the  island  of  Spbak- 
teria— numbers  and  positions  of  the  Lacedaemonians  in  it 656 

Kleon  and  Demosthenes  land  their  forces  in  the  island,  and  attack  it 656 

Numerous  light  troops  of  Demosthenes  employed  against  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians in  Sphakteria 657 

Distress  of  the  Lacedaemonians— their  bravery  and  long  resistance 657 

They  retreat  to  their  last  redoubt  at  the  extremity  of  the  island 658 

They  are  surrounded  and  forced  to  surrender 659 

Astonishment  caused  throughout  Greece  by  the  surrender  of  Lacedaemo- 
nian hoplites — diminished  luster  of  Spartan  arms 660 

Judgment  pronounced  by  Thucydides  himself— reflections  upon  it 660 

Prejudice  of  Thucydides  in  regard  to  Kleon.  Kleon  displayed  sound  judg- 
ment and  decision,  and  was  one  of  the  essential  causes  of  the  success 661 

Effect  produced  at  Athens  by  the  arrival  of  the  Lacedaemonian  prisoners. .  662 
The  Athenians  prosecute  the  war  with  increased  hopefulness  and  vigor.  The 

Lacedaemonians  make  new  advances  for  peace  without  effect 663 

Remarks  upon  the   policy  of  Athens — her  chance  was  now  universally 

believed  to  be  most  favorable,  in  prosecuting  the  war 663 

Fluctuations  in  Athenian  feeling  for  or  against  the  war:  there  were  two 

occasions  on  which  Kleon  contributed  to  influence  them  toward  it 664 

Expedition  of  Nikias  against  the  Corinthian  territory 665 

He  re-embarks— ravages  Epidaurus— establishes  a  post  on  the  peninsula  of 

Methana 666 

Eurymedon  with  the  Athenian  fleet  goes  to  Korkyra.  Defeat  and  captivity 
of  the  Korkyraean  exiles  in  the  island 666 

H.  G.  II.— 3 


34  CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  II. 

ft   * 

The  captives  are  put  to  death— cruelty  and  horrors  in  the  proceeding v<7 

Capture  of  Anaktorium  by  the  Athenians  and  Akarnanians 668 

Proceedings  of  the  Athenians  at  Chios  and  Lesbos 668 

The  Athenians  capture  Artaphernes,  a  Persian  envoy,  on  his  way  to  Sparta.  668 
Succession  of  Persian  kings— Xerxes,  Artaxerxes,  Longimanus,  etc.  Dariu* 
Nothus 669 

CHAPTER  TJTT. 

Eighth  Year  of  the  War. 

Important  operations  of  the  eighth  year  of  the  war 670 

Capture  of  Kythera  by  the  Athenians.     Nikias  ravages  the  Laconian  coast.  671 
Capture  of  Thyrea— all  the  ^Eginetans  resident  there  are  either  slain  in  the 

attack  or  put  to  death  afterward  as  prisoners 671 

Alarm  and  depression  among  the  Lacedaemonians  —  their   insecurity  in 

regard  to  the  Helots 672 

They  entrap,  and  cause  to  be  assassinated,  2,000  of  the  bravest  Helots 673 

Request  from  the  Chalkidians  and  Perdikkas  that  Spartan  aid  may  be  sent 

to  them  under  Brasidas 673 

Brasidas  is  ordered  to  go  thither,  with  Helot  and  Peloponnesian  hoplites 674 

Elate  and  enterprising  dispositions  prevalent  at  Athens.      Plan  formed 

against  Megara.   Condition  of  Megara  674 

The  Athenians,  under  Hippokrates  and  Demosthenes,  attempt  to  surprise 

Nisasa  and  Megara 675 

Conspirators  within  open  the  gate,  and  admit  them  into  the  Megarian  Long 

Walls.    They  master  the  whole  line  of  the  Long  Walls 675 

The  Athenians  inarch  to  the  gates  of  Megara— failure  of  the  scheme  of  the 

party  within  to  open  them 676 

The  Athenians  attack  Nissea— the  place  surrenders  to  them 677 

Dissension  of  parties  in  Megara— intervention  of  Brasidas 677 

Brasidas  gets  together  an  army,  and  relieves  Megara— no  battle  takes  place, 

but  the  Athenians  retire 678 

Revolution  at  Megara— return  of  the  exiles  from  Pegse,  under  pledge  of 
amnesty— they  violate  their  oaths,  and  effect  a  forcible  oligarchical  revo- 
lution   079 

Combined  plan  by  Hippokrates  and  Demosthenes  for  the  invasion  of  Boeo- 

tia  on  three  sides  at  once 680 

Demosthenes,  with  an  Akarnanian  force,  makes  a  descent  on  Bceotia  at 

Siphaa  in  the  Corinthian  Gulf— his  scheme  fails  and  he  retires 681 

Disappointment  of  the  Athenian  plans — no  internal  movements  take  place 
in  Bceotia.    Hippokrates  marches  with  the  army  from  Athens  to  Delium 

in  Boeotia 681 

Hippokrates  fortifies  Delium,  after  which  the  army  retires  homeward 682 

Gathering  of  the  Boeotian  military  force  at  Tanagra.    Pagondas,  the  The- 

ban  Bmotarch,  determines  them  to  fight 683 

Marshaling  of  the  Boeotian  army— great  depth  of  the  Theban  hoplites— spe- 
cial Theban  band  of  Three  Hundred 684 

Order  of  battle  of  the  Athenian  army 685 

Battle  of  Delium— vigorously  contested — advantage  derived  from  the  depth 

of  the  Theban  phalanx 685 

Defeat  and  flight  of  the  Athenians— Hippokrates,  with  1000  hoplites,  is  slain  686 
Interchange  of  heralds— remonstrance  of  the  Boeotians  against  the  Atheni- 
ans for  desecrating  the  temple  of  Delium — they  refuse  permission  to  bury 

the  slain  except  on  condition  of  quitting  Delium 687 

Answer  of  the  Athenian  herald — he  demands  permission  to  bury  the  bodies 

of  the  slain 687 

The  Boeotians  persist  in  demanding  the  evacuation  of  Delium  as  a  condition 

for  granting  permission  to  bury  the  dead. — Debate  on  the  subject 688 

Remarks  on  the  debate 688 

Biege  and  capture  of  Delium  by  the  Boeotians 689 


CONTENTS  OP  VOL.  H.  85 

PAGE 

Sokrates  and  Alkibiades,  personally  engaged  at  Delium 690 

March  of  Brasidas  through  Thessaly  to  Thrace  and  Macedonia 690 

Rapidity  and  address  with  which  he  gets  through  Thessaly 691 

Relations  between  Brasidas  and  Perdikkas — Brasidas  enters  into  an  accom- 
modation with  Arrhibaeus — Perdikkas  is  offended 693 

Brasidas  marches  against  Akanthus.    State  of  parties  in  the  town 693 

He  is  admitted  personally  into  the  town  to  explain  his  views— his  speech 

before  the  Akanthian  assembly 694 

Debate  in  the  Akanthian  assembly,  and  decision  of  the  majority,  voting 

secretly,  to  admit  him,  after  much  opposition 695 

Reflections  upon  this  proceeding — good  political  habits  of  the  Akanthians. .  695 
Evidence  which  this  proceeding  affords,  that  the  body  of  citizens  (among 

the  Athenian  allies)  did  not  hate  Athens,  and  were  not  anxious  to  revolt. .  695 
Brasidas  establishes  intelligences  in  Argilus.    He  lays  his  plan  for  the  sur- 
prise of  Amphipolis 697 

Night-march  of  Brasidas  from  Arne,  through  Argilus  to  the  river  Strymon 

and  Amphipolis 698 

He  becomes  master  of  the  lands  round  Amphipolis,  but  is  disappointed  in 

gaining  admission  into  the  town 699 

He  offers  to  the  citizens  the  most  favorable  terms  of  capitulation,  which 

they  accept.    Amphipolis  capitulates 699 

Thucydides  arrives  at  Eion  from  Thasos  with  his  squadron — not  in  time  to 

preserve  Amphipolis— he  preserves  Eion 700 

Alarm  and  dismay  produced  at  Athens  by  the  capture  of  Amphipolis — 

increased  hopes  among  her  enemies 700 

Extraordinary  personal  glory,  esteem,  and  influence  acquired  by  Brasidas..  700 
Inaction  and  despondency  of  Athens  after  the  battle  of  Delium,  especially 

in  reference  to  arresting  the  conquests  of  Brasidas  in  Thrace 701 

Loss  of  Amphipolis  was  caused  by  the  negligence  of  the  Athenian  command- 
ers— Eukles  and  the  historian  Thucydides 702 

The  Athenians  banish  Thucydides  on  the  proposition  of  Kleon 702 

Sentence  of  banishment  passed  on  Thucydides  by  the  Athenians — grounds 

of  that  sentence.    He  justly  incurred  their  verdict  of  guilty 702 

Preparations  of  Brasidas  in  Amphipolis  for  extended  conquest — his  opera- 
tions against  the  Akte,  or  promontory  of  Athos 706 

He  attacks  Torone  in  the  Sithonian  peninsula — he  is  admitted  into  the  town 

by  an  internal  party— surprises  and  takes  it 707 

Some  part  of  the  population,  with  the  small  Athenian  garrison,  retire  to  the 

separate  citadel  called  Leky  thus 707 

Conciliating  address  of  Brasidas  to  the  assembly  at  Torone 708 

He  attacks  Lekythus  and  takes  it  by  storm 708 

Personal  ability  and  conciliatory  efficiency  of  Brasidas 709 

CHAPTER  LTV. 

Truce  for  one  year.— Renewal  of  War  and  Battle  of  Amphipolis.— Peace 

of  Nikias. 

Eighth  year  of  the  war— began  with  the  most  favorable  promise  for  Athens 

— closed  with  great  reverses  to  her * 710 

Desire  of  Spartans  to  make  peace  in  order  to  regain  the  captives — they 

decline  sending  re-enforcements  to  Brasidas 710 

King  Pleistoanax  at  Sparta — eager  for  peace— his  special  reasons — his  long 

banishment  recently  terminated  by  recall 71 1 

Negotiations  during  the  winter  of  424-423  B.C.  for  peace 711 

Truce  for  one  year  concluded,  in  March  423  b.c 712 

Conditions  of  the  truce  713 

Resolution  to  open  negotiations  for  a  definitive  treaty 714 

New  events  in  Thrace— revolt  of  Skione  from  Athens  to  Brasidas,  two  days 

after  the  truce  was  sworn, 714 


36  CONTEXTS  OF  VOL.  H. 


PAGE. 

to  Rkiono— his  judicious  conduct — enthusiastic  admi- 

i  for  him  there 715 

brings  across  re-enforcements  toSkione — he  conveys  away  the 

I  children  into  a  place  of  safety 716 

from  Sparta  and  Athens  arrive  in  Thrace,  to  announce  to 

las  the  truce  just  concluded  716 

Dispute  respecting  Skione.    Tin- war  continues  in  Thrace,  but  is  suspended 

everywhere  else 716 

Revolt  of  Blende  from  Athens—  Brasidas  receives  the  offers  of  the  Mendaeans 

to  protect  them  and  sends  to  them  a  garrison  against  Athens. 

He  departs  upon  an  expedition  against  Arrhibeeus  in  the  interior  of  Mace- 

717 

Nikias  and  Nikostratus  arrive  with  an  At  henian  armament  in  Pallene.   They 
The  Lacedaemonian  garrison  under  Polydamidas  at  first 

repulses  them 718 

.sinus  among  the  citizens  of  Mende— mutiny  of  the  Demos  against 

I  nil  Mas— the  Athenians  are  admitted  into  the  town 718 

The  Athenians  besiege  and  blockade  Skione.    Nikias  leaves  a  blockading 

force  there,  and  returns  to  Athens 719 

Expedition  of  Brasidas  along  with  Perdikkas  into  Macedonia  against  Ar- 

rbibaeus 719 

Retreat  of  Brasidas  and  Perdikkas  before  the  Blyrians 720 

Address  of  Brasidas  to  his  soldiers  before  the  retreat 720 

Contrast  between  Grecian  and  barbarian  military  feeling 721 

Appeal  of  Brasidas  to  the  right  of  conquest  or  superior  force 722 

The  Illyrians  attack  Brasidas  in  ins  retreat,  but  are  repulsed 722 

Breach  between  Brasidas  and  Perdikkas:  the  latter  opens  negotiations  with 

Lthenians 723 

Relations  between  Athens  and  the  Peloponnesians  —  no    progress  made 
i  n  1  definitive  peace— Lacedaemonian  re-enforcement  on  its  way  to  Bra- 
sidas prevented  from  passing  through  Thessaly  723 

Incidents  in  Peloponnesus — the  temple  of  Here  near  Argos  accidentally 

burnt 724 

War  in  Arcadia— battle  between  Mantineia  and  Tegea 725 

Boeotians,  at  peace  de  facto,  though  not  parties  to  the  truce. — Hard  treat- 
ment of  the  Thespians  by  Thebes 725 

Expiration  of  the  Truce  for  one  year.  Disposition  of  both  Sparta  and  Athens 
at  that  time  toward  peace:  peace  impossible  in  consequence  of  the  rela- 
tions of  parties  in  Thrace 726 

No  actual  resumption  of  hostilities,  although  the  truce  bad  expired,  from 

the  month  of  March  to  the  Pythian  festival  in  August 726 

Alteration  in  the  language  of  statesmen  at  Athens— instances  of  Kleon  and 

his  partisans  to  obtain  a  vigorous  prosecution  of  the  war  in  Thrace 726 

Brasidas— an  opponent  of  peace— his  views  and  motives 726 

Kleon  -his  views  and  motives  as  stated  by  Thucyd- 

ides.    Kleon  had  no  personal  interest  in  war 727 

To  prosecute  the  war  vigorously  in  Thrace,  was  at  this  time  the  real  politi- 
cal interest  of  Athens 727 

Question  of  peace  or  war  as  it  stood  between  Nikias  and  Kleon,  in  March 

422  B.C.,  after  the  expiration  of  the  truce  for  one  year 728 

Kleon's  advocacy  of  war  at  this  moment  perfectly  defensible— unjust  ac- 
count of  his  motive  given  by  Thucydides 729 

Kleon  at  this  time  adhered  more  closely  than  any  other  Athenian  public 

man  to  the  foreign  policy  of  Perikles 730 

itions  of  Nikias  and  the  peace-party  in  reference  to  the  reconquestof 

Amphipolis 730 

Kleon  conducts  an  expedition  against  A mphipoiis— he  tal^s  Torone .... ....  731 

He  arrives  at  Eion  sends  envoys  to  invite  Macedonian  and  Thracian  auxili- 
aries.    Dissatisfaction  of  his  own  troops  with  his  inaction  while  waiting 

for  these  auxiliaries 733 

He  is  forced  by  these  murmurs  to  make  a  demonstration— he  marches  from 


CONTENTS  OF.  VOL.  IL  37 

PAGE 

Eion  along  the  walls  of  Amphipolis  to  reconnoiter  the  top  of  the  hill- 
apparent  quiescence  in  Amphipolis ^733 

Brasidas  at  first  on  Mount  Kerdylium — presently  moves  into  the  town  across 

the  bridge.    His  exhortation  to  his  soldiers 734 

Kleon  tries  to  effect  his  retreat 735 

Brasidas  sallies  out  upon  the  army  in  its  retreat — the  Athenians  are  com- 
pletely routed — Brasidas  and  Kleon  both  slain 735 

Profound  sorrow  in  Thrace  for  the  death  of  Brasidas — funeral  honors  paid 
him  in  Amphipolis.     The  Athenian  armament,  much  diminished  by  its 

loss  in  the  battle,  returns  home 736 

Remarks  on  the  battle  of  Amphipolis — wherein  consisted  the  faults  of  Kleon  737 
Disgraceful  conduct  of  the  Athenian  hoplites — the  defeat  at  Amphipolis 

arose  partly  from  political  feeling  hostile  to  Kleon 739 

Important  effect  of  the  death  of  Brasidas,  in  reference  to  the  prospects  of 

the  war — his  admirable  character  and  efficiency 740 

Feelings  of  Thucydides  toward  Brasidas  and  Kleon 74] 

Character  of  Kleon — his  foreign  policy 741 

Internal  policy  of  Kleon  as  a  citizen  in  constitutional  life.    Picture  in  the 

Knights  of  Aristophanes 742 

Unfairness  of  judging  Kleon  upon  such  evidence. — Picture  of  Sokrates  by 

Aristophanes  is  noway  resembling 742 

The  vices  imputed  by  Aristophanes  to  Kleon  are  not  reconcilable  one  with 

the  other 743 

Kleon— a  man  of  strong  and  bitter  opposition  talents— frequent  in  accusa- 
tion— often  on  behalf  of  poor  men  suffering  wrong 744 

Necessity  for  voluntary  accusers  at  Athens — general  danger  and  obloquy 

attending  the  function 744 

We  have  no  evidence  to  decide  in  what  proportion  of  cases  he  accused 

wrongfully 745 

Private  dispute  between  Kleon  and  Aristophanes 745 

Negotiations  for  peace  during  the  winter  following  the  battle  of  Amphipolis.  746 
Peace  called  the  Peace  of  Nikias — concluded  in  March  421  b.c. — Conditions 

of  peace 747 

The  peace  is  only  partially  accepted  by  the  allies  of  Sparta 748 

The  Boeotians:  Megarians,  and  Corinthians  all  repudiate  it 749 

CHAPTER  LV. 

From  the  Peace  op  Nikias  to  the  Olympic  Festival  op  Olympiad  90. 

Negotiations  for  peace  during  the  winter  after  the  battle  of  Amphipolis 749 

Peace  called  the  peace  of  Nikias— concluded  in  March  421  b.c.    Conditions 

of  peace 749 

Peace  accepted  at  Sparta  by  the  majority  of  members  of  the  Peloponnesian 

alliance 750 

The  most  powerful  members  of  the  alliance  refuse  to  accept  the  truce — 

Boeotians,  Megarians,  Corinthians,  and  Eleians 750 

Position  and  feelings  of  the  Lacedaemonians— their  great  anxiety  for  peace 

— their  uncertain  relations  with  Argos 750 

Steps  taken  by  the  Lacedaemonians  to  execute  the  peace— Amphipolis  is  not 

restored  to  Athens — the  great  allies  of  Sparta  do  not  accept  the  peace 751 

Separate  alliance  for  mutual  defense  concluded  between  Sparta  and  Athens  751 

Terms  of  the  alliance 752 

Athens  restores  the  Spartan  captives 752 

Mismanagement  of  the  political  interests  of  Athens  by  Nikias  and  the  peace- 
party  752 

By  the  terms  of  the  alliance,  Athens  renounced  all  the  advantages  of  her 
position  in  reference  to  the  Lacedaemonians— she  gained  none  of  those 

concessions  upon  which  she  calculated,  while  they  gained  materially 754 

Discontent  and  remonstrances  of  the  Athenians  against  Sparta  in  conse- 


o  &  i i  *i  o 


38 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  IL 


PACK 

quencp  of  the  non-performance  of  the  conditions— they  repent  of  having 
given  up  the  captives   excuses  of  Sparta 755 

New  combinations  in  Peloponnesus— suspicion  entertained  of  concert 
between  Sparta  and  Athens    Argos  stands  prominently  forward— state  of 

i  nt  of  one  thousand  formed  in  that  city 75(1 

orintnians  prevail  upon  Argos  to  stand  forward  as  head  of  a  new 

Peloponnesian  alliance 757 

iss  of  recusant  Peloponnesian  allies  at  Corinth — the  Mantineians  join 

Argos    state  of  Arcadia  -  rivalship  of  Tegea  and  Mantineia 767 

tstrances  of  La Laeznonian  envoys  at  the  congress  at  Corinth— re- 
de <  lorinthians  -pretense  of  religious  scruple 768 

The  Boeotians  and  Megarians  refuse  to  break  with  Sparta,  or  to  ally  them- 

with  Argos — the Corinthians  hesitate  in  actually  joining  Argos.   ...  753 

The  Eleians  become  allies  of  Argos— their  reasons  for  doing  so — relations 

with  Lepreum — the  Corinthians  now  join  Argos  also 760 

alof  Tegea  to  separate  from  Sparta.    The  Corinthians  are  disheart- 

ened-  their  application  through  the  Boeotians  to  Athens 7C1 

momans  emancipate  the  Arcadian  subjects  of  Mantineia — they 
plant  the  Brasidian  Helots  at  Lepreum 761 

Treat  mini  of  the  Spartan  captives  after  their  liberation  from  Athens  and 
return  to  Sparta— they  are  disfranchised  for  atimeand  in  a  qualified  man- 
ner   762 

The  Athenians  recapture  Skione— put  to  death  all  the  adult  males 762 

caJ  relations  in  Peloponnesus— change  of  Ephors  at  Sparta — the  new 
Ephors  are  hostile  to  Athens 703 

Congress  at  Sparta— Athenian,  Boeotian,  and  Corinthian  deputies  present — 
long  debates,  but  no  settlement  attained  of  any  one  of  the  disputed  points 
— intrigues  of  the  anti- Athenian  Ephors— KleobiUus  and  Xenares 763 

These  Ephors  try  to  bring  about  underhand  an  alliance  between  Sparta  and 
Argos.  I  hn  lUgh  t lie  Boeotians— the  project  fails. . .   764 

The  Lacedaemonians  conclude  a  special  alliance  with  the  Boeotians,  thereby 
violating  their  alliance  with  Athens— the  Boeotians  raze  Panaktum  to  the 
ground 765 

Application  from  the  Argeians  to  Sparta,  to  renew  the  expiring  treaty. 
Project  of  renewed  treaty  agreed  upon.  Curious  stipulation  about  com- 
bat by  champions  to  keep'  the  question  open  about  the  title  to  Thyrea 705 

Lacedaemonian  envoys  go  first  to  Bceotia,  next  to  Athens— they  find  Panak- 
tum demolished    they  ask  for  the  cession  of  Pylus  from  Athens 767 

The  envoys  are  badly  received  at  Athens — angry  feeling  against  the  Lacedae- 
monians   707 

AlMbiades  stands  forward  as  a  party-leader.     His  education  and  character.  768 

Greal  energy  and  capacity  of  Alkibiades  in  public  affairs — his  reckless 
expenditure  lawless  demeanor— unprincipled  character,  inspiring  sus- 
picion and  alarm-  military  service 769 

Alkibiades  -Sok rates-  the  Sophists 770 

Conflicting. sentiments  entertained  toward  Alkibiades— his  great  energy  and 

city.     Admiration,  fear,  hatred,  and  jealousy,  which  he  inspires 772 

Alkibiades  tries  to  renew  the  ancient  but  interrupted  connection  of  his 
ancestors  with  Laeedacmon.  as  proxeni 773 

The  Spartans  reject  his  advances— he  turns  against  them— alters  his  politics, 
and  becomes  their  enemy  at  Athens 773 

He  tries  to  bring-  Athens  into  alliance  with  Argos 774 

He  induces  the  Argeians  to  send  envoys  to  Athens— the  Argeians  eagerly 
embrace  this  opening,  and  drop  their  negotiations  with  Sparta 774 

Embassy  of  the  Lacedaemonians  to  Athens,  to  press  the  Athenians  not  to 
throw  up  the  alliance.    The  envoys  are  favorably  received 775 

Trick  by  which  Alkibiades  cheats  and  disgraces  the  envoys,  and  baffles  the 
Lacedaemonian  project    Indignation  of  the  Athenians  against  Sparta 775 

Nikias  prevails  with  the  assembly  to  send  himself  and  others  as  envoys  to 
Sparta,  in  order  to  clear  up  the  embarrassment 777 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  II.  39 

PAGE 

Failure  of  the  embassy  of  Nikias  at  Sparta— Athens  concludes  the  alliance 

with  Argos,  Elis,  and  Mantineia <™ 

Conditions  of  this  convention  and  alliance. v  •/■■•; ;-\y. i™ 

Complicated  relations  among  the  Grecian  states  as  to  treaty  and  alliance. .  <  .9 
Olympic  festival  of  the  90th  Olympiad,  July  420  B.c.-its  memorable  char- 

acter  '8(J 

First  appearance  of  Athens  at  the  Olympic  festival  since  the  beginnmg  of 

the  war.    Immense  display  of  Alkibiades  in  the  chariot-race ........ .  . . . . .  .80 

The  Eleians  exclude  the  Spartan  sacred  legation  from  this  Olympic  festival, 

in  consequence  of  alleged  violation  of  the  Olympic  truce ^81 

Alarm  felt  at  the  festival  lest  the  Spartans  should  come  in  arms 783 

Depressed  estimation  of  Sparta  throughout  Greece-Herakleia 83 

CHAPTER  LV1 

From  the  Festival  of  Olympiad  90,  down  to  the  Battle  of  Mantineia. 

New  policy  of  Athens  attempted  by  Alkibiades 784 

Expedition  of  Alkibiades  into  the  interior  of  Peloponnesus 7 85 

Attack  upon  Epidaurus  by  Argos  and  Athens 786 

Movements  of  the  Spartans  and  Argeians — ....   <»o 

The  sacred  month  Karneius— trick  played  by  the  Argeians  with  their  calen- 

,jar  1 86 

Congress  at  Mantineia  for  peace— the  discussions  prove  abortive 787 

Athenian  lordship  of  the  sea— the  alliance  between  Athens  and  Sparta  con- 

tinues  in  name,  but  is  indirectly  violated  by  both 788 

Invasion  of  Argos  by  Agis  and  the  Lacedaemonians,  Boeotians,  and  Conn- 

thians • • • JJ8 

Approach  of  the  invaders  to  Argos  by  different  lmes  of  march 789 

Superior  forces  and  advantageous  position  of  the  invaders— danger  of  Argos 
—Agis  takes  upon  him  to  grant  an  armistice  to  the  Argeians,  and  with- 
draws the  army— dissatisfaction  of  the  allies 790 

Severe  censure  against  Agis  on  his  return  to  Sparta 791 

Tardy  arrival  of  Alkibiades,  Laches,  etc.,  with  the  Athenian  contingent  at 
Argos— expedition  of   Athenians,   Eleians,   Mantineians,   and   Argeians, 

against  the  Arcadian  town  of  Orchomenus 791 

Plans  against  Tegea — the  Eleians  return  home 792 

Danger  of  Tegea— Agis  and  the  Lacedaemonians  march  to  its  relief 792 

Maneuvers  of  Agis  to  bring  on  a  battle  on  fair  ground 793 

Forward  march  and  new  position  of  the  Argeians 794 

The  Lacedaemonians  are  surprised :  their  sudden  and  ready  formation  into 

battle  order 794 

Gradation  of  command  and  responsibility  peculiar  to  the  Lacedaemonian 

army 794 

Lacedaemonian  line  :  privileged  post  of  the  Skiritae  on  the  left. 795 

Uncertain  numbers  of  both  armies 795 

Preliminary  harangues  to  the  soldiers 796 

Battle  of  Mantineia 797 

Movement  ordered  by  Agis,  on  the  instant  before  the  battle  :  his  order  dis- 
obeyed.   His  left  wing  is  defeated «. 797 

Complete  ultimate  victory  of  the  Lacedaemonians 798 

Great  effects  of  the  victory  in  re-establishing  the  reputation  of  Sparta 799 

Operations  of  Argeians,  Eleians,  etc.,  near  Epidaurus 799 

Political  change  at  Argos,  arising  out  of  the  battle  of  Mantineia 800 

Oligarchical  conspiracy  of  the  Thousand-regiment  at  Argos,  in  concert  with 

the  Lacedaemonians 801 

Treaty  of  peace  between  Sparta  and  Argos 801 

Treaty  of  alliance  between  Sparta  and  Argos— dissolution  of  the  alliance  of 

Argos  with  Athens,  Mantineia,  and  Elis 802 

Submission  of  Mantineia  to  Sparta 803 


40  CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  IL 

PAGE 

Oligarchical  revolution  effected  at  Argos  by  the  Thousand,  in  concert  with 

Hi!. I  nans 803 

I  the  towns  in  Achaia 804 

ces  of  the  Thousand  at  Argos:   counter-revolution  in  that  town: 

restoration  of  the  democracy 805 

Proceedings  of  the  restored  Argeian  Demos:  tardiness  of  Sparta 806 

Alkibiades  at  Argos  :  measures  for  the  protection  of  the  democracy 807 

Nominal  pi  ace,  6u1  precarious  relations,  between  Athens  and  Sparta 807 

as  of  Athens  with  Perdikkas  of  Macedonia 808 

of  Athens  about  Amphipolis:  improvidence  of  Nikias  and  the 

of  Alkibiades 808 

ted  contention  of  ostracism  between  NiMas  and  Alkibiades.    Propo- 

nipported  by  Hyperholus 810 

Gradual  desuetude  of  the  ostracism,  as  the  democracy  became  assured 810 

of  Melos  by  the  Athenians 811 

;   forth   by  Thucydides,  between  the  Athenian  envoys  and  the 

Executive  Council  of  Melos 812 

Langu  by  Thucydides  as  having  been  held  by  the  Athenian 

envoys    with  the  replies  of  the  Medians 812 

Refusal  of  tin-  Melians  to  submit 814 

ore  of  Melos 814 

Remarks  upon  t  he  event 815 

View  taken  by  Thucydides  of  this  incident 815 

Place  which  it  occupies  in  the  general  historical  conception  of  Thucydides. .  817 

CHAPTER  LVH. 

Sicilian  Affairs  after  the  Extinction  of  the  Gelonian  Dynasty. 

Expulsion  of  the  Gelonian  dynasty  from  Syracuse,  and  of  other  despots 

Eri  >m  the  other  Sicilian  towns 818 

Large  changes  of  resident  inhabitants — effects  of  this  fact 818 

Relative  power  and  condition  of  the  Sicilian  cities.    Political  dissensions  at 

Syracuse.    Ostracism  tried  and  abandoned 819 

Power  and  foreign  exploits  of  Syracuse  820 

Sikels  in  the  interior  of  Sicily— the  Sikel  prince  Duketius— he  founds  the  new 

town  of  Palike 820 

I  and  becomes  the  prisoner  of  the  Syra- 

cusans,  who  spare  him  and  send  him  to  Corinth 821 

Duketius  breaks  Ins  parole  and  returns  to  Sicily 821 

Conquests  of  Syracuse  in  the  interior  of  Sicily— death  of  Duketius 822 

ity  and  power  of  Agrigentum 822 

Intellectual  movement  in  Sicily— Empedokles — Tisias— Korax — Giorgias —  823 
Sicilian  cities    their  condition  and  proceedings  at  the  first  breaking  out  of 

the  Peloponnesian  war.  131  b.c 823 

ins  of  Sicily  to  Athens  and  Sparta— altered  by  the  quarrel  between 

Corinth  and  Eorkyra  and  the  intervention  of  Athens 824 

Expectations  entertained  by  Sparta  of  aid  from  the  Sicilian  Dorians,  at  the 

tning  of  the  Peloponnesian  war.    Expectations  not  realized 824 

irian  cities  in  Sicily  attack  the  Ionian  cities  in  Sicily 825 

ic  cities  in  Sicily  solicit  aid  from  Athens— first  Athenian  expedition 

to  Sicily  und   r  Laches 826 

Second  expedition  under  Pythodorus 826 

Indecisive  i, pe rat ''mis  neat-  Mcssene  and  Rhegium 827 

eniansby  the  Naxians  and  Sikels.  near  Naxos 828 

Euryinede.li  and  Sophokles,  with  a  larger  Athenian  fleet,  arrive  in  Sicily —  828 

ess  of  the  Sicilian  cities  al  Gela.    Speech  of  Hermokrates H~'9 

Genera]  peace  made  between  the  Sicilian  cities.    Em-ymedon  accedes  to  the 

peace,  and  withdraws  the  Athenian  fleet  829 

Displeasure  of  the  Athenians  against  Eurymedon  and  his  colleagues 830 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  II.  41 

Intestine  dissension  in  Leontini— expulsion  of  the  Leontine  Demos  bv  theAGE 

aid  of  Syracuse '    J         gg0 

Application  of  the  Leontine  Demos  for  lieip  to  Athens.' '  The  Athenians  send 

.Pnaeax  to  make  observations g3< 

Leontini  depopulated— the  Demos  expelled— Leontine  exiles  "at  Athens' ' '  '  83" 
War  between  Sehmis  and  Egesta— the  latter  applies  to  Athens  for  aid  "  "  832 
Promises  of  the  Egestasans  :  motives  offered  to  Athens  for  intervention  in 

Sicily 333 

Alkibiades  warmly  espouses  their  cause,  and  advises  intervention 833 

Inspecting  commissioners  dispatched  by  the  Athenians  to  Egesta— frauds 

practiced  by  the  Egestasans  to  delude  them 834 

Keturn  of  the  commissioners  to  Athens— impression  produced   by  their 

report.    Resolution  taken  to  send  an  expedition  to  Sicily '. 834 

Embarrassment  of  Nikias  as  opposer  of  the  expedition '.'.'.'..'.  835 

Speech  of  Nikias  at  the  second  assembly  held  by  the  Athenians 835 

Reply  of  Alkibiades 837 

The  assembly  favorable  to  the  views  of  Alkibiades— adheres  to  the  resolu- 
tion of  sailing  to  Sicily 839 

Second  speech  of  Nikias — exaggerating  the  difficulties  and  dangers  of  the 

expedition,  and  demanding  a  force  on  the  larger  scale 839 

Effect  of  this  speech — increased  eagerness  of  the  assembly  for  the  expedi- 
tion— ardor  and  unanimity  in  reference  to  the  plan 840 

Excitement  in  the  city  among  all  classes — great  increase  in  the  scale  on 

which  the  expedition  was  planned 841 

Large  preparations  made  for  the  expedition 841 

Review  of  these  preliminary  proceedings  to  the  Sicilian  expedition 841 

Advice  and  influence  of  Nikias 842 

Advice  and  influence  of  Alkibiades 842 

Athens  believed  herself  entitled  to  be  mistress  of  the  islands  as  well  as  of 
the  sea 844 


PAET  II. 

CONTINUATION  OF  HISTORICAL  GREECE. 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 

LYKIC  POETRY. — THE  SEVEN  WISE  MEN. 

The  interval  between  776-560  b.c.  presents  to  us  a  remarkable 
expansion  of  Grecian  genius  in  tbe  creation  of  tbeir  elegiac,  iambic, 
lyric,  choric,  and  nomic  poetry,  which  was  diversified  in  a  great 
many  ways  and  improved  by  many  separate  masters.  The  creators 
of  all  these  different  styles — from  Kallinus  and  Archilochus  down  to 
Stesichorus — fall  within  the  two  centuries  here  included;  though 
Pindar  and  Simonides,  "  the  proud  and  high-crested  bards,"  who  car- 
ried lyric  and  choric  poetry  to  the  maximum  of  elaboration  consistent 
with  full  poetical  effect,  lived  in  the  succeeding  century,  and  were 
contemporary  with  the  tragedian  ./Eschylus.  The  Grecian  drama, 
comic  as  well  as  tragic,  of  the  fifth  century  B.C.,  combined  the  lyric 
and  choric  song  with  the  living  action  of  iambic  dialogue — thus  con- 
stituting the  last  ascending  movement  in  the  poetical  genius  of  the 
race.  Reserving  this  for  a  future  time,  and  for  the  history  of 
Athens,  to  which  it  more  particularly  belongs,  I  now  propose  to 
speak  only  of  the  poetical  movement  of  the  two  earlier  centuries, 
wherein  Athens  had  little  or  no  part.  So  scanty  are  the  remnants, 
unfortunately,  of  these  earlier  poets,  that  we  can  offer  little  except 
criticisms  borrowed  at  second  hand,  and  a  few  general  considerations 
on  their  workings  and  tendency. 

Archilochus  and  Kallinus  both  appear  to  fall  about  the  middle  of 
the  seventh  century  B.C.,  and  it  is  with  them  that  the  innovations  in 
Grecian  poetry  commence.  Before  them,  we  are  told,  there  existed 
nothing  but  the  Epos,  or  Dactylic  Hexameter  poetry  of  which  much 
has  been  said  in  my  former  volume — being  legendary  stories  or 
adventures  narrated,  together  with  addresses  or  hymns  to  the  gods. 
We  must  recollect,  too,  that  this  was  not  only  the  whole  poetry,  but 
the  whole  literature  of  the  age.  Prose  composition  was  altogether 
unknown.  Writing,  if  beginning  to  be  employed  as  an  aid  to  a  few 
superior  men,  was  at  any  rate  generally  unused,  and  found  no  read- 

43 


44         LYRIC  POETRY.— THE  SEVEN  WISE  MEN. 

ing  public.  The  voice  was  the  only  communicant,  and  the  ear  the 
only  recipient,  of  all  those  ideas  and  feelings  which  productive  minds 
in  the  community  found  themselves  impelled  to  pour  out;  and  both 
voice  and  ear  were  accustomed  to  a  musical  recitation  or  chant, 
apparently  something  between  song  and  speech,  with  simple  rhythm 
and  a  still  simpler  occasional  accompaniment  from  the  primitive  four- 
Btringed  harp.  Such  babits  and  requirements  of  the  voice  and  ear 
t  thai  time,  inseparably  associated  with  the  success  and  popu- 
larity of  the  poet,  and  contributed  doubtless  to  restrict  the  range  of 
subjects  with  which  he  could  deal.  The  type  was  to  a  certain  extent 
crated,  like  the  primitive  statues  of  the  gods,  from  which  men 
only  ventured  to  deviate  by  gradual  and  almost  unconscious  innova- 
Mbreover,  in  the  first  half  of  the  seventh  century  B.C.,  that 
genius  which  had  once  created  an  Iliad  and  an  Odyssey  was  no  longer 
to  be   found.     The  work  of  hexameter  narrative  had  come  to  be 

uted  by  less  gifted  persons — by  those  Cyclic  poets  of  whom  I 
have  spoken  in  the  preceding  volumes. 

Such,  as  far  as  we  can  make  it  out  amidst  very  uncertain  evidence, 
was  the  state  of  the  Greek  mind  immediately  before  elegiac  and  lyric 
poets  appeared;  while  at  the  same  time  its  experience  was  enlarging 
by  the  formation  of  new  colonies,  and  the  communion  among  various 
states  tending  to  increase  by  the  free  reciprocity  of  religious  games 
and  festivals.  There  arose  a  demand  for  turning  the  literature  of  the 
age  (I  use  this  word  as  synonymous  with  the  poetry)  to  new  feelings 
and  purposes,  and  for  applying  the  rich,  plastic,  and  musical  lan- 
guage of  the  old  epic,  to  present  passion  and  circumstance,  social  as 

-  individual.  Such  a  tendency  had  become  obvious  in  Hesiod, 
even  within  the  range  of  hexameter  verse.  Now  the  same  causes 
which  led  to  an  enlargement  of  the  subjects  of  poetry  inclined  men 
also  to  vary  the  meter.  In  regard  to  this  latter  point,  there  is  reason 
io  believe  that  the  expansion  of  Greek  music  was  the  immediate  deter- 
mining cause.  For  it  has  been  already  stated  that  the  musical  scale 
and  instruments  of  the  Greeks,  originally  very  narrow,  were  mate- 
rially enlarged  by  borrowing  from  Phyrgia  and  Lydia,  and  these 
acquisitions  seem  to  have  been  first  realized  about  the  beginning  of 
the  seventh  century  B.C.,  through  the  Lesbian  harper  Terpander — the 
Phrygian  (or  Greco  Phrygian)  flute-player  Olympus — and  the  Arka- 
dian  or  Bceotion  flute-player  Klonas.  Terpander  made  the  important 
ace  of  exchanging  the  original  four-stringed  harp  for  one  of  seven 
abracing  the  compass  of  one  octave  or  two  Greek  tetra- 
chords;  while  Olympus  us  well,  as  Klonas  taught  many  new  nomes  or 

on  the  flute,  to  which  the  Greeks  had  before  been  strangers 
-  probably  also  the  use  of  a  flute  of  more  varied  musical  compass. 
Terpander  is  said  to  have  gained  the  prize  at  the  first  recorded  cele- 
bration of  the  Lacedaemonian  festival  of  the  Karneia,  in  676  b.c.  This 
i.^  one  of  the  best-ascertain*  d  points  among  the  obscure  chronology  of 
the  .seventh  century;  and  there  seem  grounds  for  assigning  Olympus 


ARCHILOCHUS— KALLINUS.  45 

and  Klonas  to  nearly  the  same  period,  a  little  before  Archiloclms  and 
Kallinus.  To  Terpander,  Olympus,  and  Klonas  are  ascribed  the 
formation  of  the  earliest  musical  uomes  known  to  the  inquiiing 
Greek  of  later  times ;  to  the  first,  nomes  on  the  harp ;  to  the  two 
latter,  on  the  flute — every  nome  being  the  general  scheme  or  basis  of 
which  the  airs  actually  performed  constituted  so  many  variations, 
within  certain  defined  limits.  Terpander  employed  his  enlarged 
instrumental  power  as  a  new  accompaniment  to  the  Homeric  poems, 
as  well  as  to  certain  epic  proemia  or  hymns  to  the  gods  of  his  own 
composition.  But  he  does  not  seem  to  have  departed  from  the  hex 
ameter  verse  and  the  dactylic  rhythm,  to  which  the  new  accompani- 
ment was  probably  not  quite  suitable;  and  the  idea  may  thus  have 
been  suggested  of  combining  the  words  also  according  to  new  rhyth- 
mical and  metrical  laws. 

It  is  certain,  at  least,  that  the  age  (670-600)  immediately  succeed- 
ing Terpander  —  comprising  Archilochus,  Kallinus,  Tyrtams,  and 
Alkman,  whose  relations  of  time  one  to  another  we  have  no  certain 
means  of  determining,  though  Alkman  seems  to  have  been  the 
latest — presents  a  remarkable  variety  both  of  new  meters  and  of  new 
rhythms,  superinduced  upon  the  previous  Dactylic  Hexameter.  The 
first  departure  from  this  latter  is  found  in  the  elegiac  verse,  employed 
seemingly  more  or  less  by  alt  the  four  above-mentioned  poets,  but 
chiefly  by  the  first  two,  and  even  ascribed  by  some  to  the  invention 
of  Kallinus.  Tyrtoeus  in  his  military  march-songs  employed  the 
Anapestic  meter,  while  in  Archilochus  as  well  as  in  Alkman  we  find 
traces  of  a  much  larger  range  of  metrical  variety — iambic,  trochaic, 
anapestic,  Ionic,  etc. — sometimes  even  asynartetic  or  compound 
meters,  anapestic  or  dactylic  blended  w  itli  trochaic  or  iambic.  What 
we  have  remaining  from  Mimnernms  who  comes  shortly  after  the 
preceding  four  is  elegiac.  His  contemporaries  Alkaeus  and  Sappho, 
besides  employing  most  of  those  meters  which  they  found  existing, 
invented  each  a  peculiar  stanza,  which  is  familiarly  known  under  a 
name  derived  from  each.  In  Solon,  the  younger  contemporary  of 
Mimnermus,  we  have  the  elegiac,  iambic,  and  trochaic:  in  Theognis, 
yet  later,  the  elegiac  only.  Arion  and  Stesichorus  appear  to  have 
been  innovators  in  this  department,  the  former  by  his  improvement 
in  the  dithyrambic  chorus  or  circular  song  and  dance  in  honor  of 
Dionysus — the  latter  by  his  more  elaborate  choric  compositions, 
containing  not  only  a  strophe  and  antistrophe,  but  also  a  third  divis- 
ion or  epode  succeeding  them,  pronounced  by  the  chorus  standing 
still.  Both  Anakreou  and  Ibykus  likewise  added  to  the  stock  of 
existing  metrical  varieties.  We  thus  see  that  within  the  century  and 
a  half  succeeding  Terpander,  Greek  poetry  (or  Greek  literature, 
which  was  then  the  same  thing)  became  greatly  enriched  in  matter 
as  well  as  diversified  in  form. 

To  a  certain  extent  there  seems  to  have  been  a  real  connection 
between  the  two.     New  forms  were  essential  for  the  expression  of 


40         LYEIC  POETRY. -THE  SEVEN  WISE  MEN. 

new  wants  and  feelings — though  the  assertion  that  elegiac  meter  is 
especially  adapted  for  one  set  of  feelings,  trochaic  for  a  second,  and 
iambic  for  a  third,  if  true  at  all,  ean  only  !»<■  admitted  with  great  lati- 
tude of  exception,  when  we  find  so  many  of  them  employed  by  the 
poets  for  very  different  subjects — gay  or  melancholy,  bitter  or  com- 
plaining, earnest  or  sprightly — seemingly  with  little  discrimination. 
But  the  adoption  of  some  new  meter,  different  from  the  perpetual 
series  of  hexameters,  was  required  when  the  poet  desired  to  do  some- 
thing more  than  recount  a  loni^  story  or  fragment  of  heroic  legend 
— when  he  sought  to  bring  himself,  his  friends,  his  enemies,  his  city 
his  hopes  and  fears  with  regard  to  matters  recent  or  impending,  all 
before  the  notice  of  the  hearer,  and  that  too  at  once  with  brevity 
and  animation.  The  Greek  hexameter,  like  our  blank  verse,  has  nil 
its  limiting  conditions  bearing  upon  each  separate  line,  and  presents 
to  the  hearer  no  predetermined  resting-place  or  natural  pause  beyond. 
In  reference  to  any  long  composition,  either  epic  and  dramatic,  such 
unrestrained  license  is  found  convenient,  and  the  case  was  similar 
for  Greek  epos  and  drama — the  single-lined  iambic  trimeter  being 
generally  used  for  the  dialogue  of  tragedy  and  comedy,  just  as  the 
dactylic  hexameter  had  been  used  for  the  epic.  The  metrical  changes 
introduced  by  Archilochus  and  his  contemporaries  may  be  compared 
to  a  change  from  our  blank  verse  to  the  rhymed  couplet  and  quatrain. 
The  verse  was  thrown  into  little  systems  of  two,  three,  or  four  lines, 
with  a  pause  at  the  end  of  each;  and  the  halt  thus  assured  to,  as  well 
as  expected  and  relished  by,  the  ear,  was  generally  coincident  with 
a  close,  entire  or  partial,  in  the  sense  which  thus  came  to  be  distrib- 
uted with  greater  point  and  effect. 

The  elegiac  verse,  or  common  hexameter  and  pentameter  (this 
second  line  being  an  hexameter  with  the  third  and  sixth  thesis,  or 
the  last  half  of  the  third  and  sixth  foot  suppressed,  and  a  pause  left 
in  place  of  it),  as  well  as  the  epode  (or  iambic  trimeter  followed  by 
an  iambic  dimeter)  and  some  other  binary  combinations  of  verse 
which  we  trace  among  the  fragments  of  Archilochus,  are  conceived 
with  a  view  to  such  increase  of  effect  both  on  the  ear  and  the  mind, 
not  less  than  to  the  direct  pleasures  of  novelty  and  variety.  The 
iambic  meter,  built  upon  the  primitive  iambus  or  coarse  and  licen- 
tious jesting  which  formed  a  part  of  some  Grecian  festivals  (espe- 
cially of  the  festivals  of  Demeter  as  well  in  Attica  as  in  Paros,  the 
native  country  of  the  poet),  is  only  one  amongst  many  new  paths 
struck  out  by  this  inventive  genius.  His  exuberance  astonishes  us, 
when  we  consider  that  betakes  his  start  from  little  more  than  the 
simple  hexameter,  in  which  too  he  was  a  distinguished  composer 
— for  even  of  the  elegiac  verse,  he  is  as  likely  to  have  been  the  inven- 
tor as  Kallinus,  just  as  he  was  the  earliest  popular  and  successful 
composer  of  table-songs  or  Skolia,  though  Terpander  may  have  origi- 
nated some  such  before  him.  The  entire  loss  of  his  poems,  except- 
ing some  few  fragments,  enables  us  to  recognize  little  more  than 


SIMONIDES  OF  AMORGOS.  47 

one  characteristic — the  intense  personality  which  pervaded  them,  as 
well  as  that  coarse,  direct,  and  outspoken  license,  which  afterwards 
lent  such  terrible  effect  to  the  old  comedy  at  Athens.  His  lampoons 
are  said  to  have  driven  Lykambes,  the  father  of  Neobule,  to  hang 
himself.  Neobule  had  been  promised  to  Archilochus  in  marriage, 
but  that  promise  was  broken,  and  the  poet  assailed  both  father  and 
daughter  with  every  species  of  calumny.  In  addition  to  this  disap- 
pointment, he  was  poor,  the  son  of  a  slave-mother,  and  an  exile 
from  his  country  Paros  to  the  unpromising  colony  of  Thosos.  The 
desultory  notices  respecting  him  betray  a  state  of  suffering  combined 
frith  loose  conduct  which  vented  itself  sometimes  in  complaint,  some- 
times in  libelous  assault.  He  was  at  last  slain  by  some  whom  his 
muse  had  thus  exasperated.  His  extraordinary  poetical  genius  finds 
but  one  voice  of  encomium  throughout  antiquity.  His  triumphal 
song  to  Herakles  was  still  popularly  sung  by  the  victors  at  Olympia, 
near  two  centuries  after  his  death,  in  the  days  of  Pindar;  but  that 
majestic  and  complimentary  poet  at  once  denounces  the  malignity, 
and  attests  the  retributive  suffering  of  the  great  Parian  iambist. 

Amidst  the  multifarious  veins  in  which  Archilochus  displayed  his 
genius,  moralizing  or  gnomic  poetry  is  not  wanting ;  while  his  con- 
temporary Simonides  of  Amorgos  devotes  the  Iambic  meter  espe- 
cially to  this  destination,  afterward  followed  out  by  Solon  and 
Theognis.  Kallinus,  the  earliest  celebrated  elegiac  poet,  so  far  as 
we  can  judge  from  his  few  fragments,  employed  the  elegiac  meter 
for  exhortations  of  warlike  patriotism;  and  the  more  ample  remains 
which  we  possess  of  Tyrta3us  are  sermons  in  the  same  strain, 
preaching  to  the  Spartans  bravery  against  the  foe,  and  unanimity 
as  well  as  obedience  to  the  law  at  home.  They  are  patriotic  effusions, 
called  forth  by  the  circumstances  of  the  time,  and  sung  by  single 
voice,  with  accompaniment  of  the  flute,  to  those  in  whose  bosoms 
the  flame  of  courage  was  to  be  kindled.  For  though  what  we 
peruse  is  in  verse,  we  are  still  in  the  tide  of  real  and  present  life,  and 
we  must  suppose  ourselves  rather  listening  to  an  orator  addressing 
the  citizens  when  danger  or  dissension  is  actually  impending.  It 
is  only  in  the  hands  of  Mimnermus  that  elegiac  verse  comes  to  be 
devoted  to  soft  and  amatory  subjects.  His  few  fragments  present 
a  vein  of  passive  and  tender  sentiment,  illustrated  by  appropriate 
matter  of  legend,  such  as  would  be  cast  into  poetry  in  all  ages,  and 
quite  different  from  the  rhetoric  of  Kallinus  andTyrtaeus. 

The  poetical  career  of  Alkman  is  again  distinct  from  that  of  any 
of  his  above-mentioned  contemporaries.  Their  compositions,  besides 
hymns  to  the  gods,  were  principally  expressions  of  feeling  intended 
to  be  sung  by  individuals,  though  sometimes  also  suited  for  the 
Komus  or  band  of  festive  volunteers,  assembled  on  some  occasion  of 
common  interest:  those  of  Alkman  were  principally  choric,  intended 
for  the  song  and  accompanying  dauce  of  the  chorus.  He  was  a 
native  of  Sardis  in  Lydia,  or  at  least  his  family  were  so :  and  he 


48         LYRIC  POETRY.— THE  SEVEN  WISE  MEN. 

appears  to  have  come  in  early  life  to  Sparta,  though  his  genius  and 
mastery  of  the  Greek  language  discountenance  the  story  thai  he  was 
broughl  over  to  Sparta  as  a  slave.  The  most  ancient  arrangement 
of  music  ;ii  Sparta,  generally  ascribed  to  Terpander,  underwent  con- 
siderable alteration,  nol  only  through  the  elegiac  and  anapestic 
measures  of  Tyrt»us,  bu1  also  through  the  Kretan  Thaletas  and 
the  Lydian  Alkman.  The  harp,  the  instrument  of  Terpander,  was 
rivaled  and  in  pari  superseded  by  the  flute  or  pipe,  which  had  been 
recently  rendered  more  effective  in  the  hands  of  Olympus,  Klonas, 
and  Polymnestus,  and  which  gradually  became,  for  compositions 
intended'  to  raise  strong  emotion,  the  favorite  instrument  of  the  two 
i  eing  employed  as  accompaniment  both  to  the  elegies  of  Tyrtseus, 
and  to  the  hyporchemata  (songs  or  hymns  combined  with  dancing) 
of  Thaletas;  also,  as  the  stimulus  and  regulator  to  the  Spartan  mili- 
tary march.  These  elegies  (as  has  been  just  remarked)  were  sung 
by  one  person  in  the  midst  of  an  assembly  of  listeners,  and  there 
were  doubtless  other  conpositions  intended  for  the  individual  voice. 
But  iu  general  such  was  not  the  character  of  music  and  poetry  at 
Sparta;  everything  done  there,  both  serious  and  recreative,  was 
public  and  collective,  so  that  the  chorus  and  its  performance  received 
e.\t  inordinary  development. 

It  has  been  already  stated,  that  the  chorus,  with  song  and  dance 
combined,  constituted  an  important  part  of  divine  service  through- 
out all  Greece.  It  was  originally  a  public  manifestation  of  the 
citizens  generally — a  large  proportion  of  them  being  actively 
engaged  in  it,  and  receiving  some  training  for  the  purpose  as  an 
ordinary  branch  of  education.  Neither  the  song  nor  the  dance  under 
such  conditions  could  be  otherwise  than  extremely  simple.  But  in 
process  of  time,  the  performance  at  the  chief  festival  tended  to  be- 
come more  elaborate  and  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  persons  expressly 
and  professionally  trained — the  mass  of  the  citizens  gradually  ceasing 
to  take  active  part,  and  being  present  merely  as  spectators.  Such 
was  the  practice  which  grew  up  in  most  parts  of  Greece,  and  espe- 
cially at  Athens,  where  the  dramatic  chorus  acquired  its  highest  per- 
il. But  the  drama  never  found  admission  at  Sparta,  and  the 
peculiarity  of  Spartan  life  tended  much  to  keep  up  the  popular 
chorus  on  its  ancient  looting.  It  formed  in  fact  one  element  in  that 
never-ceasing  drill  to  which  the  Spartans  were  subject  from  their 
boyhood,  and  it  served  a  purpose  analogous  to  their  military  train- 
ing, in  accustoming  them  to  simultaneous  and  regulated  movement 
imuch  that  the  comparison  between  the  chorus,  especially  in 
its  Pyrrhic  or  war-dances,  and  the  military  enomoty,  seems  to  have 
been  often  dwelt  upon.  In  the  singing  of  the  solemn  paean  in  honor 
of  Apollo,  at  the  festival  of  the  1  lyakinthia,  King  Agesilaus  was 
under  the  orders  of  the  chorus-master,  ami  sang  in  the  place  allotted 
to  him;  while  the  whole  body  of  Spartans  without  exception — the 
old,  the  middle-aged,  and  the  youth,  the  matrons  and  the  virgins— 


CHORIC  TRAIKENG.  49 

were  distributed  in  various  clioric  companies,  and  trained  to  har- 
mony both  of  voice  and  motion,  which  was  publicly  exhibited  at  the 
solemnities  of  the  G-yninopoedia.  The  word  dancing  must  be  under- 
stood in  a  larger  sense  than  that  in  which  it  is  now  employed,  and 
as  comprising  every  variety  of  rhythmical,  accentuated,  conspiring 
movements,  or  gesticulations,  or  postures  of  the  body,  from  the 
slowest  to  the  quickest;  cheironomy,  or  the  decorous  and  expres- 
sive movement  of  the  hands,  being  especially  practiced. 

We  see  thus  that  both  at  Sparta  and  in  Krete  (which  approached 
in  respect  to  publicity  of  individual  life  most  nearly  to  Sparta)  the 
choric  aptitudes  and  manifestations  occupied  a  larger  space  than  in 
any  other  Grecian  city.  And  as  a  certain  degree  of  musical  and 
rhythmical  variety  was  essential  to  meet  this  want,  while  music  was 
never  taught  to  Spartan  citizens  individually,  we  further  understand 
how  strangers  like  Terpander,  Polymnestus,  Thaletas,  Tyrtaeus,  Alk- 
man,  etc.,  were  not  only  received,  but  acquired  great  influence  at 
Sparta,  in  spite  of  the  preponderant  spirit  of  jealous  seclusion  in  the 
Spartan  character.  All  these  masters  appear  to  have  been  effective 
in  their  own  special  vocation — the  training  of  the  chorus — to  which 
they  imparted  new  rhythmical  action,  and  for  Avhich  they  composed 
new  music.  But  Alkman  did  this,  and  something  more.  He  pos- 
sessed the  genius  of  a  poet,  and  his  compositions  were  read  afterward 
with  pleasure  by  those  who  could  not  hear  them  sung  or  see  them 
danced.  In  the  little  of  his  poems  which  remains  we  recognize  that 
variety  of  rhythm  and  meter  for  which  he  was  celebrated.  In  this 
respect  he  (together  with  the  Kretan  Thaletas,  who  is  said  to  have 
introduced  a  more  vehement  style  both  of  music  and  dance,  with  the 
Kretic  and  Paeouic  rhythm,  into  Sparta)  surpassed  Archilochus,  pre- 
paring the  way  for  the  complicated  choric  movements  of  Stesichorus 
and  Pindar.  Some  of  his  fragments,  too,  manifest  that  fresh  out- 
pouring of  individual  sentiment  and  emotion  which  constitutes  so 
much  of  the  charm  of  popular  poetry.  Besides  his  touching  address 
in  old  age  to  the  Spartan  virgins,  over  whose  song  and  dance  he  had 
been  accustomed  to  preside,  he  is  not  afraid  to  speak  of  his  hearty 
appetite,  satisfied  with  simple  food  and  relishing  a  bowl  of  warm 
broth  at  the  winter  tropic.  He  has  attached  to  the  spring  an  epithet, 
which  comes  home  to  the  real  feelings  of  a  poor  country  more  than 
those  captivating  pictures  which  abound  in  verse,  ancient  as  well  as 
modern.  He  calls  it  "  the  season  of  short  fare" — the  crop  of  the 
previous  year  being  then  nearly  consumed,  the  husbandman  is  com- 
pelled to  pinch  himself  until  his  new  harvest  comes  in.  Those  who 
recollect  that  in  earlier  periods  of  our  history,  and  in  all  countries 
where  there  is  little  accumulated  stock,  an  exhorbitant  difference  is 
often  experienced  in  the  price  of  corn  before  and  after  the  harvest, 
will  feel  the  justice  of  Alkman's  description. 

Judging  from  these  and  from  a  few  other  fragments  of  this  poet, 


50         LYRIC  POETRY.— THE  SEVEN  WISE  MEN. 

Alkman  appears  to  have  combined  the  life  and  exciting  vigor  of 
Archilochufi  in  the  song  properly  so  called,  sung  by  himself  individu- 
ally— with  a  larger  knowledge  of  musical  and  rhythmical  effect  in 
r<  nil  to  the  choric performance.  He  composed  in  the  Lacouian 
dialect — a  variety  of  the  Doric  with  sonic  intermixture  of  ^Eolisms. 
And  it  was  from  him,  jointly  with  those  other  composers  who  figured 
at  Sparta  during  the  century  after  Terpander,  as  well  as  from  the 
simultaneous  development  of  the  choric  muse  in  Argos,  Sikyon, 
Arcadia,  and  other  parts  of  Peloponnesus,  that  the  Doric  dialect 
acquired  permanent  footing  in  Greece,  as  the  only  proper  dialect  for 
choric  compositions.  Continued  by  Stesichorus  and  Pindar,  this 
habit  passed  even  to  the  Attic  dramatists,  whose  choric  songs  are 
thus  in  a  great  measure  Doric,  while  their  dialogue  is  Attic.  At 
Sparta,  as  well  as  m  other  parts  of  Peloponnesus,  the  musical  and 
rhythmical  style  appears  to  have  been  fixed  by  Alkman  and  his  con- 
temporaries, and  to  have  been  tenaciously  maintained,  for  twTo  or 
three  centuries,  with  little  or  no  innovation;  the  more  so,  as  the  flute- 
players  at  Sparta  formed  an  hereditary  profession,  wyho  followed  the 
routine  of  their  fathers. 

Alkman  was  the  last  poet  who  addressed  himself  to  the  popular 
chorus.  Both  Arion  aud  Stesichorus  composed  for  a  body  of  trained 
nun,  -with  a  degree  of  variety  and  involution  such  as  could  not  be 
attained  by  a  mere  fraction  of  the  people.  The  primitive  Dithyram- 
bus  was  a  round  choric  dance  and  song  in  honor  of  Dionysus,  com 
mon  to  Naxos,  Thebes,  and  seemingly  to  many  other  places,  at  the 
Dionysiac  festival — a  spontaneous  effusion  of  drunken  men  in  the 
hour  of  revelry,  wTherein  the  poet  Archilochus,  "with  the  thunder  of 
wine  full  upon  his  mind,"  had  often  taken  the  chief  part.  Its  excit- 
ing character  appi-oached  to  the  worship  of  the  great  mother  in  Asia, 
and  stood  in  contrast  with  the  solemn  and  stately  psean  addressed  to 
Apollo.  Arion  introduced  into  it  an  alteration  such  as  Archilochus 
had  himself  brought  about  in  the  scurrilous  Iambus.  He  converted 
it  into  an  elaborate  composition  in  honor  of  the  god,  sung  and  danced 
by  a  chorus  of  fifty  persons,  not  only  sober,  but  trained  with  great 
strictness;  though  its  rhythm  and  movements,  and  its  equipment  in 
the  character  of  satyrs,  presented  more  or  less  an  imitation  of  the 
primitive  license.  Born  at  Methymna  in  Lesbos,  Arion  appears  as  a 
harper,  singer,  and  composer,  much  favored  by  Periander  at  Cor- 
ii.ih,  in  which  city  he  first  "composed,  denominated,  and  taught  the 
Dithyramb,"  earlier  than  any  one  known  to  Herodotus.  He  did  not, 
however,  remain  permanently  there,  but  traveled  from  city  to  city 
exhibiting  at  the  festivals  lor  money — especially  to  Sicilian  and  Italian 
Greece,  where  he  acquired  large  gains.  We  may  here  again  remark 
how  the  poets  as  well  as  the  festivals  served  to  promote  a  sentiment 
of  unity  among  the  dispersed  Greeks.  Such  transfer  of  the  Dithy- 
ramb, from  the  field  of  spontaneous  nature  into  the  garden  of  art, 


ALK^EUS  AND   SAPPHO.  51 

constitutes  the  first  stage  in  the  refinement  of  Dionysiac  worship; 
which  will  hereafter  be  found  still  farther  exalted  in  the  form  of  the 
Attic  drama. 

The  date  of  Arion  seems  about  600  B.C.,  shortly  after  Alkman: 
that  of  Stesichorus  is  a  few  years  later.  To  the  latter  the  Greek 
chorus  owed  a  high  degree  of  improvement,  and  in  particular  the 
final  distribution  of  its  performance  into  the  Strophe,  the  Antistrophe, 
and  the  Epodus:  the  turn,  the  return,  and  the  rest.  The  rhythm  and 
meter  of  the  song  during  each  strophe  correspoded  with  that  during 
the  antistrophe,  but  was  varied  during  the  epodus,  and  again  varied 
during  the  following  strophes.  Until  this  time  the  song  had  been 
monostrophic,  consisting  of  nothing  more  than  one  uniform  stanza, 
repeated  from  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  the  composition;  so  that 
we  may  easily  see  how  vast  was  the  new  complication  and  difficulty 
introduced  by  Stesichorus — not  less  for  the  performers  than  for  the 
composer,  himself  at  that  time  the  teacher  and  trainer  of  performers. 
Both  this  poet,  and  his  contemporary  the  flute-player  Sakadas  of 
Argos, — who  gained  theprizeat  the  first  three  Pythian  games  founded 
after  the  sacred  war, — seem  to  have  surpassed  their  predecessors  in 
the  breadth  of  subject  which  they  embraced,  borrowing  from  the 
inexhaustible  province  of  ancient  legend,  and  expanding  the  choric 
song  into  a  well-sustained  epical  narrative.  Indeed  these  Pythian 
games  opened  a  new  career  to  musical  composers  just  at  the  time 
when  Sparta  began  to  be  closed  against  musical  novelties. 

Alka3us  and  Sappho,  both  natives  of  Lesbos,  appear  about  con- 
temporaries with  Arion  B.C.  610-580.  Of  their  once  celebrated  lyric 
compositions,  scarcely  anything  remains.  But  the  criticisms  which 
are  preserved  on  both  of  them  place  them  in  strong  contrast  with 
Alkman,  who  lived  and  composed  under  the  more  restrictive  atmos- 
phere of  Sparta — and  in  considerable  analogy  with  the  turbulent 
vehemence  of  Archilochus,  though  without  his  intense  private  malig- 
nity. Both  Alkeeus  and  Sappho  composed  for  their  own  local  audi- 
ence, and  in  their  own  Lesbian  ^Eolic  dialect;  not  because  there  was 
any  peculiar  fitness  in  that  dialect  to  express  their  vein  of  sentiment, 
but  because  it  was  more  familiar  to  their  hearers.  Sappho  herself 
boasts  of  the  pre-eminence  of  the  Lesbian  bards;  and  the  celebrity  of 
Terpander,  Perikleitas,  and  Arion  permits  us  to  suppose  that  there 
may  have  been  before  her  other  popular  bards  in  the  island  who  did 
not  attain  to  a  wide  Hellenic  celebrity.*  Alkseus  included  in  his 
songs  the  fiercest  bursts  of  political  feeling,  the  stirring  alternations 
of  war  and  exile,  and  all  the  ardent  relish  of  a  susceptible  man  lor 
wine  and  love.  The  love-song  seems  to  have  formed  the  principal 
theme  of  Sappho,  who,  however,  also  composed  odes  or  songs  on  a 
great  variety  of  other  subjects,  serious  as  well  as  satirical,  and  is  said 
farther  to  have  first  employed  the  Myxolydian  mode  in  music.  It 
displays  the  tendency  of  the  age  to  metrical  and  rhythmical  novelty, 
that  Alkaeus  and  Sappho  are  said  to  have  each  invented  the  peculiar 


52         LYEIC  POETRY.— THE  SEVEN    WISE  MEN. 

Btanza,  well  known  under  their  respective  names— combinations  of 
thr  dactyl,  trochee,  and  iambus,  analogous  to  the  asynartetic  verses 
of  Ajchilochus.  They  by  qo  means  confined  themselves  however  to 
Alkaic  and  Sapphic  meter.  Both  the  one  and  the  other  composed 
hymns  to  the  gods;  indeed  this  is  a  theme  common  to  all  the  lyric 
and  choric  poets,  whatever  may  be  their  peculiarities  in  other  ways. 
Mi  >s1  of  their  compositions  were  songs  for  the  single  voice,  not  for 
the  chorus.  The  poetry  of  Alkseus  is  the  more  worthy  of  note,  as  it 
is  the  earliest  instance  of  the  employment  of  the  Muse  in  actual 
political  wai  fare,  and  shows  the  increased  hold  which  that  motive 
was  acquiring  on  the  Grecian  mind. 

The  nomic  poets,  or  moralists  in  verse,  approach  by  the  tone  of 
their  sentiments  more  to  the  nature  of  prose.  They  begin  with 
Bimonides  of  Amorgos  or  of  Samos,  the  contemporary  of  Archilo- 
clms.  Indeed  Archilochus  himself  devoted  some  compositions  to  the 
illustrative  fable,  which  had  not  been  unknown  even  to  Hesiod.  In 
the  remains  of  Simonides  of  Amorgos  we  trace  nothing  relative  to 
the  man  personally,  though  he  too,  like  Archilochus,  is  said  to  have 
had  an  individual  enemy,  Orodcekides,  whose  character  was  aspersed 
by  his  Muse.  His  only  considerable  poem  extant  is  devoted  to  a  sur- 
vey of  the  characters  of  women,  in  iambic  verse,  and  by  way  of  com- 
parison with  various  animals — the  mare,  the  ass,  the  bee,  etc.  This 
poem  follows  out  the  Hesiodic  vein  respecting  the  social  and  eco- 
nomical mischief  usually  caused  by  women,  with  some  few  honor- 
able exceptions.  But  the  poet  shows  a  much  larger  range  of  obser- 
vation and  illustration,  if  we  compare  him  with  his  predecessor 
Hesiod ;  moreover  his  illustrations  come  fresh  from  life  and  reality. 
We  find  in  this  early  iambist  the  same  sympathy  with  industry  and 
its  due  rewards,  which  is  observable  in  Hesiod,  together  with  a  still 
more  melancholy  sense  of  the  uncertainty  of  human  events. 

Of  Solon  and  Theognis  I  have  spoken  in  former  chapters.  They 
reproduce  in  part  the  moralizing  vein  of  Simonides,  though  with  a 
strong  admixture  of  personal  feeling  and  a  direct  application  to  pass- 
im:' (vents.  The  mixture  of  political  with  social  morality,  which  we 
find  in  both,  marks  their  more  advanced  age:  Solon  bears  in  this 
re  pect  the  same  relation  to  Simonides,  as  his  contemporary  Alkaeus 
bears  to  Archilochus.  His  poems,  as  far  as  we  can  judge  by  the 
fragments  remaining,  appear  to  have  been  short  occasional  effusions, 
with  the  exception  of  the  epic  poem  respecting  the  submerged  island 
of  Atlantis;  which  he  began  toward  the  close  of  his  life,  but  never 
finished.  They  are  elegiac,  trimeter  iambic,  and  trochaic  tetrameter; 
in  his  hands  certainly  neither  of  these  meters  can  be  said  to  have  any 
special  or  separate  character.  If  the  poems  of  Solon  are  short,  those 
of  Theognis  are  much  shorter,  and  are  indeed  so  much  broken  (as 
they  stand  in  our  present  collection),  as  to  read  like  separate  epigrams 
or  bursts  of  feeling,  whioh  the  poet  had  not  taken  the  trouble  to 
incorporate  in  any  definite  scheme  or  series.     They  form  a  singular 


SUBORDINATION  OF  ACCOMPANIMENT.  53 

mixture  of  maxim  and  passion — of  general  precept  with  personal 
affection  toward  the  youth  Kyrnus — which  surprises  us  if  tried  by 
the  standard  of  literary  composition,  but  which  seems  a  very  genuine 
manifestation  of  an  impoverished  exile's  complaints  and  restlessness. 
What  remains  to  us  of  Phokylides,  another  of  the  nomic  poets 
nearly  contemporary  with  Solon,  is  nothing  more  than  a  few  max- 
ims in  verse — couplets  with  the  name  of  the  author  in  several  cases 
embodied  in  them. 

Amidst  all  the  variety  of  rhythmical  and  metrical  innovations 
which  have  been  enumerated,  the  ancient  epic  continued  to  be  recited 
by  the  rhapsodes  as  before.  Some  new  epical  compositions  were 
added  to  the  existing  stock:  Eugammon  of  Kyrene,  about  the  50th 
Olympiad  (580  B.C.),  appears  to  be  the  last  of  the  series.  At  Athens, 
especially,  both  Solon  and  Peisistratus  manifested  great  solicitude  as 
well  for  the  recitation  as  for  the  correct  preservation  of  the  Iliad. 
Perhaps  its  popularity  may  have  been  diminished  by  the  competition 
of  so  much  lyric  and  choric  poetry,  more  showy  and  striking  in  its 
accompaniments,  as  well  as  more  changeful  in  its  rhythmical  char- 
acter. Whatever  secondary  effect,  however,  this  newer  species  of 
poetry  may  have  derived  from  such  helps,  its  primary  effect  was  pro- 
duced by  real  intellectual  or  poetical  excellence — by  the  thoughts, 
sentiment,  and  expression,  not  by  the  accompaniment.  For  a  long 
time  the  musical  composer  and  the  poet  continued  generally  to  be 
one  and  the  same  person;  and  besides  those  who  have  acquired  suf- 
ficient distinction  to  reach  posterity,  we  cannot  doubt  that  there  were 
many  known  only  to  their  own  contemporaries.  But  with  all  of 
them  the  instrument  and  the  melody  constituted  only  the  inferior 
part  of  that  which  was  known  by  the  name  of  music — altogether 
subordinate  to  the  "thoughts  that  breathe  and  words  that  burn." 
Exactness  and  variety  of  rhythmical  pronunciation  gave  to  the  words 
their  full  effect  upon  a  delicate  ear;  but  such  pleasure  of  the  ear  was 
ancillary  to  the  emotion  of  mind  arising  out  of  the  sense  conveyed. 
Coin  plaints  are  made  by  the  poets,  even  so  early  as  500  B.C.,  that  the 
accompaniment  was  becoming  too  prominent.  But  it  was  not  until 
the  age  of  the  comic  poet  Aristophanes,  toward  the  end  of  the  fifth 
century  B.C.,  that  the  primitive  relation  between  the  instrumental 
accompaniment  and  the  words  was  really  reversed — and  loud  were 
the  complaints  to  which  it  gave  rise.  The  performance  of  the  flute 
or  harp  then  became  more  elaborate,  showy,  and  overpowering, 
while  the  words  were  so  put  together  as  to  show  off  the  player's  exe- 
cution. I  notice  briefly  this  subsequent  revolution  for  the  purpose 
of  setting  forth,  by  contrast,  the  truly  intellectual  character  of  the 
original  lyric  and  choric  poetry  of  Greece;  and  of  showing  how  much 
the  vague  sentiment  arising  from  mere  musical  sound  was  lost  in  the 
more  definite  emotion,  and  in  the  more  lasting  and  reproductive  com- 
binations, generated  by  poetical  meaning. 

The  name  and  poetry  of  Solon,  and  the  short  maxims  or  sayings  of 


54         LYRIC  POETRY.— THE  SEVEN  WISE  MEN. 

Phokylides,  conduct   ua  to  the  mention  of  the  Seven  "Wise  men  of 

Bolon  was  himself  one  of  the  seven,  and  most,  if  not  all,  of 

thrm  were  poets,  or  c<  in  verse.     To  most  of  them  is  ascribe  id 

also  an  abundance  of  pithy  repartees,  together  with  one  short  saying 

■dm  peculiar  to  each,  serving  as  a  sort  of  distinctive  motto. 
Indeed,    the  test  of  an  accomplished  man  about  this  time  was  his 

for  singing  or  reciting  poetry,  and  for  making  smart  and  ready 
answers.  Respecting  this  constellation  of  Wise  men — who  in  the 
next  century  of  Gr<  cian  history,  when  philosophy  came  to  be  a  mat- 
ter of  discussion  and  argumentation,  were  spoken  of  with  great 
j  —all  the  statements  are  confused,  in  part  even  contradictory. 
Neither  the  number,  nor  the  names,  are  given  by  all  authors  alike. 
Diksearchus  numbered  ten,  Hermippus  seventeen:  the  names  of 
Solon  the  Athenian,  Thales  the  Milesian,  Pittakus  the  Mitylcnean, 
and  Bias  the  Prienean,  were  comprised  in  all  the  lists — and  the 
remaining  names  as  given  by  Plato  were,  Kleobulus  of  Lindus  m 
Rhodes,  Myson  of  Chena?,  and  Cheilon  of  Sparta.  We  cannot  cer- 
tainly  distribute  among  them  the  sayings  or  mottoes,  upon  which  in 
later  days  the  Arnphiktyons  conferred  the  honor  of  inscription  in  the 
Delphian  temple — Know  thyself — Nothing  too  much — Know  thy 
opportunity — Suretyship  is  the  precursor  of  ruin.  Bias  is  praised  as 
an  excellent  judge;  while  Myson  was  declared  by  the  Delphian 
oracle  to  be  the  most  discreet  man  among  the  Greeks,  according  to 
the  testimony  of  the  satirical  poet  Hipponax — this  is  the  oldest  testi- 
mony (540  b.c.)  which  can  be  produced  in  favor  of  any  of  the  Seven. 
But  Kleobulus  of  Lindus,  far  from  being  universally  extolled,  is  pro- 
nounced by  the  poet  Simonides  to  be  a  fool. 

Diksearchus,  however,  justly  observed,  that  these  seven  or  ten  per- 
sons were  not  Wise  Men  or  Philosophers,  in  the  sense  which  those 
v.  Mjils  bore  in  his  day,  but  persons  of  practical  discernment  in  refer- 
ence to  man  and  society — of  the  same  turn  of  mind  as  their  contem- 
porary the  fabulist  jEsop,  though  not  employing  the  same  mode  of 
illustration.  Their  appearance  forms  an  epoch  in  Grecian  history, 
inasmuch  as  they  are  the  first  persons  who  ever  acquired  an  Hellenic 
reputation  grounded  on  mental  competency  apart  from  poetical  genius 
or  effect — a  proof  that  political  and  social  prudence  was  beginning  to 
be  appreciated  and  admired  on  its  own  account.  Solon,  Pittakus, 
Bias,  and  Thales,  were  all  men  of  influence — the  first  two  even  men  of 
ascendency — in  their  respective  cities.  Kleobulus  was  despot  of  Lin- 
dus. and  Periander  (by  some  numbered  among  the  seven)  of  Corinth. 
Thales  stands  distinguished  as  the  earliest  name  in  physical  philos- 
ophy, with  which  the  other  contemporary  Wise  Men  are  not  said  to 
have  meddled.  Their  celebrity  rests  upon  moral,  social,  and  political 
wisdom  exclusively,  which  came  into  greater  honor  as  the  ethical 
feeling  of  the  Greeks  improved  and  as  their  experience  became 
enlarged. 
In  these  celebrated  names  we  have  social  philosophy  in  its  early 


INCREASE  OF  THE  HABIT  OF  WRITING.  55 

and  infantine  state — in  the  shape  of  homely  sayings  or  admonitions, 
either  supposed  to  be  self-evident,  or  to  rest  upon  some  great  author- 
ity divine  or  human,  but  neither  accompanied  by  reasons  nor  recog- 
nizing any  appeal  to  inquiry  and  discussion  as  the  proper  test  of  their 
rectitude.  From  such  incurious  acquiescence,  the  sentiment  to 
which  these  admonitions  owe  their  force,  we  are  partially  liberated 
even  in  the  poet  Simonides  of  Keos,  who  (as  before  alluded  to) 
severely  criticises  the  song  of  Kleobulus  as  well  as  its  author.  The 
half-century  which  followed  the  age  of  Simonides  (the  interval 
between  about  480-430  b.c.)  broke  down  that  sentiment  more  and 
more,  by  familiarizing  the  public  with  argumentative  controversy  in 
the  public  assembly,  the  popular  judicature,  and  even  on  the  drama- 
tic stage.  And  the  increased  self-Avorking  of  the  Grecian  mind,  thus 
•created,  manifested  itself  in  Sokrates,  who  laid  open  all  ethical  and 
60cial  doctrines  to  the  scrutiny  of  reason,  and  who  first  awakened 
among  his  countrymen  that  love  of  dialectics  which  never  left  them 
— an  analytical  interest  in  the  mental  process  of  inquiring  out,  veri- 
fying, proving  and  expounding  truth.  To  this  capital  item  of  human 
progress,  secured  through  the  Greeks — and  through  them  only — to 
mankind  generally,  our  attention  will  be  called  at  a  later  period  of 
the  history.  At  present  it  is  only  mentioned  in  contrast  with  the 
naked,  dogmatical,  laconism  of  the  Seven  Wise  Men,  and  with  the 
simple  enforcement  of  the  early  poets — a  state  in  which  morality  has 
a  certain  place  in  the  feelings,  but  no  root,  even  among  the  superior 
minds,  in  the  conscious  exercise  of  reason. 

The  interval  between  Archilochus  and  Solon  (660-580  B.C.)  seems, 
as  has  been  remarked  in  my  former  volume,  to  be  the  period  in  which 
writing  first  came  to  be  applied  to  Greek  poems — to  the  Homerio 
poems  among  the  number;  and  shortly  after  the  end  of  that  period, 
commences  the  era  of  compositions  without  meter  or  prose.  The 
philosopher  Pherekydes  of  Syros,  about  550  B.C.,  is  called  by  some 
the  earliest  prose-writer.  But  no  prose-writer  for  a  considerable  time 
afterward  acquired  any  celebrity — seemingly  none  earlier  than  Hek- 
ataeus  of  Miletus,  about  510-490  b.c. — prose  being  a  subordinate  and 
ineffective  species  of  composition,  not  always  even  perspicuous,  and 
requiring  no  small  practice  before  the  power  was  acquired  of  render- 
ing it  interesting.  Down  to  the  generation  preceding  Sokrates,  the 
poets  continued  to  be  the  grand  leaders  of  the  Greek  mind.  Until  then, 
nothing  was  taught  to  youth  except  to  read,  to  remember,  to  recite 
musically  and  rhythmically,  and  to  comprehend,  poetical  composition. 
The  comments  of  preceptors  addressed  to  their  pupils  may  probably 
have  become  fuller  and  more  instructive,  but  the  text  still  continued 
to  be  epic  or  lyric  poetry.  These  were  the  best  masters  for  acquiring 
a  full  command  of  the  complicated  accent  and  rhythm  of  the  Greek 
language,  so  essential  to  an  educated  man  in  ancient  times,  and  so 
sure  to  be  detected  if  not  properly  acquired.  Not  to  mention  the 
Choliambist  Hipponax,  who  seems  to  have  been  possessed  with  the 


56  LYRIC  POETRY.—  TI IE  SEVEN  WISE  MEN. 

devil  of  Achilochus,  and  in  part  also  with  his  genius— Anakreon, 
Ibykus,  Pindar,  Baccbylides,  Simonides,  and  the  dramatists  of 
Athens,   continue  the  line  of  eminent  poets  without  intermission. 

the  Persian  war,  the  requirements  of  public  speaking  created  a 
class  of  rhetorical  teachers,  while  the  gradual  spread  of  physical  phil- 
osophy widened  the  range  of  instruction;  so  that  prose  composition, 
for  speech  or  for  writing,  occupied  a  larger  and  larger  share  of  the 
attention  of  nun,  and  was  gradually  wrought  up  to  high  perfection, 
such  as  we  see  for  the  first,  time  in  Ilerodotus.  But  before  it  became 
thus  improved,  and  acquired  that  style  which  was  the  condition  of 
u  ide-spread  popularity,  we  may  be  sure  that  it  had  been  silently  used 
as  a  means  of  recording  information,  and  that  neither  the  large  mass 

graphical  matter  contained  in  the  Periegesis  of  Hekatasus,  nor 
the  map  lii-t  prepared  by  bis  contemporary  Anaximauder,  could 
have  been  presented  to  the  world,  without  the  previous  labors  of 
unpretending  prose  writers,  who  set  down  the  mere  results  of  their 
own  experience.  The  acquisition  of  prose-writing,  commencing  as 
it  does  about  the  age  of  Peisistratus,  is  not  less  remarkable  as  au  evi- 
dence of  past,  than  as  a  means  of  future,  progress. 

Of  that  splendid  genius  in  sculpture  and  architecture,  which  shone 
forth  in  Greece  after  the  Persian  invasion,  the  first  lineaments  only 
are  discoverable  between  600-500  B.C.,  iu  Corinth,  ^Egina,  Samos, 
Chios,  Ephesus,  etc. — enough,  however,  to  give  evidence  of  improve- 
ment and  progress.  Glaukus  of  Chios  is  said  to  have  discovered  the 
art  of  welding  iron,  and  Rhcekus  or  his  son  Theodorus  of  Samos  the 
art  of  easting  copper  or  brass  iu  a  mold.  Both  these  discoveries,  as 
far  as  can  be  made  out,  appear  to  date  a  little  before  600  B.C.  The 
primitive  memorial  erected  in  honor  of  a  god  did  not  even  pretend  to 
be  an  image,  but  was  often  nothing  more  than  a  pillar,  a  board,  a 
shapeless  stone,  a  post,  etc.,  fixed  so  as  to  mark  and  consecrate  the 
locality,  and  receiving  from  the  neighborhood  respectful  care  and 
decoration  as  well  as  worship.  Sometimes  there  was  a  real  statue, 
though  of  the  rudest  character,  carved  in  wood;  and  the  families  of 
carvers — who  from  father  to  son,  exercised  this  profession,  repre- 
sented in  Attica  by  the  name  of  Daedalus  and  in  ^Egina  by  the  name 
of  Smilis — adhered  long  with  strict  exactness  to  the  consecrated  type 
of  each  particular  god.  Gradually  the  wish  grew  up  to  change  the 
materia],  as  well  as  to  correct  the  rudeness,  of  such  primitive  idols. 

imes  the  original  wood  was  retained  as  the  material,  but  covered 

in  part  with  ivory  or  gold — in  other  cases  marble  or  metal  was  substi- 

Dipoenus  and  Skyllisof  Krete  acquired  renown  as  workers  in 

marble  aboul  the  00111  Olympiad  (580  b.c).     From  them  downward, 

a  series  of   names  may-  be  traced,  more  or  less  distinguished;  more- 

ms  aboul  the  same  period  that  the  earliest  temple-offer- 

in  works  of  art  properly  so  called,  commence — the  golden 
statue  of  Zeus,  and  the  large  carved  chest,  dedicated  by  the  Kypse- 
lids  of  Corinth  at  Olympia.     The  pious  associations,  however,  con- 


v    #  * 


^5S 


HERMES  OF  PRAXITELES. 


MONUMENTAL  ORNAMENTS.         57 

nected  with  the  old  type  were  so  strong,  that  the  hand  of  the  artist 
was  greatly  restrained  in  dealing  with  statues  of  the  gods.  It  was  in 
statues  of  men,  especially  in  those  of  the  victors  at  Olympia  and 
other  sacred  games,  that  genuine  ideas  of  heauty  were  first  aimed  at 
and  in  part  attained,  from  whence  they  passed  afterward  to  the 
statues  of  the  gods.  Such  statues  of  the  athletes  seem  to  commence 
somewhere  between  Olympiad  53-58  (568-548  B.C.). 

It  is  not  until  the  same  interval  of  time  (between  600-550  B.C.)  that 
we  find  any  traces  of  these  architectural  monuments  by  which  the 
more  important  cities  in  Greece  afterward  attracted  to  themselves 
so  much  renown.  The  two  greatest  temples  in  Greece  known  to 
Herodotus  were  the  Artemision  at  Ephesus,  and  the  Heraeon  at 
Samos.  Of  these  the  former  seems  to  have  been  commenced,  by  the 
Samian  Theodorus,  about  600  b.c. — the  latter,  begun  by  the  Samian 
Rhoekus,  can  hardly  be  traced  to  any  higher  antiquity.  The  first 
attempts  to  decorate  Athens  by  such  additions  proceeded  from 
Peisistratus  and  his  sons,  near  the  same  time.  As  far  as  we  can 
judge,  too,  in  the  absence  of  all  direct  evidence,  the  temples  of 
Paesturn  in  Italy  and  Selinus  in  Sicily  seem  to  fall  in  this  same  cen- 
tury. Of  painting  during  these  early  centuries,  nothing  can  be 
affirmed.  It  never  at  any  time  reached  the  same  perfection  as  sculp- 
ture, and  we  may  presume  that  its  years  of  infancy  were  at  least 
equally  rude. 

The  immense  development  of  Grecian  art,  subsequently,  and  the 
great  perfection  of  Grecian  artists,  are  facts  of  great  importance  in 
the  history  of  the  human  race ;  while  in  regard  to  the  Greeks  them- 
selves, these  facts  not  only  acted  powerfully  on  the  taste  of  the 
people,  but  were  also  valuable  indirectly  as  the  common  boast  of 
Hellenism,  and  as  supplying  one  bond  of  fraternal  sympathy  as  well 
as  of  mutual  pride,  among  its  widely-dispersed  sections.  It  is  the 
paucity  and  weakness  of  such  bonds  which  renders  the  historv  of 
Greece,  prior  to  560  b.c,  little  better  than  a  series  of  parallel"but 
isolated  threads,  each  attached  to  a  separate  city.  The  increased 
range  of  joint  Hellenic  feeling  and  action,  upon  which  we  shall 
presently  enter,  though  arising  doubtless  in  great  measure  from  new 
and  common  dangers  threatening  many  cities  at  once — also  springs 
in  part  from  those  other  causes  which  have  been  enumerated  in  this 
ckapter.as  acting  on  the  Grecian  mind.  It  proceeds  from  the  stimu- 
lus applied  to  all  the  common  feelings  in  religion,  art,  and  recreation 
—from  the  gradual  formation  of  national  festivals,  appealing  in 
various  ways  to  such  tastes  and  sentiments  as  animated  every 
Hellenic  bosom — from  the  inspirations  of  men  of  genius,  poets, 
musicians,  sculptors,  architects,  who  supplied  more  or  less  in  every 
Grecian  city,  education  for  the  youth,  training  for  the  chorus,  and 
ornament  for  the  locality— from  the  gradual  expansion  of  science, 
philosophy,  and  rhetoric,  during  the  coming  period  of  this  history, 
which  rendered  one  city  the  intellectual  "capital  of  Greece,   and 


58  GREECE  IN  THE  AGE  OP  PEISISTRATUS. 

brought  to  Isokrates  and  Plato  pupils  from  the  most  distant  parts  of 
the  Grecian  world,  li  was  this  fund  of  common  tastes,  tendencies, 
and  aptitudes,  which  caused  the  social  atoms  of  Hellas  to  gravitate 
toward  each  other,  and  which  enabled  the  Greeks  to  become  something 
better  and  greater  than  an  aggregate  of  petty  disunited  communities 
like  the  Thracians  or  Phrygians.  And  the  creation  of  such  common, 
extrapolitical  Eellenism  is  the  most  interesting  phenomenon  which 
the  historian  has  to  point  out  in  the  early  period  nowunder  our  notice. 
He  is  called  upon  to  dwell  upon  it  the  more  forcibly  because  the 
modem  reader  has  generally  no  idea  of  national  union  without  polit- 
ical union — an  association  foreign  to  the  Greek  mind.  Strange  as 
it  may  seem  to  find  a  song-writer  put  forward  as  an  active  instrument 
of  union  among  his  fellow-Hellens,  it  is  not  the  less  true  that  those 
poets,  whom  we  have  briefly  passed  in  review,  by  enriching  the 
common  language  and  by  circulating  from  town  to  town  either  in 
person  or  in  their  compositions,  contributed  to  fan  the  flame  of  Pan- 
Hellenic  patriotism  at  a  time  when  there  were  few  circumstances  to 
co-operate  with  them,  and  when  the  causes  tending  to  perpetuate 
isolation  seemed  in  the  ascendant. 


CHAPTER  XXX. 

GRECIAN  AFFAIRS  DURING   THE   GOVERNMENT  OF  PEISISTRATUS 
AND  HIS  SONS  AT  ATHENS. 

We  now  arrive  at  what  may  be  called  the  second  period  of  Grecian 
history,  beginning  with  the  rule  of  Peisistratus  at  Athens  and  of 
Croesus  in  Lydia. 

It  has  been  already  stated  that  Peisistratus  made  himself  despot  of 
Athens  in  560  b.c.  He  died  in  527  B.C.,  and  was  succeeded  by  his 
son  Hippias,  who  was  deposed  and  expelled  in  510  b.c,  thus  making 
an  entire  space  of  fifty  years  between  the  first  exaltation  of  the  father 
and  the  final  expulsion  of  the  son.  These  chronological  points  are 
settled  on  good  evidence.  But  the  thirty-three  years  covered  by  the 
reign  of  Peisistratus  are  interrupted  by  two  periods  of  exile,  one  of 
lasting  not  less  than  ten  years,  the  other,  five  years;  and  the 
exact  place  of  the  years  of  exile,  being  nowhere  laid  dowm  upon 
authority,  has  been  differently  determined  by  the  conjectures  of 
chronologers.  Partly  from  this  half-known  chronology,  partly 
from  a  very  scanty  collection  of  facts,  the  history  of  the  half-century 
now  before  us  can  only  be  given  very  imperfectly.  Nor  can  we 
wonder  at  our  ignorance,  when  we  find  that  even  among  the  Athe- 
nians themselves,  only  a  century  afterward,  statements  the  most 
incorrect  and  contradictory  respecting  the  Peisistratids  were  in  eir- 


RETIREMENT  OF  PEISISTRATUS.  59 

dilation,  as  Thucydides  distinctly,  and  somewhat  reproachfully, 
acquaints  us. 

More  than  thirty  years  had  now  elapsed  since  the  promulgation  of 
the  Solonian  constitution,  whereby  the  annual  Senate  of  Four  Hundred 
had  been  created,  and  the  public  assembly  (preceded  in  its  action  as 
well  as  aided  and  regulated  by  this  senate)  invested  with  a  power  of 
exacting  responsibility  from  the  magistrates  after  their  year  of  office. 
The  seeds  of  the  subsequent  democracy  had  thus  been  sown,  and  no 
doubt  the  administration  of  the  archons  had  been  practically  softened 
by  it.  Yet  nothing  in  the  nature  of  a  democratical  sentiment  yet 
had  been  created.  A  hundred  years  hence,  we  shall  find  that  senti- 
ment unanimous  and  potent  among  the  enterprising  masses  of  Athens 
and  Peirseus,  and  shall  be  called  upon  to  listen  to  loud  complaints 
of  the  difficulty  of  dealing  with  "that  angry,  waspish,  intractable 
little  old  man,  Dermis  of  Pnyx  " — so  Aristophanes  calls  the  Athenian 
people  to  their  faces,  with  a  freedom  which  shows  that  he  at  least 
counted  on  their  good  temper.  But  between  560-510  b.c.  the  people 
are  as  passive  in  respect  to  political  rights  and  securities  as  the  most 
strenuous  enemy  of  democracy  could  desire,  and  the  government  is 
transferred  from  hand  to  hand  by  bargains  and  cross-changes  between 
two  or  three  powerful  men,  at  the  head  of  partisans  who  echo  their 
voices,  espouse  their  personal  quarrels,  and  draw  the  sword  at  their 
command.  It  was  this  ancient  constitution — Athens  as  it  stood  before 
the  Athenian  democracy — which  the  Macedonian  Antipater  professed 
to  restore  in  322  B.C.,  when  he  caused  the  majority  of  the  poorer 
citizens  to  be  excluded  altogether  from  the  political  franchise. 

By  the  stratagem  recounted  in  a  former  chapter,  Peisistratus  had 
obtained  from  the  public  assembly  a  guard  which  he  had  employed 
to  acquire  forcible  possession  of  the  acropolis.  He  thus  became 
master  of  the  administration ;  but  he  employed  his  power  honorably 
and  well,  not  disturbing  the  existing  forms  farther  then  was  neces- 
sary to  insure  to  himself  full  mastery.  Nevertheless  we  may  see  by 
the  verses  of  Solon  (the  only  contemporary  evidence  which  we  pos- 
sess), that  the  prevalent  sentiment  was  by  no  means  favorable  to  his 
recent  proceeding,  and  that  there  was  in  many  minds  a  strong  feeling 
both  of  terror  and  aversion,  which  presently  manifested  itself  in  the 
armed  coalition  of  his  two  rivals — Megakles  at  the  head  of  the  ParaU 
or  inhabitants  of  the  sea-board,  and  Lykurgus  at  the  head  of  those 
in  the  neighboring  plain.  As  the  conjunction  of  the  two  formed  a 
force  too  powerful  for  Peisistratus  to  withstand,  he  was  driven  into 
exile,  after  no  long  possession  of  his  despotism.  But  the  time  came 
(how  soon  we  cannot  tell)  when  the  two  rivals  who  had  expelled  him 
quarreled.  Megakles  made  propositions  to  Peisistratus,  inviting 
him  to  resume  the  sovereignty,  promising  his  own  aid  and  stipulating 
that  Peisistratus  should  marry  his  daughter.  The  conditions  being 
accepted,  a  plan  was  laid  between  the  two  new  allies  for  carrying 
them  into  effect,  by  a  novel  stratagem — since  the  simulated  wounds 


CO  GREECE  IN  THE  AGE  OF  PEISISTRATUS. 

and  pretense  of  personal  danger  were  not  likely  to  be  played  off  a 
second  time  with  Buccess.  The  two  conspirators  clothed  a  stately 
woman,  six  feel  high,  named  Phye,  in  the  panoply  and  costume  of 
Athene— surrounded  her  with  the  processional  accompaniments 
belonging  to  the  goddess— and  placed  her  in  a  chariot  with  Peisistra- 
tus  by  her  side.  In  this  guise  the  exiled  despot  and  his  adherents 
approached  the  city  and  drove  up  to  the  acropolis,  preceded  by 
herald  ,  who  cried  aloud  to  the  people, — "Athenians,  receive  ye 
cordially  Peisi  tratus,  whom  Athene  has  honored  above  all  other  men, 
and  is  now  bringing  back  into  her  own  acropolis."  The  people  in 
the  city  received  the  reputed  goddesswith  implicit  belief  and  demon- 
strations of  worship,  while  among  the  country  cantons  the  report 
quickly  spread  that  Athene  had  appeared  in  person  to  restore  Peisis- 
tratus;  who  thus  found  himself,  without  even  a  show  of  resistance, 
in  possession  of  the  acropolis  and  of  the  government.  His  own  parly, 
united  with  that  of  Megakles,  were  powerful  enough  to  maintain 
him,  when  he  had  once  acquired  possession.  And  probably  all, 
except  the  leaders,  sincerely  believed  in  the  epiphany  of  the  goddess, 
which  came  to  be  divulged  as  having  been  a  deception,  only  after 
Peisistratus  and  Megakles  bad  quarreled. 

The  daughter  of  Megakles,  according  to  agreement,  quickly  became 
the  wife  of  Peisistratus,  but  she  bore  him  no  children.  It  became 
known  that  her  husband,  having  already  adult  sons  by  a  former  mar- 
riage, and  considering  that  the  Kylonian  curse  rested  upon  all  the 
Alkmseonid  family,  did  not  intend  that  she  should  become  a  mother. 
Megakles  was  so  incensed  at  this  behavior,  that  he  not  only  renounced 
his  alliauce  with  Peisistratus,  but  even  made  his  peace  with  the  third 
party,  the  adherents  of  Lykurgus — and  assumed  so  menacing  an 
attitude,  that  the  despot  was  obliged  to  evacuate  Attica.  He  retired 
to  Eretria  in  Eubcea,  where  he  remained  no  less  than  ten  years, 
employed  in  making  preparations  for  a  forcible  return,  and  exercis- 
ing, even  while  in  exile,  a  degree  of  influence  much  exceeding  that 
of  a  private  man.  He  not  only  lent  valuable  aid  to  Lygdamis  of 
Naxos  in  constituting  himself  despot  of  that  island,  but  possessed, 
we  know  not  how,  the  means  of  rendering  important  service  to  differ- 
ent cities,  Thebes  in  particular.  They  repaid  him  by  large  contribu- 
tions of  money  to  aid  in  his  re-establishment:  mercenaries  were  hired 
fr<  'in  Argos,  and  the  Naxian  Lygdamis  came  himself  both  with  money 
and  with  troops.  Thus  equipped  and  aided,  Peisistratus  landed  at 
Marathon  in  Attica.  How  the  Athenian  government  bad  been  con- 
ducted during  his  ten  years'  absence,  we  do  not  know;  but  the  leaders 
of  il  permitted  him  to  remain  undisturbed  at  Marathon,  and  to  assem- 
ble bis  partisans  both  from  the  city  and  from  the  country.  It  was 
n.t  until  lie  broke  up  from  Marathon  and  had  reached  Pallene  onhis 
way  to  Athens,  that  they  took  the  field  against  him.  Moreover,  their 
conduct,  even  when  the  two  armies  were  near  together,  must  have 
been  either  extremely  negligent  or  corrupt;  for  Peisistratus  found 


STRONG  GOVERNMENT.  6l 

means  to  attack  them  unprepared,  routing  their  forces  almost  without 
resistance.  In  fact,  the  proceedings  have  altogether  the  air  of  a  con- 
certed betrayal.  For  the  defeated  troops,  though  unpursued,  are  said 
to  have  dispersed  and  returned  to  their  homes  forthwith,  in  obedi- 
ence to  the  proclamation  of  Peisistratus,  who  marched  on  to  Athens, 
and  found  himself  a  third  time  ruler. 

On  this  third  successful  entry,  he  took  vigorous  precautions  for 
rendering  his  seat  permanent.  The  Alkmneonidre  and  their  immedi- 
ate partisans  retired  into  exile:  but  he  seized  the  children  of  those 
who  remained  and  whose  sentiments  he  suspected,  as  hostages  for  the 
behavior  of  their  parents,  and  placed  them  in  Naxos  under  the  care 
of  Lygdamis.  Moreover  he  provided  himself  with  a  powerful  body 
of  Thracian  mercenaries,  paid  by  taxes  levied  upon  the  people:  and 
he  was  careful  to  conciliate  the  favor  of  the  gods  by  a  purification  of 
the  sacred  island  of  Delos.  All  the  dead  bodies  which  had  been 
buried  within  sight  of  the  temple  of  Apollo,  were  exhumed  and 
reinterred  further  off.  At  this  time  the  Delian  festival — attended  by 
the  Asiatic  Ionians  and  the  islanders,  and  with  which  Athens  was  of 
course  peculiarly  connected — must  have  been  beginning  to  decline 
from  its  pristine  magnificence;  for  the  subjugation  of  the  continental 
Ionic  cities  by  Cyrus  had  been  already  achieved,  and  the  power  of 
Samos,  though  increased  under  the  dispot  Polykrates,  seems  to  have 
increased  at  the  expense  and  to  the  ruin  of  the  smaller  Ionic  islands. 
Partly  from  the  same  feelings  which  led  to  the  purification  of  Delos — 
partly  as  an  act  of  party  revenge — Peisistratus  caused  the  houses  of 
the  Alkmseonids  to  be  leveled  with  the  ground,  and  the  bodies  of 
the  deceased  members  of  that  family  to  be  disinterred  and  cast  out 
of  the  country. 

This  third  and  last  period  of  the  ride  of  Peisistratus  lasted  several 
years,  until  his  death  in  527  B.C.  It  is  said  to  have  been  so  mild  in 
its  character,  that  he  once  even  suffered  himself  to  be  cited  for  trial 
before  the  senate  of  Areopagus;  yet  as  we  know  that  he  had  to  main- 
tain a  large  body  of  Thracian  mercenaries  out  of  the  funds  of  the 
people,  we  shall  be  inclined  to  construe  this  eulogium  comparatively 
rather  than  positively.  Thucydides  affirms  that  both  he  and  his  sons 
governed  in  a  wise  and  virtuous  spirit,  levying  from  the  people  only 
an  income  tax  of  five  per  cent.  This  is  high  praise  coming  from 
such  an  authority,  though  it  seems  that  we  ought  to  make  some  allow- 
ance for  the  circumstance  of  Thucydides  being  connected  by  descent 
with  the  Peisistratid  family.  The  judgmenfrof  Herodotus  is  also  very 
favorable  respecting  Peisistratus;  that  of  Aristotle  favorable,  yet 
qualified,  since  he  includes  these  despots  among  the  list  of  those  who 
undertook  public  and  sacred  works  with  the  deliberate  view  of 
impoverishing  as  well  as  of  occupying  their  subjects.  This  supposi- 
tion is  countenanced  by  the  prodigious  scale  upon  which  the  temple 
of  Zeus  Olympius  at  Athens  was  begun  by  Peisistratus — a  scale  much 
exceeding  either  the  Parthenon  or  the  temple  of  Athene  Polias;  both 


62         GREECE  IX  THE  AGE  OF  PEISISTRATUS. 

of  which,  nevertheless,  were  erected  in  later  times,  when  the  m 
of  Athens  were  decidedly  larger  and  her  disposition  to  demonstrative 
certainly  no  way  diminished.     It  was  left  by  him  unfinished, 
ever  completed    until    the    Roman    emperor   Hadrian 
the  task.     Moreover  Peisistratus  introduce,!  the  greater 
I  every  four  years,  iu  the  third  Olym- 
inual  Panathenaic  festival,  henceforward  called  the 
inued. 
I  have  already  noticed,  al   considerable  length,  the  care  which  be 
bestowed  in  procuring  full  and  correct  copies  of  the  Homeric  poems; 
as  well  as  in  improving  the  recitation  of  them  at  the  Panathenaic 
eeding  for  which  we  owe  him  much  gratitude,  bul 
which  has   been   shown  to  be  erroneously  interpreted  by  various 
critics,      lie  probably  also  collected  the  works  of  other  poets-  i 
by  Aulus  Gellius,  in  language  not  well  suited  to  the  sixth  century 
B.C.,  alibrary  thrown  open  to  the  public.      The  service  which  he 
thus  rendered   must   have   been   highly  valuable  at  a   time  when 
writing  and  reading  were  not  widely  extended.     His  son  Hipparchus 
followed  up  the  same  taste,  taking  pleasure  in  the  society  of  the  most 
eminent  poets  of  the  day, — Simonides,  Anakreon,  and  Lasus;  not  to 
mention  the  Athenian  mystic  Onomakritus,  who  though  not  pretend- 
0  the  gift  of  prophecy  himself,  passed  for  the  proprietor  and 
editor  of  the  various  prophecies  ascribed  to  the  ancient  name  of 
Musseus.     The  Peisistratids,  well  versed  in  these  prophecies,  set  great 
value   upon   them,   and   guarded   their   integrity  so   carefully,   that 
Onomakritus,  being  detected  on  one  occasion  in  the  act  of  interpolat- 
ing them,  was  banished  by  Hipparchus  inconsequence.    Tke«statues 
of  Hermes,  erected  by  this  prince  or  by  his  personal  friends  in  vari- 
ous parts  of  Attica,  and   inscribed  with  short  moral  sentences,  are 
extolled  by  the  author  of  the  Platonic  dialogue  called  Hipparchus, 
with  an  exaggeration  winch  approaches  to  irony.     It  is  certain,  how- 
ever, that  both  the  sons  of   Peisistratus,  as  well  as  himself,  were 
exact  in  fulfilling  the  religious  obligations  of  the  state,  and  orna- 
mented   the   city  in    several    ways,   especially   the  public  fountain 
Kallirrhoe.     They  are  said  to  have  maintained  the  pre  existing  forms 
of  law  and  justice,  merely  taking  care  always  to  keep  themselves 
and  their  adherents  in  the  effective  offices  of  stale,  and  in  the  full 
reality  of  power.     They  were,  moreover,  modest  and  popular  in  their 
personal    demeanor,   and   charitable    to  the   poor;   yet  one   striking 
example  occurs  of  unscrupulous  enmity  in  their  murder  of  Kimon  by 
through  the  agency  of  hired  assassins.     There   is  good  reason, 
however,  for  believing  that  the  government  both  of  Peisistratus  and 
of  his  sons  was  in  practice  generally  mild  until  after  the  death  of 
Hipparchus  by  the  hands  of  Harmodius  and  Aristogeiton,  afterwhich 
event  the  surviving   Hippias  became  alarmed,  cruel,  and  oppressive 
during  his  last  four  years.     Hence  the  harshness  of  this  concluding 
period  left  upon  the  Athenian  mind  that  profound  and  imperishable 


HIS  SONS  HIPPIAS  AND  HIPPARCHUS.  63 

hatred,  against  the  dynasty  generally,  which  Thucydides  reluctantly 
admits:  laboring  to  show  that  it  was  not  deserved  by  Peisistratus, 
nor  at  first  by  Hippias. 

Peisistratus  left  three  legitimate  sons — Hippias,  Hipparchus,  and 
Thessalus.  The  general  belief  at  Athens  among  the  contemporaries 
of  Thucydides  was  that  Hipparchus  was  the  eldest  of  the  three  and 
had  succeeded  him.  Yet  the  historian  emphatically  pronounces  this 
to  be  a  mistake,  and  certifies  upon  his  own  responsibility  that 
Hippias  was  both  eldest  son  and  successor.  Such  an  assurance  from 
him,  fortified  by  certain  reasons  in  themselves  not  very  conclusive, 
is  sufficient  ground  for  our  belief — the  more  so  as  Herodotus  coun- 
tenances the  same  version ;  but  we  are  surprised  at  such  a  degree  of 
historical  carelessness  in  the  Athenian  public,  and  seemingly  even  in 
Plato,  about  a  matter  both  interesting  and  comparatively  recent.  In 
order  to  abate  this  surprise,  and  to  explain  how  the  name  of  Hip- 
parchus came  to  supplant  that  of  Hippias  in  the  popular  talk, 
Thucydides  recounts  the  memorable  story  of  Harmodius  and  AristO' 
geiton. 

f.  Of  these  two  Athenian  citizens,  both  belonging  to  the  ancient  gens 
called  Gephyrasi,  the  former  was  a  beautiful  youth,  attached  to  the 
latter  by  a  mutual  friendship  and  devoted  intimacy  which  Grecian 
manners  did  not  condemn.  Hipparchus  made  repeated  propositions 
to  Harmodius,  which  were  repelled,  but  which,  on  becoming  known 
to  Aristogeiton,  excited  both  his  jealousy  and  his  fears  lest  the  dis- 
appointed suitor  should  employ  force — fears  justified  by  the  pro- 
ceedings not  unusual  with  Grecian  despots,  and  by  the  absence  of 
all  legal  protection  against  outrage  from  such  a  quarter.  Under 
these  feelings,  he  began  to  look  about,  in  the  best  way  that  he  could, 
for  some  means  of  putting  down  the  despotism.  Meanwhile  Hip- 
parchus, though  not  entertaining  any  designs  of  violence,  was  so 
incensed  at  the  refusal  of  Harmodius,  that  he  could  not  be  satisfied 
without  doing  something  to  insult  or  humiliate  him.  In  order  to 
conceal  the  motive  from  which  the  insult  really  proceeded,  he  offered 
it,  not  directly  to  Harmodius,  but  to  his  sister.  He  caused  this 
young  maiden  to  be  one  day  summoned  to  take  her  station  in  a 
religious  procession  as  one  of  the  Kanephora?  or  basket-carriers, 
according  to  the  practice  usual  at  Athens.  But  when  she  arrived  at 
the  place  where  her  fellow-maidens  were  assembled,  she  was  dis- 
missed with  scorn  as  unworthy  of  so  respectable  a  function,  and  the 
summons  addressed  to  her  was  disavowed. 

An  insult  thus  publicly  offered  filled  Hafmodius  with  indignation, 
and  still  farther  exasperated  the  feelings  of  Aristogeiton.  Both  of 
them  resolving  at  all  hazards  to  put  an  end  to  the  despotism,  con- 
certed means  for  aggression  with  a  few  select  associates.  They 
awaited  the  festival  of  the  Great  Panathensea,  wherein  the  body  of 
the  citizens  were  accustomed  to  march  up  in  armed  procession,  with 
spear  and  shield,  to  the  acropolis;  this  being  the  only  day  on  which 


64  GREECE  IN  THE  AGE  OF  PEISISTRATUS. 

an  armed  body  could  come  together  without  suspicion.  The  con- 
Bpirators "appeared  armed  like  the  rest  of  the  citizens,  but  earning 
concealed  daggers  besides.  Earmodius  and  Aristogeiton  undertook 
with  their  own  hands  to  kill  the  two  Peisistratids,  while  the  rest 
promised  to  stand  forward  immediately  lor  their  protection  against 
the  foreign  mercenaries;  and  though  the  whole  number  of  persons 
engaged  was  small,  they  couuted  upon  the  spontaneous  sympathies 
of  i  he  armed  bystanders  in  an  effort  to  regain  their  liberties,  so  soon 
as  the  blow  should  once  be  struck.  The  day  of  the  festival  having 
arrived,  Hippias,  with  Ins  foreign  body-guard  around  him,  was 
marshaling  the  armed  citizens  for  procession,  in  the  Kerameikus 
without  the  gates,  when  Harmodius  and  Aristogeiton  approached 
with  concealed  daggers  to  execute  their  purpose.  On  coming  near, 
they  wen-  thunderstruck  to  behold  one  of  their  own  fellow-conspira- 
tors talking  familiarly  with  Hippias,  who  was  of  easy  access  to  every 
man.  They  immediately  concluded  that  the  plot  was  betrayed. 
Expecting  to  be  seized,  and  wrought  up  to  a  state  of  desperation,  they 
resolved  at  least  not  to  die  without  having  revenged  themselves  on 
Hipparchus;  whom  they  found  within  the  city  gates  near  the  chapel 
called  Leokorion,  and  immediately  slew  him.  His  attendant  guards 
killed  Harmodius  on  the  spot ;  while  Aristogeiton,  rescued  for  the 
moment  by  the  surrounding  crowd,  was  afterward  taken,  and  per- 
ished in  the  tortures  applied  to  make  him  disclose  his  accomplices. 

The  news  flew  quickly  to  Hippias  in  the  Kerameikus,  who  heard 
it  earlier  than  the  armed  citizens  near  him  awaiting  his  order  for  the 
commencement  of  the  procession.  With  extraordinary  self-com- 
mand, lie  took  advantage  of  this  precious  instant  of  foreknowledge, 
and  advanced  toward  them, — directing  them  to  drop  their  arms  for 
a  short  time,  and  assemble  on  an  adjoining  ground.  They  unsus- 
pectingly obeyed;  upon  which  he  ordered  his  guards  to  take  posses- 
sion of  the  vacant  arms.  Being  now  undisputed  master,  he  seized 
the  persons  of  all  those  citizens  whom  he  mistrusted — especially  all 
those  who  had  daggers  about  them,  which  it  was  not  the  practice  to 
carry  in  the  Panathenaic  procession. 

Such  is  the  memorable  narrative  of  Harmodius  and  Aristogeiton, 
peculiarly  valuable  inasmuch  as  it  all  comes  f  rom  1  hucydides.  To 
possess  great  power — to  be  above  legal  restraint — to  inspire  extraor- 
dinary fear — is  a  privilege  so  much  coveted  by  the  giants  among 
mankind,  that  we  may  well  take  notice  of  those  cases  in  which  it 
brings  misfortune  even  upon  themselves.  The  fear  inspired  bj'  Hip- 
parchus— of  designs  which  he  did  not  really  entertain,  but  was  likely 
to  entertain,  and  competent  to  execute  without  hindrance — was  here 
the  grand  cause  of  his  destruction. 

The  conspiracy  here  detailed  happened  in  514  B.C.,  during  the 
thirteenth  year  of  the  reign  of  Hippias,  which  lasted  four  years 
longer,  until  510  B.C.  These  last  four  years,  in  the  belief  of  the  Athe- 
nian public,  couuted  for  his  whole  reign ;  nay,  many  persons  made 


HIPPIAS  DESPOT  ALONE.  65 

the  still  greater  historical  mistake  of  eliding  these  last  four  years 
altogether,  and  of  supposing  that  the  conspiracy  of  Harmodius  and 
Aristogeiton  had  deposed  the  Peisistratid  government  and  liberated 
Athens.  Both  poets  and  philosophers  shared  this  faith,  which  is 
distinctly  put  forth  in  the  beautiful  and  popular  Skolion  or  song  on 
the  subject :  the  two  friends  are  there  celebrated  as  the  authors  of 
liberty  at  Athens — "they  slew  the  despot  and  gave  to  Athens  equal 
laws."  So  inestimable  a  present  was  alone  sufficient  to  enshrine  in 
the  minds  of  the  subsequent  democracy  those  who  had  sold  their 
lives  to  purchase  it.  Moreover,  we  must  recollect  that  the  intimate 
connection  between  the  two,  though  repugnant  to  the  modern  reader, 
was  regarded  at  Athens  with  sympathy, — so  that  the  story  took  hold 
of  the  Athenian  mind  by  the  vein  of  romance  conjointly  with  that 
of  patriotism.  Harmodius  and  Aristogeiton  were  afterward  com- 
memorated both  as  the  winners  and  as  the  protomartyrs  of  Athenian 
liberty.  Statues  were  erected  in  their  honor  shortly  after  the  final 
expulsion  of  the  Peisistratids ;  immunity  from  taxes  and  public 
burdens  was  granted  to  the  descendants  of  their  families;  and  the 
speaker  who  proposed  the  abolition  of  such  immunities,  at  a  time 
when  the  number  had  been  abusively  multiplied,  made  his  only 
special  exception  in  favor  of  this  respected  lineage.  And  since  the 
name  of  Hipparchus  was  universally  notorious  as  the  person  slain, 
we  discover  how  it  was  that  he  came  to  be  considered  by  an  uncriti- 
cal public  as  the  predominant  member  of  the  Peisistratid  family — 
the  eldest  son  and  successor  of  Peisistratus — the  reigning  despot — to 
the  comparative  neglect  of  Hippias.  The  same  public  probably 
cherished  many  other  anecdotes,  not  the  less  eagerly  believed 
because  they  could  not  be  authenticated,  respecting  this  eventful 
period. 

Whatever  may  have  been  the  previous  moderation  of  Hippias, 
indignation  at  the  death  of  his  brother,  and  fear  for  his  own  safety, 
now  induced  him  to  drop  it  altogether.  It  is  attested  both  by 
Thucydides  and  Herodotus,  and  admits  of  no  doubt,  that  his  power 
was  now  employed  harshly  and  cruelly — that  he  put  to  death  a  con- 
siderable number  of  citizens.  We  find  also  a  statement  noway 
improbable  in  itself  and  affirmed  both  in  Pausanias  and  in  Plutarch 
— inferior  authorities,  yet  still  in  this  case  sufficiently  credible — that 
he  caused  Leoena,  the  mistress  of  Aristogeiton,  to  be  tortured  to 
death,  in  order  to  extort  from  her  a  knowledge  of  the  secrets  and 
accomplices  of  the  latter.  But  as  he  could  not  but  be  sensible  that 
^  this  system  of  terrorism  was  full  of  peril  to  himself,  so  he  looked 
'  out  for  shelter  and  support  in  case  of  being  expelled  from  Athens. 
With  this  view  he  sought  to  connect  himself  with  Darius,  king  of 
Persia — a  connection  full  of  consequences  to  be  hereafter  developed. 
.JSantides,  son  of  Hippoklus  the  despot  of  Lampsakus  on  the  Helles- 
pont, stood  high  at  this  time  in  the  favor  of  the  Persian  monarch, 
which  induced  Hippias  to  give  him  his  daughter  Archedike  in  inar- 
H.  G.  II.— 3 


6Q  GREECE  IN  THE  AGE  OF  PEISISTRATUS. 

no  small  honor  to  the  Lampsakenc,  in  the  estimation  of 
Thucydides.  To  explain  how  Hippias  came  to  fix  upon  tliis  town, 
however,  it  is  necessary  to  say  a  tew  words  on  the  foreign  policy  of 
the  Peisistratids. 

It  has  alreadybeen  mentioned  that  the  Athenians,  even  so  far  hack 
as  the  daysofthepoel  Alkaeus,  had  occupied  Sigeium  in  the  Troad,  and 
had  there  carried  on  war  with  the  Mil vleneniis;  so  that  their  acquisi- 
tions in  these  t  gions  date  much  before  the  time  of  Peisistratus 
Owing  probably  to  this  circumstance,  an  application  was  made  to 
thnii  in  the  (ally  pari  of  his  reign  from  the  Dolonkian  Thracians, 
inhabitants  of  the  Ch<  rsonese  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  Hellespont, 
for  aiil  against  their  powerful  neighbors  the  Absinthian  tribe  of  Thra- 
cians. Opportunity  was  thus  offered  for  sending  out  a  colony  to 
acquire  this  valuable  peninsula  for  Athens.  Peisistratus  willingly 
entered  into  the  scheme,  while  Miltiades  son  of  Kypselus,  a  noble 
Athenian  living  impatiently  under  his  despotism,  was  no  less  pleased 
to  take  the  lead  in  executing  it:  his  departure  and  that  of  other  mal- 
contents as  founders  of  a  colony  suited  the  purpose  of  all  parties. 
According  to  the  narrative  of  Herodotus — alike  pious  and  picturesque, 
and  doubtless  circulating  as  authentic  at  the  annual  games  which  the 
Chersonesites,  even  in  his  time,  celebrated  to  the  honor  of  their  cekist 
— it  is  the  Delphian  nod  who  directs  the  scheme  and  singles  out  the 
individual.  The  chiefs  of  the  distressed  Dolonkians  going  to  Delphi 
to  crave  assistance  toward  procuring  Grecian  colonists,  were  directed 
to  choose  for  their  cekist  the  individual  who  should  first  show  them 
hospitality  on  their  quitting  the  temple.  They  departed  and  marched 
all  along  what  was  called  the  Sacred  Road,  through  Phokis  and 
Bceotia  to  Athens,  without  receiving  a  single  hospitable  invitation. 
At  length  they  entered  Athens,  and  passed  by  the  house  of  Miltiades 
while  he  himself  was  sitting  in  front  of  it.  Seeing  men  whose  cos- 
tiftne  and  arms  marked  them  out  as  strangers,  he  invited  them  into 
his  house  and  treated  them  kindly:  upon  which  they  apprised  him 
that  he  was  the  man  fixed  upon  by  the  oracle,  and  adjured  him  not  to 
refuse  his  concurrence.  After  asking  for  himself  personally  the 
opinion  of  the  oracle,  and  receiving  an  affirmative  answer,  he  con- 
sented; sailing  as  cekist  at  the  head  of  a  body  of  Athenian  emigrants 
to  the  Chersonese. 

Having  reached  this  peninsula,  and  having  bean  constituted  despot 
of  the  mixed  Thracian  and  Athenian  population,  he  lost  no  time  in 
fortifying  the  narrow  isthmus  by  a  wall  reaching  all  across  from 
Kardia  to  Paktya,  a  distance  of  about  four  miles  and  a  half;  so  that 
the  Absinthian  invaders  were  for  the  time  effectually  shut  out, 
thoughthe  protection  was  not  permanently  kept  up.  He  also  enten  i 
into  a  war  with  Lampsakus  on  the  Asiatic  side  of  the  strait,  but  was 
unfortunate  enough  to  fall  into  an  ambuscade  and  become  a  prisoner. 
Nothing  preserved  his  life  except  the  immediate  interference  of 
Croesus,  king  of  Lydia,  coupled  with  strenuous  menaces  addressed  to 


SECOND  MILTIADES.  67 

the  Lampsakenes,  who  found  themselves  compelled  to  release  their 
prisoner.  Miltiades  had  acquired  much  favor  with  Croesus,  in  what 
manner  we  are  not  told,  lie  died  childless  some  time  afterward, 
while  his  nephew  Stesagoras,  who  succeeded  him,  perished  by  assas- 
sination some  time  subsequent  to  the  death  of  Peisistratus  at 
Athens. 

The  expedition  of  Miltiades  to  the  Chersonese  must  have  occurred 
early  after  the  first  usurpation  of  Peisistratus,  since  even  his  impris- 
onment by  the  Lampsakenes  happened  before  the  ruin  of  Croesus 
(546  B.c).  But  it  was  not  till  much  later — probably  during  the  third 
and  most  powerful  period  of  Peisistratus — that  the  latter  undertook 
his  expedition  against  Sigeium  in  the  Troad.  This  place  appears  to 
have  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  Mityleneans:  Peisistratus  retook  it, 
and  placed  there  his  illegitimate  sou  Hegesistratus  as  despot.  The 
Mityleneans  may  have  beeu  enfeebled  at  this  time  (somewhere  between 
537-527  B.C.)  not  only  by  the  strides  of  Persian  conquest  on  the  main- 
land, but  also  by  the  ruinous  defeat  which  they  suffered  from 
Polykrates  and  the  Samians.  Hegesistratus  maintained  the  place 
against  various  hostile  attempts,  throughout  all  the  reign  of  Hippias, 
so  that  the  Athenian  possessions  in  those  regions  comprehended  at 
this  period  both  the  Chersonese  and  Sigeium.  To  the  former  of  the 
two,  Hippias  sent  out  Miltiades,  nephew  of  the  first  cekist,  as  gov- 
ernor after  the  death  of  his  brother  Stesagoras.  The  new  governor 
found  much  discontent  in  the  peninsula,  but  succeeded  in  subduing 
it  by  entrapping  and  imprisoning  the  principal  men  in  each  town. 
He  farther  took  into  his  pay  a  regiment  of  500  mercenaries, 
and  married  Hegesipyle,  daughter  of  the  Thracian  king  Olorus.  It 
must  have  been  about  518  B.C.  that  this  second  Miltiades  went  out  to 
the  Chersonese.  He  seems  to  have  been  obliged  to  quit  it  for  a  time, 
after  the  Scythian  expedition  of  Darius,  in  consequence  of  having 
incurred  the  hostility  of  the  Persians;  but  he  was  there  from  the 
beginning  of  the  Ionic  revolt  until  about  493  B.C.,  or  two  or  three 
years  before  the  battle  of  Marathon,  on  which  occasion  we  shall  find 
him  acting  commander  of  the  Athenian  army. 

Both  the  Chersonese  and  Sigeium,  however,  though  Athenian  pos- 
sessions, were  now  tributary  and  dependent  on  Persia.  It  was  to 
Persia  that  Hippias,  during  his  last  years  of  alarm,  looked  for  support 
in  the  event  of  being  expelled  from  Athens:  he  calculated  upon  Sige- 
ium as  a  shelter,  and  upon  ^Eantides  as  well  as  Darius  as  an  ally. 
Neither  the  one  nor  the  other  failed  him. 

The  same  circumstances  which  alarmed  Hippias  and  rendered  his 
dominion  in  Attica  at  once  more  oppressive  and  more  odious,  tended 
of  cour.se  to  raise  the  hopes  of  his  enemies,  the  Athenian  exiles,  with 
the  powerful  Alkmaeonids  at  their  head.  Believing  the  favorable 
moment  to  be  come,  they  even  ventured  upon  an  invasion  of  Attica, 
and  occupied  a  post  called  Leipsydrion  in  the  mountain  range  of 
Parnes,  which  separates  Attica  from  Boeotia.     But  their  schemes 


08  GREECE  IN  THE  AGE  OF  PESISTRATUS. 

altogether  failed:  Hippias  defeated  and  drove  them  out  of  th& 
country.  His  dominion  now  seemed  confirmed,  for  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians were  on  terms  of  intimate  friendship  with  him;  and  Amyntas, 
king  of  Macedon,  as  well  as  the  Thessalians,  were  his  allies.     Yet 

the  exiles  whom  lie  had  beaten  in  I  he  open  field  succeeded  in  an 
unexpected  maneuver,  which,  favored  by  circumstances,  proved 
his  ruin. 

By  an  accident  which  had  occurred  in  the  year  548  B.C.,  the  Del- 
phian temple  was  sel  on  fire  and  burnt.  To  repair  this  grave  loss 
was  an  object  of  solicitude  to  all  Greece;  but  the  outlay  required  was 
exceedingly  heavy,  and  it  appears  to  have  been  long  before  the 
money  could  be  collected.  The  Amphiktyons  decreed  that  one- 
fourth  of  the  cost  should  be  borne  by  the  Delphians  themselves,  who 
found  themselves  so  heavily  taxed  by  such  assessment,  that  they 
sent  envoys  throughout  all  Greece  to  collect  subscriptions  in  aid,  and 
received, 'among  other  donations,  from  the  Gieek  settlers  in  Egypt 
twenty  minye,  besides  a  large  present  of  alum  from  the  Egyptian 
king  Amasis:  their  munificent  benefactor  Crcesus  fell  a  victim  to  the 
Persians  in  546  B.C.,  so  that  his  treasure  was  no  longer  open  to 
them.  The  total  sum  required  was  300  talents  (equal  probably  to 
about  £115,000  sterling) — a  prodigious  amount  to  be  collected  from 
the  dispersed  Grecian  cities,  who  acknowledged  no  common  sov- 
ereign authority,  and  among  whom  the  proportion  reasonable  to  ask 
from  each  was  difficult  to  determine  with  satisfaction  to  all  parlies. 
At  length  however  the  money  was  collected,  and  the  Amphiktyons 
were  in  a  situation  to  make  a  contract  for  the  building  of  the  temple. 
The  Alkmseonids,  who  had  been  in  exile  ever  since  the  third  and 
final  acquisition  of  power  by  Peisistratus,  took  the  contract.  In  exe- 
cuting it,  they  not  only  performed  the  work  in  the  best  manner,  but 
even  went  much  beyond  the  terms  stipulated;  employing  Parian 
marble  for  the  frontage  where  the  material  prescribed  to  them  was 
coarse  stone.  As  was  before  remarked  in  the  case  of  Peisistratus 
when  he  was  in  banishment,  we  are  surprised  to  fiud  exiles  (whose 
property  had  been  confiscated)  so  amply  furnished  with  money, 
unless  we  are  to  suppose  that  Kleisthenes  inherited  through  his 
mother  wealth  independent  of  Attica,  and  deposited  it  in  the  temple 
of  the  Samian  Here.  But  the  fact  is  unquestir nable,  and  they  gained 
signal  reputation  throughout  the  Hellenic  world  for  their  liberal  per- 
formance of  so  important  an  enterprise.  That  the  erection  took 
considerable  time,  we  cannot  doubt.  It  seems  to  have  been  finished, 
as  far  as  we  can  conjecture,  about  a  year  or  two  after  the  death  of 
Ilipparchus — 512  B.C. — more  than  thirty  years  after  the  confla- 
gration. 

To  the  Delphians,  especially,  the  rebuilding  of  their  temple  on  so 
superior  a  scale  was  the  most  essential  of  all  services,  and  their  grati- 
tude toward  the  Alkma?ouids  was  proportionally  great.  Partly 
through  such  a  feeling,  partly  through  pecuniary  presents,  Kleis- 


EXPULSION  OP  HIPPIAS.  69 

thenes  was  thus  enabled  to  work  the  oracle  for  political  purposes, 
and  to  call  forth  the  powerful  arm  of  Sparta  against  Hippias. 
Whenever  any  Spartan  presented  himself  to  consult  the  oracle, 
either  on  private  or  public  business,  the  answer  of  the  priestess 
was  always  in  one  strain — "Athens  must  be  liberated."  The 
constant  repetition  of  that  mandate  at  length  extorted  from  the 
piety  of  the  Lacedaemonians  a  reluctant  compliance.  Reverence  for 
the  god  overcame  their  strong  feeling  of  friendship  toward  the  Peisis- 
tratids,  and  Anehimolius,  sou  of  Aster,  was  dispatched  by  sea  to 
Athens  at  the  head  of  a  Spartan  force  to  expel  them.  On  land- 
ing at  Phalerum,  however,  he  found  them  already  forewarned 
and  prepared,  as  well  as  farther  strengthened  by  1,000  horse 
specially  demanded  from  their  allies  in  Thessaly.  Upon  the  plain  of 
Phalerum  this  latter  force  was  found  peculiarly  effective,  so  that  the 
division  of  Anehimolius  were  driven  back  to  their  ships  with  great 
loss,  and  he  himself  slain.  The  defeated  armament  had  probably 
been  small,  and  its  repulse  only  provoked  the  Lacedaemonians  to  send 
a  larger,  under  the  command  of  their  king  Kleomenes  in  person,  who 
on  this  occasion  marched  into  Attica  by  land.  On  reaching  the 
plain  of  Athens,  he  was  assailed  by  the  Thessalian  horse,  but 
repelled  them  in  so  gallant  a  style,  that  they  at  once  rode  off  and 
returned  to  their  native  country;  abandoning  their  allies  with  a  faith- 
lessness not  unfrequent  in  the  Thessalian  character.  Kleomenes 
marched  on  without  farther  resistance  to  Athens,  where  he  found 
himself,  together  with  the  Alkmaeonids  and  the  malcontent  Athe- 
nians generally,  in  possession  of  the  town.  At  that  time  there  was 
no  fortification  except  round  the  acropolis,  into  which  Hippias 
retired,  with  his  mercenaries  and  the  citizens  most  faithful  to  him; 
having  taken  care  to  provision  it  well  beforehand,  so  that  it  was  not 
less  secure  against  famine  than  against  assault.  He  might  have 
defied  the  besieging  force,  which  was  no  way  prepared  for  a  long 
blockade.  Yet,  not  altogether  confiding  in  his  position,  he  tried  to 
send  his  children  by  stealth  out  of  the  country;  in  which  proceeding 
the  children  were  taken  prisoners.  To  procure  their  restoration, 
Hippias  consented  to  all  that  was  demanded  of  him,  and  withdrew 
from  Attica  to  Sigeium  in  the  Troad  within  the  space  of  five  days. 

Thus  fell  the  Peisistratid  dynasty  in  510  B.C.,  fifty  years  after  the 
first  usurpation  of  its  founder.  It  was  put  down  through  the  aid  of 
foreigners,  and  those  foreigners,  too,  wishing  well  to  it  in  their 
hearts,  though  hostile  from  a  mistaken  feeling  of  divine  injunction. 
Yet  both  the  circumstances  of  its  fall,  and  the  course  of  eventa 
which  followed,  conspire  to  show  that  it  possessed  few  attached 
friends  in  the  country,  and  that  the  expulsion  of  Hippias  was  wel- 
comed unanimously  by  the  vast  majority  of  Athenians.  His  family 
and  chief  partisans  would  accompany  him  into  exile — probably  as  a 
matter  of  course,  without  requiring  any  formal  sentence  of  condem- 
nation.    An  altar  was  erected  in  the  acropolis,  with  a  column  hard 


70  ATHENS    AFTEK   THE   PEISISTRATLDS. 

by,  commemorating  both  the  past  iniquity  of  the  dethroned  djTiasty, 
aoid  the  names  ol'  all  its  members. 


CHAPTER  XXXI. 

GRECIAN  AFFAIRS  AFTER  THE  EXPULSION  OF  THE  PEISISTRATIDS. — 
REVOLT  THiN  OF  KLEISTHENES  AND  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  DEMOCRACY 
AT  ATHENS. 

Wriir  Hippias  disappeared  the  mercenary  Thracian  garrison,  upon 
which  he  and  his  father  before  him  had  leaned  for  defense  as  well  as 
for  enforcement  of  authority.  Kleomenes  with  his  Lacedaemonian 
forces  retired  also,  after  staying  only  long  enough  to  establish  a  per- 
sonal friendship,  productive  subsequently  of  important  consequences 
between  the  Spar:  n  king  and  the  Athenian  Isagoras.  The  Athenians 
were  thus  left  to  themselves,  without  any  foreign  interference  to  con- 
strain them  in  their  political  arrangements. 

It  has  been  mentioned  in  the  preceding  chapter,  that  the  Peisistra- 
tids  had  for  the  most  part  respected  the  forms  of  the  Solonian  con- 
stitution. The  nine  archons,  and  the  prohouleutic  or  preconsidcring 
Senate  of  Four  Hundred  (both  annually  changed),  still  continued  to 
subsist,  together 'with  occasional  meetings  of  the  people — or  rather 
of  such  portion  of  the  people  as  was  comprised  in  the  gentes,  phra- 
tries,  and  four  Ionic  tribes.  The  timocratic  classification  of  Solon 
(or  quadruple  scale  of  income  and  admeasurement  of  political  fran- 
chises according  to  it)  also  continued  to  subsist — but  all  within  the 
tether  and  subservient  to  the  purposes  of  the  ruling  family,  who 
always  kept  one  of  their  number  as  real  master  among  the  chief 
administrators,  and  always  retained  possession  of  the  acropolis  as 
well  as  of  the  mercenary  force. 

That  overawing  pressure  being  now  removed  by  the  expulsion  of 
Hippias,  the  enslaved  forms  became  at  once  endued  with  freedom 
and  reality.  There  appeared  again,  what  Attica  had  not  known  for 
thirty  years,  declared  political  parties,  and  pronounced  opposition 
between  two  men-as  leaders — on  one  side.  Isagoras,  son  of  Tisandi  r, 
a  pi  rson  of  illustrious  descent — on  the  other,  Kleisthenes,  the  Alk- 
3  illustrious,  and  possessing  at  this  moment  a  claim 
on  the  gratitude  of  his  countrymen  as  the  most  persevering  as  well 
as  the  most  effective  foe  of  the  dethroned  despots.  In  what  manner 
such  opposition  was  carried  on  we  are  not  told.  It  would  seem  to 
have  been  not  alto-ether  pacific;  but  at  any  rate,  Kleisthenes  had 
the  worsl  of  it,  and  in  consequence  of  his  defeat  (says  the  historian) 
"he  took  into  partnership  the  people,  who  had  been  before  excluded 


DEMOCRATICAL  REVOLUTION.  71 

from  everything."  His  partnership  with  the  people  gave  birth  to 
the  Athenian  democracy;  it  was  a  real  and  important  revolution. 

The  political  franchise,  or  the  character  of  an  Athenian  citizen, 
both  before  and  since  Solon,  had  been  confined  to  the  primitive  four 
Ionic  tribes,  each  of  which  was  an  aggregate  of  so  man}r  close  cor- 
porations or  quasi-families — the  gentes  and  the  phratries.  None  of 
the  residents  in  Attica,  therefore,  except  those  included  in  some  gens 
or  phratrv,  had  any  part  in  the  political  franchise.  Such  non-privi- 
leged residents  were  probably  at  all  times  numerous,  and  became 
more  and  more  so  by  means  of  fresh  settlers.  Moreover  they  tended 
most  to  multiply  in  Athens  and  Peiraeus,  where  immigrants  would 
commonly  establish  themselves.  Kleisthenes,  breaking  down  the 
existing  wall  of  privilege,  imparted  the  political  franchise  to  the 
excluded  mass.  But  this  could  not  be  done  by  enrolling  them  in  new 
gentes  or  phratries,  created  in  addition  to  the  old.  For  the  gentile 
tie  was  founded  upon  old  faith  and  feeling  which  in  the  existing 
state  of  the  Greek  mind  could  not  be  suddenly  conjured  upas  a  bond 
of  union  for  comparative  strangers.  It  could  only  be  done  by  dis- 
connecting the  franchise  altogether  from  the  Ionic  tribes  as  well  as 
from  the  gentes  which  constituted  them,  and  by  redistributing  the 
population  into  new  tribes  with  a  character  and  purpose  exclusively 
political.  Accordingly  Kleisthenes  abolished  the  four  Ionic  tribes, 
and  created  in  their  place  ten  new  tribes  founded  upon  ft  different 
principle,  independent  of  the  gentes  and  phratries.  Each  of  his  new 
tribes  comprised  a  certain  number  of  demes  or  cantons,  with  the 
enrolled  proprietors  and  residents  in  each  of  them.  The  demes 
taken  altogether  included  the  entire  surface  of  Attica,  so  that  the 
Kleisthenean  constitution  admitted  to  the  political  franchise  ah  the 
free  native  Athenians;  and  not  merely  these,  but  also  many  metics, 
and  even  some  of  the  superior  order  of  slaves.  Putting  out  of  sight 
the  general  body  of  slaves,  and  regarding  only  the  free  inhabitants,  it 
was  in  point  of  fact  a  scheme  approaching  to  universal  suffrage, 
botli  political  and  judicial. 

The  slight  and  cursory  manner  in  which  Herodotus  announces 
this  memorable  revolution  tends  to  make  us  overlook  its  real  impor- 
tance. He  dwells  chiefly  on  the  alteration  in  the  number  and  names 
of  the  tribes;  Kleisthenes,  he  says,  despised  the  Ionians  so  much,  that 
he  would  not  tolerate  the  continuance  in  Attica  of  the  four  tribe3 
which  prevailed  in  the  Ionic  cities;  deriving  their  names  from  the 
four  sons  of  Ion — just  as  his  grandfather,  the  Sikyonian  Kleisthenes, 
hating  the  Dorians,  had  degraded  and  nicknamed  the  three  Dorian 
tribes  at  Sikyon.  Such  is  the  representation  of  Herodotus,  who 
seems  himself  to  have  entertained  some  contempt  for  the  Ionians, 
and  therefore  to  have  suspected  a  similar  feeling  where  it  had  no  real 
existence. 

But  the  scope  of  Kleisthenes  was  something  far  more  extensive. 
He  abolished  the  four  ancient  tribes,  not  because  they  were  Ionic, 


72  ATHENS   AFTER  THE  PEISISTRATIDS. 

Ibut  because  they  had  become  incommensurate  with  the  existing  con- 
dition of  the  Attic  people,  and  because  swell  abolition  procured  both 
for  himself  and  for  his  political  scheme  new  us  well  as  hearty  allies. 
And,  indeed,  if  a\c  study  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  we  shall  see 

very  obvious  reasons  to  suggest  the  proceeding.  For  more  than 
thirty  years — an  entire  generation — the  old  constitution  had  been  a 
iiu  re  empty  formality,  working  only  in  subservience  to  the  reigning 
dynasty,  and  stripped  of  all  real  controlling  power.  We  may  be 
very  sure,  therefore,  that  both  the  Senate  of  Four  Hundred  and  the 
popular  assembly,  divested  of  that  free  speech  which  imparted  to 
them  not  only  all  their  value  but  all  their  charm,  had  come  to  be  of 
little  public  estimation,  and  were  probably  attended  only  by  a  few 
partisans.  Under  such  circumstances,  the  difference  between  quali- 
fied citizens  and  men  not  so  qualified — between  members  of  the  four 
old  tribes  and  men  not  members — became  during  this  period  prac- 
tically effaced.  Tb>s  in  fact  was  the  ouly  species  of  good  which  a 
Grecian  despotism  ever  seems  to  have  done.  It  confounded  the 
privileged  and  the  non-privileged  under  one  coercive  authority  com- 
mon to  both,  so  that  the  distinction  between  the  two  was  not  easy 
to  revive  when  the  despotism  passed  away.  As  soon  as  Hippiaswas 
expelled,  the  senate  and  the  public  assembly  regained  their  effi- 
ciency; but  had  they  been  continued  on  the  old  footing,  including 
none  but  members  of  the  four  tribes,  these  tribes  would  have  been 
re-invested  with  a  privilege  which  in  reality  they  had  so  long  lost, 
that  its  revival  would  have  seemed  an  odious  novelty,  and  the 
remaining  population  would  probably  not  have  submitted  to  it.  If 
in  addition  we  consider  the  political  excitement  of  the  moment — the 
restoration  of  one  body  of  men  from  exile,  and  the  departure  of 
another  body  into  exile. — the  outpouring  of  long-suppressed  hatred, 
partly  against  these  very  forms  by  the  corruption  of  which  the  des- 
pot had  reigned— we  shall  si  e  that  prudence  as  well  as  patriotism 
dictated  the  adoption  of  an  enlarged  scheme  of  government.  Kleis- 
thenes  had  learnt  some  wisdom  during  his  long  exile;  and  as  he 
probably  continued  for  some  time  after  the  introduction  of  his  new 
constitution,  to  be  the  chief  adviser  of  his  countrymen,  we  may  con- 
sider their  extraordinary  success  as  a  testimony  to  his  prudence  and 
skill  not  less  than  to  their  courage  and  unanimity. 
Nor  does  it  seem  unreasonable  to  give  him  credit  for  a  more  gen- 
forward  movement  than  what  is  implied  in  the  literal  account 
if  Herodotus.  Instead  of  being  forced  against  his  will  to  purchase 
popular  support  byproposing  this  new  constitution,  Kleisthenes  may 
have  proposed  it  before,  during  the  discussions  which  immediately 
followed  the  retirement  of  Hippias;  so  that  the  rejection  of  it 
formed  the  ground  of  quarrel  (and  no  other  ground  is  mentioned) 
between  him  and  Isagoras.  The  latter  doubtless  found  sufficient 
support,  in  the  existing  senate  and  public  assembly,  to  prevent  it 
from  being  carried  without  au  actual  appeal  to  the  people.     His 


NAMES  OF  THE  TRIBES.  73 

opposition  to  it,  moreover,  is  not  difficult  to  understand;  for  neces- 
sary as  the  change  bad  become,  it  was  not  the  less  a  shock  to  ancient 
Attic  ideas.  It  radically  altered  the  very  idea  of  a  tribe,  which  now 
became  an  aggregation  of  demes,  of  gentes — of  fellow-demots,  not 
of  fellow-gentiles.  It  thus  broke  up  those  associations,  religious, 
social,  and  political,  between  the  whole  and  the  parts  of  the  old 
system,  which  operated  powerfully  ou  the  mind  of  every  old- 
fashioned  Athenian.  The  patricians  at  Rome  who  composed  the 
gentes  and  curiae — and  tue  plebs,  who  had  no  part  in  these  corpora- 
tions— formed  for  a  long  time  two  separate  and  opposing  fractions  in 
the  same  city,  each  with  its  own  separate  organization.  Only  by 
slow  degrees  did  the  plebs  gain  ground,  while  the  political  value  of 
the  patrician  gens  was  long  maintained  alongside  of  and  apart  from 
the  plebeian  tribe.  So,  too,  in  the  Italian  and  German  cities  of  the 
middle  ages,  the  patrician  families  refused  to  part  with  their  own 
separate  political  identity  when  the  guilds  grew  up  by  the  side  of 
them;  even  though  forced  to  renounce  a  portion  of  their  power,  they 
continued  to  be  a  separate  fraternity,  and  would  not  submit  to  be 
regimented  anew,  under  an  altered  category  and  denomination,  along 
with  the  traders  who  had  grown  into  wealth  and  importance.  But 
the  reform  of  Kleisthenes  effected  this  change  all  at  once,  both  as  to 
the  name  and  as  to  the  reality.  In  some  cases,  indeed,  that  which 
had  been  the  name  of  a  gens  was  retained  as  the  name  of  a  deme,  but 
even  then  the  old  gentiles  were  ranked  indiscriminately  among  the 
remaining  demote;  The  Athenian  people,  politely  considered,  thus 
became  one  homogeneous  whole  distributed  for  convenience  into 
parts,  numerical,  local,  and  politically  equal.  It  is,  however,  to  be 
remembered,  that  while  the  four  Ionic  tribes  were  abolished,  the 
gentes  and  phratries  which  composed  them  were  left  untouched, 
continuing  to  subsist  as  family  and  religious  associations,  though 
carrying  with  them  no  political  privilege. 

The  ten  newly-created  tribe-,  arranged  in  an  established  order  of 
precedence,  were  called — Erechtheis,  ./Egeis,  Pandionis,  Leontis, 
Akamantis,  GEneis,  Kekropis,  Hippothoontis,  iEantis,  Antiochis; 
names  borrowed  chiefly  from  the  respected  heroes  of  Attic  legend. 
This  number  remained  unaltered  until  the  year  305  B.C.,  when  it 
was  increased  to  twelve  by  the  addition  of  two  new  tribes,  Anti- 
gonias  and  Demetrias,  afterward  designated  anew  by  the  names  of 
Ptolemais  and  Attalis:  the  mere  names  of  these  last  two,  borrowed 
from  living  kings,  and  not  from  legendary'lieroes,  betray  the  change 
from  freedom  to  subservience  at  Athens.  Each  tribe  comprised  a 
certain  number  of  demes — cantons,  parishes,  or  townships — in  Attica. 
But  the  total  number  of  these  demes  is  not  distinctly  ascertained; 
for  though  we  know  that  in  the  time  of  Polemo  (the  third  century 
B.C.)  it  was  174,  we  cannot  be  sure  that  it  had  always  remained 
the  same;  and  several  critics  construe  the  words  of  Herodotus  to 
impjy  that  Kleisthenes  at  first  recognized  exactly  one  hundred  demes, 


74  ATHENS  AFTER  TIIE  PEISISTRATIDS. 

distributed  in  equal  proportion  anions;  his  ten  tribes.  Such  con- 
struction of  the  words,  however,  is  more  than  doubtful,  while  the 
fac1  itself  is  improbable;  partlj  because  if  the  change  of  number 
had  been  bo  considerable  as  the  difference  between  one  hundred  and 
174,  some  positive  evidence  of  it  would  probably  be  found — partly 
because  Kleisthenes  would  indeed  have  a  motive  to  render  the 
amount  of  citizen  population  nearly  equal,  but  no  motive  to  render 
the  number  of  denies  equal,  in  each  of  the  ten  tribes.  It  is  wi  11 
known  how  great  is  the  lone  of  local  habits,  and  how  unalterable 
are  parochial  or  cantonal  boundaries.  In  the  absence  of  proof  to 
the  contrary,  therefore',  we  may  reasonably  suppose  the  number  and 
circumscription  of  the  denies,  as  found  or  modified  by  Kleisthenes, 
to  have  subsisted  afterward  with  little  alteration,  at  least  until  the 
increase  in  the  number  of  the  tribes. 

There  is  another  point,  however,  which  is  at  once  more  certain 
and  more  important  to  notice.  The  denies  which  Kleisthenes 
assigned  to  each  tribe  were  in  no  case  all  adjacent  to  each  other;  and 
therefore  the  tribe,  as  a  whole,  did  not  correspond  with  any  continu- 
ous portion  of  the  territory,  nor  could  it  have  any  peculiar  local 
interest,  separate  from  the  entire  community.  Such  systematic 
avoidance  of  the  factions  arising  oul  of  neighborhood  will  appear 
to  have  been  more  especially  necessary  when  we  recollect  that  the 
quarrels  of  the  Parali.  the  Diakrii,  the  Pediaki,  during  the  preceding 
century,  had  all  been  generated  from  local  feud,  though  doubtless 
artfully  fomented  by  individual  ambition.  Moreover,  it  was  only  by 
this  same  precaution  that  the  local  predominance  of  the  citj',  and  the 
formation  of  a  city-interest  distinct  from  that  of  the  country,  was 
obviated;  which  could  hardly  base  failed  to  arise  had  the  city  by 
itself  constituted  either  one  deme  or  one  tribe.  Kleisthenes  dis- 
tributed the  city  (or  found  it  already  distributed)  into  several  denies, 
and  those  demes  among  several  tribes;  while  Peirseusand  Phalerum, 
each  constituting  a  separate  deme,  were  also  assigned  to  different 
tribes;  so  that  there  were  no  local  advantages  either  to  bestow  pre- 
dominance, or  to  create  a  struggle  tor  predominance,  of  one  tribe 
over  the  rest,  Each  deme  had  its  own  local  interests  to  watch  over; 
but  the  tribe  was  a  mere  aagregate  of  denies  for  political,  military, 
and  religious  purposes,  with  no  separate  hopes  or  fears  apart  from 
the  whole  state.  Each  tribe  had  a  chapel,  sacred  rites  and  festivals, 
find  a  common  fund  for  such  meetings,  in  honor  of  its  eponymous 
hero,  administered  by  members  of  its  own  choice:  and  the  statins 
of  all  the  ten  eponymous  heroes,  fraternal  patrons  of  the  democracy, 
were  planted  in  the  most  conspicuous  part  of  the  agora  of  Athens. 
In  the  future  working  of  the  Athenian  government,  we  shall  trace 
no  symptom  of  disquieting  local  faction- — a  capital  amendment, 
compared  with  the  disputes  of  the  preceding  century,  and  traceable 
in  part  to  the  absence  of  border-relations  between  denies  of  the  same 
tribe. 


FUNCTIONS  OF  THE  DEME.  75 

The  deme  now  became  (he  primitive  constituent  element  of  the 
commonwealth,  both  as  to  persons  and  as  to  property.  It  had  its 
own  demarch,  its  register  of  enrolled  citizens,  is  collective  property, 
its  public  meetings  and  religious  ceremonies,  its  taxes  levied  and 
administered  by  iiself.  The  register  of  qualified  citizens  was  kept  by 
the  demarch,  and  the  inscription  of  new  citizens  took  place  at  the  as- 
sembly of  the  demots,  whose  legitimate  sous  were  enrolled  on  attain- 
ing the  age  of  eighteen,  aud  their  adopted  sous  at  any  time  when  pre- 
sented and  sworn  to  by  the  adopting  citizen.  The  citizenship  could 
only  be  granted  by  a  public  vote  of  the  people,  but  wealthy  non-free- 
men were  enabled  sometimes  to  evade  this  law  and  purchase  admis- 
sion upon  the  register  of  some  poor  deme,  probably  by  means  of  a 
fictitious  adoption.  At  the  meetings  of  the  demots,  the  register  was 
called  over,  and  it  sometimes  happened  that  some  names  wTere  ex- 
punged, in  which  case  the  party  thus  disfranchised  had  an  appeal  to 
the  popular  judicature.  So  great  was  the  local  administrative  power, 
however,  of  these  deines,  that  they  are  described  as  the  substitute, 
under  the  Kleistheuean  system,  for  the  Naukraries  under  the  Solo- 
nian  and  ante-Solon ian.  TheTrittyes  and  Naukraries,  though  nomi- 
nally preserved,  and  the  latter  augmented  in  number  from  forty- 
eight  to  fifty,  appear  henceforward  as  of  little  public  importance. 

Kleisthenes  preserved,  but  at  the  same  time  modified  and  expanded, 
all  the  main  features  of  Solon's  political  constitution;  the  public 
assembly  or  Ekklesia — the  preconsidering  senate  composed  of  mem- 
bers from  all  the  tribes — and  the  habit  of  annual  election,  as  well  as 
annual  responsibility  of  magistrates,  by  and  to  the  Ekklesia.  The 
full  value  must  now  have  been  felt  of  possessing  such  pre-existing 
institutions  to  build  upon,  at  a  moment  of  perplexity  and  dissension. 
But  the  Kleistheuean  Ekklesia  acquired  new  strength,  and  almost  a 
new  character,  from  the  great  increase  of  the  number  of  citizens 
qualified  to  attend  it;  while  the  annually  changed  senate,  instead  of 
being  composed  of  four  hundred  members  taken  in  equal  proportion 
from  each  of  the  old  four  tribes,  wTas  enlarged  to  five  hundred,  taken 
equally  from  each  of  the  new  ten  tribes.  It  now  comes  before  us, 
under  the  name  of  Senate  of  Five  Hundred,  as  an  active  and  indis- 
pensable body  throughout  the  whole  Athenian  democracy:  moreover 
the  practice  now  seems  to  have  begun  (though  the  period  of  com- 
mencement cannot  be  decisively  proved)  of  deteimiuing  the  names  of 
the  senators  by  lot.  Both  the  senate  thus  constituted,  aud  the  pub- 
lic assembly,  were  far  more  popular  and  vigorous  than  they  had  been 
under  the  original  arrangement  of  Solon. 

The  new  constitution  of  the  tribes,  as  it  led  to  a  change  in  the 
annual  senate,  so  it  transformed  no  less  directly  the  military  arrange- 
ments of  the  state,  both  as  to  soldiers  and  as  to  officers.  The  citizens 
called  upon  to  serve  in  arms  were  now  marshalled  according  to  tribes 
— each  tribe  having  its  own  taxiarchs  as  officers  for  the  hoplites,  and 
its  own  phy larch  at  the  head  of  the  horsemen.     Moreover,  there  were 


76  ATHENS  AFTER  THE  PEISISTRATIDS. 

now  created,  for  the  first  time,  ten  strategi  or  generals,  one  from  i  ach 
tribe;  and  two  bippanhs,  lor  the  supreme  command  of  the  horsemen 
I  ader  the  prior  Athenian  constitution  ii  appears  that  the  command 
of  the  military  force  bad  been  rested  in  the  third  archon  or  polemarcb, 
no  strategi  then  existing.  Even  after  the  strategi  had  been  created, 
under  the  deisthenean  constitution,  the  polemarcb  still  retained  a 
jo i ni  right  of  command  along  with  them — as  we,  are  told  at  (he  battle 
of  Marathon,  where  Kallimachu.s  the  polemarcb  not  only  enjoyed  an 
equal  vote  in  the  council  of  war  along  with  the  ten  strategi,  but  even 
occupied  the  post  of  honor  on  the  right  wing.  The  ten  gem  nils 
annually  changed  are  thus  (like  the  ten  tribes)  a  fruit  of  the  Kleis- 
thenean  constitution,  which  was  at  the  same  time  powerfully 
Strengthened  and  protected  by  this  remodeling  of  Ihe  military  force. 
The  functions  of  the  generals  became  more  extensive  as  the  democ- 
racy advanced,  so  that  tiny  seem  to  have  acquired  gradually  not 
u. <  rely  the  direction  of  military  and  naval  affairs,  but  also  that  of 
the  foreign  relations  of  the  city  generally — while  the  nine  archons, 
including  the  poleinarch,  were  by  degrees  lowered  down  from  that 
full  executive  and  judicial  competence  which  they  had  once  enjoyed, 
to  the  simple  ministry  of  police  and  preparatory  justice.  Encroach 
ed  upon  by  the  strategi  on  one  side,  they  were  also  restricted  in  effi- 
ciency, on  the  other  side,  by  the  rise  of  the  popular  dikasteries  or 
numerous  jury-courts.  We  may  be  sure  that  these  popular  dikas- 
teries bad  not  been  permitted  to  meet  or  to  act  under  the  despotism 
of  the  Peisistratids,  and  that  the  judicial  business  of  the  city  must 
then  have  been  conducted  partly  by  the  senate  of  Areopagus,  partlj 
by  the  archons;  perhaps  with  a  nominal  responsibility  of  the  latter 
at  the  end  of  their  year  of  office,  to  an  acquiescent  Ekklcsia.  And  if 
Ave  even  assume  it  to  be  true,  as  some  writers  contend,  that  the  habit 
of  direct  popular  judicature  (over  and  above  this  annual  trial  of 
responsibility)  had  been  partially  introduced  by  Solon,  it  must  have 
been  discontinued  during  the  long  coercion  exercised  by  the  super- 
vening dynasty.  But  the  outburst  of  popular  spirit,  which  lent  force 
to  Kleisthenes.  doubtless  carried  the  people  into  direct  action  as 
jurors  in  the  aggregate  Heliaea,  not  less  than  as  voters  in  the  Ekkh  sia 
— and  the  change  was  thus  begun  which  contributed  to  degrade  the 
archons  from  their  primitive  character  as  judges,  into  the  lower 
function  of  preliminary  examiners  and  presidents  of  a  jury.  Such 
convocation  of  numerous  juries,  beginning  first  with  the  aggregate 
body  of  sworn  citizens  above  thirty  years  of  age,  and  subsequently 
dividing  them  into  separate  bodies  or  panels  for  trying  particular 
causes,  became  gradually  more  frequent  and  more  systematized; 
until  at  length,  in  the  time  of  Perikles,  it  was  made  to  carry  a  small 
pay,  and  stood  out  as  one  of  the  mos1  prominent  features  of  Athen- 
ian life.  We  cannot  particularize  the  different  steps  whereby  such 
final  development  was  attained,  and  whereby  the  judicial  competence 
of  the  archon  was  cut  down  to  the  mere  oower  of  inflicting  a  small 


FINANCIAL  ARRANGEMENTS.  77 

fine.  But  the  first  steps  of  it  are  found  in  the  revolution  of  Klcis- 
thenes,  and  it  seems  to  have  been  consummated  after  the  battle  of 
Platsea.  Of  the  function  exercised  by  the  nine  archons,  as  well  as 
by  many  other  magistrates  and  official  persons  at  Athens,  in  con- 
voking a  dikastery  or  jury-court,  bringing  on  causes  for  trial,  and 
presiding  over  the  trial — a  function  constituting  one  of  the  marks  of 
superior  magistracy,  and  called  the  Hegemony  or  presidency  of  a 
dikastery — I  shall  speak  more  at  length  hereafter.  At  present  I  wish 
merely  to  bring  to  view  the  increased  and  increasing  sphere  of  action 
on  which  the  people  entered  at  the  memorable  turn  of  affairs  now 
before  us. 

The  financial  affairs  of  the  city  underwent  at  this  epoch  as  com- 
plete a  change  as  the  military.  The  appointment  of  magistrates  and 
officers  by  tens,  one  from  each  tribe,  seems  to  have  become  the  ordi- 
nary practice.  A  board  of  ten,  called  Apodektae,  were  invested 
with  the  supreme  management  of  the  exchequer,  dealing  with  the 
contractors  as  to  those  portions  of  the  revenue  which  were  farmed, 
receiving  all  the  taxes  from  the  collectors,  and  disbursing  them 
under  competent  authority.  Of  this  board  the  first  nomination 
is  expressly  ascribed  to  Kleisthenes  as  a  substitute  for  certain  persons 
called  Kolakretae,  who  had  performed  the  same  function  before  and 
who  were  now  retained  only  for  subordinate  services.  The  duties  of 
the  Apodektse  were  afterward  limited  to  receiving  the  public  income, 
find  paying  it  over  to  the  ten  treasurers  of  the  goddess  Athene,  by 
ivhom  it  was  kept  in  the  inner  chamber  of  the  Parthenon,  and  dis- 
bursed as  needed;  but  this  more  complicated  arrangement  cannot  be 
referred  to  Kleisthenes.  From  his  time  forward  too,  the  Senate  of 
Five  Hundred  steps  far  beyond  its  original  duty  of  preparing  matters 
for  the  discussion  of  the  Ekklesia.  It  embraces,  besides,  a  large  cir- 
cle of  administrative  and  general  superintendence,  which  hardly 
admits  of  any  definition.  Its  sittings  become  constant,  witli  the 
exception  of  special  holidays.  The  year  is  distributed  into  ten  por- 
tions called  Prytanies — the  fifty  senators  of  each  tribe  taking  by 
turns  the  duty  of  constant  attendance  during  one  prytany,  and  receiv- 
ing during  that  time  the  title  of  The  Prytanes:  the  order  of  prece- 
dence among  the  tribes  in  these  duties  was  annually  determined  by 
lot.  In  the  ordinary  Attic  year  of  twelve  lunar  months,  or  35-4  days, 
six  of  the  prytanies  contained  thirty-five  days,  four  of  them  contained 
thirty-six:  in  the  intercalated  years  of  thirteen  months,  the  number 
of  days  was  thirty -eight  and  thirty-nine  respectively.  Moreover  a 
farther  subdivision  of  the  prytany  into  five  periods  of  seven  days 
ea  ]i,  and  of  the  fifty  tribe  senators  into  five  bodies  of  ten  each,  was 
recognized  Each  body  of  ten  presided  in  the  senate  for  one  period 
of  seven  days,  drawing  lots  every  day  among  their  number  for  a  new 
chairman  called  Epistates,  to  whom  during  his  day  of  office  were  con- 
fided the  keys  of  the  acropolis  and  the  treasury,  together  with  the 
city  seal.     The  remaining  senators,  not  belonging  to  the  prytanising 


78  ATHENS   A.FTEB   THE   PKISISTRATIDS. 

tribe,  might  of  course  attend  if  they  chose.  Rut  the  attendance  of 
nine  among  them,  one  from  each  of  the  remaining  nine  tribes,  was 
imperative!;  necessary  to  constitute  a  valid  meeting,  and  to  insure  a 
mi  representation  of  the  collective  people. 
During  those  later  times  known  to  us  through  the  great  orators,  the 
Ekklesia,  or  formal  i  est  mbly  of  the  citizens,  was  convoked  four  times 
regularly  during  et  eh  prytany,  or  oftcner  if  necessity  required — 
usually  by  the  senate,  though  the  strategi  had  also  the  power  of  con- 
voking it  by  their  own  authority.  It  was  presided  over  by  the 
prytanes,  and  questions  were  put  to  the  vote  by  their  Epistates  or 
chairman.  But  the  nine  representatives  of  the non- pry tamsing tribes 
were  always  present,  as  a  matter  of  course,  and  seem  indeed  in  the 
days  of  the  orators  to  have  acquired  to  themselves  the  direction  of  it, 
together  with  the  right  of  putting  questions  for  the  vote — setting  aside 
wholly  or  partially  the  fifty  prytanes.  When  we  carry  our  attention 
back,  however,  to  the  state  of  the  Ekklesia,  as  first  organized  by 
Kleisthenes  (I  have  already  remarked  that  expositors  of  the  Athenian 
constitution  are  too  apt  to  neglect  the  distinction  of  times,  and  to  sup- 
pose that  what  was  the  practice  between  400-o30  b.c.  had  been 
always  the  practice),  it  will  appear  probable  that  he  provided  one 
regular  meeting  in  each  prytany,  and  no  more;  giving  to  the  senate 
and  the  strategi  power  of  convening  special  meetings  if  needful  but 
establishing  one  Ekklesia  during  each  prytany,  or  ten  in  the  year,  as 
a  regular  necessity  of  state.  How  often  the  ancient  Ekklesia  had 
been  convoked  during  the  interval  between  Solon  and  Peisistratus, 
we  cannot  exactly  say — probably  but  seldom  during  the  year.  Under 
the Peisistratids,  its  convocation  had  dwindled  down  into  an  inopera- 
tive formality.  Hence  the  re-establishment  of  it  by  Kleisthenes,  not 
merely  with  plenary  determining  powers,  but  also  under  full  notice 
and  preparation  of  matters  beforehand,  togetherwith  the  best  securi- 
ties for  orderly  procedure,  was  in  itself  a  revolution  impressive  to  the 
mind  of  every  Athenian  citizen.  To  render  the  Ekklesia  efficient,  it 
was  indispensable  that  its  meetings  should  be  both  frequent  and  free. 
Men  were  thus  trained  to  the  duty  both  of  speakers  and  hearers,  and 
each  man,  while  he  felt  that  he  exercised  his  share  of  influence  on  the 
decisiou,  identified  his  own  safety  and  happiness  with  the  vote  of  the 
majority,  and  became  familiarized  with  the  notion  of  a  sovereign 
authority  which  he  neither  could  nor  ought  to  resist.  This  was  an 
ilea  new  to  the  Atheuian  bosom.  With  it  came  the  feelings  sanctify- 
ing free  speech  and  equal  law — words  which  no  Athenian  citizen  ever 
afterward  heard  unmoved:  togetherwith  that  sentiment  of  the  entire 
commonwealth  as  one  indivisible,  which  always  overruled,  though  it 
did  not  supplant,  the  local  and  cantonal  specialties.  It  is  not  too 
much  to  say  that  these  patriotic  and  ennobling  impulses  were  a  new 
product  in  the  Athenian  mind,  to  which  nothing  analogous  occurs 
even  in  the  time  of  Solon.  They  were  kindled  in  part  doubtless  by 
the  strong  reaction  against  the  Peisistratids,  but  still  more  by  the  fact 


JUDICIAL  ATTRIBUTES  OF  THE  PEOPLE.  79 

that  the  opposing  leader,  Kleisthenes,  turned  that  transitory  feeling 
to  the  best  possible  account,  and  gave  to  it  a  vigorous  perpetuity,  as 
well  as  a  well-defined  positive  object,  by  the  popular  elements  con- 
spicuous in  his  constitution.  His  name  makes  less  figure  in  history 
than  we  should  expect,  because  he  passed  for  the  mere  renovator  of 
Solon's  scheme  of  government  after  it  bad  been  overthrown  by  Peisis- 
tratus.  Probably  he  himself  professed  this  object,  since  it  would 
facilitate  the  success  of  his  propositions:  and  if  Ave  confine  ourselves 
to  the  letter  of  the  case,  the  fact  is  in  a  great  measure  true,  since  the 
annual  senate  and  the  Ekklesia  are  both  Solonian — but  both  of  them 
under  his  reform  were  clothed  in  totally  new  circumstances,  and 
swelled  into  gigantic  proportions.  How  vigorous  was  the  burst  of 
Athenian  enthusiasm,  altering  instantaneously  the  position  of  Athens 
among  the  powers  of  Greece,  we  shall  hear  presently  from  the  lips  of 
Herodotus,  and  shall  find  still  more  unequivocally  marked  in  the  facts 
of  his  history. 

But  it  was  not  only  the  people  formally  installed  in  their  Ekklesia, 
who  received  from  Kleisthenes  the  real  attributes  of  sovereignty — it 
was  by  him  also  that  the  people  were  first  called  into  direct  action  as 
dikasts,  or  jurors.  I  have  already  remarked  that  this  custom  maybe 
said,  in  a  certain  limited  sense,  to  have  begun  in  the  time  of  Solon, 
since  that  lawgiver  invested  the  popular  assembly  with  the  power  of 
pronouncing  the  judgment  of  accountability  upon  the  archons  after 
their  year  of  office.  Here  again  the  building,  afterward  so  spacious 
and  stately,  was  erected  on  a  Solonian  foundation,  though  it  was  not 
itself  Solonian.  That  the  popular  dikasteries,  in  the  elaborate  form 
in  which  they  existed  from  Perikles  downward,  were  introduced  all 
at  once  by  Kleisthenes,  it  is  impossible  to  belive.  Yet  the  steps  by 
Avhich  they  were  gradually  wrought  out  are  not  distinctly  discovera- 
ble. It  would  rather  seem  that  at  first  only  the  aggregate  body  of 
citizens  above  thirty  years  of  age  exercised  judicial  functions,  being 
specially  convoked  and  sworn  to  try  persons  accused  of  public  crimes, 
and  when  so  employed  bearing  the  name  of  the  Helisea,  orHeliasts; 
private  offenses  and  disputes  between  man  and  man  being  still 
determined  by  individual  magistrates  in  the  city,  and  a  considerable 
judicial  power  still  residing  in  the  Senate  of  Areopagus.  There  is 
reason  to  believe  that  this  was  the  state  of  things  established  by 
Kleisthenes,  which  afterward  came  to  be  altered  by  the  greater 
extent  of  judicial  duty  gradually  accruing  to  the  Heliasts,  so  that  it 
was  necessary  to  subdivide  the  collective  Helisea. 

According  to  the  subdivision,  as  practiced  in  the  times  best  known, 
6,000  citizens  above  thirty  years  of  age  were  annually  selected  by  lot 
out  of  the  whole  number,  600  from  each  of  the  ten  tribes:  5,000  of 
these  citizens  were  arranged  in  ten  panels  or  decuries  of  500  each, 
the  remaining  1000  being  reserved  to  fill  up  vacancies  in  case  of  death 
or  absence  among  the  former.  The  whole  6,000  took  a  prescribed 
oath,  couched  in  very  striking  words;  after  which  every  man  received 


80  ATHENS  AFTER  THE  PEISISTRATIDS. 

a  ticket  inscribed  with  his  own  name  as  well  as  with  a  letter  designat- 
ing bis  decury.  When  there  were  causes  or  crimes  ripe  for  trial,  the 
Thesmothets  or  six  inferior  archons  determined  by  lot,  firsi,  which 
decuries  Bhould  sit,  according  to  the  number  wanted — next,  in  which 
court,  or  under  the  presidency  of  what  magistrate,  the  decury  B  or 
E  should  Bit,  so  thai  it  could  not  be  known  beforehand  in  what  cause 
each  would  lie  judge.  In  the  number  of  persons  who  actually 
attended  ami  sat,  however,  there  seems  to  have  been  much  variety, 
and  sometimes  two  decuries  sat  together.  The  arrangement  here 
described,  we  musl  recollect,  is  given  to  us  as  belonging  to  those 
times  w  In  n  the  dikasts  received  a  regular  pay,  after  every  day's  sit- 
ting; and  it  can  hardly  have  long  continued  without  that  condition, 
which  was  not  realized  before  the  time  of  Perikles.  Each  of  these 
decuries  silting  in  judicature  was  called  1he  llvlkva — a  name  which 
belongs  properly  to  the  collective  assembly  of  the  people;  this  col- 
lective assembly  having  beer,  itself  the  original  judicature.  I  con- 
ceive that  the  practice  of  distributing  this  collective  assembly  or 
Helkea  into  sections  of  jurors  for  judicial  duty,  may  have  begun 
under  one  form  or  another  soon  after  the  reform  of  Kleisthenes, 
since  the  direct  interference  of  the  people  in  public  affairs  tended 
more  and  more  to  increase.  But  it  could  only  have  been  matured  by 
degrees  into  that  constant  and  systematic  service  which  the  pay  of 
Perikles  called  forth  at  last  in  completeness.  Under  the  last  men- 
tioned system  the  judicial  competence  of  the  archons  was  annulled, 
and  the*  third  archon  or  polemarch  withdrawn  from  all  military 
functions.  But  this  bad  not  been  yet  done  at  the  time  of  the  battle 
of  .Marathon,  where  Kallimachus the  polemarch  not  only  commanded 
along  with  the  strategi,  but  enjoyed  a  sort  of  pre-eminence  over 
them;  nor  had  it  been  done  during  the  year  after  the  battle  of  Mara- 
thon, in  which  Aristeides  wras  archon — for  the  magisterial  decisions 
of  Aristeides  formed  one  of  the  principal  foundations  of  his  honor- 
able surname,  the  Just. 

With  this  question  as  to  the  comparative  extent  of  judicial  power 
vested  by  Kleisthenes  in  the  popular  dikastery  and  the  archons,  are 
in  reality  connected  two  others  in  Athenian  constitutional  law; 
relating  first,  to  the  admissibility  of  all  citizens  for  the  post  of  archon 
— next,  to  the  choosing  of  archons  by  lot.  It  is  well  known  that  in 
the  time  of  Perikles,  the  archons,  and  various  other  individual  func- 
tionaries, had  come  to  be  chosen  by  lot — moreover  all  citizens  were 
legally  admissible,  and  might  give  in  their  names  to  be  drawn  for 
by  lot,  subject  to  what  was  called  the  Dokimasy,  or  legal  examina- 
tion into  their  status  of  citizen  and  into  various  moral  and  religious 
qualifications,  before  they  took  office;  while  at  the  same  time  the 
function  of  the  archon  had  become  nothing  higher  than  preliminary 
examination  of  parties  and  witnesses  for  the  dikastery,  and  presi- 
dence  over  it  when  afterward  assembled,  together  with  the  power  of 


EEDUCED  FUNCTIONS  OF  MAGISTRATES.  81 

imposing  by  authority  a  fine  of  small  amount  upon  inferior  offenders. 
Now  all  these  three  political  arrangements  hang  essentially  together. 
The  great  value  of  the  lot,  according  to  Grecian  democratic  ideas, 
was  that  it  equalized  the  chance  of  office  between  rich  and  poor:  but 
so  long  as  the  poor  citizens  were  legally  inadmissible,  choice  by  lot 
could  have  no  recommendation  either  to  the  rich  or  to  the  poor.  In 
fact,  it  would  be  less  democratic  than  election  by  the  general  mass  of 
citizens,  because  the  poor  citizen  would  under  the  latter  system  enjoy 
an  important  right  of  interference  by  means  of  his  suffrage,  though 
he  could  not  be  elected  himself.  Again,  choic  ■  by  lot  could  never 
under  any  circumstances  be  applied  to  those  posts  where  special  com- 
petence, and  a  certain  measure  of  attributes  possessed  only  by  a  few, 
were  indispensable — nor  was  it  ever  applied  throughout  the  whole 
history  of  democratic  Athens,  to  the  strategi  or  generals,  who  were 
always  elected  by  show  of  hands  of  the  assembled  citizens.  Accord- 
ingly, we  may  regard  it  as  certain,  that  at  the  time  when  the  archons 
first  came  to  be  chosen  by  lot,  the  superior  and  responsible  duties 
once  attached  to  that  office  had  been,  or  were  in  course  of  being, 
detached  from  it,  and  transferred  either  to  the  popular  dikasts  or  \o 
the  ten  elected  strategi :  so  that  there  remained  to  these  archons  only 
a  routine  of  police  and  administration,  important  indeed  to  the  state, 
yet  such  as  could  be  executed  by  any  citizen  of  average  probity,  dili- 
gence, and  capacity — at  least  there  was  no  obvious  absurdity  in 
thinking  so;  while  the  Dokimasy  excluded  from  the  office  men  of 
notoriously  discreditable  life,  even  after  they  might  have  drawn  the 
successful  lot.  Perikles,  though  chosen  strategus  year  after  year 
successively,  was  never  archon ;  and  it  may  be  doubted  whether  men 
of  first-rate  talents  and  ambition  often  gave  in  their  names  for  the 
office.  To  those  of  smaller  aspirations  it  was  doubtless  a  source  of 
importance,  but  it  imposed  troublesome  labor,  gave  no  pay.  and 
entailed  a  ceitain  degree  of  peril  upon  any  archon  who  might  have 
given  offense  to  powerful  men,  when  he  came  to  pass  through  the 
trial  of  accountability  which  followed  immediately  upon  his  year  of 
office.  There  was  little  to  make  the  office  acceptable,  either  to  very 
poor  men,  or  to  very  rich  and  ambitious  men;  and  between  the  mid 
tiling  persons  who  gave  in  their  names,  any  one  might  be  taken  with 
out  great  practical  mischief,  alwaj^s  assuming  the  two  guarantees  o* 
the  Dokimasy  before,  and  accountability  after  office.  This  was  the 
conclusion — in  my  opinion  a  mistaken  conclusion,  and  such  as  would 
find  no  favor  at  present — to  which  the  democrats  of  Athens  were 
conducted  by  their  strenuous  desire  to  equalize  the  chances  of  office 
for  rich  and  poor.  But  their  sentiment  seems  to  have  been  satisfied 
by  a  partial  enforcement  of  the  lot  to  the  choice  of  some  offices — 
especially  the  archons,  as  the  primitive  chief  magistrates  of  the  state 
— without  applying  it  to  all  or  to  the  most  responsihle  and  difficult. 
Hardly  would  they  have  applied  it  to  the  archons,  if  it  had  been 


82  ATHENS  AFTER  THE  PEISISTRATIDS. 

indispensably  necessary  that  these  magistrates  should  retain  their 
original  very  serious  duty  of  judging  disputes  and  condemning 
offenders. 

I  think,  therefore,  that  these  three  points — 1.  The  opening  of  the 
post  of  arch  on  to  all  citizens  indiscriminately;  2.  The  choice  of 
archons  by  lot;  S.  The  diminished  range  of  the  archon's  duties  and 
responsibilities,  through  the  extension  of  those  belonging  to  the 
popular  courts  of  justice  on  the  one  hand  and  to  the  strategi  on  the 
other — are  all  connected  together,  and  must  have  been  simultaneous, 
or  nearly  simultaneous,  in  the  time  of  introduction :  the  enactment 
of  universal  admissibility  to  office  certainly  not  coming  after  the 
other  two,  and  probably  coming  a  little  before  them. 

Now  in  regard  to  the  eligibility  of  all  Athenians  indiscriminately 
to  the  office  of  archon,  we  find  a  clear  and  positive  testimony  as  to 
the  time  when  it  was  first  introduced.  Plutarch  tells  us  that  the 
oligarchic,  but  high-principled,  Aristeides  was  himself  the  proposer 
of  this  constitutional  change,  shortly  after  the  battle  of  Platsea,  with 
the  consequent  expulsion  of  the  Persians  from  Greece,  and  the  return 
of  the  refugee  Athenians  to  their  ruined  city.  Seldom  has  it  hap- 
pened in  the  history  of  mankind  that  rich  and  poor  have  been  so 
completely  equalized  as  among  the  population  of  Athens  in  that 
memorable  expatriation  and  heroic  struggle;  nor  are  we  at  all  sur- 
prised to  heaT  that  the  mass  of  the  citizens,  coming  back  with  freshly 
kindled  -patriotism  as  well  as  with  the  consciousness  that  their  coun- 
try had  only  been  recovered  by  the  equal  efforts  of  all,  would  no 
longer  submit  to  be  legally  disqualified  from  any  office  of  state.  It 
was  on  this  occasion  that  the  constitution  was  first  made  really  ';  com- 
mon" to  all,  and  that  the  archons.  strategi,  and  all  functionaries, 
first  began  to  be  chosen  from  all  Athenians  without  any  difference  of 
legal  eligibility.  No  mention  is  made  of  the  lot,  in  this  important 
statement  of  Plutarch,  which  appears  to  me  everyway  worthy  of 
credit,  and  which  teaches  us,  that  down  to  the  invasion  of  Xerxes, 
not  only  had  the  exclusive  principle  of  the  Solonian  law  of  qualifica. 
tion  continued  in  force  (whereby  the  first  three  classes  on  the  census 
were  alone  admitted  to  all  individual  offices,  and  the  fourth  or 
Thetic  elas<  excluded),  but  also  the  archons  had  hitherto  been 
elected  by  the  citizens— not  taken  by  lot.  Now  for  financial  pur- 
the  quadruple  census  of  Solon  was  retained  long  after  this 
period,  even  beyond  the  Peloponncsian  war  and  the  oligarchy  of 
Thirty;  but  we  thus  learn  that  Kleislhenes  in  his  constitution 
retained  it  for  political  purposes  also,  in  part  at  least.  He  recog- 
nized the  exclusion  of  the  great  mass  of  the  citizens  from  all  indi- 
vidual offices — such  as  the  archon,  the  strategus,  etc  In  his  time, 
probably,  no  complaints  were  raised  on  the  subject.  For  his  con- 
stitution gave  to  the  collective  bodies — senate,  ekklesia,  and  helisea 
or  dikastery— a  degree  of  power  and  importance  such  as  they  had 
never  before  known  or  imagined.     And  we  may  well  suppose  that 


ATHENS  AFTER  PERIKLES.  83 

the  Athenian  people  of  that  day  had  no  objection  even  to  the  pro- 
claimed system  and  theory  of  being  exclusively  governed  by  men  of 
wealth  and  station  as  individual  magistrates — especially  since  many 
of  the  newly  enfranchised  citizens  had  been  before  metics  and  slaves. 
Indeed  it  is  to  be  added,  that  even  under  the  full  democracy  of  later 
Athens,  though  the  people  had  theu  become  passionately  attached  to 
the  theory  of  equal  admissibility  of  all  citizens  to  office,  yet  in  prac 
tice,  poor  men  seldom  obtained  offices  which  were  elected  by  the 
general  vote,  as  will  appear  more  fully  in  the  course  of  this  history. 

The  choice  of  the  strategi  remained  ever  afterward  upon  the  foot- 
ing on  which  Aristeides  thus  placed  it;  but  the  lot  for  the  choice  of 
archon  must  have  been  introduced  shortly  after  his  proposition  of 
universal  eligibility,  and  in  consequence  too  of  the  same  title  of  demo- 
cratic feeling — introduced  as  a  farther  corrective,  because  the  poor 
citizen,  though  he  had  become  eligible,  was  nevertheless  not  elected. 
And  at  the  same  time,  I  imagine,  that  elaborate  distribution  of  the 
Helitea,  or  aggregate  body  of  dikasts  or  jurors,  into  separate  panels  or 
dikasteries  for  the  decision  of  judicial  matters,  was  first  regularized. 
It  was  this  change  that  stole  away  from  the  archons  so  important  a 
part  of  their  previous  jurisdiction:  it  was  this  change  that  Perikles 
more  f  ull}-  consummated  by  insuring  pay  to  the  dikasts. 

But  the  present  is  not  the  time  to  enter  into  the  mollifications  which 
Athens  underwent  during  the  generation  after  the  battle  of  Plataea. 
They  have  been  here  briefly  noticed  for  the  purpose  of  reasoning  back, 
in  the  absence  of  direct  evidence,  to  Athens,  as  it  stood  in  the  gener- 
ation before  that  memorable  battle,  after  the  reform  of  Kleisthenes. 
His  reform,  though  highly  democratical,  stopped  short  of  the  mature 
democracy  which  prevailed  from  Perikles  to  Demosthenes,  in  three 
ways  especially,  among  various  others;  and  it  is  therefore  sometimes 
considered  by  the  later  writers  as  an  aristocratical  constitution: — 1. 
It  still  recognized  the  archons  as  judges  to  a  considerable  exteut,  and 
the  third  archon  or  polemarch  as  joint  military  commander  along  with 
the  strategi.  2  It  retained  them  as  elected  annually  by  the  body 
of  citizens,  not  as  chosen  by  lot.  3.  It  still  excluded  the  fourth  class  of 
the  Solonian  census  from  all  individual  office,  the  archonship  among 
the  rest.  The  Solonian  law  of  exclusion,  however,  though  retained 
in  principle,  was  mitigated  in  practice  thus  far — that  whereas  Solon 
had  rendered  none  but  members  of  the  highest  class  on  the  census 
(the  Pentakosiomedimni)  eligible  to  the  archonship,  Kleisthenes  opened 
that  dignity  to  all  the  first  three  classes,  shutting  out  only  the  fourth. 
That  ha  did  this  may  be  inferred  from  the  fact  that  Aristeides, 
assuredly  not,  a  rich  man,  became  archon.  I  am  also  inclined  to  believe 
that  the  senate  of  Five  Hundred  as  constituted  by  Kleisthenes  was 
taken,  not  by  election,  but  by  lot,  from  the  ten  tribes — and  that  every 
citizen  became  eligible  to  it.  Election  for  this  purpose — that  is,  the 
privilege  of  annually  electing  a  batch  of  fifty  senators  all  at  once  by 
esich  tribe — would  probably  be  thought  more  troublesome  than  valu- 


M  All!  I\S    AFTER    THE    I  T.1SIS  THAT  IDS. 

able;  nor  do  we  hear  of  separate  meetings  of  each  tribe  for  purposes 
of  election.  Moreover  the  oilier  oi  senator  was  a  collective,  nol  an 
individual  office;  the  shock  therefore  to  the  feelings  of  Bemi-democ 
ralized  Athens,  from  the  unpleasanl  idea  of  a  poor  man  sitting  among 
the  fifty  prytanes,  would  be  less  than  ii  they  conceived  him  as  pole- 
march  at  the  head  of  the  righl  wing  of  the  army,  or  as  an  archon 
administering  justice. 

A  farther  difference  between  the  constitution  of  Solon  and  that  of 

Kleisthenes  is  to  be  found  in  the  position  of  the  senate  of  Areopagus. 

I  the  former,  thai  senate  had  been  the  principal  body  in  the 

and  Solon  had  even  enlarged  its  powers;  under  the  latter,  it 

must  have  be<  11  In  ated  at  first  as  an  enemy  and  kept   down.      For  as 

it  was  composed  onlj  of  all  the  pasl  archonB,  and  as  during  the  pre- 
ci  ding  thirty  years  even  a  i  el  ion  had  been  a  creature  of  the  Peisistra- 
tids.  the  Areopagites  collectively  musl  have  been  both  hostile  and 
odious  to  Kleisthenes  and  his  partisans— perhaps  a  fraction  of  its 
members  might  even  retire  into  exile  with  Hippias.  Its  influence 
must  have  been  sensibly  lessened  by  the  change  of  party,  until  it  came 
gradually  filled  by  fresh  archon-  springing  from  the  bosom  of  the 
Kleisthenean  constitution.  Now  during  this  important  interval,  the 
new-modeled  senate  of  Five  Hundred  and  the  popular  assembly 
sC]  ped  into  that  ascendency  which  they  never  afterward  lost.  From 
the  time  of  Kleisthenes  forw  aid.  the  Areopagites  cease  to  be  the  chief 
and  prominent  power  in  the  state.  Yet  they  are  still  considerable; 
and  w  hen  the  second  till  of  the democratical  tide  took  place,  after  the 
battle  of  Platsea,  thej  became  the  focus  of  thai  which  was  then  con- 
sidered as  the  pariy  of  oligarchical  r<  Bistance.  I  have  already  remarked 
that  the  archons  during  the  intermediate  time  (aboul  509  47?  n.c) 
were  all  elected  by  the  ekklesia,  not  chosen  by  lot-  and  that  the 
fourth  or  poorest  and  most  numerous  class  on  the  census  were  by  law 
then  ineligible;  while  election  at  Athens,  even  when  every  citizen 
it  i  sception  was  an  elector  and  eligible,  had  a  natural  tendency 
to  fall  upon  nun  of  wealth  and  station.  We  thus  mc  how  it  hap- 
pened that  the  pasl  archons.  when  united  in  the  senate  of  Areopagus, 
infused  into  thai  body  the  sympathies,  prejudices,  and  interests  of 
the  richer  classes.  It  was  this  which  broughl  them  into  conflict  with 
the  more  democratical  party  headed  by  Perikles  and  Fphialtes,  in 
times  when  portions  of  the  Kl<  istheni  an  <  onstitution  had  come  to  be 
o  much  imbued  with  oligarchy. 

(  me  other  remarkable  institution,  distinctly  ascribed  to  Kleisthenes, 
mains  to  1  the  ostracism;  upon  which  I  have  already 

made  some  remarks  in  touching  upon  the  memorable  S.  Ionian  proc- 
lamation airainst  neutrality  in  a  -edition.  It  i-  hardly  too  much  to 
say  that  without  this  protective  process  none  of  the  other  institutions 
would  have  reach  maturity. 

By  the  ostracism  a  citizen  was  banished  without  special  accusation. 
trial,  or  defense  for  a  term  of  ten  years—  subsequently  diminished  to 


WEAKNESS  OF  THE  PUBLIC  FORCE.  85 

five.  His  property  was  not  taken  away,  nor  bis  reputation  tainted; 
so  that  the  penalty  consisted  solely  in  the  banishment  from  his  native 
city  to  some  other  Greek  city.  As  to  reputation,  the  ostracism  was 
a  compliment  rather  than  otherwise;  and  so  it  was  vividly  felt  to  be, 
when,  about  ninety  years  after  Kleisthenes,  the  conspiracy  between 
Nikias  and  Alkibiades  fixed  it  upon  Hyperbolus:  the  two  former  had 
bulb  recommended  the  taking  of  an  ostracizing  vote,  each  hoping  to 
cause  the  banishment  of  the  other;  but  before  the  day  arrived,  they 
accommodated  their  own  quarrel.  To  fire  off  the  Bafety-gun  of  the 
republic  against  a  person  so  little  dangerous  as  Hyperbolus,  was 
denounced  as  the  prostitution  of  a  great  political  ceremony:  "  it  was 
not  against  such  men  as  him  (-aid  the  comic  writer  Plato)  that 
the  shell  was  intended  to  be  used."  The  process  of  ostracism  was 
carried  into  effect  by  writing  upon  a  shell  or  potsherd  the  name  of 
the  person  whom  a  citizen  thought  it  prudent  for  a  time  to  banish ; 
which  shell,  when  deposited  in  the  proper  vessel,  counted  for  a  vote 
toward  the  sentence. 

I  have  already  observed  that  all  the  governments  of  the  Grecian 
cities,  when  we  compare  them  witli  that  idea  which  a  modern  reader 
is  apt  to  conceive  of  the  measure  of  force  belonging  to  a  government, 
were  essentially  weak — the  good  as  well  as  the  bad,  the  democratical, 
the  oligarchical,  and  the  despotic.  The  force  in  the  hands  of  any 
government,  to  cope  with  conspirators  or  mutineers,  was  extremely 
small,  with  the  single  exception  of  a  despot  surrounded  with  bis  mer- 
cenary troop.  Accordingly,  no  tolerably  sustained  conspiracy  or 
usurper  could  be  put  down  except  by  direct  aid  of  the  people  in  sup- 
port of  the  government;  which  amounted  to  a  dissolution,  for  the 
time,  of  constitutional  authority,  and  was  pregnant  with  reactionary 
consequences  such  as  no  man  could  foresee.  To  prevent  powerful 
men  from  attempting  usurpation  was  therefore  of  the  greatest  possible 
moment.  Now  a  despot  or  an  oligarchy  might  exercise  at  pleasure 
preventive  means,  much  sharper  than  the  ostracism,  such  as  the 
assassination  of  Kimon,  mentioned  in  my  last  chapter  as  directed  by 
the  Peisistratids.  At  the  very  least,  they  might  send  away  any  one, 
from  whom  they  apprehended  attack  or  danger,  without  incurring 
even  so  much  as  the  imputation  of  severity.  But  in  a  democracy, 
where  arbitrary  action  of  the  magistrate  was  the  thing  of  all  others 
most  dreaded,  and  where  fixed  laws,  with  trial  and  defense  -is  pre- 
liminaries to  punishment,  were  conceived  by  the  ordinary  citizen  as 
the  guarantees  of  bis  personal  security  and  as  the  pride  of  Ins  social 
condition — the  creation  of  such  an  exceptional  power  presented  seri- 
ous difficulty.  If  we  transport  ourselves  to  the  limes  of  Kleisthenes, 
immediately  after  the  expulsion  of  the  Peisistratids,  when  the  work- 
ing of  the  democratical  machinery  was  as  yet  untried,  we  shall  find 
this  difficulty  at  its  maximum.  But  we  shall  also  find  the  nee 
of  vesting  such  a  power  somewhere,  absolutely  imperative.  For  the 
great  Athenian  nobles  had  yet  to  learn  the  lesson  of  respect  for  any 


86  ATHENS    AFTER   THE    PEISISTRATfiDB. 

constitution.     Their  pasl  history  had  exhibited  continual  struggles 
between  the  armed  factions  of  Megakles,  Lykurgus,  and  Peisistratus, 

put  down  after  a  time  by  the  superior  force  and  alliances  of  the  latter; 
and  though  Kleisthenes,  the  -on  of  Megakles,  might  be  firmly  disposed 
mnce  tin'  example  of  his  father  and  to  aet  as  the  faithful  citizen 
of  a  fixed  constitution,  he  would  know  but  too  well  that  the  sons  of  his 
father's  companions  Mid  rivals  would  follow  out  ambitious  purposes 
without  any  regard  to  the  limits  imposed  by  law,  if  ever  they  acquired 
sufficient  partisans  to  presenl  a  fair  prospect  of  success.  Moreover, 
when  any  two  candidates  for  power,  with  such  reckless  dispositions, 
came  into  a  bitter  personal  rivalry,  the  motives  to  each  of  them,  aris- 
ing as  well  out  of  fear  as  out  of  ambition,  to  put  down  his  opponent 
at  any  cost  to  the  constitution,  might  well  become  irresistible,  unless 
Borne  impartial  and  discerning  interference  could  arrest  the  strife  in 
time.  "If  the  Athenians  were  wise  (Aristeides  is  reported  to  have 
said,  in  the  height  and  peril  of  his  parliamentary  struggle  with  The- 
mistoklcs),  they  would  cast  both  Themistokles  and  me  into  the  barath. 
rum."  And  whoever  reads  the  sad  narrative  of  the  Korkyraan 
sedition,  in  the  third  book  of  Thucydides,  together  with  the  reflec- 
tions of  the  historian  upon  it.  will  trace  the  gradual  exasperation  of 
these  party  feuds,  beginning  even  under  democratical  forms,  until  at 
length  they  break  down  the  barriers  of  public  as  well  as  of  private 
morality. 

A.gainst  this  chance  of  internal  assailants  Kleisthenes  had  to  pro- 
tect the  democratical  constitution — first,  by  throwing  impediments  in 
their  way  and  rendering  it  difficult  for  them  to  procure  the  requisite 
support;  next,  by  eliminating  them  before  any  violent  projects  were 
ripe  for  execution  To  do  either  the  one  or  the  other,  it  was  neces- 
sary to  provide  such  a  constitution  as  would  not  only  conciliate  the 
good  will,  but  kindle  the  passionate  attachment,  of  the  mass  of  citi- 
zen-, insomuch  that  not  even  any  considerable  minority  should  be 
deliberately  inclined  to  alter  it  by  force.  It  was  necessary  to  create 
In  the  multitude,  and  through  them  to  force  upon  the  leading  ambi- 
tious men,  that  rare  and  difficult  sentiment  which  we  may  term  a 
constitutional  morality — a  paramount  reverence  for  the  forms  of  the 
constitution,  enforcing  obedience  to  the  authorities  acting  under  and 
within  those  forms,  yet  combined  with  the  habit  of  open  speech,  of 
action  subject  only  to  definite  legal  control,  and  unrestrained  censure 
of  those  very  authorities  as  to  all  their  public  acts — combined,  too, 
with  a  perfect  confidence  in  the  bosom  of  every  citizen,  amidst  th 
bitterness  of  party  contest,  that  the  forms  of  the  constitution  will  be 
not  less  -acred  in  the  eyes  of  his  opponents  than  in  his  own.  Thi 
co-existence  of  freedom  and  self  imposed  restraint — of  obedience  to 
authority  with  unmeasured  censure  of  the  persons  exercising  it — may 
be  found  in  the  aristocracy  of  England  (since  about  1688)  as  well  a 
in  the  democracy  of  the  American  Dhited  States:  and  because  we  are 
familiar  with  it,  we  are  apt  to  suppose  it  a  natural  sentiment -f  though 


PURPOSE  OF  THE  OSTRACISM.  87 

there  seem  to  be  few  sentiments  more  difficult  to  establish  and  diffuse 
among  a  community,  judging  by  the  experience  of  history.  We. 
may  see  how  imperfectly  it  exists  at  this  day  iu  the  Swiss  Cantons; 
while  the  many  violences  of  the  first  French  revolution  illustrate, 
among  various  other  lessons,  the  fatal  effects  arising  from  its  absence, 
even  among  a  people  high  in  the  scale  of  intelligence.  Yet  the  diffu- 
sion of  such  constitutional  morality,  not  merely  among  the  majority 
of  any  community,  but  throughout  the  whole,  is  the  indispensable 
condition  of  a  government  at  once  free  and  peaceable;  since  even  any 
powerful  and  obstinate  minority  may  render  the  working  of  fr  e 
institutions  impracticable,  without  being  strong  enough  to  conquer 
ascendancy  for  themselves.  Nothing  less  than  unanimity,  or  so 
overwhelming  a  majority  as  to  be  tantamount  to  unanimity,  on  the 
cardinal  point  of  respecting  constitutional  forms,  even  by  those  who 
do  not  wholly  approve  of  them,  can  render  the  excitement  of  political 
passion  bloodless,  and  yet  expose  all  the  authorities  in  the  state  to  the 
full  license  of  pacific  criticism. 

At  the  epoch  of  Kleisthenes,  which  by  a  remarkable  coincidence  is 
the  same  as  that  of  the  regifuge  at  Rome,  such  constitutional  morality, 
if  it  existed  anywhere  else,  had  certainly  no  place  at  Athens;  and  the 
first  creation  of  it  in  any  particular  society  must  be  esteemed  an  inter- 
esting historical  fact.  By  the  spirit  of  his  reforms, — equal,  popular, 
and  comprehensive,  far  beyond  the  previous  experience  of  Athenians 
— he  secured  the  hearty  attachment  of  the  body  of  citizens.  But 
from  the  first  generation  of  leading  men,  under  the  nascent  democ- 
racy, and  with  such  precedents  as  they  had  to  look  back  upon, 
no  self-imposed  limits  to  ambition  could  be  expected.  Accord- 
ingly, Kleisthenes  had  to  find  the  means  of  eliminating  before- 
hand any  one  about  to  transgress  these  limits,  so  as  to  escape 
the  necessity  of  putting  him  down  afterward,  with  all  that  blood- 
shed and  reaction,  in  the  midst  of  which  the  free  working  of  the 
constitution  would  be  suspended  at  least,  if  not  irrevocably  extin- 
guished. To  acquiie  such  influence  as  would  render  him  dangerous 
under  democratical  forms,  a  man  must  stand  in  evidence  before  the 
public,  so  as  to  afford  some  reasonable  means  of  judging  of  his 
character  and  purposes.  Now  the  security  which  Kleisthenes  pro- 
vided was  to  call  in  the  positive  judgment  of  the  citizens  respecting 
his  future  promise  purely  and  simply,  so  that  they  might  not  remain 
too  long  neutral  between  two  formidable  political  rivals — pursuant 
in  a  certain  way  to  the  Solonian  proclamation  against  neutrality  in  a 
sedition,  as  I  have  already  remarked  in  a  former  chapter.  He  incor- 
porated in  the  constitution  itself  the  principle  of  privilegium  (to 
employ  the  Roman  phrase,  which  signifies  not  a  peculiar  favor  granted 
to  any  one,  but  a  peculiar  inconvenience  imposed),  yet  only  under  cir- 
cumstances solemn  and  well-defined,  with  full  notice  and  discussion 
beforehand,  and  by  the  positive  secret  vote  of  a  large  proportion  of 
tke  citizens.     "No  law  shall  be  made   against  any  single  citizen, 


8S  ATHENS   AFTER  THE  PEISISTRATTDS. 

without  the  same  ide  against  all  Athenian  citizens;  unless  it 

shall  I  to  6,000  citizens  voting  secretly."    Such  was  that 

,1  principle  of  the  constitution,  under  which  the  ostracism  was 
a  particular  <  is  \  B<  fore  the  vote  of  ostracism  could  be  taken,  a  case 
was  to  be  made  out  in  the  senate  and  the  public  assembly  to  justify 
it.  In  the  sixth  prytany  of  the  year,  these  two  bodies  debated  and 
determined  whether  the  state  of  the  republic  was  menacing  enough 
to  call  forsueh  an  exceptional  measure.  If  they  decided  in  the  affirm 
ative,  a  day  was  named,  the  agora  was  railed  round,  with  ten  entrances 
left  for  the  citizens  of  each  tribe,  and  ten  separate  casks  or  vessels  fos 
depositing  the  suffrages,  which  consisted  of  a  shell  or  a  potsherd  with 
the  name  of  the  person  written  on  it.  whom  each  citizen  designed  to 
At  the  end  of  the  day  the  number  of  votes  were  summed  up, 
and  if  6,000  votes  were  found  to  have  Ik  •en  given  against  any  one  per- 
s  II,  thai  person  was  ostracized;  if  not,  the  ceremony  ended  in  nothing. 
Ten  days  were  allowed  to  Lim  for  sett  ling  his  affairs,  after  which  lie 
was  required  to  depart  from  Attica  for  ten  years,  but  retained  his 
property,  and  suffen  1  no  other  penalty. 

it  was  not  the  maxim  at  Athens  to  escape  the  errors  of  the  people, 

ding  in  the  diffi  rent  <  rrors,  and  the  sinister  interest  besides,  of 
an  extra-popular  or  privileged  few.  Nor  was  any  third  course  open, 
since  the  principles  of  representative  governmenl  were  not  under- 
stood, nor  indeed  conveniently  applicable  to  very  small  communities. 

ad  tiie  judgment  of  the  people  (so  the  Athenians  felt),  there  was 
no  appeal.  Their  grand  study  was  to  surround  the  delivery  of  that 
judgment  with  the  besl  securities  for  rectitude,  and  the  best  preserv- 
against  haste,  passion,  or  private  corruption.  Whatever  meas- 
ure of  good  government  could  not  be  obtained  in  that  way,  could 
not,  in  their  opinion,  be  obtained  at  all.  I  shall  illustrate  the  Athe- 
nian proceedings  on  this  h  ad  more  fully  when  I  come  to  speak  of 
the  working  of  their  mature  democracy.  Meanwhile  in  respect  to 
this  grand  protection  of  the  nascent  democracy — the  vote  of  ostra- 
cism— it  will  be  found  that  the  securities  devised  by  Kleisthenes, 
for  making  the  sentence  effectual  against  the  really  dangerous  man 
and  against  no  one  else,  display  not  less  foresight  than  patriotism. 
The  main  object  was,  to  render  the  voting  an  expression  of  de- 
liberate public  feeling,  as  distinguished  from  mere  factious  anti- 
pathy. Now  the  large  minimum  of  votes  required  (one-fourth  of 
the  entire  citizen  population)  went  far  to  insure  this  effect — the 
more  bo,  since  each  vote,  taken  as  it  was  in  a  secret  manner,  counted 
unequivocally  for  the  expression  of  a  genuine  and  independent 
sentiment,  and  could  neither  be  coerced  nor  bought.  Then  again, 
Kleisthenes  did  not  permit  the  process  of  ostracizing  to  be  opened 

-t  any  one  citizen  exclusively.  If  opened  at  all.  every  one 
without  exception  was  exposed  to  the  sentence;  ^o  that  the  friends 
of  Themistokles  could  not  invoke  it  against  Aristeides,  nor  those 
of  the  latter  against  the  former,  without  exposing  their  own  leaae*. 


OSTRACISM  NECESSARY.  89 

to  the  same  chance  of  exile.  It  was  not  likely  to  be  invoked  at 
all,  therefore,  until  exasperation  had  proceeded  so  far  as  to  ren- 
der both  parties  insensible  to  this  chance — the  precise  index  of  that 
growing  internecive  hostilit}'  which  the  ostracism  prevented  from 
coming  to  a  head.  Nor  could  it  even  then  be  ratified,  unless  a  case 
was  shown  to  convince  the  more,  neutral  portion  of  the  senate  and 
the  ekklesia;  moreover,  after  all,  the  ekklesia  did  not  itself  ostracize, 
but  a  future  day  was  named,  and  the  whole  body  of  the  citizens  were 
solemnly  invited  to  vote.  It  was  in  this  way  that  security  was  taken 
not  only  for  making  the  ostracism  effectual  in  protecting  the  consti- 
tution, but  to  hinder  it  from  being  employed  for  any  other  purpose. 
We  must  recollect  that  it  exercised  its  tutelary  influence  not  merely  on 
those  occasions  when  it  was  actually  employed,  but  by  the  mere 
knowledge  that  it  might  be  employed,  and  by  the  restraining  effect 
which  that  knowledge  produced  on  the  conduct  of  the  great  men. 
Again,  the  ostracism,  though  essentially  of  an  exceptional  nature, 
was  yet  an  exception  sanctified  and  limited  by  the  constitution  itself; 
so  that  the  citizen,  in  giving  his  ostracizing  vote,  did  not  in  any  way 
depart  from  the  constitution  or  lose  his  reverence  for  it.  The  issue 
placed  before  him — "Is  there  any  man  whom  you  think  vitally  dan- 
gerous to  the  state?  if  so,  whom?" — though  vague,  was  yet  raised 
directly  and  legally.  Had  there  been  no  ostracism,  it  might  probably 
have  been  raised  both  indirectly  and  illegally,  on  the  occasion  of  some 
special  imputed  crime  of  a  suspected  political  leader,  when  accused 
before  a  court  of  justice — a  perversion  involving  all  the  mischief  of 
the  ostracism,  without  its  protective  benefits. 

Care  was  taken  to  divest  the  ostracism  of  all  painful  consequence 
except  what  was  inseparable  from  exile.  This  is  not  one  of  the  least 
proofs  of  the  wisdom  with  which  it  was  devised.  Most  certainly  it. 
never  deprived  the  public  of  candidates  for  political  influence;  and 
when  we  consider  the  small  amount  of  individual  evil  which  it 
inflicted — evil,  too,  diminished  in  the  cases  of  Kimon  and  Aristeides, 
by  a  reactionary  sentiment  which  augmented  their  subsequent  popu- 
larity after  return — two  remarks  will  be  quite  sufficient  to  offer  it 
the  way  of  justification.  First,  it  completely  produced  its  intended 
effect ;  for  the  democracy  grew  up  from  infancy  to  manhood  without 
a  single  attempt  to  overthrow  it  by  force — a  result  upon  which 
no  reflecting  contemporary  of  Kleisthenes  could  have  ventured  to 
calcuate.  Next,  through  such  tranquil  working  of  the  democrati- 
cal  forms,  a  constitutional  morality  quite  sufficiently  complete  was 
produced  among  the  leading  Athenians,  to  enable  the  people 
after  a  certain  time  to  dispense  with  that  exceptional  security 
which  the  ostracism  offered.  To  the  nascent  democracy,  it  was 
absolutely  indispensable;  to  the  growing,  yet  militant  domocracy 
it  was  salutary;  but  the  full-grown  democracy  both  could  and  did 
stand  without  it.  The  ostracism  passed  upon  Hyperbolus,  about 
ninety  years  after  Kleisthenes,  was  the  last  occasion  of  its  employ- 


90  ATHENS  AFTER   THE    FEISISTRATIDS. 

in! ni.  And  even  this  can  hardly  be  considered  as  a  serious  instance: 
ii  was  a  trick  concerted  between  two  distinguished  Athenians  (Nikiaa 
and  Alkibiades)  to  turn  to  their  own  political  account  a  process 
already  coming  to  be  antiquated.  Nor  would  such  a  maneuver  have 
be<  o  possible,  if  the  contemporary  Athenian  citizens  had  been  pene- 
trated with  the  same  serious  feeling  of  the  value  of  ostracism  as  a 
:  nil  of  democracy,  as  had  been  once  entertained  by  their  fathers 
and  grandfathers.  Between  Kleisthenes  and  Hyperbolus,  we  hear 
of  alicut  ten  different  persons  as  having  been  banished  by  ostracism: 
firsl  of  all.  Bipparchus  of  the  deme  Cholargus,  the  sou  of  Charmus, 
a  relative  of  the  recently-expelled  Peisistratid  despots;  then  Aris- 
Themistokles,  Kimon,  and  Thucydides,  son  of  Melesias,  all  of 
them  renowned  political  leaders:  also  Alkibiades  and  Megakles  (the 
paternal  and  maternal  grandfathers  of  the  distinguished  Alkibiades), 
and  Kallias,  belonging  to  another  eminent  family  at  Alliens;  lastly, 
Damcii.  tlic  preceptor  of  Perikles  iu  poetry  and  music,  and  eminent 
for  his  acquisitions  in  philosophy.  In  this  last  case  comes  out  the 
vulgar  side  of  humanity,  aristocratical  as  well  as  democratical ;  for 
with  both,  the  process  of  philosophy  and  the  persons  of  philosophers 
are  wont  to  be  alike  unpopular.  Even  Kleisthenes  himself  is  said  to 
have  been  ostracized  under  his  own  law,  and  Xanthippus;  but  both 
upon  authority  too  weak  to  trust.  Miltiades  was  not  ostracized  at 
all,  but  tried  and  punished  for  misconduct  in  his  command. 

I  should  hardly  have  said  so  much  about  this  memorable  and 
peculiar  institution  of  Kleisthenes,  if  the  erroneous  accusations 
against  the  Athenian  democracy,  of  envy,  injustice,  and  ill-treatment 
of  their  superior  men,  had  not  been  greatly  founded  upon  it,  and  if 
such  criticisms  had  not  passed  from  ancient  times  to  modern  with 
little  examination.  In  monarchical  governments,  a  pretender  to  the 
throne,  numbering  a  certain  amount  of  supporters,  is  as  a  matter  of 
course  excluded  from  the  country.  The  Duke  of  Bordeaux  cannot 
now  reside  in  France — nor  could  Napoleon  after  1815 — nor  Charles 
Edward  iu  England  during  the  last  century.  No  man  treats  this  as 
any  extravagant  injustice,  yet  it  is  the  parallel  of  the  ostracism — 
with  a  stronger  case  in  favor  of  the  latter,  inasmuch  as  the  change 
from  one  regal  dynasty  to  another  does  not  of  necessity  overthrow  all 
the  collateral  institutions  and  securities  of  the  country.  Plutarch  has 
affirmed  that  the  ostracism  arose  from  the  envy  and  jealousy  inher- 
ent in  a  democracy,  and  not  from  justifiable  fears — an  observation 
often  repeated,  yet  not  the  less  demonstrably  untrue.  Not  merely 
because  ostracism  so  worked  as  often  to  increase  the  influence  of  that 
political  leader  whose  rival  it  removed — but  still  more,  because,  if 
the  fact  had  been  as  Plutarch  says,  this  institution  would  have  con- 
tinued as  long  as  the  democracy;  whereas  it  finished  with  the  ban- 
ishment of  Hyperbolus,  at  a  period  when  the  government  was  more 
decisively  democratical  than  it  had  b  en  in  the  time  of  Kleisthenes. 
It  was,  iu  truth,  a  product  altogether  of  foar  and  insecurity  on  the 


OSTRACISM   IN  OTHER  GRECIAN  CITIES.  91 

part  both  of  the  democracy  and  its  best  friends — fear  perfectly  well 
grounded,  and  only  appearing  needless  because  the  precautions  taken 
prevented  attack.  So  soon  as  the  diffusion  of  a  constitutional  moral- 
ity had  placed  the  mass  of  the  citizens  above  all  serious  fear  of  an 
aggressive  usurper,  the  ostracism  was  discontinued.  And  doubtless 
the  feeling  that  it  might  safely  be  dispensed  with  must  have  been 
strengthened  by  the  long  ascendency  of  Perikles — by  the  spectacle  of 
the  greatest  statesman  whom  Athens  ever  produced,  acting  steadily 
wdthin  the  limits  of  the  constitution;  and  by  the  ill-success  of  his  two 
opponents,  Kimon  and  Thucydides — aided  by  numerous  partisans, 
aud  by  the  great  comic  writers,  at  a  period  when  comedy  was  a 
power  in  the  state  such  as  it  has  never  been  before  or  since — in  their 
attempts  to  get  him  ostracized.  They  succeeded  in  fanning  up  the 
ordinary  antipathy  of  the  citizens  toward  philosophers  so  far  as  to 
procure  the  ostracism  of  his  friend  and  teacher  Damon ;  but  Perikles 
himself  (to  repeat  the  complaint  of  his  bitter  enemy  the  comic  poet 
Kratiuus)  "holds  his  head  as  high  as  if  he  carried  the  Odeion  upon 
it,  now  that  the  shell  has  gone  by" — i.e.  now  that  he  has  escaped  the 
ostracism.  If  Perikles  was  not  conceived  to  be  dangerous  to  the 
constitution,  none  of  his  successors  were  at  all  likely  to  be  so 
regarded.  Damon  and  Hyperbolus  were  the  two  last  persons  ostra- 
cized. Both  of  them  were  cases,  and  the  only  cases,  of  an  unequivo- 
cal abuse  of  the  institution,  because,  whatever  the  grounds  of  dis- 
pleasure against  them  may  have  been,  it  is  impossible  to  conceive 
either  of  them  as  menacing  to  the  state — whereas  all  the  other  known 
sufferers  were  men  of  such  position  and  power,  that  the  6,000  citi- 
zens who  inscribed  each  name  on  the  shell,  or  at  least  a  large  propor- 
tion of  them,  may  well  have  done  so  under  the  most  conscientious 
belief  that  they  were  guarding  the  constitution  against  real  danger. 
Such  a  change  in  the  character  of  the  persons  ostracized  plainly 
evinces  that  the  ostracism  had  become  dissevered  from  that  genuine 
patriotic  prudence  which  originally  rendered  it  both  legitimate  and 
popular.  It  had  served  for  two  generations  an  inestimable  tutelary 
purpose — it  lived  to  be  twice  dishonored — and  then  passed,  by  uni- 
versal acquiescence,  into  matter  of  history. 

A  process  analogous  to  the  ostracism  subsisted  at  Argos,  at  Syra- 
cuse, aud  iu  some  other  Grecian  democracies.  Aristotle  states  that  it 
was  abused  for  factious  purposes:  and  at  S}Tacuse,  where  it  was 
introduced  after  the  expulsion  of  the  Gelonian  dynasty,  Diodorus 
affirms  that  it  was  so  unjustly  and  profusely  applied  as  to  deter  per- 
sons of  wealth  and  station  from  taking  any  part  in  public  affairs  for 
which  reason  it  was  speedily  discontinued.  We  have  no  particulars 
to  enable  us  to  appreciate  this  general  statement.  But  we  cannot 
safely  infer  that  because  the  ostracism  worked  on  the  whole  well  at 
Athens,  it  must  necessarily  have  worked  well  in  other  states — the 
more  so  as  we  do  not  know  whether  it  was  surrounded  with  the  same 
precautionary  formalities,  nor  whether   it  even  required    the  saint 


92  ATHENS   AFTER  THE  PEI3ISTRATIDS. 

large  minimum  of  votes  to  make  it  effective.     This  latter  guarantee. 
so  valuable  in  regard  to  an  institution  essentially  easy  to  abuse,  is  not 
noticed  by  Diodorus  in  his  brief  account  of  the  Petahsm—  so  the  proc 
as  denominated  at  Syracuse. 

Such  was  the  flrsl  Athenian  democracy,  engendered  as  well  by  the 
reaction  against  Hippiasand  his  dynasty  as  by  the  memorable  part" 
nership,  whether  spontaneous  or  compulsory,  between  Kleisthenes 
and  the  unfranchised  multitude.  It  is  to  be  distinguished  both  from 
the  mitigated  oligarchy  established  by  Solon  before,  and  from  the 
full-grown  and  symmetrical  democracy  which  prevailed  afterward 
from  the  beginning  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  toward  the  close  of 
the  career  of  Perikles.  It  was  indeed  a  striking  revolution,  impressi  d 
upon  the  citizen  not  less  by  the  sentiments  to  which  it  appealed  than 
by  the  visible  change  which  it  made  in  political  and  social  life.  lie 
saw  himself  marshaled  in  the  ranks  of  hoplites  alongside  of  new 
companions  in  arms — he  was  enrolled  in  a  new  register,  and  his  prop- 
erty in  a  new  schedule,  in  his  deme  and  by  hi^  di  march,  an  officer 
before  unknown — he  found  the  year  distributed  afresh,  for  all  legal 
purposes,  into  ten  parts  bearing  the  name  of  prytanies,  each  marked 
by  a  solemn  and  free-spoken  ekklesia  at  which  he  bad  a  right  to  be 
present — bis  ekklesia  was  convoked  and  presided  by  senators  called 
prytanes,  members  of  a  senate  novel  both  as  to  number  and  distribu- 
tion— bis  political  duties  were  now  performed  as  member  of  a  tribe, 
designate!  1  by  a  name  not  before  pronounced  in  common  Attic  life, 
connected  with  one  of  ten  heroes  whose  statues  he  now  for  the  first 
time  saw  in  the  agora,  and  associating  him  with  fcllow-tribemen 
from  all  parts  of  Attica.  All  these  and  many  others  were  sensible 
novelties  felt  in  the  daily  proceedings  of  the  citizen.  But  the  great 
novelty  of  all  was  the  authentic  recognition  of  the  ten  new  tribes  as 
a  sovereign  Demos  or  people,  apart  from  all  specialties  of  phratric  or 
gentile  origin,  with  free  speech  and  equal  law;  retaining  no  distinc- 
tion except  the  four  classes  of  the  Solouian  property-schedule  with 
their  gradations  of  eligibility.  To  a  considerable  proportion  of  citi- 
zens this  greal  novelty  was  still  farther  endeared  by  the  fact  that  it 
had  raised  them  out  of  the  degraded  position  of  metics  and  slaves; 
while  to  the  large  majority  of  all  the  citizens,  it  furnished  a  splendid 
political  idea,  profoundly  impressive  to  the  Greek  mind — capable  of 
calling  forth  the  most  ardent  attachment  as  well  as  the  most  devoted 
Sense  of  active  obligation  and  obedience.  We  have  now  to  see  how 
their  newly-created  patriotism  manifested  itself. 

Kleisthenes  and  his  new  constitution  carried  with  them  so  com 
the  popular  favor,  that  Esagoras  had  no  other  way  of  oppos- 
ing it  except  by  calling  in  the  interference  of  Kleomenes  and  the  Lace- 
daemonians. Klcorm  nes  listened  the  more  readily  to  this  call,  as  be 
was  reported  to  have  been  on  an  intimate  footing  with  the  wife  of 
Isagoras.  Be  prepared  to  come  to  Athens;  but  his  first  aim  was  to 
deprive  the  democracy  of  its  great  leader  Kleisthenes,  who,  as  belong- 


ISAGORAS  CALLS  IN  KLEOMENES.  93 

ing  to  the  Alkmreonid  family,  was  supposed  to  be  tainted  with  the 
inherited  sin  of  his  great-grandfather  Megakles,  the  destroyer  of  the 
usurper  Kylon.  Kleomenes  sent  a  herald  to  Athens,  demanding  the 
expulsion  "of  the  accursed" — so  this  family  were  called  by  their 
enemies,  and  so  they  continued  to  be  called  eighty  years  afterward, 
when  the  same  maneuver  was  practiced  by  the  Lacedsemonians  of 
that  day  against  Perikles.  This  requisition,  recommended  by  Isag- 
oras,  was  so  well-timed,  that  Kleisthenes,  not  venturing  to  disobey 
it,  retired  voluntarily;  so  that  Kleomenes,  though  arriving  at  Athens 
only  with  a  small  force,  found  himself  master  of  the  city.  At  the 
instigation  of  Isagoras,  he  sent  into  exile  700  families,  selected 
from  the  chief  partisans  of  Kleisthenes.  His  next  attempt  was  to 
dissolve  the  new  senate  of  Five  Hundred,  and  to  place  the  whole 
government  in  the  hands  of  300  adherents  of  the  chief  whose 
cause  he  espoused.  But  now  was  seen  the  spirit  infused  into  the 
people  by  their  new  constitution.  At  the  time  of  che  first  usurpa- 
tion of  Peisistratus,  the  senate  of  that  day  had  only  not  resisted, 
but  even  lent  themselves  to  the  scheme.  Now,  the  new  senate  of 
Kleisthenes  resolutely  refused  to  submit  to  dissolution,  while  the 
citizens  generally,  even  after  the  banishment  of  the  chief  Kleisthenean 
partisans,  manifested  their  feelings  in  away  at  once  so  hostile  and  so 
determined,  that  Kleomenes  and  Isagoras  were  altogether  baffled. 
They  were  compelled  to  retire  into  the  acropolis  and  stand  upon  the 
defensive.  This  symptom  of  weakness  was  the  signal  for  a  general 
risiug  of  the  Athenians,  who  besieged  the  Spartan  king  on  the  holy 
rock.  He  had  evidently  come  Avithout  any  expectation  of  finding, 
or  any  means  of  overpowering,  resistance;  for  at  the  end  of  two  days 
his  provisions  were  exhausted,  and  he  was  forced  to  capitulate.  He 
and  his  Lacedaemonians,  as  well  as  Isagoras,  were  allowed  to  retire 
to  Sparta;  but  the  Athenians  of  the  party  captured  along  with  him 
were  imprisoned,  condemned,  and  executed  by  the  people. 

Kleisthenes,  with  the  700  exiled  families,  was  immediately  re- 
called, and  his  new  constitution  materially  strengthened  by  this 
first  success.  Yet  the  prospect  of  renewed  Spartan  attack  was  suf- 
ficiently serious  to  induce  him  to  send  envoys  to  Artaphernes,  the 
Persian  Satrap  at  Sardis,  soliciting  the  admission  of  Athens  into  the 
Persian  alliance.  He  probably  feared  the  intrigues  of  the  expelled 
Hippias  in  the  same  quarter.  Artaphernes,  having  first  informed 
himself  who  the  Athenians  were,  and  where  they  dwelt,  replied  that 
if  the}-  chose  to  send  earth  and  water  to  the  king  of  Persia  they 
might  be  received  as  allies,  but  upon  no  other  condition.  Such  were 
the  feelings  of  alarm  under  which  the  envoys  had  quitted  Athens, 
that  they  went  the  length  of  promising  this  unqualified  token  of  sub- 
mission. But  their  countrymen  on  their  return  disavowed  them  with 
scorn  and  indignation. 

It  was  at  this  time  that  the  first  connection  began  between  Athens 
and  the  little  Boeotian  town  of  Platoea,  situated  on  the  northern  slope 


94  ATHENS  AFTER  THE  PEISISTRATIDS. 

of  the  ranje  of  Kithacron,  between  that  mountain  and  the  river  Aso 
pus — on  flic  road  from  Athens  to  Thebes;  and  it  is  upon  this  occasion 
thai  we  first  become  acquainted  with  the  Boeotians  and  their  politics. 
In  one  of  my  preceding  volumes,  the  Boeotian  federation  has  already 
been  briefly  described,  as  composed  of  some  twelve  or  thirteen  au- 
tonomous towns  under  the  headship  of  Thebes,  which  was,  or  pro 
fessed  to  have  been,  their  mother-city.  Plataea  had  been  (so  the 
Thebans  affirmed)  their  latest  foundation;  it  was  ill-used  by  them, 
and  discontented  with  the  alliance.  Accordingly,  as  Kleomenes  was 
on  his.  way  back  from  Athens,  the  Plataeans  took  the  opportunity  of 
addressing  themselves  to  him,  craving  the  protection  of  Sparta 
against  Thebes,  and  surrendering  their  town  and  territory  without 
reserve.  The  Spartan  king,  having  no  motive  to  undertake  a  trust 
which  promised  nothing  but  trouble,  advised  them  to  solicit  the  pro- 
tection of  Athens,  as  nearer  and  more  accessible  for  them  in  case  of 
need.  He  foresaw  that  this  would  embroil  the  Athenians  with  Bceo- 
tia,  and  such  anticipation  was  in  fact  his  chief  motive  for  giving  the 
advice,  which  the  Plataeans  followed.  Selecting  an  occasion  of  pub- 
lic sacrifice  at  Athens,  the}'  dispatched  thither  envoys,  who  sat  down 
as  suppliants  at  the  altar,  surrendered  their  town  to  Athens,  and 
implored  protection  against  Thebes.  Such  an  appeal  was  not  to  be 
resisted,  and  protection  was  promised.  It  was  soon  needed,  for  the 
Thebans  invaded  the  Plataean  territory,  and  an  Athenian  force 
marched  to  defend  it.  Battle  was  about  to  be  joined,  when  the  Cor- 
inthians interposed  with  their  mediation,  which  was  accepted  by  both 
parties.  They  decided  altogether  in  favor  of  Plataea,  pronouncing 
'.hat  the  Thebans  had  no  right  to  employ  force  against  any  seceding 
member  of  the  Boeotian  federation.  The  Thebans,  finding  the 
decision  against  them,  refused  to  abide  by  it,  and  attacked  the  Athe- 
nians on  their  return,  but  sustained  a  complete  defeat;  a  breach  of 
faith  which  the  Athenians  avenged  by  joining  to  Plata-a  the  portion 
of  Theban  territory  south  of  the  Asopus,  and  making  that  river  the 
limit  between  the  two.  By  such  success,  however,  the  Athenians 
gained  nothing,  except  the  enmity  of  Bceotia — as  Kleomenes  had 
foreseen.  Their  alliance  with  Plataea,  long-continued,  and  present- 
ing in  the  course  of  this  history  several  incidents  touching  to  our 
•ympathies,  will  be  found,  if  we  except  one  splendid  occasion,  pro- 
ductive only  of  burden  to  the  one  party,  yet  insufficient  as  a  protec- 
tion to  the  other. 

Meanwhile  Kleomenes  had  returned  to  Sparta  full  of  resentment 
against  the  Athenians,  and  resolved  on  punishing  them  as  well  as 
on  establishing  his  friend  Isagoras  as  despot  over  them.  Having 
been  taught,  however,  by  humiliating  experience,  that  this  was  no 
easy  achievement,  he  would  not  make  the  attempt,  without  having 
assembled  a  considerable  force.  He  summoned  allies  from  all  the 
various  states  of  Peloponnesus,  yet  without  venturing  to  inform  them 
what  he  was  about  to  undertake.     He  at  the  same  time  concerted 


SUCCESSES  OF  ATHENS.  95 

measures  with  the  Boeotians,  and  with  the  Chalkidians  of  Euboea.  for 
a  simultaneous  invasion  of  Attica  on  all  sides.  It  appears  that  he 
had  greater  confidence  in  their  hostile  dispositions  toward  Athens 
than  in  those  of  the  Peloponnesians,  for  he  was  not  afraid  to  acquaint 
them  with  his  design — and  probably  the  Boeotians  were  incensed  with 
the  recent  interference  of  Athens  in  the  affair  of  Platoea.  As  soon  as 
these  preparations  were  completed,  the  two  kings  of  Sparta,  Kleo- 
menes  and  Demaratus,  put  themselves  at  the  head  of  the  united  Pelo- 
ponnesian  force,  marched  into  Attica,  and  advanced  as  far  as  Eleusis 
on  the  way  to  Athens.  But  when  the  allies  came  to  know  the  pur- 
pose for  which  they  were  to  be  employed,  a  spirit  of  dissatisfaction 
manifested  itself  among  them.  They  had  no  unfriendly  sentiment 
toward  Athens;  and  the  Corinthians  especially,  favorably  disposed 
rather  than  otherwise  toward  that  city,  resolved  to  proceed  no  farther, 
withdrew  their  contingent  from  the  camp,  and  returned  home.  At 
the  same  time,  King  Demaratus,  either  sharing  in  the  general  dis- 
satisfaction or  moved  by  some  grudge  against  his  colleague  which 
had  not  before  manifested  itself,  renounced  the  undertaking  also. 
Two  such  examples,  operating  upon  the  pre-existing  sentiment  of  the 
allies  generally,  caused  the  whole  camp  to  break  up  and  return  home 
without  striking  a  blow. 

We  may  here  remark  that  this  is  the  first  instance  known  in  which 
Sparta  appears  in  act  as  recognized  head  of  an  obligatory  Peloponne- 
sian  alliance,  summoning  contingents  from  the  cities  to  be  placed 
under  the  command  of  her  king.  Her  headship,  previously  recognized 
in  theory,  passes  now  into  act,  but  in  an  unsatisfactory  manner,  so  as 
to  prove  the  necessity  of  precaution  and  concert  beforehand — which 
will  be  found  not  long  wanting. 

Pursuant  to  the  scheme  concerted,  the  Boeotians  and  Chalkidians 
attacked  Attica  at  the  same  time  that  Kleomenes  entered  it.  The 
former  seized  (Enoe  and  Hysise,  the  frontier  demes  of  Attica  on  the 
side  toward  Plataea;  while  the  latter  assailed  the  north-eastern 
frontier  which  faces  Euboea.  Invaded  on  three  sides,  the  Athenians 
were  in  serious  danger,  and  were  compelled  to  concentrate  all  their 
forces  at  Eleusis  against  Kleomenes,  leaving  the  Boeotians  and  Chalki- 
dians unopposed.  But  the  unexpected  breaking  up  of  the  invading 
army  from  Peloponnesus  proved  their  rescue,  and  enabled  them  to 
turn  the  whole  of  their  attention  to  the  other  frontier.  They  marched 
into  Bceotia  to  the  strait  called  Euripus  which  separates  it  from 
Euboea,  intending  to  prevent  the  junction  of  the  Boeotians  and 
Chalkidians,  and  to  attack  the  latter  first  apart.  But  the  arrival  of 
the  Boeotians  caused  an  alteration  in  their  scheme;  they  attacked  the 
Boeotians  first,  and  gained  a  victory  of  the  most  complete  character — 
killing  a  large  number,  and  capturing  700  prisoners.  On  the  very 
same  day  they  crossed  over  to  Euboea,  attacked  the  Chalkidians,  and 
gained  another  victory  so  decisive  that  it  at  once  terminated  the  war. 
Many  Chalkidians  were  taken,  as  well  as  Boeotians,  and  conveyed  in 


96  ATHENS  AFTER  THE  PEISISTRATIDB. 

chains  to  Athens,  where  after  a  certain  detention  they  were  at  last 
ransomed  for  two  mines  per  man.  Of  the  sum  thus  raised,  a  tenth 
was  employed  in  the  fabrication  of  a  chariol  and  lour  horses  in 
bronze,  which  wa^  placed  in  the  acropolis  to  commemorate  the  vic- 
tory, Berodotus  saw  this  trophy  when  he  was  al  Athens.  He  saw, 
too,  wiiai  was  a  still  more  speaking  trophy,  the  actual  chains  in 
which  the  prisoners  bad  been  fettered,  exbibitingin  their  appearance 
the  damage  undergone  when  the  acropoli  w.is  burnt  by  Xerxes:  :m 
inscription  of  four  lines  described  the  offerings  and  recorded  the  vic- 
tory  oul  of  which  they  had  sprung. 

Another  consequence  of  some  moment  arose  out  of  this  victory. 
Tlir  Athenians  planted  a  body  of  4,000  of  their  citizens  as  Kleruchs 
(lot  holders)  or  settlers  upon  the  lands  of  the  wealthy  Chalkidian 
oligarchy  called  the  Hippobota — proprietors  probably  in  the  fertile 
plain  of  Lelantum  between  Chalkis  and  Eretria.  This  is  a  system 
which  we  shall  find  hereafter  extensively  followed  out  by  the  Athe- 
nians in  the  days  of  their  power;  partly  with  the  view  of  providing 
for  their  poorer  citizens — partly  to  Berve  as  garrison  among  a  popula- 
tion either  hostile  or  of  doubtful  fidelity.  These  Attic  Kleruchs  (I 
can  And  no  Other  name  by  which  to  speak  of  them)  did  not  lose  their 
birth-right  as  Athenian  citizens.  They  were  not  colonists  in  the 
Grecian  sense,  and  they  are  known  by  a  totally  different  name — but 
they  correspond  very  nearly  to  the  colonies  formerly  planted  out  on 
the  conquered  lands  by  Rome.  The  increase  of  the  poorer  popula- 
lation  was  always  more  or  less  painfully  felt  in  every  Grecian  city; 
for  though  the  aggregate  population  never  seems  to  have  increased 
very  fast,  yet  the  multiplication  of  children  in  poor  families  caused 
the  subdivision  of  the  smaller  lots  of  laud,  until  at  last  they  became 
insufficient  for  a  maintenance;  and  the  persons  thus  impoverished 
found  it  difficult  to  obtain  subsistence  in  other  ways,  more  especially 
lab  a-  lor  the  richer  classes  was  so  much  performed  by  imported 
slaves.  Doubtless  some  families  possessed  of  landed  property  became 
extinct.  Vet  this  did  not  at  all  benefit  the  smaller  and  poorer  pro- 
prietors, for  the  lands  rendered  vacant  passed,  not  to  them,  but  by 
inheritance  or  bequest  or  intermarriage  to  other  proprieters  for  the 
most  part  in  easy  circumstances — since  one  opulent  family  usually 
intermarried  with  another.  I  shall  enter  more  fully  at  a  future 
opportunity  into  this  question — the  great  and  serious  problem  of 
population,  as  it  affected  the  Greek  communities  generally,  and  as 
it  was  dealt  with  in  theory  by  the  powerful  minds  of  Plato  and  Aris- 
totle—at  present  it  is  sufficient  to  notice  that  the  numerous  Kleruchies 
sent  out  by  Athens,  of  which  this  to  Euboea  was  the  first,  arose  in  a 
great  measure  out  of  the  multiplication  of  the  poorer  population, 
which  her  extended  power  was  employed  in  providing  for.  Her  sub- 
sequi  nt  proceedings  with  a  view  to  the  same  object  will  not  be  always 
found  so  justifiable  as  this  now  before  us,  which  grew  natuially, 


DISTRESS  OF  THE  THEBANS.  97 

according  to  the  ideas  of  the  time,  out  of  her  success  against  the 
Chalkidians. 

The  war  between  Athens,  however,  and  Thebes  with  her  Boeotian 
allies,  still  continued,  to  the  great  and  repeated  disadvantage  of  the 
latter,  until  at  length  the  Thebans  in  despair  sent  to  ask  advice  of 
the  Delphian  oracle,  and  were  directed  to  "solicit  aid  from  those 
nearest  to  them."  "How  (they  replied)  are  we  to  obey?  Our  nearest 
neighbors,  of  Tauagra,  Koroneia,  and  Thespia?,  arc  now,  and  have 
been  from  the  beginning,  lending  us  all  the  aid  in  their  power."  An 
ingenious  Theban,  however,  coming  to  the  relief  of  his  perplexed 
fellow-citizens,  dived  into  the  depths  of  legend  and  brought  up  a 
happy  meaning.  "  Those  nearest  to  us  (he  said)  are  the  inhabitants 
of  iEgina:  for  Thebe  (the  eponym  of  Thebes)  and  JSgina  (the  eponyin 
of  that  island)  were  both  sisters,  daughters  of  Asopus.  Let  us  send 
to  crave  assistance  from  the  ^Egiuetans."  If  his  subtle  interpretation 
(founded  upon  their  descent  from  the  same  legendary  progenitors) 
did  not  at  once  convince  all  who  heard  it,  at  least  no  one  had  any 
better  to  suggest.  Envoys  were  at  once  sent  to  the  iEginetans;  who, 
in  reply  to  a  petition  founded  on  legendary  claims,  sent  to  the  help  of 
the  Thebans  a  reinforcement  of  legendary,  but  venerated,  auxiliaries — 
the  JSakid  heroes.  We  are  left  to  suppose  that  their  efligies  are  here 
meant.  It  was  in  vain,  however,  that  the  glory  and  the  supposed 
presence  of  the  iEakids  Telamon  and  Peleus  were  introduced  into 
the  Theban  camp.  Victory  still  continued  on- the  side  of  Alliens;  so 
that  the  discouraged  Thebans  again  sent  to  JEgina,  restoring  tne 
heroes,  and  praying  for  aid  of  a  character  more  human  and  positive. 
Their  request  was  granted,  and  the  ^Eginetans  commenced  war 
against  Athens,  without  even  the  decent  preliminary  ot  a  herald  and 
declaration. 

This  remarkable  embassy  first  brings  us  into  acquaintance  with  the 
Dorians  of  ^Egina — oligarchical,  wealthy,  commercial,  and  powerful 
at  sea,  even  in  the  earliest  days;  more  analogous  to  Corinth  than  to 
any  of  the  other  cities  called  Dorian.  The  hostility  which  they  now 
began  without  provocation  against  Athens — repressed  by  Sparta  at 
the  critical  moment  of  the  battle  of  Marathon — then  again  breaking 
out — and  hushed  for  a  wdiile  by  the  common  dangers  of  the  Persian 
invasion  under  Xerxes,  was  appeased  only  with  the  conquest  of  the 
island  about  twenty  years  after  that  event,  and  with  the  expulsion 
and  destruction  of  its  inhabitants.  There  had  been  indeed,  accord- 
ing to  Herodotus,  a  feud  of  great  antiquity  between  Athens  and 
^Egina — of  which  he  gives  the  account  in  a  singular  narrative  blend- 
ing together  religion,  politics,  exposition  of  ancient  customs,  etc. 
But  at  the  time  when  the  Thebans  solicited  aid  from  iEgina,  the 
latter  was  at  peace  with  Athens.  The  iEginetans  employed  their 
fleet,  powerful  for  that  day,  in  ravaging  Phalerum  and  the  mari- 
time demes  of  Attica;  nor  had  the  Athenians  as  yet  any  fleet  to  resist 
H.  G.  II.— 4 


98  ATHENS  AFTER  THE  PEISISTRATLDS. 

them.     I'  la  probable  thai  the  desired  effect  was  produced,  of  divert 
n  of  the  Athenian  force  from  the  war  against  Ikeotia,  and 
fliu-  partially  relieving  Thebes;  but  the  war  of  Athena  against  both 
mi  continued  for  a  considerable  time,  though  we  have  no  infor- 
mation respei  ting  its  details. 

Mi  ;tn\\  lui.'  the  attention  of  Allien-  was  called  off  from  these  com- 
bined enemies  by  a  inure  menacing  cloud  which  threatened  to  burst 
upon  herfrom  the  ide  of  Sparta.  Kleomenes  and  his  countrymen, 
full  of  resentment  al  the  late  inglorious  desertion  of  Eleusis,  were 
yet  more  incensed  by  the  discovery,  which  appears  to  bave  been 
then  recently  made,  that  the  injunctions  of  the  Delphian  priestess  1 » »r 
the  expulsion  of  Hippias  from  Athens  had  been  fraudulently  pro 
cured.  Moreover  Kleomenes,  when  shut  up  in  the  acropolis  of 
Alliens  with  [sagoras,  had  found  there  various  prophecies  previously 
treasured  up  by  the  Peisistratids,  many  of  which  foreshadowed 
events  highly  disastrous  to  Sparta.  And  while  the  recent  brilliant 
manifestations  of  courage  and  repeated  victories,  on  the  part  of 
Athens,  seemed  to  indicate  that  such  prophecies  might  perhaps  be 
realized — Sparta  bad  to  reproach  herself,  that,  from  the  foolish  and 
mischievous  conduct  of  Kleomenes,  she  had  undone  the  effi  ct  of  her 
previous  aid  against  the  Peisistratids,  and  thus  losl  that  return  of 
gratitude  which  the  Athenians  would  otherwise  have  testified.  Un- 
der such  impressions,  the  Spartan  authorities  took  the  remarkable 
step  of  sending  for  Hippias  from  his  residence  at  Sigeium  to  Pelo- 
ponnesus,  and.  of  summoning  deputies  from  all  their  allies  to  meet 
him  at  Sparta. 

The  convocation  thus  summoned  deserves  notice  as  the  commence- 
ment of  a  new  era  in  Grecian  polities.  The  previous  expedition  of 
Kleomenes  against  Attica  presents  to  us  the  firsl  known  example  of 
Spartan  headship  passing  from  theory  into  act:  that  expedition  mis- 
carried because  the  allies,  though  willing  to  follow,  would  notfollow 
blindly,  nor  he  made  the  instruments  of  executing  purposes  repug- 
nant to  their  feelings.  Sparta  had  now  learnt  the  necessity,  in  order 
to  insure  their  hearty  concurrence,  of  letting  them  know  what  she 
contemplated,  so  as  to  ascertain  at  least  that  she  had  no  decided  oppo- 
sition to  apprehend.  Here  then  is  the  third  stage  in  the  spontane- 
ous movement  of  Greece  toward  a  systematic  conjunction,  however 
imperfect,  of  its  many  autonomous  units;  firstwe  have  Spartan  head- 
ship suggested  in  theory,  from  a  concourse  of  circumstances  which 
attract  to  her  the  admiration  of  all  Greece— power,  unrivaled  train- 
indisturbed  antiquity,  etc. :  next,  the  theory  passes  into  act.  yet 
rude  and  shapeless :  lastly,  the  act  becomes  clothed  with  formalities 
and  pi  discussion  and  determination.     The  first  convoca- 

tion .if  tie-  allies  al  Sparta,  for  the  purpose  of  having  a  common 
object  submitted  to  their  consideration,  may  well  be  regarded  as  an 
important  event  in  Grecian  political  history:  the  proceedings  at  the 
convocation  are  no  less  important,  as  an  indication  of  the  way  in 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  CONVOCATION".  99 

which  the  Greeks  of  that  day  felt  and  acted,  and  must  be  borne  in 
mind  as  a  contrast  with  times  hereafter  to  be  described. 

Hippias  having  been  presented  to  the  assembled  allies,  the  Spartans 
expressed  their  sorrow  for  having  dethroned  him — their  resentment 
and  alarm  at  the  newborn  insolence  of  Athens,  already  tasted  by  her 
immediate  neighbors,  and  menacing  to  every  state  represented  in  the 
convocation — and  their  anxiety  to  restore  Hippias,  not  less  as  a  rep- 
aration of  the  past  wrong,  than  as  a  means,  through  his  rule,  of 
keeping  Athens  low  and  dependent.  But  the  proposition,  though 
emanating  from  Sparta,  was  listened  to  by  the  allies  with  one  com- 
mon sentiment  of  repugnance.  They  had  no  sympathy  for  Hippias 
— no  dislike,  still  less  any  fear,  of  Athens — and  a  profound  detesta- 
tion of  the  character  of  a  despot.  The  spirit  which  had  animated 
the  armed  contingents  at  Eleusis  now  re-appeared  among  the  deputies 
a*  Sparta,  and  the  Corinthians  again  took  the  initiative.  Their  dep- 
uty Sosikles  protested  against  the  project  in  the  fiercest  and  most 
indignant  strain.  No  language  can  be  stronger  than  that  of  the  long 
harangue  which  Herodotus  puts  into  his  mouth,  wherein  the  bitter 
recollections  prevalent  at  Corinth  respecting  Kypselus  and  Periander 
are  poured  forth.  "  Surely  heaven  and  earth  are  about  to  change 
places — the  fish  are  coming  to  dwell  on  dry  land,  and  mankind  going 
to  inhabit  the  sea — when  you,  Spartans,  propose  to  subvert  the  popu- 
lar governments,  and  to  set  up  in  the  cities  that  wicked  and  bloody 
thing  called  a  Despot.  First  try  what  it  is  for  yourselves  at  Sparta, 
and  Uien  force  it  upon  others  if  you  can:  you  have  not  tasted  its 
calamities  as  we  have,  and  you  take  very  good  care  to  keep  it  away 
from  yourselves.  We  adjure  you  by  the  common  gods  of  Hellas — 
plant  not  despots  in  her  cities:  if  you  persist  in  a  scheme  so  wicked, 
know  that  the  Corinthians  will  not  second  you." 

This  animated  appeal  was  received  with  a  shout  of  approbation 
and  sympathy  on  the  part  of  the  allies.  All  with  one  accord  united 
with  Sosikles  in  adjuring  the  Lacedasmonians  "not  to  revolutionize 
any  Hellenic  city."  No  one  listened  to  Hippias  when  he  replied, 
and  warned  the  Corinthians  that  the  time  would  come,  when  they, 
more  than  anyone  else,  would  dread  and  abhor  the  Athenian  democ- 
racy, and  wish  the  Peisistratidse  back  again.  "He  knew  well  (says 
Herodotus)  that  this  would  be,  for  he  was  better  acquainted  with 
the  prophecies  than  any  man;  but  no  one  then  believed  him,  and 
he  was  forced  to  take  his  departure  back  to  Sigeium;  the  bpartans 
not  venturing  to  espouse  liis  cause  against  the  determined  sentiment 
of  the  allies." 

That  determined  sentiment  deserves  notice,  because  it  marks  the 
present  period  of  the  Hellenic  mind;  fifty  years  later  it  will  be  found 
materially  altered.  Aversion  to  single-headed  rule,  and  bitter  recol- 
lection of  men  like  Kypselus  and  Periander,  are  now  the  chords 
which  thrill  in  an  assembly  of  Grecian  deputies.  The  idea  of  a  revo- 
lution (implying  thereby  an  organic  and  comprehensive  change  of 


[00  ATHENS   AFTER  THE  I'KISISTKATIDS. 

which  the  party  using  tbe  word  disapprovi  -  |  consists  in  substituting 
a  permanent  <  >ne  in  place  of  those  periodical  magistrates  and  a  i  m 
blies  which  were  tiie  common  attribute  ol  oligarchy  and  democracy; 
the  antithesis  between  these  lasl  two  is  as  yet  in  the  background,  and 
there  prevails  neither  fear  ol  Athens  uor  hatred  of  the  Athenian 
democracy.  But  when  we  turn  to  the  period  immediately  before  the 
lonnesian  war.wefind  the  order  of  precedence  between  these 
two  sentiments  reversed.  The  anti-monarchical  feeling  has  not  per- 
ished, but  has  been  overlaid  by  other  and  more  recenl  political  antipa- 
thies— tlic  antithesis  bet  we<  n  democracy  and  oligarchy  having  become, 
not  indeed  the  only  sentiment,  bu1  the  uppermost  sentiment,  in  the 
minds  of  Grecian  politicians  generally,  and  the  soul  of  active  party 
movement.  .Moreover,  a  haired  of  the  most  deadly  character  has 
grown  up  against  Alliens  and  her  democracy,  especially  in  the  grand- 
son* ol'  those  very  Corinthians  who  now  stand  forward  as  Ik  i-  sympa- 
thizing friends.  The  remarkable  change  of  feeling  here  mentioned 
is  nowhere  so  strikingly  exhibit!  d  as  when  we  contrasl  the  addri  --  of 
the  Corinthian  Sosikies  just  narrated,  with  the  speech  of  the  Corin 
thian  envoys  at  Sparta  immediately  antecedent  to  the  Peloponnesian 
war,  as  given  to  us  in  Thucydides.  It  will  hereafter  he  fully 
explained  by  the  intermediate  events,  by  the  growth  of  Athenian 
power,  and  by  the  still  more  miraculous  development  of  Athenian 
energy. 

Such  development,  the  fruit  of  the  fresh-planted  democracy  as  well 
as  the  seed  lor  its  sustentation  and  aggrandizement,  continued 
progressive  during  the  whole  period  just  adverted  to;  but  the  first 
unexpected  burst  of  it,  under  the  EQeisthenean  constitution  and  after 
the  expulsion  of  Hippias  is  described  by  Herodotus  in  terms  too 
emphatic  to  be  omitted.  After  narrating  the  successive  victories  of 
the  Athenians  over  both  Boeotians  and  Chalkidians,  that  historian 
proceeds — "Thus  did  the  Athenians  grow  in  strength.  Anil  we  may 
find  proof  not  merely  in  this  instance  but  everywhere  else,  how  valu- 
able a  thing  freedom  is;  since  even  the  Athenians,  while  under  a 
despot,  were  not  superior  in  war  to  any  of  their  surrounding  neigh- 
bors, but  so  soon  as  they  got  rid  of  their  despots,  became  by  far  the 
first  of  all.  These  things  show  that  while  kept  down  by  one  man, 
they  were  slack  and  timid,  like  men  working  for  a  master;  but  when 
they  were  liberated,  every  single  man  became  eager  in  exertions  for 
his  own  benefit."  The  same  comparison  r<  appears  a  short  time  after- 
ward, where  lie  tells  us  that  " the  Athenians,  when  free,  felt  them- 
selves a  match  for  Sparta;  but  while  kept  down  by  any  man  under  a 
despotism,  were  feeble  and  apt  for  submission." 

Stronger  expressions  cannot  be  found  to  depict  the  rapid  improve- 
ment wrought  in  the  Athenian  people  by  their  new  democracy.  Of 
course  this  did  not  arise  merely  from  suspension  of  previous  cruel- 
ties, or  from  better  laws,  or  better  administration.  These,  indeed, 
were  essential  conditions,  but  the  active  transforming  cause  here  was, 


THE  THEORY  OF  DEMOCRACY.       101 

the  piinclple  and  system  of  which  such  amendments  formed  the 
detail:  the  grand  and  new  idea  of  the  sovereign  people,  composed  of 
free  and  equal  citizens — or  liberty  and  equality,  to  use  words  which 
so  profoundly  moved  the  French  nation  half  a  century  ago.  It  was 
this  comprehensive  political  idea  which  acted  with  electric  effect 
upon  the  Athenians,  creating  withiu  them  a  host  of  sentiments, 
motives,  sympathies,  and  capacities,  to  which  they  had  before  been 
strangers.  Democracy  in  Grecian  antiquity  possessed  the  privilege, 
not  only  of  kindling  an  earnest  and  unanimous  attachment  to  the 
constitution  in  the  bosoms  of  the  citizens,  but  also  of  creating  an 
energy  of  public  and  private  action,  such  as  could  never  be  obtained 
under  an  oligarchy,  where  the  utmost  that  could  be  hoped  for  was  a 
passive  acquiescence  and  obedience.  Mr.  Burke  has  remarked  that 
the  mass  of  the  people  are  generally  very  indifferent  about  theories 
of  government;  but  such  indifference  (although  improvements  in  the 
practical  working  of  all  governments  tend  to  foster  it)  is  hardly  to  be 
expected  among  any  people  who  exhibit  decided  mental  activity  and 
spirit  on  other  matters;  and  the  reverse  was  unquestionably  true,  in 
tne  year  500  B.C.,  among  the  communities  of  ancient  Greece.  The- 
ories of  government  were  there  anything  but  a  dead  letter:  they  were 
connected  with  emotions  of  the  strongest  as  well  as  of  the  most  oppo- 
site character.  The  theory  of  a  permanent  ruling  One,  for  example, 
was  universally  odious:  that  of  a  ruling  Few,  though  acquiesced  in, 
was  never  positively  attractive,  unless  either  where  it  was  associated 
with  the  maintenance  of  peculiar  education  and  habits,  as  at  Sparta, 
or  where  it  presented  itself  as  the  only  antithesis  to  democracy,  the 
latter  having  by  peculiar  circumstances  become  an  object  of  terror. 
But  the  theory  of  democracy  was  pre-eminently  seductive;  creating 
in  the  mass  of  the  citizens  an  intense  positive  attachment,  and  dis- 
posing them  to  voluntary  action  and  suffering  on  its  behalf,  such  as 
no  coercion  on  the  part  of  other  governments  could  extort.  Herod- 
otus, in  his  comparison  of  the  three  sorts  of  government,  puts  in  the 
front  rank  of  the  advantages  of  democracy  "its  most  splendid  name 
and  promise " — its  power  of  enlisting  the  hearts  of  the  citizens  in 
support  of  their  constitution,  and  of  providing  for  all  a  common  bond 
of  union  and  fraternity.  This  is  what  even  democracy  did  not 
always  do;  but  it  was  what  no  other  government  in  Greece  could  do; 
a  reason  alone  sufficient  to  stamp  it  as  the  best  government,  and  pre- 
senting the  greatest  chance  of  beneficent  re&ults,  for  a  Grecian  com- 
munity. Among  the  Athenian  citizens,  certainly,  it  produced  a 
strength  and  unanimity  of  positive  political  sentiment,  such  as  has 
rarely  been  seen  in  the  history  of  mankind,  which  excites  our  surprise 
and  admiration  the  more  when  we  compare  it  with  the  apathy  which 
had  preceded,  and  which  is  even  implied  as  the  natural  state  of  the 
publiic  mind  in  Solon's  famous  proclamation  against  neutrality  in  a 
6edition.  Because  democracy  happens  to  be  unpalatable  to  most 
modern  readers,  they  have  been  accustomed  to  look  upon  the  senti- 


103  ATHENS   AFTER  THE   PEISISTRATIDS. 

merit  h«rc  described  only  in  its  least  honorable  manifestations —in 
the  caricatures  <>f  Aristophanes,  or  in  the  empty  commonplaces  of 
rhetorical  declarers.  But  it  is  not  in  this  way  that  the  force,  the 
earnestness,  or  the  binding  value  of  democratic  sentiment  at  Athena 
e  measured.     We  mu  to  il  as  it  comes  from  the  lips  of 

Perikles,  while  he  is  strenuously  enforcing  upon  the  people  ihos<» 
active  duties  for  which  it  both  implanted  the  stimulus  and  supplied 
the  courage;  or  from  the  oligarchic  Nikiasin  the  harbor  of  Syracuse, 
when  be  is  endeavoring  to  revive  the  courage  of  his  despairing  troops 
for  one  lasl  death-struggle,  and  when  he  appeals  to  their  democratic 
patriotism  as  to  the  only  Same  yet  alive  and  burning  even  in  that 
moment  of  agony.  From  the  time  of  Kleistlienes  downward,  the 
creation  of  this  new  mighty  impulse  makes  an  entire  revolution  in 
the  Athenian  character;  and  if  the  change  still  stood  out  in  so  promi- 
nent a  manner  before  the  eyes  of  Herodotus,  much  more  must  it  have 
been  fell  by  the  contemporaries  among  whom  it  occurred. 

The  attachment  of  an  Athenian  citizen  to  his  democratic  consti- 
tution comprised  two  distinct  veins  of  sentiment:  first,  his  rights, 
protection,  and  advantages  d  'lived  from  it— next,  his  obligations  of 
exertion  and  sacrifice  toward  it  and  with  reference  to  it.  Neither  of 
these  two  veins  of  sentiment  was  ever  wholly  absent;  but  according 
as  the  one  or  the  other  was  present  at  different  limes  in  varyii 
portions,  the  patriotism  of  the  citizen  was  a  very  different  fei 
That  which  Herodotus  remarks  is,  the  extraordinary  efforts  of  heart 
and  hand  which  the  Athenians  suddenly  displayed;  the  efficacy  of 
the  active  sentiment  throughout  the  bulk  of  the  citizens.  We  shall 
observe  even  more  memorable  evidences  of  the  same  phenomenon  in 
tracing  down  the  history  from  Eleisthenes  to  the  end  of  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  war:  we  shall  trace  a  series  of  events  and  motives  eminently 
calculated  to  stimulate  that  self-imposed  labor  and  discipline  which 
the  early  democracy  had  firsl  called  forth.  But  when  we  advance 
farther  down,  from  the  restoration  of  the  democracy  after  the  Thirty 
Tyrants,  to  the  time  of  Demosthenes — (I  venture  upon  this  brief  anti- 
cipation, in  the  conviction  that  one  period  of  Grecian  history  can 
only  be  thoroughly  understood  by  contrasting  it  with  another) — we 
shall  find  a  sensible  change  in  Athenian  patriotism.  The  active  sen- 
tim  nt  of  obligation  is  comparatively  inoperative;  the  citizen,  it  is 
true,  has  a  keen  sense  of  the  value  of  the  democracy  as  protecting 
him  and  insuring  to  him  valuable  rights,  and  he  is,  moreover,  willing 
to  perform  hi<  ordinary  sphere  of  legal  duties  toward  it;  but  he  looks 
upon  it  as  a  thing  established,  and  capable  of  maintaining  itself  in  ;i 
due  measure  of  foreign  ascendency,  without  any  such  personal 
efforts  as  those  which  his  forefathers  cheerfully  imposed  upon  them- 
The  orations  of  Demosthenes  contain  melancholy  proof-  of 
such  altered  tone  of  patriotism — of  that  langour,  paralysis,  and  wait- 
ing for  others  to  act,  which  preceded  the  catastrophe  of  Clucroneia, 
notwithstanding  an   unabated   attachment   to  the  democracy  as  a 


STATE  OF  THE  ASIATIC   GREEKS.  103 

source  of  protection  and  good  government.  That  same  preternatural 
activity  which  the  allies  of  Sparta,  at  the  beginning  of  the  Pelopon- 
nesiau  war,  both  denounced  and  admired  in  the  Athenians,  is  noted 
by  the  orator  as  now  belonging  to  their  enemy  Philip.  Such  varia- 
tions in  the  scale  of  national  energy  pervade  history,  modern  as  well 
as  ancient,  but  in  regard  to  Grecian  histor}*,  especially,  they  can  never 
be  overlooked.  For  a  certain  measure,  not  only  of  positive  political 
attachment,  but  also  of  active  self-devotion,  military  readiness,  and 
personal  effort,  was  the  indispensable  condition  of  maintaining  Hel- 
lenic autonomy,  either  in  Athens  or  elsewhere;  and  became  so  more 
than  ever  when  the  Macedonians  were  once  organized  under  an  enter- 
prising and  semi-Hellenized  prince.  The  democracy  was  the  first 
creative  cause  of  that  astonishing  personal  and  many-sided  energy 
which  marked  the  Athenian  character,  for  a  century  downward  from 
Kleistheues;  that  the  same  ultra-Hellenic  activity  did  not  longer  con- 
tinue, is  referable  to  other  causes  which  will  be  hereafter  in  part 
explained.  No  system  of  government,  even  supposing  it  to  be  very 
much  better  and  more  faultless  than  the  Athenian  democracy,  can 
ever  pretend  to  accomplish  its  legitimate  end  apart  from  the  personal 
character  of  the  people,  or  to  supersede  the  necessity  of  individual 
virtue  and  vigor.  During  the  half-century  immediately  preceding 
the  battle  of  Chaeroneia,  the  Athenians  had  lost  that  remarkable 
energy  which  distinguished  them  during  the  first  century  of  their 
democracy,  and  had  fallen  much  more  nearly  to  a  level  with  the 
other  Greeks,  in  common  with  whom  they  were  obliged  to  yield  to 
the  pressure  of  a  foreign  enemy.  I  here  briefly  notice  their  last 
period,  of  languor,  in  contrast  with  the  first  burst  of  democratic 
fervor  under  Kleisthenes  now  opening — a  feeling,  wduch  will  be 
found,  as  we  proceed,  to  continue  for  a  longer  period  than  could 
have  been  reasonably  anticipated,  but  which  wyas  too  high-strung  to 
become  a  parpetual  and  inherent  attribute  of  any  community. 


CHAPTER  XXXII. 

RISE   OF   THE   PERSIAN  EMPIRE. — CYRUS. 

In  the  preceding  chapter  I  have  followed  the  history  of  Central 
Greece  very  nearly  down  to  the  point  at  which  the  history  of  the 
Asiatic  Greeks  becomes  blended  with  it,  and  after  which  the  two 
streams  begin  to  flow  to  a  great  degree  in  the  same  channel.  I  now 
revert  to  the  affairs  of  the  Asiatic  Greeks,  and  of  the  Asiatic  kings 
as  connected  with  them,  at  the  point  in  which  they  were  left  in  my 
seventeenth  chapter. 

The  concluding  facts  recounted  in  that  chapter  were  of  sad  and 
serious  moment  to  the  Hellenic  world.  The  Ionic  and  iEolic  Greeks 
on  the  Asiatic  coast  had  been  conquered  and  made  tributary  by  the 


104  RISE  OF   THE  PERSIAN   EMPIRE. 

Lydian  king  Croesus:  "Down  to  that  time  (says  Berodotus)  all 
Greeks  had  been  free."  Their  conqueror,  Croesus,  who  ascended  the 
throne  in  560  b.c,  appeared  to  be  al  the  summit  of  human  prosper 
ity  and  power  in  his  unassailable  capital,  and  with  his  countless 
treasures  al  Bardis.  UN  dominions  comprised  nearly  the  whole  of 
Asia  Minor,  as  far  as  the  river  I  lalys  to  the  cast ;  on  the  other  Bide  of 
that  river  began  the  Median  monarchy  under  his  brother-in  law  Asty 
eastward  to  some  boundary  which  we  cannot  define, 
bul  comprising,  in  a  south-eastern  direction,  Persia  proper  or  Farsis1 
tan,  and  separated  from  the  Kissians  and  Assyrians  on  the  east  l>y 
the  line  of  Mount  Zagros  (the  presenl  boundary  line  between  Persia 
and  Turkey).  Babylonia,  with  its  wondrous  city,  between  the 
Euphrates  and  the  Tigris,  was  occupied  by  the  Assyrians  or  Chal- 
dseans,  under  their  king  Labynetus:  a  territory  populous  and  fertile, 
partly  by  nature,  partly  by  prodigies  of  labor,  to  a  degree  which 
make-  us  mistrust  even  an  honest  eye-witness  who  describes  it  after- 
ward in  its  decline — but  which  was  then  in  its  mosl  flourishing  con- 
dition. The  Chaldean  dominion  under  Labynetus  reached  to  the 
borders  of  Egj  pt,  including  as  dependent  territories  both  Judsea  and 
Phenicia,  In  Egypt  reigned  the  native  king  Amasis,  powerful  and 
affluent,  sustained  in  his  throne  by  a  large  body  of  Grecian  mercena- 
ries, and  himself  favorably  disposed  to  Grecian  commerce  and  settle- 
ment. Both  with  Labynetus  and  with  Amasis,  Croesus  was  on  terms 
of  alliance;  and,  as  Astyages  was  his  brother-in-law,  the  four  kings 

might  well  lie  deemed  out  of  the  reach  of  calamity.      Yet  within  the 
of  thirtj  years,  or  a   little  more,  the  whede  of  their  territories 
had  become  embodied  in  one  vast  empire,  under  the  son  of  an  adven- 
turer as  ye1  not  known  even   by  name. 

The  rise  and  fall  of  oriental  dynasties  has  been  in  all  times  distin- 
guished by  the  same  general  features.  A  brave  and  adventurous 
prince,  at  the  head  of  a  population  at  once  poor,  warlike,  and  greedy, 
acquires  dominion;  while  his  successors,  abandoning  themselves  to 
sensuality  and  sloth,  probably  also  to  oppressive  and  irascible  dispo- 
sitions, become  in  process  of  time  victims  to  those  same  qualities  in 
a  stranger  which  had  enabled  their  own  father  to  seize  the  throne. 
Cyrus,  the  great  founder  of  the  Persian  empire,  first  the  subject  and 
afterward  the  det  limner  of  the  Median  Astyages,  corresponds  to  their 
general  description,  as  far,  at  least,  as  we  can  pretend'  to  know  his 
history.  For  in  truth,  even  the  conquests  of  Cyrus,  after  he  became 
ruler  of  Media,  are  very  imperfectly  known,  whilst  the  facts  which 
preci  ded  his  rise  up  to  that  sovereignty  cannot  be  said  to  lie  known 
at  all:  we  have  to  choose  between  different  accounts  at  variance  with 
each  other,  and  of  which  the  most  complete  and  detailed  is  stamped 
with  all  the  character  of  romance.  The  Cyropaedia  of  Xenophon  is 
memorable  and  interesting,  considered  with  reference  to  the  Greek 
mind,  and  as  a  philosophical  novel.  That  it  should  have  been  quoted 
so  largely  as  authority  on  matters  of  history,  is  only  one  proof  among 


STORY  OF  AST  Y AGES.  105 

many  how  easily  authors  have  hcen  satisfied  as  to  the  essentials  of 
historical  evidence.  The  narrative  given  by  Herodotus  of  the  rela- 
tions between  Cyrus  and  Astyages,  agreeing  with  Xenophon  in  Utile 
more  than  the  fact  that  it  makes  Cyrus  son  of  Ivambyses  and  Man- 
dane  and  grandson  of  Astyages,  goes  even  beyond  the  story  of  Romu- 
lus and  Remus  in  respect  to  tragical  incident  and  contrast.  Astyages, 
alarmed  by  a  dream,  condemns  the  newborn  infant  of  his  daugh- 
ter Mandane  to  be  exposed;  liarpagus,  to  whom  the  order  is  given, 
delivers  the  child  to  one  of  the  royal  herdsmen,  who  exposes  it  in  the 
mountains,  where  it  is  miraculously  suckled  by  a  bitch.  Thus  pre- 
served, and  afterward  brought  up  as  the  herdsman's  child,  Cyrus 
manifests  great  superiority,  both  physical  and  mental,  is  chosen  king 
in  play  by  the  boys  of  the  village,  and  in  this  capacity  severely  chas- 
tises the  sou  of  one  of  the  courtiers;  for  which  offense  he  is  carried 
before  Astyages,  who  recognizes  him  for  his  grandson,  but  is  assured 
by  the  Magi  that  the  dream  is  out,  and  that  he  has  no  farther  danger 
to  apprehend  from  the  boy— and  therefore  permits  him  to  live.  With 
liarpagus,  however,  Astyages  is  extremely  incensed,  for  not  having 
executed  his  orders:  he  causes  the  sou  of  Harpagus  to  be  slain,  and 
served  up  to  be  eaten  by  his  unconscious  father  at  a  regal  banquet. 
The  father,  apprised  afterward  of  the  fact,  dissembles  his  feelings, 
but  meditates  a  deadly  vengeance  against  Astyages  for  this  Thyestean 
meal.  He  persuades  Cyrus,  who  has  been  sent  back  to  his  father 
and  mother  in  Persia,  to  head  a  revolt  of  the  Persians  against  the 
Medes;  whilst  Astyages — to  fill  up  the  Grecian  conception  of  mad- 
ness as  a  precursor  to  ruin — sends  an  army  against  the  revolters,  com- 
manded by  Harpagus  himself.  Of  course  the  army  is  defeated — 
Astyages,  after  a  vain  resistance,  is  dethroned — Cyrus  becomes  king 
in  his  place — and  Harpagus  repays  the  outrage  which  he  has  under- 
gone by  the  bitterest  insults. 

Such  are  the  heads  of  a  beautiful  narrative  which  is  given  at  some 
length  in  Herodotus.  It  will  probably  appear  to  the  reader  suffi- 
ciently romantic;  though  the  historian  intimates  that  he  had  heard 
three  other  narratives  different  from  it,  and  that  all  were  more  full  ol 
marvels,  as  well  as  in  wider  circulation,  than  his  own,  which  he  had 
borrowed  from  some  unusually  sober-minded  Persian  informants. 
In  what  points  the  other  three  stories  departed  from  it  we  do  not 
hear. 

To  the  historian  of  Hal  ikarnassus  we  have  to  oppose  the  physician  oi 
the  neighboring  town.  Knidus — Ktesias.who  contradicted  Herodotus, 
not  without  strong  terms  of  censure,  on  many  points,  and  especially 
upon  that  which  is  the  very  foundation  of  the  early  narrative  respect- 
ing Cyrus;  for  he  affirmed  that  Cyrus  was  noway  related  to  Astyages. 
However  indignant  we  may  be  with  Ktesias  for  the  disparaging  epi- 
thets which  he  presumed  to  apply  to  an  historian,  whose  work  is  to 
us  inestimable — we  must  nevertheless  admit  that,  as  surgeon  in  actual 
attendance   on  king  Artaxerxes  Mnemon,  and  healer  of  the  wound 


106  RISE  OF   THE  PERSIAN  EMPIRE. 

inflicted  on  that  prince  at  Kunaxa  by  his  brother  Cyrus  the  younger, 
be  had  better  opportunities  even  than  Herodotus  01  conversing  with 
sober-minded  Persians;  and  thai  the  discrepancies  between  the  two 
aents  are  to  be  taken  as  a  proof  of  the  prevalence  of  discordant, 
qually  accredited,  stories.  Herodotus  himself  was  in  fact  com- 
pelled to  chooseone  out  of  four.  So  rare  and  late  a  plant  is  histori- 
cal authenticity. 

That  Cyrus  was  the  first  Persian  conqueror,  and  that  the  space 
which  he  overran  covered  no  less  than  fifty  degrees  of  longitude, 
from  the  coast  of  Asia  Minor  to  the  Oxus  and  the  Indus,  are  fails 
quite  indisputable;  hut  of  the  slips  by  which  this  was  achieved,  we 
know  vci\  little.  The  native  Persians,  whom  he  conducted  to  an 
empire  so'  immense,  were  an  aggregate  of  seven  agricultural,  and 
four  nomadic  tribes — all  of  them  rude,  hardy,  and  brave — dwelling 
in  a  mountainous  region  clothed  in  skins,  ignorant  of  wine,  or  fruit, 
or  any  of  the  commonest  luxuries  of  life,  and  despising  the  very  idea 
of  purchase  or  sale  Their  tribes  were  very  unequal  in  point  of 
dignity,  probably  also  in  respect  to  numbers  and  powers,  anions;  one 
another.  First  in  estimation  among  them  stood  the  Pasargadae;  and 
the  first  phratry  or  elan  among  the  Pasargada;  were  the  Acha'menidae, 
to  whom  Cyrus  himself  belonged.  Whether  his  relationship  to  the 
Median  king  whom  he  dethroned  was  a  matter  of  fact,  or  a  politic 
fiction,  we  cannot  well  determine.  But  Xenophon,  in  noticing  the 
spacious  deserted  cities,  Larissa  and  Mespila,  which  he  saw  in  his 
march  with  the  Ten  Thousand  Greeks  on  the  eastern  side  of  the 
Tigris,  gives  us  to  understand  that  the  conquest  of  Media  by  the 
Persians  was  reported  to  him  as  having  been  an  obstinate  and  pro- 
tracted struggle.  However  this  may  be,  the  preponderance  of 
the  Persians  was  at  last  complete:  though  the  Medes  always  con- 
tinued to  be  the  second  nation  in  the  empire,  after  the  Persians, 
properly  so  called;  and  by  early  Greek  writers  the  great  enemy  in 
the  Mast  is  often  called  "the  Mede  "  as  well  as  "the  Persiau."  The 
Median  Kkbatana  too  remained  as  one  of  the  capital  cities,  and 
tin'  usual  summer  residence,  of  the  kings  of  Persia;  Susa  on  the 
Choaspes,  on  the  Kissian  plain  farther  southward,  and  east  of  the 
Tigris,  being  their  winter  abode. 

Tli"  vast  space  of  country  comprised  between  the  Indus  on  the 
last,  the  Oxus  and  Caspian  Sea  to  the  north,  the  Persian  Gulf  and 
[ndian  Ocean  to  the  south,  and  the  line  of  Mount  Zagros  to  the  west, 
appears  to  have  been  occupied  in  these  times  by  a  great  variety  of 
different  tribes  and  people,  yet  all  or  most  of  them  belonging  to* the 
religion  of  Zoroaster,  ami  speaking  dialects  of  the  Zend  language. 
It  was  known  amongst  its  inhabitants  by  the  common  name  of  Iran 
or  Aria:  it  is,  in  its  central  parts  at  least,  a  high,  cold  plateau, 
totally  destitute  of  wood,  and  scantily  supplied  with  water;  much 
of  it  "indeed  is  a  salt  and  sandy  desert,  un-susceptible  of  culture. 
Parts  of  it  are  eminently  fertile,  where  water  can  be  procund  and 


WAR  BETWEEN   CYRUS  AND  CRCESUS.  107 

irrigation  applied.  Scattered  masses  of  tolerably  dense  population 
thus  grew  up;  but  continuity  of  cultivation  is  not  practicable,  and 
in  ancient  times,  as  at  present,  a  large  proportion  of  the  population 
of  Iran  seems  to  have  consisted  of  wandering  or  nomadic  tribes 
with  their  tents  and  cattle.  The  rich  pastures,  and  the  freshness  of 
♦•he  summer  climate,  in  the  region  of  mountain  and  valley  near  Ekba- 
taua,  are  extolled  by  modern  travelers,  just  as  they  attracted  the 
Great  King  in  ancient  times  during  the  hot  months.  The  more 
southerly  province  called  Persis  proper  (Farsistan)  consists  also  in 
part  of  mountain  land  interspersed  with  valley  and  plain,  abundantly 
watered,  and  ample  in  pasture,  sloping  gradually  down  to  low 
grounds  on  the  sea-coast  which  are  hot  and  diy:  the  care  bestowed 
both  by  Medes  and  Persians,  on  the  breeding  of  their  horses,  was 
remarkable.  There  were  doubtless  material  differences  between 
different  parts  of  the  population  of  this  vast  plateau  of  Iran.  Yet  it 
seems  that  along  with  their  common  language  and  religion,  they  had 
also  something  of  a  common  character,  which  contrasted  with  the 
Indian  population  east  of  the  Indus,  the  Assyrians  west  of  Mount 
Zagros,  and  the  Masaagetae  and  other  Nomads  of  the  Caspian  and  the 
Sea  of  Aral — less  brutish,  restless  and  blood-thirsty  than  the  latter — 
more  fierce,  contemptuous,  ai>d  extortionate,  and  less  capable  of  sus- 
tained industry,  than  the  two  former.  There  can  be  little  doubt,  at 
the  time  of  which  we  are  now  speaking,  when  the  wealth  and  culti- 
vation of  Assyria  were  at  their  maximum,  that  Iran  also  was  far 
better  peopled  than  ever  it  has  been  isince  European  observers  have 
been  able  to  survey  it;  especially  the  north-eastern  portion,  Baktria 
and  Sogdiana;  so  that  the  invasions  of  the  Nomads  from  Turkestan 
and  Tartary,  which  have  been  so  destructive  at  various  intervals 
since  the  Mohammedan  conquest,  were  before  that  period  success- 
fully kept  back. 

The  general  analogy  among  the  population  of  Iran  probably 
enabled  the  Persian  conqueror  with  comparative  ease  to  extend  his 
empire  to  the  east,  after  the  conquest  of  Ekbatana,  and  to  become 
the  full  heir  of  the  Median  kings.  If  we  may  believe  Ktesias,  even 
the  distant  province  of  Baktria  had  been  before  subject  to  those 
kings.  At  first  it  resisted  Cyrus,  but  finding  that  he  had  becomd 
son-in-law  of  Astyages,  as  well  as  master  of  his  person,  it  speedilj 
acknowledged  his  authority. 

According  to  the  representation  of  Herodotus,  the  war  between 
Cyrus  and  Croesus  of  Lydia  began  shortly  after  the  capture  of  Asty- 
ages, and  before  the  conquest  of  Baktria.  Croesus  was  the  assail 
ant,  wishing  to  avenge  his  brother-in-law,  to  arrest  the  growth  of 
the  Persian  conqueror,  and  to  increase  his  own  dominions.  His  mow 
prudent  councilors  in  vain  represented  to  him  that  he  had  little  to 

fain,  and  much  to  lose,  by  war  with  a  nation  alike  hardy  and  poor, 
[e  is  represented  as  just  at  that  time  recovering  from  the  affliction 
arising  out  of  the  death  of  his  son. 


108  RISE  OP  THE  PERSIAN  EMPIRE. 

To  ask  advice  of  the  oracle,  before  he  took  any  final  decision,  was 
a  Btep  which  do  pious  king  would  omit.  Bui  in  the  present  perilous 
question,  <  Iroesus  did  more — he  took  a  precaution  so  extreme,  that  if 
his  piety  had  not  been  placed  beyond  all  doubt  by  his  extraordinary 
munificence  to  the  temples,  he  might  have  drawn  upon  himself  the 
suspicion  of  a  guilty  scepticism.  Before  he  would  send  to  ask 
advice  respecting  the  project  itself,  be  resolved  to  teal  the  credit  of 
some  of  the  chief  surrounding  oracles — Delphi,  Dodona,  Brancbidae 

mar  Miletus.  Amphiaiaus  at  Thebes,  Troplionius  at  Lchadeia,  and 
Amnion  in  Libya,  His  envoys  started  from  Sardis  on  the  same  day, 
and  were  all  directed  on  the  hundredth  day  afterward  to  ask  at  the 
respective  oracles  how  ( Iroesus  was  at  that  precise  moment  employed. 
This  was  a  severe  trial:  of  tin;  manner  in  which  it  was  met  by  four 
out  of  the  six  oracles  consulted  we  have  no  information,  and  it  rather 
appears  that  their  answers  wen;  unsatisfactory.  But  Amphiaraus 
maintained  his  credit  undiminished,  while  Apollo  at  Delphi,  more 
omniscient  than  Apollo  at  Branchidsc,  solved  the  question  with  such 
unerring  precision,  as  to  afford  a  strong  additional  argument  against 
persons  who  might  be  disposed  to  scoff  at  divination.  No  sooner 
had  the  envoys  put  the  question  to  the  Delphian  priestess,  on  the  day 
named,  "What  is  Croesus  now  doing?"  than  she  exclaimed  in  the 
accustomed  hexameter  verse,  "  I  know  the  number  of  grains  of  sand, 
and  the  measures  of  the  sea:  I  understand  the  dumb,  and  1  hear  the 
man  who  speaks  not.  The  smell  reaches  me  of  a  hardskinned  tor- 
toise boiled  in  a  copper  with  lamb's  flesh — copper  above  and  copper 
below."  Croesus  was  awe-struck  on  receiving  this  reply.  It  de- 
scribed with  the  utmost  detail  that  which  he  had  been  really  doing, 
so  that  he  accounted  the  Delphian  oracle  and  that  of  Amphiaraus  the 
only  trustworthy  oracles  on  earth — following  up  these  feelings  with 
a  holocaust  of  the  most  munificent  character,  in  order  to  win  the 
favor  of  the  Delphian  god.  Three  thousand  cattle  were  offerod  up, 
and  upon  a  vast  sacrificial  pile  were  placed  the  most  splendid  purple 
robes  and  tunics,  together  with  couches  and  censers  of  gold  and 
silver;  besides  which  he  sent  to  Delphi  itself  the  richest  presents  in 
gold  and  silver — ingots,  statues,  bowls,  jugs,  etc.,  the  size  and  weight 
of  which  we  read  with  astonishment ;  the  more  so  as  Herodotus  him- 
self sawr  them  a  century  afterwards  at  Delphi.  Nor  was  Croesus 
ther unmindful  of  Amphiaraus,  whose  answer  had  been  credit- 
able, though  less  triumphant  than  that  of  the  Pythian  priestess.  He 
sent  lo  Amphiaraus  a  spear  and  shield  of  pure  gold,  which  were 
afterward  seen  at  Thebes  by  Herodotus:  this  large  donative  may 
help  the  reader  to  conceive  the  immensity  of  those  which  he  sent  to 

Delphi. 

The  envoys  who  conveyed  these  gifts  were  instructed  to  ask  at  the 
same  time,  whether  Croesus  Bhould  undertake  an  expedition  against 
the  Persians — and  if  so,  whether  he  should  solicit  any  allies  to  assist 
him.    In  regard  to  the  second  question,  the  answer  both  of  Apollo 


ADVICE  GIVEN  TO   HIM  BY  THE  ORACLE      109 

and  of  Auipliiaraus  was  decisive,  recommending  him  to  invite  the 
alliance  of  the  most  powerful  Greeks.  In  regard  to  the  first  and  m»  ist 
momentous  question,  their  answer  was  as  remarkable  for  circumspec- 
tion as  it  had  been  before  for  detective  sagacity:  they  told  Croesus 
that  if  he  invaded  the  Persians,  he  would  subvert  a  mighty  monarchy. 
The  blindness  of  Croesus  interpreted  this  declaration  into  an  unquali- 
fied promise  of  success:  he  sent  farther  presents  to  the  oracle,  and 
again  inquired  whether  his  kingdom  would  be  durable  "When  a 
mule  shall  become  king  of  the  Medes  (replied  the  priestess)  then  must 
thou  run  away — be  not  ashamed." 

More  assured  than  ever  by  such  an  answer,  Croesus  sent  to  Sparta, 
under  the  kings  Anaxandrides  and  Aristo,  to  tender  presents  and 
solicit  then-  alliance.  His  propositions  were  favorably  entertained — 
the  more  so,  as  he  had  before  gratuitously  furnished  some  gold  to  the 
Lacedaemonians,  for  a  statue  to  Apollo.  The  alliance  now  formed 
was  altogether  general — no  express  effort  being  as  yet  demanded 
from  them,  though  it  soon  came  to  be.  But  the  incident  is  to  be  noted, 
as  marking  the  first  plunge  of  the  leading  Grecian  state  into  Asiatic 
politics;  and  that  too  without  any  of  the  generous  Hellenic  sympathy 
which  afterward  induced  Athens  to  send  her  citizens  across  the 
.^Egean.  At  this  time  Croesus  was  the  master  and  tribute-exactor  of 
the  Asiatic  Greeks,  whose  contingents  seem  to  have  formed  part  of 
his  army  for  the  expedition  now  contemplated;  an  army  consisting 
principally,  not  of  native  Lydians,  but  of  foreigners. 

The  river  Halys  formed  the  boundary  at  this  time  between  the 
Median  and  Lydian  empires:  and  Croesus,  marching  across  that  river 
into  the  territory  of  the  Syrians  or  Assyrians  of  Kappadokia,  took 
the  city  of  Pteria,  with  many  of  its  surrounding  dependencies,  inflict- 
ing damage  and  destruction  upon  these  distant  subjects  of  Ekbatana. 
Cyrus  lost  no  time  in  bringing  an  army  to  their  defense  considerably 
larger  than  that  of  Croesus ;  trying  at  the  same  time,  though  unsuc- 
cessfully, to  prevail  on  the  Ionians  to  revolt  from  him.  A  bloody 
battle  took  place  between  the  two  armies,  but  with  indecisive  result: 
after  which  Croesus,  seeing  that  he  could  not  hope  to  accomplish 
more  with  his  forces  as  they  stood,  thought  it  wise  to  return  to  his 
capital,  and  collect  a  larger  army  for  the  next  campaign.  Immedi- 
ately on  reaching  Sardis  he  dispatched  envoys  to  Labynetus,  king  ot 
Babylon;  to  Amasis,  king  of  Egypt;  to. the  Lacedaemonians,  and  to 
other  allies;  calling  upon  all  of  them  to  send  auxiliaries  to  Sanli> 
during  the  course  of  the  fifth  month.  In  the  mean  time  he  dismissed 
all  the  foreign  troops  who  had  followed  himlnto  Kappadokia. 

Had  these  allies  appeared,  the  war  might  perhaps  have  been  prose- 
cuted with  success.  And  on  the  part  of  the  Lacedaemonians  at  least, 
there  was  no  tardiness;  for  their  ships  were  ready  and  their  troops 
almost  on  board,  when  the  unexpected  news  reached  them  that 
Croesus  was  already  ruined.  Cyrus  had  foreseen  and  forstalled  the 
defensive  plan  of  his  enemy.     Pushing  on  with  his  army  to  Sardis 


HO  RISE   OF   THE   PERSIAN   EMPIRE. 

■without  delay,  he  obliged  the  Lydian  prince  to  give  battle  with  his 
own  unassisted  subjects.  The  open  and  spacious  plain  before  that 
town  was  highly  favorable  to  Lydian  cavalry,  which  at  thai  time 
(Herodotus  tells  us)  was  superior  to  the  Persian.  But  Cyrus,  employ- 
ing a  Btratagem  whereby  this  cavalry  was  rendered  unavailable, 
placed  in  fronl  of  his  line  the  baggage  camels,  which  the  Lydian 
could  nnt  endure  either  to  smell  or  to  behold.  The  horsemen 
of  Croesus  were  thus  obliged  to  dismount;  nevertheless  they  Fought 
bravely  on  foot,  and  were  not  driven  into  the  town  till  after  a  sangui- 
nary combat. 

Though  confined  within  the  walls  of  his  capital,  Croesus  had  still 
good  reason  for  hoping  to  holdout  until  the  arrival  of  his  allies,  to 
whom  he  sent  pressing  envoys  of  acceleration.  For  Bardis  was  con- 
sidered impregnable — one  assaull  had  already  been  repulsed,  and  the 
Persians  would  have  been  reduced  to  the  slow  process  of  blockade. 
But  on  the  fourteenth  day  of  the  siege,  accident  did  for  the  besiegers 
that  which  they  could  not  have  accomplished  either  by  skill  or  force. 
Sardis  was  situated  on  an  outlying  peak  of  the  northern  side  of 
Tmolus;  it  was  well  fortified  everywhere  except  toward  the  moun- 
tain; and  on  thai  side  the  rock  was  so  precipitous  and  inaccessible, 
that  fortifications  were  thought  unnecessary,  nor  did  the  inhabitants 
believe  assault  to  be  possible  in  that  quarter.  But  Hyrcoades,  a  Per- 
Bian  soldier,  having  accidentally  seen  one  of  the  garrison  descending 
this  precipitous  rock  to  pick  up  his  helmet  which  had  rolled  down, 
watched  his  opportunity,  tried  to  climb  up,  and  found  it  not  imprac- 
ticable; others  followed  his  example,  the  stronghold  was  thus  seized 
fir>t,  and  the  whole  city  speedily  taken  by  storm. 

Cyrus  had  given  especial  orders  to  spare  the  life  of  Croesus,  who 
was  accordingly  made  prisoner.  But  preparations  were  made  for  a 
solemn  and  terrible  spectacle;  the  captive  king  was  destined  to  be 
burnt  in  chains,  together  with  fourteen  Lydian  youths,  on  a  vast  pile 
of  wood.  We  are  even  told  thai  the  pile  was  already  kindled  and  the 
victim  beyond  the  reach  of  human  aid,  when  Apollo  sent  a  mirac- 
ulous rain  to  preserve  him.  As  to  the  general  fact  of  supernatural 
interposition,  in  one  way  or  another,  Herodotus  and  Ktesias  both 
agree,  though  they  describe  differently  the  particular  miracles 
wrought.  It  is  certain  that  Croesus,  after  some  time,  was  released 
and  well  treated  by  his  conqueror,  and  lived  to  become  the  confiden- 
tial adviser  of  the  latter  as  well  as  of  his  son  Kambyses:  Ktesias  also 
acquaints  us  that  a  considerable  town  and  territory  near  Ekbatana, 
Barene,  was  assigned  to  him,  according  to  a  practice  which  we 
shall  find  not  (infrequent  with  the   Persian  kings. 

The  prudent  counsel  and  remarks  as  to  the  relations  between  Per- 
sians  and  Lydians,  whereby  Croesus  is  said  by  Herodotus  to  have  first 
earned  this  favorable  treatment,  are  hardly  worth  repeating;  but  the 
indignant  remonstrance  sent  by  Croesus  to  the  Delphian  god  is  too 
characteristic  to  be  passed  over.    He  obtaiued  permission  from  Cyrus 


SUCCESSFUL  JUSTIFICATION  OF  TIIE  ORACLE.  HI 

to  lay  upon  the  holy  pavement  of  the  Delphian  temple  the  chains 
with  which  he  had  at  first  been  bound.  The  Lydian  envoys  were 
instructed,  after  exhibiting  to  the  god  these  humiliating  memorials, 
to  ask  whether  it  was  his  custom  to  deceive  his  benefactors,  and 
whether  he  was  not  ashamed  to  have  encouraged  the  king  of  Lydia  in 
an  enterprise  so  disastrous  ?  The  god,  condescending  to  justify  him- 
self by  the  lipsof  the  priestess,  replied — "  Not  even  a  god  can  escape 
his  destiny.  Croesus  has  suffered  for  the  sin  of  his  iifth  ancestor 
(Gyges),  who,  conspiring  with  a  woman,  slew  Ins  master  and  wrong- 
fully seized  the  scepter.  Apollo  employed  all  his  influence  with  the 
Moerae  (Fates)  to  obtain  that  this  sin  might  be  expiated  by  the  chil- 
dren of  Croesus,  and  not  by  Croesus  himself;  but  the  Mcerae  would 
grant  nothing  more  than  a  postponement  of  the  judgment  for  three 
years.  Let  Croesus  know  that  Apollo  has  thus  procured  for  him  a 
reign  three  years  longer  than  his  original  destiny,  after  having  tried  in 
vain  to  rescue  him  altogether.  Moreover  he  sent  that  rain  which  at 
the  critical  moment  extinguished  the  burning  pile.  Nor  has  Croesus 
any  right  to  complain  of  the  prophecy  by  which  he  was  encouraged  to 
enter  on  the  war;  for  when  the  god  told  him  that  he  would  subvert 
a  great  empire,  it  was  his  duty  to  have  again  inquired  which  empire 
the  god  meant;  and  if  he  neither  understood  the  meaning,  nor  chose 
to  ask  for  information,  he  has  himself  to  blame  for  the  result. 
Besides,  Croesus  neglected  the  warning  given  to  him,  about  the  acqui- 
sition of  the  Median  kingdom  by  a  mule:  Cyrus  was  that  mule — son 
of  a  Median  mother  of  royal  breed,  by  a  Persian  father  at  once  of 
different  race  and  of  lower  position. 

This  triumphant  justification  extorted  even  from  Croesus  himself  a 
full  confession  that  the  sin  lay  with  him,  and  not  with  the  god.  It 
certainly  illustrates  in  a  remarkable  manner  the  theological  ideas  of 
the  time.  It  shows  us  how  much,  in  the  mind  of  Herodotus,  the 
facts  of  the  centuries  preceding  his  own,  unrecorded  as  they  were  by 
any  contemporary  authority,  tended  to  cast  themselves  into  a  sort  of 
religious  drama;  the  threads  of  the  historical  web  being  in  part  put 
together,  in  part  originally  spun,  for  the  purpose  of  setting  forth  the 
religious  sentiment  and  doctrine  woven  in  as  a  pattern.  The  Pythian 
priestess  predicts  to  Gyges  that  the  crime  which  he  had  committed  in 
assassinating  his  master  would  be  expiated  by  his  fifth  descendant, 
though,  as  Herodotus  tells  us,  no  one  took  any  notice  of  this  prophecy 
until  it  was  at  last  fulfilled:  we  see  thus  the  history  of  the  first  Merni- 
lmd  king  is  made  up  after  the  catastrophe  of  the  last.  There  was 
something  in  the  main  facts  of  the  history  of  Croesus  profoundly 
striking  to  the  Greek  mind,  a  king  at  the  summit  of  wealth  and 
power — pious  in  the  extreme  and  munificent  toward  the  gods — the 
first  destroyer  of  Heilenio  liberty  in  Asia — then  precipitated,  at  once 
and  on  a  sudden,  into  the  abyss  of  ruin.  The  sin  of  the  first  parent 
helped  much  toward  the  solution  of  this  perplexing  problem  as  well 
ae  to  exalt  the  credit  of  the  oracle,  when  made  to  assume  the  shape  of 


112  RISE  OF  THE  PERSIAN   EMPIRE. 

an  unnoticed  prophecy.  In  the  affecting  story  (discussed  in  a  former 
chapter)  of  Solon  and  Croesus,  the  Lydian  king  is  punished  with  an 
acute  domestic  affliction  because  he  thought  himself  the  happiesl  of 
mankind — the  gods  qoI  suffering  any  one  to  be  arrogant  excepl  them 
selves;  and  the  warning  of  Solon  is  made  to  recur  to  ( xoesue  after  be 
bas  become  the  prisoner  of  Cyrus,  in  the  narrative  of  Berodotus.  To 
iln-  game  vein  of  thought  belongs  the  story,  jusl  recounted,  of  the 
relations  of  Croesus  with  the  Delphian  oracle.  An  account  is  pro- 
vided, satisfactory  to  the  religious  feelings  of  the  Greeks,  how  and 
why  be  was  ruined — but  nothing  less  than  the  overruling  and  omnip- 
otent MEcerae  could  be  invoked  to  explain  so  stupendous  a  result.  It 
i-  rarely  thai  these  supreme  goddesses — or  byper-goddesses,  since  the 
gods  themselves  musl  submit  to  them — are  brought  into  such  distinct 
light  and  action.  Usually  they  are  ki  pt  in  the  dark,  or  arc  left  to  be 
understood  as  the  unseen  stumbling  block  in  eases  of  extreme  incom- 
prehensibility; and  it  is  ditlici.it  clearly  to  determine  (as  in  the  case  of 
some  complicated  political  constitutions)  where  the  Greeks  conceived 
sovereign  power  to  reside,  in  reaped  to  the  government  of  the 
world.  But  here  the  sovereignty  of  the  Moerse,  and  the  subordinate 
agency  of  the  gods,  are  unequivocally  set  forth.  The  gods  are  still 
extremely  powerful,  because  the  Moerae  comply  with  their  requests 
up  to  a  certain  point,  not  thinking  it  proper  to  be  wholly  inexorable; 
but  their  compliance  is  carried  no  farther  than  they  themselves  choose; 
nor  would  they,  even  in  deference  to  Apollo,  alter  the  original  sen- 
tence of  punishment  for  the  sin  of  Gyges  in  the  person  of  Ins  tilth 
descendant — a  sentence,  moreover,  which  Apollo  himself  had  for- 
merly prophesied  shortly  after  the  sin  was  committed;  so  that,  if  the 
Moerse  had  listened  to  bis  intercession  on  behalf  of  Croesus,  his  own 
prophetic  credit  would  have  been  endangered.  Their  unalterable 
resolution  has  predetermined  the  nun  of  Croesus,  and  the  grandeur 
of  the  event  is  manifested  by  the  circumstance,  that  even  Apollo  him- 
self cannot  prevail  upon  them  to  alter  it,  or  to  grant  more  than  a 
three  years'  respite.  The  religious  element  must  here  be  viewed  as 
giving  the  form — the  historical  clement  as  giving  the  matter  only, 
and  not  the  whole  matter — of  the  story.  These  two  elements  will  be 
found  conjoined  more  or  less  throughout  most  of  the  history  of  Herod- 
otus, though  as  we  descend  to  later  limes,  we  shall  find  the  latter 
element  in  constantly  increasing  proportion.  His  conception  of  his- 
tory is  extremely  different  from  that  of  Thucydides,  who  lays  down 
to  himself  the  true  scheme  and  purpose  of  the  historian,  common  to 
him  with  t he  philosopher — to  recount  and  interpret  the  past,  as  a 
rational  aid  toward  prevision  of  the  future. 

The  destruction  of  the  Lydian  monarch}*,  and  the  establishment  of 
the  Persians  at  Sardis — an  event  pregnant  with  consequences  to  lie] 
las  generally — took  place  in  54C  B.C.     Solely  did  the  Ionic  Greeks 
now  repent  that  they  had  rejected  fhe  propositions  made  to  them  by 
Cyrus  for  revolting  from  Croesus — though  at  the  time  when  these 


VAIN  APPLICATION  TO   SPARTA  FOR  AID.      113 

propositions  were  made,  it  would  have  been  highly  imprudent  to 
listen  to  them,  since  the  Lydian  power  might  reasonably  be  looked 
upou  as  the  stronger.  As  soon  as  Sardis  had  fallen,  they  sent  envoys 
to  the  conqueror  entreating  that  they  might  be  enrolled  as  his  tribu- 
taries, on  the  footing  which  they  had  occupied  under  Croesus.  The 
reply  was  a  stern  and  angry  refusal,  with  the  exception  of  the  Mile- 
sians, to  whom  the  terms  which  they  asked  were  granted,  why  this 
favorable  exception  was  extended  to  them,  we  do  not  know. 

The  other  continental  Ionians  and  iEolians  (exclusive  of  Miletus, 
and  exclusive  also  of  the  insular  cities  which  the  Persians  had  no 
means  of  attacking),  seized  with  alarm,  begau  to  put  themselves  in 
a  condition  of  defense.  It  seems  that  the  Lydian  king  had  caused 
their  fortifications  to  be  wholly  or  partially  dismantled,  for  we  are 
told  that  they  now  began  to  erect  walls;  and  thePhokaaans  especially 
devoted  to  that  purpose  a  present  which  they  had  received  from  the 
Iberian  Arganthonius,  king  of  Tartessus.  Besides  thus  strength- 
ening their  own  cities,  they  thought  it  advisable  to  send  a  joint 
embassy  entreating  aid  from  Sparta.  They  doubtless  were  not 
unapprised  that  the  Spartans  had  actually  equipped  an  army  for 
the  support  of  Croesus.  Their  deputies  went  to  Sparta,  where 
the  Phokaean  Pythermus,  appointed  by  the  rest  to  be  spokesman, 
clothing  himself  in  a  purple  robe  in  order  to  attract  the  largest  audi- 
ence possible,  set  forth  their  pressing  need  of  succor  against  the 
impending  danger.  The  Lacedaemonians  refused  the  prayer;  never- 
theless they  dispatched  to  Phoksea  some  commissioners  to  investi- 
gate the  state  of  affairs — who,  perhaps  persuaded  by  the  Phokaeaus, 
sent  Lakrines,  one  of  their  number,  to  the  conqueror  at  Sardis,  to 
warn  him  that  he  should  not  lay  hands  on  any  city  of  Hellas — for 
the  Lacedaemonians  would  not  permit  it.  "Who  are  these  Lacedae- 
monians? (inquired  Cyrus  from  some  Greeks  who  stood  near  him) — 
how  many  are  there  of  them,  that  they  venture  to  send  me  such  a 
notice?"  Having  received  the  answer,  wherein  it  was  stated  that  the 
Lacedaemonians  had  a  city  and  a  regular  market  at  Sparta,  he 
exclaimed — "I  have  never  }ret  been  afraid  of  men  like  these,  who 
have  a  set  place  in  the  middle  of  their  city,  where  they  meet  to  cheal 
one  another  and  forswear  themselves.  If  I  live  they  shall  have 
troubles  of  their  own  to  talk  about,  apart  from  the  Ionians."  To 
buy  or  sell  appeared  to  the  Persians  a  contemptible  practice:  for 
they  carried  out  consistently  one  step  farther,  the  principle  upou 
which  even  many  able  Greeks  condemned  the  lending  of  money  on 
interest ;  and  the  speech  of  Cyrus  was  intended  as  a  covert  reproach 
of  Grecian  habits  generally. 

This  blank  menace  of  Lakrines,  an  insulting  provocation  to  the 
enemy  rather  than  a  real  support  to  the  distressed,  was  the  only  benefit 
which  the  Ionic  Greeks  derived  from  Sparta.  They  were  left  to  defend 
themselves  as  best  they  could  against  the  conqueror;  -who  presently 
however  quitted  Sardis  to  prosecute  in  person  his  conquest  in  the 


114  RISE  OF  THE  PERSIAN  EMPIRE. 

leaving  the  Persian  Tabalua  with  a  garrison  in  the  citadel,  but 
consigning  the  large  treasure  captured,  with  authority  over  the 
Lydian  population,  to  the  Lydian  Paktyas.  As  he  carried  away 
Croesus  along  with  him,  he  probably  considered  himself  sure  of  the 
fidelity  of  those  Lydians  whom  the  deposed  monarch  recomm<  i 
But  lie  had  not  yet  arrived  at  his  own  capital,  when  lie  received  the 
Intelligence  that  Paktyas  had  revolted,  arming  the  Lydian  popula- 
tion, and  employing  the  treasure  in  his  charge  to  hire  fresh  troop  . 
On  hearing  this  news,  Cyrus  addressed  himself  to  Croesus  (according 
to  Herodotus)  in  terms  of  much  wrath  against  the  Lydians,  and  even 
intimated  that  he  should  he  compelled  to  Bell  them  all  as  slaves. 
Upon  which  Croesus,  full  of  alarm  for  his  people,  contended  stren- 
OUsly  that  Paktyas  alone  was  in  fault  and  deserving  of  punishment; 
but  he  at  the  same  time  advised  (  \  rus  to  disarm  the  Lydian  popula- 
tion, and  to  enforce  upon  them  both  effeminate  attire  and  habits  of 
playing  on  the  harp  and  shopkeeping.  "By  this  process  (he  said) 
you  will  soon  see  them  become  women  instead  of  nun."  This  sug- 
gestion is  said  to  have  been  accepted  by  Cyrus,  and  executed  ly  his 
general  Mazares.  The  conversation  here  reported,  and  the  deliberate 
plan  for  enervating  the  Lydian  character  supposed  to  be  pursued 
by  Cyrus,  is  evidently  an  hypothesis  imagined  by  some  of  the  con- 
temporaries or  predecessors  of  Herodotus,  to  explain  the  contrast 
between  the  Lydian  whom  they  saw  before  them,  after  two  or  three 
generations  of  slavery,  and  the  old  irresistible  horsemen  of  whom 
they  heard  in  fame,  at  the  time  when  Croesus  was  lord  from  the  Halys 
to  the  iE.irean  Sea. 

To  return  to  Paktyas — he  had  commenced  his  revolt,  come  down 
to  the  sea-coast,  and  employed  the  treasures  of  Sardis  in  levying  a 
Grecian  mercenary  force,  with  which  he  invested  the  place  and 
blocked  up  the  governor  Tabalus.  But  he  manifested  no  courage 
worthy  of  so  dangerous  an  enterprise;  for  no  sooner  had  he  heard 
that  the  Median  general  Mazares  was  approaching  at  the  head  of  an 
army  dispatched  by  Cyrus  against  him,  than  he  disbanded  his  fojce 
and  tied  to  Kyme  for  protection  as  a  suppliant.  Presently  arrived  a 
menacing  summons  from  Mezares,  demanding  that  he  should  be 
given  up  forthwith,  which  plunged  the  Kymaeans  into  profound  dis- 
The  idea  of  giving  up  a  suppliant  to  destruction  was  shock- 
ing to  Grecian  sentiment.  They  sent  to  solicit  advice  from  the  holy 
temple  of  Apollo  at  Branchidse  near  Miletus;  and  the  reply  directed 
thai  Paktyas  should  be  surrendered.  Nevertheless,  so  ignominious  did 
such  a  surrender  appear,  that  Ar.stodikus  and  some  other  Kym;eaii 
citizens  denounced  the  messengers  as  liars,  and  required  that  a  more 
trustworthy  deputation  should  he  sent  to  consult  the  god.  Aristodi- 
kus  himself,  forming  one  of  the  second  body,  stated  the  perplexity  to 
the  oracle,  and  received  a  repetition  of  the  same  answer;  whereupon 
he  proceeded  to  rob  the  bird-'  nests  which  existed  in  abundance  m 
and  about  the  temple.     A  voice  from  the  inner  oracular  chamber 


HARPAGUS  SUCCEEDS  MAZARES.  115 

speedily  arrested  him,  exclaiming — "Most  impious  of  men,  how 
darest  thou  do  such  things?  Wilt  thou  snatch  my  suppliants  l'rorn 
the  temple  itself?"  Unabashed  by  the  rebuke,  Aristodikus  replied— 
"  Master,  thus  dost  thou  help  suppliants  thyself :  and  dost  thoa  com* 
maud  the  Kymaeans  to  give  up  a  suppliant?"  "Yes,  1  do  command 
it  "  (rejoined  the  god  forthwith),  in  order  that  the  crime  may  bring 
destruction  upon  you  the  sooner,  and  that  you  may  not  in  future 
come  to  consult  the  oracle  upon  the  surrender  of  suppliants." 

The  ingenuity  of  Aristodikus  thus  completely  nullified  the  oracular 
response,  and  left  the  Kymaeans  in  their  original  perplexity.  ISTot 
choosing  to  surrender  Paktyas,  nor  daring  to  protect  him  against  a 
besieging  army,  they  sent  him  away  to  Mitylene,  whither  the  envoys 
of  Mazares followed  and  demanded  him;  offering  a  reward  so  consid- 
erable, that  the  Kymaeans  became  fearful  of  trusting  them,  and  again 
conveyed  away  the  suppliant  to  Chios,  where  he  took  refuge  in  the 
temple  of  Athene  Poliuchus.  But  here  again  the  pursuers  followed. 
The  Chians  were  pe/suaded  to  drag  him  from  the  temple  and  sur- 
render him,  on  consideration  of  receiving  the  territory  of  Atarneus 
(a  district  on  the  continent  over  against  the  island  of  Lesbos',  as  pur- 
chase-money. Paktyas  was  thus  seized  and  sent  prisone/  to  Cyrus, 
who  had  given  the  most  express  orders  for  this  capture,  hence  tha 
unusual  intensity  of  the  pursuit.  But  it  appears  that  th .territory  of 
Atarneus  was  considered  as  having  been  ignominiouslv  acquired  by 
the  Chians:  none  even  of  their  own  citizens  would  employ  any  article 
of  its  produce  for  holy  or  sacrificial  purposes. 

Mazares  next  proceeded  to  the  attack  and  conquest  of  the  Greeks 
on  the  coast;  an  enterprise  which,  since  he  soon  died  of  illness,  was 
completed  by  his  successor  Harpagus.  The  towns  assailed  succes- 
sively made  a  gallant  but  ineffectual  resistance.  The  Persian  general 
by  his  numbers  drove  the  defenders  within  their  walls,  against 
which  he  piled  up  mounds  of  earth,  so  as  either  to  carry  the  place 
by  storm  or  to  compel  surrender.  All  of  them  were  reduced  one 
after  the  other.  With  all,  the  terms  of  subjection  were  doubtless 
harder  than  those  which  had  been  imposed  upon  them  by  Croesus, 
because  Cyrus  had  already  refused  to  grant  these  terms  to  them,  with 
the  single  exception  of  Miletus,  and  because  they  had  since  given 
additional  offense  by  aiding  the  revolt  of  Paktyas.  The  inhabitants 
of  Prieue  were  sold  into  slavery :  they  were  the  first  assailed  by 
Mazares,  and  had  perhaps  been  especially  forward  in  the  attack  made 
by  Paktyas  on  Sardis. 

Among  these  unfortunate  towns  thus  changing  their  master  and 
passing  into  a  harsher  subjection,  two  deserve  especial  notice — 
Teos  and  Phokoea.  The  citizens  of  the  former,  so  soon  as  the  mound 
around  their  Avails  had  rendered  farther  resistance  impossible,  em- 
barked and  emigrated,  some  to  Thrace,  where  they  founded  Abdera 
— others  to  the  Cimmerian  Bosphorus,  where  they  planted  Phana- 
goria:  a  portion  of  them,  however,  must  have  remained  to  take  the 


110  RISE  OF  THE  PERSIAN  EMPIRE. 

chances  of  subjection,  since  the  town  appears  in  after-times  still 
peopled  and  still  Hellenic. 

The  fate  of  Phoksea,  similar  in  the  main,  is  given  to  us  with  more 
striking  circumstances  of  detail,  and  becomes  the  more  interesting, 
since  the  enterprising  mariners  who  inhabited  it  had  been  the  torch- 
bearers    of  Grecian   geographical    discovery    in    the    west.     1    have 
already   described    their  adventurous   exploring  voyages   of  former 
days  into  the  interior  of  the  Adriatic,  and  along  the  whole  northern 
rind  western  coasts  of  the  Mediterranean  as  far  as  Tartessus  (the 
i  around  aud  adjoining  to  Cadiz) — together  with  the  favorable 
reception  given  to  them  by  old  Arganthonius,  king  of  the  country, 
who   invited  them  to  immigrate  in  a  body  to  his  kingdom,  offering 
them  the  choice  of  any  site  which  they  might  desire.     His  invitation 
was  declined,  though  probably  the  Phokseans  may  have  subsequently 
d  the  refusal;  and  he  then  manifested  his  good  will  toward 
them  by  a  large  present  to  defray  the  expense  of  constructing  forti- 
us round  their  town.     The  walls,  erected  in  part  by  this  aid, 
m!i  extensive  and  well  built.     Yet  they  could  not  hinder  llar- 
3  from  raising  his  mounds  of  earth  up  against  them,  while  he 
iolitic  enough  at  the  same  time  to  tempt  them  with  offers  of  a 
ate  capitulation;  requiring  only  that  they  should  breach  their 
walls  in  one  place  by  pulhng  down  one  of  the  towers,  and  consecrate 
one  building  in  the  interior  of  the  town  as  a  token  of  subjection. 
To  accepl    these  terms  was  to  submit  themselves  to  the  discretion  of 
the    besieger,   lor  there   could   lie   no  security   that   they   would   be 
. '  d.     The  Phokseans,  while  they  asked  for  one  day  to  deliber- 
ate upon  their  reply,  entreated  that  during  that  day  HarpagUK  i  'nould 
withdraw  his  troops  altogether  from  the  walls.     With  this  demand 
the  latter  complied,  intimating  at  the  same  time  that  he  saw  clearly 
through  the  meaning  of  it.     The   Phokseans,  having  determined  that 
the  inevitable  servitude  impending  over  their  town  should  not  be 
shared  by  its  inhabitants,  employed  their  day  of  grace  in  preparation 
i!e,  putting  on  shipboard  l.icir  wives  aud  children  as 
well  as  their  furniture  and  the  movable  decorations  of  their  temples. 
I  lor  Chios,  leaving  to  the  conquerer  a  deserted  town 
for  the  occupation  of  a  Persian  garrison. 
It  appears  that   the  fugitives  were  not  very  kindly  received  at 
At  leasl  when  they  made  a  proposition  for  pui  chasing  from 
the  Ohians  the  neighboring  islands  of  (Enussse  asa  permanenl  abode, 
the  latter  were  induced  to  rein  e  by  apprehensions  of  commercial 
rivalry.     It    tvas   necessary  to  look   farther  for  a  settlement;    while 
Arganthonius,   their  protector,    being  now    dead,  Tartessus  was  no 
:uj:.     Twenty  years  before,  however,  the  colony  of  Alalia 
in    the   island   of   Corsica   had    been   founded    from    Phok.-ea    by    the 
oracle,  and   thither  the  general    body  of  Phoku'ans 
now  resolved  to  repair.     Having  prepared  their  ships  for  this  distant 
voyage,  they  hist  sailed  back  to  Phoksea,  surprised  the  Persian  gar- 


PHOKJSAN  COLONY.  117 

rison  whom  Harpagus  had  left  in  the  town,  and  slew  them.  They 
then  sunk  in  the  harbor  a  great  lump  of  iron,  binding  themselves  by 
a  solemn  and  unanimous  oath  never  again  to  see  Phokaea  until  that 
iron  should  come  up  to  the  surface.  Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  the 
oath,  the  voyage  of  exile  had  been  scarcely  begun  when  more  than 
half  of  them  repented  of  having  so  bound  themselves — and  became 
homesick.  They  broke  their  vow  and  returned  to  Phokaea.  Yet 
since  Herodotus  does  not  mention  any  divine  judgment  as  having 
been  consequent  on  the  perjury,  we  may  perhaps  suspect  that  some 
gray-headed  citizen,  to  whom  transportation  to  Corsica  might  be  Utile 
less  than  a  sentence  of  death,  both  persuaded  himself,  and  certified 
to  his  companions,  that  he  had  seen  the  sunken  lump  of  iron  raised 
up  and  floating  for  a  while  buoyant  upon  the  waves.  Harpagus 
must  have  been  induced  to  pardon  the  previous  slaughter  of  his  Per- 
sian garrison,  or  at  least  to  believe  that  it  had  been  done  by  those 
Phokseans  who  still  persisted  in  exile.  He  wanted  tribute-paying 
subjects,  not  an  empty  military  post,  and  the  repentant  home-seekers 
were  allowed  to  number  themselves  among  the  slaves  of  the  Great 
King. 

Meanwhile  the  smaller  but  more  resolute  half  of  the  Phokreans 
executed  their  voyage  to  Alalia  in  Corsica,  with  their  wives  and 
chi'dren,  in  sixty  pentekonters  or  armed  ships,  and  established  them- 
selves along  with  the  previous  settlers.  They  remained  there  for  five 
years,  during  which  time  their  indiscriminate  piracies  had  become  so 
intolerable  (even  down  to  this  time,  piracy  committed  against  a  for- 
eign vessel  seems  to  have  been  practiced  frequently  and  without 
much  disrepute),  that  both  the  Tyrrhenian  sea-ports  along  the  Med- 
iterranean coast  of  Italy,  and  the  Carthaginians,  united  to  put  them 
down.  There  subsisted  particular  treaties  between  these  two,  for 
the  regulation  of  the  commercial  intercourse  between  Africa  and 
Italy,  of  which  the  ancient  treaty  preserved  by  Polybius  between 
Rome  and  Carthage  (made  in  509  b,C.)  may  be  considered  as  a  speci- 
men. Sixty  Carthaginian  and  as  many  Tuscan  ships,  attacking  the 
sixty  Phoksean  ships  near  Alalia,  destroyed  forty  of  them,  yet  not 
without  such  severe  loss  to  themselves  that  the  victory  was  said  to  be 
on  the  side  of  the  latter;  who,  however,  in  spite  of  this  Kadmeian 
Victory  (so  a  battle  was  denominated  in  which  the  victors  lost  more 
than  the  vanquished),  were  compelled  to  carry  back  their  remaining 
twenty  vessels  to  Alalia,  and  to  retire  with  their  wives  and  families, 
in  so  far  as  room  could  be  found  for  them,  to  Rhegium.  At  last 
these  unhappy  exiles  found  a  permanent  home  by  establishing  the 
new  settlement  of  Elea  or  Yelia  in  the  Gulf  of  Policastro,  on  the 
Italian  coast  (then  called  GEnotrian)  southward  from  Poseidonia  or 
jPaestum.  It  is  probable  that  they  were  here  joined  by  other  exiles 
from  Ionia,  in  particular  by  the  Kolophonian  philosopher  and  poet 
Xenophanes,  from  whom  what  was  afterward  called  the  Eleatic 
school  of  philosophy,  distinguished  both  for  bold  consistency  and 


118  THE   PERSIAN  EMPTITE. 

The    Phokaean  captives,  taken 
prisoners  in  the  naval  combal  by  Tyrrhenians  and  Carthaginians, 
toned  to  death.     Bui  a  divine  judgmenl  overtook  the  Tyr- 
rhenian town  of  Agylla  in  consequence  of  this  cruelly;  and  even  in 

ae  of  II'  rodotus,  a  century  afterward,  the  Agyllaeans  were  -till 
expiating  the  sin  bj  a  periodical  solemnity  and  agon,  pursuant  to  the 
penalty  which  the  Delphian  oracle  bad  imposed  upon  them. 
Such  was  the  fate  of  the  Phokaean  exiles,  while  their  brethri 

remained  as  Bubiects  of  Harpagus,  in  common  with  all  the 
and  iEolic  Greeks,  except  Bamos  and  Miletus.     For  ev<  n 
the  insular  inhabitants  of  Lesbos  and  Chios,  though  nol  assailable  by 
the  Persians  had  no  fleet,  thoughl   ii  better  to  renounce 
their  indepi  id  enroll  themselves  as  Persian  subjects  both  of 

them  i  Btrips  of  the  mam-land  which  they  were  unable  to 

proteel  otherwise.  Bamos,  on  the  other  hand,  maintained  its  inde- 
pendence, and  even  reached,  shortly  after  this  period,  under  the 
a  higher  degree  of  power  than  ever:  per- 
haps ihe  humilia  i  -  i  other  maritime  Greeks  around  may  have 
rather  favored  the  ambition  of  this  unscrupulous  prince,  to  whom  L 
shall  revert  presi  atly.  But  we  may  readily  conceive  thai  the  public 
solemnities  in  which  1  i  reeks  intermingled,  in  place  01  those 

gay  and  richly-decked  crowds  which  the  Hom<  ric  hymn  describee  in 
the  preceding  century  as  assembled  at  Delos,  presented  scenes;  of 
marked  despondency.  One  of  their  wisesl  men,  indeed,  Bias  of 
Priene,  went  so  far  as  to  propose,  at  the  Pan-Ionic  Festival,  a  collec- 
tive emigration  of  the  entire  population  of  the  Ionic  towns  to  the 
island  of  Sardinia.  Nothing  like  freedom  (lie  urged)  was  now  open 
to  them  it)  Asia;  bul  in  Sardinia,  one  great  Pan-Ionic  city  might  be 
formed,  which  would  not  only  be  free  herself,  bul  mistress  of  her 
neighbors.  The  proposition  round  no  favor;  the  reason  of  which 
is  sufficiently  evidenl  from  the  narrative  jusl  given  respecting  the 
unconquerable  local  attachment  on  the  part  of  the  Phokaean  majority. 
I  Jut  Herodotus  bestows  upon  ii  the  most  unqualified  commend 
and  regrets  that  it  was  no1  acted  upon.     Had  such  been  the  case,  the 

/ant   history  of  Carthage,  Sicily,  and  even  Home,  might  have 
been  sensibly  alt( 

Thus  subdued  by  Harpagus,  the  Tonic  and  ^Eolic  Greeks  were 
employed  as  auxiliaries  to  him  in  the  conques)  of  the  south-western 
inhabitants  of  Asia  Minor — Karians,  Kaunians,  Lykians,  and  Doric 
Greeks  of  K  nidus  and  1  [alikarnassus.  Of  the  fate  of  the  latter  town, 
Herodotus  tells  us  nothing,  though  it  was  his  native  place.  The 
inhabitants  of  Knidus,  a  place  situated  on  a  long  outlying  tongue  of 
land,  at  firsl  tried  to  cut  through  the  narrow  isthmus  which  joined 
them  t"  the  continent,  bul  abandoned  the  attempt  with  a  facility 
which  Herodotus  explains  bj  referring  it  to  a  prohibition  of  the  ora- 

Neither  Karians  nor  Kaunians  offered  any  serious  resistance. 
The  Lykians  only,  in  their  chief  town  Xanthus,  made  a  desperate 


CONQUESTS  OF  CYRUS   IN  ASIA.  119 

defense.  Having  in  vain  tried  to  repel  the  assailants  in  the  open 
field,  and  finding  themselves  blocked  up  in  their  city,  they  set  fire  to 
it  with  their  own  hands;  consuming  in  the  flames  their  women,  chil- 
dren, and  servants,  while  the  armed  citizens  marched  out  and  perished 
to  a  man  in  combat  with  the  enemy.  Such  an  act  of  brave  and  even 
ferocious  despair  is  not  in  the  Grecian  character.  In  recounting, 
however,  the  languid  defense  and  easy  submission  of  the  Greeks  of 
Knidus,  it  may  surprise  us  to  call  to  mind  that  they  were  Dorians 
and  colonists  from  Sparta.  The  want  of  steadfast  courage,  often 
imputed  to  Ionic  Greeks  as  compared  to  Dorian,  ought  properly  to 
be  charged  on  Asiatic  Greeks  as  compared  with  European;  or  rather 
upon  that  mixture  of  indigenous  with  Hellenic  population,  which  all 
the  Asiatic  colonies,  in  common  with  most  of  the  other  colonies,  pre- 
sented, and  which  in  Halikarnassus  was  particular^  remarkable;  for 
it  seems  to  have  been  half  Kariau,  half  Dorian,  and  was  even  gov- 
erned by  a  line  of  Karian  despots. 

Harpagus  and  the  Persians  thus  mastered,  without  any  considera- 
ble resistance,  the  western  and  southern  portions  of  Asia  Minor; 
probably  also,  though  we  have  no  direct  account  of  it,  the  entire  ter- 
ritory within  the  Halys  wdiich  had  before  been  ruled  by  Croesus. 
The  tributes  of  the  conquered  Greeks  were  transmitted  to  Ekbatana 
instead  of  to  Sardis.  While  Harpagus  was  thus  employed,  Cyrus 
himself  had  been  making  still  more  extensive  conquests  in  Upper 
Asia  and  Assyria,  of  which  I  shall  speak  in  the  coming  chapter. 


CHAPTER  XXXIII. 

GROWTH  OF  THE   PERSIAN  EMPIRE. 

In  the  preceding  chapter  an  account  has  been  given,  the  best 
tvhich  we  can  pick  out  from  Herodotus,  of  the  steps  by  which  the 
Asiatic  Greeks  became  subject  to  Persia.  If  his  narrative  is  meager, 
on  a  matter  which  vitally  concerned  not  only  so  many  of  his  brother 
Greeks,  but  even  his  own  native  city,  we  can  hardly  expect  that  he 
should  tell  us  much  respecting  the  other  conquests  of  Cyrus.  He 
seems  to  withhold  intentionally  various  details  which  had  come  to 
his  knowledge,  and  merely  intimates  in  general  terms  that  while  Har- 
pagus was  engaged  on  the  coast  of  the  .ZEgean,  Cyrus  himself  assailed 
and  subdued  all  the  nations  of  Upper  Asia  "not  omitting  any  one  of 
them."  He  alludes  to  the  Baktrians  and  the  Sakae,  who  arc  also 
named  by  Ktesias  as  having  become  subject  partly  by  force,  partly 
by  capitulation.  But  he  deems  only  two  of  the  exploits  of  Cyrus 
worthy  of  special  notice — the  conquest  of  Babylon,  and  the  final 
expedition  against  the  Massagetae.  In  the  short  abstract  which  we 
now  possess  of  the  lost  work  of  Ktesias,  no  mention  appears  of  the 


[20  (IliOWTII    OF    THK    PERSIAN    EMPIRE. 

Important  conquesl  of  Babylon,     His  narrative,  indeed,  as  far  as  the 
abstract  enables  us  to  follow  it,  diverges  materially  from  that  of 

lotus,  and  musl  have  be<  n  founded  on  data  altogether  different. 
■  l  Bhall  mention  (says  Herodotus)  those  conquest  e  which  gave 
Cyrus  raosl  trouble,  and  arc  mosl  memorable:  after  he  had  subdued 
ail  the  rest  of  the  continent,  he  attacked  the  Assyrians."  Those  who 
recoiled  the  description  of  Babylon  and  its  surrounding  territory,  as 
given  in  a  former  chapter,  will  nol  be  surprised  to  learn  that  the  cap 

ij  it  gave  the  Persian  aggressor  much  trouble.  Their  only  sur- 
prise  will  be,  how  il  could  ever  have  been  taken  at  all — or  indeed 
how  a  hostile  army  could  have  even  reached  it.  Herodotus  informs 
us  thai  the  Babylonian  queen  Nitokris  (mother  of  that  very  Laby- 
netus  who  was  king  when  Cyrus  attacked  the  place)  apprehensive  of 
invasion  from  the  Medea  after  their  capture  of  Nineveh,  had  executed 
many  laborious  works  near  the  Euphrates  for  the  purpose  of  obstruct- 
ing their  approach.  Moreover  there  existed  what  was  called  the  wall  of 
Media  (probably  built  by  her,  but  certainly  buill  prior  to  the  Persian 
conquest),  one  hundred  feet  high  and  twenty  feet  thick,  across  t  lie 
entire  space  of  seventy-live  miles  which  joined  the  Tigris  with  one 
of  the  canals  of  the  Euphrates:  while  the  canals  themselves,  as  we 
may  see  by  the  march  of  the  Ten  Thousand  Greeks  after  the  battle 
of  Kunaxa,  presented  means  ol  defense  altogether  insuperable  by  a 
rude  army  such  as  thai  of  the  Persians..  On  the  east,  the  territory  of 
Babylonia  was  defended  by  the  Tigris,  which  cannot  be  forded  lower 

be  ancient  Nineveh  or  the  modern  .Mosul.  In  addition  to  these 
rampart-,  natural  as  well  as  artificial,  to  protect  the  territory— popu- 
lous, cultivated,  productive,  and  offering  every  motive  to  its  inhabit- 
ant- to  resist  even  the  entrance  of  an  enemy — we  are  told  that  the 
Babylonians  were  so  thoroughly  prepared  for  the  inroad  of  Cyrus 
that  they  had  accumulated  within  their  walls  a  store  of  provisions  for 
many  years.  Strange  as  ii  may  seem,  we  must  suppose  that  the  king 
of  Babylon,  after  all  the  cost  and  labor  spent  in  providing  defenses 
for  the  territory,  voluntarily  neglected  to  avail  himself  of  them,  suf- 
fered the  invader  to  tread  down  the  fertile  Babylonia  without  resist- 
ance, and  merely  drew  (jut  the  citizens  to  oppose  him  when  he 
arrived  under  the  wall-  of  the  city — if  the  statement  of  Herodotus  UE 
eorrect.  And  we  may  illustrate  this  unaccountable  omission  by  thai 
which  we  know  to  have  happened  in  the  march  of  the  younger  Cyrus 
to  Kunaxa  against  his  brother  Artaxerxes  Mnemon.  The  latter  had 
caused  to  lie  dug,  expressly  in  preparation  for  this  invasion,  a  broad 
and  deep  ditch  (thirty  feet  wide  and  eight  bet  deep)  from  the  wall 
of  Media  to  the  river  Euphrates,  a  distance  of  twelve  parasan 
forty-five  English  mile-,  leaving  only  a  passage  of  twenty  feet  broad 
close  alongside  of  the  river.  \,et  when  the  invading  army  arrived  at 
this  important  pass,  they  tound  not' a  man  there  to  defend  it.  and  all 
of  them  marched  withoul  r<  si  Jtance  through  the  narrow  inlet.  <  ..  rus 
the  younger,  who  had   up  to  that   momenl    felt  assured  that  his 


CYRUS  DISTRIBUTES  THE  RIVER  GYNDES.      121 

brother  would  fight,  now  supposed  that  lie  had  given  up  the  idea  of 
defending  Balwlon:  instead  of  which,  two  days  afterward.  Arta- 
xerxes  attacked  him  on  an  open  plain  of  ground  where  there  was  no 
advantage  of  position  on  either  side;  though  the  invaders  were  taken 
rather  unawares  in  consequence  of  their  extreme  confidence  arising 
from  recent  unopposed  entrance  within  the  artificial  ditch.  This 
anecdote  is  the  more  valuable  as  an  illustration,  because  all  its  cir- 
cumstances are  transmitted  to  us  ny  a  discerning  eye-witness.  And 
both  the  two  incidents  here  brought  into  comparison  demonstrate  the 
recklessness,  changefulness,  and  incapacity  of  calculation  belonging 
to  the  Asiatic  mind  of  that  day — as  well  as  the  great  command  of 
(lands  possessed  by  these  kings,  and  their  prodigal  waste  of  human 
labor.  We  shall  see,  as  we  advance  in  this  history,  farther  evidences 
of  the  same  attributes,  which  it  is  essential  to  bear  in  mind,  for  tne 
purpose  of  appreciating  both  Grecian  dealing  with  Asiatics,  and  the 
comparative  absence  of  such  defects  in  the  Grecian  character.  Vast 
walls  and  deep  ditches  are  an  inestimable  aid  to  a  brave  and  well- 
commanded  garrison;  but  they  cannot  be  made  entirely  to  supply 
the  want  of  bravery  and  intelligence. 

In  whatever  manner  the  difficulties  of  approaching  Babylon  may 
have  been  overcome,  the  fact  that  they  were  overcome  by  Cyrus  is 
certain.  On  first  setting  out  for  this  conquest,  he  was  about  to  cross 
the  river  Gyndes  (one  of  the  affluents  from  the  east  which  joins  the. 
Tigris  near  the  modern  Bagdad,  and  along  which  lay  the  high  road 
crossing  the  pass  of  Mount  Zagros  from  Babylon  to  Ekbatana),  when 
one  of  the  sacred  white  horses,  which  accompanied  him,  entered  the 
river  in  pure  wantonness  and  tried  to  cross  it  by  himself.  The 
Gyndes  resented  this  insult  and  the  horse  was  drowned:  upon  which 
Cyrus  swore  in  his  wrath  that  he  would  so  break  the  strength  of  the 
river  as  that  women  in  future  should  pass  it  without  wetting  their 
knees.  Accordingly  he  employed  his  entire  army,  during  the  whole 
summer  season,  in  digging  three  hundred  and  sixty  artificial  channels 
to  disseminate  the  unity  of  the  stream.  Such,  according  to  Herodotus, 
was  the  incident  which  postponed  for  one  year  the  fall  of  the  great 
Babylon.  But  in  the  next  spring  Cyrus  and  his  army  were  before  the 
walls,  after  having  defeated  and  driven  in  the  population  who  came 
out  to  fight.  These  walls  were  artificial  mountains  (three  hundred 
feet  high,  seventy-five  feet  thick,  and  forming  a  square  of  fifteen 
miles  to  each  side),  within  which  the  besieged  defied  attack,  and  even 
blockade,  having  previously  stored  up  "several  years'  provision. 
Through  the  midst  of  the  town,  however,  flowed  the  Euphrates. 
That  river,  which  had  been  so  laboriously  trained  to  serve  for  protec- 
tion, trade  and  sustenance  to  the  Babylonians,  was  now  made  the 
avenue  of  their  ruin.  Having  left  a  detachment  of  his  army  at  the 
two  points  where  the  Euphrates  enters  and  quits  the  city,  Cyrus 
retired  with  the  remainder  to  the  higher  part  of  its  course,  where  an 
ancient  Babylonian  queen  had  prepared  one  of  the  great  lateral  reser- 


122  GROWTH   OF  THE  PERSIAN   EMPIRE. 

voire  for  carrying  off  in  case  of  need  the  superfluity  of  its  v/a^i 
Near  this  point  Cyrus  caused  anothei  reservoir  and  another  canal  o» 
communication  to  be  dug,  by  means  of  which  he  drew  off  the  watei 
ni  the  Euphrates  to  such  a  degree  ii  became  uol  above  the  beighl  of 
a  man's  thigh  The  period  chosen  was  that  of  a  great  Babylonian 
fe  tival,  "when  the  whole  population  were  engaged  in  amusement  and 

revelry.  The  Persian  troops  left  near  II, e  town,  watching  their 
Opportunity,  entered  from  both  sides  along  the  bed  of  the  river,  and 
took  it  by  surprise  with  scarcely  any  resistance.  At  no  Other  time, 
except  during  a  festival,  could  they  ha\e  done  this  (says  Herodotus, 
had  the  riser  been  ever  so  low,  for  both  banks  throughout  the  whole 

length  of  tin-  town  were  provided  with  quays,  with  continuous  walls, 

and  with  gates  at  the  end  of  every  street  which  led  down  to  therivei 
ni  angles:  so  that  if  the  population  bad  not  been  disqualified  bj 
the  influences  of  the  moment,  they  would  have  caught  the  assailants 
in  the  bed  of  the  river  "as  in  a  trap,"  and  overwhelmed  them  from 
the  walls  alongside.  Within  a  square  of  fifteen  miles  to  each  side, 
we  are  not  surprised  to  hear  that  both  the  extremities  were  already 
in  the  power  of  the  besiegers  before  the  central  population  heard  of 
it.  and  while  they  were  yet  absorbed  in  unconscious  festivity. 

Such  is  the  account  given  by  Herodotus  of  the  circumstances 
which  placed  Babylon— the  greatest  city  of  Western  Asia— in  the 
power  of  the  Persians.  To  what  extent  the  information  communi- 
cated to  him  was  incorrect  or  exaggerated,  we  cannot  now7  decide. 
The  way  in  which  the  city  was  treated  would  lead  us  to  suppose  thut 
its  acquisition  cannot  have  cost  the  conquerer  either  much  time  or 
much  loss.  Cyrus  comes  into  the  list  as  king  of  Babylon,  and  the 
inhabitants  with  their  whole  territory  become  tributary  to  the  Per- 
sians, forming  the  richest  satrapy  in  the  empire;  but  we  do  not  hear 
that  the  people  were  otherwise  ill-used,  and  it  is  certain  that  the  vast 
walls  and  gates  were  left  untouched.  This  was  very  different  from 
the  way  in  which  the  Medes  had  treated  Nineveh,  which  seems  to  have 
been  ruined  and  for  a  long  time  absolutely  uninhabited,  though  re- 
occupied  on  a  reduced  scale  under  the  Parthian  empire;  and  very 
different  also  from  the  way  in  which  Paly  Ion  itself  was  treated  twenty 
years  afterward  by  Darius,  when  reconquered  after  a  revolt. 

The  importance  of  Babylon,  marking  as  it  dees  one  of  the  peculiar 
forms  of  civilization  belonging  to  the  ancient  world  in  a  state  of  full 
development,  gives  an  interest  even  to  the  half-authenticated  stories 
respecting  its  capture.  The  other  exploits  ascribed  to  Cyrus — his 
invasion  of  India,  across  the  des<  rl  of  Arachosia — and  his  attack 
upon  the  Massagetae,  Nomads  ruled  by  queen  Tomyris  and  greatly 
bling  the  Scythians,  across  the  mysterious  river  which  Hero- 
dotus calls  Araxes— are  too  little  known  to  be  at  all  dwelt  upon.  In 
the  latter  he  is  said  to  have  perished,  his  army  being  defeated  in  a 
bloody  battle.  He  was  buried  at  Pasargadae,  in  bis  native  province 
of  Persia  proper,  where  his  tomb  was  honored  and  watched  until  the 


STIMULUS   TO   TIIE  PERSIAN.  123 

breaking  up  of  the  empire,  while  his  memory  was  held  in  profound 
veneration  among  the  Persians,  Of  his  real  exploits  we  know  little 
or  nothing,  but  in  what  we  read  respecting  him  there  seems,  though 
amidst  constant  fighting,  very  little  cruelty.  Xenophon  has  selected 
hia  life  as  the  subject  of  a  moral  romance,  which  for  a  long  time  was 
cited  as  authentic  history,  and  which  even  now  serves  as  an  author- 
ity, express  or  implied,  for  disputable  and  even  incorrect  conclusions. 
His  extraordinary  activity  and  conquests  admit  of  no  doubt.  He 
left  the  Persiau  empire  extending  from  Sogdiana  and  the  rivers 
Jaxartes  and  Indus  eastward,  to  the  Hellespont  and  the  Syrian  coast 
westward,  and  his  successors  made  no  permanent  addition  to  it  except 
that  of  Egypt.  Phenicia  and  Judaea  were  dependencies  of  Babylon, 
at  the  time  when  he  conquered  it,  with  their  princes  and  grandees  in 
Babylonian  captivity.  As  they  seem  to  have  yielded  to  him,  and 
became  his  tributaries,  without  difficulty;  so  the  restoration  of  their 
captives  was  conceded  to  them.  It  was  from  Cyrus  that  the  habits  of 
the  Persian  kings  took  commencement,  to  dwell  at  Susa  in  the  win- 
ter, and  Ekbataua  during  the  summer;  the  primitive  territory  of 
Persis,  with  its  two  towns  of  Persepolis  and  Pasargadae,  being 
reserved  for  the  burial-place  of  the  kings  and  the  religious  sanctuary 
of  the  empire.  How  or  when  the  conquest  of  Susiana  was  made,  we 
are  not  informed.  It  lay  eastward  of  the  Tigris,  between  Babylonia 
and  Persis  proper,  and  its  people,  the  Kissians,  as  far  as  we  can 
discern,  were  of  Assyrian  and  not  of  Arian  race.  The  river  Choas- 
pes  near  Susa  was  supposed  to  furnish  the  only  water  fit  for  the 
palate  of  the  Great  King,  and  it  is  said  to  have  heen  carried  about 
with  him  wherever  he  went. 

While  the  conquests  of  Cyrus  contributed  to  assimilate  the  distinct 
types  of  civilization  in  Western  Asia — not  by  elevating  the  worse,  but 
by  degrading  the  better — upon  the  native  Persians  themselves  they 
operated  as  an  extraordinary  stimulus,  provoking  alike  their  pride, 
ambition,  cupidity,  and  warlike  propensities.  Not  only  did  the  ter- 
ritory of  Persis  proper  pay  no  tribute  to  Susa  or  Ekbatana — being 
the  only  district  so  exempted  between  the  Jaxartes  and  the  Mediter- 
ranean— but  the  vast  tributes  received  from  the  remaining  empire 
were  distributed  to  a  great  degree  among  its  inhabitants.  Empire  to 
them  meant — for  the  great  men,  lucrative  satrapies  or  pachalics,  with 
powers  altogether  unlimited,  pomp  inferior  only  to  that  of  the  Great 
King,  and  standing  armies  which  they  employed  at  their  own  discre- 
tion sometimes  against  each  other — for  the  -common  soldiers,  drawn 
from  their  fields  or  flocks,  constant  plunder,  abundant  maintenance, 
and  an  unrestrained  licence,  either  in  the  suite  of  one  of  the  satraps, 
or  in  the  large  permanent  troop  which  moved  from  Susa  to  Ekbatana 
with  the  Great  King.  And  if  the  entire  population  of  Persis  proper 
dilnot  migrate  from  their  abodes  to  occupy  some  of  those  more 
inviting  spots  which  the  immensity  of  the  imperial  dominion  fur- 
nished— a  dominion  extending  (to  use  the  language  of  Cyrus  the 


GROWTH   OF   THE   PERSIAN    EMPIRE. 

be  battle  of  Kunaxa)  from  the  region  of  insupporta 
hi,-  heal  to  that  of  insupportable  cold— this  was  only  because  the 
early  kings  discouraged  such  a  movement,  in  order  that  the  nation 
might  maintain  its  military  hardihood  and  be  in  a  situation  to  fur- 
nish  undiminished  supplies  of  Boldiers.  The  self-esteem  and  arro- 
gance o1  the  Persians  were  no  less  remarkable  than  their  avidity  for 

il  enjoyment.  They  were  fond  of  wine  to  excess'  their  wives 
iikI  their  concubines  were  both  numerous;  and  they  adopted  eagerly 
from  fori  ign  cations  new  fashions  of  luxury  as  well  as  of  ornament. 
Even  I"  novelties  in  religion,  they  were  not  strongly  averse.  For 
though  disciples  of  Zoroaster,  with  Magi  as  their  priests  and  as  in- 
dispensable companions  of  their  sacrifices,  worshiping  Sun.  Moon, 
Earth,  Fire,  etc.,  and  recognizing  neither  image,  temple,  nor  altar — 
yet  they  had  adopted  the  voluptuous  worship  of  the  goddess  Mylitta 

the  Assyrians  and  Arabians.  A  numerouf  male  offspringwas 
the  Persian's  boast.  I  li-  warlike  character  and  <  msciousness  oi  force 
were  displayed  in  the  education  of  these  youths,  who  were  taught, 
from  live  years  old  to  twenty,  only  three  thhigi — to  ride,  to  .hoot 
with  the  how.  and  to  speak  the  truth.  To  ow<  money,  or  even  to 
buy  and  sell,  was  accounted  among  the  Persians  disgraceful— a  sen 
timent  which  they  defended  by  saying  that  both  the  one  and  the 
other  imposed  the  necessity  of  telling  falseLood.  To  exact  tnbutc 
from  subjects,  to  receive  pay  or  presents  from  the  king,  and  to 
give  away  without  forethoughl  whatevei  was  not  immediately 
wanted.  \\*a<  their  mode  (if  dealing  with  money.  Industrio 
suits  were  left  to  the  conquered,  who  were  fortunate  if  by  ]  a; 
fixed  contribution  and  sending  a  military  c  mtingenl  when  required, 
they  could  purchase  undisturbed  immunity  for  their  remaining  con- 
ierns.  They  could  not  thus  purchase  safety  for  the  family  hearth, 
since  we  find  instances  of  noble  Grecian  maidens  torn  from  their 
parents  for  the  harem  of  the  satrap. 

To  a  people  of  tin-  character,  whose  cone  ,ptions  of  political  society 

;e>  farther  than  personal  obedii  i  bief,  a  conqueror  like 

Cyrus  would  communicate  the  strongest  excitement  and  enthusiasm 

r.f  which  they  were  capable.  lie  had  found  them  slaves,  and  made 
them  masters:  he  was  the  first  and  greatesl  of  national  benefactors,  as 
Well  as  th<  most  forward  of  leader-  in  the  field:  they  followed  him 
from  one  conquest  to  another,  during  the  thirty  years  of  his  reign, 
their  love  of  empire  growing  with  the  empire  itself.  And  this  im- 
of  aggrandizement  continued  unabated  during  the  reigns  of 
Ids  th  i  uccessors — Kambyses,  Darius,  and    Xerxes — until   it, 

length  violently  stifled  by  the  humiliating  defeats  of  Platsea 
and  Salamis;  after  which  the  Persians  became  contenl  with  defend- 
ing themselves  at  home  and  playing  a   seeondan  game.      But   al    the 

■hen  Kami  of  Cyrus  succeeded  to  his  father's  scepter, 

in  spirit  was  at  its  highest  point.     Be  was  not  long  in  fixing 

upon  a.  prey  both  richer  and  less  hazardous  than  the  Massaget«e, 


KAMBYSES   SUCCEEDS  HIS  FATHER  CYRUS.     125 

at  the  opposite  extremity  of  the  empire.  Phenicia  and  Judsea  being 
already  subject  to  him,  lie  resolved  to  invade  Egypt,  then  highly 
flourishing  under  the  long  and  prosperous  reign  of  Amasis.  Not 
much  pretense  was  needed  to  color  the  aggression;  so  that  the  various 
stories  which  Herodotus  mentions  as  causes  of  the  war,  are  only  inter- 
esting inasmach  as  they  imply  a  vein  of  Egyptian  party-feeling — 
affirming  that  the  invasion  was  brought  upon  Amasis  by  a  daughter 
of  Apries,  and  was  thus  a  judgment  upon  Amasis  for  having  deposed 
Apries.  As  to  the  manner  in  which  the  daughter  had  produced  this 
effect,  indeed,  the  most  contradictory  stories  were  circulated. 

Kambyses  summoned  the  forces  of  his  empire  for  this  new  enter- 
prise, and  among  them  both  the  Phenicians  and  the  Asiatic  Greeks, 
.rfEolic  as  well  as  Ionic,  insular  as  well  as  continental — nearly  all  the 
maritime  force  and  skill  of  the  iEgean  sea.  He  was  apprised  by  a 
Greek  deserter  from  the  mercenaries  in  Egypt,  named  Phanes,  of  the 
difficulties  of  the  march,  and  the  best  method  of  surmounting  them; 
especially  the  three  days  of  sandy  desert,  altogether  without  water, 
which  lay  between  Egypt  and  Judoea.  By  the  aid  of  the  neighboring 
Arabians — with  whom  he  concluded  a  treaty,  and  who  were  requited 
for  this  service  with  the  title  of  equal  allies,  free  from  all  tribute — he 
was  enabled  to  surmount  this  serious  difficulty,  and  to  reach  Pelu- 
sium  at  the  eastern  mouth  of  the  Nile,  where  the  Ionian  and  Karian 
troops  in  the  Egyptian  service,  as  well  as  the  Egyptian  military,  were 
assembled  to  oppose  him. 

Fortunately  for  himself  the  Egyptian  king  Amasis  had  died  during 
the  interval  of  the  Persian  preparations,  a  few  months  before  the 
expedition  took  place — after  forty-four  years  of  unabated  Drosperity. 
His  death,  at  this  critical  moment,  was  probably  the  main  cause  of 
the  easy  conquest  which  followed;  his  son,  Psammenitus,  succeeding 
to  his  crown,  but  neither  to  his  abilities  nor  his  influence.  The 
result  of  the  invasion  was  foreshadowed,  as  usual,  by  a  menacing 
prodigy — rain  falling  at  Thebes  in  upper  Egypt.  It  was  brought 
about  by  a  single  victory,  though  bravely  disputed,  at  Pelusium — 
followed  by  the  capture  of  Memphis  with  the  person  of  king  Psam- 
menitus, after  a  siege  of  some  duration.  Kambyses  had  sent  for- 
ward a  Mitylenaean  ship  to  Memphis  with  heralds  to  summon  the 
city.  The  Egyptians,  in  a  paroxysm  of  fury,  rushed  out  of  the  walls, 
destroyed  the  vessel,  and  tore  the  crew  into  pieces — a  savage  pro 
ceeding  which  drew  upon  them  severe  retribution  after  the  capture. 
Psammenitus,  after  being  at  first  treated  with  harshness  and  insult, 
was  at  length  released  and  even  allowed  to  retain  his  regal  dignity 
as  a  dependent  of  Persia.  But  being  soon  detected,  or  at  least 
believed  to  be  concerned,  in  raising  revolt  against  the  conquerors,  he 
was  put  to  death,  and  Egypt  was  placed  under  a  satrap. 

There  yet  lay  beyond  Egypt  territories  for  the  Persians  to  conquer, 
though  Kyrene  and  Barka,  the  Greek  colonies  near  the  coast  of 
Libya,  placed  themselves  at  once  out  of  the  reach  of  danger  by  send- 


120  GROWTH  OF  THE  PERSIAN   EMPIRE. 

ing  to  Kambyses  tribute  aud  submission  at  Memphis.  He  projt  cted 
three  new  enterprisi  s:  one  against  ( 'arthage  by  *  a;  the  oilier  two  by 
land  againsl  the  Ethiopians,  fai  to  the  southward  up  the  court e  of 
the  Nile-  and  against  the  oracle  and  oasis  of  Zeus  Amnion,  amidst 
the  deserts  of  Libya.  Towards  Ethiopia  he  himself  conducted  bis 
troops  but  was  compelled  to  bring  them  back  without  reaching  it, 
pince  they  were  on  the  poinl  of  perishing  with  famine;  while  the 
division  which  he  sent  against  the  temple  of  Amnion  is  said  to  bavc 
been  overwhelmed  by  a  sand-storm  in  the  desert.  The  expedition 
i  Carthage  was  given  up  for  a  reason  which  well  deserves  to 
be  commemorated.  The  Phenicians,  who  formed  the  most  efficient 
pari  of  his  navy,  refused  to  serve  against  their  kinsmen  and  colonists, 
pleading  the  sanctity  of  mutual  oaths  as  well  as  the  ties  both  of  rela- 
tionship and  traffic.     Even  the  frantic  Kambysea  was  compelled  to 

accept,  and  perhaps  to  respect,  this  honorable  refusal,  which  was  not 
imitated  by  the  Ionic  Greeks  when  Darius  and  Xerxes  demand)  d  the 
aid  of  their  ships  againsl  Athens — we  must  add,  however,  that  they 
were  then  in  a  situation  much  more  exposed  and  helpless  than  that 
in  which  the  Phenicians  stood  before  Kambyses. 

Among  the  sacred  animals  so  numerous  and  60  different  through- 
out the  various  nomes  of  Egypt,  the  most  venerated  of  all  was  the 
bull  Apis.  Such  peculiar  conditions  were  required  by  the  Egyptian 
religion  as  to  the  birth,  the  age,  aud  the  marks  of  this  animal,  that 
when  he  died  it  was  difficult  to  find  a  new  calf  properly  qualified  to 
succeed  him.  Much  time  was  sometimes  spent  in  the  search,  aud 
when  an  unexceptionable  successor  was  at  last  found  the  demonstra- 
tions of  joy  in  Memphis  were  extravagant  and  universal.  At  the 
moment  when  Kambyses  returned  to  Memphis  from  his  Ethiopian 
expedition,  full  of  humiliation  for  the  result,  it  so  happened  that  a 
new  Apis  was  just  discovered;  and  as  the  population  of  the  city  gave 
vent  to  their  usual  festive  pomp  and  delight,  he  construed  it  into  an 
intentional  insult  toward  his  own  recent  misfortunes.  In  vain  did 
the  priests  and  magistrates  explain  to  him  the  real  cause  of  these 
popular  manifestations.  He  persisted  in  his  belief,  punished  some 
of  them  with  death  and  others  with  stripes,  aud  commanded  every 
man  seen  in  holiday  attire  to  be  slain.  Fartht  rmore— to  carry  his 
outrage  against  Egyptian  feeling  to  the  uttermost  pitch — he  sent  for 
the  newly -discovered  Apis,  and  plunged  his  dagger  into  the  side  of 
the  animal,  who  shortly  afterward  died  of  the  wound. 

After  this  brutual  deed — calculated  to  efface  in  the  minds  of  the 
Eg3  ptian  priests  the  enormities  of  Cheops  and  Chephren,  and  doubt- 
less unparalleled  in  all  the  24,000  years  of  their  anterior  history— 
Kambyses  lost  every  spark  of  reason  which  yet  remained  to  him. 
The  Egyptians  found  in  this  visitation  a  new  proof  of  the  avenging 
interference  of  their  gods.  Not  only  did  he  commit  every  variety  of 
studied  outrage  against  the  conquered  people  among  whom  he  was 
tarrying,  as  well  as  their  temples  aud  their  sepulchers — but  he  also 


DEATH  OF  KAMBYSES.  127 

dealt  his  blows  against  his  Persian  friends  and  even  his  nearest 
blood-relations.  Among  these  revolting  atrocities,  one  of  the  greates\ 
deserves  peculiar  notice,  because  the  fate  of  the  empire  was  after- 
ward materially  affected  by  it.  His  younger  brother,  Smerdis,  had 
accompanied  him  into  Egypt,  but  had  been  sent  back  to  Susa  because 
the  king  became  jealous  of  the  admiration  which  his  personal  strength 
and  qualities  called  forth.  That  jealousy  was  aggravated  into  alarm 
and  hatred  by  a  dream  portending  dominion  and  conquest  to  Smerdis, 
and  the  frantic  Kambyses  sent  to  Susa  secretly  a  confidential  Persian, 
Prexaspes,  with  the  express  orders  to  get  rid  of  his  brother.  Prex- 
aspes  fulfilled  his  commission  effectively,  burying  the  slain  prince 
with  his  own  hands,  and  keeping  the  deed  concealed  from  all  except 
a  few  of  the  chiefs  at  the  regal  residence. 

Among  these  few  chiefs,  however,  there  was  one,  the  Median  Pati- 
zeithes,  belonging  to  the  order  of  the  Magi,  who  saw  in  it  a  conveni- 
ent stepping-stone  for  his  own  personal  ambition,  and  made  use  of  it 
as  a  means  of  covertly  supplanting  the  dynasty  of  the  great  Cyrus. 
Enjoying  the  full  confidence  of  Kambyses,  he  had  been  left  by  that 
prince  on  departing  for  Egypt  in  the  entire  management  of  the  palace 
and  treasures,  wftth  extensive  authority,  Moreover  he  happened  to 
have  a  brother  extremely  resembling  in  person  the  deceased  Smerdis. 
As  the  open  and  dangerous  madness  of  Kambyses  contributed  to 
alienate  from  him  the  minds  of  the  Persians,  Patizeithes  resolved  to 
proclaim  his  brother  as  king  in  his  room,  as  if  it  were  the  younger 
son  of  Cyrus  succeeding  to  the  disqualified  elder.  On  one  important 
point,  the  false  Smerdis  differed  from  the  true.  He  had  lost  his  ears, 
which  Cyrus  himself  had  caused  to  be  cut  off  for  an  offense;  but  the 
personal  resemblance,  after  all,  was  of  little  importance,  since  he  was 
seldom  or  never  allowed  to  show  himself  to  the  people.  Kambyses 
heard  of  this  revolt  in  Syria  on  his  return  from  Egypt.  He  was 
mounting  his  horse  in  haste  for  the  purpose  of.  going  to  suppress  it, 
when  au  accident  from  his  sword  put  an  end  to  his  life.  Herodotus 
tells  us  that  before  his  death  he  summoned  the  Persians  around  him, 
confessed  that  he  had  been  guilty  of  putting  his  brother  to  death,  and 
apprised  them  that  the  reigning  Smerdis  was  only  a  Median  preten- 
der— conjuring  them  at  the  same  time  not  to  submit  to  the  disgrace 
of  being  ruled  by  any  other  than  a  Persian  and  an  Achoernenid.  But 
if  it  be  true  that  he  ever  made  known  the  facts,  no  one  believed  him. 
For  Prexaspes  on  his  part  was  compelled  by  regard  to  his  own  safety, 
to  deny  that  he  had  imbrued  his  hands  in  the  blood  of  a  son  of  Cyrus; 
and  thus  the  opportune  death  of  Kambyses  placed  the  false  Smerdis 
without  opposition  at  the  head  of  the  Persians,  who  all,  or  for  the 
most  part,  believed  themselves  to  be  ruled  by  a  genuine  son  of 
Cyrus.     Kambyses  had  reigned  for  seven  years  and  five  months. 

For  seven  months  did  Smerdis  reign  without  opposition,  seconded 
by  his  brother  Patizeithes.  If  he  manifested  his  distrust  of  the 
haughty  Persians  around  him  by  neither  inviting  them  into  his  palace 


128  GROWTH  OF  THE  PERSIAN  EMPIRE. 

nor  showing  himself  out  of  it,  heal  the  same  time  studiously  concil- 
iated the  favor  of  the  subject-provinces,  by  remission  of  tribute  and 
of  military  service  for  three  years.  Such  a  departure  from  the  Per- 
sian principle  of  government  was  in  itself  sufficient  to  disgust  the 
Warlike  and  rapacious  Achsemenids  a1  Suea;  but  it  seems  that  their 
suspicions  as  to  his  genuine  character  had  never  been  entirely  se1  al 
ad  in  the  eighth  month  those  suspicions  were  converted  into 
certainty.  According  to  whal  seems  to  have  been  the  1'ersian  usage, 
lie  bad  taken  to  himself  the  entire  harem  of  his  predecessor,  among 
Whose  wives  was  numbered  Phaedyme,  daughter  of  a  distinguished 
Persian  named  Otanes.  At  the  instance  of  her  lather,  Pha?dyme 
■Undertook  the  dangerous  task  of  feeling  the  head  of  Smerdis  while 
he  slept,  and  thus  detected  the  absence  of  ears.  Otanes,  possessed  of 
the  decisive  information,  lost  no  time  in  concerting,  with  five  other 
noble  Achsemenids,  means  for  ridding  themselves  of  a  king  who  was 
at  once  a  Mede,  a  Magian,  and  a  man  without  ears;  Darius,  son  of 
Hystaspes  the  satrap  of  Persis  proper,  arriving  just  in  time  to  join 
the  conspiracy  as  the  seventh.  How  these  seven  noblemen  slew 
Smerdis  in  his  palace  at  Susa — how  they  subsequently  debated  among 

themselves  whether  they  should   establish   in    Persia  a  monarchy,  an 

oligarchy,  or  a  democracy — how,  after  the  first  of  the  three  had  been 
resolved  upon,  it  was  determined  that  the  future  king,  whichever  he 
might  be,  should  he  hound  to  take  his  wives  only  from  the  families 
of  the  seven  conspirators — how  Darius  became  king  from  the  circum- 
stance of  his  horse  being  the  first  to  neigh  among  those  of  the  con- 
spirators at  a  given  spot,  by  the  stratagem  of  the  groom  (Ebares — 
how  Otanes,  standing  aside  beforehand  from  this  lottery  for  the 
throne,  reserved  for  himself  as  well  as  for  his  descendants  perfect 
freedom  and  exemption  from  the  rule  of  the  future  king,  whichso- 
ever might  draw  the  prize — all  these  incidents  may  be  found 
recounted  by  Herodotus  with  his  usual  vivacity,  but  with  no  small 
addition  of  Hellenic  ideas  as  well  as  of  dramatic  ornament. 

It  was  thus  that  the  upright  tiara,  the  privileged  head-dress  of  the 
a  kings,  passed  away  from  the  lineage  of  Cyrus,  yet  without 
departing  from  tin*  great  phratry  of  the  Achannenidae — to  which 
Darius  and  his  father  Hystaspes,  as  well  as  Cyrus,  belonged.  That 
important  fact  is  unquestionable,  and  probably  the  acts  ascribed  to 
the  seven  conspirators  are  in  the  main  true,  apart  from  their  discus- 
sions and  intentions.  Put,  on  this  as  well  as  on  other  occasions,  we 
must  guard  ourselves  against  an  illusion  which  the  historical  manner 
of  Herodotus  is  apt  to  create.  He  presents  to  us  with  so  much 
descriptive  force  the  personal  narrative — individual  action  and 
speech,  with  all  its  accompanying  hopes,  fears,  doubts  and  passions 
!  our  attention  is  distracted  from  the  political  bearing  of  what  is 
going  on;  which  we  are  compelled  often  to  gather  up  from  hints  in 
the  speeches  of  pi  rformers,  or  from  consequences  afterwards  indi- 
rectly noticed.     When  we  put  together  all  the  incidental  notices 


REVOLT  OF  THE  MEDES.  129 

which  he  lets  drop,  it  will  he  found  that  the  change  of  scepter  from 
Smerdis  to  Darius  was  a  far  larger  political  event  than  his  direct  nar- 
rative would  seem  to  announce.  Smerdis  represents  preponderance 
to  the  Medes  over  the  Persians,  and  comparative  degradation  to  the 
latter;  who,  by  the  installation  of  Darius,  are  again  placed  in  the 
ascendant.  The  Medea  and  the  Magians  are  in  this  case  identical; 
for  the  Magians.  though  indispensable  in  the  capacity  of  priests  to 
the  Persians,  were  essentially  one  of  the  seven  Median  tribes.  It 
thus  appears  that  though  Smerdis  ruled  as  a  son  of  the  great  Cyrus, 
yet  he  ruled  by  means  of  Medes  and  Magians,  depriving  the  Persians 
of  that  supreme  privilege  and  predominance  to  which  they  had 
become  accustomed.  We  see  this  by  what  followed  immediately 
after  the  assassination  of  Smerdis  and  his  brother  in  the  palace.  The 
seven  conspirators,  exhibiting  the  bloody  heads  of  both  these  victims 
as  an  evidence  of  their  deed,  instigated  the  Persians  in  Susa  to  a  gen- 
eral massacre  of  the  Magians,  many  of  whom  were  actually  slain, 
and  the  rest  only  escaped  by  flight,  concealment,  or  the  hour  of 
night.  And  the  anniversary  of  this  day  was  celebrated  afterward 
among  the  Persians  by  a  solemnity  and  festival,  called  the  Mago- 
phonia;  no  Magian  being  ever  allowed  on  that  day  to  appear  in  pub- 
lic. The  descendants  of  the  Seven  maintained  a  privileged  name  and 
rank,  even  down  to  the  extinction  of  the  monarchy  by  Alexander  the 
Great. 

Furthermore,  it  appears  that  the  authority  of  Darius  was  not  read- 
ily acknowledged  throughout  the  empire,  and  that  an  interval  of  con- 
fusion ensued  before  it  became  so.  The  Medes  actually  revolted,  and 
tried  to  maintain  themselves  by  force  against  Darius,  who,  however, 
found  means  to  subdue  them:  though  when  he  convoked  his  troops 
from  the  various  provinces,  he  did  not  receive  from  the  satraps  uni- 
versal obedience.  The  powerful  Orcetes  especially,  who  had  been 
appointed  by  Cyrus  satrap  of  Lydia  and  Ionia,  not  only  sent  no 
troops  to  the  aid  of  Darius  against  the  Medes,  but  even  took  advan- 
tage of  the  disturbed  state  of  the  government  to  put  to  death  his  pri- 
vate enemy  Mitrobates  satrap  of  Phrvgia,  and  appropriate  that 
satrapy  in  addition  to  his  own.  Aryandes  also,  the  satrap  nominated 
by  Kambyses  in  Egypt,  comported  himself  as  the  equal  of  Darius 
rather  than  as  his  subject.  The  subject  provinces  generally,  to  whom 
Smerdis  had  granted  remission  of  tribute  and  military  service  for  the 
space  of  three  years,  were  grateful  and  attached  to  his  memory,  and 
noway  pleased  with  the  new  dynasty.  Moreover  the  revolt  of  the 
Babylonians,  conceived  a  year  or  two  before  ft  was  executed,  took  its 
rise  from  the  feelings  of  this  time.  But  the  renewal  of  the  old  con- 
flict between  the  two  principal  sections  of  the  empire,  Medes  and  Per- 
sians, is  doubtless  the  most  important  feature  in  this  political  revolu- 
tion. The  false  Smerdis  with  his  brother,  botli  of  them  Medes  and 
Magians,  had  revived  the  Median  nationality  to  a  state  of  supremacy 
over  the  Persian,  recalling  the  memory  of  what  it  had  been  under 

H.  G.  II.— 5 


130  GROWTIT  OF  TIIE  PERSIAN  EMPIRE. 

Astyagcs;  while  Darius — a  pure  Persian,  and  riot  (like  the  mule 
Cyrus)  half  Mede  and  half  Persian — replaced  the  Persian  nationality 
in  its  ascendant  condition,  though  nol  without  the  necessity  of  sup- 
Dressing  by  force  n  rebellion  of  the  Medes. 

It  has  already  been  observed  that  the  subjugation  of  there* 
Medes  was  not  the  only  embarrassmenl  of  the  first  years  of  Darius. 
Oroetes,  satrap  of  Phrygia,  Lydia,  and  Ionia,  ruling  seemingly  the 
entire  western  coasl  of  Asia  Minor — possessing  a  large  military  force 
and  revenue,  and  surrounded  by  a  body-guard  of  1000  native  Per- 
sians— maintained  a  haughty  independence.     He  Becretjy  madi 
with  couriers  sent  to  summon  bim  to  Susa,  and  even  wreaked  his 
vengeance  upon  some  of  the  principal  Persians  who  bad  privately 
offended   him.     Darius,  not  thinking  it   prudent  to  attack  him  by 
open  force,  proposed  to  the  chief  Persians  at  S^si  tin-  dang 
problem  of  destroying  him   by  stratagem.     Thirty  among  them  vol- 
unteered to  undertake  it,  and  Bagseus,  son  of  Attontes,  to  whom  on 
drawing  lots    the    task   devolved,    accomplished    it    by    a    maneuver 

which  might  serve  as  a  lesson  to  tbe'Jtloman  government  in  its  em- 
barrassments with  contumacious  Pastas.     Having  proceeded  to  Sar- 

dis  furnished  with  many  differenl  ,-oyal  ordinances,  formally  set 
forth  and  bearing  the  seal  of  Dari  ,„  he  was  presented  to  Oro  tes  in 
audience,  with  the  public  se  x<  b  rj  of  the  Batrapy  close  at  hand,  and 
the  Persian  guards  standing  arou  id.  He  presented  his  ordinances 
to  be  read  aloud  by  the  secretary,  choosing  firsl  those  which  n 
to  matters  of  no  great  importance;  but  when  he  saw  that  tin  | 
listened  with  profound  reverence,  and  that  the  king's  name  ai 
imposed  upon  them  irresistibly,  he  ventured  upon  the  real  purporl 
of  his  perilous  mission.  An  ordinance  was  handed  to  the  secretary, 
and  read  by  him  aloud,  as  follows:  "Persians,  king  Darius  forbids 
you  to  serve  any  longer  as  guards  to  Orcetes."  The  obedienl  guards 
at  once  delivered  up  their  spears,  when  Bagseus  caused  the  final  war- 
rant to  be  read  to  them:  "King  Darius  commands  the. Persians  in 
Bardis  to  kill  Orestes."  The  guards  drew  their  swords  and  killed 
him  on  the  spot:  his  large  treasure  was  conveyed  to  Susa:  Darius 
became  undisputed  master,  and  probably  Bagseus  satrap. 

Another  devoted  adherent,  and  another  yet  more  memorable  piece 
of  cunning,  laid  prostrate  before  Darius  the  mighty  walls  and  gates 
of  the  revolted  Babylon.  The  inhabitants  of  that  city  had  employi  d 
themselves  assiduously — both  during  the  lax  provincial  superintend- 
ence of  the  false  Smerdis  and  during  the  period  of  confusion  and 
conflict  which  elapsed  before  Darius  became  firmly  established  and 
obeyed — in  making  every  preparation  both  for  declaring  and  sustain- 
ing their  independence.  Having  accumulated  a  large  store  of  pro 
and  other  r<  quisites  for  a  long  siege,  without  previous  detec- 
tion, they  at  length  proclaimed  their  independence  openly.  Such 
was  the  intensity  of  their  resolution  to  shake  off  the  yoke,  that  they 
had  recourse  to  a  proceeding,  which,  if  correctly  reported  by  Herodo- 


RECONQUERED  BY  DARIUS.  131 

tus,  forms  one  of  the  most  frightful  enormities  recorded  in  his  history. 
To  make  their  provisions  last  out  longer,  they  strangled  all  the 
women  in  the  city,  reserving  only  their  mothers,  and  one  woman  to 
each  family  for  the  purpose  of  baking.  We  cannot  but  suppose  that 
this  has  been  magnified  from  a  partial  into  a  universal  destruction; 
but  taking  it  even  with  such  allowance,  it  illustrates  that  ferocious 
force  of  will — and  that  predominance  of  strong  nationality,  com- 
bined with  antipathy  to  foreigners,  over  all  the  gentler  sympathies — 
which  seems  to  mark  the  Semitic  nations,  and  which  may  be  traced 
so  conspicuously  in  the  Jewish  history  of  Josephus. 

Darius,  assembling  all  the  forces  in  his  power,  laid  siege  to  the 
revolted  city,  but  could  make  no  impression  upon  it  either  by  force 
or  by  stratagem.  He  tried  to  repeat  the  proceeding  by  which  Cyrus 
had  taken  it  at  first;  but  the  besieged  were  found  this  time  on  their 
guard.  The  siege  had  lasted  twenty  months  without  the  smallest  prog- 
ress, and  the  Babylonians  derided  the  besiegers  from  the  height  of 
their  impregnable  walls,  when  a  distinguished  Persian  nobleman, 
Zopyrus — son  of  Megabyzus,  who  had  been  one  of  the  seven  conspir- 
ators against  Smerdis — presented  himself  one  day  before  Darius  in  a 
state  of  frightful  mutilation.  His  nose  and  ears  were  cut  off,  and 
his  body  misused  in  every  way.  He  had  designedly  thus  maimed 
himself,  "thinking  it  intolerable  that  Assyrians  should  thus  laugh 
the  Persians  to  scorn,"  in  the  intention,  which  he  presently  intimated 
to  Darius,  of  passing  into  the  town  as  a  deserter,  with  the  view  of 
betraying  it — for  which  purpose  measures  were  concerted.  The 
Babylonians,  seeing  a  Persian  of  the  highest  rank  in  so  calamitous  a 
condition,  readily  believed  his  assurance  that  he  had  been  thus  pun- 
ished by  the  king's  order,  and  that  he  came  over  to  them  as  the  only 
means  of  procuring  for  himself  signal  vengeance.  Intrusted  by  them 
with  the  command  of  a  detachment,  he  gained  several  advantages  in 
different  sallies,  according  to  previous  concert  with  Darius,  until  at 
length  the  Babylonians,  grateful  and  coufident,  placed  under  his 
charge  the  principal  gates.  At  the  critical  moment  these  gates 
were  thrown  open,  and  the  Persians  became  masters  of  the  city. 

Thus  was  the  impregnable  Babylon  a  second  time  reduced.  Darius 
took  precautions  on  tnis  occasion  to  put  it  out  of  condition  for 
resisting  a  third  time.  He  caused  the  walls  and  gates  to  be  demol- 
ished, and  three  thousand  of  the  principal  citizens  to  be  crucified. 
The  remaining  inhabitants  were  left  in  the  dismantled  city,  fifty 
thousand  women  being  levied  by  assessment  upon  the  neighboring 
provinces,  to  supply  the  place  of  the  women  strangled  when  it  first 
revolted  Zopyrus  was  appointed  satrap  of  the  territory  for  life, 
with  enjoyment  of  its  entire  revenues,  receiving  besides  every  addi- 
tional reward  which  it  was  in  the  power  of  Darius  to  bestow,  and 
generous  assurances  from  the  latter  that  he  would  rather  have  Zopy- 
rus without  wounds  than  the  possession  of  Babylon.  I  have  already 
intimated  in  a  former  chapter  that  the  demolition  of  the  walls  here 


132  GROWTH   OF   THE   PERSIAN  EMPIRE. 

mentioned  i-  nol  to  be  regarded  as  <  omplete  and  continuous,  nor  was 
there  any  necessity  thai  il  should  be  so.  Partial  demolition  would 
in  quite  sumcienl  to  leave  the  city  without  defense;  and  the  descrip- 
tion given  by  Herodotus  of  the  Btate  of  things  as  they  stood  at  the 
time  of  biB  visit,  proves  thai  portions  of  the  walls  yel  subsisted.  One 
circu  istanct!  i-  yel  to  be  added  in  reference  to  the  subsequent  condi- 
tion of  Babylon  under  the  Persian  empire.  The  city,  with  the  terri- 
tory belonging  to  it,  constituted  a  satrapy,  which  not  only  paid  a 
large:  tribute  (one  thousand  Euboic  talents  of  silver)  and  contributed 
i  much  larger  amount  of  provisions  in  kind  Car  the  maintenance  of 
ili.'  Persian  court,  than  any  other  among  the  twenty  satrapies  of  the 
empire,  but  furnished  besides  an  annual  supply  of  five  hundred 
eunuch  youths.  We  may  presume  that  this  was  intended  in  pari  as 
a  punishment  for  the  past  revolt,  since  the  like  obligation  was  not 

imposed  upon  any  other  satrapy. 

Thus  firmly  established  on  the  throne,  Darius  occupied  it  for 
thirty -six  years.  His  reign  was  one  of  organization,  different  from 
that  of  his  two  predecessors;  a  difference  which  the  Persians  well 
understood  and  noted,  calling  Cyrus  the  father,  Kambyses  the  mas- 
ter, and  Darius  the  retail  trader  or  huckster.  In  the  mouth  of  the 
Persians  this  latter  epithet  must  be  construed  as  no  insignificant 
compliment,  since  it  intimates  that  Ik-  was  the  first  to'introduce  some 
methodical  order  into  the  imperial  administration  and  finances. 
lii'li  r  the  two  fotmer  kings  there  was  no  definite  amount  of  tribute 
levied  upon  the  subject  provinces.  They  furnished  what  were  called 
presents,  subject  to  no  fixed  limit  except  such  as  might  be  satisfac- 
tory to  the  satrap  in  each  district.  Bui  Darius — succeeding  as  lie 
did'  toSmerdis,  a\1io  had  rendered  himself  popular  with  the  prov- 
inces by  large  financial  exemptions,  and  having  farther  to  encounter 
jealousy  and  dissatisfaction  from  Persian-,  his  former  equals  in  rank 
— probably  felt  it  expedient  to  relieve  the  provinces  from  the  burden 
of  undefined  exactions.  He  distributed  the  whole  empire  into  tw<  nty 
departments,  imposing  upon  each  a  fixed  annual  tax,  and  a  fixed 
contribution  for  the  maintenance  of  the  court.  This  must  doubtless 
have  been  a  great  improvement,  though  the  limitation  of  the  sum 
•which  the  Great  King  at  Susa  would  require,  did  not  at  all  prevent 
thesatrapin  his  own  province  from  indefinite  requisitions  beyond  it. 
The  satrap  was  a  little  king,  who  acted  nearly  as  he  pleased  in  the 
internal  administration  of  his  province,  subject  only  to  the  necessity 
of  sending  up  the  impcria)  tribute,  of  keeping  off  foreign  enemies, 
and  of  furnishing  an  adequate  military  contingent  for  the  foreign 
enterprises  of  the  Great  King.  To  every  satrap  was  attached  a  royal 
secretary  or  comptroller  of  the  revenue,  who  probably  managed  the 
imperial  finances  in  the  province,  and  to  whom  the  court  of  Buea 
might  perhaps  look  as  a  watch  upon  the  satrap  himself.  It  is  not  to 
be  supposed  that  the  Persian  authorities  in  any  province  meddled 
with  the  details  of  taxation  or  contribution,  as  they  bore  upon  indi- 


TWENTY  SATRAPIES,  133 

vlduals.  The  court  having  fixed  the  entire  sum  payable  by  the  sat- 
rapy in  the  aggregate,  the  satrap  or  the  secretary  apportioned  it 
among  the  various  component  districts,  towns,  or  provinces,  leaving 
to  the  local  authorities  in  each  of  these  latter  the  task  of  assessing  it 
upon  individual  inhabitants.  From  necessity,  therefore,  as  well  a.-f 
from  indolence  of  temper  and  political  incompetence,  the  Persians 
were  compelled  to  respect  the  authorities  winch  they  found  stand- 
ing both  in  town  and  country,  and  to  leave  in  their  hands  a  large 
measure  of  genuine  influence,  frequently  overruled  indeed  by 
oppressive  interference  on  the  part  of  the  satrap,  whenever  any  of  his 
passions  prompted — but  never  entirely  superseded.  In  the  impor- 
tant towns  and  stations,  Persian  garrisons  were  usually  kept,  and 
against  the  excesses  of  the  military  there  was  probably  little  or  no 
protection  to  the  subject  people.  Yet  still  the  provincial  govern- 
ments were  allowed  to  continue,  and  often  even  the  petty  kings  who 
had  governed  separate  districts  during  their  state  of  independence 
prior  to  the  Persian  conquest,  retained  their  title  and  dignity  as 
tributaries  to  the  court  of  Susa.  The  empire  of  the  Great  King  was 
thus  an  aggregate  of  heterogeneous  elements,  connected  together  by 
no  tie  except  that  of  common  fear  and  subjection — noway  coherent 
nor  self-supporting,  nor  pervaded  by  any  common  system  or  spirit  of 
nationality.  It  resembled  in  its  main  political  features,  the  Turkish 
and  Persian  empires  of  the  present  day,  though  distinguished  materi- 
ally by  the  many  differences  arising  out  of  Mohammedanism  and 
Christianity,  and  perhaps  hardly  reaching  the  same  extreme  of 
rapacity,  corruption,  and  cruelty  in  detail. 

Darius  distributed  the  Persian  empire  into  twenty  satrapies,  each 
including  a  certain  continuous  territory,  and  one  or  more  nations 
inhabiting  it,  the  names  of  which  Herodotus  sets  forth.  The  amount 
of  tribute  payable  by  each  satrapy  w7as  determined;  payable  in  gold, 
according  to  the  Euboic  talent,  by  the  Indians  in  the  easternmost  sat- 
rapy— in  silver,  according  to  the  Babylonian  ar  larger  talent,  by  the 
remaining  nineteen.  Herodotus  computes  the  ratio  of  gold  to  silver 
as  13  :  1.  From  the  nineteen  satrapies  which  paid  in  silver,  there  was 
levied  annually  the  sum  of  7,740  Babylonian  talents,  equal  to  something 
about  £2  964,000  sterling-  from  the  Indians,  who  alone  paid  in  gold, 
there  was  received  a  sum  equal  (at  the  rate  of  1  :  13)  to  4,680  Euboic 
talents  of  silver,  or  to  about  £1,290,000  sterling.  To  explain  how  it 
happened  that  this  one  satrapy  was  charged  with  a  sum  equal  to 
two-fifths  of  the  aggregate  charge  on  the  other  nineteen,  Herodotus 
dwells  upon  the  vast  population,  the  extensive  territory,  and  the 
abundant  produce  in  gold,  among  those  whom  he  calls  Indians — the 
easternmost  inhabitants  of  the  earth,  since  be3'ond  them  there  was 
nothing  but  uninhabitable  sand — reaching,  as  far  as  we  can  make  it 
out,  from  Baktria  southward  along  the  Indus  to  its  mouth,  but  how 
far  eastward  we  cannot  determine.  Darius  is  said  to  have  under- 
taken an  expedition  against  them  and  subdued  them.     Moreover,  he 


134  GROWTH  OF  THE  PERSIAN   EMPIRE. 

is  affirmed  to  have  constructed  and  dispatched  vessels  down  the 
Indus  from  the  city  of  Kaspatyri  and  the  territory  of  the  Paktyes, 
in  its  upper  regions,  all  thewaydown  to  its  mouth:  then  into  the 
[ndian  Ocean,  round  the  peninsula  of  Arabia,  and  up  tin-  Red  Bea 
to  Egypt.  The  ships  were  commanded  'y  a  Greek — Skylax,  of 
Caryanda  on  the  south-western  coast,  of  Asia  .Minor;  who,  if  tliis 
Btatemeul  be  correct,  executed  a  scheme  of  nautical  enterprise  not 
only  one  hundred  and  seventy  years  earlier,  hut  also  Ear  more  exten- 
sive than  the  famous  voyage  of  Nearchus,  admiral  of  Alexander  the 
Great,  who  only  went  from  the  Indus  to  the  Persian  Gulf.  The 
eastern  portions  of  the  Persian  empire  remained  so  unknown  and 
Unvisited until  the  .Macedonian  invasion,  that  we  are  unahle  to  criti- 
cise the  isolated  statements  of  Herodotus.  None  of  the  Persian 
kings  subsequent  to  Darius  appear  to  have  visited  them,  and  whether 
the  prodigious  sum  demandable  from  them  according  to  the  Persian 
rent-roll  was  ever  regularly  levied,  may  reasonably  he  doubled.  At 
the  same  time,  we  may  readily  believe  that  the  mountains  in  the 
northern  parts  of  Persian  India  (Cabul  and  Little  Thibet)  were 
at  that  time  extremely  productive  in  gold,  and  that  quantities 
of  that  metal,  such  as  now  appear  almost  fabulous,  may  have  been 
often  obtained.  It  seems  that  the  produce  of  gold  in  all  parts  of  the 
earth,  as  far  as  hitherto  known,  is  obtained  exclusively  near  the  sur- 
face; so  that  a  country  once  rich  in  that  metal  may  well  have  been 
exhausted  of  its  whole  supply,  and  left  at  a  later  period  without  any 
gold  at  all. 

Of  the  nineteen  silver-paying  satrapies,  the  most  heavily  imposed 
was  Babylonia,  which  paid  1000  talents.  The  next  in  amount  of 
charge  was  Egypt,  paying  700  talents,  besides  the  produce  of  tne  fish 
from  the  lake  of  Moeris:  the  remaining  satrapies  varied  in  amount, 
down  as  low  as  170  talents,  which  was  the  sum  charged  on  the 
seventh  satrapy  (in  the  enumeration  of  Herodotus)  comprising  the 
Sattagydae,  the  Gandarii,  the  Dodika?,  and  the  Aparyta?.  The 
[onians,  iEolians,  Magnesians  on  the  Mseander  and  on  Mount  Sipy- 
lus,  Karians,  L;  kians,  Milyans,  and  Pamphylians — including  thy 
coast  of  Asia  Minor  southward  of  Kane,  and  from  thence  round  the 
southern  promontory  to  Phaselis — were  rated  as  one  division,  paying 
400  talents.  Yet  we  may  be  sure  that  much  more  than  this  was 
really  taken  from  the  people,  when  we  read  that  Magnesia  alone 
afterward  paid  to  Themistokles  a  revenue  of  50  talents  annually. 
The  Mysians  and  Lydians  were  included,  with  some  others,  in 
another  division;  and  the  Ilellcspontine  Greeks  in  a  third,  with 
Phrygians,  Bithynians,  Paphlagonians,  Mariandynians,  and  Syrians, 
paying  360  talents — nearly  the  same  as  was  paid  by  Syria  proper, 
Phcnicia  and  Judaea,  with  the  island  of  Cyprus.  Independent  of  this 
regular  tribute,  with  the  undefined  sums  extorted  over  and  above  it, 
then;  were  some  dependent  nations,  which,  though  exempt  from 
tribute,  furnished  occasional  sums  called  presents.     Further  contri- 


ORGANIZING  TENDENCY   OP  DARIUS.  135 

butions  were  exacted  for  the  maintenance  of  the  vast  suite  who 
always  personally  attended  the  king.  One  entire  third  of  this  last 
burden  was  borne  by  Babylonia  alone  in  consequence  of  its  exuber- 
ant fertility:  it  was  paid  in  produce,  as  indeed  the  peculiar  produc- 
tions of  every  part  of  the  empire  seem  to  have  been  sent  up  for  tho 
regal  consumption. 

However  imperfectly  we  are  now  able  to  follow  the  geographical 
distribution  of  the  subject  nations  as  given  by  Herodotus,  it  is  ex- 
tremely valuable  as  the  only  professed  statistics  remaining,  of  the 
entiie 'Persian  empire.  The  arrangement  of  satrapies,  which  he 
describes,  underwent  modification  in  subsequent  times;  at  least  it 
does  not  harmonize  with  various  statements  in  the  Anabasis  of  Xen- 
ophon,  and  in  other  authors  who  recount  Persian  affairs  belonging  to 
the  fourth  century  B.C.  But  we  find  in  no  other  author  except  Hero- 
dotus any  entire  survey  and  distribution  of  the  empire.  It  is  indeed 
a  new  tendency  which  now  manifests  itself  in  the  Persian  Darius, 
compared  with  his  predecessors;  not  simply  to  conquer,  to  extort, 
and  to  give  away— but  to  do  all  this  with  something  like  method  and 
system,  and  to  define  the  obligations  of  the  satraps  towards  Susa. 
Another  remarkable  example  of  the  same  tendency  is  to  be  found  in 
the  fact,  that  Darius  was  the  first  Persian  king  who  coined  money. 
His  coin  both  in  gold  and  silver,  the  Daric,  was  the  earliest  produce 
of  a  Persian  mint.  The  revenue,  as  brought  to  Susa  in  metallic 
mone}r  of  various  descriptions,  was  melted  down  separately,  and 
poured  in  a  fluid  state  in  jars  or  earthenware  vessels.  When  the 
metal  had  cooled  and  hardened,  the  jar  was  broken,  leaving  a  stand- 
ing solid  mass  from  which  portions  were  cut  off  as  the  occasion  re- 
quired. And  in  addition  to  these  administrative,  financial,  and 
monetary  arrangements,  of  which  Darius  was  the  first  originator,  we 
may  probably  ascribe  to  him  the  first  introduction  of  that  system  of 
roads,  restiug-places,  and  permanent  relays  of  couriers,  which  con- 
nected both  Susa  and  Ekbatana  wTith  the  distant  portions  of  the 
empire.  Herodotus  describes  in  considerable  detail  the  imperial 
road  from  Sardis  to  Susa,  a  journey  of  ninety  days,  crossing  the 
Halys,  the  Euphrates,  the  Tigris,  the  Greater  and  Lesser  Zab,  the 
Gyndes,  and  the  Choaspes.  In  his  time  it  was  kept  in  excellent 
order,  with  convenience  for  travelers. 

It  was  Darius  also  who  first  completed  the  conquest  of  the  Ionic 
Greeks  by  the  acquisition  of  the  important  island  of  Samos.  That 
island  had  maintained  its  independence,  at  the  time  when  the  Persian 
general  Harpagus  effected  the  conquest  of  Icmia,  and  even  when  Chios 
and  Lesbos  submitted.  The  Persians  had  no  fleet  to  attack  it;  nor 
had  the  Phenicians  yet  been  taught  to  round  the  Triopian  cape. 
Indeed  the  depression  which  overtook  the  other  cities  of  Ionia  tended 
rather  to  the  aggrandizement  of  Samos,  under  the  energetic  and 
unscrupulous  despotism  of  Polykrates.  That  ambitious  Samian, 
about  ten  years  after  the  conquest  of  Sardis  by  Cyrus  (seemingly 


136  GROWTH   OP  THE   PERSIAN    EMPIRE. 

between  536  532  B.C.),  contrived  to  seize  bj  force  ot  fraud  thi 
ernmeni  of  his  native  island,  with  the  aid  of  bis  brothers  Pantaj 
and  Syloson,  and  a  small  hand  of  conspirators.  Ai  first  the  three 
brothers  shared  the  supreme  power;  but  presently  Polykrates  pu1  to 
death  Pantagnotus,  banished  Syloson,  and  made  himself  despot  alone. 
In  i his  station,  his  ambition,  bis  perfidy,  and  bis  pood  fortune  were 
alike  remarkable.  Be  conquer*  d  several  of  the  neighboring  islands, 
and  even  soe  towns  on  the  mainland:  be  carried  on  successful  war 
againsl  Miletus,  and  signally  defeated  the  Lesbian  ships  which  came 
i-t  Miletus:  begot  together  a  force  of  one  hundred  armed  ships 

called  pentekontei'S,  and  one  thousand  mercenary  bowmen — aspiring 
to  nothing  less  than  the  dominion  of  Ionia,  with  the  islands  in  the 
/Egean.  Alike  terrible  to  friend  and  foe  by  his  indiscriminate  spirit 
of  aggression,  he  acquired  a  naval  power  which  seems  at  that  time 
to  have  Ik  en  the  greatest  in  the  Grecian  world.  He  had  been  in 
intimate  alliance  with  Amasis,  King  o*  Egypt,  who  however  ulti- 
mately broke  with  him.  Considering  his  behavior  towards  allies, 
this  rupture  is  not  at  all  surprising;  hut  Herodotus  ascribes  it  to  the 
alarm  which  Amasis  conceived  at  the  uninterrupted  and  superhuman 
good  fortune  of  Polj  Urates — a  degree  of  good  fortune  sure  to  draw- 
down ultimately  corresponding  intensity  of  suffering  from  the  hands 
of  the  envious  gods.  Indeed.  Herodotus — deeply  penetrated  with 
this  helief  in  an  ever  presenl  Nemesis,  which  allows  no  man  to  be 
very  happy,  or  long  happy,  with  impunity — throws  it  into  the  form 
of  an  epistolary  warning  from  Amasis  to  Polykrates.  advising  him  to 
inflict  upon  himself  some  seasonable  mischief  or  suffering;  in  order, 
if  possible,  to  avert  the  ultimate  judgment — to  let  hlood  in  time,  so 
that  the  plethora  of  happiness  might  not  end  in  apoplexy.  Pursuant 
to  such  counsel,  Polykrates  threw  into  the  sea  a  favorite  ring  of 
matchless  price  and  beauty;  hut  unfortunately,  in  a  few  days,  the 
ring  reappeared  in  the  belly  of  a  fine  fish,  which  a  fisherman  had 
sent  to  him  as  a  present.  Amasis,  now  forewarned  that  the  final 
apoplexy  was  inevitable,  broke  off  the  alliance  with  Polykrates 
Without  delay.  This  well-known  story,  interesting  as  evidence  of 
ancient  beliel,  is  not  less  to  lie  noted  as  showing  the  power  of  that 
belief  to  begel  fictitious  details  out.  of  real  characters,  such  as  I  have 
already  touched  upon  in  the  history  of  Solon  and  Croesus,  and  else- 
where. 

The  facts  mentioned  by  Herodotus  rather  lead  us  to  believe  thai  it 
was  Polykrates,  who,  with  characteristic  faithlessness,  broke  off  his 
friendship  with  Amasis;  finding  it  suitable  to  his  policy  to  cultivate  the 
alliance  of  Kamhyses,  when  that  prince  was  preparing  for  his  inva- 
sion of  Egypt.  In  that  invasion  the  Ionic  subjects  of  Persia  were 
called  Upon  to  serve,  and  Polykrates  deeming  it  a  good  opportunity 
to  rid  himself  of  swine  Samian  malcontents,  sent  to  the  Persian  king 
to  tender  auxiliaries  from  himself.  Kambyses  eagerly  caught  at  tho 
prospect  of  aid  from  the  first  naval  potentate  in  the  ^Egean ;  upon 


THE  S  AMI  AN   EXILES.  137 

which  forty  Samian  triremes  were  sent  to  the  Nile,  having  on  board 
the  suspected  persons,  as  well  as  conveying  a  secret  request  to  the 
Persian  king  that  they  might  never  be  suffered  to  return.  Either 
they  never  went  to  Egypt,  however,  or  they  found  means  to  escape; 
very  contradictory  stories  have  reached  Herodotus.  But  they  cer- 
tainly returned  to  Sanios,  attacked  Polykrates  at  home,  and  were 
driven  off  by  his  superior  force  without  making  any  impression. 
Whereupon  they  repaired  to  Sparta  to  entreat  assistance. 

We  may  here  notice  the  gradual  increasing  tendency  in  the  Grecian 
world  to  recognize  Sparta  as  something  like  a  head,  protector,  or 
referee,  in  cases  either  of  foreign  danger  or  internal  dispute.  The 
earliest  authentic  instance  known  to  us,  of  application  to  Sparta  in 
this  character,  is  that  of  Crcesus  against  Cyrus;  next,  that  of  the 
Ionic  Greeks  against  the  latter:  the  instance  of  the  Samians  now 
before  us,  is  the  third.  The  important  events  connected  with,  and 
consequent  upon,  the  expulsion  of  the  Peisistratidae  from  Athens, 
manifesting  yet  more  formally  the  headship  of  Sparta,  occur  fifteen 
years  after  the  present  event;  they  have  been  already  recounted  in  a 
previous  chapter,  and  serve  as  a  farther  proof  of  progress  in  the 
same  direction,  To  watch  the  growth  of  these  new  political  habits 
is  essential  to  a  right  understanding  of  Grecian  history. 

On  reaching  Sparta,  the  Samian  exiles,  borne  down  with  despond- 
ency and  sufferin"-,  entered  at  large  into  the  particulars  of  their  case. 
Their  long  speaking  annoyed  instead  of  moving  the  Spartans,  wdio 
said,  or  are  made  to  say — "  We  have  forgotten  the  first  part  of  the 
speech,  and  the  last  part  is  unintelligible  to  us."  Upon  which  the 
Samians  appeared  the  next  day  simply  with  an  empty  wallet,  saying 
— "Our  wallet  has  no  meal  in  it."  "Your  wallet  is  superfluous" 
(said  the  Spartans);  i.e.  the  words  wTould  have  been  sufficient  with- 
out it.     The  aid  which  they  implored  was  granted. 

We  are  told  that  both  the  Lacedaemonians  and  the  Corinthians — 
who  joined  them  in  the  expedition  now  contemplated — had  separate 
grounds  of  quarrel  with  the  Samians,  which  operated  as  a  more 
powerful  motive  than  the  simple  desire  to  aid  the  suffering  exiles. 
But  it  rather  seems  that  the  subsequent  Greeks  generally  construed 
the  Lacedaemouiau  interference  against  Polykrates  as  an  example  of 
standing  Spartan  hatred  against  despots.  Indeed  the  only  facts  which 
wre  know,  to  sustain  this  anti-despotic  sentiment  for  which  the  Lace- 
daemonians had  credit,  are,  their  proceedings  against  Polykrates  and 
Hippias:  there  may  have  been  other  cases,  but  we  cannot  specify  them 
with  certainty.  However  this  may  be,  a  joint  Lacedaemonian  and 
Corinthian  force  accompanied  the  exiles  back  to  Samos,  and  assailed 
Polykrates  in  the  city:  they  did  their  best  to  capture  it,  for  forty 
days,  and  were  at  one  time  on  the  point  of  succeeding,  but  were 
finally  obliged  to  retire  without  any  success.  "  The  city  would  have 
been  taken,"  sajrs  Herodotus,  "if  all  the  Lacedaemonians  had  acted 
like  Archias  and  Lykopas" — who,  pressing  closely  upon  the  retreati 


138  GROWTH   OF  THE  PERSIAN  EMPIRE. 

ing  Samians,  were  shul  within  the  town  gates,  and  perished.  The  his- 
torian bad  beard  this  exploit  in  personal  conversation  with  Ar<  bias, 
grandson  of  the  person  above-mentioned,  in  the  deme  Pitana  at 
8parta~-whose  father  bad  been  named  Bamius,  and  who  respected 
the  Bamians  above  any  other  Greeks,  because  they  bad  bestowed 
upon  the  two  brave  warriors,  slain  within  their  town,  an  honorable 
and  public  funeral.  It  is  rarely  that  Herodotus  thus  specifies  his 
informants,  had  he  done  so  more  frequently,  the  value  as  well  as 
the  interest  of  his  history  would  have  been  materially  increased. 

On  the  retirement  of  the  Lacedaemonian  force,  the  Bamian  exiles 
were  left  destitute;  and  looking  out  for  some  community  to  plunder, 
weak  as  well  as  rich,  they  pitched  upon  the  island  of  Biphnos.  The 
Biphnians  of  that  day  were  the  wealthiest  islanders  in  the  .JSgean, 
from  the  productiveness  Of  their  gold  and  silver  mines, — the  produce 
of  which  was  annually  distributed  among  the  citizens,  reserving  a 
tithe  for  the  Delphian  temple.  Their  treasure-chamber  was  among 
the  most  richly-furnished  of  which  that  holy  place  could  boast,  and 
they  themselves  probably,  in  these  times  of  early  prosperity,  were 
numbered  among  the  most  brilliant  of  the  Ionic  visitors  at  theDelian 
festival.  The  Samians,  landing  at  Siphnos,  demanded  a  contribu- 
tion, under  the  name  of  a  loan,  of  ten  talents.  Upon  refusal,  they 
proceeded  to  ravage  the  island,  inflicting  upon  the  inhabitants  a 
severe  defeat,  and  ultimately  extorting  from  them  100  talents. 
They  next  purchased  from  the  inhabitants  of  Hermione,  intheArgo- 
lic  peninsula,  the  neighboring  island  of  Ilydrea,  famous  in  modern 
Greek  warfare.  Yet  it  appears  that  their  plans  must  have  been  sub- 
sequently changed,  for  instead  of  occupying  it,  they  placed  it  under 
the  care  of  the  Trcezenians.  and  repaired  themselves  to  Krete,  for  the 
purpose  of  expelling  the  Zakynthian  settlers  at  Kydonia.  In  this 
they  succeeded,  and  were  induced  to  establish  themselves  in  that 
place;  but  after  they  had  remained  there  five  years,  the  Kretans 
obtained  naval  aid  from  iEgina,  whereby  the  place  was  recovered, 
and  the  Bamian  intruders  finally  sold  into  slavery. 

Such  was  the  melancholy  end  of  the  enemies  Ot  Polykrates.    Mean 
while  that   despot   himself  was  more  powerful  and  prosperous  than 
ever.     Samos  under  him  was  "the  first  of  all  cities,  Hellenic  or  bar- 
baric."   The  great  works  admired  by  Herodotus  in  the  island — an 
aqueduct  for  the  city,  tunneled  through  a  mountain  for  the  length 
of  seven  furlongs — a  mole  to  protect  the  harbor,  two  furlongs   i 
and   twenty    fathoms    deep— and    the   vast    temple  of   Hen 
probably  have  \>n-n  enlarged  and  completed,  if  not  begun,  by  him. 
Aristotle  quotes  the  public  works  of  Polykrates  as  instances  of  the 
profound  policy  of  despots,  to  occupy  as  well  as  to  impoverish 
subjects.      The  earliest  of  all  Grecian  thalassokrata,  or  sea  kings  - 
master  of  the  greatest   naval  force  in  the  .Iv.rean,  as  well  .->s  of  many 
among  its  islands — he  displayed   his  love  of  letters  by  friendship  to 
Anakreon,  and  his  piety  by  "consecrating  to  the  Delian  Apollo  the 


SLAIN  BY  THE  PERSIAN  SATRAP  ORCETES.     139 

neighboring  islaud  of  Rheneia.  But  while  thus  outshining  all  his 
contemporaries,  victorious  over  Sparta  and  Corinth,  and  projecting 
farther  aggrandizement,  he  was  precipitated  on  a  sudden  into  the 
abyss  of  ruin;  and  that  too,  as  if  to  demonstrate  unequivocally  the 
ageucy  of  the  envious  gods,  not  from  the  revenge  of  any  of  his  numer- 
ous victims,  but  from  the  gratuitous  malice  of  a  stranger  whom  he 
had  never  wronged  and  never  even  seen.  The  Persian  satrap  Oreetes, 
on  the  neighboring  main-land,  conceived  an  implacable  hatred  against 
him:  no  one  could  tell  why — for  he  had  no  design  of  attacking  the 
islaud;  and  the  trifling  reasons  con jecturally  assigned,  only  prove  that 
the  real  reason,  whatever  it  might  be,  was  unknown.  Availing  him- 
self of  the  notorious  ambition  and  cupidity  of  Polykrates,  Oreetes 
sent  to  Samos  a  messenger,  pretending  that  his  life  was  menaced  by 
Kambyses,  and  that  he  was  anxious  to  make  his  escape  with  his 
abundant  treasures.  He  proposed  to  Polykrates  a  share  in  this  treas- 
ure, sufficient  to  make  him  master  of  all  Greece,  as  far  as  that  object 
could  be  achieved  by  money,  provided  the  Samian  priuce  would  come 
over  to  convey  him  away.  Moeandrius,  secretary  of  Polykrates,  was 
sent  over  to  Magnesia  on  the  Maeander  to  make  inquiries.  He  there 
saw  the  satrap  with  eight  large  coffers  full  of  gold — or  rather  appar- 
ently so,  being  in  reality  full  of  stones,  with  a  layer  of  gold  at  the 
top — tied  up  ready  for  departure.  The  cupidity  of  Polykrates  was 
hot  proof  against  so  rich  a  bait.  He  crossed  over  to  Magnesia  with  a 
considerable  suite,  and  thus  came  into  the  power  of  Oreetes,  in  spite 
of  the  warnings  of  his  prophets  and  the  agony  of  his  terrified  daugh- 
ter, to  whom  his  approaching  fate  had  been  revealed  in  a  dream.  The 
satrap  slew  him  and  crucified  his  body;  releasing  all  the  Samians 
who  accompanied  him,  with  an  intimation  that  they  ought  to  thank 
him  for  procuring  them  a  free  government — but  retaining  both  the 
foreigners  and  the  slaves  as  prisoners.  The  death  of  Oreetes  himself, 
which  ensued  shortly  afterward,  has  already  been  described:  it  is 
considered  by  Herodotus  as  a  judgment  for  his  flagitious  deed  in  the 
case  of  Polykrates. 

At  the  departure  of  the  latter  from  Samos,  in  anticipation  of  a 
speedy  return,  Moeandrius  had  been  left  as  his  lieutenant  at  Samos; 
and  the  unexpected  catastrophe  of  Polykrates  filled  him  with  surprise 
and  consternation.  Though  possessed  of  the  fortresses,  the  soldiers, 
and  the  treasures,  which  had  constituted  the  machinery  of  his  power- 
ful master,  he  knew  the  risk  of  trying  to  employ  them  on  his  own 
account.  Partly  from  this  apprehension,  partly  from  the  genuine 
political  morality  which  prevailed  with,  more  or  less  force  in  every 
Grecian  bosom,  he  resolved  to  lay  down  his  authority  and  enfranchise 
the  island.  "  He  wished  (says  the  historian  in  a  remarkable  phrase) 
to  act  like  the  justest  of  men ;  but  he  was  not  allowed  to  do  so."  His 
first  proceeding  was  to  erect  in  the  suburbs  an  altar,  in  honor  of  Zeus 
Eleutherius,  and  to  inclose  a  piece  of  ground  as  precinct,  which  still 
existed  in  the  time  of  Herodotus;  he  next  convened  an  assembly  of  the 


140  GROWTH  OF  THE  PERSIAN   EMPIRE. 

Samians.  "You  know  (said  he)  that  the  whole  power  of  Polykrates 
la  now  in  my  hands,  and  that  there  is  nothing  to  hinder  me  from  con- 
tinuing to  rule  over  yon.  Nevertheless  what  I  condemn  in  another 
1  will  not  do  myself,  and  !  have  always  disapproved  of  Polykrates, 
and  others  like  him,  for  seeking  to  rule  over  men  as  good  as  them- 
selves. Now  that  Polykrates  has  come  to  the  end  of  his  destiny,  1  at 
once  lay  down  the  command,  and  proclaim  among  you  equal  law; 
resen  iug  to  myself  as  privileges,  first,  six  talents  out  of  the  treasures 
of  Polykrates — next,  the  hereditary  priesthood  of  Zeus  Eleutherius 
for  myself  and  my  descendants  forever.  To  him  I  have  just  Bet  apart 
a  sacred  precinct,  as  the  God  of  that  freedom  which  I  now  hand  over 
to  you." 

This  reasonable  and  generous  proposition  fully  justifies  the  epithet 
of  Herodotus.  But  very  differently  was  it  received  by  the  Samian 
hearers.  One  of  the  chief  men  among  them,  Telesarchus,  exclaimed 
with  the  applause  of  the  rest,  "  You  rule  us,  low-horn  and  scoundrel 
as  you  are!  you  are  not  worthy  to  ride:  don't  think  of  that,  but  give 
us  some  account  of  the  money  which  you  have  been  handling." 

Such  an  unexpecti  d  reply  caused  a  total  revolution  in  the  mind  of 
Mseandrius.  It  left  him  no  choice  but  to  maintain  dominion  at  all 
hazards,  which  lie  resolved  to  do.  Retiring  into  the  acropolis  under 
pretense  of  preparing  his  money  accounts  for  examination,  he  sent 
for  Telesarchus  and  his  chief  political  enemies,  one  by  one — intimat- 
ing that  the  accounts  were  open  to  inspection.  As  fast  as  they  arrived 
they  were  put  in  chains,  while  Mseandrius  remained  in  the  acropolis, 
with  his  soldiers  and  Lis  treasures,  as  the  avowed  successor*  f  Polyk- 
rates. After  a  short  hour  of  insane  boastfulness,  the  Samians  found 
themselves  again  en-laved.  "It  seemed  (says  Herodotus)  that  they 
were  not  willing  to  be  free." 

We  cannot  but  contrast  their  conduct  on  this  occasion  with  that  of 
the  Athenians  about  twelve  years  afterward,  on  the  expulsion  of 
Hippias,  which  has  been  recounted  in  a  previous  chapter.  The  posi- 
tion of  the  Samians  was  far  the  more  favorable  of  the  two,  for  the 
quiet  and  successful  working  of  a  free  government;  since  they  had 
the  advantage  of  a  voluntary  as  well  as  a  sincere  resignation  from  the 
actual  despot.  Yet  the  thirst  for  reactionary  investigation  prevent*  d 
them  even  from  taking  a  reasonable  estimate  of  their  own  power  of 
enforcing  it.  They  passed  at  once  from  extreme  subjection  to  over- 
bearing and  ruinous  rashness.  \\  hereas  the  Athenians,  under  circum- 
stances far  less  promising,  avoided  the  fatal  mistake  of  sacrificing  the 
prospects  of  the  future  to  recollections  of  the  past;  showed  them- 
selves both  anxious  to  acquire  the  rights,  and  willing  to  perform  the 
obligations,  of  a  free  community;  listened  to  wwe  counsels,  main- 
tained unanimous  ac  ton,  end  overcame  by  heroic  effort  forces  m  it 
greatly  superior.  If  we  compare  the  reflections  of  Herodotus  on  the 
aseand  on  the  other,  we  shall  he  struck  with  the  difference  which 
those  reflections  imply  between  the  Athenians  and  the  Samians — a 


SYLOSON  LANDS  IX   SAMOS.  141 

difference  partly  referable,  doubtless,  to  the  pure  Hellenism  of  the 
former,  contrasted  with  the  hali'-Asiatized  Hellenism  of  the  latter — 
hut  also  traceable  in  a  great  degree  to  the  preliminary  lessons  of  the 
Solouian  constitution,  overlaid,  but  not  extinguished,  during  the 
despotism  of  the  Peisistratids  which  followed. 

The  events  which  succeeded  in  Saints  are  little  better  than  a  series 
of  crimes  and  calamities.  The  prisoners,  whom  Maeandrius  had 
detained  in  the  acropolis,  were  slain  during  his  dangerous  illness,  by 
his  brother  Lykaretus,  under  the  idea  that  this  would  enable  him 
more  easily  to  seize  the  scepter.  But  Maeandrius  recovered,  and  must 
have  continued  as  despot  for  a  year  or  two.  It  was  however  a  weak 
despotism,  contested  more  or  less  in  the  island,  and  very  different 
from  the  iron  hand  of  Polykrates.  In  this  untoward  coudition  the 
Samians  were  surprised  by  the  arrival  of  a  new  claimant  for  their 
scepter  and  acropolis — and  what  was  much  more  formidable,  a  Per- 
sian army  to  back  him. 

Syloson,  the  brother  of  Polykrates,  having  taken  part  originally  in 
his  brother's  conspiracy  and  usurpation,  had  been  at  first  allowed  to 
share  the  fruits  of  it,  but  quickly  found  himself  banished.  In  thij 
exile  he  remained  during  the  whole  life  of  Polykrates,  and  until  the 
accession  of  Darius  to  the  Persian  throne,  which  followed  ahout  a 
year  after  the  death  of  Polykrates.  He  happened  to  be  at  Memphis 
in  Egypt  during  the  time  when  Kambyses  was  there  with  his  con- 
quering army,  and  when  Darius,  then  a  Persian  cf  little  note,  was 
serving  among  his  guards.  Syloson  was  walking  in  the  agora  of 
Memphis,  wearing  a  scarlet  cloak,  to  which  Darius  took  a  great  fancy, 
and  proposed  to  buy  it.  A  divine  inspiration  prompted  Syloson  to 
reply,  "  I  cannot  forany  price  sell  it ;  but  I  give  it  to  you  for  nothing:, 
if  it  must  be  yours."  Darius  thanked  him  and  accepted  the  cloak; 
and  for  some  years  the  donor  accused  himself  of  a  silly  piece  of  good 
nature.  But  as  events  came  round,  Syloson  at  length  heard  with  sur- 
prise that  the  unknown  Persian,  whom  he  had  presented  with  the 
cloak  at  Memphis,  was  installed  as  king  in  the  palace  at  Susa.  lie 
went  thither,  proclaimed  himself  as  a  "Greek,  the  benefactor  of  the 
new  king,  and  was  admitted  to  the  regal  presence.  Darius  had  for- 
gotten his  person,  but  perfectly  remembered  the  adventure  of  the 
cloak,  when  it  was  brought  to  his  mind — and  showed  himself  forward 
to  requite,  on  the  scale  becoming  the  Great  King,  former  favors, 
though  small,  rendered  to  the  simple  soldier  at  Memphis.  Gold  and 
silver  were  tendered  to  Syloson  in  profusion,  but  he  rejected  them — 
requesting  that  the  island  of  Samos  might  be  conquered  and  handed 
over  to  him,  without  slaughter  or  enslavement  of  inhabitants.  His 
request  was  complied  with.  (Manes,  the  originator  of  the  conspiracy 
against  Smerdis,  was  sent  down  to  the  coast  of  Ionia  with  an  army, 
carried  Syloson  over  to  Samos,  and  landed  him  unexpectedly  on  the 
island. 

Majandrius  was  in  no  condition  to  resist  the  invasion,  nor  were  thu 


142  GROWTH  OF  TTIE  PERSIAN   EMPIRE. 

Bamiana  generally  disposed  to  sustain  him,  Fie  accordingly  con 
eluded  a  convention  with  Otanes,  whereby  ho  agreed  to  make  way 
for  Byloson,  to  evacuate  the  island,  and  to  admit  the  Persians  at  (Mice 
into  the  city;  retaining  possession,  however,  for  such  time  as  might 
be  necessary  to  embark  his  property  and  treasures,  of  the  acropolis, 
which  had  a  separate  landing  place,  and  even  a  subterranean  |  assage 
and  secrel  portal  for  embarkation— probably  one  of  the  pn  cautionary 
provisions  of  Polykratea  Otanes  «  illingly  granted  these  com  lit  ions, 
and  himself  with  his  principal  officers  entered  the  town,  the  army 
quartered  around;  while  Syloson  seemed  on  the  point  of 
ascending  the  scat  of  his  deceasi  d  brother  without  violence  or  blood- 
shed. But  the  Bamians  were  destined  to  a  fate  more  calamitous, 
Mseandriua  had  a  brother  named  Charilaus,  violent  in  his  temper  and 
half  a  madman,  whom  he  was  obliged  to  keep  in  confinement.  This 
man.  looking  out  of  his  chamber-window,  saw  the  Persian  officers 
seated  peaceably  throughout  the  town  and  even  under  the  gates  of 
the  acropolis,  unguarded,  and  relying  upon  the  convention:  it  seems 
that  these  were  the  chief  officers  whose  rank  gave  them  the  privilege 
of  being  carried  about  on  their  seats.  The  sighl  inflamed  both  his 
wrath  and  his  insane  ambition.  He  clamored  for  liberty  and  admis- 
sion to  his  brother,  whom  he  reviled  as  a  coward  no  less  than  a 
tyrant.  "Here  are  you.  worthless  man,  keeping  me,  your  own 
brother,  in  a  dungeon,  though  I  have  done  no  wrong  worthy  of 
bonds;  while  you  do  not  dare  to  take  your  revenge  on  the  Persians, 
who  are  casting  you  out  as  a  houseless  exile,  and  whom  it  would  be 
so  easy  to  put  down.      If  you  are  afraid  of  them,  give  me  your  guards; 

I  will  make  the  Persians  repent  of  their  c ing  here,  and  I  will  send 

you  safely  out  of  the  island  forthwith." 

Maandrius.  on  the  point  of  quitting  Samoa  for  ever,  had  little  per- 
sonal motive  to  care  what  became  of  the  population.  He  had  prob- 
ably never  forgiven  them  for  disappointing  his  honorable  intentions 
after  the  death  of  Polykrates,  nor  was  he  displeased  to  hand  over 
to  Sylo-on  an  odious  and  blood-stained  scepter,  which  he  foresaw 
would  be  the  only  consequence  of  his  brother's  mad  project.  He 
therefore  sailed  away  with  his  treasures,  leaving  the  acropolis  to  bis 
brother  Charilaus;  who  immediately  armed  the  guards,  sallied  forth 
from  bis  fortress,  and  attacked  the  unsuspecting  Persians.  Many  of 
the  great  officers  were  slain  without  resistance  before  the  army  could 
be  got  together;  but  at  length  Otanes  collected  his  troops  and  drove 
tie-  assailants  back  into  the  acropolis  While  he  immediately  began 
th''  siege  of  that  fortress,  he  also  resolved,  as  Mseandriua  had  fore- 
seen, to  take  a  signal  revenge  for  the  treacherous  slaughter  of  so 
many  of  his  friends  and  companions.  His  army,  no  less  incensed 
than  himself,  were  directed  to  fall  upon  the  Samian  people  and 
'•  assacre  them  without  discrimination — man  and  boy,  on  srround 
si(  red  as  well  as  profane.  The  bloody  order  was  too  faithfully 
executed,  and  Samos  was  handed  over  to  Syloson,  stripped  of  its 


CONQUERING  DISPOSITION  OF  DARIUS.  143 

male  inhabitants.  Of  Charilaus  and  the  acropolis  we  hear  no  farther: 
perhaps  he  and  Ins  guards  may  have  escaped  by  sea.  Lykaretus,  the 
other  brother  of  Mseandrius,  must  have  remained  either  in  the  service 
of  Syloson  or  in  that  of  the  Persians;  for  we  iind  him  some  years 
afterward  intrusted  by  the  latter  with  an  important  command. 

Syloson  was  thus  finally  installed  as  despot  of  an  island  peopled 
chiefly,  if  not  wholly,  with  women  and  children:  we  may  however 
presume,  that  the  deed  of  blood  has  been  described  by  the  historian 
as  more  sweeping  than  it  really  was.  It  seems,  nevertheless,  to  have 
set  heavily  on  the  conscience  of  Otanes,  who  was  induced  some  time 
afterward,  by  a  dream  and  by  a  painful  disease,  to  take  measures  for 
repcopling  the  island.  From  wdience  the  new  population  came,  we 
are  not  told;  but  wholesale  translations  of  inhabitants  from  one  place 
to  another  were  familiar  to  the  mind  of  a  Persian  king  or  satrap. 

Maeandrius,  following  the  example  of  the  previous  Samian  exiles 
under  Polykrates,  wTent  to  Sparta  and  sought  aid  for  the  purpose  of 
re-establishing  himself  at  Samos.  But  the  Lacedasmonians  had  no 
disposition  to  repeat  an  attempt  which  had  before  turned  out  so 
unsuccessfully,  nor  could  he  seduce  king  Kleomenes  by  the  display 
of  his  treasures  and  finely  wrought  gold  plate.  The  king  however, 
not  without  fear  that  such  seductions  might  win  over  some  of  the 
Spartan  leading  men,  prevailed  with  the  ephors  to  send  Maeandrius 
away. 

Syloson  seems  to  have  remained  undisturbed  at  Samos,  as  a  tribu- 
tary of  Persia,  like  the  Ionic  cities  on  the  continent:  some  years 
afterward  we  find  his  son  ^Eakes  reigning  in  the  island.  Strabo 
states  that  it  was  the  harsh  rule  of  Syloson  which  caused  the 
depopulation  of  the  island.  But  the  cause  just  recounted  out  of 
Herodotus  is  both  very  different,  and  sufficiently  plausible  in  itself; 
and  as  Strabo  seems  in  the  main  to  have  derived  his  account  from 
Herodotus,  we  may  suppose  that  on  this  point  he  has  incorrectly 
remembered  his  authority. 


CHAPTER  XXXIV. 

DEMOKEDES. — DARIUS  INVADES  SCYTHIA. 

Darius  had  now  acquired  full  authority  throughout  the  Persian 
empire,  having  put  down  the  refractory  satrap  Orcetes,  as.  well  as 
the  revolted  Medes  and  Babylonians.  He  had  moreover  completed 
the  conquest  of  Ionia,  by  the  important  addition  of  Samos;  and  his 
dominion  thus  comprised  all  Asia  Minor  with  its  neighboring  islands. 
But  this  was  not  sufficient  for  the  ambition  of  a  Persian  king,  next 
but  one  in  succession  to  the  great  Cyrus.  The  conquering  impulse 
was  yet  unabated  among  the  Persians,  who  thought  it  incumbent 


U4       DEMOKEDES— DARIUS  INVADES  SOYTHIA. 

upon  their  king,  and  whose  king  thought  it  incumbent  upon  bin 
to  extend  the  limits  of  the  empire.  Though  doI  of  the  lineage  oi 
Cyrus,  Darius  bad  taken  pains  to  connect  himself  with  it  by  mar- 
riage: lie  had  married  Atossa  and  Artystone,  daughters  of  Cyrus- 
ana  Parmys,  daughter  of  Bmerdis,  the  younger  son  of  <  \  i  us.  Atossa 
had  been  first  the  wife  of  her  brother  Kambyses;  next,  of  the  Ma  man 
Smerdis,  bis  successor;  and  thirdly  of  Darin-,  to  whom  she  bore  tour 
children.  Of  those  children  the  eldesl  was  Xerxes,  respecting  whom 
more  will  be  said  hereafter. 

Atossa,  mother  of  the  only  Persian  king  who  ever  set  foot  in 
Greece— the  Sultana  Validi  ol'  Persia  during  the  reign  of  Xerxes- 
was  a  person  of  commanding  influence  in  the  reign  of  her  lasl 
husband,  as  well  as  in  thai  of  her  son,  and  filled  no  inconsiderable 
space  even  in  Grecian  imagination,  as  we  may  see  both  by  /Eschylus 
and  Herodotus.  Had  her  influence  prevailed,  the  first  conquering 
appetites  of  Darius  would  have  been  directed  not  against  the  Bteppes 
of  Scythia,  hut  against  Attica  and  Peloponnesus;  at  least  so  Herod- 
otus assures  us.  The  grand  ohject  of  thai  historian  is  to  set  forth 
the  contentions  of  Hellas  with  the  barbarians  or  non-Hellenic  world. 
Accordingly  with  an  art  truly  epical,  which  manifests  itself  every- 
where to  "the  careful  reader  of  his  nine  hooks,  he  preludes  to  the  real 
dangers  which  were  averl<  d  at  Marathon  and  Plataea  by  recounting 
the  first  conception  of  an  invasion  of  Greece  by  the  Persians — how 
it  originated  and  how  it  was  abandoned.  For  this  purpose — accord- 
ing to  his  historical  style,  win  rein  general  facts  are  set  forth  as  sub- 
ordinate and  explanatory  accompaniments  to  the  adventures  of 
particular  persons — he  gives  us  the  interesting,  but  romantic  history, 
of  the  Krotoniate  surgeon  Demokedes. 

Demokedes,  son  of  a  citizen  of  Kroton,  named  Kalliphon.  had 
turned  his  attention  in  early  youth  to  the  study  and  practice  of 
medicine  and  surgery  (for  that  age,  we  cm  make  no  difference  be- 
tween  the  two),  and  had  made  considerable  progress  in  it.  His 
youth  coincides  nearly  with  the  arrival  of  Pythagoras  at  Kroton 
(550-520);  a  time  when  the  science  of  the  surgeon  as  well  as  the  art 
of  the  gymnastic  trainer  were  prosecuted  in  that  city  more  actively 
than  in'anypart  of  Greece.  Kalliphon,  the  father  of  Demokedes, 
was  a  man  of  such  severe  temper,  that  the  son  ran  away  from  him 
and  resolved  to  maintain  himself  by  his  talents  elsewhere.  Retiring 
to  JSgina,  he  there  began  to  practice  In  his  profession.  So  rapid  was 
hi-  success  even  in  the  first  year — though  very  imperfectly  equipped 
with  instruments  and  apparatus — 1  hat  the  citizens  of  the  island  made 
a  contract  with  him  to  remain  there  for  one  year,  at  a  salary  of  one 
talent  (about  £383  sterling,  an  iEginajan  talent).  The  year  afterward 
lie  was  invited  to  come  to  Athens,  then  under  the  Peisistratid 
salary  of  100  mina  or  lj  talent;  and  in  the  following  year,  Polyk- 
rates  of  Samos  tempted  him  by  the  offer  of  two  talents.  With  that 
despot  he  remained,  and  accompanied  him  in  his  last  calamitou    \  i  ;' 


DEMOKEDES  CURES  DARIUS.  145 

to  the  satrap  Orcetes:  on  the  murder  of  Polykratcs,  being  seized 
among  the  slaves  and  foreign  attendants,  he  "was  left  to  languish 
with  the  rest  in  imprisonment  and  neglect.  When  again,  soon  after, 
Orcetes  himself  was  slain,  Demokedes  was  numbered  among  his 
slaves  and  chattels,  and  sent  up  to  Susa. 

He  had  not  been  long  at  that  capital,  when  Darius,  leaping  from 
his  horse  in  tlie  chase,  sprained  his  foot  badly,  and  was  carried  home 
in  violent  pain.  The  Egyptian  surgeons,  supposed  to  be  the  first 
men  in  their  profession  whom  he  habitually  employed,  did  him  no 
good,  but  only  aggravated  his  torture.  For  seven  days  and  nights 
he  had  no  sleep,  and  he  as  well  as  those  around  him  began  to  despair. 
At  length,  some  one  who  had  been  at  Sardis  accidentally  recollected 
that  he  had  heard  of  a  Greek  surgeon  among  the  slaves  of  Orcetes. 
Search  was  immediately  made,  and  the  miserable  slave  was  brought, 
in  chains  as  well  as  in  rags,  into  the  presence  of  the  royal  sufferer. 
Being  asked  whether  he  understood  surgery,  he  affected  ignorance; 
but  Darius,  suspecting  this  to  be  a  mere  artifice,  ordered  out  the 
scourge  and  the  pricking  instrument  to  overcome  it.  Demokedes 
now  saw  that  there  was  no  resource,  admitted  that  he  had  acquired 
some  little  skill,  and  was  called  upon  to  do  his  utmost  in  the  case 
before  him.  He  was  fortunate  enough  to  succeed  perfectly,  in 
alleviating  the  pain,  in  procuring  sleep  for  the  exhausted  patient, 
and  ultimately  in  restoring  the  foot  to  a  sound  state.  Darius,  who 
had  abandoned  all  hopes  of  such  a  cure,  knew  no  bounds  to  his 
gratitude.  As  a  first  reward,  he  presented  him  with  two  sets  of 
chains  in  solid  gold — a  commemoration  of  the  state  in  which  Demo- 
kedes had  first  come  before  him.  He  next  sent  him  into  the  harem 
to  visit  his  wives.  The  conducting  eunuchs  introduced  him  as  the 
man  who  had  restored  the  king  to  life,  upon  which  the  grateful 
sultanas  each  gave  to  him  a  saucer  full  of  golden  coins  calledstaters; 
in  all  so  numerous,  that  the  slave  Skiton,  who  followed  him,  was 
enriched  b}-  merely  picking  up  the  pieces  which  dropped  on  the 
floor.  This  was  not  all.  Darius  gave  him  a  splendid  house  and 
furniture,  made  him  the  companion  of  his  table,  and  showed  him 
every  description  of  favor.  He  was  about  to  crucify  the  Egyptian 
surgeons  who  had  been  so'  unsuccessful  in  their  attempts  to  cure 
him.  But  Demokedes  had  the  happiness  of  preserving  their  lives, 
as  well  as  of  rescuing  an  unfortunate  companion  of  his  imprison- 
ment— an  Eleian  prophet,  who  had  followed  the  fortunes  of  Polyk- 
rates. 

But  there  was  one  favor  which  Darius  would  on  no  account  grant; 
yet  upon  this  one  Demokedes  had  set  his  heart — the  liberty  of  return- 
ing to  Greece.  At  length  accident,  combined  with  his  own  surgical 
skill,  enabled  him  to  escape  from  the  splendor  of  his  second  deten- 
tion, as  it  had  before  extricated  him  from  the  misery  of  the  first.  A 
tumor  formed  upon  the  breast  of  Atossa:  at  first  she  said  nothing  to 
any  one,  but  it  became  too  bad  for  concealment,  and  she  was  forced 


146       DEMOKEDES— DARIUS  INVADES  SCYTHIA. 

to  consult  Demokedes.  He  promised  to  cure  her,  but  required  from 
her  a  solemn  oath  that  Bhe  would  afterward  do  for  him  anything 
which  he  Bhould  ash — pledging  himself  at  the  .sane  time  to  ask  noth- 
ing indecent.  The  cure  was  successful,  and  Atossa  was  required  i>. 
repay  it  by  procuring  Ids  liberty.  Knowing  thai  the  favor  would  b< 
refused,  even  to  her.  if  directly  solicited,  he  taught  her  a  stratagi  m 
for  obtaining  under  false  pretenses  the  consent  of  Darius.  She  t<  ok 
an  early  opportunity  (Herodotus  tells  us,  in  bed)  of  reminding  Darius 
that  the  Persians  expected  from  him  seme  positive  addition  to  the 
power  and  splendor  of  the  empire;  and  when  Darius,  in  answer, 
acquainted  her  that  he  contemplated  a  speedy  expedition  againal  the 
Scythians,  she  entreated  him  to  postpone  it  and  to  turn  hiG  for* 
against  Grccei — "  I  have  heard  (>\if  .-aid)  about  the  maid*  as  of  Sparta, 
Athens,  Argos,  and  Corinth,  and  I  want  to  have  some  of  them  as 
slaves  to  serve  me — (we  may  conceive  the  smile  of  triumph  with 
which  the  sons  of  those  who  had  conquered  at  Platsea  and  Salamis 
-would  hear  this  part  of  the  history  read  by  Herodotus) — you  have 
near  you  the  best  person  possible  to  give  information  about  Greece — 
that  Greek  who  cured  your  foot."  Darius  was  induced  by  this 
request  to  send  some  confidential  Persians  into  Greece  to  procure 
information,  along  with  Demokedes.  Selecting  fifteen  of  them,  he 
ordered  them  to  survey  the  coasts  and  cities  of  Greece,  under  guid- 
ance of  Demokedes,  but  with  peremptory  orders  upon  no  account  to 
let  him  escape  or  to  return  without  him.  He  next  sent  lor  Demo- 
kedes himself,  explained  to  him  what  he  wanted,  and  enjoined  him 
imperatively  to  return  as  soon  as  the  business  had  been  completed. 
He  farther  desired  him  to  carry  away  all  the  ample  donations  which 
he  had  already  received,  as  presents  to  his  father  and  brothers,  prom- 
ising that  on  his  return  fresh  donations  of  equal  value  should  make 
up  the  loss.  Lastly,  he  directed  that  a  store-ship,  "filled  with  all 
manner  of  good  thin-.-,"  should  accompany  the  voyage.  Demokedes 
undertook  the  mission  with  every  appearance  of  sincerity.  The  betti  r 
to  play  his  part,  he  declined  to  take  away  what  he  already  po 
.1:  Susa — saying  that  he  should  like  to  find  his  property  and  furniture 
Mu  cdining  back,  and  that  the  store  .-hip  alone,  with  its  con- 
would  be  sufficient  both  for  the  voyage,  and  for  all  neo 

tits. 

Ac<  ordingly  he  and  the  fifteen  Persian  envoys  went  down  to  Sidon 
in  Phenicia,  when-  two  armed  triremes  were  equipped^  with  a  large 
□     impany.     The  voyage  of  survey  into  Greece  was  corn- 
ed.   They  \  isited  and  examined  all  the  principal  places  in  ( 
—  probably  beginning  with  the  Asiatic  and  insular  Greeks,  en 
to  Eubcea,  circumnavigating  Attica  and  Peloponnesus,  then  passing 
to  Korkyra  and  Italy.     They  surveyed  the  coasts  and  cities, 
memoranda  of  everything  worthy  of  note  which  they  saw.     £ 
Periplus,  if  it  had  been  preserved,  would  have  been inestimal 
an  account  of  the  actual  slate  of  the  Grecian  world  about  518  B.C. 


VOYAGE  OF  DEMOKEDES  ALONG  THE  COAST.  147 

As  soon  as  they  arrived  at  Tarenturn,  Demokedes — now  within  a 
short  distance  of  his  own  home,  Kroton — found  an  opportunity  of 
executing  what  he  had  meditated  from  the  beginning.  At  his  request, 
Aristophilides,  the  king  of  Tarenturn,  seized  the  fifteen  Persians  and 
detained  them  as  spies,  at  the  same  time  taking  the  rudders  from  off 
their  ships — while  Demokedes  himself  made  his  escape  to  Kroton. 
As  soon  as  he  had  arrived  there,  Aristophilides  released  the  Persians; 
who,  pursuing  their  voyage,  went  on  to  Kroton,  found  Demokedes 
in  the  market-place,  and  laid  hands  upon  him.  But  his  fellow-citi- 
zens rescued  him,  not  without  opposition  from  some  who  were  afraid 
of  provoking  the  Great  King — and  in  spite  of  remonstrances,  ener- 
getic and  menacing,  from  the  Persians  themselves.  Indeed  the  Kro- 
toniates  not  only  protected  the  restored  exile,  but  even  robbed  the 
Persians  of  their  store-ship.  The  latter,  disabled  from  proceeding 
farther  as  well  by  this  loss  as  by  the  secession  of  Demokedes,  com- 
menced their  voyage  homeward,  but  unfortunately  suffered  shipwreck 
near  the  Iapygian  cape,  and  became  slaves  in  that  neighborhood. 
A  Tarentine  exile,  named  Gillus,  ransomed  them  and  carried  them 
up  to  Susa — a  service  for  which  Darius  promised  him  any  recompense 
that  he  chose.  Restoration  to  his  native  citjr  was  ad  chat  Gillus 
asked;  and  that  too,  not  by  force,  but  by  the  mediation  of  the  Asiatic 
Greeks  of  Knidus,  who  were  on  terms  of  intimate  alliance  with  the 
Tarentines.  This  generous  citizen — an  honorable  contrast  to  Demo- 
kedes, who  had  not  scrupled  to  impel  the  stream  of  Persian  conquest 
against  his  country  in  order  to  procure  his  own  release — was  unfor- 
tunately disappointed  of  his  anticipated  recompense.  For  though  the 
Kuidians,  at  the  injunction  of  Darius,  employed  all  their  influence  at 
Tarenturn  to  procure  a  revocation  of  the  sentence  of  exile,  they  were 
unable  to  succeed,  and  force  was  out  of  the  question.  The  last  words 
addressed  by  Demokedes  at  parting  to  his  Persian  companions, 
exhorted  them  to  acquaint  Darius  that  he  (Demokedes)  was  about  to 
marry  the  daughter  of  the  Krotoniate  Milo — one  of  the  first  men  in 
Kroton,  as  well  as  the  greatest  wrestler  of  his  time.  The  reputation 
of  Milo  was  very  great  with  Darius — probably  from  the  talk  of 
Demokedes  himself:  moreover,  gigantic  muscular  force  could  be 
appreciated  by  men  who  had  no  relish  either  for  Homer  or  I 
And  thus  did  this  clever  and  vain-glorious  Greek,  sending  back  his 
fifteen  Persian  companions  to  disgrace  and  perhaps  to  death,  deposit 
in  their  parting  ears  a  braggart  message  calculated  to  create  for  him- 
self a  factitious  name  at  Susa.  He  paid  aJarge  sum  to  Milo  as  the 
price  of  his  daughter,  for  this  very  purpose. 

Thus  finishes  the  history  of  Demokedes,  and  of  the  "first  Persians 
(to  use  the  phrase  of  Herodotus)  who  ever  came  over  from  Asia  into 
Greece."  It  is  a  history  well  deserving  of  attention,  even  looking 
only  to  the  liveliness  of  the  incidents,  introducing  us  as  they  do  into 
the  full  movement  of  the  ancient  world — incidents  which  I  see  no 
reason  for  doubting,  with  a  reasonable  allowance  for  the  dramatic 


148        fcEMOEBBES     DARIUS    1WAPKS   SCYTHIA. 

amplification  of  the  historian.  Even  at  thai  esrly  date,  Greek  medical 
intelligence  stands  onl  in  a  surpassing  marmeT,  and  Demokedee  is  the 
firsl  01  those  many  able  Creek  snrgeons  who  were  seized,  carried 
up  to  Susa,  anil  there  detained  for  the  Great  King,  his  court,  and 
harem. 

Bui  his  history  suggests  in  another  point  of  view  far  more  serious 
reflections.  Like  the  Milesian  Histiseus  (of  whom  I  shall  speak  here- 
after), he  cared  nol  whal  amount  of  risk  he  broughl  upon  his  country 
in  order  to  procure  his  own  escape  from  a  splendid  detention  at  Susa. 
.Now  the  influence  which  he  originated  was  on  the  point  of  precipi- 
tating upon  Greece  the  whole  force  of  the  Persian  empire,  at  a  time 
when  Greece  was  in  do  condition  to  resist  it.  Had  the  lirst  aggressive 
expedition  of  Darius,  with  his  own  personal  command  and  fresh 
appetite  for  conquest,  been  directed  againsl  Greece  instead  of  againsl 
Scythia  (between  51fr-514  e.g.),  Grecian  independence  would  have 
perished  almost  infallibly.  For  Athens  was  then  still  governed  by 
the  l'eis'istralids.  Whal  she  was  under  them,  we  have  had  occasion 
to  notice  in  a  former  chapter.  She  had  then  no  courage  for  energetic 
self-defense,  and  probably  llippias  himself,  far  from  offering  resist- 
ance,  would  have  found  it  advantageous  to  accept  Persian  dominion 
as  a  means  of  strengthening  his  own  rule,  like  the  Ionian  despots. 
Moreover,  Grecian  habit  of  co-operation  was  tlnn  only  just  com- 
mencing. But  fortunately  the  Persian  invader  did  not  touch  the 
Bhore  of  Greece  until  more  than  twenty  years  afterward,  in  400  b.c.  ; 
and  during  that  precious  interval,  the  Athenian  character  had  under- 
gone the  memorable  revolution  which  has  been  before  described. 
Their  energy  and  their  organization  had  been  alike  improved,  and 
their  f  rce  of  resistance  had  become  decupled;  besides  which,  their 
conduct  had  so  provoked  the  Persian  that  resistance  w as  then  a  mat- 
ter of  necessity  with  them,  and  submission  on  tolerable  terms  an 
impossibility.  When  we  come  to  the  grand  Persian  invasion  of 
Greece,  we  shall  sec  that  Athi  hs  was  the  life  and  soul  of  all  the  oppo- 
sition offered.  We  shall  see  farther,  that  with  all  the  efforts  of 
:  •■!'  tin'  di  fense*was  more  than  once  doubtful;  and 

Would  have  been  converted  into  a  very  different  result,  if  Xerxes  had 
1  to  the  best  of  his  own  counselors.     But  had  Darius — at  the 
f   the  very  same  force  which  he  conducted  into  Scythia,   or 
.  :\  inferior  forc< — landed  at   Marathon  in  514   B.C.,  instead  of 
:    Datis  in  490  B.C.,  he  would  have  found  no  men  like  the  vic- 
of   Marathon   to  meet  him.      As   far  as  we  can  appreciate  the 
probabilities,  he  would  have  met  with  little  resistance  except  from 
irians  singly,   who  would   have  maintained   their  own   very 
ible  territi  I  all  his  efforts,  like  the  Mysfans  and  Pisi- 

in  Asia  Minor,  or  like  the  Mainots  of  Laconia  in'Iater  days;  but 
••ally  wow  ;  a  Persian  satrapy.     Fortunately, 

Darius,  \  l.'l"  benl  on  invading  some  country,  had  set  his  mind  on 
the  attack  of  Scythia,  alike  perilous  and  unprofitable.     His  personal 


DARIUS  MARCHES   AGAINST   SCYTIIIA.  149 

ardor  was  wasted  on  those  unconquerable  regions,  where  lie  narrowly- 
escaped  the  disastrous  fate  of  Cyrus — nor  did  he  ever  pay  a  second 
visit  to  the  coasts  of  the  ^Egean.  Yet  the  amorous  influences  of 
Atossa,  set  at  work  by  Demokedes,  might  well  have  been  sufficiently 
powerful  to  induce  Darius  to  assail  Greece  instead  of  Scythia — a 
choice  in  favor  of  which  all  other  recommendations  concurred;  and 
the  history  of  free  Greece  would  then  probably  h  ve  stopped  at  this 
point,  without  unrolling  any  of  the  glories  which  followed.  So 
incalculably  great  has  been  the  influence  of  Grecian  development, 
during  the  two  centuries  between  0OO-8OO  B.C.,  on  the  destinies  of 
mankind,  that  we  cannot  pass  without  notice  a  contingency  which 
threatened  to  arrest  that  development  in  the  bud.  Indeed,  it  may 
be  remarked  that  the  history  of  any  nation,  considered  as  a  sequence 
of  causes  and  effects  affording  applicable  knowledge,  requires  us 
to  study  not  merely  real  events,  but  also  imminent  contingencies — 
events  which  were  on  the  point  of  occurring,  but  yet  did  not  occur. 
When  we  read  the  wailings  of  Atossa  in  the  Persae  of  ^Eschylus,  for 
the  humiliation  which  her  son  Xerxes  had  just  undergone  in  his  flight 
from  Greece,  we  do  not  easily  persuade  ourselves  to  reverse  the  pic- 
ture, and  to  conceive  the  same  Atossa  twenty  years  earlier,  number- 
ing as  her  slaves  at  Susa  the  noblest  Herakleid  and  Alkmaeonid 
maidens  from  Greece.  Yet  the  picture  would  really  have  been  thus 
reversed — the  wish  of  Atossa  would  have  been  fulfilled  and  the  wail- 
ings would  have  been  heard  from  enslaved  Greek  maidens  in  Persia 
— if  the  mind  of  Darius  had  not  happened  to  be  preoccupied  with  a 
project  not  less  insane  even  than  those  of  Kambyses  against  Ethiopia 
and  the  Lybian  desert.  Such,  at  least,  is  the  moral  of  the  story  of 
Demokedes. 

That  insane  expedition  across  the  Danube  into  Scythia  comes  now 
to  be  recounted.  It  was  undertaken  by  Darius  for  the  purpose  of 
avenging  the  inroad  and  devastation  of  the  Scythians  in  Media  and 
Upper  Asia,  about  a  century  before.  The  lust  of  conquest  imparted 
unusual  force  to  this  sentiment  of  wounded  dignity,  which  in  the 
case  of  the  Scythians  could  hardly  be  connected  with  any  expectation 
of  plunder  or  profit.  In  spite  of  the  dissuading  admonition  of  his 
brother  Artabanus,  Darius  summoned  the  whole  force  of  his  empire, 
army  and  navy,  to  the  Thracian  Eosphoms— a  force  not  less  than  700.000 
horse  and  foot  and  600  ships,  according  to  Herodotus.  On  these  pro- 
digious numbers  we  can  lay  no  stress.  "  Rut  it  appears  that  the  names 
of  all  the  various  nations  composing  the  iWSst  were  inscribed  on  two 
pillars,  erected  by  order  of  Darius  on  the  European  side  of  the  Ros- 
phorus,  and  afterward  seen  by  Herodotus  himself  in  the  city  of 
Ryzantium — the  inscriptions  were  bilingual,  in  Assyrian  characters 
as  well  as  Greek.  The  Samian  architect  Mandrokles  had  been  directed 
to  throw  a  bridge  of  boats  across  the  Rosphorus,  about  half-way 
between  Ryzantium  and  the  mouth  of  the  Euxine.  So  peremptory 
were  the  Persian  kings  that  their  orders  for  military  service  should 


150       DEMOKEDES— DAPJVS  INVADES  SCYTHIA. 

he  punctually  obeyed,  and  so  impatient  were  they  of  the  idea  of 
exemptions,  that  when  a  Persian  father  named  (Eohazus  entreated 
that  one  of  his  three  sons,  all  included  in  the  conscription,  might  be 

left  at  home,  Darius  replied  thai  all  three  of  them  should  In- 
left  at  tic mi — an  answerwhich  the  unsuspecting  father  heard  with 

delight.      They  were  indeed  all  left  at  homi — for  they  were  all  1'iit  to 

(1,  ath.  A  proceeding  similar  to  thi^  is  ascribed  afterward  to  Xerxes; 
whether  true  or  not  as  matters  of  fact,  they  illustrate  the  wrathful 
displeasure  with  which  the  Persian  kings  were  known  to  receive  su<  b 

petitions  tor  exemption. 

The  naval  force  of  Darius  seems  to  have  consisted  entirely  of  sub- 
ject Greeks,  Asiatic  and  insular;  for  the  Phenician  fleet  was  not 
brought  into  the  .ZBgean  until  the  subsequent  Ionic  revolt.  At  thia 
time  all  or  most  of  the  Asiatic  Greek  cities  were  under  despots,  who 
leaned  on  the  Persian  government  for  support,  and  who  appeared 
with  their  respective  contingents  to  take  part  in  the  Scythian  e\  peti- 
tion. Of  Ionic  Greeks  were  seen — Strattis,  despot  of  Chios;  JEakes, 
son  of  Syloson,  despot  of  Samos;  Laodamas,  of  Phokaja:  and  lli-- 
tiaeus,  of  Miletus.  From  the  ^Eolic  towns.  Aristagoras  of  Kyme; 
from  the  Hellespontine  Greeks,  Daphnis  of  Abydus,  Hippoklue  of 
Lampsakus,  ITerophanlus  of  Parium,  Metrodorus  of  Prokonnesus, 
Aristagoras  of  Kyzikus,  and  Miltiades  of  the  Thracian  Chersonese — 
all  these  are  mentioned,  and  there  were  probably  more.  This  large 
fleet,  assembled  at  the  Bosphorus,  was  sent  forward  into  the  Enxine 
to  the  mouth  of  the  Danube — with  orders  to  sail  up  the  river  two 
days'  journey,  above  the  point  where  its  channel  begins  to  divide, 
and  to  throw  a  bridge  of  boats  over  it.  Darius,  having  liberally 
recompensed  the  architect  Mandrokles,  crossed  the  bridge  over  the 
Bosphorus,  and  began  his  march  through  Thrace,  receiving  the  sub- 
mission of  various  Thracian  tribes  in  his  way,  and  subduing  others — 
especially  the  Getre  north  of  Mount  Hsemus,  who  were  compelled  to 
increase  still  farther  the  numbers  of  his  vast  army.  On  arriving  at 
the  Danube,  he  found  the  bridge  finished  and  prepared  forhii 
sage  by  the  [onians.  We  may  remark,  here  as  on  so  many  other 
occasions,  thai  all  operations  requiring  intelligence  are  perform i  d  for 
the  Persians  either  by  Greeks  or  by  Phenicians — more  usually  by  Ihe 
former.  He  crossed  this  greatest  of  all  earthly  rivers — for  so  the 
Danube  was  imagined  to  be  in  the  fifth  century  B.C. — and  directed 
his  march  into  Scvthia. 

As  far  as  the  point  now  attained,  our  narrative  runs  smoothly  ami 
intelligibly:  we  know  that  Darius  marched  his  army  into  Scythia.  and 
thai  he  came  back  with  ignominy  and  severe  loss.  But  as  to  all 
which  happened  between  his  crossing  and  recrossing  the  Danube,  we 
find  nothing  approaching  to  authentic  statement,  nor  even  what  we 
can  set  forth  as  the  probable  basis  of  truth  on  which  exaggerating 
fancy  has  been  at  work — all  is  inexplicable  mystery.  Ktesias  indeed 
says  that  Darius  marched  for  fifteen  days  into  the  Scythian  territory — . 


DARIUS  MARCHES  INTO   SCYTHIA.  151 

that  he  then  exchanged  bows  with  the  king  of  Scythia  and  discovered 
the  Scythian  bow  to  be  the  largest— and  that  being  intimidated  by 
such  discovery,  he  fled  back  to  the  bridge  by  which  he  had  crossed 
the  Danube,  and  recrossed  the  river  with  the  loss  of  one-tenth  part  of 
his  army,  being  compelled  to  break  down  the  bridge  before  all  had 
passed.  The  length  of  march  is  here  the  only  thing  distinctly  stated; 
about  the  direction  nothing  is  said;  but  the  narrative  of  Ktesias, 
defective  as  it  is,  is  much  less  perplexing  than  that  of  Herodotus, 
who  conducts  the  immense  host  of  Darius  as  it  were  through  fairy- 
land— heedless  of  distance,  large  intervening  rivers,  want  of  all  culti- 
vation or  supplies,  destruction  of  the  country  (in  so  far  as  it  could  be 
destroyed)  by  the  retreating  Scythians,  etc.  He  tells  us  that  the 
Persian  army  consisted  chiefly  of  foot — that  there  were  no  roads  nor 
agriculture;  yet  his  narrative  carries  it  over  about  twelve  degrees  of 
longitude  from  the  Dauube  to  the  country  east  of  the  Tanais,  across 
the  rivers  Tyras  (Dniester),  Hypanis  (Bog),  Borysthenes  (Dnieper), 
Hypakyris,  Gerrhos,  aud  Tanais.  How  these  rivers  could  have  been 
passed  in  the  face  of  enemies  by  so  vast  a  host,  we  are  left  to  conjec- 
ture, since  it  was  not  winter-time  to  convert  them  into  ice:  nor  does 
the  historian  even  allude  to  them  as  having  been  crossed  either  in 
the  advance  or  in  the  retreat.  What  is  not  less  remarkable,  is,  that 
in  respect  to  the  Greek  settlement  of  Olbia  or  Borysthenes,  aud  the 
agricultural  Scythians  and  Mix-hellenes  between  the  Hypanis  and  the 
Borysthenes,  across  whose  country  it,  would  seem  that  this  march  of 
Darius  must  have  carried  him — Herodotus  does  not  say  anything; 
though  we  should  have  expected  that  he  would  have  had  better 
means  of  informing  himself  about  this  part  of  the  march  than  about 
any  other,  and  though  the  Persian?  could  hardly  have  failed  to  plun- 
der or  put  in  requisition  this,  the  only  productive  portion  of  Scythia. 
The  narrative  of  Herodotus  in  regard  to  the  Persian  march  north 
of  the  Isler  seems  indeed  destitute  of  all  the  conditions  of  reality.  It 
is  rather  an  imaginative  description,  illustrating  the  desperate  and 
impracticable  character  of  Scythian  warfare,  and  grouping  in  the 
same  picture,  according  to  that  large  sweep  of  the  imagination  which 
is  admissible  in  epical  treatment,  the  Scythians  with  all  their  barbar- 
ous neighbors  from  the  Carpathian  mountains  to  the  river  Wolga. 
The  Agathyrsi,  the  Neuri,  the  Androphagi,  the  Melanchlaeni,  the 
Budini,  the  Geloni,  the  Sarmatians,  and  the  Tauri — all  of  them  bor- 
dering on  that  vast  quadrangular  area  of  4,000  stadia  for  each  side, 
called  Scythia,  as  Herodotus  conceives  it — are  brought  into  delibera- 
tion and  action  in  consequence  of  the  Persian  approach.  And  Herod- 
otus takes  that  opportunity  of  communicating  valuable  particulars 
respecting  the  habits  and  manners  of  each.  The  kings  of  these 
nations  discuss  whether  Darius  is  justified  in  his  invasion,  and 
whether  it  be  prudent  in  them  to  aid  the  Scythians.  The  latter  ques- 
tion is  decided  in  the  affirmative  by  the  Sarmatians,  the  Budini,  and 
the  Geloni,  all  eastward  of  the  Tanais — in  the  negative  by  the  rest. 


[52       DEMOKEDES— DARIUS  INVADES  BCYTHTA. 

-i  j ihi.in-.  removing  their  wagons  with  i li<ir  wives  and  children 
oiii  of  the  way  northward,  retreat  and  draw  Darius  after  them  from 
the  Danube  all  across  Scythia  and  Sarmatia  to  the  north-eastern 
mitj  of  the  territory  of  the  liudini,  several  days'  journey  east 
ward  of  the  Tanais.  Moreovi  r  they  destroy  the  wells  and  ruin  tin; 
herbage  as  much  as  they  can,  80  thai  during  all  this  long  march  (-ays 
Herodotus)  the  Persians  "found  nothing  to  damage,  inasmuch  as 
the  country  was  barren."  \\  e  can  hardly  understand  therefore  what 
iin  ,  found  to  live  upon.  It  is  in  the  territory  of  the  Budini,  at  this 
easternmost  terminus  on  the  borders  of  the  desert,  that  the  Persians 
perform  the  duly  positive  acts  which  are  ascribed  to  them  throughout 
the  whole  expedition.  They  burn  the  wooden  wall  before  occupied, 
but   now  descrnd,  by  the  (.eloni;  and  they  build,  or  begin  to  build. 

large  fortresses  near  the  river  Oarus.  For  what  purposes  thi  so 
fortresses  could  have  been  intended  Herodotus  gives  no  intimation , 
but  he  .-ays  that  the  unfinished  work  was  yet  to  be  seen  even  in  bis 
day. 

Having  thus  been  carried  all  across  Scythia  and  the  other  territo- 
ries above-mentioned  in  a  north  easterly  direction,  Darius  and  his 
army  are  next  inarched  back  a  prodigious  distance  in  a  north-westerly 
direction,  through  the  territories  of  the Melanchlseni,  the  AndropLagi. 
and  the  Neuri,  all  of  whom  flee  affrighted  into  the  northern  desert, 
having  been  thus  compelled  against  their  will  to  share  in  the  eon 
sequences  of  the  war.  The  Agathyrsi  peremptorily  require  the 
Scythians  to  abstain  from  drawing  the  Persians  into  their  territory  on 
pain  of  being  themselves  treated  as  enemies.  Accordingly  the 
Scythians,  avoiding  the  boundaries  of  the  Agathyrsi.  direct  their 
retreat  in  such  a  manner  as  to  draw  the  Persians  again  southward 
into  Scythia.  During  all  this  long  march  backward  and  forward, 
there  are  partial  skirmishes  and  combats  of  horse,  but  the  Scythians 
steadily  refuse  any  general  engagement.  And  though  Darius  chal- 
]■  ages  them  formally  by  means  of  a  herald,  with  taunts  of  cowardice, 
the  Scythian  king  Idanthyrsus  not  only  refuses  battle,  but  explains 
and  defends  his  policy,  and  defies  the  Persian  to  come  and  destroy 
the  tombs  of  their  fathers — it  will  then  (he  adds)  be  seen  whether  the 
Scythians  are  cowards  or  not.  The  difficulties  of  Darius  have  by 
this  time  become  serious,  when  Idar.tln  reus  sends  to  him  the  menac- 
ing presents  of  a  bird,  a  mouse,  a  frog,  and  five  arrows:  the  Persians 
I  to  commence  a  rapid  retreat  toward  the  Danube,  leaving, 

er  to  ch(  ck  and  slacken  the  Scythian  pursuit,  the  least  effective 
and  the  sick  part  of  their  army  encamped,  together  with  the  asses  which 
bad  been  brought  with  them — animals  unknown  to  the  Scythians, 
and  ca  at  alarm  by  their  braying.     However,  notwithstand- 

me  d<  lay  thus  caused,  as  well  as  the  anxious  haste  of  Darius  to 

.  die  Danube,  the  Scythians,  far  more  rapid  in  their  movements, 

arrive  at  the  river  before  him,  and  open  a  negotiation  with   the 

Ioniaus  left  in  guard  of  the  bridge,  urging  them  to  break  it  down  ivnd 


IMPRESSION  PRODUCED  UPON  HERODOTUS.     153 

leave  the  Persian  king  to  his  fate — inevitable  destruction  with  his 
whole  arm)'. 

Here  we  re-enter  the  world  of  reality,  at  the  north  bank  of  the 
Danube,  the  place  where  we  before  quitted  it.  All  that  is  reported 
to  liave  passed  in  the  interval,  if  tried  by  the  tests  of  historical  mat- 
ter of  fact,  can  be  received  as  nothing  better  than  a  perplexing 
dream.  It  only  acquires  value  when  we  consider  it  as  an  illustrative  fic- 
tion, including,  doubtless,  some  unknown  matter  of  fact,  but  framed 
chiefly  to  exhibit  In  action  those  unattackable  Nomads  who  formed 
the  north-eastern  barbarous  world  of  a  Greek,  and  with  whose  manners 
Herodotus  was  profoundly  struck.  "The  Scythians  (says  he),  in 
regard  to  one  of  the  greatest  of  human  matters,  have  struck  out  a 
plan  cleverer  than  any  that  I  know.  Iu  other  respects  I  do  not 
admire  them;  but  they  have  contrived  this  great  object,  that  no 
invader  of  their  country  shall  ever  escape  out  of  it,  or  shall  ever  be 
able  to  find  out  aud  overtake  them,  unless  they  themselves  choose. 
For  when  meu  have  neither  walls  nor  established  cities,  but  are  all 
house-carriers  and  horse-bowmen — living,  not  from  the  plow,  but 
from  cattle,  and  having  their  dwellings  on  wagons — how  can  they 
be  otherwise  than  unattackable  and  impracticable  to  meddle  with?'' 
The  protracted  and  unavailing  chase  ascribed  to  Darius — who  can 
neither  overtake  his  game  nor  use  his  arms,  *nnd  who  hardly  even 
escapes  iu  safety — embodies  in  detail  this  formidable  attribute  of  the 
Scythian  Nomads.  That  Darius  actually  marched  into  the  country, 
there  can  be  no  doubt.  Nothing  else  is  certain,  except  his  ignomini- 
ous retreat  out  of  it  to  the  Danube;  for  of  the  many  different  guesses, 
by  which  critics  have  attempted  to  cut  down  the  gigantic  sketch  of 
Herodotus  into  a  march  with  definite  limits  and  direction,  not  one 
rests  upon  any  positive  grounds.  We  can  trace  the  pervading  idea 
in  the  mind  of  the  historian,  but  cannot  find  out  what  were  his  sub- 
stantive data. 

The  adventures  which  took  place  at  the  passage  of  that  river,  both 
on  the  out-march  and  the  home-march,  wherein  the  Ionians  are  con- 
cerned, are  far  more  within  the  limits  of  history.  Here  Herodotus 
possessed  better  means  of  information,  and  had  less  of  a  dominant 
idea  to  illustrate.  That  which  passed  between  Darius  and  the  Ionians 
mi  his  first  crossing  is  very  curious:  I  have  reserved  it  until  the  pres 
ent  moment,  because  it  is  particularly  connected  with  the  incidents 
which  happened  on  his  return. 

On  reaching  the  Danube  from  Thrace,  he  found  the  bridge  of  boats 
ready;  and  when  the  whole  army  had  passed  over,  he  ordered  the 
Ionians  to  break  it  down,  as  well  as  to  follow  him  in  his  land-march 
into  Scythia,  the  ships  being  left  with  nothing  but  the  rowers  and 
seamen  essential  to  navigate  them  homeward.  His  order  was  on 
the  point  of  being  executed,  when,  fortunately  for  him,  the  Mity- 
lensean  general  Koes  ventured  to  call  in  question  the  prudence 
of  it,  having  first  asked  whether  it  was  the  pleasure  of  the  Persian 


154       DEMOKEDES— DARIUS  INVADES  BCYTHIA. 

king  to  listen  to  advice.  Koes  urged  that  tlie  march  on  which  they 
were  proceeding  mij  lit  prove  peril  >us,  and  retreat  possibly  unavoid 
able; because  the  Scythians,  though  certain  to  be  defeated  if  brou<  lit 
to  action,  might  perhaps  not  suffer  themselves  to  1"-  approached  or 

discovered.     Asa  precaution   against  all  contingencies,  it  was 
prudent  to  leave  the  bridge  standing  and  watched  by  those  who  had 

meted  it.  Far  from  being  offended  at  the  advice,  Darius  fell 
grateful  for  it,  and  desired  that  Koes  would  ask  him  after  his  return 
for  a  suitable  reward— which  we  shall  hereafter  find  granted.  lie 
then  altered  his  resolution,  took  a  cord,  and  tied  sixty  knots  in  it. 
"  Take  this  cord  (said  he  to  the  Lonians):  untie  one  of  the  knots  in  it 
each  day  after  my  advance  from  the  Danube  into  Seythia.  Remain 
here  and  guard  the  bridge  until  you  shall  have  untied  all  the  knot-; 
but  if  by  that  time  I  shall  not  have  returned,  then  depart  and  sail 
home.""  With  sucli  orders  he  began  his  march  into  the  inti  rior.  This 
anecdote  is  intere  ling,  not  only  as  it  discloses  the  simple  expedients 
for  numeration  and  counting  of  time  then  practiced,  but  al>o  as  it 
illustrates  the  geographical  ideas  prevalent.  Darius  did  not  intend 
to  come  back  over  the  Danube,  but  to  march  round  the  MsBOtis,  and 
to  return  into  Persia  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  Euxine.  No  Other 
explanation  can  lie  given  of  his  orders.  At  first,  confident  of  SU 
he  orders  the  bridge  to  be  destroyed  forthwith:  he  will  beat  the 
Scythians,  march  through  their  country,  and  re-enter  Media  from  the 
east*  a  side  of  the  Euxine:  when  he  is  reminded  that  possibly  he  may 
not  be  able  to  find  the  Scythians,  and  may  be  obliged  to  retreat,  he 
still  continues  persuaded  that  this  must  happen  within  sixty  clays,  if 
it  happens  at  all;  and  that  should  he  remain  absent  more  than  sixty 
days,  such  delay  will  be  a  convincing  proof  that  he  will  take  the 
other  road  of  return  instead  of  repassing  the  Danube.  The  reader 
who  looks  at  a  map  of  the  Euxine  and  its  surrounding  territories  may 
be  startled  at  so  extravagant  a  conception  ;  but  he  should  recollect  that 
there  was  no  map  of  the  same  or  nearly  the  same  accuracy  before 
Herodotus,  much  less  before  the  contemporaries  of  Darius.  The  idea 
of  entering  .Media  by  the  north  from  Seythia  and  Sarmatia  over  the 
Caucasus,  is  familiar  to  Herodotus  in  his  sketch  of  the  early  marches 
of  the  Scythians  and  Cimmerians:  mor<  over,  lie  tells  us  that  after  the 
expedition  of  Darius,  there  came  some  Scythian  envoys  to  Sparta, 
proposing  an  offensive  alliance  against  Persia,  and  offering  on  their 
part  to  march  across  the  Pliasis  into  Media  from  the  north,  while  the 
Spartans  were  invited  to  land  on  the  shores  of  Asia  Minor,  and 
advance  across  the  country  to  nice!  them  from  the  west.  When  we 
recollect  that  the  Macedonians  and  ihi  ir  leader,  Alexander  the  Great, 
having  arrived  at  the  river  Jaxartes,  on  the  north  of  Sogdiana  and 
on  the  east  of  the  Sea  of  Aral,  supposed  that  they  had  reached  the 
Tanais  and  called  the  river  by  that  nam< — we  shall  not  be  astonished 
at  the  erroneous  estimation  of  distance  implied  in  the  plan  conceived 
by  Darius. 


CONDUCT  OF  THE  IONIANS.  155 

The  Ionians  had  already  remained  in  guard  of  the  bridge  beyond 
the  sixty  days  commanded,  without  hearing  anything  of  the  Persian 
army,  when  they  were  surprised  by  the  appearance,  not  of  that  army, 
but  of  a  body  of  Scythians;  who  acquainted  them  that  Darius  was  in 
full  retreat  aud  in  the  greatest  distress,  and  that  his  safety  with  the 
whole  army  depeuded  upon  that  bridge.  They  endeavored  to  pre- 
vail upon  the  Ionians,  since  the  sixty  days  included  in  their  order  to 
remain  had  now  elapsed,  to  break  the  bridge  and  retire;  assuring 
them  that  if  this  were  done,  the  destruction  of  the  Persians  was 
inevitable — of  course  the  Ionians  themselves  would  then  be  free. 
At  first  the  latter  were  favorably  disposed  toward  the  proposition, 
which  was  warmly  espoused  by  the  Athenian  Miltiades,  despot  or 
governor  of  the  Thracian  Chersonese.  Had  he  prevailed,  the  victor 
of  Marathon  (for  such  we  shall  hereafter  rind  him)  would  have  thus 
inflicted  a  much  more  vital  blow  on  Persia  than  even  that  celebrated 
action,  and  would  have  brought  upon  Darius  the  disastrous  fate  of 
his  predecessor  Cyrus.  But  the  Ionian  princes,  though  leaning  at 
first  toward  his  suggestion,  were  speedily  converted  by  the  represen- 
tations of  Histiajus  of  Miletus,  who  reminded  them  that  the  main- 
tenance of  his  own  ascendency  over  the  Milesians  and  that  of  each 
despot  in  his  respective  city,  was  assured  by  means  of  Persian  sup- 
port alone — the  feeliug  of  the  population  being  everywhere  against 
them:  consequently,  the  ruin  of  Darius  would  be  their  ruin  also. 
This  argument  proved  conclusive.  It  was  resolved  to  stay  and  main- 
tain the  bridge,  but  to  pretend  compliance  with  the  Scythians,  and 
prevail  upon  them  to  depart,  by  affecting  to  destroy  it,  The  northern 
portion  of  the  bridge  was  accordingly  destroyed,  for  the  length  of  a 
bow-shot;  while  the  Scythians  departed,  under  the  persuasion  that 
they  had  succeeded  in  depriving  their  enemies  of  the  means  of 
crossing  the  river.  It  appears  that  they  missed  the  track  of  the 
retreating  host,  which  was  thus  enabled,  after  the  severest  privation 
and  suffering,  to  reach  the  Danube  in  safety.  Arriving  during  the 
darkness  of  the  night,  Darius  was  at  first  terrified  to  find  the  bridge 
no  longer  joining  the  northern  bank.  An  Egyptain  herald,  of  sten- 
torian powers  of  voice,  was  ordered  to  call  as  loudly  as  possible  the 
name  of  Histiseus  the  Milesian.  Answer  being  speedily  made,  the 
bridge  was  re-established,  and  the  Persian  army  passed  over  before 
the  Scythians  returned  to  the  spot. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  Ionians  here  lost  an  opportunity 
eminently  favorable,  su?  i  as  never  again  returned,  for  emancipating 
themselves  from  the  Persian  dominion.  Their  despots,  by  whom 
the  determination  wTas  made,  especially  the  Milesian  Histiseus,  were 
not  induced  to  preserve  the  bridge  by  any  honorable  reluctance  to 
betray  the  trust  reposed  in  them,  but  simply  by  selfish  regard  to  the 
maintenance  of  their  own  unpopular  dominion.  And  we  may  remark 
that  the  real  character  of  this  impelling  motive,  as  well  as  the  delib- 
eration accompanying  it,  may  be  assumed  as  resting  upon  very  good 


156       DEMuKEDES— DARIUS  INVADES   SCYTHIA. 

evidence,  since  we  are  now  arrived  within  the  personal  know].  ! 

the  Milesian  historian  Hekataeus,  who  took  an  active  pari  in  the  ionic 
revolt  a  few  years  afterward,  and  who  may  perhaps  have  been  per 
Bonally  engaged  in  this  expedition,  lie  will  be  found  reviewing  w  ith 
prudence  and  sobriety  the  chances  of  that  unfortunate  revolt,  ami 
distrusting  its  success  from  the  beginning;  while  Histiaeus  of  Mile- 
tus will  appear  on  the  .same  occasion  as  the  iomenter  of  it,  in  i 
to  procure  hisrelease  from  an  honorable  detention  at  Susa  near  the 
person  of  Darius.  The  selfishness  of  this  despot,  having  deprived 
bis  countrymen  of  that  real  and  favorable  chance  of  emancipation 
which  the  destruction  of  the  bridge  would  have  opened  to  them, 
threw  them  into  revolt  a  few  years  afterward  against  the  entire  and 
unembarrassed  force  of  the  Persian  king  and  empire. 

Extricated  from  the  perils  of  the  Scythian  warfare.  Darius  marched 
southward  from  the  Danube  through  Thrace  to  the  Hellespont,  where 
he  crossed  from  Sestus  into  Asia.  lie  left,  however,  a  considi 
army  in  Europe,  under  the  command  of  Megabazus,  to  accomplish 
the  conquest  of  Thrace.  Perinthus  on  the  Propontis  made  a  brave 
resistance,  but  was  at.  length  subdued;  after  which  all  the  Thracian 
tribes,  and  all  the  Grecian  colonies  between  the  Hellespont  and  the 
Strymon,  were  forced  to  suhmit.  giving  earth  and  water,  and  becom- 
ing subject  to  tribute.  Near  the  lower  Strymon  was  the  Edonian 
town  of  Myrkinus,  which  Darius  orden  d  to  be  made  over  to  Histiaeus 
of  Miletus;  for  both  this  Milesian,  and  Koes  of  Mitylene,  had  been 
desired  by  the  Persian  king  to  name  their  own  reward  for  their 
fidelity  to  him  on  the  passage  over  the  Danube.  Koes  requested  that 
he  might  be  constituted  despot  of  Mitylene,  which  was  accomplished 
by  Persian  authority;  but  Histiaeus  solicited  that  the  territory  near 
Myrkinus  might  be  given  to  him  for  the  foundation  of  a  colony.  As 
soon  as  the  Persian  conquests  extended  thus  far,  the  site  in  question 
was  presented  to  Histiaeus,  who  entered  actively  upon  his  new 
scheme.  We  shall  find  the  territory  near  Myrkinus  eminent  here- 
after as  the  site  of  Ainphipolis;  it  offered  great  temptation  to  settlers, 
as  fertile,  well-wooded,  convenient  for  maritime  commerce,  and  near 
to  auriferous  and  argentiferous  mountains. 

It  seems,  however,  that  the  Persian  dominion  in  Thrace  was  dis- 
turbed by  au  invasion  of  the  Scythians,  who,  in  revenge  for  the 
aggression  of  Darius,  overran  the  country  as  far  as  the  Thracian 
■  ,  and  are  even  said  to  have  sent  envoys  to  Sparta,  pro- 
posing a  simultaneous  invasion  of  Persia,  from  different  sides,  by 
Spartans  and  Scythians,  The  Athenian"  Miltiades,  who  was  i 
or  governor  of  the  Chersonese,  was  forced  to  quit  it  for  some  time, 
and  Herodotus  ascribes  bis  retirement  to  the  incursion  of  these 
Nomads.  But  we  may  be  permitted  to  suspect  that  the  historian  has 
misconceived  the  real  cause  of  such  retirement.  3Iiltiades  could  not 
remuiu  iu  the  Chersonese  after  he  had  incurred  the  deadly  enmity  of 


MURDER  OF  THE  PERSIAN  ENVOY.  157 

Darius  by  exhorting  the  Ionians  to  destroy  the  bridge  over  the 
Danube. 

The  conquests  of  Megabazus  did  not  stop  at  the  western  bank  of 
the  Stryrnon.  He  carried  his  arms  across  that  river,  conquering  the 
Paeonians,  and  reducing  the  Macedonians  under  Amyntas  to  tribute. 
A  considerable  number  of  the  Faeonians  were  transported  across  into 
Asia,  by  express  order  of  Darius;  whose  fancy  hail  been  struck  by 
seeing  at  Sardis  a  beautiful  Pseonian  woman  carrying  a  vessel  on  her 
head,  leading  a  horse  to  water,  and  spinning  flax,  all  at  the  same 
time.  This  woman  had  been  brought  over  (we  are  told)  by  her  two 
brothers  Piges  and  Mantyes  for  the  express  purpose  of  arresting  the 
attention  of  the  Great  King.  They  hoped  by  this  means  to  be  con- 
stituted despots  of  their  countrymen;  and  we  may  presume  that  their 
scheme  succeeded,  for  such  part  of  the  Paeonians  as  Megabazus  could 
subdue  were  conveyed  across  to  Asia  and  planted  in  some  villages  in 
Phrygia.  Such  violent  transportations  of  inhabitants  were  in  the 
genius  of  the  Persian  government. 

From  the  Pseonian  lake  Prasias,  seven  eminent  Persians  were  sent 
as  envoys  into  Macedonia,  to  whom  Amyntas  readily  gave  the 
required  token  of  submission,  inviting  them  to  a  splendid  banquet. 
When  exhilarated  with  wine,  they  demanded  to  see  the  women  of  the 
regal  family,  who,  being  accordingly  introduced,  were  rudely  dealt 
with  by  the  strangers:  at  length  the  son  of  Amyntas,  Alexander, 
resented  the  insult,  and  exacted  for  it  a  signal  vengeance.  Dis- 
missing the  women  under  pretense  that  they  should  return  after  a 
bath,  he  brought  back  in  their  place  youths  in  female  attire,  armed 
with  daggers.  Presently  the  Persians,  proceeding  to  repeat  their 
caresses,  were  all  put  to  death.  Their  retinue,  and  the  splendid  car- 
riages and  equipment  which  they  had  brought,  disappeared  at  the 
same  time,  without  any  tidings  reaching  the  Persian  army.  And 
when  Bubares,  another  eminent  Persian,  was  sent  into  Macedonia  to 
institute  researches,  Alexander  contrived  to  hush  up  the  proceeding 
by  large  bribes,  and  by  giving  him  his  sister  Gigaea  in  marriage. 

Meanwhile  Megabazus  crossed  over  into  Asia,  carrying  with  him 
the  Paeonians  from  the  Strymon.  Having  become  alarmed  at  the 
progress  of  Histiseus  with  his  new  city  of  Myrkinus,  he  communi- 
cated his  apprehensions  to  Darius;  who  was  prevailed  upon  to  send 
for  Histiseus,  retaining  him  about  his  person,  and  carrying  him  to 
Susa  as  counselor  and  friend,  with  every  mark  of  honor,  but  with 
the  secret  intention  of  never  letting  him  revisit  Asia  Minor.  The 
fears  of  the  Persian  general  were  probably  not  unreasonable;  but  this 
detention  of  Histiseus  at  Susa  became  in  the  sequel  an  important 
event. 

On  departing  for  his  capital,  Darius  nominated  his  brother  Arta- 
pherues  satrap  of  Sardis,  and  Otanes  general  of  the  forces  on  the 
coast  in  place  of  Megabazus.     The  new  general  dealt  very  severely 


158       DEMOKEDES— DARIUS   INVADES  SCYTHIA. 

-with  various  towns  near  the  Propontis,  on  the  ground  that  they  had 
evaded  their  duty  in  the  late  Scythian  expedition,  and  bad  even  har- 
assed the  army  of  Darius  in  its  retreat.  He  took  Byzantium  and 
Chalkedoo,  as  well  as  Anlandrus  in  the  Troad,  and  Lamponium. 
With  the  aid  of  a  fleel  from  Lesbos,  he  achieved  a  new  conquest — 
the  islands  of  Lemnoa  and  [mbros,  at  that  tune  occupied  by  a  Pelas- 
gric  population,  seemingly  without  any  Greek  inhabitants  at  all. 
These  Pelasgi  were  of  cruel  and  piratical  character,  if  we  may  judge 
by  the  tenor  of  the  legends  respecting  them ;  Lemnian  misdeeds  being 
cited  as  a  proverbial  expression  for  atrocities.  They  were  distin- 
guished also  for  ancient  worship  of  Hephaestus,  together  with  mystic 
rites  in  honor  of  the  Kabeiri,  and  even  human  sacrifices  to  their 
Gnat  Godde  3.  In  their  two  cities — HephsBStias  on  the  east  of  the 
island  and  Myrina  on  the  west — they  held  out  bravely  against  Otanes, 
and  did  not"  submit  until  they  had  undergone  long  and  .severe 
hardship.  Lykaretus,  brother  of  that  Mseandrius  whom  we  have 
already  noticed  as  despot  of  Samos,  was  named  governor  of  Lem- 
nos;  bul  he  soon  after  died.  It  is  probable  that  the  Pelasgic  popu- 
lation of  the  islands  was  greatly  enfeebled  during  this  struggle,  and 
we  even  hear  that  their  king  Ilermon  voluntarily  emigrated  from 
fear  of  Darius. 

Lemnos  and  Imbros  thus  became  Persian  possessions,  held  by  a 
subordinate  prince  as  tributary.  A  few  years  afterward  their  lot 
was  ;i'j.-iin  changed — they  passed  into  the  bauds  of  Athens,  the  Pelas- 
gic inhabitants  were  expelled,  and  fresh  Athenian  settlers  introduced. 
They  were  conquered  by  Miltiades  from  the  Thracian  Chersonese; 
from  Elseusat  the  south  of  that  peninsula  to  Lemnos  being  within  one 
day's  sail  with  a  north  wind.  Th e  Hephsestieans  abandoned  their 
city  and  evacuated  the  island  with  little  resistance;  but  the  inhabi- 
tants of  Myrina  stood  a  siege,  and  wrere  not  expelled  without  diffi- 
culty: both  of  them  found  abodes  in  Thrace,  on  and  near  the  penin- 
sula" of  Mount  Athos.  Both  these  islands,  together  with  that  of 
Skyros  (which  was  not  taken  until  after  the  invasion  of  Xerxes), 
remained  connected  with  Athens  in  a  manner  peculiarly  intimate. 
At  the  peace  of  Antalkidas  (387  B.C.) — which  guaranteed  universal 
autonomy  to  every  Grecian  city,  gnat  and  small — they  were  specially 
reserved,  and  considered  as  united  with  Athens.  The  property  in 
their  soil  was  held  by  men.  who,  without  losing  their  Athenian  citi- 
zenship, became  Lemnian  Kleruchs,  and  as  such  were  classified  apart 
among  the  military  force  of  the  state;  while  absence  in  Lemnos  or 
[mbros  seems  to  have  been  accepted  as  an  excuse  for  delay  before  the 
courts  of  justice,  so  as  to  escape  the  penalties  of  contumacy  or 
departure  from  the  country.  It  is  probable  that  a  considerable  num- 
ber of  poorAthenian  citizens  were  provided  with  lots  of  land  in  these 
islands,  though  we  have  no  direct  information  of  the  fact,  and  are 
even  obliged  to  guess  the  precise  time  at  which  Miltiades  made  the 
conquest.     Herodotus,  according  to  his  usual  manner,  connects  the 


DARIUS  CARRIES  HISTIiEUS  TO  SUSA.  159 

conquest  with  an  ancient  oracle,  and  represents  it  as  the  retribution 
for  ancient  legendary  crime  committed  by  certain  Pelasgi,  who,  many 
centuries  before,  had  been  expelled  by  the  Athenians  from  Attica, 
and  had  retired  to  Lemnos.  Full  of  this  legend,  he  tells  us  nothing 
about  the  proximate  causes  or  circumstances  of  the  conquest,  which 
must  probably  have  been  accomplished  by  the  efforts  of  Athens 
jointly  with  Miltiades  from  the  Chersonese,  during  the  period  that 
the  Persians  were  occupied  in  quelling  the  Ionic  revolt,  between  502- 
494  b.c. — since  it  is  hardly  to  be  supposed  that  Miltiades  would  have 
ventured  thus  to  attack  a  Persian  possession  during  the  time  that  the 
satraps  had  their  hands  free.  Tiie  acquisition  was  probably  facili- 
tated by  the  fact,  that  the  Pelasgic  population  of  the  islands  had  been 
weakened,  as  well  by  their  former  resistance  to  the  Persian  Otanes, 
as  by  some  years  passed  under  the  deputy  of  a  Persian  satrap. 

In  mentioning  the  conquest  of  Lemnos  by  the  Athenians  and  Milti- 
ades, I  have  anticipated  a  little  on  the  course  of  events,  because  that 
conquest — though  coinciding  in  point  of  time  with  the  Ionic  revolt 
(which  will  be  recounted  in  the  following  chapter),  and  indirectly 
caused  by  it  in  so  far  as  it  occupied  the  attention  of  the  Persians — 
iies  entirely  apart  from  the  operations  of  the  revolted  Ionians.  When 
Miltiades  was  driven  out  of  the  Chersonese  b}'  the  Persians,  on  the 
suppression  of  the  Ionic  revolt,  his  fame,  derived  from  having  sub- 
dued Lemnos,  contributed  both  to  neutralize  the  enmity  which  he 
had  incurred  as  governor  of  the  Chersonese,  and  to  procure  his  elec- 
tion as  one  of  the  ten  generals  for  the  year  of  the  Marathonian 
combat. 


CHAPTER  XXXV. 

IONIC  REVOLT. 

Hitherto  the  history  of  the  Asiatic  Greeks  has  flowed  in  a  stream 
distinct  from  that  of  the  European  Greeks.  The  present  chapter  will 
mark  the  period  of  confluence  between  the  two. 

At  the  time  when  Darius  quitted  Sardis  on  his  return  to  Susa,  car- 
rying with  him  the  Milesian  Histiseus,  he  left  Artaphernes  his  brother 
as  satrap  of  Sardis,  invested  with  the  supreme  command  of  Western 
Asia  Minor.  The  Grecian  cities  on  the  coast,  comprehended  under 
his  satrapy,  appear  to  have  been  chiefly  governed  by  native  despots 
in  each;  and  Miletus  especially,  in  the  absence  of  Histiaeus,  was  ruled 
by  his  son-in-law  Aristagoras.  That  city  was  now  in  the  height  of 
power  and  prosperity — in  every  respect  the  leading  city  of  Ionia. 
The  return  of  Darius  to  Susa  may  be  placed  seemingly  about  512  B.C., 


160  IONIC   REVOLT. 

from  which  time  forward  t lie*  state  of  things  above  described  con- 
tinued, without  disturbance,  fdreighl  or  ten  years — "a  respite  from 
suffering, "  to  use  the  significant  phrase  of  the  historian. 
It  was  about  tin-  year  506  b.c.  that  the  exiled  Athenian  despol  Sip 

pias,  alter  having  been  repelled  from  Sparla  by  the  unanimous  refusal 

of  the  Lacedaemonian  allies  to  take  part  in  his  cause,  presented  him- 
self from  Bigeium  as  a  petitioner  to  Arlaphernes  at  Sardis.  He  now 
doubtless  found  the  benefit  of  the  alliance'  which  he  had  formed  for 
his  daughter  with  the  despot  2Eantides  of  Lampsakus,  whose  favor 
with  Darius  would  stand  him  in  good  Stead,  lb1  made  pressing  repre- 
sentations to  the  satrap,  with  a  view  of  ptfO'CllTing  restoration  to 
Athens,  on  condition  of  holding  it  under  Persian  dominion  ;  and  Arta- 
phernes  was  prepared,  if  an  opportunity  offered,  to  aid  him  in  tins 
design.  So  thoroughly  had  he  resolved  on  espousing  actively  the 
cause  of  Hippias,  that  when  the  Athenians  dispatched  envoys  to 
Sardis,  to  set  forth  the  case  of  the  city  againsl  its  exiled  pretender, 
he  returned  to  them  an  answer  not  merely  of  denial,  but  of  menace — 
bidding  them  receive  Hippias  hack  again,  if  they  looked  for  Safety. 
Such  a  reply  Was  equivalent  to  a  declaration  of  war,  and  so  it  was 
construed  at  Athens.  It  leads  us  to  infer  that  the  satrap  was  even 
then  revolving  in  bis  mind  an  expedition  against  Attica,  in  conjunc- 
tion with  Ilippias;  but  fortunately  for  the  Athenians,  other  projects 
and  necessities  intervened  to  postpone  for  several  years  the  execution 
of  the  scheme. 

Of  these  new  projects,  the  first  was  that  of  conquering  the  island 
of  Naxos.  Here  too,  as  in  the  case  of  Hippias;  the  instigation  arose 
from  Naxian  exiles — a  rich  oligarchy  which  had  been  expelled  by  a 
rising  of  the  people.  This  island  like  all  the  rest  of  the  Cyclades, 
was  as  yet  independent  of  the  Persians.  It  was  wealthy,  prosperous, 
sing  a  Large  population  bothof  freemen  and  slaves,  and  defended 
as  well  1))'  armed  ships  as  by  a  force  of  8000  heavy  armed  infantry. 
The  exiles  applied  for  aid  to  Aristagoras,  who  saw  that  he  could  turn 
them  into  instruments  of  dominion  for  himself  in  the  island,  provided 
he  could  induce  Artaphernes  to  embark  in  the  project  along  with  him 
— his  own  force  not  being  adequate  by  itself.  Accordingly  he  went 
to  Sardis,  and  laid  his  pfojecl  before  the  satrap,  intimating'  that  as 
soon  as  the  exiles  should  land  with  a  powerful  support,  Naxos  would 
be  reduced  with  little  trouble:  that  the  neighboring  islands  of  Paros, 
AndroS,  Tenos,  and  the  other  Cyclades,  could  not  long  hold  out  after 
the  conquest  of  NaxOS,  nor  even  the  large  and  Valuable  island  of 
Eubcea.  He  himself  engaged,  if  a  licet  of  100  ships  were  granted  to 
him,  to  accomplish  all  these  conquests  for  the  Great  King,  and  to  bear 
the  expenses  of  the  armament  besides.  Artaphernes  entertained  the 
proposition  with  eagerni  -  loaded  him  with  praise,  and  promised 
him  in  the  ensuing  spring  200  ships  instead  of  100.  Messengers 
dispatched  to  Susa  having  brought  back  the  ready  consent  of  Darius, 
ft  Luge  armament  was  forthwith  equipped  under  the  command  of  the 


EXPEDITION  AGAINST  NAXOS.  101 

Persian  Megabates,  to  be  placed  at  the  disposal  of  Aristagoras — com- 
posed both  of  Persians  and  of  all  the  tributaries  near  the  coast. 

With  this  force  Aristagoras  and  the  Naxian  exiles  set  sail  from 
Miletus,  giving  out  that  they  were  going  to  the  Hellinpont:  on  reach- 
ing Chios,  they  waited  in  its  western  harbor  of  Kaukasa  for  a  fair 
wind  to  carry  them  straight  across  to  Naxos.  No  suspicion  was  enter- 
tained in  that,  island  of  its  real  purpose,  nor  was  any  preparation 
made  for  resistance;  so  that  the  success  of  Aristagoras  would  have 
been  complete,  had  it  not  been  defeated  by  an  untoward  incident 
ending  in  dispute.  Megabates,  with  a  solicitude  which  we  are  sur- 
prised to  discern  in  a  Persian  general,  personally  made  a  tour  of  his 
fleet,  to  see  that  every  ship  was  under  proper  watch.  He  discovered 
a  ship  from  Mynilus  (an  Asiatic  Dorian  city  near  llalikarnassus)  left 
without  a  single  man  on  board.  Incensed  at  such  neglect,  he  called 
before  him  Skylax,  the  commander  of  the  ship,  and  ordered  him  to  be 
put  in  chains,  with  his  head  projecting  outward  through  one  of  the 
apertures  for  oars  in  the  ship's  side.  Skylax  was  a  guest  and  friend 
of  Aristagoras,  who  on  hearing  of  this  punishment,  interceded  with 
Megabates  for  his  release;  but  finding  the  request  refused,  took  upon 
him  to  release  the  prisoner  himself.  He  even  went  so  far  as  to  treat 
the  remonstrance  of  Megabates  with  disdain,  reminding  him  that 
accordiuu;  to  the  instructions  of  Artaphherues,  he  was  only  second — 
himself  (Aristagoras)  being  first.  The  pride  of  Megabates  could  not 
endure  such  treatment:  as  soon  as  night  arrived,  he  sent  a  private 
intimation  to  Naxos  of  the  coming  of  the  fleet,  warning  the  islanders 
to  be  on  their  guard.  The  warning  thus  fortunately  received  was 
turned  by  the  Naxians  to  the  best  account.  They  carried  in  their 
property,  laid  up  stores,  and  made  every  preparation  for  a  siege,  so 
that  when  the  fleet,  probably  delayed  "by  the  dispute  between  its 
leaders,  at  length  arrived,  it  was  met  by  a  "stout  resistance,  remained 
on  the  island  for  four  months  in  prosecution  of  an  unavailing  sietre, 
and  was  obliged  to  retire  without  accomplishing  an  vthing  bevond  the 
erection  of  a  fort,  as  lodgment  for  the  Naxian  exiies.  After  a  large 
cost  incurred,  not  only  by  the  Persians,  but  also  by  Aristagoras  him- 
self, the  unsuccessful  armament  was  brought  back  to  the  coast  of 
Ionia. 

The  failure  of  this  expedition  threatened  Aristagoras  with  entire 
ruin.  He  had  incensed  Megabates, deceived  Artaphernes.  and  incurred 
an  obligation,  which  he  knew  not  how  to  discharge,  of  indemnifvin? 
the  latter  for  the  costs  of  the  fleet.  He  berran  to  revolve  in  his  mind 
the  scheme  of  revolting  from  Persia,  and  it  so  happened  that  there 
arrived  nearly  at  the  same  moment  a  messenger  from  his  father-in-lnw 
Histigeus,  wfe©  was  detained  at  the  court  of  Susa,  secretly  instigating 
him  to  this  very  resolution.  Not  knowing  whom  to  trust  with  tins 
dangerous  message,  Histiaeus  had  caused  the  head  of  a  faithful  slave 
to  be  shaved — branded  upon  it  the  words  neeessarv — and  then 
dispatched  him  as  soon  as  his  hair  had  growm,  to  Miletus,  with  a 
H.  G.  II.— 6 


162  TOXIC  REVOLT. 

verbal  intimation  to  Aristagoras  thai  hia  head  was  to  be  a?ain  shaved 
and  examined.  Histiseus  Bought  to  provoke  this  perilu 
simply  as  a  means  of  procuring  bis  own  release  from  Busa,  and  in  the 
calculation  thai  Darius  would  send  him  down  to  the  coasl  to  re  estab- 
lish order.  His  message  arriving  at  so  critical  a  moment,  determined 
the  faltering  resolution  of  Aristagoras,  who  convened  his  principal 
partisans  a1  .Miletus,  and  laid  before  them  the  formidable  projeel  of 
revolt.  All  of  them  approved  it.  with  one  remarkable  exception — 
the  historian  Hekatseus  of  Miletus;  who   opposed   it  as  altogether 

ruinous,  Slid  contended  that  the  power  of  J  >ariuS  was  tOO  vast  to  leave 
th  in  any  prospect  of  success.  When  lie  found  direct  opposition 
fruitless,  he  next  insisted  upon  the  necessity  of  al  once  seizing  the 
large  treasures  in  the  neighboring  temple  of  Apollo  at  Branchidae  for 
the  purpose  of  carrying  on  the  revolt.  By  this  means  alone  (he  said) 
COUld  the  Milesians,  too  feeble  to  carry  on  the  contest  with  their  own 
force  alone,  hope  to  become  masters  at  sea — while,  if  they  diil  not  take 
treasures,  the  victorious  enemy  assuredly  would.  Neither  of 
recommendations,  both  of  them  indicating  sagacity  and  fore- 
sight in  the  proposer,  was  listened  to.      Probably  the  seizures  of  the 

treasures — though  highly   useful   for  the  impending  struggle,  and 

though  in  the  end  they  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  as  Ilekataus 

anticipated — would  have  been  insupportable  to  the  pious  feelings  of 

the  people,  and  would  thus  have  proved  more  injurious  than  bene- 
ficial: perhaps  indeed  Hekatseus  himself  may  baVe  urged  it  with  the 
indirect  view  of  stifling  the  whole  project.  We  may  remark  that  be 
seems  to  have  argued  the  question  as  if  Miletus  were  to  stand  alone 
in  the  revolt :  not  anticipating,  a-  indeed  no  prudent  man  could  then 
anticipate,  that  the  Ionic  cities  generally  would  follow  the  example. 
Aristagoras  and  bis  friends  resolved  forthwith  to  revolt.  Their 
first  Step  was  to  conciliate  popular  favor  throughout  Asiatic  Greece 
by  puttingdown  the  despots  in  all  the  various  cities — the  instruments 
no1  less  than  the  supports  of  Persian  ascendency,  as  Histiseus  had 
well  argued  at  the  bridge  of  the  Danube.  The  opportunity  was 
favorable  for  striking  this  blow  at  once  on  a  considerable  scale.  For 
the  fleet,  recently  employed  at  Naxos,  bad  not  yet  dispersed,  but 
was  still  assembled  at  Myus,  with  many  of  the  despots  present  at  the 
head  of  their  ships.  Accordingly  [atragoras  was  dispatched  from 
Miletus,  at  once  to  seize  as  many  of  them  as  he  could,  and  to  stir  up 
the  soldiers  to  revolt.  This  decisive  proceeding  was  the  first  mani- 
fest,, against  Darius.  Iatragoras  was  successful:  the  fleet  went  along 
with  him,  and  many  of  the  despots  fell  into  his  hands — among  them 
Histiseus  (a  second  person  so  named)  of  Termera,  Oliatus  of  Mylasa 
(both  Karians),  Koes  of  Mitylene,  and  Aristagoras  (also  a  second 
per  on  30  named)  of  Kyme.  At  the  same  time  the  Milesian  Arista 
Lroras  himself,  while  he  formally  proclaimed  revolt  against  Darius, 
and  invited  the  Milesians  to  follow  him.  laid  down  Ids  own  author- 
ity,  and  affected   to    place  the   government  in  the    hands  of  the 


EXTENSION  OF  THE  REVOLT.  163 

people.  Throughout  most  of  the  towns  of  Asiatic  Greece,  insular 
and  continental,  a  similar  revolution  was  brought  about;  the  despots 
were  expelled,  and  the  feelings  of  the  citizens  were  thus  warmly 
interested  in  the  revolt.  Such  of  these  despots  as  fell  into  the 
hands  of  Aristagoras  were  surrendered  into  the  hands  of  their  former 
subjects,  by  whom  they  were  for  the  most  part  quietly  dismissed, 
and  we  shall  find  them  hereafter  active  auxiliaries  to  the  Persians. 
To  this  treatment  the  only  exception  mentioned  is  Koes,  who  was 
stoned  to  death  bjr  the  Mitylenseans. 

By  these  first  successful  steps  the  Ionic  revolt  was  made  to  assume 
an  extensive  and  formidable  character;  much  more  so,  probably, 
than  the  prudent  Hekatoeus  had  anticipated  as  practicable.  The 
naval  force  of  the  Persians  in  the  ^Egean  was  at  once  taken  away 
from  them,  and  passed  to  their  opponents,  who  were  thus  completely 
masters  of  the  sea;  and  would  in  fact  have  remained  so,  if  a  second 
naval  force  had  not  been  brought  up  against  them  from  Phenic in — a 
proceeding  never  before  resorted  to,  and  perhaps  at  that  time  not 
looked  for. 

Having  exhorted  all  the  revolted  towns  to  name  their  generals  aDd 
to  put  themselves  in  a  state  of  defense,  Aristagoras  crossed  the 
yEjrean  to  obtain  assistance  from  Sparta,  then  under  the  government 
of  king  Kl'  omeues;  to  whom  he  adiressed  him.-elf,  "holding  in  his 
baud  a  brazen  tablet,  wherein  was  engraved  the  circuit  of  the  entire 
exrth,  wiih  the  whole  sea  and  all  the  rivers."  Probably  this  was  the 
first  map  or  plan  which  had  ever  been  seen  at  Sparta,  and  so  pro- 
found was  the  impression  which  it  made,  that  it  was  remembered 
there  even  in  the  time  of  Heiodotus.  Hiving  emphatically  entreated 
the  Spartans  to  step  forth  in  aid  of  their  Ionic  brethren,  now  engaged 
in  a  desperate  struggle  for  freedom,  he  proceeded  to  describe  the 
wealth  and  abundance  (gold,  silver,  brass,  vestments,  cattle  and 
slaves),  together  with  the  ineffective  weapons  and  warfare  ef  the 
Asiatics.  Such  enemies  as  the  latter  (he  said)  could  be  at  once  put 
down,  and  their  wealth  appropriated,  by  military  training  such  as 
that  of  the  Spartans— whose  long  spear,  brazen  helmet  and  breast- 
plate, and  ample  shield,  enabled  them  to  despise  the  bow,  the  short 
javelin,  the  light  wicker  target,  the  turban  and  trowsers,  of  a  Per- 
sian. He  then  traced  out  on  his  brazen  plan  the  road  from  Ephesus 
to  Susa,  indicating  the  intervening  nations,  all  of  them  affording  a 
booty  more  or  less  rich.  He  concluded  by  magnifying  especially 
the  vast  treasures  at  Susa — "  Instead  of  fighting  your  neighbors  (he 
concluded),  Argeians,  Arcadians,  and  Messenians,  from  whom  jrou 
get  hard  blows  and  small  reward,  why  do  you  not  make  yourself 
rulers  of  all  Asia,  a  prize  not  less  easy  than  lucrative  ?"  Kleomenes 
replied  to  these  seductive  instigations  by  desiring  him  to  come  for  an 
answer  on  .he  third  day.  When  that  day  arrived,  he  put  to  him  the 
simple  question,  how  far  it  was  from  Susa  to  the  sea  ?  To  which 
Aristagoras  answered  with   more  frankness  than  dexterity,  that  it 


104  IONIC   REVOLT. 

was  a  three  months' journey;  and  he  was  proceeding  to  enlarge  upon 
the  facilities  of  the  road  when  Kleomenea  interrupted  him — "Quit 
Sparta  before  sunset,  .Mile-inn  stranger:  you  arc  no  friend  to  the 
Lacedaemonians,  if  you  wanl  to  carry  them  a  three  months' journey 
from  the  m\i."  In  spiie  of  this  peremptory  mandate,  Aristagoras 
tried  a  last  resource.  Taking  in  his  hand  the  bough  of  supplication, 
he  again  went  to  the  house  of  Kleomenes,  who  was  sitting  with  his 
daughter  Gorgo,  a  girl  of  eight  years  old.     He  requested  tLleomenes 

to  send  away  the  child,  hut  this  was   refused,  and    he  was  desired  t<i 

proceed;  upon  which  he  began  to  off er  to  the  Spartan  king  a  bribe 
for  compliance,  bidding  continually  higher  and  higher  from  ten  tal 
ents  up  to  fifty.  At  length  the  little  girl  suddenly  exclaimed, 
'•Father,  the  stranger  will  corrupt  you,  if  you  do  not  at  onco 
go  away."  The  exclamation  so  struck  Klcomenes,  that  he  broke  up 
the  interview,  and  Aristagoras  forthwith  quitted  Sparta. 

Doubtless  Herodotus  heard  the  account  of  this  interview  froin 
Lacedaemonian  informants.  Vet  we  may  be  permitted  to  doubt 
whether  any  such  suggestions  were  really  made,  or  any  such  hopes 
held  out,  as  those  which  he  places  in  the  mouth  of  Aristagoras — 
suggestions  and  hopes  which  might  well  be  conceived  in  450 — 440 
B.C.,  after  a  generation  of  victories  over  the  Persians,  but  which  have 
no  pertinence  in  the  year  502  B.C.  Down  even  to  the  battle  of  Mara- 
thon, the  name  of  the  Medes  was  a  terror  to  the  Greeks,  and  the 
Athenians  are  highly  and  justly  extolled  as  the  first  who  dared  to 
look  them  in  the  face.  To  talk  about  an  easy  march  up  to  the  treas- 
ures of  Susa  and  the  empire  of  all  Asia,  at  the  time  of  the  Ionic 
revolt,  would  have  been  considered  as  a  proof  of  insanity.  Arista- 
goras may  very  probably  have  represented  that  the  Spartans  were 
more  than  a  match  for  Persians  in  the  field;  but  even  thus  much 
would  have  been  considered,  in  502  B.C.,  rather  as  the  sanguine  hope 
of  a  petitioner  than  as  the  estimate  of  a  sober  looker-on. 

The  Milesian  chief  bad  made  application  to  Sparta,  as  the  presiding 
power  of  Hellas — a  character  which  we  thus  find  more  and  more 
recognized  and  passing  into  the  habitual  feelings  of  the  Greeks. 
Fifty  years  previously  to  this,  the  Spartans  had  been  flattered  by  the 
circumstance  that  Crcesus  singled  them  out  from  all  other  Greeks  to 
invite  as  allies:  now,  they  accepted  such  priority  as  a  matter  of 
course. 

Rejected  at  Sparta,  Aristagoras  proceeded  to  Athens,  now  decidedly 
the  second  power  in  Greece.  Here  he  found  an  easier  task,  not  only 
as  it  was  the  metropolis  (or  mother-city)  of  Asiatic  Ionia,  but  also  as 
it  had  already  incurred  the  pronounced  hostility  of  the  Persian 
satrap,  and  might  look  to  be  attacked  as  soon  as  the  project  came  to 
suit  his  convenience,  under  the  instigation  of  Hippias:  whereas  the 
Spartans  had  not  only  no  kindred  with  Ionia,  beyond  that  of  common 
Hellenism,  but  were  in  no  hostile  relations  with  Persia,  and  would 
have  been  provoking  a  new  enemy  by  meddling  in  the  Asiatic  war. 


MARCH  OF   ARISTAGORAS  UP  TO   SARDIS.      165 

The  promises  and  representations  of  Aristagoras  were  accordingly 
received  with  great  favor  by  the  Athenians;  who,  over  and  above  the 
claims  of  sympathy,  had  a  powerful  interest  in  sustaining  the  Ionic 
revolt  as  an  indirect  protection  to  themselves — and  to  whom  the 
abstraction  of  the  Ionic  fleet  from  the  Persians  afforded  a  conspicu- 
ous and  important  relief.  The  Athenians  at  once  resolved  to  send 
a  fleet  of  twenty  ships,  under  Melanthius,  as  an  aid  to  the  revolted 
Ionians — ships  which  are  designated  by  Herodotus,  "the  beginning 
of  the  mischiefs  between  Greeks  and  barbarians  " — as  the  ships  in 
which  Paris  crossed  the  iEgean  had  before  been  called  in  the  Iliad  of 
Homer.  Herodotus  further  remarks  that  it  seems  easier  to  deceive 
many  men  together  than  one — since  Aristagoras,  after  having  failed 
with  Kleomenes,  thus  imposed  upon  the  30,000  citizens  of  Athens. 
But  on  this  remark  two  comments  suggest  themselves.  First,  the 
circumstances  of  Athens  and  Sparta  were  not  the  same  in  regard  to 
the  Ionic  quarrel — an  observation  which  Herodotus  himself  had  made 
a  little  while  before:  the  Athenians  had  a  material  interest  in  the 
quarrel,  political  as  well  as  sympathetic,  while  the  Spartans  had 
none.  Secondly,  the  ultimate  result  of  their  interference,  as  it 
stood  in  the  time  of  Herodotus,  though  purchased  by  severe  inter- 
mediate hardship,  was  one  eminently  gainful  and  glorifying,  not  less 
to  Athens  than  to  Greece. 

When  Aristagoras  returned,  he  seems  to  have  found  the  Persians 
engaged  in  the  siege  of  Miletus.  The  twenty  Athenian  ships  soon 
crossed  the  iEgean,  and  found  there  five  Eretrian  ships  which  had 
also  come  to  the  succor  of  the  Ionians;  the  Eretrians  generously 
taking  this  opportunity  to  repay  the  assistance  formerly  rendered  to 
them  by  the  Milesians  in  their  ancient  war  with  Chalkis.  On  the 
arrival  of  these  allies,  Aristagoras  organized  an  expedition  from 
Ephesus  up  to  Sardis,  under  the  command  of  his  brother  Charopinus 
with  others.  The  ships  were  left  at  Koressus,  a  mountain  and  sea- 
port five  miles  from  Ephesus,  while  the  troops  marched  up  under 
Ephesian  guides,  first  along  the  river  Kayster,  next  across  the  moun- 
tain range  of  Tmolus  to  Sardis.  Artaphernes  had  not  troops  enough 
to  do  more  than  hold  the  strong  citadel,  so  that  the  assailants  pos- 
sessed themselves  of  the  town  without  opposition.  But  he  imme- 
diately recalled  his  force  near  Miletus,  and  summoned  Persians  and 
Lydians  from  all  the  neighboring  districts,  thus  becoming  more  than 
a  match  for  Charopinus:  who  found  himself  moreover  obliged  to 
evacuate  Sardis  owing  to  an  accidental  conflagration.  Most  of  the 
houses  in  that  city  were  built  in  great  part  with  reeds  or  straw,  and 
all  of  them  had  thatched  roofs.  Hence  it  happened  that  a  spark 
touching  one  of  them  set  the  wdiole  city  in  a  flame.  Obliged  to 
abandon  their  dwellings  by  this  accident,  the  population  of  the  town 
congregated  in  the  market-place — and  as  reinforcements  were  hourly 
crowding  in,  the  position  of  the  Ionians  and  Athenians  became  pre- 
carious.    They  evacuated  the  town,  took  up  a  position  on  Mount 


166  IONIC  REVOLT. 

Tmolus,  and  when  night  came,  made  the  best  of  their  way  to  the 
seacoaat,  The  troops  of  Artaphernes  pursued,  overtook  them  neai 
Ephesis,  and  defeated  them  completely.  Eualkidea  the  Eretrian 
general,  a  man  of  eminence  and  celebrated  victor  at  the  Bolemn 
games,  perished  in  the  action,  together  with  a  considerable  numbi  r  of 
troops.  After  this  unsuccessful  commencement,  the  Athenians  betook 
themselves  to  their  vessels  and  sailed  borne,  in  spite  of  pressing 
instances  on  the  part  of  Aristogoras  to  induce  tin  in  to  stay.  They 
look  no  farther  part  in  the  struggle  ;  a  retirement  at  once  so  sudden 
and  so  complete,  that   they   must    probably   have    experienced   some 

glaring  desertion  on  the  part  of  their  Asiatic  allies,  similar  to  that 
which  broughl  so  much  danger  upon  the  Spartan  general  Derkyllidas, 
in  3'J6.  B.C.  Unless  such  was  the  case,  they  seem  open  to  censure 
rather  for  having  too  soon  withdrawn  their  aid,  than  for  having  orig- 
inally lent  it. 

The  burning  of  a  place  so  important  as  Sardis,  however,  including 
the  temples  of  the  local  goddess  Kybebe,  which  perished  with  the 
remaining  buildings,  produced  a  powerful  effect  on  hoth  sides — 
encouraging  the  revolters,  as  well  as  incensing  the  Persians.  Ari.s- 
tagoras  dispatched  ships  along  the  coast,  northward  as  far  as  Byzan- 
tium, and  southward  as  far  as  Cyprus.  The  Greek  cities  near  the 
Hellespont  and  the  Propontis  were  induced,  either  by  force  or  by 
inclination,  to  take  part  with  him;  the  Karians  embraced  his  cause 
warmly;  even  the  Kaunianswho  had  not  declared  themselves  before, 
joined  him  as  soon  as  they  heard  of  the  capture  of  Sardis;  while  the 
Greeks  in  Cyprus,  with  the  single  exception  of  the  town  of  Amathus, 
at  once  renounced  the  authority  of  Darius,  and  prepared  for  a  stren- 
uous contest.  Onesilus  of  Salamis,  the  most  considerable  city  in  the 
island,  finding  the  population  willing,  but  his  brother,  the  despot 
Gorgus,  reluctant,  shut  tin-  latter  out  of  the  gates,  took  the  command 
of  the  united  forces  of  Salamis  and  the  other  revolting  cities,  and 
laid  siege  to  Amathus.  These  towns  of  Cyprus  were  then,  and  seem 
always  afterward  to  have  continued,  under  the  government  of  des- 
pots;' who  however,  unlike  the  despots  in  Ionia  generally,  took  part 
with  their  subjects  in  the  revolt  against  Persia. 

The  rebellion  had  now  assumed  a  character  so  serious,  that  the 
Persians  were  compelled  to  put  forth  their  strongest  efforts  to  subdue 
it.  From  the  number  of  different  nations  comprised  in  their  empire, 
they  were  enabled  to  make  use  of  the  antipathies  of  one  against  the 
other;  and  the  old  adverse  feeling  of  Phenicians  against  Greeks  was 
no  '■  found  extremely  serviceable.     After  a  year  spent  in  petting 

together  forces,  the  Phenician  licit  was  employed  to  transport  into 
Cyprus  the  Pi  rsian  general  Artybius  with  a  Kilikian  and  Egyptian 
army;  while  the  force  under  Artaphernes  at  Sardis  was  so  strength- 
as  to  enable  him  to  act  at  once  against  all  the  coast  of  Asia 
Minor,  from  the  Propontis  to  the  Triopian  promontory.  On  the 
other  side,  the  common   danger   had  lor    the   moment  brought  the 


ARMAMENT  SENT  AGAINST   CYPRUS.  167 

Ioniaus  into  a  state  of  union  foreign  to  their  usual  habit;  so  that  we 
hear  now,  for  the  first  and  the  last  time,  of  a  tolerably  efficient  Pan- 
Ionic  authority. 

Apprised  of  the  coming  of  Artybius  with  the  Phenician  fleet, 
Onesilus  and  his  Cyprian  supporters  solicited  the  aid  of  the  Ionic 
fleet,  which  arrived  shortly  after  the  disembarkation  of  the  Persian 
force  in  the  island.  Onesilus  offered  to  the  louians  their  choice, 
whether  they  would  fight  the  Phcnicians  at  sea  or  the  Persians  on 
land.  Their  natural  determination  was  in  favor  of  the  sea-fight,  and 
they  engaged  with  a  degree  of  courage  and  unanimity  which  pro- 
cured for  them  a  brilliant  victory;  the  Samians  being  especially  dis- 
tinguished. But  the  combat  on  land,  carried  on  at  the  same  time, 
took  a  different  turn.  Onesilus  and  the  Salaminians  brought  into  the 
field,  after  the  fashion  of  Orientals  rather  than  of  Greeks,  a  number 
of  scythed  chariots,  destined  to  break  the  enemy's  ranks;  while  on 
the  other  hand  the  Persian  general  Artybius  was  mounted  on  a  horse, 
trained  to  rise  on  his  hind-legs  and  strike  out  with  his  fore-legs 
against  an  opponent  on  foot.  In  the  thick  of  the  fight,  Onesilus  and 
his  Karian  shield-bearer  came  into  personal  conflict  with  this  general 
and  his  horse.  By  previous  concert,  when  the  horse  so  reared  as  to 
get  his  fore-legs  over  the  shield  of  Onesilus,  the  Karian  with  a  scythe 
severed  the  legs  from  his  body,  while  Onesilus  with  his  own  hand 
slew  Artybius.  But  the  personal  bravery  of  the  Cypriots  was  ren- 
dered useless  by  treachery  in  their  own  ranks.  Stesenor,  despot  of 
Kurium,  deserted  in  the  midst  of  the  battle,  and  even  the  scythed 
chariots  of  Salamis  followed  his  example;  while  the  brave  Onesilus, 
tius  weakened,  perished  in  the  total  rout  of  his  army,  along  with 
Aristokyprus  despot  of  Soli  on  the  north  coast  of  the  island :  this 
latter  was  son  of  that  Philokyprus  who  had  been  immortalized  more 
than  sixty  years  before  in  the  poems  of  Solon.  No  farther  hopes 
now  remaining  for  the  revolters,  the  victorious  Ionian  fleet  returned 
home.  Salamis  relapsed  under  the  sway  of  its  former  despot  Gorgus, 
while  the  remaining  cities  in  Cyprus  were  successively  besieged  and 
taken;  not  without  a  resolute  defense,  however,  since  Soli  alone  held 
out  five  months. 

Meanwhile  the  principal  force  of  Darius  having  been  assembled 
at  Sardis,  Daurises,  Hymeas,  and  other  generals  who  had  married 
daughters  of  the  Great  King,  distributed  their  efforts  against  different 
parts  of  the  western  coast.  Daurises  attacked  the  towns  near  the 
Hellespont — Abydus,  Perkote,  Lampsakus,  and  Poesus — which  made 
little  resistance.  He  was  then  ordered  southward  into  Karia,  while 
Hymeas,  who  with  another  division  had  taken  Kios  on  the  Propontis, 
marched  down  to  the  Hellespont  and  completed  the  conquest  of  the 
Troad  as  well  as  of  the  iEolic  Greeks  in  the  region  of  Ida.  Arta- 
phernes  and  Otanes  attacked  the  Ionic  and  ^Eolic  towns  on  the  coast 
— the  former  taking  Klazomense,  the  latter  Kyme. 

There  remained  Karia,  which,  with  Miletus  in  its  neighborhood, 


108  IONIC  REVOLT. 

offered  a  determined  resistance  to  Daurises.  Forewarned  of  his 
approach,  the  Karians  assembled  al  a  Bpol  called  the  White  Pillars, 
near  the  confluence  of  the  rivers  Mseander  and  Marsyas.  Pixodarus, 
one  of  their  chiefs,  recommended  the  desperate  expedienl  of  lighting 
with  the  river  at  their  hack,  so  thai  all  chance  of  flighl  might  be  cul 
off;  bul  mosl  of  the  chiefs  decided  in  favor  of  a  contrary  policy — to 
lei  the  Persians  pass  the  river,  in  hopes  of  driving  them  back  into  it 
and  thus  rendering  theirdefeal  total.  Victory  however,  after  a  sharp 
contest,  declared  in  favor  of  Daurises,  chiefly  in  consequence  of  Ins 
superior  numbers.  Two  thousand  Persians,  and  not  less  than  ten 
thousand  Karians,  are  said  to  have  perished  in  the  battle.  The 
Karian  fugitives,  re  united  after  the  flighl  in  the  grove  of  nohle 
plane-trees  consecrated  to  Zeus  Stratius  near  Labranda,  were  delib- 
erating whether  they  should  now  submil  to  the  Persians  or  emigrate 
forever,  when  the  appearance  of  a  Milesian  re-enforcement  restored 
their  courage.  A  second  battle  was  fought,  and  a  second  time  they 
were  deli  ated,  the  loss  on  this  occasion  falling  chiefly  on  the  Milesi- 
an-. The  victorious  Persians  now  proceeded  to  assault  the  Karian 
cities,  hut  Berakleides  of  Mylasalaid  an  ambuscade  for  them  with  so 
much  skill  and  good  fortune,  that  their  army  was  nearly  destroyed, 
and  Daurises  with  other  Persian  generals  perished.  This  successful 
effort,  following  upon  two  severe  defeats,  does  honor  to  the  constancy 
of  the  Karians,  upon  whom  Greek  proverbs  generally  fasten  a  mean 
reputation.  It  saved  for  the  lime  the  Karian  towns,  which  the  Per- 
sians did  not  succeed  in  reducing  until  after  the  capture  of  .Miletus. 

On  land,  the  revolters  were  thus  everywhere  worsted,  though  at 
eea  the  Eonians  >till  remained  masters.  Hut  the  unwarlike  Aristago- 
ras  I  '  gan  to  d<  spair  of  success,  and  to  meditate  a  mean  desertion  of 
the  companions  and  countrymen  whom  he  had  himself  betrayed  into 
danger.  Assembling  his  chief  advisers,  he  represented  to  them  the 
unpromising  -tate  of  affairs,  and  the  necessity  of  securing  some  place 
of  refuge,  in  case  they  were  expelled  from  Miletus,  lie  then  putthe 
question  to  them,  whether  the  island  of  Sardinia,  or  Myrkinus  in 
Thrace  near  the  Strymon  (which  Histiseus  had  begun  some  time 
before  to  fortify,  as  I  have  mentioned  in  the  preceding  chapter), 
appeared  to  them  best  adapted  to  the  purpose.  Among  the  persons 
consulted  was  Bekataeus  the  historian,  who  approved  neither  the  one 
nor  the  other  scheme,  hut  suggested  theerection  of  a  fortified  post  in 
the  neighboring  island  of  Leros;  a  Milesian  colony,  wherein  a  tem- 
porary retirement  might  he  sought,  should  it  prove  impossible  to 
bold  .Miletus,  hut  which  permitted  an  easy  return  to  that  city,  so 
Boon  as  opportunity  offered.  Such  an  opinion  must  doubtless  have 
been  founded  on  the  assumption,  thai  they  would  beable  to  maintain 
superiority  at  sea.  It  is  important  to  note  such  confident  reliance 
upon  this  superiority  in  the  mind  of  a  sagacious  man,  not  given  to 
sanguine  hopes,  like  Hekatseus — even  under  circumstances  very 
unprosperous  on  land.     Emigration   to  Myrkinus,  as  proposed  by 


APPEARANCE  OF  HISTI.EUS.  169 

Aristagoras,  presented  no  hope  of  refuge  at  all;  since  the  Persians, 
if  they  regained  their  authority  in  Asia  Minor,  would  not  fail  again 
to  extend  it  to  the  Strymon.  Nevertheless  the  consultation  ended  by 
adopting  this  scheme,  since  probably  no  Ionians  could  endure  the 
immeasurable  distance  of  Sardinia  as  a  new  home.  Aristagoras  set 
sail  for  Myrkinus,  taking  with  him  all  who  chose  to  bear  him  com- 
pany. But  he  perished  not  long  after  landing,  together  with  nearly 
all  his  company,  in  the  siege  of  a  neighboring  Thracian  town. 
Though  making  profession  to  lay  down  his  supreme  authority  at  the 
.  •ommeucemeut  of  the  revolt,  he  had  still  contrived  to  retain  it  in 
great  measure;  and  on  departing  for  Myrkinus,  he  devolved  it  on 
Pythagoras,  a  citizen  in  high  esteem.  It  appears  however,  that  the 
Milesians,  glad  to  get  rid  of  a  leader  who  had  brought  them  nothing 
but  mischief,  paid  little  obedience  to  his  successor,  and  made  their 
government  from  this  period  popular  in  reality  as  well  as  in  profes- 
sion. The  desertion  of  Aristagoras  with  the  citizens  whom  he  carried 
away,  must  have  seriously  damped  the  spirits  of  those  who  remained. 
Nevertheless  it  seems  that  the  cause  of  the  Ionic  revolters  was  quite 
as  well  conducted  without  him. 

Not  long  after  his  departure,  another  despot — Histia?us  of  Miletus 
his  father-in  law  and  jointly  with  him  the  fomenter  of  the  revolt — ■ 
presented  himself  at  the  gates  of  Miletus  for  admission.  The  out- 
break of  the  revolt  had  enabled  him,  as  he  had  calculated,  to  procure 
leave  of  departure  from  Darius.  That  prince  had  been  thrown  into 
violent  indignation  by  the  attack  and  burning  of  Sardis,  and  by  the 
general  revolt  of  Ionia,  headed  (so  the  news  reached  him)  by  the  Mile- 
sian Aristagoras,  but  carried  into  effect  by  the  active  co-operation  of 
the  Athenians.  ' '  The  Athenians  (exclaimed  Darius) — who  are  they  ?" 
On  receiving  the  answer,  he  asked  for  his  bow,  placed  an  arrow  on 
the  string,  and  shot  as  high  as  he  could  toward  the  heavens,  saying— - 
"Grant  me,  Zeus,  to  revenge  myself  on  the  Athenians."  He  at  the 
same  time  desired  an  attendant  to  remind  him  thrice  every  day  at 
dinner — "Master,  remember  the  Athenians;"  for  as  to  the  Ionians  he 
felt  assured  that  their  hour  of  retribution  would  come  speedily  and 
easily  enough. 

This  Homeric  incident  deserves  notice  as  illustrating  the  epical 
handling  of  Herodotus.  His  theme  is,  the  invasions  of  Greece  by  Per- 
sia: he  has  now  arrived  at  the  first  eruption,  in  the  bosom  of  Darius, 
of  that  passion  which  impelled  the  Persian  forces  toward  Mara- 
thon and  Salamis — and  he  marks  the  beginning  of  a  new  phase  by 
act  and  word  both  alike  significant.  It  may  be  compared  to  the  liba- 
tion and  prayer  addressed  by  Achilles  in  the  Iliad  to  Zeus,  at  the 
moment  when  lie  is  sending  forth  Patroklus  and  the  Myrmidons  to 
the  rescue  of  the  despairing  Greeks. 

At  first  Darius  had  been  inclined  to  ascribe  the  movement  in  Ionia 
to  the  secret  instigation  of  Histiaeus,  whom  he  called  into  his  presence 
and  questioned.     But  the  latter  found  means  to  satisfy  him,  and 


170  IONIC  -REVOLT. 

even  to  make  out  that  no  such  mischief  would  have  occurred,  if  he 
(Histiseus)  had  been  at  Miletus  instead  of  being  detained  at  Susa. 
"  Send  me  down  to  the  spot  (he  asseverated),  and  I  engage  not  merely 
to  quell  the  revoll  and  pul  into  your  hands  the  traitor  who  beads  it 
— but  also  not  to  take  off  this  tunic  from  my  body,  before  I  shall 
have  added  to  your  empire  the  great  island  of  Sardinia."  An  expe- 
dition to  Sardinia,  though  neveT  realized,  appears  to  have  been  among 
the  favorite  fancies  of  the  Ionic  Greeks  of  that  day.  By  such  boasts 
and  assurances  he  obtained  his  liberty,  and  went  down  to  Sardis, 
promising  to  return  as  soon  as  he  should  have  accomplished  them.  But 
on  reaching  Sardis  lie  found  the  satrap  Artaphernes  better  informed 
than  the  Great  King  at  Susa.  Though  Histiseus,  when  questioned 
as  to  the  causes  which  had  brought  on  the  outbreak,  affected  nothing 
but  ignorance  and  astonishment,  Artaphernes  detected  his  evasions, 
and  said  — "  I  will  tell  you  how  the  facts  stand,  Histiseus:  it  is  you 
that  have  stitched  this  shoe,  and  Ari.-tagoras  has*put  it  on."  Such 
a  declaration  promised  little  security  to  the  suspected  Milesian  who 
bean]  it ;  and  accordingly,  as  soon  as  night  arrived,  he  took  to  flight, 
went  down  to  the  coast,  and  from  thence  passed  over  to  Chios.  Here 
he  found  himself  seized  on  the  opposite  count,  as  the  confidant  of 
Darius  and  the  enemy  of  Ionia,  lis  was  released,  however,  on  pro- 
claiming himself  not  merely  a  fugitive  escaping  from  Persian  cus- 
tody, but  also  as  the  prime  author  of  the  Ionic  revolt;  and  he  farther 
added,  in  order  to  increase  his  popularity,  that  Darius  had  contem- 
plated the  translation  of  the  Ionian  population  to  Phenieia,  as  well  as 
that  of  the  Phenician  population  to  buna — to  prevent  which  trans- 
lation he  (Histiseus)  had  instigated  the  revolt.  This  allegation, 
though  nothing  better  than  a  pure  fabrication,  obtained  for  him  the 
good-will  of  the  Chians,  who  carried  him  back  to  Miletus;  but  before 
lie  departed,  he  dispatched  to  Sardis  some  letters,  addressed  to  dis- 
tinguished Persians,  framed  as  if  he  were  already  in  established 
intrigue  with  them  for  revolting  against  Darius,  and  intended  to 
invite  them  to  actual  revolt.  His  messenger,  Hermippus  of  Atar- 
neus, betrayed  him.  and  carried  his  letters  straight  to  Artaphernes. 
The  satrap  desired  that  these  letters  might  be  delivered  to  the  per- 
sons to  whom  they  were  addressed,  but  that  the  answers  sent  to  His- 
tiseus  might  be  handed  to  himself.  Such  was  the  tenor  of  the  answers, 
that  Artaphernes  was  induced  to  seize  and  put  to  death  several  of  the 
Persians  around  him;  but  Histiseus  was  disappointed  in  his  purpose 
of  bringing  about  a  revolt  in  the  place. 

On  arriving  at  Miletus.  Histiseus  Found  Aristagoras  no  longer  pres- 
ent, and  the  citizens  altogether  adverse  to  the  return  of  their  old  despot ; 
nevertheless  he  tried  to  force  his  way  by  night  into  the  town,  but 
was  repulsed  and  <•-.  en  wounded  in  the  thigh.  He  returned  toCJ 
but  the  Chians  refused  him  the  aid  of  any  of  their  ships:  he  next 
passed  to  Lesbos,  from  the  inhabitants  of  which  island  he  obta 

triremes,  and  employed  them  to  occupy  Byzantium,  pillaging 


SIEGE  OP  MILETUS.  171 

and  detaining  the  Ionian  merchant-ships  as  they  passed  into  or  out  of 
the  Euxine.  The  few  remaining  piracies  of  this  worthless  traitor, 
mischievous  to  his  countrymen  even  down  to  the  day  of  his  death, 
hardly  deserve  our  notice  amid  the  last  struggles  and  sufferings  of 
the  subjugated  Ionians,  to  which  we  are  now  hastening. 

A  vast  Persian  force,  both  military  and  naval,  was  gradually  con- 
centrating ittelf  near  Miletus,  against  which  city  Artaphernes  had 
determined  to  direct  his  principal  efforts.  Not  only  the  whole  army 
of  Asia  Minor,  but  also  the  Kilikian  and  Egyptian  troops  fresh  from 
the  conquest  of  Cyprus,  and  even  the  conquered  Cypriots  themselves, 
were  brought  up  as  reinforcements;  while  the  entire  Phenician  fleet, 
no  less  than  600  ships  strong,  co-operated  on  the  coast.  To  meet  such 
a  land-force  in  the  field  was  far  beyond  the  strength  of  the  Ionians, 
and  the  joint  pan-Ionic  council  resolved  that  the  Milesians  should  be 
left  to  defend  their  own  fortifications,  while  the  entire  force  of  the 
confederate  cities  should  be  mustered  on  board  the  ships.  At  sea 
they  had  as  yet  no  reason  to  despair,  having  been  victorious  over  the 
Phenicians  near  Cyprus,  and  having  sustained  no  defeat.  The  com- 
bined Ionic  fleet,  including  the  /Eolic  Lesbians,  amounting  in  all  to 
the  number  of  353  ships,  was  accordingly  mustered  at  Lade — then  a 
little  island  near  Miletus,  but  now  joined  on  to  the  coast,  by  the  gra- 
dual accumulation  of  land  in  the  bay  at  the  mouth  of  the  Maeander. 
Eighty  Milesian  ships  formed  the  right  wing,  one  hundred  Chian 
ships  the  center,  and  sixty  Samian  ships  the  left  wing,  while  the 
space  between  the  Milesians  and  the  Chians  was  occupied  by  twTelve 
ships  from  Priene,  three  from  Myus,  and  seventeen  from  Teos — the 
space  between  the  Chians  and  Samians  was  filled  by  eight  ships  from 
Erythrne,  three  from  Phokaea,  and  seventy  from  Lesbos. 

The  total  armament  thus  made  up  was  hardly  inferior  in  number 
to  that  which,  fifteen  years  afterward,  gained  the  battle  of  Salamis 
against  a  far  larger  Persian  fleet  than  the  present.  Moreover,  the 
courage  of  the  Ionians,  on  ship-board,  was  equal  to  that  of  their  con- 
temporaries on  the  other  side  of  the  iEgean;  while  in  respect  of  dis- 
agreement among  the  allies,  we  shall  hereafter  find  the  circumstances 
preceding  the  battle  of  Salamis  still  more  menacing  than  those  before 
the  coming  battle  of  Lade.  The  chances  of  success,  therefore,  were  at 
least  equal  between  the  two,  and  indeed  the  anticipations  of  the  Per- 
sians and  Phenicians  on  the  present  occasion  were  full  of  doubt,  so 
that  they  thought  it  necessary  to  set  on  fooL  express  means  for  dis- 
uniting the  Ionians — it  was  fortunate  for  the  Greeks  that  Xerxes  at 
Salamis  could  not  be  made  to  conceive  the  prudence  of  aiming  at  the 
same  object.  There  were  now  in  the  Persian  camp  all  those  various 
despots  whom  Aristagoras,  at  the  beginning  of  the  revolt,  had  driven 
out  of  their  respective  cities.  At  the  instigation  of  Artaphernes,  eac  h  of 
these  men  dispatched  secret  communications  to  their  citizens  ip  the 
allied  fleet,  endeavoring  to  detach  them  severally  from  the  ge^ral 
body,  by  promises  of  gentle  treatment  in  the  event  of  compliance,  and 


172  IONIC  REVOLT. 

by  throats  of  extreme  infliction  from  the  Persians  if  they  persisted  in 
armed  efforts.  Though  these  communications  were  Ben1  to  each  with- 
out the  knowledge  01  the  rest,  yel  the  answerfrom  all  was  one  unani- 
mous negative!  The  confederates  at  Lade  seemed  more  one,  in  heart 
and  spirit,  than  the  Athenians,  Spartans,  and  Corinthians  will  here- 
after prove  to  be  at  Salamis. 
Bui  there  was  one  grand  difference  which  turned  the  scale — the 

superior    energy   and    ability   of    the   Athenian    leaders    at    Salamis, 

coupled  with  the  fact  thai  they  were  Athenians — that  is,  in  com- 
mand of  the  largest  and  most  important  contingent  throughout  the 
fleet. 

At  Lade,  unfortunately,  this  was  quite  otherwise.  Each  separate 
contingent  had  its  own  commander,  hut  Ave  hear  of  no  joint  com- 
mander at  all.  Nor  were  the  chiefs  who  came  from  the  larger  cities 
— Milesian,  Chian,  Samian,  or  Lesbian — men  like  Tbemistokles, 
competent  and  willing  to  stand  forward  as  self-created  leaders,  and 
usurp  for  the  moment,  with  the  general  consenl  and  lor  the  general 
benefit,  a  privilege  not  intended  for  them.  r!  he  only  man  of  suffi- 
cient energy  and  forwardness  to  do  this,  was  the  Phoka'an  Diony- 
sius — unfortunately  the  captain  of  the  smallest  contingent  of  the 
fleet,  and  therefore  enjoying  the  least  respect.  For  Phokffia,  once 
the  daring  explorer  of  the  western  waters,  had  so  dwindled  down 
since  the  Persian  conquest  of  Ionia,  that  she  could  now  furnish  no 
more  than  three  ships,  and  her  ancient  maritime  spirit  survived  only 
in  the  bosom  of  her  captain.  When  Dioiiysius  saw  the  lonians 
assembled  at  bade,  willing,  eager,  full  of  talk  and  mutual  encourage- 
ment, but  untrained  and  taking  no  thoughl  of  discipline,  or  nautical 
practice,  or  co-operation  in  the  hour  of  battle— he  saw  the  risk  which 
they  ran  for  want  of  these  precautions,  and  strenuously  remon- 
strated with  them:  ''Our  fate  hangs  on  the  razor's  edge,  men  of 
Ionia:  cither  to  be  freemen  or  slaves, — and  slaves,  too,  caught  after 
running  away.  Set  yourself  at  once  to  work  and  duty.  You  will 
then  have  trouble  indeed  at  first,  with  certain  victory  and  freedom 
afterward;  but  if  you  persist  in  this  carelessness  and  disorder,  there 
is  no  hope  for  you  to  escape  the  king's  revenge  for  your  revolt.  Be 
persuaded  and  <  ommit  yourself  to  me.  1  pledge  myself,  if  the  gods 
only  hold  an  equal  balance,  that  your  enemies  either  will  not  light, 
or  will  be  severely  beaten." 

The  wisdom  of  this  advice  was  so  apparent,  that  the  lonians,  emit- 
ting their  comfortable  tents  on  the  shore  of  Lade,  and  going  on  board 

their  ships,  submitted  themselves  to  the  continuous  nautical  labors 
and  maneuvers  imposed  upon  them  by  Dionysius.  The  rowers,  and 
the  hopliies  on  the  deck,  were  exercised  in  their  separate  functions, 

and  even  when  they  were  not  so  employed,  the  ships  were  kept  at 
anchor,  and  the  crews  on  board,  instead  of  on  shore;  SO  that  the 
work  lasted  all  day  long,  under  a  hot  summer's  sun.  Such  labor 
was  new  to  the  Ionian  crews.     They  endured  it  for  seven  successive 


IONIC  CREWS  AND  ATHENIAN  SEAMEN.        173 

days,  after  which  they  broke  out  with  one  accord  into  resolute 
mutiny  and  refusal:  "Which  of  the  Gods  have  we  offended,  to 
bring  upon  ourselves  such  a  retribution  as  this?  madmen  as  we  are, 
to  put  ourselves  into  the  hands  of  this  Phoka?an  braggart,  who  has 
furnished  only  three  ships!  He  has  now  got  us  and  is  ruining  us 
without  remedy;  many  of  us  are  already  sick,  many  others  are  sick- 
ening. We  had  better  make  up  our  minds  to  Persian  slavery,  or 
any  other  mischiefs,  rather  than  go  on  with  these  present  sufferings. 
Come,  we  will  not  obey  this  man  any  longer."  And  they  forthwith 
refused  to  execute  his  orders,  resuming  their  tents  on  shore,  with  the 
enjoyments  of  shade,  rest,  and  inactive  talk,  as  before. 

I  have  not  chosen  to  divest  this  instructive  scene  of  the  dramatic 
liveliness  with  which  it  is  given  in  Herodotus — the  more  so  as  it  has 
all  the  air  of  reality,  and  as  Hekataeus  the  historian  was  probably 
present  in  the  Island  of  Lade,  and  may  have  described  what  he  actu- 
ally saw  and  heard.  When  we  see  the  intolerable  hardship  which 
these  nautical  maneuvers  and  labors,  imposed  upon  the  Ionians, 
though  men  not  accustomed  to  ordinary  ship- work, — and  when  we 
witness  their  perfect  incapacity  to  submit  themselves  to  such  a  dis- 
cipline, even  with  extreme  danger  staring  them  in  the  face — we  shall 
be  able  to  appreciate  the  severe  and  unremitting  toil  whereby  the 
Athenian  seaman  afterward  purchased  that  perfection  of  nautical 
discipline  which  characterized  him  at  the  beginning  of  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  war.  It  will  appear,  as  we  proceed  with  this  history,  that 
the  full  development  of  the  Athenian  democracy  worked  a  revolution 
in  Grecian  military  marine,  chiefly  by  enforcing  upon  the  citizen 
seaman  a  stric  continuous  training,  such  as  was  only  supassed  by 
the  Lacedaemonian  drill  on  land — and  by  thus  rendering  practicable 
a  species  of  nautical  maneuvering,  which  was  unknown  even  at  the 
time  of  the  battle  of  Salamis.  I  shall  show  this  more  fully  here- 
after: at  present  I  contrast  it  briefly  with  the  incapacity  of  the 
Ionians  at  Lade,  in  order  that  it  may  be  understood  how  painful 
such  training  really  was.  The  reader  of  Grecian  history  is  usually 
taught  to  associate  only  ideas  of  turbulence  and  anarchy  with  the 
Athenian  democracy.  But  the  Athenian  navy,  the  child  and  cham- 
pion of  that  democracy,  will  be  found  to  display  an  indefatigable 
labor  and  obedience  nowhere  else  witnessed  in  Greece — of  which 
even  the  first  lessons,  as  in  the  case  now  before  us,  prove  to  others 
so  irksome  as  to  outweigh  the  prospect  of  extreme  and  imminent 
peril.  The  same  impatience  of  steady  toil  and  discipline,  which  the 
Ionians  displayed  to  their  own  ruin  before  the  battle  of  Lade,  will 
be  found  to  characterize  them  fifty  years  afterward  as  allies  of 
Athens,  as  I  shall  have  occasion  to  show  when  I  come  to  describe 
the  Athenian  empire. 

Ending  in  this  abrupt  and  mutinous  manner,  the  judicious  sug- 
gestions of  the  Phokaean  leader  did  more  harm  than  good.  Perhaps 
his  manner  of  dealing  may  have  been  unadvisedly  rude;  but  we  are 


174  IONIC  REVOLT. 

surprised  to  see  that  no  one  among  tho  leaders  of  the  larger  contin- 

fenta  bad  the  good  sense  to  avail  himself  of  the  first  readiness  of  the 
onians,  and  to  employ  his  superior  influence  in  securing  the  con- 
tinuance of  s  good  practice  once  begun.  Not  one  such  superior  man 
did  this  I"i  ic  r<  voll  throw  up.  From  the  day  on  which  t lie  [onians 
discarded  Dionysius,  their  camp  became  a  scene  of  disunion  and 
mistrust.  Some  of  them  grew  so  reckless  and  unmangeable,  thai 
the  better  portion  despaired  of  maintaining  any  orderly  liattlc;  and 
the  Samians  in  particular  now  repented  that  they  had  declined  the 
secret  offers  made  to  them  by  their  expelled  despot — .Fakes,  son  of 
Byloson.  Thej  senl  privately  to  renew  the  negotiation,  received  a 
fresh  promise  of  the  same  indulgence;  and  agreed  to  desert  when  the 
<  ccasion  arrived.  On  the  day  of  battle,  v»  hen  the  two  fleets  were  on 
the  point  of  coming  to  action,  the  sixly  Si  mian  ships  all  sailed  off, 
except  eleven  whose  captains  disdained  such  treachery.  Other 
Ionians  followed  their  example;  yel  amidst  the  reciprocal  crimina- 
tion which  Herodotus  had  heard,  he  finds  it  difficult  to  determine 
who  was  most  to  blame,  though  he  names  the  Lesbians  as  among  the 
earliest  deserters.  The  hundred  ships  from  Chios,  constituting  the 
center  of  the  fleet— each  ship  carrying  forty  chosen  soldiers  fully 
armed — formed  a  brillianl  exception  to  the  rest.  They  fought  with 
the  greatest  fidelity  and  resolution,  inflicting  upon  the  enemy,  and 
themselves  sustaining,  heavy  loss.  Dionysius  the  Phoksean  also 
behaved  in  a  manner  worthy  of  his  previous  language,  and  captured 
with  his  three  ships  the  like  number  of  Phenicians.  But  such 
examples  of  bravery  did  not  compensate  the  treachery  or  cowardice 
of  the  rest.  The  defeat  of  the  Ionians  at  Lade  was  complete  as  well 
as  irrecoverable,  To  the  faithful  Chians,  the  loss  was  terrible  both 
in  the  battle  and  after  it ;  for  though  sonic  of  their  vessels  escaped 
from  the  defeat  safely  to  Chios,  others  were  so  damaged  as  to  be 
obliged  to  run  ashore  close  at  hand  on  the  promontory  of  Mykale, 
where  the  crews  quitted  them,  with  the  intention  of  marching  north- 
ward through  the  Epbesian  territory  to  the  continent  opposite  their 
own  island.  We  hear  with  astonishment,  that  at  that  critical 
moment,  the  Ephesian  women  were  engaged  in  solemnizing  the 
Thesmophoria, — a  festival  celebrated  at  night,  in  the  open  air,  in 
some  uninhabited  portion  of  the  territory,  and  without  the  presi  nee 
of  any  male  person.  As  the  Chian  fugitives  entered  the  Ephesian 
territory  by  night,  their  coming  being  neither  known  nor  antici- 
pated—it was  believed  that  they  were  thieves  or  pirates  (oming  to 
seize  the  women,  and  under  this  error  they  were  attacked  by  the 
Ephesians  and  slain.  It  would  seem  from  this  incident  that  the 
Ephesians  had  taken  no  part  in  the  Ionic  revolt,  nor  are  they  men- 
tioned amidst  the  various  contingents;  nor  is  anything  said  either  of 
Kolophon,  or  Lebedus,  or  Eras. 

The  Phoksean  Dionysius,  perceiving  that  the  defeat  of  Lade  was 
the  ruin  of  the  Ionic  cause,  and  that  his  native  city  was  again  doomed 


SIEGE,  CAPTURE,  AND  RUIN  OF  MILETUS.        175 

to  Persian  subjection,  did  not  think  it  prudent  even  to  return  home. 
Immediately  after  the  battle  he  set  sail,  not  for  Phoksea,  but  for  the 
Phenician  coast,  at  this  moment  stripped  of  its  protecting  cruisers. 
Be  seized  several  Phenician  merchantmen,  out  of  which  considerable 
profit  was  obtained:  then  setting  sail  for  Sicily,  he  undertook  the 
occupation  of  a  privateer  against  the  Carthaginians  and  Tyrrhenians, 
abstaining  from  injury  toward  Greeks.  Such  an  employment  seems 
then  to  have  been  considered  perfectly  admissible.  A  considerable 
body  of  Samians  also  migrated  to  Sicily,  indignant  at  the  treachery 
of  their  admirals  in  the  battle,  and  yet  more  indignant  at  the 
approaching  restoration  of  their  despot  iEakes.  Howt  these  Samian 
emigrants  became  established  in  the  Sicilian  town  of  Zankle,  I  shall 
mention  as  a  part  of  the  course  of  Sicilian  events,  which  will  come 
hereafter. 

The  victory  of  Lade  enabled  the  Persians  to  attack  Miletus  by  sea 
as  well  as  by  land;  they  prosecuted  the  siege  with  the  utmost  vigor, 
by  undermining  the  walls,  and  by  various  engines  of  attack.  Their 
resources  in  this  respect  seem  to  have  been  enlarged  since  the  days 
of  Harpagiis.  In  no  long  time  the  city  was  taken  by  storm,  and  mis- 
erable was  the  fate  reserved  to  it.  The  adult  male  population  was 
chiefly  slain;  while  such  of  them  as  were  preserved,  together  with 
the  women  and  children,  were  sent  in  a  body  to  Susa  to  await  the 
orders  of  Darius,  who  assigned  to  them  a  residence  at  Ampe,  not  far 
from  the  mouth  of  the  Tigris.  The  temple  at  Brauchidse  was  burnt 
and  pillaged,  as  Hekatseus  had  predicted  at  the  beginning  of  the 
revolt.  The  large  treasures  therein  contained  must  have  gone  far  to 
defray  the  costs  of  the  Persian  army.  The  Milesian  territory  is  said 
to  have  been  altogether  denuded  of  its  former  inhabitants — the  Per- 
sians retaining  for  themselves  the  city  with  the  plain  adjoining  to  it, 
and  making  over  the  mountainous  portions  to  the  Kariaus  of  Pedasa. 
Some  few  of  the  Milesians  found  a  place  among  the  Samian  emi- 
grants to  Sicily.  It  is  certain,  however,  that  the  new  Grecian  inhab- 
itants must  have  been  subsequently  admitted  into  Miletus;  for  it 
appears  ever  afterward  as  a  Grecian  town,  though  with  diminished 
power  and  importance. 

The  capture  of  Miletus,  in  the  sixth  year  from  the  commencement 
of  the  revolt,  carried  with  it  the  rapid  submission  of  the  neighboring 
towns  in  Karia:  and  during  the  next  summer — the  Phenician  fleet 
having  wintered  at  Miletus — the  Persian  forces  by  sea  and  land 
reconquered  all  the  Asiatic  Greeks,  insular  as  well  as  continental. 
Chios,  Lesbos,  and  Tenedos — the  towns  in  the  Chersonese — Sclym- 
bria  and  Perinthus  in  Thrace — Prokonuesus  and  Artake  in  the  Pro- 
pontis — all  these  towns  were  taken  or  sacked  by  the  Persian  and 
Phenician  fleet.  The  inhabitants  of  Byzantium  and  Chalkedon  fled 
for  the  most  part,  without  even  awaiting  its  arrival,  to  Mesembria; 
while  the  Athenian  Miltiades  only  escaped  Persian  captivity  by  a 
rapid  flight  from  his  abode  in  the  Chersonese  to  Athens.     His  pur- 


176  IONIC  REVOLT. 

sviers  were  indeed  bo  close  upon  him,  that  one  of  his  ships,  with  Lis 
son  Metioclrus  on  board,  fell  into  their  hands.  As  Miltiades  had 
been  Btrenuous  in  urging  the  destruction  of  the  bridge  over  the  Dan- 
ube, on  the  occasion  of  the  Scythian  expedition,  the  Phenicians  were 
particularly  anxious  to  gel  possession  of  his  person,  as  the  most 
acceptable  of  all  Greek  prisoners  to  the  Persian  sing;  who,  however, 
when  Metiochus,  the  son  of  Miltiades,  was  brought  to  Susa,  not  only 
did  him  no  harm,  but  treated  him  with  greal  kindness,  and  gave  him 
a  Persian  wife  with  a  comfortable  maintenance. 
Far  otherwise  did  the  Persian  generals  deal  with  the  reconquered 

cities  on  and  near  the  coast.  The  threats  which  had  been  laid  out 
before  the  battle  of  Lade  were  realized  to  the  full.  The  most  beauti- 
ful Greek  youths  and  virgins  were  picked  out,  to  be  distributed 
among  the  Persian  grandees  as  t  unuchs  or  inmates  of  the  harems. 
The  cities,  with  their  edifices'  sacred  as  well  as  profane,  were  made  a 
prey  to  the  flames;  and  in  the  case  of  the  islands,  Herodotus  even 
tells  us  that  a  line  of  Persians  was  formed  from  shore  to  shore,  which 
swept  each  territory  from  north  to  south,  and  drove  the  inhabitants 
out  of  it.  That  much  of  this  hard  treatment  is  well  founded,  there 
can  be  no  doubt.  But  it  must  be  exaggerated  as  to  extent  of  depop- 
ulation and  destruction,  for  these  islands  and  cities  appear  ever  after- 
ward as  occupied  by  a  Grecian  population,  and  even  as  in  a  tolera- 
ble, though  reduced,  condition.  Samos  was  made  an  exception  to 
the  rest,  and  completely  spared  by  the  Persians,  as  a  reward  to  its 
captains  for  setting  the  example  of  desertion  at  the  battle  of  I.ade; 
while  /Lakes,  the  despot  of  that  island,  was  reinstated  in  his  govern- 
ment. It  appears  that  several  other  despots  were  reinstated  at  the 
same  time  in  their  respective  cities,  though  we  are  not  told  which. 

Amid  the  sufferings  endured  by  so  many  innocent  persons,  of 
every  age  and  of  both  sexes,  the  fate  of  Histiseus  excites  but  little 
sympathy,  lie  was  carrying  on  his  piracies  at  Byzantium  when  he 
learnt  the  surrender  of  Miletus;  he  then  thought  it  expedient  to  sail 
with  his  Lesbian  vessels  for  Chios,  where  admittance  was  refused  to 
him.  But  the  Chians,  weakened  as  they  had  been  by  the  late  battle, 
were  in  little  condition  to  resist,  so  that  he  defeated  their  troops  and 
despoiled  the  island.  During  the  present  break-up  of  the  Asiatic 
Greeks,  there  were  doubtless  many  who  (like  the  Phokavau  Dionysius) 
did  not  choose  to  return  home  to  an  enslaved  city,  yet  had  no  fixed 
plan  for  a  new  abode.  Of  these  exiles,  a  considerable  number  put 
themselves  under  the  temporary  command  of  HistisBus,  and  accom- 
panied him  to  the  plunder  of  Thasos.  While  besieging  that  town, 
he  learnt  the  news  that  the  Phenician  fleet  had  quitted  Miletus  to 
attack  the  remaining  Ionic  towns.  He  therefore  left  his  designs  on 
Thasos  unfinished,  in  order  to  go  and  defend  Lesbos.  But  in  this 
latter  island  the  dearth  of  provisions  was  such,  that  he  was  forced  to 
cross  over  to  the  continent  to  reap  the  standing  corn,  around  Atar- 
neus  and  in  the  fertile  plain  of  Mysia  near  the  river  Kaikus.     Here 


PHRYNICHUS  IS  FINED.  177 

he  fell  in  with  a  considerable  Persian  force  under  Harpagus — was 
beaten,  compelled  to  tlee,  and  taken  prisoner.  On  his  being  carried 
to  Sardis,  Artapliernes  the  satrap  caused  him  to  be  at  once  crucified: 
partly  no  doubt  from  genuine  hatred,  but  palrtly  also  under  the  per- 
suasion that  if  he  were  sent  up  as  a  prisoner  to  Snsa,  he  might  again 
become  daugerous,  since  Darius  would  even  now  spare  his  life,  under 
an  indelible  sentiment  of  gratitude  for  the  maintenance  of  the  bridge 
over  the  Danube.  The  head  of  Histiaeus  was  embalmed  and  sent  up 
to  Susa,  where  Darius  caused  it  to  be  honorably  buried,  condemning 
this  precipitate  execution  of  a  man  who  had  once  been  his  preserver. 
We  need  not  wonder  that  the  capture  of  Miletus  excited  the  strong- 
est feeling,  of  mixed  sympathy  and  consternation,  among  the  Atheni- 
ans. In  the  succeeding  year  (so  at  least  we  are  led  to  think,  though 
the  date  cannot  be  positively  determined)  it  was  selected  as  the  sub- 
ject of  a  tragedy) — The  Capture  of  Miletus — by  the  dramatic  poet 
Phrynichus;  which,  when  performed,  so  painfully  wrung  the  feel- 
ings of  the  Athenian  audience,  that  they  burst  into  tears  in  the  thea- 
ter, and  the  poet  was  condemned  to  pay  a  fine  of  one  thousand 
drachmae,  as  "having  recalled  to  them  their  own  misfortune."  The 
piece  was  forbidden  to  be  afterward  acted,  and  has  not  come  down 
to  us.  Some  critics  have  supposed  that  Herodotus  has  not  correctly 
assigned  the  real  motive  which  determined  the  Athenians  to  impose 
this  fine;  for  it  is  certain  that  the  subjects  usually  selected  for  trag- 
edy were  portions  of  heroic  legend,  and  not  matters  of  recent  his- 
tory; so  that  the  Athenians  might  complain  of  Phrynichus  on  the 
double  ground — for  having  violated  an  established  canon  of  propri- 
ety, as  well  as  for  touching  their  sensibilities  too  deeply.  Still,  I  see 
no  reason  for  doubting  that  the  cause  assigned  by  Herodotus  is  sub- 
stantially the  true  one.  Yet  it  is  very  possible  that  Phrynichus,  at 
an  age  when  tragic  poetry  had  not  yet  reached  its  full  development, 
might  touch  this  very  tender  subject  with  a  rough  and  offensive 
hand,  before  a  people  who  had  fair  reason  to  dread  the  like  cruel 
fate  for  themselves.  iEschylus,  in  his  Persae,  would  naturally  carry 
with  him  the  full  tide  of  Athenian  sympathy,  while  dwelling  on  the 
victories  of  Salamis  and  Platsea.  But  to  interest  the  audience  in  Per- 
sian success  and  Grecian  suffering,  was  a  task  in  which  much  greater 
poets  than  Phrynichus  would  have  failed — and  which  no  judicious 
poet  would  have  undertaken.  The  sack  of  Magdeburg  by  Count 
Tilly,  in  the  Thirty  Years'  war,  was  not  likely  to  be  endured  as  the 
subject  of  dramatic  representation  in  any  Protestant  town  of  Ger- 
many. 


178     IONIC  REVOLT  TO  BATTLE  OF  MARATHOfi 
CHAPTER  XXXVI. 

FROM  IONIC  REVOLT   TO   BATTLE    OF    MARATHON. 

In  the  preceding  chapter,  I  indicated  the  point  of  confluence 
between  the  European  and  Asiatic  streams  of  Grecian  history — the 
commencement  of  a  decided  Persian  intention  to  conquer  Attica; 
manifested  first  in  the  form  of  a  threat  by  Artaphernes  the  satrap, 
when  he  enjoined  the  Athenians  to  take  back  Bippias  as  the 
condition  of  safety,  and  afterward  converted  into  a  passion  in  the 
bosom  (if  Darius  in  consequence  of  the  burning  of  Bardis.  From 
this  time  forward,  therefore,  the  affairs  of  Greece  and  Persia  come 
to  be  in  direct  relation  one  with  the  other,  and  capable  of  b<  ing 
embodied,  much  more  than  before,  into  one  continuous  narrative. 

The  reconquesl  of  Ionia  being  thoroughly  completed,  An.  i 
proceeded  to  organize  the  future  government  of  it,  with  a   'I 
prudence  and  forethought  not  often  visible  in  Persian  procei 
Convoking  deputies  from  all  the  different  cities,  he  compelled 
to  enter  into  a  permanent  convention  for  the  amicable  settlement   of 
disputes,  so  as  to  prevent  all  employment  of  force  by  anyone.- .. 
the  others.     Moreover  he   caused   the   territory  of  each  city  to  be 
measured  by  parasangs  (each  parasang  was  equal  to  thirty  stadia,  or 
about  three  miles  ami  a  half),  and  arrangi  d  the  ai  j<  ssmente  of  tribute 
according  to  this  measurement ;  withoul  any  material  departure,  bow  - 
ever,  for  tbe  sums  which  had  been  paid  before  the  revolt.     Unfor- 
tunately,   Herodotus    is   unusually    bri<  !'    in    his    allusion    to    this 
proceeding,  which  it  would  have  been  highly  interesting  to  bi 
to  comprehend  perfectly.     We  may.  however,  assume  it  as  certain 
that  both  the  population  and  the  territory  of  many  among  the  Ionic 
cities,  if  not  of  all,  were  materially  altered  in  consequence  of  the  pre- 
ceding revolt,  ami  still  more  in  consequence  of  the  cruelties  with 
which  the  suppression  of  the  revolt   had   been  accompanied.     In 
regard  to  Miletus,  Herodotus  tells  us  that  the  Persians  retained  for 
themselves  the  city,  with  its  circumjacent  plain,  but  gave  the  moun- 
tain-portion of  the  Milesian  territory  to  the  Kalians  of  Pedasa.     Su<  h 
a  proceeding  would  naturally  call  for  fresh  measurement  and  i 
nicnt  of  tribute;  and  there  may  have  been  similar  transfers  of  land 
here.     1  have  already  observed  that  the  statements  which  we 
find  in  Herodotus,  of  utter  depopulation  and  destruction  fallin 
the  cities,  cannot  he  credited  in  their  full  extent ;  for  these  cities  are 
all  peopled,  and  all  Hellenic,  afterward.     Yet  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  they  are  partially  true,  and  that  the  miseries  of  these  da; 
stated  in  the  work  of  Hekata  us  as  well  as  by  contemporary  infor. 
mants  with  whom  Herodotus  had  probably  conversed,  must  ha\  i 


MARDONIUS  PUTS  DOWN  THE  DESPOTS.        179 

extreme.  New  inhabitants  would  probably  be  admitted  in  many  of 
them,  to  supply  the  loss  sustained;  and  such  infusion  of  fresh  blood 
would  strengthen  the  necessity  for  the  organization  introduced  by 
Artapherues,  in  order  to  determine  clearly  the  obligations  due  from 
the  cities  both  to  the  Persian  government  and  toward  each  other. 
Herodotus  considers  that  the  arrangement  was  extremely  beneficial 
to  the  Ionians,  and  so  it  must  unquestionably  have  appeared,  coining 
as  it  did  immediately  after  so  much  previous  suffering.  He  farther 
adds  that  the  tribute  then  fixed  remained  unaltered  until  his  own 
day — a  statement  requiring  some  comment,  which  I  reserve  until  the 
time  arrives  for  describing  the  condition  of  the  Asiatic  Greeks  after 
the  repulse  of  Xerxes  from  Greece  proper. 

Meanwhile  the  intentions  of  Darius  for  the  conquest  of  Greece 
were  now  effectively  manifested.  JMardonius,  invested  with  tin: 
supreme  command,  at  the  head  of  a  large  force,  was  sent  down  in 
the  ensuing  spring  for  the  purpose.  Having  reached  Kilikia  in  the 
course  of  the  march,  he  himself  got  on  ship-board  and  went  by  sea  to 
Ionia,  while  his  army  marched  across  Asia  Minor  to  the  Hellespont. 
His  proceeding  in  IoLia  surprises  us,  and  seems  to  have  appeared 
surprising  as  well  to  Herodotus  himself  as  to  his  readers.  Mardonius 
deposed  the  despots  throughout  the  various  Greek  cities;  leaving  the 
people  of  each  to  govern  themselves,  subject  to  Persian  dominion  and 
tribute.  This  was  a  complete  reversal  of  the  former  policy  of  Persia, 
and  must  be  ascribed  to  a  new  conviction,  doubtless  wise  and  well- 
founded,  which  had  recently  grown  up  among  the  Persian  hade:  , 
that  on  the  whole  their  unpopularity  was  aggravated  more  than  their 
strength  was  iucreased,  by  employing  these  despots  as  instruments. 
The  phenomena  of  the  late  Ionic  revolt  were  well  calculated  to  teach 
such  a  lesson;  but  we  shall  not  often  find  the  Persians  profiting  by 
experience,  throughout  the  course  of  this  history. 

Mardonius  did  not  remain  long  in  Ionia,  but  passed  on  with  his 
fleet  to  the  Hellespont,  where  the  land  force  had  already  arrived. 
He  transported  it  across  into  Europe,  and  began  his  march  through 
Thrace;  all  of  which  had  already  been  reduced  by  Megabazus,  and 
does  not  seem  to  have  participated  in  the  Ionic  revolt.  The  island 
of  Thasus  surrendered  to  the  fleet  without  resistance,  and  the  land 
force  was  conveyed  across  the  Strymon  to  the  Greek  city  of  Akan- 
thus.  on  the  western  coast  of  the  Strymonic  Gulf.  From  hence  Mar- 
donius marched  into  Macedonia,  and  subdued  a  considerable  portion 
of  its  inhabitants — perhaps  some  of  those  not  comprised  in  the 
dominion  of  Amyntas,  since  that  prince  had  before  submitted  to 
Megabazus.  Meanwhile  he  sent  his  fleet  to  double  the  promontory 
of  Mount  Athos,  and  to  join  the  land  force  again  at  the  Gulf  of 
Therma,  with  a  view  of  conquering  as  much  of  Greece  as  he  could, 
and  even  of  prosecuting  the  march  as  far  as  Athens  and  Eretria;  so 
that  the  expedition  afterward  accomplished  by  Xerxes  would  have 
been  tried  at  least  by  Mardonius,  twelve  or  thirteen  years  earlier,  had 


180      IONIC  REVOLT  TO  BATTLE  OF  MARATHON 

not  a  terrible  storm  completely  disabled  the  fleet.  The  sea  near 
Allios  was  then,  and  is  now,  full  of  peril  1o  navigators.  One  of  the 
hurricanes  so  frequenl  in  its  neighborhood  overtook  the  Persian 
fleet,  destroyed  300  ships,  and  drowned  or  casl  ashore  not  less 
than  20,000  men.  Of  those  who  reached  the  shore,  many  died 
of  cold,  or  were  devoured  by  the  wild  beasts  on  that  inhospi- 
table tongue  <>f  land.  This  disaster  checked  altogether  the  farther 
progress  of  Mardonius,  who  also  sustained  considerable  loss  with  his 
land  army,  and  was  himself  wounded  in  a  night  attack  made  upon 
him  by  the  tribe  of  Thracians  called  BrygL  Though  strong  enough 
to  repel  and  avenge  this  attack,  and  to  subdue  the  Brygi,  he  was  yet 
in  no  condition  to  advance  farther.  Both  the  land  force  and  the 
fleet  were  conveyed  back  to  the  Hellespont,  and  from  thence  across 
to  Asia,  with  so  much  shame  of  failure,  that  Mardonius  was  never 
again  employed  by  Darius;  though  we  cannot  make  out  that  the 

\  as  imputable  to  him.  We  shall  hear  of  him  again  under 
Xers 

The  ill-success  of  Mardonius  seems  to  have  inspired  the  Thasians, 
so  recently  subdued,  with  the  idea  of  revolting.  At  least  their  con- 
duet  provoked  the  suspicion  of  Darius;  for  they  made  active  prepara- 
tions for  defense,  both  by  building  war-ships,  and  by  strengthening 
their  fortifications.  The  Thasians  were  at  this  time  in  great  opu- 
lence, chiefly  from  gold  and  silver  mine--,  both  in  their  island  and  in 
their  mam  land  territory  opposite.  The  mines  at  Skapte  Hyle  in 
Thrace  yielded  to  them  an  annual  income  of  eighty  talents;  their 
total  surplus  revenue — after  defraying  all  the  expenses  of  government 
so  that  the  inhabitants  were  entirely  untaxed — was  200  talents 
(  E46,000,  if  Attic  talents;  more,  if  cither  Euboic  or  yEgimean).  With 
such  large  means,  they  were  enabled  soon  to  make  preparations 
i  ed  notice  among  their  neighbors;  many  of  whom  were 
.1  his  of  their  prosperity,  and  perhaps  inclined  to  dispute 
v,  ith  them  possession  of  the  profitable  mines  of  Skapte  Hyle.  As  in 
other  cases,  so  in  this:  the  jealousies  among  subject  neighbors  often 
procured  revelations  to  the  superior  power.  The  proceedings  of  the 
Thasians  were  made  known,  and  they  were  forced  to  raze  their  for- 
tifications as  well  as  to  surrender  all  their  ships  to  the  Persians  at 
Abdera. 

Though  dissatisfied  with  Mardonius,  Darius  was    only  the  more 

3  benl  on  his  project  of  conquering  Greece.  Hippias  was  at 
his  side  to  keep  alive  his  wrath  against  the  Athenians.     Older-;  were 

ched  to  the  maritime  cities  of  his  empire  to  equip  both  ships  of 
v>ar  and    horse-transports    for  a   renewed    attempt.     His  intentions 

pn  bably  known  in  Greece  itself  by  this  time,  from  the  recent 
march  of  his  army  to  Macedonia.     Nevertheless,  he  now  thought  it 

ible  to  send  heralds  round  to  most  of  the  Grecian  cities,  in  order 
to  require  from  each  the  formal  token  of  submission — earth  and 
water;  and  thus  to  ascertain  what  extent  of  resistance  his  projected 


SUBMISSION  OF  .EGINA.  181 

expedition  was  likely  to  experience.  The  answers  received  were  to 
a  high  degree  favorable.  Many  of  the  continental  Greeks  sent  their 
submission,  as  well  as  all  those  islanders  to  whom  application  was 
made.  Among  the  former  we  are  probably  to  reckon  the  Thebans 
and  Thessalians,  though  Herodotus  does  not  particularize  them. 
Among  the  latter  Naxos,  Euboea,  and  some  of  the  smaller  islands,  are 
not  included ;  but  ./Egina,  at  that  time  the  first  maritime  power  of 
Greece,  is  expressly  included. 

Nothing  marks  so  clearly  the  imminent  peril  in  which  the  liberties 
of  Greece  were  now  placed,  and  the  terror  inspired  by  the  Persians 
after  their  reconquest  of  Ionia,  as  this  abasement  on  the  part  of  the 
/Eginetans,  whose  commerce  with  the  Asiatic  islands  and  continent 
doubtless  impressed  them  strongly  with  the  melancholy  consequences 
of  unsuccessful  resistance  to  the  Great  King.  But  on  the  present 
occasion  their  conduct  was  dictated  as  much  by  antipathy  to  Athens 
as  by  fear,  so  that  Greece  was  thus  threatened  with  the  intrusion  of 
the  Persian  arm  as  ally  and  arbiter  in  her  internal  contests — a  contin- 
gency which,  if  it  had  occurred  now  in  the  dispute  between  iEgina 
and  Athens,  would  have  led  to  the  certain  enslavement  of  Greece, 
though  when  it  did  occur  nearly  a  century  afterward,  toward  the 
close  of  the  Peloponnesian  war  and  in  consequence  of  the  prolonged 
struggle  between  Lacedaemon  and  Athens,  Greece  had  become  strong 
enough  in  her  own  force  to  endure  it  without  the  loss  of  substantial 
independence. 

The  war  between  Thebes  and  ^Egina  on  one  side,  and  Athens  on 
the  other — begun  several  years  before,  and  growing  out  of  the  con- 
nection between  Athens  and  Plataea — had  never  yet  been  terminated. 
The  ^Eginetans  had  taken  part  in  that  war  from  gratuitous  feeling, 
either  of  friendship  for  Thebes  or  of  enmity  to  Athens,  without  any 
direct  ground  of  quarrel,  and  they  had  begun  the  war  even  without 
the  formality  of  notice.  Though  a  period  apparently  not  less  than 
fourteen  years  (from  about  506-492  b.c.)  had  elapsed,  the  state  of 
hostility  still  continued;  and  we  may  readily  conceive  that  Hippias, 
the  great  instigator  of  Persian  attack  upon  Greece,  would  not  fail  to 
enforce  upon  all  the  enemies  of  Athens  the  prudence  of  seconding, 
or  at  least  of  not  opposing,  the  efforts  of  the  Persian  to  reinstate  him 
in  that  city.  It  was  partly  under  this  feeling,  combined  with  genu- 
ine alarm,  that  both  Thebes  and  iEgina  manifested  submissive  dis- 
positions towrard  the  heralds  of  Darius. 

Among  these  heralds,  some  had  gone  both*  to  Athens  and  to  Sparta, 
for  the  same  purpose  of  demanding  earth  and  water.  The  reception 
given  to  them  at  both  places  was  angry  in  the  extreme.  The  Athe- 
nians cast  the  herald  into  the  pit  called  (lie  Barathrum,  into  which 
they  sometimes  precipitated  public  criminals:  the  Spartans  threw  the 
herald  who  came  to  them  into  a  well,  desiring  the  unfortunate  mes- 
senger to  take  earth  and  water  from  thence  to  the  king.  The  invio- 
lability of  heralds  was  so  ancient  and  undisputed  in  Greece,  from  the 


182     IONIC  REVOLT  TO  BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 

Homeric  times  downward,  that  nothing  short  of  the  fiercest  excite- 
menl  could  have  instigated  any  Grecian  community  to  such  an  out 
But  to  the  Lacedaemonians,  now  accustomed  t < •  regard  then 
as  the  first  of  all  Grecian  states,  and  to  be  addressed  always  in  the 
character  of  superiors,  the  demand  appeared  so  gross  an  insult  as  to 
banish  from  their  minds  for  the  time  all  recollection  of  established 
obligations.  They  came  subsequently,  however,  to  repent  of  the 
act  as  highly  criminal,  and  to  look  upon  it  as  the  cause  of  misfor- 
tunes which  overtook  them  thirty  or  forty  years  afterward.  How 
they  tried  at  that  time  to  expiate  it,  I  shall  hen  alter  recount. 

But  if,  on  the  one  hand,  the  wounded  dignity  of  the  Spartans 
hurried  them  into  the  commission  of  this  wrong,  it  was  on  the  other 
hand  of  signal  use  to  the  general  liberties  of  Greece,  by  rousing  them 

out  of  their  apathy  as  to  the  coming  invader,  and  placing  them  with 
regard  to  him  in  the  same  state  of  inexpiable  hostility  as  Athens  and 
Eretria,  We  see  at  once  the  bonds  drawn  closer  between  Alliens  and 
Sparta.  The  Athenians,  for  the  first  time,  prefer  a  complaint  at 
Sparta  against  the  j^lginetans  for  having  given  earth  and  water  to 
Darius— accusing  them  of  having  done  this  with  views  of  enmity  to 
Athens,  and  in  order  to  invade  Attica  conjointly  with  the  Persian. 
This  they  represented  "as  treason  to  Hellas,"  calling  upon  Sparta,  as 
head  of  Greece,  to  interfere.  In  consequence  of  their  appeal,  Klco- 
menes,  king  of  Sparta,  went  over  to  .T.inna.  to  lake  measures  against 
the  authors  of  the  late  proceeding,  "for  the  general  benelit  of 
Hellas." 

The  proceeding  now  before  us  is  of  very  great  importance  in  the 
progress  of  Grecian  history.  It  is  the  first  direct  and  positive  histori- 
cal manifestation  of  Hellas  as  an  aggregate  body,  with  Sparta  as  its 
chief,  and  obligations  of  a  certain  soil  on  the  part  of  its  members,  the 
neglect  or  violation  of  which  constitutes  a  species  of  treason.  I  have 
already  pointed  out  several  earlier  incidents,  showing  how  the  Greek 
political  mind,  beginning  from  entire  severance  of  states,  became 
gradually  prepared  for  this  idea  of  a  permanent  league  with  mutual 
obligations  and  power  of  enforcement  vested  in  a  permanent  chief— 
an  idea  never  fully  carried  into  practice,  but  now  distinctly  m  I 

and  partially  operative.  First,  the  great  acquired  power  and  terri- 
tory of  Sparta,  her  military  training,  her  undisturbed  political  tra- 
ditions, create  an  unconscious  deference  toward  her  such  as  wa 
fell  toward  any  other  state.  Next,  she  is  seen  (in  the  proceedings 
'  Athens  after  the  expulsion  of  Hippias)  as  summoning  and 
conducting  to  war  a  cluster  of  self-obliged  Peloponnesian  allies,  with 
certain  formalities  which  give  to  the  alliance  an  imposing  perma 
nence  and  solemnity.  Thirdly,  her  position  becomes  recognized  as 
first  power  or  president  of  Greece,  both  by  foreigners  who  invite 
alliance  (Croesus)  or  by  Greeks  who  seek  help,  such  as  the  Platseans 
-t  Thebes  or  the  lonians  against  Persia.  But  Sparta  has  not 
been  hitherto  found  willing  to  take  on  herself  the  performance  of 


EXTREME  WEAKNESS   OF  ARGOS.  183 

this  duty  of  Protector  general.  She  refused  the  Ionians  and  the 
Samian  Maeandrius,  as  well  as  the  Platseans,  in  spite  of  their  entreat- 
ies founded  on  common  Hellenic  lineage:  the  expedition  which  she 
undertook  against  Polykrates  of  Samos  was  founded  upon  private 
motives  for  displeasure,  even  in  the  estimation  of  the  Lacedaemonians 
themselves:  moreover,  even  if  all  these  requests  had  been  granted, 
she  might  have  seemed  to  be  rather  obeying  a  generous  sympathy 
than  performing  a  duty  incumbent  upon  her  as  superior.  But  in  the 
case  now  before  us,  of  Athens  against  iEgina,  the  latter  considera- 
tion stands  distinctly  prominent.  Athens  is  not  a  member  of  the 
cluster  of  Spartan  allies,  nor  does  she  claim  the  compassion  of  Sparta, 
as  defenseless  against  an  overpowering  Grecian  neighbor.  She  com- 
plains of  a  PamHellenic  obligation  as  having  been  contravened  by 
the  ^Eginetans  to  her  detriment  and  danger,  and  calls  upon  Sparta  to 
enforce  upon  the  delinquents  respect  to  these  obligations.  For  the 
first  time  in  Grecian  history,  such  a  call  is  made;  for  the  first  time  in 
Grecian  history,  it  is  effectively  answered.  We  may  well  doubt 
whether  it  would  have  been  thus  answered — considering  the  tardy, 
unimpressible,  and  home  keeping  character  of  the  Spartans,  with 
their  general  insensibility  to  distant  dangers — if  the  adventure  of 
the  Persian  herald  had  not  occurred  to  gall  their  pride  beyond  endur- 
ance— to  drive  them  into  unpardonable  hostility  with  the  Great  King 
— and  to  cast  them  into  the  same  boat  with  Athens  for  keeping  off 
an  enemy  who  threatened  the  common  liberties  of  Hellas. 

From  this  time,  then,  we  may  consider  that  there  exists  a  recog- 
nized political  union  of  Greece  against  the  Persian — or  at  least  some- 
thing as  near  to  a  political  union  as  Grecian  temper  will  permit — with 
Sparta  as  its  head  for  the  present,  To  such  a  pre-eminence  of  Sparta, 
Grecian  history  had  been  gradually  tending.  But  the  final  event 
which  placed  it  beyond  dispute,  and  which  humbled  for  the  time  her 
ancient  and  only  rival — Argos — is  now  to  be  noticed. 

It  was  about  three  or  four  years  before  the  arrival  of  these  Per- 
sian heralds  in  Greece,  and  nearly  at  the  time  when  Miletus  was 
besieged  by  the  Persian  generals,  that  a  war  broke  out  between  Sparta 
and  Argos — on  what  groimds  Herodotus  does  not  inform  us.  Kleo- 
menes,  encouraged  by  a  promise  of  the  oracle  that  he  should  take 
Argos,  led  the  Lacedaemonian  troops  to  the  banks  of  the  Erasinus, 
the  border  river  of  the  Argeian  territory.  But  the  sacrifices,  without 
which  no  river  could  be  crossed,  were  so  unfavorable,  that  he  altered 
his  course,  extorted  some  vessels  from  iEgina*  and  Sikyon,  and  car- 
ried his  troops  by  sea  to  Nauplia,  the  sea-port  belonging  to  Argos, 
and  to  the  territory  of  Tiryns.  The  Argeians  having  marched  their 
forces  down  to  resist  him,  the  two  armies  joined  battle  at  Sepeia 
near  Tiryns.  Kleomenes,  by  a  piece  of  simplicity  on  the  part  of  his 
enemies  which  we  find  it  difficult  to  credit  in  Herodotus,  was 
enabled  to  attack  them  unprepared,  and  obtained  a  decisive  victory. 
For  the  Argeians  (the  historian  states)  were  so  afraid  of  being  over- 


184      IONIC  REVOLT  TO  BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 

reached  by  stratagem,  in  the  post  which  their  army  occupied  over 
againsl  the  enemy,  thai  they  Listened  for  the  commands  proclaimed 
aloud  by  the  Lacedaemonian  berald,  and  performed  with  their  own 
army  the  same  order  which  they  tin;-  heard  given.  This  came  to  the 
knowledge  of  Kleomenes,  who  communicated  private  notice  to  Lis 
s  ildiers,  thai  when  the  herald  proclaimed  orders  to  goto  dinner,  they 
should  not  obey,  but  immediately  stand  to  their  arms.  We  are  to 
presume  thai  the  Argeian  camp  was  sufficiently  near  to  that  of  the 
Lacedsemonians  to  enable  them  to  hear  the  voice  of  the  herald — yet 
not  within  sight,  from  the  nature  of  the  ground.  Accordingly,  so 
soon  as  the  Argeians  heard  the  herald  in  the  enemy's  camp  proclaim 
the  word  togo  to  dinner,  they  went  to  dinner  themselves.  In  this 
disorderly  condition  they  were  attacked  and  overthrown  by  the  Spar- 
tan-. Many  of  them  perished  in  the  field,  while  the  fugitives  took 
refuge  in  a  thick  grove  consecrated  to  their  eponymous  hero  Argus, 
icnes  having  inclosed  them  therein,  yet  thinking  it  safer  to 
employ  deceit  rather  than  force,  ascertained  from  deserters  the  names 
of  the  chief  Argeians  thus  shut  up,  and  then  invited  them  out  suc- 
cessively by  means  of  a  herald — pretending  that  he  had  received  their 
ransom,  and  that  they  were  released.  As  fasl  as  each  man  came  out 
he  was  put  to  death;  the  fate  of  these  unhappy  sufferers  being  con- 
cealed  from  their  comrades  within  the  grove  by  the  thickness  of  the 
foliage,  until  some  one  climbing  to  the  top  of  a  tree  detected  and  pro- 
claimed the  destruction  going  on — after  about  fifty  of  the  victims  had 
perished.     Unable   to  entice  anymore  of  the  Argeians  from  their 

crated  refuge,  which  they  still  vainly  hoped  would  protect 
them — Kleomenes  set  lire  to  the  grove  and  burned  it  to  tin-  ground. 
The  persons  within  it  appear  to  have  been  destroyed  either  by  fire 
or  by  sword.  After  the  <  onfiagratioh  bad  begun,  be  inquired  for  the 
first  time  to  whom  the  grove  belonged,  and  learned  that  it  belonged 
to  the  hero  Argus.  Not  less  than  G,000  citizens,  the  flower  and 
strength  of  Argos,  perished  in  this  disastrous  battle  and  retreat. 
So  completely  was  the  city  prostrated,  that  Kleomenes  might  easily 
have  taken  it,  had  he  cho-en  to  march  thither  forthwith  and  attack 
it  with  vigor.  If  we  are  to  believe  later  historians  whom  Pausanias, 
Polysenus,  and  Plutarch  have  copied,  he  did  march  thither  and 
attack  it,  butwas  repulsed  by  the  valor  of  the  Argeian  women;  who, 
in  the  dearth  of  warriors  occasioned  by  the  recent  defeat,  took  arms 
along  with  headed  by  the  poetess  Telesilla,  and  gallantly 

defended  the  walls.     Tins  is  probably  a  myth,  general  d  by  a  desire 

ibody  in  detail  the  dictum  of  the  oracle  a  little  before,  about 
female  conquering  the  male. "  Without  meaning  to  deny  that 
the  Argeian  women  might  have  been  capable  of  achieving  so  patriotic 
a  deed,  if  Kleomenes  bad  actually  marched  to  the  attack  of  tin  it- 
chy— we   are  compelled  by  the  distinct  statement  of  Herodotus  to 

Q  that  he  never  did  attack  it.  Immediately  after  the  burning  of 
the  sacred  grove  of  Argos,  he  dismissed  the  bulk  of  his  army  to 


KLEOMENES   TRIED  AND  ACQUITTED.  185 

Sparta,  retaining  only  1000  choice  troops — with  whom  he  marched 
up  to  the  Heneuui.  or  great  temple  of  Here,  between  Argos  and 
Mykenae,  to  offer  sacrifice.  The  priest  in  attendance  forbade  him 
to  enter,  saying  that  no  stranger  was  allowed  to  offer  sacrifice  in. 
the  temple.  But  Kleomenes  had  once  already  forced  his  way  into 
the  sanctuary  of  Athene  on  the  Athenian  acropolis,  in  spite  of  the 
priestess  and  her  interdict — and  he  now  acted  still  more  brutally 
toward  the  Argeian  priest,  for  he  directed  his  helots  to  drag  him 
from  the  altar  and  scourge  him.  Having  offered  sacrifice,  Kleomenes 
returned  with  his  remaining  forces  to  Sparta. 

But  the  army  whom  he  had  sent  home  returned  with  a  full  persua- 
sion that  Argos  might  easily  have  been  taken — that  the  king  alone 
was  to  blame  for  having  missed  the  opportunity.  As  soon  as  he  him- 
self returned,  his  enemies  (perhaps  his  colleague  Demaratus)  brought 
him  to  trial  before  Ihe  ephors  on  a  charge  of  having  been  bribed, 
against  which  he  defended  himself  as  follows.  He  had  invaded  the 
hostile  territory  on  tiie  faith  of  an  assurance  from  the  oracle  that  he 
should  take  Argos ;  but  so  soon  as  he  had  burnt  down  the  sacred 
grove  of  the  hero  Argus  (without  knowing  to  whom  it  belonged),  he 
became  at  once  sensible  that  this  was  all  that  the  god  meant  by  talcing 
Argot,  and  therefore  that  the  divine  promise  had  been  fully  realized. 
Accordingly,  he  did  not  think  himself  at  liberty  to  commence  any 
fresh  attack,  until  he  had  ascertained  whether  the  gods  would  approve 
it  and  would  urant  him  success.  It  was  with  this  view  that  he  sacri- 
ficed in  the  Herreum.  There,  though  his  sacrifice  was  favorable,  he 
observed  that  the  flame  kindled  on  the  altar  flashed  back  from  the 
bosom  of  the  statue  of  Here,  and  not  from  her  head.  If  the  flame 
had  Hashed  from  her  head,  he  would  have  known  at  once  that  the 
gods  intended  him  to  take  the  city  by  storm;  but  the  flash  from 
her  bosom  plainly  indicated  that  the  topmost  success  was  out  of  his 
and  that  he  had  already  reaped  all  the  glories  which  they 
intended  for  him.  We  may  see  that  Herodotus,  though  he  refrains 
from  criticising  this  story,  suspects  it  to  be  a  fabrication.  Not  so  the 
Spartan  ephors.  To  them  it  appeared  not  less  true  as  a  story  than 
triumphant  as  a  defense,  insuring  to  Kleomenes  an  honorable  ac- 
quittal. 

Though  this  Spartan  king  lost  the  opportunity  of  taking  Argos, 
his  victories  already  gained  had  inflicted  upon  her  a  blow  such  as 
she  did  not  recover  for  a  generation,  putting  her  for  a  time  out  of 
all  condition  to  dispute  the  primacy  of  Greece  with  Lacedsemon.  I 
have  already  mentioned  that  both  in  legend  and  in  earliest  history, 
Argos  stands  forth  as  the  first  power  in  Greece,  with  legendary 
claims  to  headship,  and  decidedly  above  Lacedsemon;  who  gradually 
usurps  from  her,  first  the  reality  of  superior  power,  next  the  recog- 
nition of  pre-eminence — and  is  now,  at  the  period  which  we  have 
reached,  taking  upon  herself  both  the  rights  and  the  duties  of  a 
presiding  state  over  a  body  of  allies  who  are  bound  both  to  her  and 


186     IONIC  REVOLT  TO  BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 

to  each  other.  Her  title  to  this  honor,  however,  was  never  admitted 
al  Argoa,  and  it  is  very  probable  that  the  war  just  described  grew  in 
Borne  way  or  other  out,  of  the  increasing  presidential  power 'which 
circumstances  were  tending  to  throw  into  her  hands.  Now  the  com- 
plete temporary  prostration  of  Argoa  was  one  essential  condition  to 

the  quiet  acquisition  of  this  power  by  Sparta.     Occurring  as  it  did 

two  or  thne  years  before  the  above-recounted  adventure  of  the  in  r 

aids,  it  removed  the  only  rival  at  that  time  both  willing  and  able  to 

compete  with  Sparta — a  rival  who  might  well  have  prevented  any 

effective  union  under  another  chief,  though  she  could  no  longer  have 
secured  any  Pan  Hellenic  ascendency  for  herself — a  rival  who  would 
have  seconded  iEgina  in  her  submission  to  the  Persians,  and  would 
thus  have  lamed  incurably  the  defensive  force  of  Greece.  The  ships 
which  Kleomenes  had  obtained  from  the  vEginctans  as  well  as  from 
the  Sikyonians,  against  their  own  will,  for  landing  bis  troops  ;it 
Nauplia,  brought  upon  both  these  cities  the  enmity  of  Argos,  which 
the  Sikyonians  compromised  by  paying  a  sum  of  money,  while  the 
iEginetans  refused  to  do  so.  The  circumstances  of  the  Kleomenic 
war  had  thus  the  effect  not  only  of  enfeebling  Argos,  hut  of  alienat- 
ing her  from  her  natural  allies  and  supporters,  and  clearing  the 
ground  for  undisputed  Spartan  primacy. 

Returning  now  to  the  complaint  preferred  by  Athens  to  the  Spartans 
againsl  the  traitorous  submission  of  iEgina  to  Darius,  we  find  that 
king  Kleomenes  passed  immediately  over  to  that  island  for  the  pur- 
pose of  inquiry  and  punishment.  lie  was  proceeding  to  seize  and 
carry  away  as  prisoners  several  of  the  leading  ^Eginetans,  when  Krius 
and  some  others  among  them  opposed  to  him  a  menacing  resistance, 
telling  him  that  he  came  without  any  regular  warrant  from  Sparta 
and  under  the  influence  of  Athenian  bribes — that  in  order  to  carry 
authority,  both  the  Spartan  kings  ought  to  come  together.  It  was  not 
of  their  "own  accord  that  the  JEginetans  ventured  to  adopt  so  danger- 
ous a  course.  Demaratus,  the  colleague  of  Kleomenes  in  the  junior 
or  Prokleid  line  of  kings,  had  suggested  to  them  the  step,  and  prom- 
ised to  carry  them  through  it  in  safety.  Dissension  between  the  two 
co-ordinate  kings  was  no  new  phenomenon  at  Sparta.  But  in  the 
case  of  Demaratus  and  Kleomenes,  it  had  broken  out  some  years  pre- 
viously on  the  occasion  of  the  march  against  Attica.  Hence  Demara- 
tus, hating  his  colleague  more  than  ever,  entered  into  the  present 
intrigue  with  the  iEginetans  with  the  deliberate  purpose  of  frustrat- 
ing his  intervention,  lie  succeeded,  so  that  Kleomenes  was  com- 
pelled to  return  to  Sparta:  not  without  unequivocal  menace  against 
Krius  and  the  other  JEginetans  who  had  repelled  him,  and  not  with- 
out a  thorough  determination  to  depose  Demaratus. 

It  appears  that  suspicions  had  always  attached  to  the  legitimacy  of 
Demaratus's  birth.  His  reputed  father  Aristo,  having  had  no  off- 
spring by  two  successive  wives,  at  la-t  became  enamored  of  the  wife 
of  his  friend  Agetus — a  woman  of  surpassing  beauty — and  entrapped 


DEMARATUS  DEPOSED.  187 

him  into  an  agreement,  whereby  each  solemnly  bound  himself  to  sur- 
render anything  belonging  to  him  which  the  other  might  ask  for. 
That  which  Agetus  asked  from  Aristo  was  at  once  given.  In  return, 
the  latter  demanded  to  have  the  wife  of  Agetus,  who  was  thunder- 
struck at  the  request,  and  indignantly  complained  of  having  been 
cheated  into  a  sacrifice  of  all  others  the  most  painful :  nevertheless  the 
oath  was  peremptory,  and  he  was  forced  to  comply.  The  birth  of 
Demaratus  took  place  so  soon  after  this  change  of  husbands,  that 
when  it  was  first  made  known  to  Aristo,  as  he  sat  upon  a  bench  along 
with  the  ephors,  he  counted  on  his  fingers  the  number  of  months  since 
his  marriage,  and  exclaimed  with  an  oath, "  The  child  cannot  be  mine." 
He  soon,  however,  retracted  his  opinion,  and  acknowledged  the  child, 
who  grew  up  without  any  question  being  publicly  raised  as  to  his 
birth,  and  succeeded  his  father  on  the  throne.  But  the  original  words 
of  Aristo  had  never  been  forgotten,  and  private  suspicions  were  still 
cherished  that  Demaratus  was  really  the  son  of  his  mother's  first  hus- 
band. 

Of  these  suspicions  Kleomencs  now  resolved  to  avail  himself, 
exciting  Leotychides,  the  next  heir  in  the  Prokleid  line  of  kings,  to 
impugn  publicly  the  legitimacy  of  Demaratus — engaging  to  second 
him  with  all  his  influence  as  next  in  order  for  the  crown — and  exact- 
ing in  return  a  promise  that  he  would  support  the  intervention  against 
-(Egina.  Leotychides  was  animated  not  merely  by  ambition,  but  also 
by  private  enmity  against  Demaratus,  who  had  disappointed  him  of 
his  intended  bride.  He  warmly  entered  into  the  scheme,  arraigned 
Demaratus  as  no  true  Herakleid,  and  produced  evidence  to  prove  the 
original  doubts  expressed  by  Aristo.  A  serious  dispute  was  thus 
raised  at  Sparta,  wherein  Kleomenes,  espousing  the  pretensions  of 
Leotychides,  recommended  that  the  question  as  to  the  legitimacy  of 
Demaratus  should  be  decided  by  reference  to  the  Delphian  oracle. 
Through  the  influence  of  Kobon,  a  powerful  native  of  Delphi,  he 
procured  from  the  Pythian  priestess  an  answer  pronouncing  that 
Demaratus  was  not  the  son  of  Aristo.  Leotychides  thus  became 
king  of  the  Prokieid  line,  while  Demaratus  descended  into  a  private 
station,  and  was  elected  at  the  ensuing  solemnity  of  the  Gymnopsedia 
to  an  official  function.  The  new  king,  unable  to  repress  a  burst  of 
triumphant  spite,  sent  an  attendant  to  ask  him  in  the  public  theater, 
how  he  felt  as  an  officer  after  having  once  been  a  king.  Stung  with 
this  insult,  Demaratus  replied  that  he  himself  had  tried  them  both, 
and  that  Leotychides  might  in  time  come  to  try  them  both  also,  the 
question  (he  added)  shall  bear  its  fruit — great  evil,  or  great  good,  to 
Sparta.  So  saying  he  covered  his  face  and  retired  home  from  the 
theater — offered  a  solemn  farewell  sacrifice  at  the  altar  of  Zeus  Iler- 
keios,  and  solemnly  adjured  his  mother  to  declare  to  him  who  his 
real  father  was — then  at  once  quitted  Sparta  for  Elis,  under  pretense 
of  going  to  consult  the  Delphian  oracle. 

Demaratus  was  well  known  to  be  a  high-spirited  and  ambitious 


188     IONIC  REVOLT  TO  BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 

man — noted,  among  other  things,  as  the  only  Lacedaemonian  king 
down  to  the  time  of  I  [erodotus  w  ho  had  ever  gained  a  chariol  victory 
at  Olympia.  Hence  Kleomeue  and  Leotychides  became  alarmed  at 
the  mischief  which  he  might  do  them  in  exile.  By  the  law  of 
Sparta,  do  Herakleid  was  allowed  to  establish  his  residence  out  of 
Lhe  country,  on  pain  of  death.  This  marks  the  sentiment  of  the 
Lacedaemonians,  and  Demaratus  was  not  the  Less  likely  to  give 
trouble  because  they  had  pronounced  him  illegitimate.  Accordingly 
they  sent  in  pursuit  of  him.  and  seized  him  in  the  island  of  Zakyn- 
thus.  Bui  the  Zakyn thiaus  would  not  consent  to  surrender  him,  so 
that  he  passed  unobstructed  into  Asia,  where  he  presented  bimsi  If  to 
Darius,  and  was  received  with  abundant  favors  and  presents.  We 
shall  hereafter  find  him  the  companion  of  Xerxes,  giving  to  that 
monarch  advice  such  as,  if  it  had  been  acted  upi.ii.  would  have 
proved  the  ruin  of  Grecian  independence;  to  winch  however  he 
would  have  heeti  even  more  dangerous,  if  he  had  remained  at  home 
as  king  of  Sparta. 

Meanwhile  Kleomenes,  having  obtained  a  consentient  colleague  in 
Leotychides,  went  with  him  over  to  iEgina,  eager  t<>  revenge  himself 
for  the  affront  which  had  been  put  upon  him.  To  the  requisition 
and  presence  of  the  two  kings  jointly,  the  iEginetans  did  not  dare  to 
oppose  any  resistance.  Kleomenes  made  choice  often  citizens  emi- 
nent for  wealth,  station,  and  influence,  among  whom  were  Krius  and 
another  person  named  Kasamlms,  the  two  mosl  powerful  nun  in 
the  island.  Conveying  them  away  to  Athens,  he  deposited  them  as 
hostages  in  the  hands  of  the  Athenians. 

It  was  in  this  slate  that  the  affairs  of  Athens  and  of  Greece  gene- 
rally were  found  by  the  Persian  armament  which  landed  at  Mara- 
thon, the  progress  of  which  we  are  now  about  to  follow.  And  the 
events  just  recounted  were  of  material  importance,  considered  in 
their  indirect  bearing  upon  the  success  of  that  armament.  Sparta 
had  now,  on  the  invitation  of  Athens,  assumed  to  herself  for  the 
first  time  a  formal  Pan  hellenic  primacy,  her  ancient  rival  ArgOS 
being  too  much  broken  to  contesl  it — her  two  kings,  at  this  juncture 
unanimous,  employ  their  presiding  interference  in  coercing  J£gina, 
and  placing  iEginetan  hostages  in  the  hands  of  Athens.  TheiZEgi 
netans  would  not  have  been  unwilling  to  purchase  victory  over  a 
neighbor  and  rival  at  the  cost  of  submission  to  Persia,  and  it  was 
the  Spartan  interference  only  which  restrained  them  from  assailing 
Alliens  conjointly  witli  the  Persian  invaders;  thus  leaving  the  hands 
of  the  Athenians  free,  and  their  courage  undiminished  for  the  com- 
ing trial. 

Meanwhile  a  vast  Persian  force,  brought  together  in  consequence 
of  the  preparation  made  during  the  last  two  years  in  every  part  of 
the  empire,  had  assembled  in  the  Aleian  plain  of  Kilikia  near  the  sea. 
A  fleet  of  GOO  armed  triremes,  together  with  many  transports  both 
for  men  and  horses;  was  brought  hither  for  their  embarkation:  the 


DATIS  CROSSES  THE  ^EGEAN.  189 

troops  were  put  on  board  and  sailed  along  the  coast  of  Samos  in 
Ionia.  The  Ionic  and  HColic  Greeks  constituted  an  important  part 
of  this  armament,  while  the  Athenian  exile  Hippias  was  on  board  as 
guide  and  auxiliary  in  the  attack  of  Attica.  The  generals  were 
Datis,  a  .Median — and  Artaphernes  son  of  the  satrap  of  Sardis  so 
Darned,  and  nephew  of  Darius.  We  may  remark  that  Datis  is  the 
fa-si  person  of  Median  lineage  who  is  mentioned  as  appointed  to  high 
command  alter  the  accession  of  Darius,  which  had  been  preceded 
aud  marked,  as  I  have  noticed  in  a  former  chapter,  by  an  outbreak  of 
hostile  nationality  between  the  Medes  and  Persians.  Their  instruc- 
tions were,  generally,  to  reduce  to  subjection  and  tribute  all  such 
Greeks  as  had  not  already  given  earth  and  water.  But  Darius 
directed  them  most  particularly  to  conquer  Eretria  and  Athens,  and 
to  bring  the  inhabitants  as  slaves  into  his  presence.  These  orders 
were  literally  meant,  and  probably  neither  the  generals  nor  the 
soldiers  of  this  vast  armament  doubted  that  they  would  be  literally 
executed;  and  that  before  the  end  of  the  year,  the  wives,  or  rather 
the  witlows.  of  men  like  Themistokles  and  Aristeides  would  be  seen 
among  a  mournful  train  of  Athenian  prisoners  on  the  road  from 
Sardis  to  Susa,  thus  accomplishing  the  wish  expressed  by  queen 
Atossa  at  the  instance  of  Demokedes. 

The  recent  terrific  storm  near  Mount  Athos  deterred  the  Persians 
from  following  the  example  of  Mardonius,  and  taking  their  course 
by  the  Hellespont  and  Thrace.  It  was  resolved  to  strike  straight 
across  the  iEgean  (the  mode  of  attack  which  intelligent  Greeks  like 
Themistokles  most  feared,  even  after  the  repulse  of  Xerxes)  from 
Samos  to  Eubcea,  attacking  the  intermediate  islands  in  the  way. 
Among  those  islands  was  Naxos,  which  ten  years  before  had  stood  a 
long  seige,  and  gallantly  repelled  the  Persian  Megabates  with  the 
Milesian  Aristagoras.  It  was  one  of  the  main  objects  of  Datis  to 
efface  this  stain  on  the  Persian  arms  and  to  take  a  signal  revenge  on 
the  Naxi.ins.  Crossing  from  Samos  to  Naxos,  he  landed  his  army  on 
the  island,  which  he  found  an  easier  prize  than  he  had  expected.  The 
terrified  citizens,  abandoning  their  town,  fled  with  their  families  to 
the  highest  summits  of  their  mountains;  while  the  Persians,  seizing 
as  slaves  a  few  who  had  been  dilatory  in  flight,  burnt  the  unde- 
fended town  with  its  edifices,  sacred  and  profane. 

Immense  indeed  was  the  difference  in  Grecian  sentiment  towards 
the  Persians  created  by  the  terror-striking  reconquest  of  Ionia,  and 
by  the  exhibition  of  a  large  Phenician  fleej  in  the  HSgean.  The 
strength  of  Naxos  was  the  same  now  as  it  had  been  before  the  Ionic 
revolt,  and  the  successful  resistance  then  made  might  have  been 
supposed  likely  to  nerve  the  courage  of  its  inhabitants.  Yet  such  is 
the  fear  now  inspired  by  a  Persian  armament,  that  the  eight  thousand 
Naxian  hoplites  abandon  their  towns  and  their  gods  without  striking 
a  blow,  and  think  of  nothing  but  personal  safety  for  themselves  and 
their  families.     A  sad  augury  for  Athens  and  Eretria! 


190     IONIC  REVOLT  TO  BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 

u  Na  os  Datis  dispatched  bis  fleet  round  the  other  Cyclades 
islands,  requiring  from  each  hostages  for  fidelity  and  a  contingent  to 
increase  his  army.  With,  the  sacred  island  of  Delos,  however,  ho 
dealt  tenderly  and  respectfully.  The  Delians  had  fled  before  his 
approach  to  Tenos,  bu1  Datis  sent  a  herald  to  invite  them  back  again, 
promised  to  preserve  their  persons  and  property  inviolate,  and  pro- 
claimed  that  he  had  received  express  orders  from  the  Great  King  to 
reverence  the  island  in  which  Apollo  and  Artemis  were  horn.  His 
acts  corresponded  with  this  language;  for  the  fleet  was  not  allowed 
to  touch  the  island,  and  lie  himself,  landing  with  only  a  few  attend- 
ants, offered  a  magnificent  sacrifice  at  the  altar.  As  a  large  portion 
of  his  armament  consisted  of  Ionic  Greeks,  such  pronounced  respect 
to  the  island  of  Delos  may  probably  be  ascribed  to  the  desire  of 
satisfying  their  religious  feelings;  for  in  their  days  of  early  freedom, 
this  island  had  been  the  scene  of  their  solemn  periodical  festivals,  as 
1  have  already  more  than  (Mice  remarked. 

Pursuing  his  course  without  resistance  along  the  islands,  and  de- 
manding re-enforcements  as  well  as  hostages  from  each.  Datis  at  length 
touched  the  southernmost  portion  of  Eubcea — the  town  of  Karysius 
and  its  territory.  The  Karystians  at  first  refused  either  to  give 
hostages  or  to  furnish  reinforcements  against  their  friends  and  neigh- 
bors. But  they  were  speedily  compelled  to  submission  by  the 
-ive  devastation  of  the  invaders.  This  was  the  first  taste  of 
resistance  which  Datis  had  yet  experienced;  and  the  facility  with 
which  it  was  overcome  gave  him  a  promising  omen  as  to  his  success 
against  Eretria,  whither  he  soon  arrived. 

The  destination  of  the  armament  was  no  secret  to  the  inhabitants 
of  this  fated  city,  among  whom  consternation,  aggravated  by  intestine 
differences,  was  the  reigning  sentiment.  They  made  application  to 
Athens  for  aid,  which  was  readily  and  conveniently  afforded  to  them 
by  means  of  those  four  thousand  kleruchs  or  out-citizens  whom  the 
Athenians  had  planted  sixteen  years  before  in  the  neighboring  terri- 
tory of  Chalkis.  Notwithstanding  such  re-enforcement,  however, 
many  of  them  despaired  of  defending  the  city,  and  thought  only  of 
seeking  shelter  on  the  unassailable  summits  of  the  island,  as  the  more 
numerous  and  powerful  Naxians  had  already  done  before  them; 
while  another  party,  treacherously  seeking  their  own  profit  out  of 
the  public  calamity,  lay  in  wait  for  an  opportunity  of  betraying  the 
city  to  the  Persians.  Though  a  public  resolution  was  taken  to  defend 
ty,  yet  so  manifest  was  the  absence  of  that  stoutness  of  heart 
which  could  alone  avail  to  save  it,  that  a  leading  Eretrian  named 
JEschines  was  not  ashamed  to  forewarn  the  four  thousand  Athenian 
alllos  of  the  coming  treason,  and  urge  them  to  save  themselves  before 
i!  was  too  late.  They  followed  his  advice  and  passed  over  to  Attica 
by  way  of  Oropus;  while  the  Persians  disembarked  their  troops,  and 
evi  n  tiieir  horses,  in  expectation  that  the  Ereirians  would  come  out 
and  light,  at  Tamynae  and  other  places  in  the  territory.     As  the 


DATIS  LANDS  AT  MARATHON.        191 

Eretrians  did  not  come  out,  they  proceeded  to  lay  siege  to  the  city, 
and  for  some  days  met  with  a  brave  resistance,  so  that  the  loss  on 
both  sides  was  considerable.  At  length  two  of  the  leading  citizens, 
Euphorbus  and  Philagrus,  with  others,  betrayed  Eretria  to  the 
besiegers;  its  temples  were  burnt,  aud  its  inhabitants  dragged  into 
slavery.  It  is  impossible  to  credit  the  exaggerated  statement  of 
Plato,  which  is  applied  by  him  to  the  Persians  at  Eretria  as  it  had 
been  before  applied  by  Herodotus  to  the  Persians  at  Chios  and  Samos 
■ — that  they  swept  the  territory  clean  of  inhabitants  by  joining  hands 
and  forming  a  line  across  its  whole  breadth.  Evidently  this  is  an 
idea,  illustrating  the  possible  effects  of  numbers  and  ruinous  conquest, 
which  has  been  woven  into  the  tissue  of  historical  statements,  like  so 
many  other  illustrative  ideas  in  the  writings  of  Greek  authors.  That 
a  large  proportion  of  the  inhabitants  were  carried  away  as  prisoners, 
there  can  be  no  doubt.  But  the  traitors  who  betrayed  the  town 
were  spared  and  rewarded  by  the  Persians,  and  we  see  plainly  that 
either  some  of  the  inhabitants  must  have  been  left,  or  new  settlers 
introduced,  when  we  find  the  Eretrians  reckoned  ten  years  afterwards 
among  the  opponents  of  Xerxes. 

Datis  had  thus  accomplished  with  little  or  no  resistance  one  of  the 
two  express  objects  commanded  by  Darius,  and  his  army  were  elated 
with  the  confident  hope  of  soon  completing  the  other.  After  halting 
a  few  da}'s  at  Eretria,  and  depositing  in  the  neighboring  islet  of 
jEgilia  the  prisoners  recently  captured,  he  re-embarked  his  army  to 
cross  over  to  Attica,  and  landed  in  the  memorable  bay  of  Marathon 
on  the  eastern  coast — the  spot  indicated  by  the  despot  Hippias,  who 
now  landed  along  with  the  Persians,  twenty  years  after  his  expulsion 
from  the  government.  Forty-seven  years  had  elapsed  since  he  had 
made  as  a  young  man  this  same  passage,  from  Eretria  to  Marathon, 
in  conjunction  with  his  father  Peisistratus,  on  the  occasion  of  the 
second  restoration  of  the  latter.  On  that  previous  occasion,  the 
force  accompanying  the  father  had  been  immeasurably  inferior  to 
that  which  now  seconded  the  son.  Yet  it  had  been  found  amply 
sufficient  to  carry  him  in  triumph  to  Athens,  with  feeble  opposition 
from  citizens  alike  irresolute  and  disunited.  And  the  march  of 
Hippias  from  Marathon  to  Athens  would  now  have  been  equally 
easy,  as  it  was  doubtless  conceived  to  be  by  himself,  both  in  his 
waking  hopes  and  in  the  dream  which  Herodotus  mentions — had  not 
the  Athenians  whom  he  found  been  men  radically  different  from 
those  whom  he  had  left. 

To  that  great  renewal  of  the  Athenian  character,  under  the  demo- 
cratical  institutions  which  had  subsisted  since  the  dispossession  of 
Hippias,  I  have  already  pointed  attention  in  a  former  chapter.  The 
modifications  introduced  by  Kleisthenes  in  the  constitution  had  now 
existed  eighteen  or  nineteen  years,  without  any  attempt  to  overthrow 
them  by  violence.  The  Ten  Tribes,  each  with  its  constituent  denies, 
had  become  a  part  of  the  established  habits  of  the  country;   the 


192      IONIC  REVOLT  TO  BATTLE  OF  MARATHON.  * 

citizens  had  become  accustomed  to  exorcise  a  genuine  and  self- 
determi ned  decision,  in  their  assemblies  political  as  well  as  Judicial; 
while  even  the  senate  of  Areopagus,  renovated  by  the  nine  annual 
archons  successively  chosen  who  passed  into  it  after  their  year  of 
office,  had  also  become  identified  in  feeling  with  the  constitution  of 
Klei-ihenes.  Individual  citizens  doubtless  remained,  partisans  in 
secret,  and  perhaps  correspondents,  <>t'  Hippiks.  But  the  mass  of 
citizen-;,  in  every  scale  of  life,  could  look  upon  his  return  with  nothing 
but  terror  and  aversion.  Withwhal  degree  of  newly  acquired  energy 
the  democratical  Athenians  could  act  in  defense  of  their  country  and 
institutions,  has  already  been  related  in  a  former  chapter.  But,  un- 
fortunately, Ave  possess  few  particulars  of  Athenian  history,  during 
the  decade  preceding  490  B.O,  nor  can  we  follow  in  detail  the  working 
of  the  government.  The  new  form,  however,  which  Athenian  politics 
had  assumed  becomes  partially  manifest  when  we  observe  the  three 
leaders  who  stand  prominent  at  this  important  epoch — Miltiades, 
Themistokles,  and  Aristeides. 

The  first  of  the  three  had  returned  to  Athens  three  or  four  years 
before  the  approach  of  Datis,  after  six  or  seven  years'  absence  in  the 
Chersonesus  of  Thrace,  whither  he  had  been  originally  sent  by  Hip- 
pias  about  the  year  517-516  B.C.,  to  inherit  the  property  as  well  as 
the  supremacy  of  his  uncle  the  cekist  Miltiades.  As  despot  of  the 
Chersonese,  and  as  one  of  the  subjects  of  Persia,  he  had  been  among 
the  lonians  who  accompanied  Darius  to  the  Danube  in  his  Scythian 
ion.  He  had  been  the  author  of  that  memorable  recommenda- 
tion which  Histiseus  and  the  other  despots  did  net  think  it  their 
interest  to  follow — of  destroying  the  bridge  and  leaving  the  Persian 
king  to  perish.  Subsequently  he  had  been  unable  to  remain  perma- 
nently in  the  Chersonese,  for  reasons  which  have  before  been  noticed: 
but  he  seems  to  have  occupied  it  during  the  period  of  the  Ionic 
revolt.  What  pari  he  took  in  that  revolt,  we  do  not  know.  He 
availed  himself,  however,  of  the  period  while  the  Persian  satraps 
were  employed  in  suppressing  it,  and  deprived  of  the  mastery  of  the 
sea,  to  expel,  in  conjunction  with  forces  from  Athens,  both  the  Per- 
i  i  in  earri  ;i  m  and  the  Pelasgic  inhabitants  from  the  islands  of  Lemnos 
and  [mbros.  But  the  extinction  of  the  Ionic  revolt  threatened  him 
with  ruin.  When  the  Phcnician  fleet,  in  the  summer  following  the 
capture  of  AI il<  t u s.  made  iis  conquering  appearance  in  the  Helles- 
pont, he  was  forced  to  ("-cape  rapidly  to  Athens  with  his  immediate 
friends  and  property,  and  with  a  small  squadron  of  five  ships.  One 
of  these  ships,  commanded  by  his  son.  Metiochus,  was  actually  cap- 
tured between  the  Chersonese  and  [mbros;  and  the  Phenicians  were 
mosl  eager  to  capture  Miltiades  himself,  inasmuch  as  he  was  per- 
sonally odious  to  Darius  from  his  strenuous  recommendation  to 
de  troy  the  bridge  over  the  Danube.  On  arriving  at  Athens,  after 
his  escape  from  the  Phcnician  licet,  he  was  brought  fro  trial  before 
the  judicial  popular  assembly  for  alleged  misgovernment  in  the 


THEMISTOKLES  193 

Chersonese,  or  for  what  Herodotus  calls  "his  despotism"  there  exer- 
cised. Probably  the  Athenian  citizens  settled  in  that  peninsula  may 
have  had  good  reason  to  complain  of  him, — the  more  so  as  he  had 
carried  out  with  him  the  maxims  of  the  government  prevalent  at 
Athens  under  the  Peisistratids,  and  had  in  his  pay  a  body  of  Thra- 
cian  mercenaries.  However  the  people  at  .ithens  honorably 
acquitted  him.  probably  in  part  from  the  reputation  which  he  had 
obtained  as  conqueror  of  Lemnos;  and  he  wasone  of  the  ten  annually 
elected  generate  of  the  republic,  during  the  year  of  this  Persian  expe- 
dition—chosen at  the  beginning  of  the  Attic  year,  shortly  after  the 
summer  solstice,  at  a  time  when  Datis  and  ilippias  had  actually 
sailed,  and  were  known  to  be  approaching. 

The  character  of  Miltiades  is  one  of  great  bravery  and  decision — 
qualities  pre-eminently  useful  to  his  country  on  the  present  crisis, 
and  the  more  useful  as  he  was  under  the  strongest  motive  to  put 
them  forth,  from  the  personal  hostility  of  Darius  towards  him.  Yet 
he  does  not  peculiarly  belong  to  the  democracy  of  Kleistheues,  like 
his  younger  contemporaries  Themistokles  and  Aristeides.  The  two 
latter  are  specimens  of  a  class  of  men  new  at  Athens  since  the-  expul- 
sion of  Hippias,  and  contrasting  forcibly  with  Pesistratus,  Lykurgus, 
and  Megakles,  the  political  leaders  of  the  preceding  generation. 
Themistokles  and  Aristeides,  different  as  they  were  in  disposition, 
agree  in  being  politicians  of  the  democratical  stamp,  exercising  ascend- 
ency by  and  through  the  people — devoting  their  time  to  the  discharge 
of  public  duties,  and  to  the  frequent  discussion  in  the  political  and 
judicial  meetings  of  the  people — manifesting  those  combined  powers 
of  action,  comprehension,  and  persuasive  speech,  which  gradually 
accustomed  the  citizens  to  look  to  them  as  advisers  as  well  as  leaders 
— but  always  subject  to  criticism  and  accusation  from  unfriendly 
rivals,  and  exercising  such  rivalry  towards  each  other  with  an  asper- 
ity constantly  increasing.  Instead  of  Attica  disunited  and  torn  into 
armed  factions,  as  it  had  beeu  forty  years  before — the  Diakrii  under 
one  man,  and  the  Parali  and  Pedieis  under  others — we  have  now 
Attica  one  and  indivisible;  regimented  into  a  body  of  orderly  hearers 
in  the  Pnyx,  appointing  and  holding  to  accountability  the  magis- 
trates, and* open  to  be  addressed  by  Themistokles,  Aristeides,  or  any 
other  citizen  who  can  engage  their  attention. 

Neither  Themistokles  nor  Aristeides  could  boast  a  lineage  of  gods 
and  heroes,  like  the  iEakid  Miltiades.  Both  were  of  middling  sta- 
tion and  circumstances.  Aristeides,  son  of  Xysimachus,  was  on  both 
sides  of  pure  Athenian  blood ;  but  the  wife  of  Neokles,  father  of 
Themistokles,  was  a  foreign  woman  of  Thrace  or  of  Karia;  and  such 
an  alliance  is  the  less  surprising,  since  Themistokles  must  have  been 
born  during  the  dynasty  of  the  Peisistratids,  when  the  status  of  an 
Athenian  citizen  had  not  yet  acquired  its  political  value.  There  was 
a  marked  contrast  between  these  two  eminent  men — those  points 
which  stood  most  conspicuous  in  the  one  being  comparatively  defi- 
H.  G.  II.—  7 


104     IONIC  REVOLT  TO  BATTLE  OF  MARATHON". 

cient  in  the  other.  In  the  description  of  Themistokles,  which  w? 
have  the  advantage  of  finding  briefly  sketched  by  Thucydides,  the 
circumstance  most  emphatically  broughl  out  is,  his  immense  force 
of  spontaneous  invention  and  apprehension,  without  an\  previous 
aid  either  from  teaching  or  gradual  practice.  The  mighl  of  unas 
nature  was  never  so  strikingly  exhibited  as  in  him.  He  conceived 
the  complications  of  a  present  embarrassment,  and  divined  the 
chances  of  a  mysterious  future,  with  equal  sagacity  and  equal  quick- 
ness. The  right  expedient  seemed  to  flash  upon  his  mind  extem- 
pore, even  in  the  most  perplexing  contingencies,  without  the  least 

sity  for  premeditation.  He  was  nol  less  distinguished  for  dar- 
ing and  resource  in  action;  v<  ]  fed  on  any  joint  affairs,  his 
superior  competence  marked  him  out  as  the  leader  tor  others  to  fol- 
low, and  no  business,  however  foreign  to  his  experience,  ever  took 
him  by  surprise,  or  came  wholly  amiss  to  him.  Such  is  the  remark- 
able picture  which  Thucydides  draws  of  a  countryman  whose  death 
nearly  coincided  in  time  with  bis  own  birth.  The  untutored 
ness  and  universality  of  Themistokles  probably  formed  in  bis  mind 
a  contrast  to  the  more  elaborate  discipline,  and  careful  preliminary 
study,  •with  which  the  statesmen  of  his  own  day — and  Perikles  espe- 
cially, the  greatest  of  them — approached  the  consideration  and  dis- 
cussion of  public  affairs.  Themistokles  had  received  no  teaching 
from  philosophers,  sophists,  and  rhetors,  who  wen-  the  instructors  of 
well-horn  youth  in  the  days  of  Thucydides,  and  whom  Aristophanes. 
the  contemporary  of  the  latter,  so  unmercifully  derides — treating 
such  instruction  as  worse  than  nothing,  and  extolling,  in  comparison 
with  it.  the  unlettered  courage,  with  mere  gymnastic  accomplish- 
ments. o\  the  victors  at  Marathon.  There  is  no  evidence  in  the  mind 
of  Thucydides  of  any  such  undue  contempt  towards  his  own  aire 
Tiie  same  t<  rms  of  contrast  are  tacitly  present  to  his  mind,  hut  he 
senns  to  treat  the  great  capacity  of  Themistokles  as  {lie  more  a  mat- 
ter of  wonder,  since  it  sprung  up  without  that  preliminary  cultiva- 
tion which  had  gone  to  the  making  of  Perikles. 
The  general  character  given  by  Plutarch,  though  many  of  his  anec- 

are  both  trifling  and  apocryphal,  is  quite  consistent  with  the 
brief  -ketch  just  cited  from  Thucydides.  Themistokles  had  an  un- 
bounded passion — nol  merely  for  glory,  insomuch  that  the  laurels  of 
Miltiades  acquired  at  Marathon  deprived  him  of  rest — but  als< 
display  of  every  kind.  He  was  eager  to  vie  with  men  richer  than 
himself  in  Bhowy  exhibition — one  ureal  Bource,  though  not  the  only 
of  popularity  at  A  thesis — nor  was  he  at  all  scrupulous  in  pro- 
curing the  means  of  doing  so.  Besides  being  assiduous  in  attendance 
nt  the  Ekklesia  and  the  Dikastery,  he  knew  most  of  the  citizens  by 
name,  and  was  always  ready  with  advice  to  them  in  their  private 
«lTairs.  Moreover  lie  p  >ss<  SSi  d  all  the  tactics  of  an  expert  party-man 
in  conciliating  political  friends  and  in  defeating  political  en<  I 
And  though  he  was  in  the  early  part  of  his  lite  sincerely  bent   upon 


ARISTEIDES.  195 

the  upholding  and  aggrandizement  of  his  country,  and  was  on  some 
most  critical  occasions  of  unspeakable  value  to  it.  yet  on  the  whole  his 
morality  was  as  reckless  as  his  intelligence  was  eminent.  He  will  be 
found  grossly  corrupt  in  the  exercise  of  power,  and  employing  tor- 
tuous means,  sometimes  indeed  for  ends  in  themselves  honorable  and 
patriotic,  but  sometimes  also  merely  for  enriching  himself.  He  ended 
a  glorious  life  by  years  of  deep  disgrace,  with  the  forfeiture  of  all 
Hellenic  esteem  and  brotherhood — a  rich  man,  an  exile,  a  traitor,  and 
a  pensioner  of  the  Great  King,  pledged  to  undo  his  own  previous 
work  of  liberation  accomplished  at  the  victory  of  Salamis. 

Of  Aristeides  we  possess  uufortunately  no  description  from  the 
hand  of  Tlmcydides.  Yet  his  character  is  so  simple  and  consistent, 
that  we  may  safely  accept  the  brief  but  unqualified  encomium  of 
Herodotus  and  Plato,  expanded  as  it  is  in  the  biography  of  Plutarch 
and  Cornelius  Nepos,  however  little  the  details  of  the  latter  can  be 
trusted.  Aristeides  was  inferior  to  Themistokles  in  resource,  quick- 
ness, flexibility,  aDd  power  of  coping  with  difficulties;  but  incom- 
parably superior  to  him,  as  well  as  to  other  rivals  and  contemporaries, 
in  integrity  public  as  well  as  private:  inaccessible  to  pecuniary  temp- 
tations >  s  well  as  to  other  seductive  influences,  and  deserving  as  well 
as  enjoying  the  highest  measure  of  personal  confidence.  He  is 
described  as  the  peculiar  friend  of  Kleisthenes,  the  first  founder  of 
the  democracy — as  pursuing  a  strdght  and  a  single-handed  course  in 
political  life,  with  no  solicitude  for  party-ties,  and  with  little  care 
either  to  conciliate  friends  or  to  offend  en  mies — as  unflinching  in  the 
exposure  of  corrupt  practices,  by  whomsover  committed  or  upheld 
— as  earning  for  himself  the  lofty  surname  of  the  Just,  not  less  by  his 
judicial  decisions  in  the  capacity  of  archon,  than  by  his  equity  in 
private  arbitrations  and  even  his  candor  in  political  dispute — and  as 
manifesting  throughout  a  long  public  life  full  of  tempting  oppor- 
tunities, an  uprightness  without  flaw,  and  beyond  all  suspicion,  rec- 
ognized equally  by  his  bitter  contemporary  the  poet  Timokreon  and 
by  the  allies  of  Athens  upon  whom  he  first  assessed  the  tribute. 
Few  of  the  leading  men  in  any  part  of  Greece  were  without  some 
taint  on  their  reputation,  deserved  or  undeserved,  in  regard  to  pecun- 
iary probity.  But  whoever  became  notoriously  recognized  as  pos- 
sessing this  vital  quality,  acquired  by  means  of  it  a  firmer  hold  on 
the  public  esteem  than  even  eminent  talents  could  confer.  Thucyd- 
ides ranks  conspicuous  probity  among  the  first  of  the  many  ascend- 
ent qualities  possessed  by  Perikles;  while  Hildas,  equal  to  him  in 
this  respect,  though  immeasurably  inferior  in  every  other,  owed  to  it 
a  still  larger  proportion  of  that  exaggerated  confidence  which  the 
Athenian  people  continued  so  long  to  repose  in  him.  The  abilities  of 
Aristeides — though  apparently  adequate  to  every  occasion  on  which 
he  was  engaged,  and  only  inferior  when  we  compare  him  with  so 
remarkable  a  man  as  Themistokles — were  put  in  the  shade  by  this 
incorruptible  probity;  which  procured  for  him,  however,  along  with 


[96      IONIC  REVOLT  TO  BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 

neral  esteem,  no  inconsiderable  amount  of  private  enmity  from 
jobbers  whom  he  exposed,  and  even  some  jealousy  from  persona  who 
heard  il  proclaimed  with  offensive  ostentation.  We  are  told  thai  a 
fustic  and  unletu  r  'I  citizi  □  gave  his  ostracizing  vote  and  expressed 
his  dislike  against  Aristeides,  on  the  simple  ground  that  he  was  tired 
of  hearing  him  always  called  the  Just.  Now  the  purity  of  the  mos. 
honorable  man  will  nol  bear  to  be  so  boastfully  talked  of  as  if  he 
w  ere  the  only  honorable  man  in  the  counl  ry.  The  less  it  is  obtruded, 
the  more  deeply  and  cordially  will  it  be  felt:  and  the  story  just 
alluded  to,  whether  true  or  false,  illustrates  thai  natural  reaction  of 
feeling  produced  by  absurd  encomiasts,  or  perhaps  by  insidious 
enemies  under  the  mask  of  encomiasts,  who  trumpeted  forth  Axis- 
teicles  as  Tht  Just  man  of  Attica,  bo  as  to  wound  the  legitimate  dig- 
nity of  e\ery  one  else  Neither  indiscreel  friends  nor  artful  enemies, 
however,  could  rob  him  of  the  lasting  esteem  of  his  countrymen; 
which  he  enjoyed,  though  with  intervals  of  their  displeasure,  to  the 
end  of  his  life.  He  was  ostracized  during  a  part  of  the  period  be- 
tween the  hat  lies  of  Marathon  and  Sal  am  is,  at  a  time  when  the  rivalry 
between  him  and  Themistokles  was  so  violent  that  both  could  not 
remain  at  Alliens  without  peril;  but  the  dangers  of  Athens  during 
the  invasion  of  Xerxes  broughl  him  hack  before  the  ten  years  <>f 
exile  were  expired.  His  fortune,  originally  very  moderate,  was  still 
farther  diminished  during  the  course  of  his  life,  so  that  he  died  very 
poor,  and  the  state  was  obliged  to  1<  nd  aid  to  his  children. 

Such  were  the  characlei's  of  Themistokles  and  Aristeides,  t lie  two 
eariiesl  leaders  thrown  up  by  the  Athenian  democracy.  Half  a  cen- 
tury before,  Themistokles  would  have  been  an  active  partisan  in  the 
faction  of  the  Parali  or  the  Pedieis  w  Idle  Aristeides  would  probably 
have  remained  an  unnoticed  citizen.  At  the  present  period  of 
Athenian  history,  the  characters  of  soldier,  magistrate,  and  orator 
were  intimately  Mended  together  in  a  citizen  who  stood  forward  for 
eminence,  though  they  tended  more  and  more  to  divide  themselves 
during  the  ensuing  century  and  a  half.  Aristeides  andMiltiadea 
were  both  elected  among  the  ten  generals,  each  for  his  respective 
tribe,  in  the  year  of  the  expedition  of  Datis  across  the  ^Egean,  and 
probably  even  after  that  expedition  was  known  to  be  on  its  voyage. 
Moreover  we  are  led  to  suspect  from  a  passage  in  Plutarch,  that 
Themistokles  also  was  general  of  his  tribe  on  the  same  occasion, 
though  this  is  doubtful;  hut  it  is  certain  that  he  fought  at  Marathon. 
The  ten  generals  had  jointly  the  command  of  the  army,  each  of  them 
taking  Ids  turn  to  exercise  it  tor  a  day.  In  addition  lo  the  tin.  the 
third  archon  or  polemarch  was  considered  as  eleventh  in  the  military 
council.     The  polemarch  of  this  year  was  Kallimachus  of  Apbidnse. 

Such  were  the  chief-  of  the  military  force,  and  to  a  great  degree 
the  administrators  of  foreign  affairs,  at  the  time  when  the  4,000 
Athenian  kleruehs  or  settlers  planted  in  Eubcea-  escaping  from 
Eretria,  now  invested  by  the  Persians — brought  word  to  their  coun- 


THE  ATHENIANS  ASK  AID  FROM  SPARTA.    197 

trymen  at  home  that  the  fall  of  that  city  was  impending.  It  was  ob- 
vious that  the  Persian  host  would  proceed  from  Eretria  forthwith 
against  Athens.  A  few  days  afterward  Ilippias  disembarked  them 
at  Marathon. 

Of  the  feeling  which  now  prevailed  at  Athens  we  have  no  details. 
But  doubtless  {he  alarm  was  hardly  inferior  to  that  which  had  been 
felt  at  Eretria.  Opinions  were  not  unanimous  as  to  the  proper  steps 
to  be  taken,  nor  were  suspicions  of  treason  wanting.  Pheidippides 
the  courier  was  sent  to  Sparta  immediately  to  solicit  assistance;  and 
such  was  his  prodigious  activity,  that  he  performed  this  journey  of 
150  miles,  on  foot,  in  48  hours.  Revealing  to  the  ephors  that  Eretria 
was  already  enslaved,  he  entreated  their  assistance  to  avert  the  same 
fate  from  Athens,  the  most  ancient  city  in  Greece.  The  Spartan 
authorities  readily  promised  their  aid,  but  unfortunately  it  was  now 
the  ninth  day  of  the  moon.  Ancient  law  or  custom  forbade  them  to 
march,  in  this  mouth  at  least,  during  the  last  quarter  before  the  full 
moon;  but  after  the  full,  they  engaged  to  march  without  delay.  Five 
days'  delay  at  this  critical  moment  might  prove  the  utter  ruin  of  the 
endangered  city;  yet  the  reason  assigned  seems  to  have  been  no  pre- 
tense on  the  part  of  the  Spartans.  It  was  mere  blind  tenacity  of  an 
cient  habit,  which  we  shall  And  to  abate,  though  never  to  disappear, 
as  we  advance  in  their  history.  Indeed  their  delay  in  marching  to 
rescue  Attica  from  Mardonius,  eleven  years  afterward,  at  the  immi- 
nent hazard  of  alienating  Athens  and  ruining  the  Hellenic  cause, 
marks  the  same  selfish  dullness.  But  the  reason  now  given  certainly 
looked  very  like  a  pretense,  so  that  the  Athenians  could  indulge  no 
certain  assurance  that  the  Spartan  troops  would  start  even  when  the 
full  moon  arrived. 

In  this  respect  the  answer  brought  by  Pheidippides  was  mischiev- 
ous, as  it  tended  to  increase  that  uncertainty  and  indecision  which 
already  prevailed  among  the  ten  generals,  as  to  the  proper  steps  for 
meeting  the  invaders.  Partly,  perhaps,  in  reliance  on  tins  expected 
Spartan  help,  rive  out  of  the  ten  generals  were  decidedly  averse  to 
an  immediate  engagement  with  the  Persians;  while  Miltiades,  with 
the  remaining  four,  strenuously  urged  that  not  a  moment  should  be 
lost  in  bringing  the  enemy  to  action,  without  leaving  time  to  the 
timid  and  the  treacherous  to  establish  correspondence  with  Hippias 
and  to  take  some  active  step  for  paralyzing  all  united  action  on  the 
part  of  the  citizens.  This  most  momentous  debate,  upon  which  the 
fate  of  Athens  hung,  is  represented  by  Herodotus  to  have  occurred  at 
Marathon,  after  the  army  had  marched  out  and  taken  post  there 
within  sight  of  the  Persians;  while  Cornelius  Nepos  describes  it  as 
having  been  raised  before  the  army  quitted  the  city — upon  the  ques- 
tion, whether  it  was  prudent  to  meet  the  enemy  at  all  in  the  field,  or 
to  confine  the  defense  to  the  city  and  the  sacred  rock.  Inaccurate  as 
this  latter  author  generally  is,  his  statement  seems  more  probable 
here  than  that  of-  Herodotus.     For  the  ten  generals  would  scarcely 


198     IONIC  REVOLT  TO  BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 

march  oul  of  Athens  to  Marathon  without  having  previously  resolved 
to  fight:  moreover,  the  question  between  fighting  in  the  field  ot 
resisting  behind  the  walls,  which  had  already  been  raised  at  Eretria, 
semis  the  natural  point  on  which  the  five  mistrustful  generals  would 
take  their  stand.  And  probably,  indeed,  Miltiades  himself ,  if  debarred 
from  immediate  action,  would  have  preferred  to  hold  possession  of 

Athens,  and  prevent  any  treacherous  movement  from  breaking  out 
there,  rather  than  to  remain  inactive  on  the  hills,  watching  the  Per- 
sians at  Marathon,  with  the  chance  of  a  detachment  from  their 
numerous  fleet  sailing  round  to  Phalerum,  and  thus  distracting  by  a 
double  attack  both  the  city  and  the  camp. 

However  this  may  be,  the  equal  division  of  opinion  among  the  ten 
generals,  whether  manifested  at  Marathon  or  at  Athens,  is  certain. 
Miltiades  had  to  await  the  casting  vote  of  the  polemarch  Kallimachus. 
To  him  he  represented  emphatically  the  danger  of  delay,  with  the 
chance  of  some  traitorous  intrigue  occurring  to  excite  disunion  and 
aggravate  the  alarms  of  the  citizens.  .Nothing  could  prevent  such 
treason  from  breaking  out,  with  all  its  terrific  consequences  of 
enslavement  to  the  Persians  and  to  Hippias,  except  a  bold,  decisive, 
and  immediate  attack — the  success  of  which  he  (Miltiades)  was  pre- 
pared to  guarantee.  Fortunately  for  Alliens,  the  polemarch  embraced 
the  opinion  of  Miltiades;  while  the  seditious  movements  which  were 
preparing  did  not  show  themselves  until  after  the  battle  had  been 
gained.  Aristeides  and  Thcmistokles  are  both  recorded  to  have 
seconded  Miltiades  warmly  in  this  proposal,  while  all  the  other  gen- 
erals agreed  in  surrendering  to  .Miltiades  their  days  of  command,  so 
as  to  make  him  as  much  as  they  could  the  sole  leader  of  the  army. 
It  is  said  that  the  latter  awaited  the  day  of  his  own  regular  turn 
before  he  fought  the  battle.  Yet  considering  the  eagerness  which  he 
displayed  to  bring  on  an  immediate  and  decisive  action,  we  cannot 
suppose  that  he  would  have  admitted  any  serious  postponement  upon 
such  a  punctilio. 

While  the  army  were  mustered  on  the  ground  sacred  to  Ilcrakles 
near  Marathon,  with  the  Persians  and  their  fleet  occupying  the  plain 
and  shore  beneath,  and  in  preparation  for  immediate  action — they 
were  joined  by  the  whole  force  of  the  little  town  of  Plataa,  consist- 
ing of  about  1000  hoplites,  who  had  marched  directly  from  their  own 
city  to  the  spot,  along  the  southern  range  of  Kithseron,  and  passing 
through  Dekeleia.  We  are  not  told  that  they  had  ever  been  invited. 
Very  probably  the  Athenians  had  never  thought  of  summoning  aid 
from  this  unimportant  neighbor,  in  whose  behalf  they  had  taken 
upon  themselves  a  lasting  feud  with  Thebes  and  the  Boeotian  league. 
Their  coming  on  this  important  occasion  seems  to  have  been  a  spon- 
taneous effort  of  gratitude,  which  ought  not  to  be  the  less  c<  immended 
because  their  interests  were  really  wrapped  up  in  those  of  Athens — 
since  if  the  latter  had  been  conquered,  nothing  could  have  saved 
Plataea  from  being  subdued  by  the  Thebans.      Yet  many  a  Grecian 


NUMBERS  OF  THE  ARMIES.  199 

town  would  have  disregarded  both  generous  impulse  and  rational 
calculation,  in  the  fear  of  provoking  a  new  and  terrific  enemy.  If 
we  summon  up  to  our  imaginations  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case 
— which  it  requires  some  effort  to  do,  because  our  authorities  come 
from  the  subsequent  generations,  after  Greece  had  ceased  to  fear  the 
Persians — we  shall  be  sensible  that  this  volunteer  march  of  the  whole 
Platsean  for  '.e  to  Marathon  is  one  of  the  most  affecting  incidents  of 
all  Grecian  history.  Upon  Athens  generally  it  produced  an  indelible 
impression,  commemorated  ever  afterward  in  the  public  prayers  of 
the  Athenian  herald,  and  repaid  by  a  grant  to  the  Plataeans  of  the 
full  civil  rights  (seemingly  without  the  political  rights)  of  Athenian 
citizens.  Upon  the  Athenians  then  marshalled  at  Marathon  its  effect 
must  have  been  unspeakably  powerful  and  encouraging,  as  a  proof 
that  they  were  not  altogether  isolated  from  Greece,  and  as  an  unex- 
pected countervailing  stimulus  under  circumstances  so  full  of  hazard. 

Of  the  two  opposing  armies  at  Marathon,  we  are  told  that  the 
Athenians  were  10,000  hoplites,  either  including,  or  besides,  the  1000 
who  came  from  Plata?a.  This  statement  is  no  way  improbable,  though 
it  does  not  come  from  Herodotus,  who  is  our  only  really  valuable 
authority  on  the  case,  and  wTho  mentions  no  numerical  total.  Indeed, 
the  number  named  may  seem  smaller  than  we  should  have  expected, 
considering  that  no  less  than  4,000  kleruchs  or  out-settled  citizens  had 
just  come  over  from  Euboea.  A  sufficient  force  of  citizens  must  of 
course  have  been  left  behind  to  defend  the  city.  The  numbers  of  the 
Persians  we  cannot  be  said  to  know  at  all,  nor  is  there  anything  cer- 
tain except  that  they  were  greatly  superior  to  the  Greeks.  We  hear 
from  Herodotus  that  their  armament  originally  consisted  of  six  hun- 
dred ships  of  war,  but  we  are  not  told  how  many  separate  transports 
there  were;  moreover,  reinforcements  had  been  procured  as  they 
came  across  the  ^Egean  from  the  islands  successively  conquered. 
The  aggregate  crews  on  board  of  all  their  ships  must  have  been 
between  150,000  and  200,000  men.  Yet  what  proportion  of  these 
were  fighting-men,  or  how  many  actually  did  fight  at  Marathon,  we 
have  no  means  of  determining.  There  were  a  certain  proportion  of 
cavalry,  and  some  transports  expressly  prepared  for  the  conveyance 
of  horses.  Moreover,  Herodotus  tells  us  that  Hippias  selected  the 
plain  of  Marathon  for  a  landing-place,  because  it  was  the  most  con- 
venient spot  in  Attica  for  cavalry  movements — though  it  is  singular 
that  in  the  battle  the  cavalry  are  not  mentioned. 

Marathon,  situated  near  to  a  bay  on  the,,  eastern  coast  of  Attica, 
and  in  a  direction  E.N.E.  from  Athens,  is  divided  by  the  high  ridge 
of  Mount  Pentelikus  from  the  city,  with  which  it  communicated  by 
two  roads,  one  to  the  north,  another  to  the  south  of  that  mountain. 
Of  these  two  roads,  the  northern,  at  once  the  shortest  and  the  most 
difficult,  is  twenty-two  miles  in  length;  the  southern — longer  but 
more  easy,  and  the  only  one  practicable  for  chariots — is  twenty-six 
miles  in  length,  or  about  six  and  a  half  hours  of  computed  march. 


200     IONIC  REVOLT  TO  BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 

It  passed  between  Mounts  Pentelikus  and  Hymettus,  through  the 
ancienl  denies  of  Gargettus  and  Pallene,  and  was  the  road  by  which 
Peisistratus  and  Bippias,  when  they  landed  at  Marathon,  forty-seven 
years  before,  had  marched  to  Athens.  The  bay  of  Marathon,  shel- 
tered by  a  projecting  cape  from  the  northward,  affords  both  deep 
water  and  a  shore  convenient  for  landing;  while  "its  plain  (says  a 
careful  modern  observer)  extends  in  a  perfect  level  along  this  fine 
bay  and  is  in  length  about  six  miles,  in  breadth  never  less  than  about 
one  mile  and  a  half.  Two  marshes  hound  the  extremities  of  the 
plain;  the  southern  is  not  very  large,  and  is  almost  dry  at  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  greal  heats;  hut  the  northern,  which  generally  covers  con- 
siderably more  than  a  square  mile,  offers  several  parts  which  are  at 
all    seasons   impassable.     Both,  however,  leave   a   broad,  firm,  sandy 

beach  between  them  and  the  sea.  The  uninterrupted  flatness  of  the 
plain  is  hardly  relieved  by  a  single  tree;  and  an  amphitheater  of 
rocky  hills  and  rugged  mountains  separates  it  from  the  rest  of  Attica, 
over  the  lower  ridges  of  which  some  steep  and  difficult  paths  commu- 
nicate with  the  districts  of  the  interior." 

The  position  occupied  by  Miltiades  before  the  battle,  identified  as 
it  was  to  all  subsequent  Athenians  by  the  sacred  grove  of  llerakles 
near  Marathon,  was  probably  on  some  portion  of  the  high  ground 
above  this  plain.  Cornelius  Nepos  tells  us  that  he  protected  it  from  the 
attacks  of  the  Persian  cavalry  by  felled  trees  obstructing  the  approach. 
The  Persians  occupied  a  position  on  the  plain;  their  fleet  was  ranged 
along  the  beach,  and  Hippias  himself  marshaled  them  for  the  battle. 
The  native  Persians  and  Sakse,  the  best  troops  in  the  whole  army, 
were  placed  in  the  center,  which  they  considered  as  the  post  of 
honor,  and  which  was  occupied  by  the  Persian  king  himself,  when 
present  at  a  battle.  The  right  whig  A\a<  so  regarded  by  the  Greeks, 
and  the  polemarch  Kalliraachus  had  the  command  of  it.  The  hop- 
lites  were  arranged  in  the  order  of  their  respective  tribes  from  right 
to  left,  and  at  the  extreme  left  stood  the  Plabcans.  It  was  necessary 
for  Miltiades  to  present  a  front  ecpial  or  nearly  equal  to  that  of  the 
more  numerous  Persian  host,  in  order  to  guard  himself  from  being 
taken  in  flank.  With  this  view  he  drew  up  the  central  tribes,  includ- 
ing the  Leontis  and  Antiochis,  in  shallow  files  and  occupying  a  large 
breadth  of  ground;  while  each  of  the  wings  was  in  stronger  and 
deeper  order,  so  as  to  make  his  attack  efficient  on  both  sides.  His 
whole  army  consisted  of  hoplitcs,  with  some  slaves  as  unarmed  or 
light-armed  attendants,  but  without  either  bowmen  or  cavalry.  Nor 
could  the  Persians  have  been  very  strong  in  this  latter  force,  seeing 
that  their  horses  had  to  be  transported  across  theiEgean;  but  the 
elevated  position  of  .Miltiades  enabled  them  to  take  some  measure  of 
the  numbers  under  his  command,  and  the  entire  absence  of  Cavalry 
in  his  army  could  not  but  confirm  the  confidence  with  which  a  long 
career  of  uninterrupted  victory  had  impressed  their  generals. 

At  length  the  sacrifices  in  the  Greek  camp  were  favorable  for  bat- 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON.  201 

tie.  Miltiades,  who  had  everything  to  gain  by  coming  immediately 
to  close  quarters,  ordered  his  army  to  advance  at  a  running  step  over 
the  interval  of  one  mile  which  separated  the  two  armies.  This  rapid 
forward  movement,  accompanied  by  the  war-cry  or  paean  which 
always  animated  the  charge  of  the  Greek  soldier,  astounded  the  Per- 
sian army.  They  construed  it  as  an  act  of  desperate  courage  little 
short  of  insanity,  in  a  body  not  only  small  but  destitute  of  cavalry  or 
archers — but  they  at  the  same  time  felt  their  conscious  superiority 
sink  within  them.  It  seems  to  have  been  long  remembered  also 
among  the  Greeks  as  the  peculiar  characteristic  of  the  battle  of  Mar- 
atlio .1.  and  Herodotus  tells  us  that  the  Athenians  were  the  first  Greeks 
wlio  c  cr  charged  at  a  run.  It  doubtless  operated  beneficially  in  ren- 
dering Hie  Persian  cavalry  and  archers  comparatively  innocuous,  but 
we  may  reasonably  suppose  that  it  also  disordered  the  Athenian 
ranks,  and  that  when  they  reached  the  Persian  front  they  were  both 
out  of  breath  and  unsteady  in  that  line  of  presented  spears  and  shields 
which  constituted  their  force.  On  the  two  wings,  where  the  files 
were  deep,  such  disorder  produced  no  mischievous  effect:  the  Per- 
sians, after  a  certain  resistance,  wrere  overborne  and  driven  back- 
But  in  the  center,  where  the  files  were  shallow,  and  where  moreover 
the  native  Persians  and  other  choice  troops  of  the  army  were  posted, 
the  breathless  and  disordered  Athenian  hoplites  found  themselves  in 
far  greater  difficulties.  The  tribes  Leontis  and  Antiochis,  with  Them- 
istokles  and  Aristeides  among  them,  were  actually  defeated,  broken, 
driven  back,  and  pursued  by  the  Persians  and  Sakse.  Miltiades 
seems  to  have  foreseen  the  possibility  of  such  a  check  when  he  found 
himself  compelled  to  diminish  so  materially  the  depth  of  his  center. 
For  his  wings,  having  routed  the  enemies  opposed  to  them,  were 
stayed  from  pursuit  until  the  center  was  extricated,  and  the  Persians 
and  Sakoa  put  to  flight  along  with  the  rest.  The  pursuit  then  became 
general,  and  the  Persians  were  chased  to  their  ships  ranged  in  line 
along  the  shore.  Some  of  them  became  involved  in  the  impassable 
marsh  and  there  perished.  The  Athenians  tried  to  set  the  ships  on 
fire,  but  the  defense  here  was  both  vigorous  and  successful — several 
of  the  forward  warriors  of  Athens  were  slain,  and  only  seven  ships 
out  of  the  numerous  fleet  destroyed.  This  part  of  the  battle  termi- 
nated to  the  advantage  of  the  Persians.  They  repulsed  the  Athe- 
nians from  the  sea-shore,  so  as  to  secure  a  safe  re-embarkation ;  leaving 
few  or  no  prisoners,  but  a  rich  spoil  of  tents  and  equipments  which 
had  been  disembarked  and  could  not  be  carried  away. 

Herodotus  estimates  the  number  of  those  who  fell  on  the  Persian  side 
.n  this  memorable  action  at  6.400  men.  The  number  of  Athenian  dead 
is  accurately  known,  since  all  were  collected  for  the  last  solemn  obse- 
quies— they  were  192.  How  many  were  wounded  we  do  not  hear. 
The  brave  Kallimachus  the  polemarch,  and  Stesilaus  one  of  the 
ten  generals,  were  among  the  slain;  together  with  Kynegeirus,  son 
of  Euphorion,  who,  on  laying  hold  on  the  poop-staff  of  one  of  the 


202     IONIC  PEYOLT  TO  BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 

vessels,  had  bis  hand  cut  off  by  an  axe,  and  died  of  the  wound.  ITe 
was  brother  of  the  poel  ^Eschylus,  himself  presenl  a1  the  fight;  to 
Whose  imagination  this  battle  al  the  ships  musl  have  emphatically 
recalled  the  fifteenth  booh  of  the  Iliad.  Both  the  slain  Athenian 
generals  are  said  to  have  perished  in  the  assaull  of  the  ships,  appa- 
rently the  bottesl  part  of  the  combat.  The  statement  of  the  Persian 
lossas  given  by  Berodotus  appears  moderate  and  reasonable,  but  he 
does  not  specify  any  distinguished  individuals  as  having  fallen. 

Bui  the  Persians,  though  thus  defeated  and  compelled  to  abandon 
the  position  of  Marathon,  were  not  vet  disposed  to  relinquish  alto- 
gether their  chances  against  Attica.  Their  fleet  was  observed  to  take 
the  direction  of  Cape  Sunium — a  poit ion  being  sent  to  take  up  the 
Eretrian  prisoners  and  the  stores  which  had  been  left  in  the  island  of 
liEgilia.  At  the  same  time  a  shield,  discernible  from  its  polished  sur- 
face afar  off,  was  seen  held  aloft  upon  some  high  point  of  Attica — 
perhaps  on  the  summit  of  .Mount  Pentelikus,  as  Colonel  Leake  siip- 
poses  with  much  plausibility.  The  Athenians  doubtless  saw  it  as 
well  as  the  Persians;  ami  Miltiades  did  not  fail  to  put  the  righl  inter- 
pretation upon  it,  taken  in  conjunction  with  the  course  of  the 
depart inp,-  fleet.  The  shield  was  a  signal  put  up  by  partisans  in  the 
country,  to  invite  the  Persians  round  to  Athens  by  sea,  while  the 
Marathonian  army  was  absent.  Miltiades  saw  through  the  plot,  and 
lost  not  a  moment  in  returning  to  Athens.  On  the  very  day  of  bat- 
tle, the  Athenian  army  marched  back  with  the  utmost  speed  from 
the  precinct  of  Herakles  at  .Marathon  to  the  precinct  of  the  same  god 
at  Kynosarges  close  to  Athens,  which  tiny  reached  before  the  arrival 
of  the  Persian  Beet.  Datissoon  came  oil'  the  port  of  Phalerum;  but 
the  parti>ans  of  Hippias  had  been  so  dismayed  by  the  rapid  return  of 
the  Marathonian  army,  that  he  did  not  find  those  aids  and  facilities 
which  he  had  anticipated  for  a  fresh  disembarkation  in  the  immediate 
neighborhood  of  Athens.  Though  too  late,  however,  it  seems  that 
he  was  not  much  too  late  The  Marathonian  army  had  only  just 
completed  their  forced  return-march.  A  little  less  quickness  on  the 
part  of  Miltiades  in  deciphering  the  treasonable  signal,  and  giving  the 
instant  order  of  march — a  little  lessenergy  on  the  part  of  the  Athenian 
citi/ens  in  superadding  a  fatiguing  march  to  a  no  less  fatiguing  com- 
bat— and  the  Persians  with  the  partisans  of  Hippias  might  have  been 
found  in  possession  of  Athens.  As  the  facts  turned  out.  Datis, 
finding  at  Phalerum  no  friendly  movemenl  to  encourage  him.  but, 
on  the  contrary,  the  unexpe  ted  presence  of  the  soldiers  who  had 
already  vanquished  him  a:  Marathon — made  no  attempt  again  to 
disembark  in  Attica,  but  sailed  away,  after  a  short  delay,'  to  the 
Cyclades. 

'Thus  was  Athens  rescued,  for  this  time  at  least,  from  a  danger  not 
less  terrible  than  imminent.  Nothing  could  have  rescued  her  except 
that  decisive  and  instantaneous  attack  which  Miltiades  so  emphati- 
cally urged.     The   ruuning   step  on   the   field  of   Marathon   might 


ATHENS  RESCUED.  203 

cause  some  disorder  in  the  ranks  of  the  hoplites;  but  extreme  haste 
in  bringing  on  the  combat  was  the  only  means  of  preventing  dis- 
union and  distraction  in  the  minds  of  the  citizens.  Imperfect  as  the 
accouut  is  which  Herodotus  gives  of  this  most  interesting  crisis,  we 
see  plainly  that  the  partisans  of  Hippias  had  actually  organized  a 
conspiracy,  and  that  it  only  failed  by  coming  a  little  too  late.  The 
bright  shield  uplifted  on  Mount  Pentelikus,  apprising  the  Persians 
that  matters  were  prepared  for  them  at  Athens,  was  intended  to  have 
come  to  their  view  before  any  action  had  taken  place  at  Marathon, 
and  while  the  Athenian  army  were  yet  detained  there,  so  that  Datis 
might  have  sent  a  portion  of  his  fleet  round  to  Phalerum,  retaining 
the  rest  for  combat  with  the  enemy  before  him.  If  it  had  once 
become  known  to  the  Marathonian  army  that  a  Persian  detachment 
had  landed  at  Phalerum — where  there  was  a  good  plain  for  cavalry  to 
act  in,  prior  to  the  building  of  the  Phaleric  wall,  as  had  been  seen  in 
the  defeat  of  the  Spartan  Anehimolius  by  the  Thessalian  cavalry,  in 
510  B.C. — that  it  had  been  joined  by  timid  or  treacherous  Athenians, 
and  had  perhaps  even  got  possession  of  the  city — their  minds  would 
have  been  so  distracted  by  the  double  danger,  and  by  fears  for  their 
absent  wives  and  children,  that  they  would  have  been  disqualified 
for  any  unanimous  execution  of  military  orders.  Generals  as  well  as 
soldiers  would  have  become  incurably  divided  in  opinion — perhaps 
even  mistrustful  of  each  other.  The  citizen-soldier  of  Greece  gener 
ally,  and  especially  of  Athens,  possessed  in  a  high  degree  both  per 
sonal  bravery  and  attachment  to  order  and  discipline.  But  his  brav 
ery  was  not  of  that  equal,  imperturbable,  uninquiring  character, 
which  belonged  to  the  battalions  of  Wellington  or  Napoleon.  It  was 
fitful,  exalted,  or  depressed  by  casual  occurrences,  and  often  more 
sensitive  to  dangers  absent  and  unseen  than  to  enemies  immediately 
in  his  front.  Hence  the  advantage,  so  unspeakable  in  the  case  before 
us,  and  so  well  appreciated  by  Miltiades,  of  having  one  undivided 
Athenian  army — with  one  hostile  army,  and  only  one,  to  meet  in 
the  field.  When  we  come  to  the  battle  of  Salamis,  ten  years  later,  it 
will  be  seen  that  the  Greeks  of  that  day  enjoyed  the  same  advan- 
tage. But  the  wisest  advisers  of  Xerxes  impressed  upon  him  the 
prudence  of  dividing  his  large  force,  and  of  sending  detachments  to 
assail  separate  Greek  states — which  would  infallibly  produce  the 
effect  of  breaking  up  the  combined  Grecian  host,  and  leaving  no 
central  or  co-operating  force  for  the  defence  of  Greece  generally. 
Fortunately  for  the  Greeks,  the  childish  insolence  of  Xerxes  led  him 
to  despise  all  such  advice,  as  implying  conscious  weakness.  Not  so 
Datis  and  Hippias.  Sensible  of  the  prudence  of  distracting  the 
attention  of  the  Athenians  by  a  double  attack,  they  laid  a  scheme, 
while  the  main  army  was  at  Marathon,  for  rallying  the  partisans  of 
Hippias,  with  a  force  to  assist  them  in  the  neighborhood  of  Athens, 
and  the  signal  was  upheld  by  these  partisans  as  soon  as  their  meas- 
ures were  taken.     But  the  rapidity  of  Miltiades  so  precipitated  the 


§04     IONIC  REVOLT  TO  BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 

battle  that  this  signal  came  too  late,  and  was  only  given  "  when  the 
Persians  were  already  in  their  ships,"  after  the    Marathnnian  defeat. 

Even  then  it  might  have  proved  dangerous,  had  not  the  movements 
of  Miltiades  been  as  rapid  after  the  victorj  as  before  it.    If  time  had 

been  allowed  for  the  Persian  movement  on  Athens  before  the  battle 
of  Marathon  had  been  fought,  the  triumph  of  tin-  Athenians  might 

well  have  been  exchanged  for  a  calamitous  servitude.      To  Miltiades 

belongs  the  credit  of  having  comprehended  the  emergency  from  the 
beginning,  and  overruled  the  irresolution  of  his  colleagues  by  his 

own  single  hearted  energy.  The  chances  all  turned  out  in  his  favor 
— for  the  unexpected  junction  of  the  Platseans  in  the  very  encamp 
ment  of  Marathon  must  have  wrought  up  the  courage  of  his  army  to 
the  highest  pitch.  Not  only  did  he  thus  escape  all  the  depressing 
and  distracting  accidents,  hut  he  was  fortunate  enough  to  find  this 
extraneous  encouragement  immediately  preceding  the  battle,  from  a 
source  on  which  he  could  not  have  calculated 

I  have  already  observed  that  the  phase  of  Grecian  history  best 
known  to  us,  and  amid  which  the  great  authors  from  whom  we 
draw  our  information  lived,  was  one  of  contempt  for  the  Persians  in 
the  field.  It  requires  some  effort  of  imagination  to  call  back  previ- 
ous feelings  after  the  circumstances  have  been  altogether  reversed. 
Perhaps  even  ^Eschylus  the  poet,  at  the  time  when  he  composed  his 
tragedy  of  the  Persae  to  celebrate  the  disgraceful  flight  of  the  invader 
Xerxes,  may  have  forgotten  the  emotions  with  which  he  and  his 
brother  Kynegeirus  must  have  marched  out  from  Athens  fifteen 
years  before,  on  the  eve  of  the  battle  of  Marathon.  Again,  there 
fore,  the  fact  must  be  brought  to  view,  that  down  to  the  time  when 
Datis  landed  in  the  bay  of  Marathon,  the  tide  of  Persian  success  had 
never  yet  been  interrupted,  and  that  especially  during  the  ten  years 
immediately  preceding,  the  high  handed  and  cruel  extinction  of  the 
Ionic  revolt  had  aggravated  to  the  highest  pitch  the  alarm  of  the 
Greeks.  To  this  must  be  added  the  successes  of  I  >at  is  himself.,  and 
the  calamities  of  Eretna,  coming  with  all  the  freshness  of  novelty  as 
an  apparent  sentence  of  death  to  Athens.  The  extreme  efforl  of 
courage  required  in  the  Athenians,  to  encounter  such  invaders,  is 
attested  by  the  division  of  opinion  among  the  ten  generals.  Putting 
all  the  circumstances  together,  it  is  without  a  parallel  in  Grecian 
history.  It  surpasses  even  the  combat  of  Thermopylae,  as  will 
appear  when  I  come  to  describe  that  memorable  event.  And  the 
admirable  conduct  of  the  live  dissentient  generals,  when  outvoted  by 

the  decision  of  the  polemarch  against  them,  in  co-operating  heartily 

for  the  success  of  a  policy  which  they  deprecated — proves  how  much 
the  feelings  of  n,  constitutional  democracy,  and  that  entire  acceptance 
of  the  pronounced  decision  of  the  majority  on  which  it  rests,  had 
worked  themselves  into  the  Athenian  mind.  The  combat  of  Mara- 
thon was  by  no  means  a  very  decisive  defeat,  but  it  was  a  defeat — 
the  first  which  the  Persian  had  ever  received  from  Greeks  in  the 


EFFECT  OF  THE  MARATHON1AN  VICTORY.      205 

field.  If  the  battle  of  Salamis,  ten  years  afterward,  could  be  treated 
by  Themistokles  as  a  hairbreadth  escape  for  Greece,  much  more  is 
this  true  of  the  battle  or  Marathon;  which  first  afforded  reasonable 
proof,  even  to  discerning  and  resolute  Greeks,  that  the  Persians 
might  be  effectually  repelled,  and  the  independence  of  European 
Greece  maintained  against  them— a  conviction  of  incalculable  value 
in  reference  to  the  formidable  trials  destined  to  follow. 

Upon  the  Athenians  themselves,  the  first  to  face  in  the  field  suc- 
cessfully the  terrific  look  of  a  Persian  army,  the  effect  of  the  victory 
was  yet  more  stirring  and  profound.  It  supplied  them  with  resolu- 
tion for  the  far  greater  actual  sacrifices  which  they  cheerfully  under- 
went ten  years  afterward,  at  the  invasion  of  Xerxes,  without  falter- 
ing in  their  pan-Hellenic  fidelity.  It  strengthened  them  at  home  by 
swelling  the  tide  of  common  sentiment  and  patriotic  fraternity  in  the 
bosom  of  every  individual  citizen.  It  was  the  exploit  of  Athenians 
alone,  but  of  all  Athenians  without  dissent  or  exception — the  boast  of 
orators,  repeated  until  it  almost  degenerated  into  commonplace, 
though  the  people  seem  never  to  have  become  weary  of  allusions  to 
their  single  handed  victory  over  a  host  of  forty-six  nations.  It  had 
been  purchased  without  a  drop  of  intestine  bloodshed — for  even  the 
unknown  traitors  who  raised  the  signal  shield  on  Mount  Pentelikus, 
took  care  not  to  betray  themselves  by  want  of  apparent  sympathy 
with  the  triumph.  Lastly,  it  was  the  final  guarantee  of  their  democ- 
racy, barring  ail  chance  of  restoration  of  Ilippias  for  the  future. 
Themistokles  is  said  to  have  been  robbed  of  his  sleep  by  the  trophies 
of  Miltiades,  and  this  is  cited  in  proof  of  his  ambitious  temperament. 
Yet  without  supposing  either  jealousy  or  personal  love  of  glory,  the 
rapid  transit  from  extreme  danger  to  unparalleled  triumph  might 
well  deprive  of  rest  even  the  most  sober-minded  Athenian. 

Who  it  was  that  raised  the  treacherous  signal  shield,  to  attract  the 
Persians  to  Athens,  was  never  ascertained.  Very  probably,  in  the 
full  exultation  of  success,  no  investigation  was  made.  Of  course, 
however,  the  public  belief  would  not  be  satisfied  without  singling 
out  some  persons  as  the  authors  of  such  a  treason.  The  information 
received  by  Herodotus  (probably  about  450-440  B.C.,  forty  or  fifty 
years  after  the  Marathonian  victory)  ascribed  the  deed  to  Alkmaeo- 
nids.  He  does  not  notice  any  other  reported  authors,  though  he 
rejects  the  allegation  against  the  Alkmseonids  upon  very  sufficient 
grounds.  They  were  a  race  religiously  tainted,  ever  since  the  Kylo- 
niau  sacrilege,  and  were  therefore  convenient  persons  to  brand 
with  the  odium  of  an  anonymous  crime;  while  party  feud,  if  it  did 
not  originally  invent,  would  at  least  be  active  in  spreading  and  cer- 
tifying such  rumors.  At  the  time  when  Herodotus  knew  Athens,  the 
political  enmity  between  Perikles,  son  of  Xanthippus,  and  Kimon,  son 
of  Miltiades,  was  at  its  height.  Perikles  belonged  by  his  mother's 
side  to  the  Alkmaeonid  race,  and  we  know  that  such  lineage  was 
made  subservient  to  political  maneuvers  against  him  by  his  enemies. 


206  IONIC  REVOLT  TO  RATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 

Moreover  the  enmity  between  Eimon  and  Perikles  had  been  inher 
ited  by  both  from  their  fathers;  for  we  shall  rind  Xanthippus,  not 
long  after  the  battle  of  Marathon,  theprominenl  accuser  of  Miltiadea 
Though  Xanthippus  was  nol  an  Alkmseonid,  his  marriage  with 
Agariste  connected  himself  indirectly,  and  his  son  Perikles  directly, 
with  that  race,  And  we  may  trace  in  this  standing  political  lend  a 
probable  origin  for  the  false  reports  as  to  the  treason  of  the  Aikmaeo- 
nids,  on  that  great  occasion  winch  founded  the  glory  of  Miltiades 
for  that  the  reports  were  false,  the  intrinsic  probabilities  of  the  case, 
supported  by  the  judgment  of  Herodotus,  afford  ample  ground  for 
believing. 

When  the  Athenian  army  made  its  sudden  return  inarch  from 
Marathon  to  Athens,  Ansteides  with  Ins  tribe  was  left  to  guard  the 
field  and  the  spoil;  hut  the  speedy  retirement  of  Datis  from  Attica  left 
the  Athenians  at  full  liberty  to  revisil  the  scene,  and  discharge  the  last 
duties  to  the  dead.  A  tumulus  was  erected  on  the  held  (such  distinc- 
tion was  never  conferred  by  Athens  except  in  this  case  only)  to  the 
192  Athenian  citizens  who  had  been  slain.  Their  names  were  in- 
scribed on  ten  pillars  erected  at  the  spot,  one  for  each  tribe:  there  was 
also  a  second  tumulus  for  the  slam  Platreans,  a  third  for  tiie  slaves, 
and  a  separate  funeral  monument  to  .Miltiades  himself.  Six  hundred 
years  after  the  battle,  Pausanias  saw  the  tumulus,  and  could  still 
read  on  the  pillars  the  names  of  the  immortalized  warriors  Even 
now  a  conspicuous  tumulus  exists  about  half  a  mile  from  the  sea 
shore,  which  Colonel  Leake  believes  to  be  the  same.  The  inhabit 
ants  of  the  deme  of  Marathon  worshiped  these  slam  warriors  a.a 
heroes,  along  with  their  own  eponymus,  and  with  Herakles. 

So  splendid  a  victory  had  not  been  achieved,  in  the  belief  of  the 
Athenians  without  marked  supernatural  aid.  The  god  Pan  had  met 
the  courier  Pheidippides  on  his  hasty  route  from  Athens  to  Sparta, 
and  had  told  him  that  he  was  much  hurt  that  the  Athenians  had  as 
yet  neglected  to  worship  him,  in  spite  of  which  neglect,  however, 
he  promised  them  effective  aid  at  Marathon.  The  promise  of  Pan 
having  been  faithfully  executed,  the  Athenians  repaid  it  by  a  temple 
with  annual  worship  and  sacrifice.  Moreover,  the  hero  Theseus  was 
seen  strenuously  assisting  in  the  battle:  while  an  unknown  warrior. 
in  rustic  garb  and  armed  only  with  a  plowshare,  deall  destruction 
among  the  Persian  ranks-  after  the  battle  he  could  not  be  found,  and 
the  Athenians,  on  asking  at  Delphi  wdio  he  was,  were  directed  U 
worship  the  hero  Echetlus.  Even  in  the  time  of  Pausanias,  thh 
memorable  battle  field  was  heard  to  resound  every  night  with  the 
noise  of  combatants  and  the  snorting  of  horses.  "It  is  dangerous 
(observes  that  pious  author)  to  go  to  the  spot  with  the  express  pur- 
pose of  seeing  what  is  passing;  but  if  a  man  finds  himself  there  by 
accident,  without  having  heard  anything  about  the  matter,  the  gods 
will  not  be  angry  with  him.''  The  gods  (it  seems)  could  not  pardon 
the   inquisitive  mortal  who  deliberately  pried   into  their  secrets. 


RETURN  OF  DATIS  TO  ASIA.  207 

Amidst  the  ornaments  with  which  Athens  was  decorated  during  the 
free  working  of  her  democracy,  the  glories  of  Marathon  of  course 
occupied  a  conspicuous  place.  The  battle  was  painted  on  one  of  the 
compartments  of  the  portico  called  Pcekile,  wherein,  amid  several 
figures  of  gods  and  heroes — Athene,  Herakles,  Theseus,  Echetlus, 
and  the  local  patron  Marathon — were  seen  honored  and  prominent 
the  polemarch  Kallimachus  and  the  general  Miltiades,  while  the  Pla- 
tseans  were  distinguished  by  their  Boeotian  leather  casques.  The  sixth 
of  the  month  Boedromion,  the  anniversary  of  the  battle,  was  com- 
memorated by  an  annual  ceremony  even  down  to  the  time  of  Plu- 
tarch. 

Two  thousand  Spartans  started  from  their  city  immediately  after 
the  full  moon,  and  reached  the  frontier  of  Attica  on  the  third  day  o± 
their  march — a  surprising  effort  when  we  consider  that  the  total  dis- 
tance from  Sparta  to  Athens  was  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles. 
They  did  not  arrive,  however,  until  the  battle  had  been  fought  and 
the  Persians  departed.  Curiosity  led  them  to  the  field  of  Marathon 
to  behold  the  dead  bodies  of  the  Persians;  after  which  they  returned 
home,  bestowing  well-merited  praise  on  the  victors. 

Datis  and  Artaphernes  returned  across  the  yEgean  with  their  Ere- 
trian  prisoners  to  Asia;  stopping  for  a  short  time  at  the  island  of 
Mykonos,  where  discovery  was  made  of  a  gilt  image  of  Apollo  car- 
ried off  as  booty  in  a  Phenician  ship.  Datis  went  himself  to  restore 
it  to  Delos,  requesting  the  Delians  to  carry  it  back  to  the  Delium  or 
temple  of  Apollo  on  the  eastern  coast  of  Bceotia;  the  Delians  how- 
ever chose  to  keep  the  statue  until  it  was  reclaimed  from  them 
twenty  years  afterward  by  the  Thebans.  On  reaching  Asia,  the 
Persian  generals  conducted  their  prisoners  up  to  the  court  of  Susa 
and  into  the  presence  of  Darius.  Though  he  had  been  vehemently 
incensed  against  them,  yet  when  he  saw  them  in  his  power,  his  wrath 
abated,  and  he  manifested  no  desire  to  kill  or  harm  them.  They 
were  planted  at  a  spot  called  Arderikka,  in  the  Kissian  territory,  one 
of  the  resting-places  on  the  road  from  Sardis  to  Susa,  and  about 
twenty-six  miles  distant  from  the  latter  place.  Herodotus  seems 
himself  to  have  seen  their  descendants  there  on  his  journey  between 
the  two  capitals,  and  to  have  had  the  satisfaction  of  talking  to  them 
in  Greek — which  we  may  easily  conceive  to  have  made  some  impres- 
sion upon  him.  at  a  spot  distant  by  nearly  three  months'  journey 
from  the  coast  of  Ionia. 

Happy  would  it  have  been  for  Miltiades  if  he  had  shared  the 
honorable  death  of  the  polemarch  Kallimachus — "  animam  exha- 
lassrt  opimam" — in  seeking  to  fire  the  ships  of  the  defeated  Persians 
at  Marathon.  The  short  sequel  of  his  history  will  be  found  in  melan- 
choly contrast  with  the  Marathonian  heroism. 

His  reputation  had  been  great  before  the  battle,  and  after  it  the 
admiration  and  confidence  of  his  countrymen  knew  no  bounds.  These 
feelings  reached  such  a  pitch  that  his  head  was  turned,  and  he  lost 


908      IONIC  REVOLT  TO  BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 

both  his  patriotism  and  his  prudence.  He  proposed  to  his  countrymen 
to  incur  the  cosl  of  equipping  an  armament  of  seventy  ships  with  an 
adequate  armed  force,  and  to  place  ii  altogether  al  bis  discretion; 
giving  them  no  intimation  whither  he  intended  to  go,  but  merely 
assuring  them  thai  if  they  would  follow  him,  be  would  conduct  them 
to  a  land  where  gold  was  abundant,  and  thus  enrich  them.  Sin  b  a 
promise,  from  the  lips  of  the  recent  victor  of  Marathon,  was  suffi- 
cient. The  armamenl  was  granted,  no  man  except  Bliltiadea  knowing 
what  was  its  destination.  He  sailed  immediately  to  the  island  of 
Paros,  laid  siege  to  the  town,  and  sent  in  a  herald  to  require  from 
the  inhabitants  a  contribution  of  one  hundred  talents  on  pain  of 
entire  destruction.  His  pretense  for  this  attack  was  that  the  Parians 
had  furnished  a  trireme  to  Datis  for  the  Persian  fleet  at  Marathon; 
but  his  real  motive  (so  Herodotus  assur<  s  us)  was  \  mdictive  animosity 
againsl  a  Parian  citizen  named  Lysagoras,  who  had  exasperated  the 
Persian  general  Hydarnes  against  him.  The  Parians  amused  him  at 
tirsi  with  evasions,  until  they  had  procured  a  little  delay  to  repair 
the  defective  portions  of  their  Avail,  after  which  they  sel  him  at 
defiance.  In  vain  did  Miltiades  prosecute  hostilities  against  them 
for  the  space  of  twenty-six  days:  lie  ravaged  the  island,  hut  his 
attacks  made  no  impression  upon  the  town.  Beginning  to  despair  of 
success  in  his  military  operations,  he  entered  into  some  negotiation 
(such  at  least  was  the  tale  of  the  Parians  themselves)  with  a  Parian 
woman  named  Timo,  priestess  or  attendant  in  the  temple  of  Demeter, 
near  the  town-gates.  This  woman,  promising  to  reveal  to  him  a 
secret  which  would  place  Paros  in  his  power,  induced  him  to  visit 
by  nighl  a  temple  to  which  no  male  person  was  admissible.  Having 
leaped  the  exterior  fence,  he  approached  the  sanctuary;  but  on  com- 
ing near  he  was  seized  with  a  panic-terror  and  ran  away,  almost  out 
of  his  senses.  On  leaping  the  same  fence  to  get  back,  he  strained  or 
bruised  his  thigh  badly,  and  became  utterly  disabled.  In  this  melan- 
choly state  he  was  placed  on  shipboard;  the  siege  being  raised,  and 
the  whole  armament  returning  to  Athens. 

Vehement  was  the  indignation  both  of  the  armament  and  of  the 
remaining  Athenians  against  Miltiades  on  his  return.  Of  this  f<  eling 
Xanthippus,  fatherof  thegreat  Perikles,  became  the  spokesman.  Ho 
impeached  Miltiades  before  the  popular  judicature,  as  having  been 
guilty  of  deceiving  the  people  and  as  having  deserved  the  penally  of 
death.  The  accused  himself,  disabled  by  his  injured  thigh,  which 
even  began  to  show  symptoms  Of  gangrene,  was  unable  to  stand  or  to 
say  a  word  in  his  own  defense,  lie  lay  on  his  couch  before  the 
assembled  judges,  while  his  friends  made  the  best  case  they  could  in 
his  behalf.  Defense,  it  appears,  there  was  none:  all  they  could  do 
was  to  appeal  to  his  previous  services:  they  reminded  the  people 
largely  and  emphatically  of  the  inestimable  exploit  of  Marathon, 
coming  in  addition  to  his  previous  conquest  of  Lemnos.  The  assem- 
bled dfkasts  or  jurors  showed  their  sense  of  such  powerful  appeals  by 


MILTIADES  DIES   OF  HIS   WOUND.  9<>9 

rejecting  the  proposition  of  his  accuser  to  condemn  him  to  death; 
but  they  imposed  on  him  the  penalty  of  fifty  talents  "  for  his  iniquity." 
Cornelius  Nepos  affirms  that  these  fifty  talents  represented  the 
expenses  incurred  by  the  state  in  fitting  out  the  armament.  But  we 
may  more  probably  believe,  looking  to  the  practice  of  the  Athenian 
dikastery  in  criminal  cases,  that  fifty  talents  was  the  minor  penalty 
actually  proposed  by  the  defenders  of  Miltiades  themselves,  as  a  sub- 
stitute for  the  punishment  of  death. 

In  those  penal  cases  at  Athens,  where  the  punishment  was  not 
fixed  beforehand  by  the  terms  of  the  law,  if  the  person  accused  was 
found  guilty,  it  was  customary  to  submit  to  the  jurors,  subsequently 
and  separately,  the  question  as  to  amount  of  punishment:  first,  the 
accuser  named  the  penalty  which  he  thought  suitable;  next,  the 
accused  person  was  called  upon  to  name  an  amount  of  penalty  for 
himself,  and  the  jurors  were  constrained  to  take  a  choice  between 
these  two — no  third  gradation  of  penalty  being  admissible  for  con- 
sideration. Of  course,  under  such  circumstances,  it  was  the  interest 
of  the  accused  party  to  name,  even  in  his  own  case,  some  real  and 
serious  penalty — something  which  the  jurors  might  be  likely  to  deem 
not  wholly  inadequate  to  his  crime  just  proved;  for  if  he  proposed 
some  penalty  only  trifling,  he  drove  them  to  prefer  the  heavier  sen- 
tence recommended  by  his  opponent.  Accordingly,  in  the  case  of 
Miltiades,  his  friends,  desirous  of  inducing  the  jurors  to  refuse  their 
assent  to  the  punishment  of  death,  proposed  a  fine  of  fifty  talents  as 
the  self-assessed  penalty  of  the  defendant,  and  perhaps  they  may 
have  stated,  as  an  argument  in  the  case,  that  such  a  sum  would 
suffice  to  defray  the  costs  of  the  expedition.  The  fine  was  imposed, 
but  Miltiades  did  not  live  to  pay  it:  his  injured  limb  mortified,  and 
he  died,  leaving  the  fine  to  be  paid  by  his  sou  Kimon. 

According  to  Cornelius  Nepos,  Diodorus,  and  Plutarch,  he  was  put 
in  prison,  after  having  been  lined,  and  there  died.  But  Herodotus 
does  not  mention  this  imprisonment,  nor  does  the  fact  appear  to  me 
probable:  he  would  hardly  have  omitted  to  notice  it,  had  it  come  to 
his  knowledge.  Immediate  imprisonment  of  a  person  fined  by  the 
dikastery,  until  his  fine  was  paid,  was  not  the  natural  and  ordinary 
course  of  Athenian  procedure,  though  there  were  particular  cases  in 
which  such  aggravation  was  added.  Usually  a  certain  time  was  allowed 
for  payment,  before  absolute  execution  was  resorted  to;  though  the 
person  under  sentence  became  disfranchised,  and  excluded  from  all 
political  rights,  from  the  very  instant  of- his  condemnation  as  a 
public  debtor,  until  the  fine  was  paid.  Now,  in  the  instance  of  Mil- 
tiades, the  lamentable  condition  of  his  wounded  thigh  rendered 
escape  impossible  —  so  that  there  would  be  no  special  motive 
for  departing  from  the  usual  practice,  and  imprisoning  him 
forthwith:  moreover,  if  he  was  not  imprisoned  forthwith,  he 
would  not  be  imprisoned  at  all,  since  he  cannot  have  lived 
many   days   after  his   trial.     To  carry  away  the  suffering  genera] 


210     IONIC  REVOLT  TO  BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 

in  his  couch,  incapable  of  raising  himself  even  to  plead  for  his 
own  life,  from  the  presence  of  the  dikasts  to  a  prison— "would 
not  only  have  been  a  needless  severity,  but  could  hardly  have 
failed  to  imprint  itself  on  the  sympathies  and  the  memory  of 
all  the  beholders;  so  that  Herodotus  would  have  been  likely  to 
hear  and  mention  it,  if  it  had  really  occurred.  I  incline  to  believe, 
therefore,  that  Miltiades  died  at  home.  All  accounts  concur  in 
stating  that  he  died  of  the  mortal  bodily  hurt  which  already  dis- 
abled him  even  at  the  moment  of  his  trial,  and  that  his  son  Kimon 
paid  the  fifty  talents  after  his  death.  If  he  could  pay  them,  probably 
his  father  could  have  paid  them  also.  This  is  an  additional  reason 
for  believing  that  there  was  no  imprisonment — for  nothing  but  non- 
payment could  have  sent  him  to  prison;  and  to  rescue  the  suffering 
Miltiades  from  being  sent  thither,  would  have  been  the  first  and 
strongest  desire  of  all  sympathizing  friends. 

Thus  closed  the  life  of  the  conqueror  of  Marathon.  The  last  act  of 
it  produces  an  impression  so  mournful,  and  even  shocking — his 
descent  from  the  pinnacle  of  glory  to  defeat,  mean  tampering  with 
a  temple-servant,  mortal  bodily  hurt,  undefended  ignominy,  and  death 
under  a  sentence  of  heavy  fine,  is  so  abrupt  and  unprepared — that 
readers,  ancient  and  modern,  have  not  been  satisfied  without  finding 
someone  to  blame  for  it:  we  must  except  Herodotus,  our  original 
authority,  who  recounts  the  transaction  without  dropping  a  hint  of 
blame  against  any  one.  To  speak  ill  of  the  people,  as  Machiavel  has 
long  ago  observed,  is  a  strain  in  which  every  one  at  all  times,  even 
under  a  democratical  government,  indulges  with  impunity  and  with- 
out provoking  any  opponent  to  reply.  In  this  instance,  the  hard  fate 
of  Militades  has  been  imputed  to  the  vices  of  the  Athenians  and  their 
democracy — it  has  been  cited  in  proof,  partly  of  their  fickleness, 
partly  of  their  ingratitude.  But  however  such  blame  may  serve  to 
lighten  the  mental  sadness  arising  from  a  series  of  painful  facts,  it 
will  not  be  found  justified  if  we  apply  to  those  facts  a  reasonable 
criticism. 

What  is  called  the  fickleness  of  the  Athenians  on  this  occasion  is 
nothing  more  than  a  rapid  and  decisive  change  in  their  estimation  of 
Miltiades;  unbounded  admiration  passing  at  once  into  extreme  wrath. 
To  censure  them  for  fickleness  is  here  an  abuse  of  terms;  such  a 
change  in  their  opinion  was  the  unavoidable  result  of  his  conduct. 
His  behavior  in  the  expedition  of  Paros  was  as  reprehensible  as  :it 
Marathon  it  had  been  meritorious,  and  the  one  succeeded  immedi- 
ately after  the  other;  what  else  could  ensue  except  an  entire  revolu- 
tion in  the  Athenian  feelings?  He  had  employed  his  prodigious 
ascendency  over  their  minds  to  induce  them  to  follow  him  without 
knowing  whither,  in  the  confidence  of  an  unknown  booty:  he  had 
exposed  their  lives  and  wasted  their  substance  in  wreaking  a  private 
grudge:  in  addition  to  the  shame  of  an  unprincipled  project,  comes 
the  constructive  shame  of  not  having  succeeded  in  it.  Without  doubt, 


ATHENIAN  INGRATITUDE.  211 

such  behavior,  coming  from  a  man  whom  they  admired  to  excess, 
must  have  produced  a  violent  and  painful  revulsion  iu  the  feelings  of 
his  countrymen.  The  idea  of  having  lavished  praise  and  confidence 
upon  a  person  who  forthwith  turus  it  to  an  unworthy  purpose,  is  on^ 
of  the  greatest  torments  of  the  human  bosom;  and  we  may  easily 
understand  that  the  intensity  of  the  subsequent  displeasure  would  be 
aggravated  by  this  reactionary  sentiment  without  accusing  the  Athe- 
nians of  fickleness.  If  an  officer,  whose  conduct  had  been  such  as  to 
merit  the  highest  encomiums,  comes  on  a  sudden  to  betray  his  trust, 
and  manifests  cowardice  or  treachery  in  a  new  and  important  under- 
taking confided  to  him,  are  we  to  treat  the  general  in  command  as 
fickle,  because  his  opinion  as  well  as  his  conduct  undergoes  an  instan- 
taneous revolution — which  will  lie  all  the  more  vehement  in  propor- 
tion to  his  previous  esteem?  The  question  to  be  determined  is, 
whether  there  be  sufficient  ground  for  such  a  change;  and  in  the  case 
of  Miltiades..  that  question  must  be  answered  in  the  affirmative. 

In  regard  to  the  charge  of  ingratitude  against  the  Athenians,  this 
last-mentioned  point — sufficiency  of  reason — stands  tacitly  admitted. 
It  is  conceded  that  Miltiades  deserved  punishment  for  his  conduct  in 
reference  to  the  Parian  expedition,  but  it  is  nevertheless  maintained 
that  gratitude  for  his  previous  services  at  Marathon  ought  to  have 
exempted  him  from  punishment.  But  the  sentiment,  upon  which, 
after  all,  this  exculpation  rests,  will  not  bear  to  be  drawn  out  and 
slated  in  the  form  of  a  cogent  or  justifying  reason.  For  will  any  one 
really  contend,  that  a  man  who  has  rendered  great  services  to  the 
public,  is  to  receive  in  return  a  license  of  unpunished  misconduct  for 
the  future?  Is  the  general,  who  has  earned  applause  by  eminent 
skill  and  important  victories,  to  be  recompensed  by  being  allowed 
the  liberty  of  betraying  his  trust  afterward,  and  exposing  hiscountry 
to  peril,  without  censure  or  penalty?  This  is  what  no  one  intends  to 
vindicate  deliberately;  yet  a  man  must  be  prepared  to  vindicate  it, 
when  he  blames  the  Athenians  for  ingratitude  toward  Miltiades.  For 
if  all  that  be  meant  is,  that  gratitude  for  previous  services  ought  to 
pass,  not  as  a  receipt  in  full  for  subsequent  crime,  but  as  an  extenu- 
ating circumstance  in  the  measurement  of  the  penalty,  the  answer  is, 
that  it  was  so  reckoned  in  the  Athenian  treatment  of  Miltiades.  His 
friends  had  nothing  whatever  to  urge,  against  the  extreme  penalty 
proposed  by  his  accuser,  except  these  previous  services — which  influ- 
enced the  dikasts  sufficiently  to  induce  them  to  inflict  the  lighter 
punishment  instead  of  the  heavier.  Now  thtrwhoie  amount  of  punish- 
ment inflicted  consisted  in  a  fine  which  certainly  was  not  beyond  his 
reasonable  means  of  paying,  or  of  prevailing  upon  friends  to  pay  for 
him — since  his  son  Kimon  actually  did  pay  it.  Those  who  blame 
the  Athenians  for  ingratitude,  unless  they  are  prepared  to  maintain 
the  doctrine,  that  previous  services  are  to  pass  as  full  acquittal  for 
future  crime,  have  no  other  ground  left  except  to  say  that  the  fine 
was  too  high;  that  instead  of  being  fifty  talents,  it  ought  to  have  beeu 


rJJ-J      IONIC  REVOLT  TO  BATTLE  OF  M  A  ItATIION. 

no  more  than  forty,  thirty,  twenty,  or  ten  talents.     Whether  they 

arc  rigbl  in  this,  I  will  not  lake  apoc  me  to  pronounce:  if  the  amount 
was  named  on  behalf  of  the  accused  party,  the  dikastery  had  no  legal 
power  of  diminishing  it ;  bul  it  is  within  such  narrow  limits  that  the 
question  actually  lies,  when  transferred  from  the  province  of  senti- 
ment to  that  of  reason.  It  will  be  recollected  that  the  death  of 
Miltiades  arose  neither  from  his  trial  nor  his  hue,  but  from  the  hurt 
in  his  thigh. 

The  charge  of  ingratitude  against  the  Athenian  popular  juries 
really  amounts  to  this — that  in  trying  a  person  accused  of  present 
crime  or  fault,  they  were  apt  to  confine  themselves  too  strictly  and 
exclusively  to  the  particular  matter  of  charge,  either  forgetting,  or 
making  too  little  account  of,  past  services  which  he  might  have  ren- 
dered. Whoever  imagines  that  such  was  the  habit  of  the  Athenian 
dikasts,  must  have  studied  the  orators  to  very  little  purpose.  Their 
real  defect  was  the  very  opposite:  they  were  too  much  disposed  to 
wander  from  tin.'  special  issue  before  them,  and  to  be  affected  by 
appeals  to  previous  services  and  conduct.  That  which  an  accused 
person  at  Athens  usually  strives  to  produce  is,  an  impression  in  the 
minds  of  the  dikasts  favorable  to  his  general  character  and  behavior: 
of  course  he  meets  the  particular  allegation  of  his  accuser  as  well  as 
he  can,  but  he  neve-  fails  also  to  remind  them  emphatically,  how  well 
he  has  performed  his  general  duties  of  a  citi7.cn— how  many  times  he 
has  served  in  military  expeditions — how  many  trieiarchies  and  litur- 
gies he  has  performed,  and  performed  with  splendid  efficiency.  In 
fact,  the  claim  of  an  accused  person  to  acquittal  is  made  to  rest  too 
much  on  his  prior  services,  and  too  little  upon  innocence  or  justify- 
ing matter  as  to  the  particular  indictment.  '\Yh<  n  we  come  down  to 
the  time  of  the  orators,  I  shall  be  prepared  to  show  that  such  indis- 
position  to  confine  themselves  to  a  sp<  cial  issue  was  one  of  the  most 
serious  defects  of  the  assembled  dikasts  at  Athens.  It  is  one  which 
we  should  naturally  expect  from  a  body  of  private,  non -professional 
citizens  assembled  for  the  occasion — and  which  belongs  more  or  less 
to  the  system  of  jury-trial  everywhere;  but  it  is  the  direct  reverse  of 
thai  ingratitude,  or  habitual  insensibility  to  prior  services,  for  which 
they  have  been  so  often  denounced. 

The  fate  of  Miltiades,  then,  so  far  from  illustrating  either  the 
fickleness  or  the  ingratitude  of  his  countrymen,  attests  their  just 
appri  ciation  of  deserts.  It  also  illustrates  another  moral,  of  no  small 
importance  to  the  right  comprehension  of  Grecian  affairs; — it  teaches 
us  the  painful  lesson,  how  perfectly  maddening  were  the  effects  of  a 
;■  ,-  draught  of  glory  on  the  temperament  of  an  enterprising  and 
ambitious  Greek.  There  can  be  no  doubt,  that  the  rapid  transition, 
C  i  irse  of  about  one  week,  from  Athenian  terror  before  the 
battle  to  Athenian  exultation  after  it,  must   have  produced  demon- 

i.;.i'iis  toward  Miltiades  such  as  were  never  paid  toward  any  other 
.1  the  whole  history  of  the  commonwealth.     Such  unmeasured 


MILTIADES.  213 

admiration  unseated  his  rational  judgment.  His  mind  became  aban- 
doned to  the  reckless  impulses  of  insolence,  and  antipathy,  and 
rapacity; — that  distempered  state,  for  which  (according  to  Grecian 
morality)  the  retributive  Nemesis  was  ever  on  the  watch,  and  which 
in  his  case  she  visited  with  a  judgment  startling  in  its  rapidity  as 
well  as  terrible  in  its  amount.  Had  Miltiades  been  the  same  man 
before  the  battle  of  Marathon  as  he  became  after  it,  the  battle  might 
probably  have  turned  out  a  defeat  instead  of  a  victory.  Demosthenes 
indeed,  in  speaking  of  the  wealth  and  luxury  of  political  leaders  in 
his  own  time,  and  the  profuse  rewards  bestowed  upon  them  by  the 
people,  pointed  in  contrast  to  the  house  of  Miltiades  as  being  noway 
more  splendid  than  that  of  a  private  man.  But  though  Miltiades 
might  continue  to  live  in  a  modest  establishment,  he  received  from 
his  countrymen  marks  of  admiration  and  deference  such  as  were 
never  paid  to  any  citizen  before  or  after  him;  and,  after  all,  admira- 
tion and  deference  constitute  the  precious  essence  of  popular  reward. 
No  man  except  Miltiades  ever  dared  to  raise  his  voice  in  the  Athenian 
assembly,  and  say — "Give  me  a  fleet  of  ships:  do  not  ask  what  I  am 
going  to  do  with  them,  but  only  follow  me,  and  I  will  enrich  you." 
Herein  we  may  read  the  unmeasured  confidence  which  the  Athenians 
placed  in  their  victorious  general,  and  the  utter  incapacity  of  a  lead- 
ing Greek  to  bear  it  without  mental  depravation;  while  we  learn 
from  it  to  draw  the  melancholy  inference,  that  one  result  of  success 
was  to  make  the  successful  leader  one  of  the  most  dangerous  men  in 
the  community.  We  shall  presently  be  called  upon  to  observe  the 
same  tendency  in  the  case  of  the  Spartan  Pausanias,  and  even  in 
that  of  the  Athenian  Themistokles. 

It  is  indeed  fortunate  that  the  reckless  aspirations  of  Miltiades  did 
not  take  a  turn  more  noxious  to  Athens  than  the  comparatively 
unimportant  enterprise  against  Paros.  For  had  he  sought  to  acquire 
dominion  and  gratify  antipathies  against  enemies  at  home,  instead  of 
directing  his  blow  against  a  Parian  enemy,  the  peace  and  security  of 
his  country  might  have  been  seriously  endangered.  Of  the  despots 
who  gained  power  in  Greece,  a  considerable  proportion  begau  by 
popular  conduct  and  by  rendering  good  service  to  their  fellow- 
citizens:  having  first  earned  public  gratitude,  they  abused  it  for  pur- 
poses of  their  own  ambition.  There  was  far  greater  danger,  in  a 
Grecian  communit}*,  of  dangerous  excess  of  gratitude  toward  a  vic- 
torious soldier,  than  of  deficiency  in  that  sentiment.  The  person 
thus  exalted  acquired  a  position  such  thatjihe  community  found  it 
difficult  afterward  to  shake  him  off.  Now  there  is  a  disposition 
almost  universal  among  writers  and  readers  to  side  with  an  indi- 
vidual, especially  an  eminent  individual,  against  the  mull  it  tide 
Accordingly  those  who  under  such  circumstances  suspect  the  pr< iba- 
ble  abuse  of  an  exalted  position,  are  denounced  as  if  they  harbored 
an  unworthy  jealousy  of  superior  abilities;  but  the  truth  is,  that  the 
largest  analogies  of  the  Grecian  character  justified  that  suspicion, 


214     IONIC  REVOLT  TO  BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 

and  required  the  community  to  take  precautions  against  tho  corrup- 
ting effects  of  their  own  enthusiasm.  There  is  no  feature  which 
more  largely  pervades  the  impressible  Grecian    character,  than  a 

liability  to  be  intoxicated  and  demoralized  by  success:  there  was  no 
fault  from  which  sofeweminenl  Greeks  were  free:  there  was  hardly 
any  danger,  againsl  which  it  was  at  once  so  necessary  and  so  difficult 
for  the  Grecian  governments  to  take  security— especially  the  demo- 
,  where  the  manifestations  of  enthusiasm  were  always  the 
loudest.  Such  is  the  real  explanation  of  those  charges  which  have 
been  urged  againsl  the  Grecian  democracies,  thai  they  came  to  hate 
and  ill-treat  previous  benefactors.  The  history  of  Miltiades  illus- 
trates it  in  a  manner  no  less  pointed  than  painful. 

I  have  already  remarked  that  the  fickleness,  which  has  been  so 
largely  imputed  to  the  Athenian  democracy  in  their  dealings  with 
him,  is  nothing  more  than  a  reasonable  change  of  opinion  on  the 

grounds:  nor  can  it,  he  said  that  fickleness  was  in  any  ci 
attribute  of  the  Athenian  democracy.  It  is  a  well-known  fact,  that 
feelings,  or  opinions,  or  modes  of  judging,  which  have  i  nee  obtained 
footing  among  a  large  number  of  people,  arc  more  lasting  and 
unchangeable  than  those  which  belong  only  to  one  or  a  few;  inso- 
much thai  the  judgments  and  actions  of  the  many  admit  of  being 
more  clearly  understood  as  to  the  past,  and  more  certainly  predicted 
as  to  the  future.  If  we  are  to  predicate  any  attribute  of  the  multi- 
tude, it  will  rather  be  that  of  undue  tenacity  than  undue  fickleness. 
There  will  occur  nothing  in  the  course  of  this  history  to  prove  that 
the  Athenian  people  changed  their  opinions,  on  insufficient  grounds, 
more  frequently  than  an  unresponsible  one  or  few  would  have 
changed. 

But  there  were  two  circumstances  in  the  working  of  the  Athenian 
democracy  which  imparted  to  it  an  appearance  of  greater  fickleness, 
without  the  reality :— First,  that  the  manifestations  and  changes  of 
opinion  were  all  'open,  undisguised,  and  noisy:  the  people  gave 
utterance  to  their  present  impression,  whatever  it  was.  with  perfed 
frankness;  if  their  opinions  were  really  changed,  they  bad  no  shame 
or  scruple  in  avowing  it:  Secondly — and  this  is  a  point  of  capital 
importance  in  the  working  of  democracy  generally — the  present 
impression,  whatever  it  might  be.  was  not  merely  undisguised  in  its 
manifestations,  but  also  had  a  tendency  to  lie  exaggerated  in  its 
intensity.  This  arose  from  their  habit  of  treating  public  affairs  in 
multitudinous  assemblages,  the  welbknown  effect  of  which  is.  to 
inflame  sentiment  in  every  man's  bosom  by  mere  contact  with  a 
sympathizing  circle  of  neighbors.  Whatever  the  sentiment  might 
be,  fear,  ambition,  cupidity,  wrath,  compassion,  piety,  patriotic 
devotion,  etc.:  and  whether  well  founded  or  ill  found' d — it  was 
constantly  influenced  more  or  less  by  such  intensifying  cause.  This 
is  a  defect  which  of  course  belongs  in  a  certain  degree  to  .ill  exercise 
Of  power  by  numerous  bodies,  even  though  they  be  representative 


THE  ATHENIAN  PEOPLE.  215 

bodies — especially  when  the  character  of  the  people,  instead  of  being 
comparatively  sedate  and  slow  to  move,  like  the  English,  is  quick, 
impressible,  and  fiery,  like  Greeks  or  Italians;  but  it  operated  far 
more  powerfully  on  the  self-acting  Demos  assembled  in  the  Pnyx. 
It  was  in  fact  the  constitutional  malady  of  the  democracy,  of  which 
the  people  were  themselves  perfectly  sensible — as  I  shall  show  here- 
after from  the  securities  which  the}'  tried  to  provide  against  it — but 
which  no  securities  could  ever  wholly  eradicate.  Frequency  of  pub- 
lic assemblies,  far  from  aggravating  the  evil,  had  a  tendency  to 
lighten  it.  The  people  thus  became  accustomed  to  hear  and  balance 
many  different  views  as  a  preliminary  to  ultimate  judgment;  they 
contracted  personal  interest  and  esteem  for  a  numerous  class  of  dis- 
sentient speakers;  and  they  even  acquired  a  certain  practical  con- 
sciousness of  their  own  liability  to  error.  Moreover  the  diffusion  of 
habits  of  public  speaking,  by  means  of  the  sophists  and  the  rhetors, 
whom  it  has  been  so  much  the  custom  to  disparage,  tended  in  the 
same  direction— to  break  the  unity  of  sentiment  among  the  listening 
crowd,  to  multiply  separate  judgments,  and  to  neutralize  the  con- 
tagion of  mere  sympathizing  impulse.  There  were  important  deduc- 
tions, still  farther  assisted  by  the  superior  taste  and  intelligence  of 
the  Athenian  people:  but  still  the  inherent  malady  remained — exces- 
sive and  misleading  intensity  of  present  sentiment.  It  was  this 
which  give  such  inestimable  value  to  the  ascendency  of  Perikles,  as 
depicted  by  Thucydides:  his  hold  on  the  people  was  so  firm,  that 
he  could  always  speak  with  effect  against  excess  of  the  reigning  tone 
of  feeling.  "  When  Perikles  (says  the  historian)  saw  the  people  in  a 
state  of  unreasonable  and  insoient  confidence,  he  spoke  so  as  to  cow 
them  into  alarm;  when  again  they  were  in  groundless  terror,  he 
combated  it,  and  brought  them  back  to  confidence."  We  shall  find 
Demosthenes,  with  far  inferior  ascendency,  employed  in  the  same 
honorable  task.  The  Athenian  people  often  stood  in  need  of  such 
correction,  but  unfortunately  did  not  always  find  statesmen,  at  once 
friendly  and  commanding,  to  administer  it. 

These  twro  attributes,  then,  belonged  to  the  Athenian  democracy; 
first,  their  sentiments  of  every  kind  were  manifested  loudly  and 
openly;  next,  their  sentiments  tended  to  a  pitch  of  great  present  intcn 
sity.  Of  course,  therefore,  when  they  changed,  the  change  of  senti- 
ment stood  prominent  and  forced  itself  upon  every  one's  notice — 
being  a  transition  from  one  strong  sentiment  past  to  another  strong 
sentiment  present.  And  it  wras  because  such -alterations,  when  they 
did  take  place,  stood  out  so  palpably  to  remark,  that  the  Athenian 
people  have  drawn  upon  themselves  the  imputation  of  fickleness:  for 
it  is  not  all  true  (I  repeat)  that  changes  of  sentiment  were  more  fre- 
quently produced  in  them  by  frivolous  or  insufficient  causes,  than 
changes  of  sentiment  in  other  srovernments. 


016  IONIC  PHILOSOPHERS. 

CHAPTER  XXXVII. 

I0NTC  rniLOPOPITERS. — PYTHAGORAS.  —  KKOTON  AND   SYBARIS. 

The  history  of  the  powerful  Grecian  cities  in  Italy  and  Sicily, 
between  tlie  accession  of  Peisistratns  and  the  battle  of  Marathon,  is 
for  the  most  part  unknown  to  us.  Phalaris,  despot  of  Agrigentum 
in  Sicily,  made  for  himself  an  unenviable  name  during  this  obscure 
interval  His  reign  seems  to  coincide  in  time  with  the  earlier  part  of 
the  rule  of  PeisistratUS  (about  560-540  B.C.),  and  the  few  and  vague 
statements  which  we  find  respecting  it,  merely  show  us  thai  it  was  a 
period  of  extortion  and  cruelty,  even  beyond  the  ordinary  license  of 
Grecian  despots.  The  reality  of  the  hollow  bull  of  brass,  which 
Phalaris  was  accustomed  to  heat  in  order  to  shut  up  his  victims  in  it 
and  burn  them,  appears  to  be  better  authenticated  than  the  nature  of 
the  story  would  lead  us  to  presume.  For  it  is  not  only  noticed  by 
Pindar,  but  even  the  actual  instrument  of  this  torture — the  brazen 
bull  itself — which  had  been  taken  away  from  Agrigentum  as  a  trophy 
by  the  Carthaginians  when  they  captured  the  town,  was  restored  by 
the  Romans,  on  the  subjugation  of  Carthage  to  its  original  domicile. 
Phalaris  is  said  to  have  acquired  the  supreme  command  by  under- 
taking the  task  of  building  a  great  temple  to  Zeus  Polieus  on  the 
citadel  rock;  a  pretense  whereby  he  was  enabled  to  assemble  and 
arm  a  number  of  workmen  and  devoted  partisans,  whom  he  em- 
ployed at  the  festival  of  the  Thesmophoria  to  put  down  the  authori- 
ties. He  afterward  disarmed  the  citizens  by  a  stratagem,  and  com- 
mitted cruelties  which  rendered  him  SO  abhorred  that  a  sudden  rising 
of  the  people,  headed  by  Telemachus  (ancestor  of  the  subsequent 
depot  Theron),  overthrew  and  slew  him.  A  severe  revenge  was 
taken  on  his  partisans  after  his  fall. 

During  the  interval  between  540-500  B.C.,  events  of  much  impor- 
tance occurred  among  the  Italian  Greeks — especially  at  Kroton  and 
Sybaris — events,  unhappily,  very  imperfectly  handed  down.  Be- 
tween these  two  periods  fall  both  the  war  between  Sybaris  and  Kro- 
ton and  the  career  and  ascendency  of  Pythagoras.  In  connection 
with  this  latter  name  it  will  be  requisite  to  say  a  few  words  respecting 
the  other  Grecian  philosophers  of  the  sixth  century  B.C. 

I  have,  in  a  former  chapter,  noticed  and  characterized  those  distin- 
guished persons  called  the  Seven  Wise  Men  of  Greece,  whose  a  'el 
vii\  Tails  in  the  first  half  of  this  century — men  not  so  much  n  a  k.ed 
by  scientific  genius  as  by  practical  sagacity  and  foresight  in  the  a]  pre- 
ciation  of  worldly  affairs,  and  enjoying  a  high  degree  of  political 
respect  from  their  fellow-citizens.  One  of  them,  however,  the  Mile- 
sian Thales,  claims  our  notice,  not  only  on  this  ground,  but  also  as 
the  earliest  known  name  in  the  long  line  of  Greek  scientific  investi- 
gators.    His  life,  nearly  contemporary  with  that  of  Solon,  belongs 


PHILOSOPHY  COMMENCED  BY  THALES.         217 

seemingly  to  the  interval  about  640-550  B.C.:  the  stories  mentioned 
in  Herodotus  (perhaps  borrowed  in  part  from  the  Milesian  Hekatseus) 
are  sufficient  to  show  that  his  reputation,  for  wisdom  as  well  as  for 
science,  continued  to  be  very  great,  even  a  century  after  his  death, 
among  his  felloAV-citizens.  And  he  marks  an  important  epoch  in 
the  progress  of  the  Greek  mind  as  having  been  the  first  man  to  depart 
both  in  letter  and  spirit  from  the  Hesiodic  theogony,  introducing  the 
conception  of  substances  with  their  transformations  and  sequences, 
in  place  of  that  string  of  persons  and  quasi-human  attributes  which 
had  animated  the  old  legendary  world.  He  is  the  father  of  what  is 
called  the  Ionic  philosophy,  which  is  considered  as  lasting  from  his 
time  down  to  that  of  Sokrates.  Writers,  ancient  as  well  as  modern, 
have  professed  to  trace  a  succession  of  philosophers,  each  one  the 
pupil  of  the  preceding,  between  these  two  extreme  epochs.  But  the 
appellation  is  in  truth  undefined  and  even  incorrect,  since  nothing 
entitled  to  the  name  of  a  school,  or  sect,  or  succession  (like  that  of 
the  Pythagoreans,  to  be  noticed  presently)  can  be  made  out.  There 
is  indeed  a  certain  general  analogy  in  the  philosophical  vein  of 
Thales,  Hippo,  Anaximenes,  and  Diogenes  of  Apollonia,  whereby 
they  all  stand  distinguished  from  Xenophanes  of  Elea,  and  his  suc- 
cessors the  Eleatic  dialecticians,  Parmenides  and  Zeno;  but  there  are 
also  material  differences  between  their  respective  doctrines — no  two 
of  them  holding  the  same.  And  if  we  look  to  Anaximander  (the 
person  next  in  order  of  time  to  Thales),  as  well  as  to  Herakleitus,  we 
find  them  departing  in  a  great  degree  even  from  that  character  which 
all  the  rest  have  in  common,  though  both  the  one  and  the  other  are 
usually  enrolled  in  the  ]ist  of  Ionic  philosophers. 

Of  the  old  legendary  and  polytheistic  conception  of  nature,  which 
Thales  partially  discarded,  we  mpy  reTtark  that  it  is  a  state  of  the 
human  mind  in  which  the  problems  suggesting  themselves  to  be 
solved,  and  the  machinery  for  solving  'hem,  bear  a  fair  proportion 
one  to  the  other.  If  the  problems  be  vast,  indeterminate,  confused, 
and  derived  rather  from  the  hopes,  fears,  love,  hatred,  astonishment, 
etc.,  of  men,  than  from  any  genuine  desire  of  knowledge — so  also 
does  the  received  belief  supply  invisible  agents  in  unlimited  number 
and  with  every  variety  of  power  and  inclination.  The  means  of 
explanation  are  thus  multiplied  and  diversified  as  readily  as  the  phe- 
nomena to  be  explained.  Though  no  event  or  state  which  has  not 
yet  occurred  can  be  predicted,  there  is  little  difficulty  in  rendering  a 
plausible  account  of  everything  which  has  occurred  in  the  past — of 
any  and  all  things  alike.  Cosmogony,  and  the  prior  ages  of  the 
world,  were  conceived  as  a  sort  of  personal  history  with  intermar- 
riages, filiation,  quarrels,  and  other  adventures,  of  these  invisible 
agents;  among  whom  some  one  or  more  were  assumed  as  unbegotten 
and  self-existent — the  latter  assumption  being  a  difficulty  common  to 
all  systems  of  cosmogony,  and  from  ••vhich  even  this  flexible  and 
ex_  insive  hypothesis  is  not  exempt.     Now  when  Thales  disengaged 


218  IONIC  PHILOSOPHERS. 

Grecian  philosophy  from  the  old  mode  of  explanation,  be  did  not  at 
the  same  time  di  I   from  the  old  problems  and  matters  pro- 

pounded for  inquiry.  These  be  retained  and  transmitted  to  bis  Mie- 
ns vague  and  vast  as  they  were  at  first  conceived;  and  so  they 
remained,  though  with  some  transformations  and  modifications, 
together  with  many  new  questions  equally  insoluble,  substantially 
present  to  the  Greeks  throughout  their  whole  history,  as  the  legiti- 
mate problems  for  philosophical  investigation.  Bui  these  problems, 
adapted  only  to  t lie  old  elastic  system  of  polytheistic  explanation  and 
omnipresent  personal  agency,  became  utterly  disproportioned  to  any 

impersonal  hypothesis  such  as  those  of  Thales  and  the  philosophers 
after  him — whether  assumed  physical  laws,  or  plausible  moral  and 
metaphysical  dogmas,  open  to  argumentative  attack,  and  of  course 
requiring  the  like  defense.  To  treat  the  visible  world  as  a  whole, 
and  inquire  when  and  how  it  began,  as  well  as  into  all  its  past 
changes — to  discuss  the  first  origin  of  men,  animals,  plants,  the  sun, 
the  stars,  etc. — to  assign  some  comprehensive  reason,  why  motion  or 
change  in  general  look  place  in  the  universe — to  investigate  the  des- 
tinies of  the  human  race,  and  to  lay  down  some  systematic  relation 
between  them  and  the  gods — all  these  were  topics  admitting  of  being 
conceived  in  many  different  ways,  and  set  forth  with  eloquent  plausi- 
bility; but  not  reducible  to  any  solution  resting  on  scientific  evidence 
or  commanding  steady  adherence  under  a  free  scrutiny. 

At  the  time  when  the  power  of  scientific  investigation  was  scanty 
and  helpless,  the  problems  proposed  were  thus  such  as  to  lie  out  of 
the  reach  of  science  in  its  largest  compass.  Gradually  indeed  subjects 
more  special  and  limited,  and  upon  which  experience  or  deductions 
from  experience  could  be  brought  to  bear,  were  added  to  the  list  of 
queesita,  and  examined  with  profit  and  instruction.  But  the  old 
problems,  with  new  ones  alike  unfathomable,  were  never  eliminated, 
and  always  occupied  a  prominent  place  in  the  philosophical  world. 
Now  it  was  this  disproportion,  between  questions  to  be  solved  and 
means  of  solution,  which  gave  rise  to  that  conspicuous  characteristic 
of  Grecian  philosophy — the  antagonist  force  of  suspensive  scepticism, 
passing  in  some  minds  into  a  broad  negation  of  the  attainability  of 
genital  truth — which  it  nourished  from  its  beginning  to  its  end; 
commencing  as  early  as  Xenophanes,  continuing  to  manifest  itself 
seven  centuries  afterward  in  ^Enesidemus  and  Sextus  Empiricus, 
and  including  in  the  interval  between  these  two  extremes  some  of 
the  most  powerful  intellects  in  Greece.  The  present  is  not  the  time 
for  considering  these  Sceptics,  who  bear  an  unpopular  mime,  and 
have  not  often  been  fairly  appreciated;  the  more  so,  as  it  often 
suited  the  purpose  of  men  themselves  more  than  half  sceptical,  like 
Sokrates  and  Plato,  to  denounce  professed  scepticism  with  indigna- 
tion. But  it  is  essential  to  bring  them  into  notice  at  the  first  spring 
of  Grecian  philosophy  under  Thales,  because  the  circumstances  were 
then  laid  which  so  soon  afterward  developed  them. 


THALES.  219 

Though  the  celebrity  of  Thales  in  antiquity  was  great  and  univer- 
sal, scarcely  any  distinct  facts  v:ere  known  respecting  him:  it  is 
certain  that  he  left  nothing  in  writing.  Extensive  travels  iu  Egypt 
and  Asia  are  ascribed  to  him,  and  as  a  general  fact  these  travels  are 
doubtless  true,  since  no  other  means  of  acquiring  knowledge  were 
then  open.  At  a  time  when  the  brother  of  the  Lesbian  Alkseus  was 
serving  in  the  Babylonian  army,  we  may  well  conceive  that  an 
inquisitive  Milesian  would  make  his  way  to  that  wonderful  city 
wherein  stood  the  temple-observatory  of  the  Chaldoean  priesthood. 
How  great  his  reputation  was  in  his  lifetime,  the  admiration  ex- 
pressed by  his  younger  contemporary  Xenophanes  assures  lis;  and 
Herakleitus,  in  the  next  generation,  a  severe  judge  of  all  other  philo- 
sophers, spoke  of  him  with  similar  esteem.  To  him  were  traced  by 
the  Grecian  inquirers  of  the  fourth  century  B.C.,  the  first  beginnings 
of  geometry,  astronomy,  and  physiology  in  its  large  and  really 
appropriate  sense,  the  scientific  study  of  nature:  for  the  Greek  word 
denoting  nature  (aovtfiS)  first  comes  into  comprehensive  use  about  this 
time  (as  I  have  remarked  in  an  earlier  chapter)  with  its  derivatives 
physics  and  physiology,  as  distinguished  from  the  theology  of  the  old 
poets.  Little  stress  can  be  laid  on  those  elementary  propositions  in 
geometry  which  are  specified  as  discovered,  or  as  first  demonstrated, 
by  Thales — still  less  upon  the  solar  eclipse  respecting  which  (accord- 
ing to  Herodotus)  he  determined  beforehand  the  year  of  occurrence. 
But  the  main  doctrine  of  his  physiology  (using  that  word  in  its  larger 
Greek  sense)  is  distinctly  attested.  He  stripped  Oceanus  and  Tethys, 
primeval  parents  of  the  gods  in  the  Homeric  theogony,  of  their 
personality  and  laid  down  water,  or  fluid  substance,  as  the  single 
original  element  from  which  everything  came  and  into  which  every- 
thing returned.  The  doctrine  of  one  eternal  element,  remaining 
always  the  same  in  its  essence,  but  indefinitely  variable  in  its  mani- 
festations to  sense,  was  thus  first  introduced  to  the  discussion  of  the 
Grecian  public.  We  have  no  means  of  knowing  the  reasons  by  which 
Thales  supported  this  opinion,  nor  could  even  Aristotle  do  more 
than  conjecture  what  they  might  have  been ;  but  one  of  the  state- 
ments urged  on  behalf  of  it — that  the  earth  itself  rested  on  water — 
we  may  safely  refer  to  the  Milesian  himself,  for  it  would  hardly 
have  been  advanced  at  a  later  age.  Moreover  Thales  is  reported  tc 
have  held,  that  everything  was  living  and  full  of  gods;  and  that  the 
magnet,  especially,  was  a  living  thing.  Thus  the  gods,  as  far  as  we 
can  pretend  to  follow  opinions  so  very  faintly  transmitted,  are  con- 
ceived as  active  powers  and  causes  of  changeful  manifestation, 
attached  to  the  primeval  substance;  the  universe  being  assimilated  to 
an  organized  body  or  system. 

Respecting  Hippo — who  reproduced  the  theory  of  Thales  with  some 
degree  of  generalization,  substituting,  in  place  of  water,  moisture, 
or  something  common  to  air  and  water — we  do  not  know  whether  lie 
belonged  to  the  sixth  or  the  fifth  century  b.c.  :  but  both  Anaximan- 


220  IONIC  PHILOSOPHERS. 

der,  Xenpphanes,  and  Pherekydea  belong  to  the  latter  half  of  the 
sixth  century.  Anaximander  the  son  of  Praxiades  waa  a  native  of 
Miletus  -Xenophanes,  a  native  of  Kolophon;  the  former  among  the 
curliest  expositors  of  doctrine  in  prose,  while  the  latter  committed 
his  opinions  to  the  old  medium  of  verse.  Anaximander  seema  to  have 
taken  up  the  philosophical  problem,  while  he  materially  altered  the 
hypothesis,  of  his  predecessor  Thales.  Instead  of  the  primeval  fluid 
of  the  latter,  he  supposed  a  primeval  principle,  without  any  actual 
determining  qualities  whatever,  but  including  all  qualities  poten- 
tially, and  manifesting  them  in  an  infinite  variety  from  its  continu- 
ally self-changing  natun — a  principle,  which  was  nothing  in  itself, 
yet  had  the  capacity  of  producing  any  and  all  manifestations,  how- 
ever contrary  to  each  other — a  primeval  something,  whose  essence 
it  was  to  be  eternally  productive  of  dilTci'cnt  phenomena — a  sort 
of  mathematical  point,  which  counts  for  nothing  in  itself,  but  is 
vigorous  in  generating  lines  to  any  extent  thai  may  be  des'red.  In 
this  manner  Anaximander  professed  to  give  a  compn  hensive 
explanation  of  change  in  general,  or  Generation  or  Destruction — how 
it  happened  that  one  sensible  thing  began  and  another  ceased  to 
exist — according  to  the  vague  problems  which  these  early  inquirers 
wire  in  the  habit  of  setting  to  themselves.  He  avoided  that  which 
the  first  philosophers  especially  dreaded,  the  affirmation  that  genera- 
tion could  take  place  out  of  Nothing;  yet  the  primeval  Something 
which  he  supposed  was  only  distinguished  from  Nothing  by  posses- 
sing this  power  of  generation.  In  his  theory  he  passed  from  the 
province  of  physics  into  that  of  metaphysics.  He  first  introduced 
into  Grecian  philosophy  that  important  word  winch  signifies  a 
Beginning  or  a  Principle,  and  firs*  opened  that  metaphysical  discus- 
sion, which  was  carried  on  in  various  ways  throughout  the  whole 
period  of  Grecian  philosophy.  ><s  to  the  One  and  the  Many — the 
Continuous  and  the  Variable — 'hat  which  exists  eternally,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  that  which  comos  and  passes  away  in  ever-changing 
manifestations.  His  physiology  or  explanation  of  nature  thus  con- 
ducted the  mind  into  a  different  route  from  that  suggested  by  the 
hypothesis  of  Thales,  which  was  built  upon  physical  considerations, 
and  was  therefore  calculated  to  suggest  and  stimulate  observations 
of  physical  phenomena  for  the  purpose  of  verifying  or  confuting  it 
— while  the  hypothesis  of  Anaximander  admitted  only  of  being  dis- 
cussed  dialectically,  or  by  reasonings  expressed  in  general  language; 
reasonings,  sometimes  indeed  referring  to  experience  for  the  purpose 
of  illustration,  but  seldom  resting  on  it — and  never  looking  out  for  it 
as  a  necessary  support.  The  physical  explanation  of  nature,  how- 
ever, once  introduced  by  Thales,  although  deserted  by  Anaximander, 
was  taken  up  by  Anaximenes  and  others  afterward,  and  reproduced 
with  many  divergences  of  doctrine — yet  always  more  or  less  entan- 
gled and  perplexed  with  metaphysical  additions,  since  the  two  depart- 
meats  were  never  clearly  parted  throughout  all  Greciau  philosophy. 


XENOPHANES.  221 

Of  these  subsequent  physical  philosophers  I  shall  speak  hereafter: 
at  present  I  contine  myself  to  the  thinkers  of  the  sixth  century  B.C., 
among  whom  Anaximander  stands  prominent,  not  as  the  follower  of 
Thales,  but  as  the  author  of  an  hypothesis  both  new  and  tending  in 
a  different  direction.  It  was  not  merely  as  the  author  of  this  hypoth- 
esis, however,  that  Anaximander  enlarged  the  Greek  mind  and 
foused  the  powers  of  thought:  we  find  him  also  mentioned  as  distin- 
guished in  astronomy  and  geometry.  He  is  said  to  have  been  the 
first  to  establish  a  sun-dial  in  Greece,  to  construct  a  sphere,  and  to 
explain  the  obliquity  of  the  ecliptic;  how  far  such  alleged  author- 
ship really  belongs  to  him,  we  cannot  be  certain — but  there  is  one 
step  of  immense  importance  which  he  is  clearly  affirmed  to  have 
made.  He  was  the  first  to  compose  a  treatise  on  the  geography  of 
the  laud  and  sea  within  his  cognizance,  and  to  construct  a  chart  or 
map  founded  thereupon — seemingly  a  tablet  of  brass.  Such  a  nov- 
elty, wondrous  even  to  the  rude  and  ignorant,  was  calculated  to 
stimulate  powerfully  inquisitive  minds  and  from  it  may  be  dated 
the  commencement  of  Grecian  rational  geography — not  the  least  valu- 
able among  the  contributions  of  this  people  to  the  stock  of  human 
knowledge. 

Xenophanes  of  Kolophon,  somewhat  younger  than  Anaximander 
and  nearly  contemporary  with  Pythagoras  (seemingly  from  about 
570-480  b.c),  migrated  from  Kolophon  to  Zankle  and  Katana  in 
Sicily  and  Elea  in  Italy,  soon  after  the  time  when  Ionia  became  sub- 
ject to  the  Persians  (540-530  B.C.).  He  was  the  founder  of  what  is 
called  the  Eleatic  school  of  philosophers — a  real  school,  since  it 
appears  that  Parmenides,  Zeno,  and  Melissus  pursued  and  devel- 
oped, in  a  great  degree,  the  train  of  speculation  winch  had  been 
begun  by  Xenophanes — doubtless  with  additions  and  variations  of 
their  own,  but  especially  with  a  dialectic  power  which  belongs  to  the 
age  of  Perikles,  and  is  unknown  in  the  sixth  century  B.C.  He  was 
the  author  of  more  than  one  poem  of  considerable  length,  one  on  the 
foundation  of  Kolophon  and  another  on  that  of  Elea;  besides  his 
poem  on  Nature,  wherein  his  philosophical  doctrines  were  set  forth. 
His  manner  appears  to  have  been  controversial  and  full  of  asperity 
toward  antagonists.  But  what  is  most  remarkable  is  the  plain- 
spoken  manner  in  which  he  declared  himself  against  the  popular 
religion,  and  in  which  he  denounced  as  abominable  the  descriptions 
of  the  gods  given  by  Homer  and  Hesiod.  He  is  said  to  have  contro- 
verted the  doctrines  both  of  Thales  and  Pythagoras:  this  is  probable 
enough;  but  he  seems  to  have  taken  his  start  from  the  philosophy  of 
Anaximander — not  however  to  adopt  it,  but  to  reverse  it — and  to  set 
forth  an  opinion  which  we  may  call  its  contrary.  Nature,  in  the  con- 
ception of  Anaximander,  consisted  of  a  Something  having  no  other 
attribute  except  the  unlimited  power  of  generating  and  canceling 
phenomenal  changes;  in  this  doctrine  the  Something  or  Substratum 
existed  only  in  and  for  those  changes,  and  could  not  be  said  to  exist 


222  IONIC  PHILOSOPHERS. 

at  all  in  any  other  sense:  the  Permanent  was  thus  merged  and  lost  in 
ihe  Variable — the  One  in  the  .Many.  Xenophanea  laid  down  the 
exact  opposite:  he  i teived  nature  as  one  unchangeable  and  indi- 
visible Whole,  spherical,  animated,  endued  with  reason,  and  pene- 
trated by  or  indeed  identical  with  God.  He  denied  the  objective 
reality  of  all  change,  or  generation,  or  destruction,  winch  he  Beems 
to  have  considered  as  only  changes  or  modifications  in  the  percipi- 
ent, and  perhaps  different  in  one  percipient  and  another.  That 
which  exisis  (he  maintained)  could  not  have  been  generated,  nor 
could  it  ever  be  destroyed:  there  was  neither  real  generation  nor  real 
destruction  of  anything;  but  that  which  men  took  for  such  was  Hie 
change  in  their  own  feelings  and  ideas.  He  thus  recognized  the  Per- 
manent without  the  Variable — the  One  without  the  Many.  And  his 
treatment  of  the  received  religious  creed  was  in  harmony  with  such 
physical  or  metaphysical  hypothesis;  for  while  he  held  the  whole  of 
nature  to  be  God,  without,  parts  or  change,  lie  at  the  same  pro- 
nounced the  popular  gods  to  be  entities  of  subjective  fancy,  imag- 
ined by  men  after  their  own  model:  if  oxen  or  lions  were  to  become 
religious  (he  added),  they  would  in  like  manner  provide  for  them- 
selves gods  after  their  respective  shapes  and  characters.  This 
hypothesis,  which  seemed  to  set  aside  altogother  the  study  of  the 
sensible  world  as  a  source  of  knowledge,  was  expounded  briefly, 
and,  as  it  should  seem,  obscurely  and  rudely,  by  Xenophanes;  at 
least,  we  may  infer  thus  much  from  the  slighting  epithet  applied  to 
him  by  Aristotle.  But  his  successors,  Parmenides  and  Zcno,  in  the 
succeeding  century,  expanded  it  considerably,  supported  it  with 
extraordinary  acuteness  of  dialectics,  and  even  superadded  a  second 
part,  in  which  the  phenomena  of  sense — though  considered  only  as 
appearances,  not  partaking  in  the  reality  of  the  One  Ens — were  yet 
explained  by  a  new  physical  hypothesis;  so  that  they  will  be  found 
to  exercise  great  influence  over  the  speculations  both  of  Plato  and 
Aristotle.  We  discover  in  Xenophanes,  moreover,  avein  of  skepti- 
cism, and  a  mournful  despair  as  to  the  attainability  of  certain  knowl- 
edge, which  the  nature  of  his  philosophy  was  well  calculated  to  sug- 
gest, and  in  which  the  sinograph  Timon  of  the  third  century  B.C., 
who  seems  to  have  spoken  of  Xenophanes  better  than  of  most  of  the 
other  philosophers,  powerfully  sympathized. 

The  cosmogony  of  Pherekydes  of  Syrus,  contemporary  of  Anaxi- 
mander  and  among  the  teachers  of  Pythagoras,  seems,  according  to 
the  fragments  preserved,  a  combination  of  the  legendary  fancies 
with  Orphic  mysticism,  and  probably  exercised  little  influence  over 
the  subsequent  course  of  Grecian  philosophy.  By  what  has  been 
said  of  Thales,  Anaximander,  and  Xenophanes,  it  will  be  seen  that 
the  sixth  century  B.C.  witnessed  the  opening  of  several  of  those  roads 
of  intellectual  speculation  which  the  later  philosophers  pursued 
farther,  or  at  least  from  which  they  branched  off.  Before  the  year 
500  B.C.  many  interesting  questions  were  thus  brought  into  discus- 


HISTORY  OF  PYTHAGORAS.  223 

sion,  which  Solon, who  died  about  558  B.C.,  had  never  heard  of — just 
as  he  may  probably  never  have  seen  the  map  of  Anaximander.  .But 
neither  of  these  two  distinguished  men — Anaximander  or  Xenoph- 
anes — was  anything  more  than  a  speculative  inquirer.  The  third 
eminent  name  of  this  century,  of  whom  I  am  now  about  to  speak, 
Pythagoras,  combined  in  his  character  disparate  elements  which 
require  rather  a  longer  development. 

Pythagoras  was  founder  of  a  brotherhood,  original/y  brought 
together  by  a  religious  influence,  and  with  observances  approaching 
to  monastic  peculiarity — working  in  a  direction  at  once  religious, 
political,  and  scientific,  and  exercising  for  some  time  a  real  political 
ascendency, — but  afterward  banished  from  government  and  state 
affairs  into  a  sectarian  privacy  with  scientific  pursuits,  not  without 
however  still  producing  some  statesmen  individually  distinguished. 
Amid  the  multitude  of  false  and  apocryphal  statements  which  cir- 
culated in  antiquity  respecting  this  celebrated  man,  we  find  a  few 
important  facts  reasonably  attested  and  deserving  credence.  He  was  a 
native  of  Samos,  son  of  an  opulent  merchant  named  Mnesarchus, — or, 
according  to  some  of  his  later  and  more  fervent  admirers,  of  Apollo: 
born,  as  far  as  we  can  make  out,  about  the  fiftieth  Olympiad,  or  580 
B.C.  On  the  many  marvels  recounted  respecting  his  youth  it  is 
unnecessary  to  dwell.  Among  them  may  be  numbered  his  wide- 
reaching  travels,  said  to  have  been  prolonged  for  nearly  thirty  years, 
to  visit  the  Arabians,  the  Syrians,  the  Phenicians,  the  Chaldaeans,  the 
Indians,  and  the  Gallic  Druids.  But  there  is  reason  to  believe  that 
he  really  visited  Egypt — perhaps  also  Phenicia  and  Babylon,  then 
Chaldoean  and  independent.  At  the  time  when  he  saw  Egypt,  be- 
tween 560-540  B.C.,  about  one  century  earlier  than  Herodotus,  it  was 
under  Amasis,  the  last  of  its  own  kings,  with  its  peculiar  native 
character  yet  unimpaired  by  foreign  conquest,  and  only  slightly  modi- 
fied by  the  admission  during  the  preceding  century  of  Grecian  mer- 
cenary troops  and  traders.  The  spectacle  of  Egyptian  habits,  the 
conversation  of  the  priests,  and  the  initiation  into  various  mysteries  or 
secret  rites  and  stories  not  accessible  to  the  general  public,  may  very 
naturally  have  impressed  the  mind  of  Pythagoras,  and  given  him 
that  turn  for  mystic  observance,  asceticism,  and  peculiarity  of  diet 
and  clothing,  which  manifested  itself  from  the  same  cause  among 
several  of  his  contemporaries,  but  which  was  not  a  common  phenom- 
enon in  the  primitive  Greek  religion.  Besides  visiting  Egypt, 
Pythagoras  is  also  said  to  have  profited  by  the  teaching  of  Thales, 
of  Anaximander,  and  of  Pherekydes  of  S3T0S:  amid  the  towns  of 
Ionia  he  would,  moreover,  have  an  opportunity  of  conversing  with 
many  Greek  navigators  who  had  visited  foreign  countries,  especially 
Italy  and  Sicily.  His  mind  seems  to  have  been  acted  upon  and 
impelled  by  this  combined  stimulus, — partly  toward  an  imaginative 
and  religious  vein  of  speculation,  with  a  life  of  mystic  observance, — ■ 
partly  toward  that  active  exercise,  both  of  mind  and  body,  which 


$34  IONIC  PHILOSOPHERS. 

the  genius  of  nn  Hellenic  community  so  naturally  tended  to  sug 
gest. 

Of  the  personal  doctrines  or  opinions  of  Pythagoras,  whom  we 
must  distinguish  from  Philolaus  and  the  subsequent  Pythagorean-, 
we  have  little  certain  knowledge,  though  doubtless  the  first  germ  of 
their  geometry,  arithmetic,  astronomy,  etc.,  must  have  proceeded 
from  him.  But  that  he  believed  in  the  metempsychosis  or  trans- 
migration of  the  souls  of  deceased  men  into  other  men  as  well  as 
into  animals  we  know,  not  only  by  ether  evidence,  hut  also  by  the 
testimony  ot  his  contemporary,  the  philosopher  Xenophanes  of  Elea. 
Pythagoras,  seeing  a  dog  beaten  and  hearing  him  howl,  desired  the 
striker  to  desist,  saying — "It  is  the  soul  of  a  friend  of  mine,  whom 
I  recognized  by  his  voice."  This — together  with  the  general  testi- 
mony of  Herakleitus,  that  Pythagoras  was  a  man  of  extensive 
research  and  acquired  instruction,  hut  artful  for  mischief  and  desti- 
tute of  sound  judgment — is  all  that  we  know  about  him  from  eon- 
temporaries.  Herodotus,  two  generations  afterward,  while  he  con- 
ceives the  Pythagoreans  as  a  peculiar  religious  order,  intimates  that 
both  Orpheus  and  Pythagoras  had  derived  the  doctrine  of  the 
metempsychosis  from  Egypt,  hut  had  pretended  to  it  as  their  own 
without  acknowledgment.  Pythagoras  combines  the  character  of  a 
sophist  (a  man  of  large  observation,  and  clever,  ascendent,  inventive 
mind — the  original  sense  of  the  word  Sophist,  prior  to  the  polemics 
of  the  Platonic  school,  and  the  only  sense  known  to  Herodotus), 
with  that  of  an  inspired  teacher,  prophet,  and  worker  of  miracles, — 
approaching  to  and  sometimes  even  confounded  with  the  gods, — and 
employing  all  these  gills  to  found  a  new  special  order  of  brethren 
bound  together  by  religious  rites  and  observances  peculiar  to  them- 
selves. In  his  prominent  vocation,  analogous  to  that  of  Epimenides, 
Orpheus,  or  Melampus,  he  appears  as  a  revealer  of  a  mode  of  life 
calculated  to  raise  his  disciples  above  the  level  of  mankind,  and  to 
recommend  them  to  the  favor  of  the  gods;  the  Pythagorean  life,  like 
the  Orphic  lite,  being  intended  as  the  exclusive  prerogative  of  the 
brotherhood — approached  only  by  probation  and  initiatory  cere- 
monies, which  were  adapted  to  select  enthusiasts  rather  than  to  an 
indiscriminate  crowd — and  exacting  entire  mental  devotion  to  the 
master.  In  these  lofty  pretensions  the  Agrigentine  Empedokles 
seems  to  have  greatly  copied  him,  though  with  some  varieties,  about 
half  a  century  afterward.  While  Aristotle  tells  us  that  the  Kioto 
niates  identilied  Pythagoras  with  the  Hyperborean  Apollo,  the  satiri- 
cal Timon  pronounced  him  to  have  been  "a  juggler  of  solemn 
speech,  engaged  in  fishing  for  men."  This  is  the  same  character, 
looked  at  from  the  different  points  of  view  of  the  believer  and  the  un- 
believer. There  is,  however,  no  reason  for  regarding  Pythagoras  as 
an  impostor,  because  experience  seems  to  show,  that  while  in  certain 
ages  it  is  not  difficult  for  a  man  to  persuade  others  that  he  is  inspired, 
it  is  still  less  difficult  for  him  to  contract  the  same  belief  himself. 


POLITICAL  EFFICIENCY  EXAGGERATED.        225 

Looking  at  the  general  type  of  Pythagoras,  as  conceived  by  wit- 
nesses in  and  nearest  to  his  own  age — Xenophaues,  Herakleitus, 
Herodotus,  Plato,  Aristotle,  Isokratcs — we  rind  in  him  chiefly  the 
religious  missionary  and  schoolmaster,  with  little  of  the  politician. 
His  efficiency  in  the  latter  character,  originally  subordinate,  first 
becomes  prominent  in  those  glowing  fancies  which  the  later  Pytha- 
goreans communicated  to  Aristoxenus  and  Dika3archus.  The  primi- 
tive Pythagoras  is  inspired  by  the  gods  to  reveal  a  new  mode  of  life 
— the  Pythagorean  life — and  to  promise  divine  favor  to  a  select  and 
docile  few  as  the  recompense  of  strict  ritual  obedience,  of  austere 
self-control,  and  of  laborious  training,  bodily  as  well  as  mental.  To 
speak  with  confidence  of  the  details  of  his  training,  ethical  or  scien- 
tific, and  of  the  doctrines  which  he  promulgated,  is  impossible;  for 
neither  he  himself  nor  any  of  his  disciples  anterior  to  Philolaus  (who 
was  separated  from  him  by  about  one  intervening  generation)  left 
any  memorials  in  writing.  Numbers  and  lines,  studied  partly  in 
their  own  mutual  relations,  partly  under  various  symbolizing  fancies, 
presented  themselves  to  him  as  the  primary  constituent  elements  of 
the  universe,  and  as  a  sort  of  magical  key  to  phenomena,  physical 
as  well  as  moral.  Such  mathematical  tendencies  in  his  teaching, 
expanded  by  Pythagoreans  his  successors,  and  coinciding  partly  also 
(as  has  been  before  stated)  with  the  studies  of  Anaximander  and 
Thales,  acquired  more  and  more  development,  so  as  to  become  one 
of  the  most  glorious  and  profitable  manifestations  of  Grecian  intel- 
lect. Living,  as  Pythagoras  did,  at  a  time  when  the  stock  of  expe- 
rience was  scanty,  the  license  of  hypothesis  unbounded,  and  the 
process  of  deduction  without  rule  or  verifying  test — he  was  thus 
fortunate  enough  to  strike  into  that  track  of  geometry  and  arithme- 
tic, in  which,  from  data  of  experience  few,  simple,  and  obvious,  an 
immense  field  of  deductive  and  verifiable  investigation  may  be 
traveled  over.  We  must  at  the  same  time  remark,  however,  that  in 
his  mind  this  track,  which  now  seems  so  straightforward  and  well- 
defined,  was  clouded  by  strange  fancies  which  it  is  not  easy  to 
understand,  and  from  which  it  was  but  partially  cleared  by  his  suc- 
cessors. 

Of  his  spiritual  training  much  is  said,  though  not  upon  very  good 
authority:  we  hear  of  his  memorial  discipline,  his  monastic  self- 
scrutiny,  his  employment  of  music  to  soothe  disorderly  passions,  his 
long  novitiate  of  silence,  his  knowledge  of  physiognomy  which 
enabled  him  to  detect,  even  without  trial,,  unworthy  subjects,  his 
peculiar  diet,  and  his  rigid  care  for  sobriety  as  well  as  for  bodily 
vigor.  He  is  also  said  to  have  inculcated  abstinence  from  animal 
food;  a  feeling  so  naturally  connected  with  the  doctrine  of  the 
metempsychosis,  that  we  may  well  believe  him  to  have  entertained 
it,  as  Empedokles  also  did  after  him.  It  is  certain  that  there  were 
peculiar  observances,  and  probably  a  certain  measure  of  self-denial, 
embodied  in  the  Pythagorean  life.  Yet,  on  the  other  hand,  it  seems 
H.  G.  II.— 8 


226  IONIC  PHILOSOPHERS. 

equally  certain  that  the  members  of  the  order  cannol  have  been  all 
subjected  to  the  Bame  diet,  i  t  training,  or  Btudiea;  for  Milo  the  Kro- 
tomate  was  among  them,  the  strongesl  man  and  the  unparalleled 
wrestler  of  hi  age — who  cannol  possibly  have  dispensed  with  animal 
food  ami  ample  diet  (even  Betting  aside  the  tales  about  his  voracious 
appetite),  and  is  not  likely  to  have  bent  bis  attention  on  speculative 
Btudy.  Probably  Pythagoras  did  not  enforce  the  same  bodily  or 
menial  discipline  on  all,  or  at  least  knew  u  hen  to  grant  dispensations. 
The  order,  as  it  first  stood  under  him,  consisted  of  nun  different 
both  in  temperament  and  aptitude,  bul  hound  together  by  common 
religious  observances  and  hopes,  common  reverence  for  the  master, 
and  mutual  attachment  as  well  as  pride  in  each  other's  success.  It 
must  thus  be  distinguished  from  the  Pythagoreans  of  the  fourth  cen- 
tury B.C.,  who  had  no  communion  with  wrestlers,  and  comprisi  d 
only  ascetic,  studious  men,  generally  recluse,  though  in  some  cases 
rising  to  political  distinction.  The  succession  of  these  Pythagoreans, 
never  very  numerous,  seems  to  have  continued  until  about  800  B.C., 
and  then  nearly  died  out ;  being  superseded  by  other  schemes  of  phi- 
losophy more  suited  to  cultivated  Greeks  of  the  age  after  Sokrates. 
But  during  the  time  of  Cicero,  two  centuries  aft<  rward,  the  oriental- 
izing tendency — then  beginning  to  spread  over  the  Grecian  and 
Roman  world,  and  becoming  gradually  stronger  and  stronger — 
caused  the  Pythagorean  philosophy  to  be  again  revived.  It  was 
revived,  too,  with  little  or  none  of  its  scientific  tendencies,  but  with 
more  than  its  primitive  religious  and  imaginative  fanaticism — Apol- 
lonius  of  Tyana  constituting  himself  a  living  copy  of  Pythagoras. 
And  thus,  while  the  scientific  elements  developed  by  the  disciples  of 
Pythagoras  had  become  disjoined  from  all  peculiarity  of  sect,  and 
passed  into  the  general  studious  world — the  original  vein  of  mystic 
and  ascetic  fancy  belonging  to  the  master,  without  any  of  that  prac- 
tical efficiency  of  body  and  mind  which  had  marked  his  first  follow- 
ers, was  taken  up  anew  into  the  pagan  world,  along  with  the  disfigured 
doctrines  of  Plato.  Neo-Pythagorism,  passiug  gradually  into  Neo- 
Platonism,  outlasted  the  other  more  positive  and  masculine  systems 
of  pagan  philosophy,  as  the  contemporary  and  rival  of  Christianity. 
A  large  proportion  of  the  false  statements  concerning  Pythagoras 
came  from  these  Neo-Pythagoreans,  who  were  not  deterred  by  the 
want  of  memorials  from  illustrating,  with  ample  latitude  of  fancy, 
the  ideal  character  of  the  master. 

That  an  inquisitive  man  like  Pythagoras,  at  a  time  when  there 
were  hardly  any  books  to  study,  would  visit  foreign  countries,  and 
converse  with  all  the  Grecian  philosophical  inquirers  within  his 
reach,  is  a  matter  which  we  should  presume  even  if  no  one  attested 
it;  and  our  witnesses  cany  us  very  little  beyond  this  general  pre- 
sumption. What  doctrines  he  borrowed,  or  from  whom,  we  are 
unable  to  discover.  But  in  fact  his  whole  life  and  proceedings  bear 
the  stamp  of  an  original  mind  and  not  of  a  borrower — a  mind 


STATE  OF  KROTON.  227 

impressed  both  -with  Hellenic  and  with  non-Hellenic  habits  and 
religion,  yet  capable  of  combining  the  two  in  a  manner  peculiar  to 
himself;  and,  above  all,  endued  with  those  talents  for  religious  and 
personal  ascendency  over  others,  which  told  for  much  more  than  the 
intrinsic  merit  of  his  ideas.  We  are  informed  that  after  extensive 
travels  and  inquiries  he  returned  to  Sainos,  at  the  age  of  about  forty. 
He  then  found  his  native  island  under  the  despotism  of  Polykrates, 
which  rendered  it  an  unsuitable  place  either  for  free  sentiments  or 
for  marked  individuals.  Unable  to  attract  hearers,  or  found  any 
school  or  brotherhood,  in  his  native  island,  he  determined  to  expatri- 
ate; and  we  nitty  presume  that  at  this  period  (about  535-530  B.C.)  the 
recent  subjugation  of  Ionia  by  the  Persians  was  not  without  influence 
on  his  determination.  The  trade  between  the  Asiatic  and  the  Italian 
Greeks — and  even  the  intimacy  between  Miletus  and  Knidus  on  the 
one  side,  and  Sybaris  and  Tarentum  on  the  other — had  been  great 
And  of  long  standing,  so  that  there  was  more  than  one  motive  to  deter- 
mine him  to  the  coast  of  Italy;  in  which  direction  also  his  contem- 
porary Xenophanes,  the  founder  of  the  Eleatic  school  of  philosophy, 
emigrated  seemingly  about  the  same  time — from  Kolophon  to  Tan- 
kle,  Katana,  and  Elea. 

Krutoti  and  Sybaris  were  at  this  time  in  their  luliesc  prosperity — 
among  the  first  and  most  prosperous  cities  01  the  Hellenic  name.  To 
the  former  of  the  two  Pythagoras  directed  his  course.  A  Council  of 
One  Thou-and  persons,  taken  from  among  tho  heirs  and  representa- 
tives of  the  principal  proprietors  at  its  first  foundation,  was  here 
invested  with  the  supreme  authority :  in  what  manner  the  executive 
offices  were  rilled,  we  have  no  information.  Besides  a  great  extent 
of  power,  and  a  numerous  population,  the  large  mass  of  whom  had 
no  share  in  the  political  franchise,  Kroton  stood  at  this  time  distin- 
guished for  two  tiling — he  general  excellence  of  the  bodily  habit  of 
the  citizens,  attested  in  part  by  the  number  of  conquerors  furnished 
to  the  Olympic  games— and  the  superiority  of  its  physicians  or  sur- 
geons. These  two  points  were  in  fact  greatly  connected  with  each 
other;  for  the  therapeutics  of  the  day  consisted  not  so  much  of  active 
remedies  as  of  careful  diet  aud  regimen;  while  the  trainer,  who  dic- 
tated the  life  of  an  athlete  during  his  long  and  fatiguing  preparation 
for  an  Olympic  contest — and  the  professional  superintendent  of  the 
youths  who  frequented  the  public  gymnasia — followed  out  the  same 
general  views  and  acted  upon  the  same  basis  of  knowledge  as  the 
physician  who  prescribed  for  a  state  of  positiw  bad  health.  Of  medi- 
cal education  properly  so  called,  especially  of  anatomy,  there  was 
then  little  or  nothing.  The  physician  acquired  his  knowledge  from 
observation  of  men  sick  as  well  as  healthy,  and  from  a  careful  notice 
of  the  way  in  which  the  human  body  was  acted  upon  by  surround- 
ing agents  aud  circumstances:  and  this  same  knowledge  was  not  less 
necessary  for  the  trainer;  so  that  the  same  place  which  contained  the 
best  men  in  the  latter  class  was  also  likely  to  be  distinguished  in  the 


228  IONIC  PHILOSOPHERS. 

former.  It  is  not  improbable  that  sucb  celebrity  of  Kroton  may  have 
been  one  of  the  reasons  which  determini  d  Pythagoras  to  go  thither. 
For  among  the  preci  pts  ascribed  to  bim,  precise  rules  as  to  did  and 
hoi  lily  regulation  occupy  a  prominent  place.  The  medical  or  surgical 
celebrity  of  Demokedes  (son-in-law  of  the  1'.  an  Milo),  to  whom 

allusion  bas  b<  en  made  in  a  former  chapter,  is  cont<  mporaneoua  with 
the  presence  of  Pythagoras  al  Kroton;  and  the  medical  men  of  Mag- 
na Graecia  maintained  themselves  in  credit,  as  rivals  of  the  schools  of 
the  Asklcpiads  at  Kos  and  Knidus,  throughout  all  the  fifth  and  fourth 
oenturies  y..c. 

The  biographers  of  Pythagoras  tell  us'  that  his  arrival  there,  his 
preaching,  and  his  conduct,  produced  an  effect  almost  electric  upon 
the  mmds  of  the  people,  with  an  extensive  reform  public  as  well  as 
private.  Political  discontent  was  repressed,  incontinence  disappeared, 
luxury  became  discredited,  and  the  women  hast<  ned  to  exchange 
then:  golden  ornaments  for  the  simplest  attire.  No  less  than  2,000 
persons  were  converted  al  his  first  preaching,  bo  effective  were  his 
discourses  to  the  youth,  that  the  Supreme  Council  of  One  Thousand 
invited  him  into  their  assembly,  solicited  his  advice,  and  even  offered 
to  constitute  him  their  Prytanis  or  president,  while  his  wife  and 
daughter  were  placed  at  the  head  of  the  religious  processions  of 
females.  His  influence  was  not  confined  to  Kroton.  Other  towns  iu 
Italy  and  Sicily — Sybaris,  Metapontum,  Rhegium,  Katana,  Ilimera, 
etc.,  all  felt  the  benefit  of  his  exhortations,  which  extricated  some  of 
them  even  from  slavery.  Such  are  the  tales  of  which  the  biographers 
of  Pythagoras  are  full:  and  we  see  that  even  the  disciples  of  Aris- 
totle, about  the  year  300  B.C. — Aristoxenus,  Diksearchue,  Herakleides 
of  Pontus,  etc. — are  haro  y  less  charged  with  them  than  the  Neo- 
Pythagoreans  of  three  or  tour  centuries  later.  They  doubtless  heard 
these  tales  from  their  contemporary  Pythagoreans,  the  last  members 
of  a  declining  sect,  among  whom  the  attributes  of  the  primitive 
founder  passed  for  godlike,  but  who  had  no  memorials,  no  historical 
judgment,  and  no  means  of  forming  a  true  conception  of  Kroton  as 
it  stood  in  530  b.c.  To  trace  these  tales  to  a  true  foundation  is 
impossible.  But  we  may  reasonably  believe  that  the  success  of 
Pythagoras,  as  a  person  favored  by  the  gods  and  patentee  of  divine 
secrets,  was  very  great — that  he  procured  to  himself  bolh  the  rever- 
ence of  the  multitude,  and  the  peculiar  attachment  and  obedience  of 
many  devoted  adherents,  chiefly  belonging  to  the  wealthy  and  pow- 
erful classes — that  a  select  body  of  these  adherents,  300  in  number, 
bound  themselves  by  a  sort  of  vow  both  to  Pythagoras  and  to  each 
other,  adopting  a  peculiar  diet,  ritual,  and  observances,  as  a  token  of 
union — though  without  anything  like  community  of  property,  which 
some  have  ascribed  to  them.  Such  a  band  of  men,  standing  high  in 
the  city  for  wealth  and  station,  and  bound  together  by  this  intimate 
tie,  came  by  almost  unconscious  tendency  to  mingle  political  ambition 
with  religious  and  scientific  pursuits.     Political  clubs  with  sworn 


POLITICAL  INFLUENCE  OF  PYTHAGORAS.      229 

members,  under  one  form  or  another,  were  a  constant  phenomenon 
in  the  Grecian  cities.  Now  the  Pythagorean  order  at  its  first  forma- 
tion was  the  most  efficient  of  all  clubs;  since  it  presented  an  intimacy 
of  attachment  among  its  members,  as  well  as  a  feeling  of  haughty 
exclusiveness  against  the  public  without,  such  as  no  other  fraternity 
could  parallel.  The  devoted  attachment  of  Pythagoreans  toward 
each  other  is  not  less  emphatically  set  forth  than  their  contempt  for 
every  one  else :  in  fact  these  two  attributes  of  the  order  seem  the  best 
ascertained  as  well  as  the  most  permanent  of  all.  Moreover,  we  may 
be  sure  that  the  peculiar  observances  of  the  order  passed  for  exem- 
plary virtues  in  the  eyes  of  its  members,  and  exalted  ambition  into  a 
duty,  by  making  them  sincerely  believe  that  they  were  the  only  per- 
sons fit  to  govern.  It  is  no  matter  of  surprise,  then,  to  learn  that  the 
Pythagoreans  gradually  drew  to  themselves  great  ascendency  iu  the 
government  of  Kroton.  And  as  similar  clubs,  not  less  influential, 
were  formed  at  Metapontum  and  other  places,  so  the  Pythagorean 
order  spread  its  net  and  dictated  the  course  of  affairs  over  a  large 
portion  of  Magna  Graecia.  Such  ascendency  of  the  Pythagoreans 
must  have  procured  for  the  master  himself  some  real,  and  still  more 
supposed,  influence  over  the  march  of  government  at  Kroton  and 
elsewhere,  of  a  nature  not  then  possessed  by  any  of  his  contempo- 
raries throughout  Greece.  Yet  his  influence  was  probably  exercised 
in  the  background,  through  the  medium  of  the  brotherhood  who 
reverenced  him:  for  it  is  hardly  comformable  to  Greek  manners  that 
a  stranger  of  his  character  should  guide  personally  and  avowedly  the 
political  affairs  of  any  Grecian  city. 

Nor  are  we  to  believe  that  Pythagoras  came  originally  to  Kroton 
with  the  express  design  of  creating  for  himself  an  ascendent  political 
position — still  less  that  he  came  for  the  purpose  of  realizing  a  great 
preconceived  political  idea,  and  transforming  Kroton  into  a  model 
city  of  pure  Dorism,  as  has  been  supposed  by  some  eminent  modern 
autlwrs.  Such  schemes  might  indeed  be  ascribed  to  him  by  Pytha- 
goreans of  the  Platonic  age,  when  large  ideas  of  political  amelioration 
were  rife  in  the  minds  of  speculative  men — by  men.  disposed  to  forego 
the  authorship  of  their  own  opinions,  and  preferring  to  accredit 
them  as  traditions  handed  down  from  a  founder  who  had  left  no 
memorials.  But  it  requires  better  evidence  than  theirs  to  make  us 
believe  that  any  real  Greek  born  iu  580  b.c.  actually  conceived  such 
plans.  We  cannot  construe  the  scheme  of  Pythagoras  as  going 
farther  than  the  formation  of  a  private,  select,  order  of  brethren, 
embracing  his  religious  fancies,  ethical  tone,  and  germs  of  scientific 
idea — and  manifesting  adhesion  by  those  observances  which  Herod- 
otus and  Plato  call  the  Pythagorean  orgies  and  mode  of  life.  And 
his  private  order  became  politically  powerful,  because  he  was  skillful 
or  fortunate  enough  to  enlist  a  sufficient  number  of  wealthy  Kor- 
toniates,  possessing  individual  influence  which  they  strengthened 
immensely  by  thus  regimenting  themselves  in  intimate  union.     The 


230  IONIC  PHILOSOPHERS. 

Pythagorean  orgies  or  religions  ceremonies  were  not  inconsistent  with 
public  activity,  bodily  as  well  as  mental.  Probably  the  rich  m<  b  oi 
the  order  may  have  been  rendered  even  more  active,  by  being  forti- 
fied against  the  temptations  of  a  life  of  indulgence.     The  character 

of  the  order  as  it  Aral  Btood,  different  from  thai  to  which  it  was  after- 
ward reduced,  was  indeed  religious  and  exclusive,  but  also  active 
and  domineering:  not  despising  any  of  those  bodily  accomplishments 
which  increas  J  the  efficiency  of  the  Grecian  citizen,  and  whicb  so 
particularly  harmonized  with  the  pre-existing  tendencies  of  Kroton. 
Niebuhr  and  <).  Midler  have  even  supposed  that  the  select  Three 
Hundred  Pythagoreans  constituted  a  sort  of  smaller  senate  at  that 
city — an  hypothesis  do  way  probable;  we  may  rather  conceive  them 
as  a  powerful  private  club,  exercising  ascendency  in  the  interior  of 
the  senate,  and  governing  through  the  medium  of  the  constituted 
authorities.  Nor  can  we  receive  without  great  allowance  the  asser- 
tion of  Varro,  who,  assimilating  Pythagoras  to  Plato,  tells  us  that  he 
confined  his  instructions  on  matters  of  government  to  chosen  disci- 
ples, who  had  gone  through  a  complete  training,  and  had  reached  the 
perfection  of  wisdom  and  virtue.  It  seems  more  probable  that  the 
political  Pythagoreans  were  those  who  were  most  qualified  for  action, 
and  least  for  speculation;  and  that  the  general  of  the  order  possessed 
that  skill  in  turning  to  account  the  aptitudes  of  individuals,  which 
two  centuries  ago  was  so  conspicuous  in  the  Jesuits;  to  whom,  in 
various  ways,  the  Pythagoreans  bear  considerable  resemblance.  All 
that  we  can  be  said  to  know  about  their  political  principles  is.  that 
they  were  exclusive  and  aristocratical,  adverse  to  the  control  and 
interference  of  the  people;  a  circumstance  no  way  disadvantageous 
to  them,  since  they  coincided  in  this  respect  with  the  existing  gov- 
ernment of  the  city — had  not  their  own  conduct  brought  additional 
odium  on  the  old  aristocracy,  and  raised  up  an  aggravated  demo- 
cratical  opposition  carried  to  the  most  deplorable  lengths  of  violence. 
All  the  information  which  we  possess,  apocryphal  as  it  is,  respecting 
this  memorable  club  is  derived  from  its  warm  admirers.  Yet  even 
their  statements  are  enough  to  explain  how  it  came  to  provoke  deadly 
and  extensive  enmity.  A  stranger  coming  to  teach  new  religious 
dogmas  and  observances,  with  a  tincture  of  science  and  some  new 
ethical  ideas  and  phrases,  though  he  would  obtain  some  zealous 
votaries,  would  also  bring  upon  himself  a  certain  measure  of  antip 
athy.  Extreme  strictness  of  observances,  combined  with  the  art  of 
touching  skillfully  the  springs  of  religious  terror  in  others,  would 
indeed  do  much  both  to  fortify  and  to  exalt  him.  Bui  when  it  was 
discovered  that  science,  philosophy,  and  even  the  mystic  revelations  of 
religion,  whatever  they  were,  remained  confined  to  the  private  talk 
and  practice  of  the  disciples,  and  were  thus  thrown  into  the  back- 
ground, while'  all  that  was  seen  and  felt  without  was  the  political 
predominance  of  an  ambitious  fraternity — we  need  not  wonder  that 
Pythagorism  in  all  its  parts  became  odious  to  a  large  portion  of  the 


DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  PYTHAGOREAN  ORDER.  231 

community.  Moreover  we  find  the  order  represented  not  merely  as 
constituting  a  devoted  and  exclusive  political  party,  but  also  as  mani- 
festing an  ostentatious  self-conceit  throughout  their  personal  de- 
meanor— refusing  the  hand  of  fellowship  to  all  except  the  brethren, 
and  disgusting  especially  their  owu  familiar  friends  and  kinsmen 
So  far  as  we  know  Grecian  philosophy,  this  is  the  only  instance  in 
which  it  was  distinctly  abused  for  political  and  party  objects.  The 
early  days  of  the  Pythagorean  order  stand  distinguished  for  such 
perversion,  which  fortunately  for  the  progress  of  philosophy,  never 
presented  itself  afterward  in  Greece.  Even  at  Athens,  however,  we 
shall  hereafter  see  that  Sokrates,  though  standing  really  aloof  from 
all  party  intrigue,  incurred  much  of  his  unpopularity  from  supposed 
political  conjunction  with  Kritias  and  Alkibiades,  to  which  indeed 
the  orator  JEschines  distinctly  ascribes  his  condemnation,  speaking 
about  sixty  years  after  the  event.  Had  Sokrates  been  known  as  tho 
founder  of  a  band  holding  together  intimately  for  ambitious  pur- 
poses, the  result  would  have  been  eminently  pernicious  to  philosophy, 
and  probably  much  sooner  pernicious  to  himself. 

It  was  this  cause  which  brought  about  the  complete  and  violent 
destruction  of  the  Pythagorean  order.  Their  ascendency  had  pro 
voked  such  widespread  discontent,  that  their  enemies  became 
emboldened  to  employ  extreme  force  against  them.  Kylon  and 
Ninon — the  former  of  whom  is  said  to  have  sought  admittance  into 
the  order,  but  to  have  been  rejected  on  account  of  his  bad  character 
— took  the  lead  in  pronounced  opposition  to  the  Pythagoreaus;  whose 
unpopularity  extended  itself  farther  to  the  Senate  of  One  Thousand, 
through  the  medium  of  which  their  ascendency  had  been  exercised. 
Propositions  were  made  for  rendering  the  government  more  demo- 
cratic, and  for  constituting  a  new  senate,  taken  by  lot  from  all  the 
people,  before  which  the  magistrates  should  go  through  their  trial  of 
accountability  after  office:  an  opportunity  being  chosen  in  which  the 
Senate  of  One  Thousand  had  given  signal  offense  by  refusing  to 
divide  among  the  people  the  receutly  conquered  territory  of  Sybaris. 
In  spite  of  the  opposition  of  the  Pythagoreans,  this  change  of  gov- 
ernment was  carried  through.  Ninon  and  Kylon,  their  principal 
enemies,  made  use  of  it  to  exasperate  the  people  still  farther  against 
the  order,  until  they  provoked  actual  popular  violence  against  it. 
The  Pythagoreans  were  attacked  when  assembled  in  their  meeting- 
house near  the.  temple  of  Apollo,  or,  as  some  said,  in  the  house  of 
Milo.  The  building  was  set  on  fire,  and,  many  of  the  members 
perished;  none  but  the  younger  and  more  vigorous  escaping.  Simi- 
lar disturbances,  and  the  like  violent  suppression  of  the  order,  with 
destruction  of  several  among  the  leading  citizens,  are  said  to  have 
taken  place  in  other  cities  of  Magna  Graecia — Tarentum,  Metapontum, 
Kaulonia.  And  we  are  told  that  these  cities  remained  for  some  time 
in  a  state  of  great  disquietude  and  commotion,  from  which  they  were 
only  rescued  by  the  friendly  mediation  of  the  Peloponnesian  Achse- 


232  IONIC  PHILOSOPHERS. 

ans,  the  original  founders  of  Bybaria  and  Kroton — assisted  indeed  by 
mediators  from  other  parts  of  Greece.  The  cities  were  at  length 
pacified,  and  induced  to  adopt  an  amicable  congress,  with  common 
religious  festivals,  at  a  temple  founded  expressly  For  the  purpose  and 

dedicated  to  Zeus  Homarins  Thus  perished  the  original  Pytha- 
gorean order.  Respecting  Pythagoras  himself,  there  were  conflicting 
accounts;  some  representing  thai  lie  was  burnt  in  the  temple  with 
his  disciples;  others,  that  he  had  died  a  short  time  previously;  others 
again  affirmed,  that  he  was  alive  at  the  time,  bul  absent,  and  thai  he 
died  not  long  afterward  in  exile,  after  forty  days  of  voluntary  absti- 
nence from  food.  His  tomb  was  still  shown  at  Metapontum  in  the 
days  of  Cicero.  As  an  active  brotherhood,  the  Pythagoreans  never 
revived;  but  the  dispersed  members  came  together  as  a  sect,  for 
common  religious  observances  and  common  pursuit  of  science.  They 
were  readmitted,  after  some  interval,  into  the  cities  of  Magna  Grsecia, 
from  which  they  had  been  originally  expelled,  but  to  which  the  sect 
is  always  considered  as  particularly  belonging — though  individual 
members  of  it  are  found  besides  at  Thebes  and  in  other  cities  of 
Greece.  Indeed,  some  of  these  later  Pythagoreans  sometimes  even 
acquired  great  political  influence,  as  we  see  in  the  case  of  the  Taren- 
tine  Archytas,  the  contemporary  of  Plato. 

It  has  already  been  stated  that  the  period  when  Pythagoras  arrived 
at  Kroton  may  be  fixed  somewhere  between  B.C.  540-530.  His  arrival 
is  said  to  have  occurred  at  a  time  of  great  depression  in  the  minds  of 
the  Krotoniates.  They  bad  recently  been  defeated  by  the  united 
Lokrians  and  Rhegians,  vastly  inferior  to  themselves  in  number,  at 
the  river  Sagra;  which  humiliation  is  said  to  have  rendered  them 
docile  to  the  training  of  the  Samian  missionary.  As  the  birth  of  the 
P3Tthagorean  order  is  thus  connected  with  the  defeat  of  the  Kro- 
toniates at  the  Sagra,  so  its  extinction  is  also  connected  with  their 
victory  over  the  Sybarites  at  the  river  Traeis  or  Trionto,  about 
twenty  years  afterward. 

Of  the  history  of  these  two  great  Achaean  cities  we  unfortunately 
know  very  little.  Though  both  were  powerful,  yet  down  to  the  period 
of  510  B.C.,  Sybaris  seems  to  have  been  decidedly  the  greatest.  Of  its 
dominion  as  well  as  of  its  much  denounced  luxury  I  have  spoken  in  a 
former  chapter.  It  was  at  that  time  that  the  war  broke  out  between 
them,  wdnch  ended  in  the  destruction  of  Sybaris.  It  is  certain  that 
the  Sybaritans  were,  aggressors  in  the  war;  but  by  what  causes  it  bad 
been  preceded  in  their  own  town,  or  what  provocation  they  had 
received,  we  make  out  very  indistinctly.  There  had  been  a  political 
revolution  at  Sybaris  (we  are  told)  not  long  before,  in  which  a  popular 
leaderTelys  had  headed  a  rising  against  the  oligarchical  government, 
and  induced  the  people  to  banish  500  of  the  leading  rich  men,  as  well 
as  to  confiscate  their  properties,  lb:  had  acquired  the  sovereignty 
and  become  despot  of  Sybaris.  It  appears  too  that  he,  or  his  rule  at 
Sybaris,  was  much  abhorred  at  Kroton;  since  the  Krotoniate  Philip- 


DEFEAT   OF  THE  SYBARITES.  233 

pus,  a  man  of  splendid  muscular  form  and  an  Olympic  victor,  was 
exiled  for  having  engaged  himself  to  marry  the  daughter  of  Telys. 
According  to  the  narrative  given  by  the  later  Pythagoreans,  those 
exiles,  whom  Telys  had  driven  from  Sybaris,  took  refuge  at  Kroton, 
casting  themselves  as  suppliants  on  the  altars  for  protection;  it  may 
well  be,  indeed,  that  they  were  in  part  Pythagoreans  of  Sybaris.  A 
body  of  powerful  exiles,  harbored  in  a  town  so  close  at  hand,  inspired 
alarm,  and  Telys  demanded  that  they  should  be  delivered  up,  threat- 
ening war  in  case  of  refusal.  This  demand  excited  consternation  at 
Kroton.  since  the  military  strength  of  Sybaris  was  decidedly  superior. 
The  surrender  of  the  exiles  was  much  debated,  and  almost  decreed, 
by  the  Krotoniates,  until  at  length  the  persuasion  of  Pythagoras  him- 
self is  said  to  have  determined  them  to  risk  any  hazard  sooner  than 
incur  the  dishonor  of  betraying  suppliants. 

On  the  demand  of  the  Sybarites  being  refused,  Telys  marched 
against  Kroton  at  the  head  of  a  force  which  is  reckoned  at  300,000 
men.  He  marched,  too,  in  defiance  of  the  strongest  religious  warn- 
ings against  the  enterprise;  for  the  sacrifices,  offered  on  his  behalf  by 
the  Iamid  prophet  Kallias  of  Elis,  were  so  decisively  unfavorable, 
that  the  prophet  himself  fled  in  terror  to  Kroton.  Near  the  river 
Traeis  or  Trionto,  Telys  was  met  by  the  forces  of  Kroton,  consisting 
(we  are  informed)  of  100,000  men,  and  commanded  by  the  great 
athlete  and  Pythagorean  Milo;  who  was  clothed  (we  are  told)  in  the 
costume  and  armed  with  the  club  of  Herakles.  They  were  farther 
reinforced  by  a  valuable  ally,  the  Spartan  Dorieus  (younger  brother 
of  king  Kleomenes),then  coasting  along  the  Gulf  of  Tarentum  with  a 
body  of  colonists,  intending  to  found  a  settlement  in  Sicily.  A 
bloody  battle  was  fought,  in  which  the  Sybarites  were  totally  worsted, 
with  prodigious  slaughter;  while  the  victors,  fiercely  provoked  and 
giving  no  quarter,  followed  up  the  pursuit  so  warmly  that  they  took 
the  city,  dispersed  its  inhabitants,  and  crushed  its  whole  power  in  the 
short  space  of  seventy  days.  The  Sybarites  fled  in  great  part  to  Laos 
and  Skidros,  their  settlements  planted  on  the  Mediterranean  coast, 
across  the  Calabrian  peninsula.  So  eager  were  the  Krotoniates  to 
render  the  site  of  Sybaris  untenable,  that  they  turned  the  course  of 
the  river  Krathis  so  as  to  overwhelm  and  destroy  it:  the  dry  bed  in 
which  the  river  had  originally  flowed  was  still  visible  in  the  time  of 
Herodotus,  who  was  among  the  settlers  in  the  town  of  Thurii  after- 
ward founded  nearly  adjoining.  It  appears,  however,  that  the 
Krotoniates  for  a  long  time  kept  the  site  of  Sybaris  deserted,  refusing 
even  to  allot  the  territory  among  the  body  of  their  own  citizens;  from 
which  circumstances  (as  has  been  before  noticed)  the  commotion 
against  the  Pythagorean  order  is  said  to  have  arisen.  They  may  per- 
haps have  been  afraid  of  the  name  and  recollections  of  the  city.  No 
large  or  permanent  establishment  was  ever  formed  there  until  Thurii 
was  established  by  Athens  about  sixty-five  years  afterward.  Never- 
theless the  name  of  the  Sybarites  did  not  perish;  they  maintained 


234  IONIC  PHILOSOPHERS. 

themselves  at  Loas,  Skidros,  and  elsewhere — and  afterward  formed 
the  privileged  old  citizens  among  ill''  colonists  of  Thurii;  but  misbe- 
haved  themselves  in  thai  capacity,  and  were  mostly  either  slain  or 
expelled.  Even  after  that,  however,  the  name  of  Sybaris  still 
remained  on  a  reduced  scale  in  some  portion  of  the  territory;  Herod- 
otus recounts  what  he  was  told  by  the  Sybarites,  and  we  find  sub- 
sequent indications  of  them  even  as  late  as  Theokritus. 

The  conquest  and  destruction  of  the  original  Sybaris — perhaps  in 
510  n.c.  the  greatest  of  all  Grecian  cities — appears  to  have  excited  a 
strong  sympathy  in  the  Hellenic  world.  In  Miletus  especially,  with 
which  it  had  maintained  intimate  union,  the  grief  was  so  vehement, 
that  all  the  Milesians  shaved  their  heads  in  token  of  mourning.  The 
event,  happening  just  at  the  time  of  the  expulsion  of  Hippias  from 
Athens,  must  have  made  a  sensible  revolution  in  the  relations  of  the 
Greek  cities  on  the  Italian  coast  with  the  rustic  population  of  the 
interior.  The  Krotoniates  might  destroy  Sybaris  and  disperse  its 
inhabitants,  but  they  could  not  succeed  to  its  wide  dominion  over 
dependent  territory:  and  the  extinction  of  this  great  aggregate  power, 
stretching  across  the  peninsula  from  sea  to  sea,  lessened  the  means  of 
resistance  against  the  Oscan  movements  from  the  inland,  From  this 
time  forward,  the  cities  of  Magna  Gnecia,  as  well  as  those  of  Ionia, 
tend  to  decline  in  consequence;  while  Athens,  on  the  other  hand, 
becomes  both  more  conspicuous  and  more  powerful.  At  the  invasion 
of  Greece  by  Xerxes  thirty  years  after  this  conquest  of  Sybaris,  Sparta 
and  Athens  send  to  ask  for  aid  both  from  Sicily  and  Korkyra,  but 
not  from  Magna  Graecia. 

It  is  much  to  be  regretted  that  we  do  not  possess  fuller  information 
respecting  such  important  changes  among  the  Greco-Italian  cities. 
Yet  we  may  remark  that  even  Herodotus — himself  a  citizen  of  Thurii 
and  dwelling  on  the  spot  not  more  than  eighty  years  after  the  cap- 
ture of  Sybaris — evidently  found  no  written  memorials  to  consult; 
and  could  obtain  from  verbal  conversation  nothing  belter  than  state- 
ments both  meager  and  contradictory.  The  material  circumstance, 
for  example,  of  the  aid  rendered  by  the  Spartan  Dorieus  and  his 
colonists,  though  positively  asserted  by  the  Sybarites,  was  as  posi- 
tively denied  by  the  Krotoniates,  who  alleged  that  they  had  accom- 
plished  the  conquest  by  themselves  and  with  their  own  unaided 
forces.  There  can  be  little  hesitation  in  crediting  the  affirmative 
assertion  of  the  Sybarites,  who  showed  to  Herodotus  a  temple  and 
precinct  creeled  by  the  Spartan  prince  in  testimony  of  his  share  in 
the  victory,  on  the  banks  of  the  dry  deserted  channel  out  of  which 
the  Krathis  had  been  turned,  and  in  honor  of  the  Krathian  Athene, 
This  of  itself  forms  a  proof,  coupled  with  the  positive  assertion  of 
the  Sybarites,  sufficient  for  the  case;  but  they  produced  another 
indirect  argument  to  confirm  it.  which  deserves  notice.  Dorieus  had 
attacked  Sybaris  while  he  was  passing  along  the  coast  of  Italy  to  go 
and  found  a  colony  in  Sicily,  under  the  express  mandate  and  encourage- 


NO  MENTION  OF  THE  PYTHAGOREANS.        235 

ment  of  the  oracle.  After  tarrj'ing  awhile  at  Sybaris,  he  pursued  his 
journey  to  the  south-western  portion  of  Sicily,  where  he  and  nearly 
all  his  companions  perished  in  a  battle  with  the  Carthaginians  and 
Egestaeans — though  the  oracle  had  promised  him  that  he  should 
acquire  and  occupy  permanently  the  neighboring  territory  near  Mount 
Eryx.  Now  the  Sybarites  deduced  from  this  fatal  disaster  of  Dorieus 
and  his  expedition,  combined  with  the  favorable  promise  of  the  oracle 
beforehand,  a  confident  proof  of  the  correctness  of  their  own  state- 
ment that  he  had  fought  at  Sybaris.  For  if  he  had  gone  straight  to  the 
territory  marked  out  by  the  oracle  (they  argued),  without  turning 
aside  for  any  other  object,  the  prophecy  on  which  his  hopes  were 
founded  would  have  been  unquestionably  realized,  and  he  would 
have  succeeded.  But  the  ruinous  disappointment  which  actually  over- 
took him  was  at  once  explained,  and  the  truth  of  prophecy  vindi- 
cated, when  it  was  recollected  that  he  had  turned  aside  to  help  the 
Krotoniates  against  Sybaris,  and  thus  set  at  nought  the  conditions 
prescribed  to  him.  Upon  this  argument  (Herodotus  tells  us)  the 
Sybarites  of  his  day  especially  insisted.  And  while  we  note  their 
pious  and  literal  faith  in  the  communications  of  an  inspired  prophet, 
we  must  at  the  same  time  observe  how  perfectly  that  faith  supplied 
the  place  of  historical  premises — how  scanty  thier  stock  was  of  such 
legitimate  evidence — aud  how  little  they  had  yet  learnt  to  appreciate 
its  value. 

It  is  to  be  remarked  that  Herodotus,  in  his  brief  mention  of  the 
fatal  war  between  Sybaris  and  Kroton,  does  not  make  the  least  allu- 
sion to  Pythagoras  or  his  brotherhood.  The  least  which  we  can  infer 
from  such  silence  is,  that  the  part  which  they  played  in  reference  to 
the  war,  and  their  general  ascendency  in  Magna  Groecia,  was  in  real- 
ity less  conspicuous  and  overruling  than  the  Pythagorean  historians 
set  forth.  Even  making  such  allowance,  however,  the  absence  of  all 
allusion  in  Herodotus,  to  the  commotions  which  accompanied  the 
subversion  of  the  Pythagoreans,  is  a  circumstance  not  easily  explica- 
ble. Nor  can  I  pass  over  a  perplexing  statement  in  Polybius,  which 
seems  to  show  that  he  too  must  have  conceived  the  history  of  Sybaris 
in  a  way  different  from  that  in  which  it  is  commonly  represented. 
He  tells  us,  that  after  much  suffering  in  Magna  GraBcia  from  the 
troubles  which  followed  the  expulsion  of  the  Pythagoreans,  the  cities 
were  induced  by  Achasan  mediation  to  come  to  an  accommodation 
and  even  to  establish  something  like  a  permanent  league  with  a  com- 
mon temple  and  sacrifices.  Now  the  three  cities  which  he  specifies 
as  having  been  the  first  to  do  this,  are,  Kroton,  Sybaris,  and  Kaulonia. 
But  according  to  the  sequence  of  events  and  the  fatal  war  (just 
described)  between  Kroton  and  Sybaris,  the  latter  city  must  have  been 
at  that  time  in  ruins;  little,  if  at  all,  inhabited.  I  cannot  but  infer 
from  this  statement  of  Polybius,  that  he  followed  different  authori- 
ties respecting  the  early  history  of  Magna  Graecia  in  the  beginning 
of  the  fifth  century  B.C. 


230        FROM  MARATHON  TO   XERXES'S  MARCH. 

Indeed  tin-  early  history  of  these  cities  gives  us  little  more  than  a 
few  isolated  facts  and  oames.  With  regard  to  their  legislators,  Zaleu- 
kus  and  ( lharondas,  nothing  is  made  oul  exec])!  their  existence — and 
even  that  fact  some  ancient  critics  contested.    Of  Zaleukus,  whom 

chronologists   place   in  664  B.C.,  1  have   already  .spoken;    the  date  of 

Charondas  cannot  be  assigned,  but  we  may  perhaps  presume  that  it 

was  at  some  lime  between  600-600  B.C.  He  was  a  citizen  of  middling 
Station,  born  in  the  Chalkidic  colony  of  Katana  in  Sicily,  and  he 
framed  laws  not  only  for  his  own  city,  but  for  the  Other  Chalkidic 
cities  in  Sicily  and  Italy — Leontini,  Naxos,  Zankle,  and  Rhegium. 
The  laws  and  the  solemn  preamble  ascribed  to  him  by  Diodorus  and 
Stobaeus,  belong  to  a  later  day.  and  we  are  obliged  to  content  our- 
selves with  collecting  the  brief  hints  of  Aristotle,  who  tells  us  that 
the  laws  of  Charondas  descended  to  great  minuteness  of  distinction 
and  specification,  especially  in  graduating  the  line  for  offenses  accord- 
ing to  the  property  of  the  guilty  person  fined — but  that  there  was 
nothing  in  his  laws  strictly  original  and  peculiar,  except  that  he  was 
the  first  to  introduce  the  solemn  indictment  against  perjured  wit- 
nesses before  justice.  The  perjured  witness,  in  Grecian  ideas,  was 
}ooked  upon  as  having  committed  a  crime  half  religious,  half  civil. 
The  indictment  raised  against  him,  known  by  a  peculiar  name,  par- 
took of  both  characters,  approaching  in  some  respects  to  the  proced- 
ure against  a  murderer.  Such  distinct  form  of  indictment  against 
perjured  testimony — with  its  appropriate  name,  which  we  shall  rind 
maintained  at  Athens  throughout  the  best-known  days  of  Attic  iaw 
— was  first  enacted  by  Charondas. 


CHAPTER  XXXVIII. 

FROM  THE  BATTLE  OF  MARATHON  TO  THE  MARCH  OF  XERXES 
AGAINST  GREECE. 

I  have  recounted,  in  a  preceding  chapter,  the  Athenian  victory  at 
Marathon,  the  repulse  of  the  Persian  general  Datis,  and  the  return  of 
Ins  armament  across  the  ^Egean  to  the  Asiatic  coast.  He  had  been 
directed  to  conquer  both  Eretria  and  Athens;  an  order  which  he  had 
indeed  executed  in  part  with  success,  as  the  string  of  Eretrian  priso- 
ners brought  to  Susa  attested — but  which  remained  still  unfulfilled  in 
regard  to  the  city  principally  obnoxious  to  Darius.  Far  from  satiat- 
ing his  revenge  upon  Athens,  the  Persian  monarch  was  compelled  to 
listen  to  the  tale  of  an  ignominious  defeat.  His  wrath  against  the 
Athenians  rose  to  a  higher  pitch  than  ever,  and  he  commenced 
vigorous  preparations  for  a  renewed  attack  upon  them  as  well  as  upon 
Gruece  generally.     Resolved  upon  assembling  the  entire  force  of  hia 


DEATPI  OF  DARIUS.  237 

empire,  he  directed  the  various  satraps  and  sub-governors  throughout 
all  Asia  to  provide  troops,  horses,  and  ships  both  of  war  and  burden. 
For  no  less  than  three  years  the  empire  was  agitated  by  this  immeji.se 
levy,  which  Darius  determined  to  conduct  in  person  against  Greece. 
Nor  was  his  determination  abated  by  a  revolt  of  the  Egyptians, 
which  broke  out  about  the  time  when  his  preparations  were  com- 
pleted. He  was  on  the  point  of  undertaking  simultaneously  the  two 
enterprises — the  conquest  of  Greece  and  the  reconquest  of  Egypt — 
when  he  was  surprised  by  death,  after  a  reign  of  thirty-six  years.  As 
a  precaution  previous  to  this  intended  march,  he  had  nominated  as 
successor  Xerxes,  his  son  by  Atossa;  for  the  ascendency  of  that  queen 
insured  to  Xerxes  the  preference  over  his  elder  brother  Artabazanes, 
son  of  Darius  by  a  former  wife,  and  born  before  the  latter  became 
king.  The  choice  of  the  reigning  monarch  passed  unquestioned,  and 
Xerxes  succeeded  without  opposition.  It  deserves  to  be  remarked, 
that  though  we  shall  meet  with  several  acts  of  cruelty  and  atrocity 
perpetrated  in  the  Persian  regal  family,  there  is  nothing  like  that 
systematic  fratricide  which  has  been  considered  necessary  to  guar- 
antee succession  in  Turkey  and  other  Oriental  empires. 

The  intense  wrath  against  Athens,  which  had  become  the  predomi- 
nant sentiment  in  the  mind  of  Darius,  was  yet  unappeased  at  the 
time  of  his  death,  and  it  was  fortunate  for  the  Athenians  that  his 
crown  now  passed  to  a  prince  less  obstinately  hostile  as  well  as  in 
every  respect  inferior.  Xerxes,  personally  the  handsomest  and  most 
stately  man  amid  the  immense  crowd  which  he  led  against  Greece, 
was  in  character  timid  and  faint-hearted,  over  and  above  those  defects 
of  vanity,  childish  self-conceit,  and  blindness  of  appreciation,  which 
he  shared  more  or  less  with  all  the  Persian  kings.  Yet  we  shall  see 
that  even  under  his  conduct,  the  invasion  of  Greece  was  very  near 
proving  successful:  and  it  might  well  have  succeeded  altogether,  had 
he  been  either  endued  with  the  courageous  temperament,  or  inflamed 
with  the  fierce  animosity,  of  his  father. 

On  succeeding  to  the  throne,  Xerxes  found  the  forces  of  the  empire 
in  active  preparation,  pursuant  to  the  orders  of  Darius;  except  Egypt, 
which  was  in  a  state  of  revolt.  His  first  necessity  was  to  reconquer 
this  country;  a  purpose  for  which  the  great  military  power  now  in 
readiness  was  found  amply  sufficient,  Egypt  was  subdued  and 
reduced  to  a  state  of  much  harder  dependence  than  before:  we  may 
presume  that  not  only  the  tribute  was  increased,  but  also  the  numbers 
of  the  Persian  occupying  force,  maintained  by  contributions  levied 
on  the  natives.  Acha?menes,  brother  of  Xerxes,  was  installed  there 
as  satrap. 

But  Xerxes  was  not  at  first  equally  willing  to  prosecute  the  schemes 
of  his  deceased  father  against  Greece.  At  least  such  is  the  statement 
of  Herodotus;  who  represents  Mardonius  as  the  grand  instigator  of 
the  invasion,  partly  through  thirst  for  warlike  enterprise,  partly 
from  a  desire  to  obtain  the  intended  conquest  as  a  satrapy  for  him- 


238        FROM  MARATHON  TO   XERXES'S  MARCH. 

self.  There  were  not  wanting  Grecian  counselors  to  enforce  Iris 
recommendation  both  by  the  promise  of  help  and  by  the  color  of 
religion.    The  great  family  of  the  Aleuadse,  belonging  to  Larissa  and 

perhaps  to  oilier  towns  in  Thessaly,  wen-  so  eager   in  the  cause,  that 

their  principal  members  came  to  Susa  to  offer  an  easy  occupation  of 
that  frontier  territory  of  Hellas;  while  the  exiled  Peisistratids  from 
Athens  still  persevered  in  striving  to  procure  their  own  restoration  at 
the  tail  of  a  Persian  army.  On  the  present  occasion,  they  brought 
with  them  to  Susa  a  new  instrument,  the  holy  mystic  Onomakritus — 
a  man  who  had  acquired  much  reputation,  not  by  prophesying  him- 
self, but  by  collecting,  arranging,  interpreting,  and  delivering  out 
prophetic  verses  passing  under  the  name  of  the  ancient  seer  or  poet 
Musseus.  Thirty  years  before,  in  the  flourishing  days  of  the  Peisis- 
tratids, he  had  lived  at  Athens,  enjoying  the  confidence  of  Hippar- 
chus,  and  consulted  by  him  as  the  expositor  of  these  venerated  docu- 
ments. But  having  been  detected  by  the  poet  Lasus  of  Hermione,  in 
the  very  act  of  interpolating  them  with  new  matter  of  his  own,  he  was 
indignantly  banished  by  Hipparchus.  The  Peisistratids  kowever, 
now  in  banishment  themselves,  forgot  or  forgave  this  offense,  and 
carried  Onomakritus  with  his  prophecies  to  Susa,  announcing  him  as 
a  person  of  oracular  authority,  to  assist  in  working  on  the  mind  of 
Xerxes.  To  this  purpose  his  interpolations,  or  his  omissions,  were 
now  directed.  When  introduced  to  the  Persian  monarch,  he  recited 
emphatically  various  encouraging  predictions,  wherein  the  bridging 
of  the  Hellespont,  and  the  triumphant  march  of  a  barbaric  host  into 
Greece,  appeared  as  predestined;  while  he  carefully  kept  back  all 
those  of  a  contrary  tenor,  which  portended  calamity  and  disgrace. 
So  at  least  Herodotus,  strenuous  in  upholding  the  credit  of  Bakis, 
Musseus,  and  other  Grecian  prophets  whose  verses  were  in  circulation, 
expressly  assures  us.  The  religious  encouragements  of  Onomakritus, 
and  the  political  co-operation  proffered  by  the  Aleuadse,  enabled  Mar- 
donius  effectually  to  overcome  the  reluctance  of  his  master.  Indeed, 
it  was  not  difficult  to  show,  according  to  the  feelings  then  prevalent, 
that  a  new  king  of  Persia  was  in  honor  obliged  to  enlarge  the  boun- 
daries of  the  empire.  The  conquering  impulse  springing  from  the 
first  founder  was  as  yet  unexhausted;  the  insults  offered  by  the 
Athenians  remained  still  unavenged;  and  in  addition  to  this  double 
stimulus  to  action,  Mardonius  drew  a  captivating  picture  of  Europe 
as  an  acquisition — "it  was  the  finest  land  in  the  world,  produced 
every  variety  of  fruit-bearing  trees,  and  was  too  good  a  possession  for 
any  mortal  man  except  the  Persian  kings."  Fifteen  years  before,  the 
Milesian  Aristagoras,  when  entreating  the  Spartans  to  assist  the  Ionic 
revolt,  had  exaggerated  the  wealth  and  productiveness  of  Asia  in  con- 
trast with  the  poverty  of  Greece — a  contrast  less  widely  removed  from 
the  truth,  at  that  time,  than  the  picture  presented  by  Mardonius. 

Having  thus  been  persuaded  to  alter  his  original  views,  Xerxes  con- 
voked a  meeting  of  the  principal  Persian  counsellors,  and  announced 


HISTORICAL   CONCEPTION  OF  HERODOTUS.     239 

to  them  his  resolution  to  invade  Greece;  setting  forth  the  mingled 
motives  of  revenge  and  aggrandizement  which  impelled  him,  and 
representing  the  conquest  of  Greece  as  carrying  with  it  that  of 
all  Europe,  so  that  the  Persian  empire  would  become  coextensive 
with  the  ether  of  Zeus  and  the  limits  of  the  sun's  course. 

On  the  occasion  of  this  invasion,  now  announced  and  about  to  take 
place,  we  must  notice  especially  the  historical  manner  and  concep- 
tion of  our  capital  informant — Herodotus.  The  invasion  of  Greece 
by  Xerxes,  and  the  final  repulse  of  his  forces,  constitute  the  entire 
theme  of  his  three  last  books,  and  the  principal  object  of  his  whole 
history,  toward  which  the  previous  matter  is  intended  to  conduct. 
Amid  those  prior  circumstances,  there  are  doubtless  many  which 
have  a  substantive  importance  and  interest  of  their  own,  recounted 
at  so  much  length  that  they  appear  co-ordinate  and  principal,  so  that 
the  thread  of  the  history  is  for  a  time  put  out  of  sight.  Yet  we  shall 
find,  if  we  bring  together  the  larger  divisions  of  his  history,  omitting 
the  occasional  prolixities  of  detail,  that  such  thread  is  never  lost  in 
the  historian's  own  mind:  it  may  be  traced  by  an  attentive  reader, 
from  his  preface  and  the  statement  immediately  following  it — of 
Croesus  as  the  first  barbaric  conqueror  of  the  Ionian  Greeks — down 
to  the  full  expansion  of  his  theme,  "  Grrecia  Barbariae  lento  collisa 
duello,"  in  the  expedition  of  Xerxes.  That  expedition,  as  forming 
the  consummation  of  his  historical  scheme,  is  not  only  related  more 
copiously  and  continuously  than  any  events  preceding  it,  but  is  also 
ushered  in  with  an  unusual  solemnity  of  religious  and  poetical 
accompaniment,  so  that  the  seventh  Book  of  Herodotus  reminds  us 
in  many  points  of  the  second  Book  of  the  Iliad:  probably  too,  if  the 
lost  Grecian  epics  had  reached  us,  we  should  trace  many  other  cases 
in  which  the  imagination  of  the  historian  has  unconsciously  assimi- 
lated itself  to  them.  The  Dream  sent  by  the  gods  to  frighten  Xerxes, 
when  about  to  recede  from  his  project — as  well  as  the  ample  cat- 
alogue of  nations  and  eminent  individuals  embodied  in  the  Persian 
host — have  both  of  them  marked  parallels  in  the  Iliad:  and  Herodo- 
tus seems  to  delight  in  representing  to  himself  the  enterprise  against 
Greece  as  an  antithesis  to  that  of  the  Atreidaa  against  Troy.  He 
enters  into  the  internal  feeling  of  Xerxes  with  as  much  familiarity  as 
Homer  into  those  of  Agamemnon,  and  introduces  "the  counsel  of 
Zeus"  as  not  less  direct,  special,  and  overruling,  than  it  appears  in  the 
Iliad  and  Odyssey:  though  the  Godhead  in  Herodotus,  compared  with 
Homer,  tends  to  become  neuter  instead  of  masculine  or  feminine,  and 
retains  only  the  jealous  instincts  of  a  ruler,  apart  from  the  appetites, 
lusi  s,  and  caprices  of  a  man :  acting,  moreover,  chiefly  as  a  centralized, 
or  at  least  as  a  homogeneous,  force,  in  place  of  the  discordant  sever- 
alty of  agents  conspicuous  in  the  Homeric  theology.  The  religious 
idea,  so  often  presented  elsewhere  in  Herodotus — that  the  Godhead 
was  jealous  and  hostile  to  excessive  good  fortune  or  immoderate 
desires  in  man — is  worked  into  his  history  of  Xerxes  as  the  ever- 


24()        FROM    MA  IIATirnN    TO    XERXES'S   MARCH. 

present  moral  and  as  the  main  cause  of  its  disgraceful  termination 
For  we  shall  discover  as  we  proceed,  that  the  historian,  with  that 
honorable  frankness  which  Plutarch  calls  his  "malignity, "  neither 
ascribes  to  his  countrymen  credil  greater  than  they  deserve  for  per- 
sonal valor,  nor  seeks  to  veil  the  many  chances  of  defeat  which  their 

mismanagement  laid  open. 

I  have  already  mentioned  that  Xerxes  is  described  as  having  orig- 
inally been  averse  to  the  enterprise,  and  only  stimulated  thereto  by 
the  persuasions  of  Mardonius.  This  was  probably  the  genuine  Per- 
sian belief,  for  the  blame  of  so  great  a  disaster  would  naturally  be 
tranferred  from  the  monarch  to  some  evil  counselor.  As  soon  as 
Xerxes,  yielding  to  persuasion,  has  announced,  to  the  Persian  chief 
men  whom  he  had  convoked,  his  resolution  to  bridge  over  the 
Hellespont  and  march  to  the  conquest  of  Greece  and  Europe,  Mar- 
donius is  represented  as  expressing  his  warm  concurrence  in  the  proj- 
ect, extolling  the  immense  force  of  Persia,  and  depreciating  the 
Ionians  in  Europe  (so  he  denominated  them)  as  so  poor  and  disunited 
that  success  was  not  only  certain  but  easy.  Against  the  rashness  of  this 
general — the  evil  genius  of  Xerxes — we  find  opposed  the  prudence 
and  long  experience  of  Artabanus,  brother  of  the  deceased  Darius, 
and  therefore  uncle  to  the  monarch.  The  age  and  relationship  of 
this  Persian  Nestor  embolden  him  to  undertake  the  dangerous  task 
of  questioning  the  determination  which  Xerxes,  though  professing  to 
invite  the  opinions  of  others,  had  proclaimed  as  already  settled  in  his 
own  mind.  The  speech  which  Herodotus  puts  into  the  mouth  of 
Artabanus  is  that  of  a  thoughtful  and  religious  Greek.  It  opens 
with  the  Grecian  conception  of  the  necessity  of  hearing  and  com- 
paring opposite  views,  prior  to  any  final  decision — reproves  Mardo- 
nius for  falsely  depreciating  the  Greeks  and  seducing  his  master  into 
personal  danger — sets  forth  the  probability  that  the  Greeks,  if  vic- 
torious at  sea,  would  come  and  destroy  the  bridge  by  which  Xerxes 
had  crossed  the  Hellespont — reminds  the  latter  of  the  imminent  haz- 
ard which  Darius  and  his  army  had  undergone  in  Scythia,  from  the 
destruction  (averted  only  by  Histiseus  and  his  influence)  of  the 
bridge  over  the  Danube :  such  prudential  suggestions  being  further 
strengthened  by  adverting  to  the  jealous  aversion  of  the  Godhead 
toward  overgrown  human  power. 

The  impatient  monarch  silences  his  uncle  in  a  tone  of  insult  and 
menace:  nevertheless,  in  spite  of  himself,  the  dissuasions  work  upon 
him  so  powerfully,  that  before  night  they  gradually  alter  his  resolu- 
tion, and  decide  him  to  renounce  the  scheme.  In  this  latter  disposi- 
tion he  falls  asleep,  when  a  dream  appears:  a  tall  stately  man  stands 
over  him,  denounces  his  change  of  opinion,  and  peremptorily  com- 
mands him  to  persist  in  the  enterprise  as  announced.  In  spite  of  this 
dream,  Xerxes  still  adheres  to  his  altered  purpose,  assembles  his 
council  the  next  morning,  and  after  apologizing  for  his  angry  lan- 
guage toward  Artabanus,  acquaints  them  to  their  great  joy  that  he 


DREAMS  OF  XERXES.  241 

adopts  the  recommendations  of  the  latter,  and  abandons  his  project 
against  Greece.  But  in  the  following  night,  no  sooner  has  Xerxes 
fallen  asleep,  than  the  same  dream  and  the  same  figure  again  appear 
to  him,  repeating  the  previous  command  in  language  of  terrific  men- 
ace. The  monarch,  in  a  state  of  great  alarm,  springs  from  his  bed 
and  sends  for  Artabanus,  whom  he  informs  of  the  twice-repeated 
vision  and  divine  mandate  interdicting  his  change  of  resolution. 
"If  (says  he)  it  be  the  absolute  will  of  God  that  this  expedition 
against  Greece  should  be  executed,  the  same  vision  Avill  appear  to 
thee  also,  provided  thou  puttest  on  my  attire,  sittest  in  my  throne, 
and  sleepest  in  my  bed."  Not  without  reluctance,  Artabanus  obeys 
this  order  (for  it  was  high  treason  in  any  Persian  to  sit  upon  the  regal 
throne),  but  he  at  length  complies,  expecting  to  be  able  to  prove  to 
Xerxes  that  the  dream  deserved  no  attention.  "  Many  dreams  (he 
says)  are  not  of  divine  origin,  nor  anything  better  than  mere  wander- 
ing objects  such  as  we  have  been  thinking  upon  during  the  day:  this 
dream,  of  whatever  nature  it  may  be,  will  not  be  foolish  enough  to 
mistake  me  for  the  king,  even  if  I  be  in  the  royal  attire  and  bed;  but 
if  it  shall  still  continue  to  appear  to  thee,  I  shall  myself  confess  it  to 
be  divine."  Accordingly  Artabanus  is  placed  in  the  regal  throne  and 
bed,  and  as  soon  as  he  falls  asleep,  the  very  same  figure  shows  itself 
to  him  also,  saying,  "  Art  thou  he  who  dissuadest  Xerxes,  on  the 
plea  of  solicitude  for  his  safety,  from  marching  against  Greece? 
Xerxes  has  already  been  forewarned  of  that  which  he  will  suffer  if 
he  disobeys,  and  thou,  too,  shalt  nor  escape  either  now  or  in  future, 
for  seeking  to  avert  that  which  must  and  shall  be."  With  these 
words  the  vision  assumes  a  threatening  attitude,  as  though  preparing 
to  burn  out  the  eyes  of  Artabanus  with  hot  irons,  when  the  sleeper 
awakens  in  terror,  and  runs  to  communicate  with  Xerxes.  "I  have 
hitherto,  O  king,  recommended  to  thee  to  rest  contented  with  that 
vast  actual  empire  on  account  of  which  all  mankind  think  thee  happy; 
but  since  the  divine  impulsion  is  now  apparent,  and  since  destruction 
from  on  high  is  prepared  for  the  Greeks,  I  too  alter  my  opinion,  and 
advise  thee  to  command  the  Persians  as  God  directs;  so  that  nothing 
may  be  found  wanting  on  thy  part  for  that  which  God  puts  into  thy 
hands." 

It  is  thus  that  Herodotus  represents  the  great  expedition  of  Xerxes 
to  have  originated;  partly  in  the  rashness  of  Mardonius,  who  reaps 
his  bitter  reward  on  the  field  of  battle  at  Platasa— but  still  more  in 
the  influence  of  "  mischievous  Oneiros,"  who  is  sent  by  the  gods  (as 
in  the  second  book  of  the  Iliad)  to  put  a  ch'eatupon  Xerxes,  and  even 
to  overrule  by  terror  both  his  scruples  and  those  of  Artabanus.  The 
gods  having  determined  (as  in  the  instances  of  Astyages,  Polykrates, 
and  others)  that  the  Persian  empire  shall  undergo  signal  humiliation 
and  repulse  at  the  hands  of  the  Greeks,  constrain  the  Persian  monarch 
into  a  ruinous  enterprise  against  his  own  better  judgment.  Such 
religious  imagination  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  peculiar  to  Herodotus, 


242        FROM  MARATHON  TO   XERXES'S  MARCH. 

but  as  common  to  him  with  his  contemporaries  generally,  Greeks  as 
well  :i3  Persians,  though  peculiarly  stimulated  among  the  Greeks  by 
the  abundance  of  their  epic  or  quasi-historical  poetry.  Modified  more 
or  less  in  each  individual  narrator,  it  is  made  to  supply  connecting 
links  as  well  as  initiating  causes  for  the  great  events  of  history.  As 
a  cause  for  this  expedition,  incomparably  the  greatest  fact  and  the 
most  fertile  in  consequences,  throughout  the  political  career  both  of 
Greeks  and  Persians,  nothing  less  than  a  special  interposition  of  the 
gjds  would  have  satisfied  the  feelings  either  of  one  nation  or  the 
other.  The  story  of  the  dream  has  its  rise  (as  Herodotus  tells  us)  in 
Persian  fancy,  and  is  in  some  sort  a  consolation  for  the  national  van- 
ity; but  it  is  turned  aud  colored  by  the  Grecian  historian,  who  men 
tions  also  a  third  dream,  which  appears  to  Xerxes  after  his  resolution 
to  march  was  finally  taken,  and  which  the  mistake  of  the  Magian 
interpreters  falsely  construed  into  an  encouragement,  though  it  really 
threatened  ruin.  How  much  this  religious  conception  of  the 
sequence  of  events  belongs  to  the  age,  appears  by  the  fact,  that  it  not 
only  appears  in  Pindar  and  the  Attic  tragedians  generally,  but  per- 
vades especially  the  Persae  of  iEschylus,  exhibited  seven  years  after 
the  battle  of  Salamis — in  which  we  find  the  premonitory  dreams  as 
well  as  the  jealous  enmity  of  the  gods  toward  vast  power  and  over- 
weening aspirations  in  man;  though  without  any  of  that  inclination, 
which  Herodotus  seems  to  have  derived  from  Persian  informants,  to 
exculpate  Xerxes  by  representing  him  as  disposed  himself  to  sober 
counsels,  but  driven  in  a  contrary  direction  by  the  irresistible  fiat  of 
the  gods. 

While  we  take  due  notice  of  those  religious  conceptions  with  which 
both  the  poet  and  the  historian  surround  this  vast  conflict  of  Greeks 
and  barbarians,  we  need  look  no  farther  than  ambition  and  revenge 
for  the  real  motives  of  the  invasion.  Considering  that  it  had  been 
a  proclaimed  project  in  the  mind  of  Darius  for  three  years  previous 
to  his  death,  there  was  no  probability  that  his  son  and  successor 
would  gratuitously  renounce  it.  Shortly  after  the  reconquest  of 
Egypt,  Xerxes  began  to  make  his  preparations,  the  magnitude  of 
which  attested  the  strength  of  his  resolve  as  well  as  the  extent  of  his 
designs.  The  satraps  and  subordinate  officers,  throughout  the  whole 
range  of  his  empire,  received  orders  to  furnish  the  amplest  quota  of 
troops  and  munitions  of  war — horse  and  foot,  ships  of  war,  horse- 
transports,  provisions,  or  supplies  of  various  kinds,  according  to  the 
circumstances  of  the  territory;  while  rewards  were  held  out  to  those 
who  should  execute  the  orders  most  efficiently.  For  four  entire 
years  these  preparations  were  carried  on,  and  as  we  are  told  that 
3imilar  preparations  had  been  going  forward  during  the  three  years 
preceding  the  death  of  Darius,  though  not  brought  to  any  ultimate 
result,  we  cannot  doubt  that  the  maximum  of  force,  which  the 
empire  could  possiblv  be  made  to  furnish,  was  now  brought  to  exe- 
cute the  schemes  of  Xerxes. 


THE  INVADING  ARMY  AT   SARDIS.  243 

The  Persian  empire  was  at  this  moment  more  extensive  than  ever 
it  will  appear  at  any  subsequent  period;  for  it  comprised  maritime 
Thrace  and  Macedonia  as  far  as  the  borders  of  Tbessaly,  and  nearly 
all  the  islands  of  the  .^Egean  nortli  of  Krete  and  east  of  Eubcea — 
including  even  the  Cyclades.  There  existed  Persian  forts  and  garri- 
sons at  Doriskus,  Eion,  and  other  places  on  the  coast  of  Thrace, 
while  Abdera  with  the  other  Grecian  settlements  on  that  coast  were 
numbered  among  the  tributaries  of  Susa.  It  is  necessary  to  bear  in 
mind  these  boundaries  of  the  empire,  at  the  time  when  Xerxes 
mounted  the  throne,  as  compared  with  its  reduced  limits  at  the 
later  time  of  the  Peloponnesian  war — partly  that  we  may  understand 
the  apparent  chances  of  success  to  his  expedition,  as  they  presented 
themselves  both  to  the  Persians  and  to  the  medising  Greeks — partly 
that  we  may  appreciate  the  after-circumstances  connected  with  the 
formation  of  the  Athenian  maritime  empire. 

In  the  autumn  of  the  year  481  B.C.,  the  vast  army  thus  raised  by 
Xerxes  arrived  from  all  quarters  of  the  empire,  at  or  near  to  Sardis; 
a  large  portion  of  it  having  been  directed  to  assemble  at  Kritala  in 
Kappadokia,  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  Halys,  where  it  was  joined 
by  Xerxes  himself  on  the  road  from  Susa.  From  thence  he  crossed 
the  Halys,  and  marched  through  Phrygia  and  Lydia,  passing  through 
the  Phrygian  towns  of  Kelamai,  Anaua,  and  Kolossse,  and  the  Lydian 
town  of  Kallatebus,  until  he  reached  Sardis,  where  winter-quarters 
were  prepared  for  him.  But  this  land  force,  vast  as  it  was  (respect- 
ing its  numbers,  I  shall  speak  farther  presently),  was  not  all  that  the 
empire  had  been  required  to  furnish.  Xerxes  had  determined  to 
attack  Greece,  not  by  traversing  the  ^Egean,  as  Datis  had  passed  to 
Eretria  and  Marathon,  but  by  a  land  force  and  fleet  at  once;  the 
former  crossing  the  Hellespont,  and  marching  through  Thrace,  Mace- 
donia and  Tbessaly ;  while  the  latter  was  intended  to  accompany  and 
co-operate.  A  fleet  of  1207  ships  of  war,  besides  numerous  vessels 
of  service  and  burden,  had  been  assembled  on  the  Hellespont  and  on 
the  coasts  of  Thrace  and  Ionia ;  moreover  Xerxes,  with  a  degree  of 
forethought  much  exceeding  that  of  his  father  Darius  in  the  Scythian 
expedition,  had  directed  the  formation  of  large  magazines  of  pro- 
visions at  suitable  maritime  stations  along  the  line  of  march,  from 
the  Hellespont  to  the  Strymonic  gulf.  During  the  four  years  of 
military  preparation  there  had  been  time  to  bring  together  great 
quantities  of  flour  and  other  essential  articles  from  Asia  and  Egypt. 

If  the  whole  contemporary  world  were  ,overawed  by  the  vast 
assemblage  of  men  and  muniments  of  war,  which  Xerxes  thus 
brought  together,  so  much  transcending  all  past,  we  might  even  say 
all  subsequent,  experience — they  were  no  less  astounded  by  two  enter- 
prises which  entered  into  his  scheme — the  bridging  of  the  Helles- 
pont, and  the  cutting  of  a  ship-canal  through  the  isthmus  of  Mount 
Athos.  For  the  first  of  the  two  there  had  indeed,  been  a  precedent, 
since  Darius  about  thirty-five  years  before  had  caused  a  bridge  to  be 


244       FROM   MARATHON  TO   XERXES'B  MARCH. 

thrown  over  the  Thracian  Bosphorus,  and  crossed  it  in  his  march  to 
Scythia.  5Tet  t his  bridge  of  Darius,  tliough  constructed  by  the 
Imiiaiis  and  by  a  Samian  Greek,  having  bad  reference  only  to  dis- 
tant regions,  seems  to  have  been  little  known  or  little  thought  ol 
among  the  Greeks  generally,  as  we  maj  infer  from  the  fact  that  the 
poel  .l-'-'li\  lus  speaks  as  if  he  had  never  beard  of  it;  while  the 
-  of  Xerxes  was  ever  remembered  both  by  Persians  and  by 
Greeks  as  a  most  imposing  display  of  Asiaiie  omnipotence.  The 
bridge  of  boats — or  rather  me  two  separate  bridges  not  far  removed 
from  each  Other,  —  which  Xerxes  caused  to  be  thrown  across  the 
lleli'  pout,  stretched  from  the  neighborhood  of  Abydos  on  the  Asiatic 
side  to  the  coast  between  Sestos  and  Madytus  ou  the  European, 
where  the  strait  is  about  an  English  mile  in  breadth.  The  execution 
of  the  work  was  at  first  int Misled,  not  to  Greeks,  but  to  Phenicians 
and  Egyptians,  who  had  received  orders  long  beforehand  to  prepare 
cables  of  extraordinary  strength  and  size  expressly  for  the  purpose; 
the  material  used  by  the  Phenicians  was  llax,  that  employed  by  the 
Egj  ptians  was  the  liber  of  the  papyrus.  Already  had  the  work  been 
completed  and  announced  to  Xerxes  as  available  for  transit,  when  a 
storm  arose,  so  violent  as  altogether  to  ruin  it,  The  wrath  of  the 
monarch,  when  apprised  of  this  catastrophe,  burst  all  bounds.  It 
was  directed  partly  against  the  chief  engineers,  whose  heads  he 
caused  to  be  struck  off,  hut  partly  also  agaiust  the  Hellespont  itself. 
He  commanded  that  the  strait  should  be  scourged  with  800  lashes, 
and  that  a  set  of  fetters  should  be  let  down  into  it  as  a  farther  pun- 
ishment. Moreover,  Herodotus  had  heard,  but  does  not  believe,  that 
he  even  sent  irons  for  the  purpose  of  branding  it.  "  Thou  bitter 
water  (exclaimed  the  scourgers  while  inflicting  this  punishment), 
this  is  the  penalty  which  our  master  inflicts  upon  thee,  because  thou 
hast  wronged  him  though  he  hath  never  wronged  thee  King 
Xerxes  will  cross  thee,  whetherthou  wilt  or  not;  but  thou  deservest 
not  sacrifice  from  any  man,  because  thou  art  a  treacherous  river  of 
(useless)  salt  water.'' 

Such  were  the  insulting  terms  heaped  by  order  of  Xerxes  on  the 
rebellious  Hellespont.  Herodotus  calls  them  "non-Hellenic  and 
blasphemous  terms,"  which,  together  with  their  brevity,  leads  us  to 
believe  that  he  gives  them  as  he  heard  them,  and  that  they  are  not  of 
his  own  invention,  like  so  many  other  speeches  iii  his  work,  where 
he  dramatizes,  as  it  were,  a  given  position.  It  has  been  common, 
however,  to  set  aside  in  \\\\<  case  not  merely  the  words,  but  even  the 
main  incident  of  punishment  inflicted  on  the  Hellespont,  as  a  mere 
Greek  fable  rather  than  a  real  fact;  the  extreme  childishness  and 
absurdity  of  the  proceeding  giving  to  it,  the  air  of  an  enemy's  cal- 
umny. But  this  reason  will  not  appear  sufficient,  if  we  transport 
ourselves  hack  to  the  time  and  to  the  party  concerned.  To  transfer 
to  inanimate  objects  the  sensitive  as  well  as  the  willing  and  design- 
ing attributes  of  human  beings,  is  among  the  early  and  widespread 


RECONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  3RIDGE.  215 

instincts  of  mankind,  and  one  of  the  primitive  forms  of  religion. 
And  although  the  enlargement  of  reason  and  experience  gradually 
displaces  this  elementary  fetichism,  banishing  it  from  the  regions  of 
reality  into  those  of  conventional  fiction — yet  the  force  of  momentary 
passion  will  often  suffice  to  supersede  the  acquired  habit:  and  even 
an  intelligent  man  may  be  impelled  in  a  moment  of  agonizing  pain 
to  kick  or  beat  the  lifeless  object  from  which  he  has  suffered.  By  tho 
old  procedure,  never  formally  abolished,  though  gradually  disused, 
at  Athens — an  inanimate  object  which  had  caused  the  death  of  a 
man  was  solemnly  tried  and  cast  out  of  the  border.  And  the  Arca- 
dian youths,  when  they  returned  hungry  from  an  unsuccessful  day's 
hunting,  scourged  and  pricked  the  god  Pan  or  his  statue  by  way  of 
revenge.  Much  more  may  we  suppose  a  young  Persian  monarch, 
corrupted  by  universal  subservience  around  him,  to  be  capable  of 
thus  venting  an  insane  wrath.  The  vengeance  exercised  by  Cyrus 
on  the  river  Gyndes  (which  he  caused  to  be  divided  into  360  stream- 
lets, because  one  of  his  sacred  horses  liad  been  drowned  in  it),  affords 
a  fair  parallel  to  the  scourging  of  the  Hellespont  by  Xerxes.  To 
offer  sacrifice  to  rivers,  and  to  testify  in  this  manner  gratitude  for 
service  rendered  by  rivers,  was  a  familiar  rite  in  the  ancient  religion. 
While  the  grounds  for  distrusting  the  narrative  are  thus  materially 
weakened, "the  positive  evidence  will  be  found  very  forcible.  The 
expedition  of  Xerxes  took  place  when  Herodotus  was  about  four 
years  old,  so  that  he  afterward  enjoyed  ample  opportunity  of  con 
versing  with  persons  who  had  witnessed  and  taken  part  in  it:  and 
the  whole  of  Ins  narrative  shows  that  he  availed  himself  largely  of 
such  access  to  information.  Besides,  the  building  of  the  bridge 
across  the  Hellespont,  and  all  the  incidents  connected  with  it,  were 
acts  necessarily  known  to  many  witnesses,  and  therefore  the  more 
easily  verified.  The  decapitation  of  the  unfortunate  engineers  was 
an  act  fearfully  impressive,  and  even  the  scourging  of  the  Helles 
pont,  while  essentially  public,  appears  to  Herodotus  (as  well  as  to 
Arrian  afterward),  not  childish,  but  impious.  The  more  attentively 
we  balance,  in  the  case  before  us,  the  positive  testimony  against 
the  intrinsic  negative  probabilities,  the  more  shall  we  be  disposed  to 
admit  without  diffidence  the  statement  of  our  original  historian. 

New  engineers — perhaps  Greek  along  with,  or  in  place  of,  Pheni- 
cians  and  Egyptians — were  immediately  directed  to  recommence  the 
work,  wdiich  Herodotus  now  describes  in  detail,  and  which  was  exe- 
cuted with  increased  care  and  solidity.  To*  form  the  two  bridges, 
two  lines  of  ships — triremes  and  pentekonters  blended  together — 
were  moored  across  the  strait  breastwdse,  with  their  sterns  toward 
the  Euxine  and  their  heads  toward  the  ^Egean,  the  stream  flowing 
always  rapidly  from  the  former  toward  the  latter.  They  were 
moored  by  anchors  head  and  stern,  and  by  verjr  long  cables.  The 
number  of  ships  placed  to  carry  the  bridge  nearest  to  the  Euxine 
was  360;  the  number  in  the  other,  314.    Over  each  of  the  two  lines 


246       FROM  MARATHON   T< »  XERXES'S  MARCH. 

of  ships,  across  From  shore  to  shore,  were  Btrctched  six  vasl  cables, 
which  discharged  the  double  function  of  holding  the  ships  together, 
ai  '1  of  supporting  the  bridgeway  to  be  laid  upon  them.  They  were 
tightened  by  means  of  capstans  on  each  shore:  in  three  different 
places  along  the  line,  a  gap  was  left  between  the  ships  for  the  purpose 
of  enabling  Bmall  trading  vessels  without  masts,  in  voyage  to  or 
from  the  Euxine,  to  pass  and  repass  beneath  the  cables. 

<  >ut  of  the  six  cables  assigned  to  each  bridge,  two  were  of  flax  and 
four  of  papyrus,  combined  for  the  sake  of  increased  strength;  for  it 
seems  thai  in  the  bridges  first  made,  which  proved  too  weak  to  resist 
the  winds,  thePhenicians  had  employed  cables  of  flax  for  one  bridge, 
the  Egyptians  those  of  papyrus  for  the  oilier.  Over  these  again  were 
laid  planks  of  wood,  sawn  to  the  appropriate  width,  secured  above 
by  a  second  line  of  cables  stretched  across  to  keep  them  in  their  places. 
Lastly,  upon  this  foundation  the  causeway  itself  was  formed  out  of 
earth  and  wood,  with  a  palisade  on  each  side  high  enough  to  prevent 
the  cattle  which  passed  over  from  seeing  the  water. 

The  other  greal  work  which  Xerxes  caused  to  be  performed,  for 
facilitating  his  march,  was,  the  cutting  through  of  the  isthmus  which 
connects  the  stormy  promontory  of  Mount  Athos  with  the  mainland. 
That  isthmus  near  the  point  where  it  joins  the  mainland  was  about 
twelve  stadia  (not  quite  so  many  furlongs)  across,  from  the  Strymonic 
to  the  Toronaic  Gulf;  and  the  canal  dug  by  order  of  Xerxes  was 
broad  and  deep  enough  for  two  triremes  to  sail  abreast.  In  this  work 
too,  as  well  as  in  the  bridge  across  the  Hellespont,  the  Phenicians 
were  found  the  ablest  and  most  efficienl  among  all  the  subjects  of  the 
Persian  monarch;  but  the  other  tributaries,  especially  the  Greeks 
from  the  neigboring  town  of  Akanthus,  and  indeed  the  entire  mari- 
time forces  of  the  empire,  were  brought  together  to  assist.  The  head- 
quarters of  the  fleet  were  first  at  Kvme  and  Phokaea,  next  at  Ela-u? 
in  the  southern  extremity  of  the  Thracian  Chersonese,  from  which 
poinl  it  could  protect  and  second  at  once  the  two  enterprises  going 
forward  at  the  Hellespont  and  Mount  Athos.  The  canal  cutting  at 
the  latter  was  placed  under  the  general  directions  of  two  noble  Per- 
sians—  Bubares  and  Artachaeus,  and  distributed  under  their  measure- 
ment as  task-work  among  the  contingents  of  the  various  nations;  an 
ample  supply  of  Hour  and  other  provisions  being  brought  for  sale  in 
the  neighboring  plain  from  various  parts  of  Asia  and  Egypt. 

Three  circumstances  in  the  narrative  of  Herodotus  respecting  thie 
work  deserve  special  notice.  First,  the  superior  intelligence  of  the 
Phenicians.  who,  within  sight  of  that  lofty  island  of  Thasos  which 
had  been  occupied  three  centuries  before  by  their  free  ancestors,  were 
now  laboring  as  instruments  to  the  ambition  of  a  foreign  conqueror. 
Amidst  all  the  people  engaged,  they  alone  took  the  precaution  of 
beginning  the  excavation  at  a  breadth  far  greater  than  the  canal  wae 
finally  destined  tc  occupy,  so  as  gradually  to  narrow  it,  and  leave  a 
convenient    slope  for  the  side*.     Tho    others   dug   straight    down, 


BRIDGE   ACROSS  THE   STRYMON.  247 

so  that  the  time  as  well  as  the  toil  of  their  work  was  doubled  by  the 
continual  falling  in  of  the  sides— a  remarkable  illustration  of  the 
degree  of  practical  intelligence  then  prevalent,  since  the  nations 
assembled  were  many  and  diverse.  Secondly,  Herodotus  remarks 
that  Xerxes  must  have  performed  this  laborious  work  from  motives 
of  mere  ostentation;  "  for  it  would  have  cost  no  trouble  at  all  "  (he 
observes)  to  drag  all  the  ships  in  the  fleet  across  the  isthmus;  so  that 
the  canal  was  nowise  needed.  So  familiar  a  process  was  it,  in  the 
mind  of  a  Greek  of  the  fifth  century  B.C.,  to  transport  ships  by 
mechanical  force  across  an  isthmus;  a  special  groove  or  slip  being 
seemingly  prepared  for  them;  such  was  the  case  at  the  Diolkus 
across  the  isthmus  of  Corinth.  Thirdly,  it  is  to  be  noted,  that  the  men 
who  excavated  the  canal  at  Mount  Athos  worked  under  the  lash;  and 
these,  be  it  borne  in  mind,  were  not  bought  slaves,  but  freemen,  except 
in  so  far  as  they  were  tributaries  of  the  Persian  monarch ;  perhaps 
the  father  of  Herodotus,  a  native  of  Halikarnassus  and  a  subject  of 
the  brave  Queen  Artemisia,  may  have  been  among  them.  We  shall 
find  other  examples  as  we  proceed,  of  this  indiscriminate  use  of  the 
whip,  and  full  conviction  of  its  indispensable  necessity,  on  the  partof 
the  Persians — even  to  drive  the  troops  of  their  subject  contingents  on 
to  the  charge  in  battle.  To  employ  the  scourge  in  this  way  toward 
freemen,  and  especially  toward  freemen  engaged  in  military  service, 
was  altogether  repugnant  both  to  Hellenic  practice  and  to  Hellenic 
feeling.  The  Asiatic  and  insular  Greeks  were  relieved  from  it  as 
from  various  other  hardships,  when  they  passed  out  of  Persian  do- 
minion to  become,  first  allies,  afterward  subjects,  of  Athens;  and  we 
shall  be  called  upon  hereafter  to  take  note  of  this  fact  when  we  appre- 
ciate the  complaints  preferred  against  the  hegemony  of  Athens. 

At  the  same  time  that  the  subject-contingents  of  Xerxes  excavated 
this  canal,  which  was  fortified  against  the  sea  at  its  two  extremities 
by  compact  earthen  walls  or  embankments,  they  also  threw  bridges 
of  boats  over  the  river  Strymon.  These  two  works,  together  with 
the  renovated  double  bridge  across  the  Hellespont,  were  both 
announced  to  Xerxes  as  completed  and  ready  for  passage,  on  his 
arrival  at  Sardis  at  the  beginning  of  winter  481-480  b.c  Whether 
the  whole  of  his  vast  army  arrived  at  Sardis  at  the  same  time  as  him- 
self, and  wintered  there,  may  reasonably  be  doubted;  but  the  whole 
was  united  at  Sardis  and  read}'  to  march  against  Greece,  at  the  begin- 
ning of  spring  480  B.C. 

While  wintering  at  Sardis,  the  Persian  monarch  dispatched  heralds 
to  a'l  the  cities  of  Greece,  except  Sparta  and  Athens,  to  demand  the 
received  tokens  of  submission,  earth  and  water.  The  news  of  his 
prodigious  armament  waswTell  calculated  to  spread  terror  even  among 
the  most  resolute  of  them.  And  he  at  the  same  time  sent  orders  to 
the  maritime  cities  in  Thrace  and  Macedonia  to  prepare  "  dinner  "  for 
himself  and  his  vast  suite  as  he  passed  on  his  march.  That  march  was 
commenced  at  the  first  beginning  of  spring,  and  continued  in  spite  of 


248        PROM    MARATHON   TO    XERXES'S  MARCH. 

Beveral  threatening  portents  during  the  course  of  it— one  of  which 
Xerxes  was  blind  enough  not  to  comprehend,  though,  according  to 
Herodotus,  nothing  could  be  more  obvious  than  its  signification — 
while  another  was  misinterpreted  into  a  favorable  omen  by  the  com- 
pliant answer  of  the  Marian  priests. 

On  quitting  Bardis,  the  vast  bost  was  divided  into  two  nearly  equal 
columns;  a  spacious  interval  being  lefl  between  the  two  for  the  King 
himself  with  bis  guards  at  id. select  Persians.  First  of  till  came  the  bag* 
gage,  carried  by  beasts  of  burden,  immediately  followed  by  one  half 
of  the  entire  body  of  infantry,  without  any  distinction  of  nations. 
SText,    the   select  troops,  1,000   Persian    cavalry    with    1,000   Persian 

spearmen,  the  latter  being  distinguished  by  carrying  their  spears  with 

the  point  downward  as  well  as  by  the  spear  itself,  w  Inch  had  a  golden 
pomegranate  at  its  other  extremity,  in  place  of  the  ordinary  spike  or 
point  whereby  the  weapon  was  planted  in  the  ground  when  the  sol- 
dier was  not  on  duty.  Behind  these  troops  walked  ten  sacred  li 
of  vast  power  and  splendidly  caparisoned,  bred  on  the  Nissan  plains 
in  Media;  next,  the  sacred  chariot  of  Zeus,  drawn  by  eight  white 
horses — wherein  no  man  was  ever  allowed  to  mount,  not  even  the 
charioteer,  who  walked  on  foot  behind  with  the  reins  in  his  hand. 
Next  after  the  sacred  chariot  came  that  of  Xerxes  himself,  drawn  by 
Nissean  horses;  the  charioteer,  a  noble  Persian  named  Patiramphes, 
being  seated  in  it  by  the  side  of  the  monarch — who  was  often  accus- 
tomed to  alight  from  the  chariot  and  to  enter  a  litter.  Immediately 
about  his  person  were  a  chosen  body  of  1000  horse-guards,  the  best 
troops  and  of  the  highest  breed  among  the  Persians,  having  golden 
apples  at  the  reverse  extremity  of  their  spears,  and  followed  by  other 
detachments  of  1000  borse,  10,000  foot,  and  10,000  horse,  all  native 
Persians.  Of  these  10,000  Persian  infantry,  called  the  Immortals 
because  their  number  was  always  exactly  maintained,  9,000  carried 
spears  with  pomegranates  of  silver  at  the  reverse  extremity,  while  the 
remaining  1000,  distributed  in  front,  rear,  and  on  each  side  of  this 
detachment,  were  marked  by  pomegranates  of  gold  on  their  spears. 
Willi  them  ended  what  we  may  call  the  household  troops;  after  whom, 
with  an  interval  of  two  furlongs,  the  remaining  host  followed  pell- 
mell.  Respecting  its  numbers  and  constituent  portions  I  shall  speak 
presently,  on  occasion  of  the  great  review  at  Doriskus. 

On  each  side  of  the  army,  as  it  marched  out  of  Sardis,  was  seen 
suspended  one-half  of  the  body  of  a  slaughtered  man,  placed  there 
expressly  for  the  purpose  of  impressing  a  lesson  on  the  subjects  of 
Persia.  It  was  the  body  of  the  eldest  son  of  the  wealthy  Pythius,  a 
Phrygian  old  man  resident  at  Kelana\  who  had  entertained  Xerxes 
in  I  lie  course  of  bis  march  from  Kappadokia  to  Sardis,  and  who  had 
previously  recommended  himself  by  rich  gifts  to  the  preceding  king 
Darius.  So  abundant  was  his  hospitality  to  Xerxes,  and  so  pressing 
his  offers  of  pecuniary  contribution  for  the  Grecian  expedition,  that  the 
monarch  asked  him  what  was  the  amount  of  his  wealth.   "  I  possess 


STORY  OF  KAPPADOKIAN  PYTHIUS.  249 

(replied  Pythius),  besides  lands  and  slaves,  2,000  talents  of  silver  and 
3,993,000  "of  golden  darics,  wanting  only  7,000  of  being  4,000,000. 
All  this  gold  and  silver  do  I  present  to  thee,  retaining  only  my  lands 
and  slaves,  which  will  be  quite  enough."  Xerxes  replied  by  the 
strongest  expressions  of  praise  and  gratitude  for  his  liberality;  at  the 
same  time  refusing  his  offer,  and  even  giving  to  Pythius  out  of  his 
own  treasure  the  sum  of  7,000  darics,  which  was  wanting  to  make- 
up the  exact  sum  of  4,000,000.  The  latter  was  so  elated  with  this 
mark  of  favor,  that  when  the  army  was  about  to  depart  from  Sardis, 
he  ventured,  under  the  influence  of  terror  from  the  various  menacing 
portents,  to  prefer  a  prayer  to  the  Persian  monarch.  His  five  sons 
were  all  about  to  serve  in  the  invading  army  against  Greece:  his 
prayer  to  Xerxes  was,  that  the  eldest  of  them  might  be  left  behind, 
as  a  stay  to  his  own  declining  years,  and  that  the  service  of  the 
remaining  four  with  the  army  might  be  considered  as  sufficient.  But 
the  unhappy  father  knew  not  what  he  asked.  "Wretch!  (replied 
Xerxes)  dost  thou  dare  to  talk  to  me  about  thy  son.  when  I  am  myself 
on  the  march  against  Greece,  with  my  sons,  brothers,  relatives,  and 
friends?  thou  who  art  my  slave,  and  whose  duty  it  is  to  follow  me 
with  thy  wife  and  thy  entire  family?  Know  that  the  sensitive  soul 
of  man  dwells  in  his  ears:  on  hearing  good  things,  it  rills  the  body 
with  delight,  but  boils  with  wrath  when  it  hears  the  contrary.  As, 
when  thou  didst  good  deeds  and  madest  good  offers  to  me,  thou 
canst  not  boast  of  having  surpassed  the  king  in  generosity — so  now, 
when  thou  hast  turned  round  and  become  impudent,  the  punishment 
inflicted  on  thee  shall  not  be  the  full  measure  of  thy  deserts,  but 
something  less.  For  thyself  and  for  thy  four  sons,  the  hospitality 
which  I  received  from  thee  shall  serve  as  protection.  But  for  that 
one  son  whom  thou  especially  wishest  to  keep  in  safety,  the  forfeit 
of  his  life  shall  be  thy  penalty."  He  forthwith  directed  that  the  son 
of  Pythius  should  be  put  to  death,  and  his  body  severed  in  twain;  of 
which  one-half  was  to  be  fixed  on  the  right-hand,  the  other  on  the 
left  hand,  of  the  road  along  which  the  army  was  to  pass. 

A  tale  essentially  similar,  yet  rather  less  revolting,  has  been  already 
recounted  respecting  Darius,  when  undertaking  his  expedition  against 
Scythia.  Both  tales  illustrate  the  intense  force  of  sentiment  with 
which  the  Persian  kings  regarded  the  obligation  of  universal  per- 
sonal service,  when  they  were  themselves  in  the  field.  They  seem  to 
have  measured  their  strength  by  the  number  of  men  whom  they  col- 
lected around  them,  with  little  or  no  reference  to  quality:  and  the 
very  mention  of  exemption — the  idea  that  a  subject  and  a  slave 
should  seek  to  withdraw  himself  from  a  risk  which  the  monarch  was 
about  to  encounter — was  an  offense  not  to  be  pardoned.  In  this  as 
in  the  other  acts  of  Oriental  kings,  whether  grateful,  munificent,  or 
ferocious,  we  trace  nothing  but  the  despotic  force  of  personal  will, 
translating  itself  into  act  without  any  thought  of  consequences,  and 
treating  subjects  with  less  consideration  than  an  ordinary  Greek  mas- 
ter would  have  shown  toward  his  slaves. 


250        FROM   MARATHON  TO  XERXES'S  MARCH. 

From  Sar<li>,  the  hosl  of  Xerxes  directed  its  march  to  Abydos,  first 
across  Mysia  and  the  river  Kaikus — then  through  Aterneus,  Karine, 
and  tlie  plain  of  Thebe.  They  passed  Adramyttium  and  Antandrus, 
and  crossed   the  range  of  [da,  mosl  pari  of  which  was  on  their  left 

hand,    not    without    some    loss    from    Stormy    weather   and    thunder. 

From  hence  they  reached  Ilium  and  the  river  Bkamander,  the  stream 
of  which  was  drunk  up,  or  probably  in  pari  trampled  and  rendered 
undrinkable,  by  the  vast  host  of  men  and  animals.  In  spite  of  the 
immortal  interest  which  the  Bkamander  derives  from  the  Homeric 
poems,  its  magnitude  is  not  such  as  to  make  this  fact  surprising.  To 
the  poems  themselves  even  ,\<  rxes  did  not  disdain  to  pay  tribute. 
He  ascended  the  holy  hill  of  Ilium,— reviewed  the  Pergamus  where 

Priam  was  said  to  have  lived  and  reigned, — sacrificed  1000  oxen  to 
the  patron  goddess  Athene, — and  caused  the  Magian  priests  to  make 
libations  in  honor  of  the  heroes  who  had  fallen  on  that  venerated 
spot.  He  even  condescended  to  inquire  into  the  local  details,  abun- 
dantly supplied  to  visitors  by  the  inhabitants  of  Ilium,  of  that  great 
real  or  mythical  war  to  which  Grecian  chronologers  had  hardly  yet 
learned  to  assign  a  precise  date.  And  doubtless  when  he  contem- 
plated the  narrowT  area  of  that  Troy  which  all  the  Greeks  confeder- 
ated under  Agamemnon  had  been  unable  for  ten  years  to  overcome, 
he  could  not  but  fancy  that  these  same  Greeks  would  fall  an  easy 

grey  before  his  innumerable  host.  Another  day's  march  between 
Ihceteium,  Ophryneium,  and  Dardamis  on  the  left  hand,  and  the 
Teukrians  of  Gergis  on  the  right  hand,  brought  him  to  Abydos, 
where  his  two  newly  constructed  bridges  over  the  Hellespont  awaited 
him. 

On  this  transit  from  Asia  into  Europe  Herodotus  dwells  with 
peculiar  emphasis — and  well  he  might  do  so,  since  when  we  consider 
the  bridges,  the  invading  number,  the  unmeasured  hopes  succeeded 
by  no  less  unmeasured  calamity — it  will  appear  not  only  toha«-ebeen 
the  most  imposing  event  of  his  century,  but  to  rank  among  the  most 
imposing  events  of  all  history.  He  surrounds  it  with  much  dramatic 
circumstance,  not  only  mentioning  the  marble  throne  erected  for 
Xerxes  on  a  hill  near  Abydos,  from  whence  he  surveyed  both  his 
masses  of  land-force  covering  the  shore  and  his  ships  sailing  and 
racing  in  the  strait  (a  race  in  which  the  Phoenicians  of  Sidon  f-w 
passed  the  Creeks  and  all  the  other  contingents) — but  also  super 
adding  to  this  real  fact  a  dialogue  with  Artabaiius,  intended  to  set 
forth  the  internal  mind  of  Xerxes.  He  farther  quoles  certain  sup- 
posed exclamations  of  the  Abydenes  at  the  sighl  of  his  superhuman 
power.  "  Why  (said  one  of  these  terror-stricken  spectators),  why 
dost  thou,  oh  Zeus,  under  the  shape  of  a  Persian  man  and  the  name 
of  Xerxes,  thus  bring  together  the  whole  human  race  for  the  ruin  of 
Greece?  It  would  have  been  easy  for  thee  to  accomplish  Mw  without 
so  much  ado."  Such  emphatic  ejaculations  exhibit  the  strong  feel- 
ing which  Herodotus  or  his  informants  throw  into  the  scene,  though 
we  cannot  venture  to  apply  to  them  the  scrutiny  of  historical  criticism. 


MARCH  TO  DORISKUS..  251 

At  the  first  moment  of  sunrise,  so  sacred  in  the  mind  of  Orientals, 
the  passage  was  ordered  to  begin.  The  bridges  were  perfumed  with 
frankincense  and  strewed  with  myrtle  boughs,  while  Xerxes  himself 
made  libations  into  the  sea  with  a  golden  censer,  and  offered  up 
prayers  to  Helios,  that  he  might  effect  without  hindrance  his  design 
of  conquering  Europe  even  to  its  farthest  extremity.  Along  with 
his  libation  he  cast  into  the  Hellespont  the  censer  itself,  with  a  golden 
bowl  and  a  Persian  scimitar — "  I  do  not  exactly  know  (adds  the  his- 
torian) whether  he  threw  them  in  as  a  gift  to  Helios,  or  as  a  mark  of 
repentance  and  atonement  to  the  Hellespont  for  the  stripes  which  he 
had  inflicted  upon  it."  Of  the  two  bridges,  that  nearest  to  the 
Euxine  was  devoted  to  the  military  force — the  other  to  the  attend- 
ants, the  baggage,  and  the  beasts  of  burden.  The  10,000  Persians, 
called  Immortals,  all  wearing  garlands  on  their  heads,  were  the  first 
to  pass  over.  Xerxes  himself,  with  the  remaining  army,  followed 
next,  though  in  an  order  somewhat  different  from  that' which  had 
been  observed  in  quitting  Sardis:  the  monarch  having  reached  the 
European  shore,  saw  his  troops  crossing  the  bridges  after  him 
"  under  the  lash."  But  in  spite  of  the  use  of  this  sharp  stimulus  to 
accelerate  progress,  so  vast  were  the  numbers  of  his  host,  that  they 
occupied  no  less  than  seven  clays  and  seven  nights,  without  a  moment 
of  intermission,  in  the  business  of  crossing  over — a  fact  to  be  borne 
in  mind  presently,  when  we  come  to  discuss  the  totals  computed  by 
Herodotus. 

Having  thus  cleared  the  strait,  Xerxes  directed  his  march  along 
the  Thracian  Chersonese,  to  the  isthmus  whereby  it  is  joined  with 
Thrace,  between  the  town  of  Kardia  on  his  left  hand  and  the  tomb 
of  Helle  on  his  right — the  eponymous  heroine  of  the  strait.  After 
passing  this  isthmus,  he  turned  westward  along  the  coast  of  the 
Gulf  of  Melas  and  the  ^Egean  Sea — crossing  the  river  from  which 
that  Gulf  derived  its  name,  and  even  drinking  its  waters  up  (accord- 
ing to  Herodotus)  with  the  men  and  animals  of  his  army.  Having 
passed  by  the  ^Eolic  city  of  iEnus  and  the  harbor  called  Stentoris, 
he  reached  the  sea-coast  and  plain  called  Doriskus  covering  the  rich 
delta  near  the  mouth  of  the  Hebrus.  A  fort  had  been  built  there 
and  garrisoned  by  Darius.  The  spacious  plain  called  by  this  same 
name  reached  far  along  the  shore  to  Cape  Serreium,  and  comprised 
in  it  the  towns  of  Sale  and  Zone,  possessions  of  the  Samothracian 
Greeks  planted  on  the  territory  once  possessed  by  the  Thracian 
Kikones  on  the  main-laud.  Having  been  here  joined  by  his  fleet, 
which  had  doubled  the  southernmost  promontoiy  of  the  Thracian 
Chersonese,  he  thought  the  situation  convenient  for  a  general  review 
and  enumeration  both  of  his  land  and  his  naval  force. 

Never  probably  in  the  history  of  mankind  has  there  been  brought 
together  a  body  of  men  from  regions  so  remote  and  so  widely  diverse, 
for  one  purpose  and  under  one  command,  as  those  which  were  now 
assembled  in  Thrace  near  the  mouth  of  the  Hebrus.     About  the 


252        FROM    .MARATHON    TO    XERXBB'S   MARCH. 

numerical  total  we  cannol  pretend  to  form  any  definite  idea;  about 
the  variety  of  contingents  there  is  no  room  for  doubt.  "What 
Asiatic  nation  was  there  (asks  Herodotus,  whose  conceptions  of  thia 
expedition  seem  to  outstrip  his  powers  of  language)  thai  Xerxes  did 
not  bring  againsl  Greece?"  Nor  was  it  Asiatic  nations  alone,  emu 
prised  within  the  Oxus,  the  Indus,  the  Persian  Gulf,  the  Red  Sea, 
the  Levant,  the  ^Egean,  and  the  Euxine:  we  must  add  to  these  also 
the  Egyptians,  the  Ethiopians  on  the  Nile  south  of  Egypt,  and  the 
Libyans  from  the  desert  near  Cyrene.  Not  all  the  expi  di  lions,  fabu- 
lous or  historical,  of  which  Herodotus  had  ever  heard,  appeared  to 
him  comparable  to  this  of  Xerxes,  even  for  total  number;  much 
more  in  respect  of  variety  of  component  elements.  Forty-six  dif- 
ferent nations,  each  with  its  distinct  national  costume,  mode  of  arm- 
ing, and  local  leaders,  formed  the  vasl  land-force.  Eight  other 
nations  furnished  the  licet,  on  board  of  which  Persians,  Medes.  and 
Sakse  served  as  armed  soldiers  or  marines.  The  real  leaders,  both  of 
the  entire  army  and  of  all  its  various  divisions,  were  native  Persians 
of  noble  blood,  who  distributed  the  various  native  contingents  into 
companies  of  thousands,  hundreds,  and  tens.  The  forty  six  natioi  a 
composing  the  land-force  were  as  follows: — Persians,  .Medes,  Kissians, 
Hyrkanians,  Assyrians,  Baktrians,  Sakse,  Indians,  Arians,  Parthians, 
Chorasmians,  Sogdians,  Gandarians,  Dadikse,  Kaspians,  Sarangae, 
Paktyes,  Utii,  Myki,  Parikanii,  Arabians,  Ethiopians  in  Asia  and 
Ethiopians  south  of  Egypt,  Libyans,  Paphlagonians,  Ligyes,  Matieni, 
Maryandyni,  Syrians,  Phrygians,  Armenians,  Lydians,  Mysians, 
Thracians,  Kabelians,  Mares,  Kolchians,  Alarodians,  Saspeires, 
Sagartii.  The  eight  nations  who  furnished  the  fleet  were — Phoeni- 
cians (300  ships  of  war),  Egyptians  ('200),  Cypriots  (150),  Kilikians 
(100),  Pamphvlians(30),  Lykians  (50),  Karians<70),  Ionic  Greeks  (100), 
Doric  Greeks  (30),  ^Eolic  Greeks  (60),  Hellespontic  Greeks  (100), 
Greeks  from  the  islands  in  the  ^Egean  (17):  in  all  1207  triremes  or 
ships  of  war  with  three  banks  of  oars.  The  desciiptions  of  costumes 
and  arms  which  we  find  in  Herodotus  are  curious  and  varied.  But 
it  is  important  to  mention  that  no  nation  except  the  Lydians,  Lam- 
phylians,  Cypriots,  and  Karians  (partially  also  the  Egyptian  marines 
on  shipboard)  bore  arms  analogous  to  those  of  the  Greeks  (i.e.,  arms 
fit  for  steady  conflict  and  sustained  charge, — for  hand  combat  in  line 
as  well  as  for  defense  of  the  person, — but  inconveniently  heavy  either 
in  pursuit  or  in  flight).  The  other  nations  were  armed  with  missile 
weapons, — light  shields  of  wicker  or  leather,  or  no  shields  at  all, — 
turbans  or  leather  caps  instead  of  helmets, — swords  and  scj 
They  were  not  properly  equipped  either  for  fighting  in  regular  order 
or  for  resisting  the  line  of  spears  and  shields  which  the  Grecian 
hoplites  brought  to  bear  upon  them.  Their  persons  too  were  much 
less  protected  against  wounds  than  those  of  the  latter;  some  of  them 
indeed,  as  the  wysianS  and  Libyans,  did  not  even  carry  spears,  but 
only  staves  with  the  end  hardened  in  the  fire.     A  nomadic  tribe  of 


NUMBERING  OF  THE  ARMY.  253 

Persians,  called  Sagartii,  to  the  number  of  8,000  horsemen,  came 
armed  only  with  a  dagger  and  with  the  rope  known  in  South  America 
as  the  lasso,  which  they  cast  in  the  fight  to  entangle  an  antagonist. 
The  ^Ethiopians  from  the  Upper  Nile  had  their  bodies  painted  half 
red  and  half  white,  wore  the  skins  of  lions  and  panthers,  and  carried, 
besides  the  javelin,  a  long  bow  with  arrows  of  reed,  tipped  with  a 
point  of  sharp  stone. 

It  was  at  Doriskus  that  the  fighting-men  of  the  entire  land-army 
were  first  numbered;  for  Herodotus  expressly  informs  us  that  the 
various  contingents  had  never  been  numbered  separately,  and  avows 
his  own  ignorance  of  the  amount  of  each.  The  means  employed  for 
numeration  were  remarkable,  Ten  thousand  men  were  counted,  and 
packed  together  as  closely  as  possible:  a  line  was  drawn,  and  a  wall 
of  inclosure  built,  around  the  space  which  they  had  occupied,  into 
which  all  the  army  was  directed  to  enter  successively,  so  that  the 
aggregate  number  of  divisions,  comprising  10,000  each,  was  thus 
ascertained.  One  hundred  and  seventy  of  these  divisions  were 
affirmed  by  the  informants  of  Herodotus,  to  have  been  thus  num- 
bered, constituting  a  total  of  1,700,000  foot,  besides  80,000  horse, 
many  war-chariots  from  Libya  and  camels  from  Arabia,  with  a  pre- 
sumed total  of  20,000  additional  men.  Such  was  the  vast  land-force 
of  the  Persian  monarch:  his  naval  equipments  were  of  corresponding 
magnitude,  comprising  not  only  the  1207  triremes  or  war-ships  of 
three  banks  of  oars,  but  also  3,000  smaller  vessels  of  war  and  trans- 
ports. The  crew  of  each  trireme  comprised  200  rowers,  and  thirty 
fighting  men,  Persians  or  Saks;  that  of  each  of  the  accompanying 
vessels  included  eighty  men,  according  to  an  average  which  Herodo- 
tus supposes  not  far  from  the  truth.  If  we  sum  up  these  items,  the 
total  numbers  brought  by  Xerxes  from  Asia  to  the  plain  and  to  the 
coast  of  Doriskus  would  reach  the  astounding  figure  of  2,317.000  men. 
Nor  is  this  all.  In  the  farther  march  from  Doriskus  to  Thermopylae, 
Xerxes  pressed  into  his  service  men  and  ships  from  all  the  people 
whose  territory  he  traversed;  deriving  from  hence  a  reinforcement 
of  120  trireme*  with  aggregate  crews  of  24,000  men,  and  of  300,000 
new  land  troops,  so  that  the  aggregate  of  his  force  when  he  appeared 
at  Thermopylae  was  2,640,000  men.  To  this  we  are  to  add,  according 
to  the  conjecture  of  Herodotus,  a  number  not  at  all  inferior,  as 
attendants,  slaves,  sutlers,  crews  of  the  provision-craft  and  ships  of 
burden,  etc.,  so  that  the  male  persons  accompanying  the  Persian 
king  when  he  reached  his  first  point  of  Grecianr  resistance  amounted  to 
5,283,220!  So  stands  the  prodigious  estimate  of  this  army,  the  whole 
strength  of  the  eastern  world,  in  clear  and  express  figures  of  Herodo- 
tus, who  himself  evidently  supposes  the  number  to  have  been  even 
greater;  for  he  conceives  the  number  of  "  camp  followers"  as  not 
only  equal  to,  but  considerably  larger  than,  that  of  fighting-men. 
We  are  to  reckon,  besides,  the  eunuchs,  concubines,  and  female 
cooks,    at  whose  number  Herodotus   does  not  pretend  to  guess; 


254        FROM  MARATHON   TO   XERXES'S  MARCH. 

together  with  cattle,  beasts  of  burden,  and  Indian  dogs,  in  indefinite 
multitude,  increasing  the  consumption  of  the  regular  army. 

To  admit  this  overwhelming  total,  or  anything  near  to  it,  in 
obviously  impossible;  yet  the  disparaging  remarks  which  it  has 
drawn  down  upon  Herodotus  are  noway  merited.  He  takes  pains  to 
distinguish  thai  which  informants  told  him,  from  that  which  he 
merely  guessed.  His  description  of  the  review  at  Doriskus  is  so 
detailed,  that  he  had  evidently  conversed  with  persons  who  were 
present  at  it,  and  had  learnt  the  separate  totals  promulgated  by  the 
enumerators — infantry,  cavalry,  and  ships  of  war  great  and  small. 
As  to  the  number  of  triremes,  his  statement  seems  beneath  the  truth, 
as  we  may  judge  from  the  contemporary  authority  of  ^Eschylus, 
who  in  the  "  Persai"  gives  the  exact  number  of  1207  Persian  ships 
as  having  fought  at  Salamis;  but  between  Doriskus  and  Salamis, 
Herodotus  has  himself  enumerated  647  ships  as  lost  or  destroyed,  ami 
only  120  as  added.  No  exaggeration  therefore  can  well  be  suspected 
in  this  statement,  which  would  imply  about  276,000  as  the  number  of 
the  crews,  though  there  is  here  a  confusion  or  omission  in  the  narrative 
which  we  cannot  clear  up.  But  the  aggregate  of  3,000  smaller  ships, 
and  still  more  that  of  1,700,000  infantry,  are  far  less  trustworthy. 
There  would  be  little  or  no  motive  for  the  enumerators  to  be  exact, 
and  every  motive  for  them  to  exaggerate — an  immense  nominal  total 
would  be  no  less  pleasing  to  the  army  than  to  the  monarch  himself — 
so  that  the  military  total  of  land-force  and  ship's  crews,  which  Herod- 
otus gives  as  2,641,000  on  the  arrival  at  Thermopylae,  maybe  dis- 
missed as  unwarranted  and  incredible.  And  the  computation 
whereby  he  determines  the  amount  of  non-military  persons  present, 
as  equal  or  more  than  equal  to  the  military,  is  founded  upon  suppo- 
sitions no  way  admissible.  For  though  in  a  Grecian  well-appointed 
army  it  was  customary  to  reckon  one  light-armed  soldier  or  attendant 
for  every  hoplite,  no  such  estimate  can  be  applied  to  the  Persian 
host.  A  few  grandees  and  leaders  might  be  richly  provided  with 
attendants  of  various  kinds,  but  the  great  mass  of  the  army  would 
have  none  at  all.  Indeed,  it  appears  that  the  only  way  in  which  we 
can  render  the  military  total,  which  must  at  all  events  have  been 
very  great,  consistent  with  the  conditions  of  possible  subsistence,  is 
by  supposing  a  comparative  abseuce  of  attendants,  and  by  adverting 
to  the  fact  of  the  small  consumption,  and  habitual  patience  as  to 
hardship,  of  Orientals  in  all  ages.  An  Asiatic  soldier  will  at  this  day 
make  his  compaign  upon  scanty  fare,  and  under  privations  which 
would  be  intolerable  to  an  European.  And  while  we  thus  diminish 
the  probable  consumption,  we  have  to  consider  that  never  in  any 
case  of  ancient  history  had  so  much  previous  pains  been  taken  to 
accumulate  supplies  on  the  line  of  march;  in  addition  to  which,  the 
cities  in  Thrace  were  required  to  furnish  such  an  amount  of  provis- 
ions when  the  army  passed  by,  as  almost  brought  them  to  ruin. 
Herodotus  himself  expresses  his  surprise  how  provisions  could  have 


NUMBER  OF  THE  PERSIANS.  255 

^eeu  provided  for  so  vast  a  multitude,  and  were  we  to  admit  his  esti- 
mate literally,  the  difficulty  would  be  magnified  iuto  au  impossibility. 
Weighing  the  circumstances  of  the  case  well,  and  considering  that 
mis  army  was  the  result  of  a  maximum  of  effort  throughout  the  vast 
empire, — that  a  great  numerical  total  was  the  thing  chiefly  demanded, 
— and  that  prayers  for  exemption  were  regarded  by  the  Great  King  as 
a  capital  offense — and  that  provisions  had  been  collected  for  three 
years  before  along  the  line  of  march — we  may  well  believe  that  the 
numbers  of  Xerxes  were  greater  than  wei'e  ever  assembled  in  ancient 
times,  or  perhaps  at  any  known  epoch  of  history.  But  it  would  be 
rash  to  pretend  to  guess  at  any  positive  number,  in  the  entire  absence 
of  ascertained  data.  When  we  learn  from  Thucydides  that  he  found  it 
impossible  to  find  out  the  exact  numbers  of  the  small  armies  of  Greeks 
who  fought  at  Mantineia,  we  shall  not  be  ashamed  to  avow  our  ina- 
bility to  count  the  Asiatic  multitudes  at  Doriskus.  We  may  remark, 
however,  that,  in  spite  of  the  reinforcements  received  afterward  in 
Thrace,  Macedonia,  and  Thessaly,  it  may  be  doubted  whether  the 
aggregate  total  ever  afterward  increased.  For  Herodotus  takes  no 
account  of  desertions,  which  yet  must  have  been  very  numerous,  in 
a  host  disorderly,  heterogeneous,  without  any  interest  in  the  enter- 
prise; and  wherein  the  numbers  of  each  separate  contingent  were 
unknown. 

Ktesias  gives  the  total  of  the  host  at  800,000  men,  and  1000  tri- 
remes, independent  of  the  war  chariots;  if  he  counts  the  crews  of  the 
triremes  apart  from  the  800,000  men  (as  seems  probable),  the  total  will 
then  be  considerably  above  a  million.  ^Elian  assigns  an  aggregate 
of  700,000  men;  Diodorus  appears  to  follow  partly  Herodotus,  partly 
other  authorities.  None  of  these  witnesses  enable  us  to  correct 
Herodotus,  in  a  case  where  we  are  obliged  to  disbelieve  him.  He  is 
in  some  sort  an  original  witness,  having  evidently  conversed  with 
persons  actually  present  at  the  muster  of  Doriskus,  giving  us  their 
belief  as  to  the  numbers,  together  with  the  computation,  true  or 
false,  circulated  among  them  by  authority.  Moreover,  the  contem- 
porary iEschylus,  while  agreeing  with  him  exactly  as  to  the  number 
of  triremes,  gives  no  specific  figure  as  to  the  laud-force,  but  conveys 
to  us  in  his  "  Persae"  a  general  sentiment  of  vast  number,  which 
may  seem  in  keeping  with  the  largest  statement  of  Herodotus:  the 
Persian  empire  is  drained  of  men — the  women  of  Susa  are  left  with- 
out husbands  or  brothers — the  Baktrian  territory  has  not  been  allowed 
to  retain  even  its  old  men.  The  terror-striking  effect  of  this  crowd 
was  probably  quite  as  great  as  if  its  numbers'had  really  corresponded 
to  the  ideas  of  Herodotus. 

After  the  numeration  had  taken  place,  Xerxes  passed  in  his  chariot 
by  each  of  the  several  contingents,  observed  their  equipment,  and 
put  questions  to  which  the  royal  scribes  noted  down  the  answers. 
He  then  embarked  on  board  a  Sidonian  trireme  (which  had  been 
already  fitted  up  with  a  gilt  tent),  and  sailed  along  the  prows  of  his 


25C        FROM  MARATHON   TO   XERXES'S  MARCH. 

immense  fleet,  moored  in  line  about  400  feet  from  the  shore,  a:-i 
every  vessel  completely  manned  for  action.  Such  a  spectacle  was 
well  calculated  to  rouse  emotions  of  arrogant  confidence.  Ii  was  in 
this  spirit  that  lie  sent  forthwith  for  Demaratus,  the  exiled  king  of 
Spuria,  who  was  among  his  auxiliaries — to  ask  whether  resistance  on 
the  part  of  the  Greeks,  to  such  a  force,  was  even  conceivable.  The 
conversation  between  them,  dramatically  given  by  Herodotus,  is  one 
of  the  most  impressive  manfestations  of  sentiment  in  the  Greek  lan- 
guage. Demaratus  assures  him  that  the  Spartans  most  certainly,  and 
the  Dorians  of  Peloponnesus  probably,  will  resist  him  to  the  death, 
be  the  difference  of  numbers  what  it  may.  Xerxes  receives  the 
statement  with  derision,  but  exhibits  no  feeling  of  displeasure:  an 
honorable  contrast  to  the  treatment  of  Charidemus  a  century  and  a 
half  afterward,  by  the  last  monarch  of  Persia. 

After  the  completion  of  the  review,  Xerxes  with  the  army  pursued 
his  march  westward,  in  three  divisions  and  along  three  different  lines 
of  road,  through  the  territories  of  seven  distinct  tribes  of  Thracians, 
interspersed  with  Grecian  maritime  colonies.  All  was  still  within 
bis  own  empire,  and  he  took  reinforcements  from  each  as  he  passed: 
the  Thracian  Satra*  were  preserved  from  this  levy  by  their  unassaila- 
ble seats  amidst  the  woods  and  snows  of  Rhodope.  The  islands  of 
Samothrace  and  Thasus,  with  their  subject  towns  on  the  mainland — 
and  the  Grecian  colonies  Dik;ea,  Maroneia,  and  Abdera — were  suc- 
cessively laid  under  contribution  for  contingents  of  ships  or  men. 
What  was  still  more  ruinous — they  were  constrained  to  provide  a 
day's  meal  for  the  immense  host  :is  it  passed:  on  the  day  of  his  pas- 
sage the  Great  King  was  their  guest.  Orders  had  been  transmitted 
for  this  purpose  long  beforehand,  and  for  many  months  the  citizens 
had  been  assiduously  employed  in  collecting  food  for  the  army,  a* 
well  as  delicacies  for  the  monarch — in  grinding  flour  of  wheat  and 
barley,  fattening  cattle,  keeping  up  birds  and  fowls;  together  with  a 
decent  display  of  g:ld  and  silver  plate  for  the  regal  dinner.  A 
superb  tent  was  erected  for  Xerxes  and  his  immediate  companions, 
while  the  army  received  their  rations  in  the  open  region  around,  on 
commencing  the  march  next  morning,  the  tent  with  all  its  rich  con- 
tents was  plundered,  and  nothing  restored  to  those  who  had  furnished 
it.  Of  course  so  prodigious  a  host,  which  had  occupied  seven  days 
and  seven  nights  in  crossing  the  double  Hellespont iue  bridge,  must 
also  have  been  for  many  days  on  its  march  through  the  territory,  and 
therefore  at  the  charge,  of  each  one  among  the  cities,  so  that  the 
cost  brought  them  to  the  brink  of  ruin,  and  even  in  some  cases  drove 
them  to  abandon  house  and  home.  The  cost  incurred  by  the  city  of 
Thasus,  on  account  of  their  possessions  of  the  main-land,  for  this 
purpose  was  no  less  than  400  talents  (£92,800)-  while  at  Abdera, 
the  witty  Megakreon  recommended  to  his  countrymen  to  go  in  a 
body  to  the  temples  and  thank  the  gods,  because  Xerxes  was  pleased 
to  be  satisfied  with  one  meal  in  the  day.     Had  the  monarch  required 


XERXES  CROSSES  THE  STRYMON.  257 

breakfast  as  well  as  dinner,  the  Abderites  must  have  been  reduced  to 
the  alternative  either  of  exde  or  of  utter  destitution.  A  stream  called 
Lissus,  which  seems  to  have  been  of  no  great  importance,  is  said  to 
have  been  drunk  up  by  the  army,  together  with  a  lake  of  some 
magnitude  near  Pistyrus. 

Through  the  territory  of  the  Edonian  Thracians  and  the  Pierians, 
between  Pangaeus  and  the  sea,  Xerxes  and  his  army  reached  the  river 
Slrymon  at  the  important  station  called  Ennea  Hodoi  or  Nine-Roads, 
afterward  memorable  by  the  foundation  of  Amphipolis.  Bridges  had 
been  already  thrown  over  the  river,  to  which  the  Magian  priests  ren- 
dered solemn  honors  by  sacrificing  white  horses  and  throwing  them 
into  the  stream.  Moreover,  the  religious  feelings  of  Xerxes  were  not 
satisfied  without  the  more  precious  sacrifices  often  resorted  to  by  the 
Persians.  He  here  buried  alive  nine  native  youths  and  nine  maidens, 
in  compliment  to  Nine-Roads,  tlie  name  of  the  spot:  he  also  left, 
under  the  care  of  the  Pseonians  of  Siris,  the  sacred  chariot  of  Zeus, 
which  had  been  brought  from  the  seat  of  empire,  but  which  doubtless 
was  found  inconvenient  on  the  liue  of  march.  From  the  Strymon  he 
marched  forward  along  the  Strymonic  Gulf,  passing  through  the 
territory  of  the  Bisaltse  near  the  Greek  colonies  of  Argilus  and 
Stageirus,  until  he  came  to  the  Greek  town  of  Akanthus,  hard  by  the 
isthmus  of  Athos  which  had  been  recently  cut  through.  The  fierce 
king  of  the  Bisaltse  refused  submission  to  Xerxes,  fled  to  Rhodope 
for  safety,  and  forbade  his  six  sons  to  join  the  Persian  host.  Un- 
happily for  themselves,  they  nevertheless  did  so,  and  when  they 
came  back  he  caused  all  of  them  to  be  blinded. 

All  the  Greek  cities  which  Xerxes  had  passed  by,  obeyed  his  orders 
with  sufficient  readiness,  and  probably  few  doubted  the  ultimate  suc- 
cess of  so  prodigious  an  armament.  But  the  inhabitants  of  Akanthus 
had  been  eminent  for  their  zeal  and  exertions  in  the  cutting  of  the 
canal  and  had  probably  made  considerable  profits  during  the  opera- 
tion :  Xerxes  now  repaid  their  zeal  by  contracting  with  them  the  tie 
of  hospitality,  accompanied  with  praise  and  presents;  though  he 
does  not  seem  to  have  exempted  them  from  the  charge  of  maintain- 
ing the  army  while  in  their  territory.  He  here  separated  himself 
from  his  fleet,  which  was  directed  to  sail  through  the  canal  of  Athos, 
to  double  the  two  south-western  capes  of  the  Chalkidic  peninsula,  to 
enter  the  Thermaic  Gulf,  and  to  await  his  arrival  at  Therma.  The 
fleet  in  its  course  gathered  additional  troops  from  the  Greek  towns 
in  the  two  peninsulas  of  Sithonia  and  Pallene,  as  well  as  on  the 
eastern  side  of  the  Thermaic  Gulf,  in  the  region  called  Krusis  or 
Krosssea,  on  the  continental  side  of  the  isthmus  of  Pallene.  These 
Greek  towns  were  numerous,  but  of  little  individual  importance. 
Near  Therma  (Salonichi)  in  Mygdonia,  in  the  interior  of  the  Gulf  and 
eastward  of  the  mouth  of  the  Axius,  the  fleet  awaited  the  arrival  of 
Xerxes  by  land  from  Akanthus.  He  seems  to  have  had  a  difficult 
march,  and  to  have  taken  a  route  considerably  inland,  through 
H.  G.  II.— 9 


258  PROCEEDINGS  IN  GREECE. 

Pseonia  and  Krestonia — a  wild,  woody,  and  untrodden  country, 
where  his  baggage-camels  were  set  upon  by  lions,  and  where  there 
were  also  wild  hulls  of  prodigious  size  and  fierceness.  At  length  ho 
rejoined  his  fleet  at  Therma,  and  stretched  his  army  throughout 
Mygdonia,  the  ancient  Pieria,  and  Bottiseis,  as  far  as  the  mouth  of 
the  Haliakmon. 

Xerxes  had  now  arrived  within  sight  of  Mount  Olympus,  the 
northern  boundary  of  what  was  properly  called  Hellas;  after  a  march 
through  nothing  but  subject  territory,  with  magazines  laid  up  hcfore- 
hand  for  the  subsistence  of  an  army— with  additional  contingents 
levied  in  his  course— and  probably  with  Thracian  volunteers  joining 
him  in  the  hope  of  plunder.  The  road  along  which  he  had  marched 
was  still  shown  with  solemn  reverence  by  the  Thracians,  and  pro- 
tected both  from  intruders  and  from  tillage,  even  in  the  days  of 
Herodotus.  The  Macedonian  princes,  the  last  of  his  western  tribu- 
taries, in  whose  territory  he  now  found  himself — together  with  the 
Thessalian  Aleuadse— undertook  to  conduct  him  farther.  Nor  did 
the  task  as  yet  appear  difficult:  what  steps  the  Greeks  were  taking  to 
oppose  him  shall  be  related  in  the  coming  chapter. 


CHAPTER  XXXIX. 

PBOCEEDINGS  IN  GKEECE  FROM  THE  BATTLE  OP  MAEATHON  TO  THH 
TIME  OF  THE  BATTLE  OF  THEKMOPTLG3. 

Our  information  respecting  the  affairs  of  Greece  immediately  after 
the  repulse  of  the  Persians  from  Marathon,  is  very  scanty. 

Kleomenes  and  Leotvchides,  the  two  kings  of  Sparta  (the  former 
belonging  to  the  elder  or  Eurystheneid,  the  latter  to  the  younger  or 
the  Prokleid  race),  had  conspired  for  the  purpose  of  dethroning  the 
former  Prokleid  king  Demaratus:  and  Kleomenes  had  even  gone  so 
far  as  to  tamper  with  the  Delphian  priestess  for  this  purpose.  His 
maneuver  being  betrayed  shortly  afterward,  he  was  so  alarmed  at 
the  displeasure  of  the  Spartans,  that  he  retired  into  Thessaly,  and 
form  thence  into  Arcadia,  where  he  employed  the  powerful  influence 
of  his  regal  character  and  heroic  lineage  to  arm  the  Arcadian  people 
against  his  country.  The  Spartans,  alarmed  in  their  turn,  volunta- 
rily invited  him  bad:  with  a  promise  of  amnesty.  But  his  renewed 
lease  did  not  List  long.  His  habitual  violence  of  character  became 
aggravated  into  decided  insanity,  insomuch  that  he  struck  with  his 
stick  whomsoever  he  met;  and  bis  relatives  were  forced  to  confine 
him  in  chains  under  a  Helot  sentinel.  By  severe  menaces,  he  ono 
day  constrained  this  man  to  give  him  his  sword,  with  which  he  man- 
gled himself  dreadfully  and  perished.  So  shocking  a  death  was 
certain  to   receive  a  religious  interpretation:  yet  which,  among  the 


COMPLAINT  OF  THE  ^GINETANS  259 

misdeeds  of  his  life,  had  drawn  down  upon  him  the  divine  wrath, 
was  a  point  difficult  to  determine.  Most  of  the  Greeks  imputed  it 
to  the  sin  of  his  having  corrupted  the  Pythian  priestess.  But  the 
Athenians  and  Argeians  were  each  disposed  to  an  hypothesis  of  their 
own— the  former  believed  that  the  gods  had  thus  punished  the  Spar- 
tan king  for  having  cut  timber  in  the  sacred  grove  of  Eleusis— the 
latter  recognized  the  avenging  hand  of  the  hero  Argus,  whose  grove 
Kleomenes  had  burnt,  along  with  so  many  suppliant  warriors  who 
had  taken  sanctuary  in  it.  Without  pronouncing  between  these  dif- 
ferent suppositious,  Herodotus  contents  himself  with  expressing  his 
opinion  that  the  miserable  death  of  Kleomenes  was  an  attonement  for 
his  conduct  to  Demaratus.  But  what  surprises  us  most  is,  to  hear 
that  the  Spartans,  usually  more  disposed  than  other  Greeks  to  refer 
every  striking  phenomenon  to  divine  agency,  recognized  on  this 
occasion  nothing  but  a  vulgar  physical  cause:  Kleomones  had  gone 
mad  (they  affirmed)  through  habits  of  intoxication,  learnt  from  some 
Scythian  envoys  who  had  come  to  sparta. 

The  death  of  Kleomenes,  and  the  discredit  thrown  on  his  character, 
emboldened  the  iEginetans  to  prefer  a  complaint  at  Sparta  respecting 
their  ten  hostages,  whom  Kleomenes,  and  Leotychides  had  taken 
away  from  the  island,  a  little  before  the  invasion  of  Attica  by  the 
Persians  under  Datis,  and  deposited  at  Athens  as  guarantee  to  the 
Athenians  against  aggression  from  iEgina  at  that  critical  moment 
Leotychides  was  the  surviving  auxiliary  of  Kleomenes  in  the  requi- 
sition of  these  hostages,  and  against  him  the  iEginetans  complained. 
Though  the  proceeding  was  one  unquestionably  beneficial  to  the  gen- 
eral cause  of  Greece,  yet  such  was  the  actual  displeasure  of  the  Lace- 
dasmonians  against  the  deceased  king  and  his  acts,  that  the  survivor 
Leotychides  was  brought  to  a  public  trial,  and  condemned  to  be 
delivered  up  as  prisoner  in  atonement  to  the  iEginetans.  The  latter 
were  about  to  carry  away  their  prisoner,  when  a  dignified  Spartan 
named  Theasides,  pointed  out  to  them  the  danger  which  they  were 
incurring  by  such  an  indignity  against  the  regal  person.  The  Spar- 
tans (he  observed)  had  passed  sentence  under  feelings  of  temporary 
wrath,  which  would  probably  be  exchanged  for  sympathy  if  they  saw 
the  sentence  executed. 

Accordingly  the  iEginetans  contented  themselves  with  stipulating 
fhat  Leotychides  should  accompany  them  to  Athens  and  redemeud 
their  hostages  detained  there.  The  Athenians  refused  to  give  up  the 
hostages,  in  spite  of  the  emphatic  terms  in  which  the  Spartan  king 
Bet  forth  the  sacred  obligation  of  restoring  a  deposit.  They  justified 
the  refusal  in  part  by  saying  that  the  deposit  had  been  lodged  by  the 
two  kings  jointly,  and  could  not  be  surrendered  to  one  of  them  alone. 
But  they  probably  recollected  that  the  hostages  were  placed  with  them 
less  as  a  deposit  than  as  a  security  against  iEginetan  hostility — which 
security  they  were  not  disposed  to  forego. 

Leotychides  having  been   obliged   to   retire  without  succsms,  the 


260  PROCEEDINGS  IX  GREECE. 

/Eginetans  resolved  to  adopt  measures  of  retaliation  for  themselves. 
They  waited  for  the  period  of  a  solemn  festival  celebrated  every  fifth 
year  at  Sunium;  on  which  occasion  a  ship,  peculiarly  equipped  and 
carrying  someofthe  leading  Athenians  as  Theors  or  sacred  envoys, 
sailed  thither  from  Athens.  This  ship  they  found  means  to  capture, 
and  carried  all  on  hoard  prisoners  to  JSgina.  \\  nether  an  exchange 
took  place,  or  whether  the  prisoners  and  hostages  on  lioth  sides  were 
put  to  death,  we  do  not  know.  But  the  consequence  of  their  pro- 
ceeding was  an  active  and  decided  war  between  Athens  and  yEgina, 
beginning  seemingly  about  488  or  487  B.C.,  and  lasting  until  481  B.C., 
i  he  \  i  ar  preceding  the  invasion  of  Xerxes. 

An  iEginetan  citizen  named  Nikodromus  took  advantage  of  this 
war  to  further  a  plot  against  the  government  of  the  island.  Having 
been  before  banished  (as  he  tb.OUgh.1  unjustly),  he  now  organized  a 
revolt  of  the  people  against  the  ruling  oligarchy,  concerting  with  the 
Athenians  a  simultaneous  invasion  in  support  of  his  plan.  Accord- 
ingly <»n  the  appointed  day  he  rose  with  his  partisans  in  arms  and 
took  possession  of  the  Old  Town — a  strong  post  which  had  been 
superseded  in  course  of  time  by  the  mere  modern  city  on  the  sea- 
shore, less  protected  though  more  convenient.  But  no  Athenians 
appeared,  and  without  them  he  was  unable  to  maintain  Ins  fooling. 
He  was  obliged  to  make  his  escape  from  the  island,  after  witnessing 
the  complete  defeat  of  his  partisans;  a  large  body  of  whom,  700 
in  number,  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  government,  and  were  led 
out  for  execution.  One  man  alone  among  these  prisoners  burst 
his  chains,  lied  to  the  sanctuary  of  Demeter  Thesmophonis,  and 
was  fortunate  enough  to  seize  the  handle  of  the  door  before  he 
was  overtaken.  In  spite  of  every  effort  to  drag  him  away  by 
force,  he  clung  to  it  with  convulsive  grasp.  His  pursuers  did  not 
venture  to  put  him  to  death  in  such  a  position,  but  they  severed  thb 
hands  from  the  body  and  then  executed  him,  leaving  the  hands  still 
hanging  to  and  grasping  the  door-handle,  where  they  seem  to  have 
long  remained  without  being  taken  off.  Destruction  of  the  700 
prisoners  does  not  seem  to  have  drawn  down  upon  the  yEginetan 
oligarchy  either  vengeance  from  the  gods  or  censure  from  their 
contemporaries.  But  the  violation  of  sanctuary,  in  the  case  of 
that  one  unfortunate  man  whose  hands  were  cut  off,  was  a  crime 
which  the  goddess  Demeter  never  forgave.  More  than  fifty  years 
afterward,  in  the  first  year  of  the  lYloponnesian  war,  the  ^Eginetans, 
having  been  previously  conquered  by  Athens,  were  finally  expelled 
from  their  island:  such  expulsion  was  the  divine  judgment  upon 
them  lor  this  ancient  impiety,  which  half  u  century  of  continued 
expiatory  sacrifice  had  not  been  sufficient  to  wipe  out. 

The  Athenians  who  were  to  have  assisted  Nikodromus  arrived  at 
iEgina  one  day  too  late.  Their  proceedings  had  been  delayed  by  the 
necessity  of  borrowing  twenty  triremes  from  the  Corinthians,  in  addi- 
tion to  fifty  of  their  own:  with  these  seventy  sail  they  defeated  the 


EFFECT   OF  THE  WAR.  261 

JSginetans,  who  mot  them  with  a  fleet  of  equal  number — and  then 
landed  on  the  island.  The  ^Eginetans  solicited  aid  from  Argos,  but 
that  city  was  either  too  much  displeased  with  them,  or  too  much 
exhausted  by  the  defeat  sustained  from  the  Spartan  Kleomenes,  to 
•grant  it.  Nevertheless,  one  thousand  Argeian  volunteers,  under  a 
distinguished  champion  of  the  pentathlon  named  Eurybates,  came  to 
their  assistance,  and  a  vigorous  war  was  carried  on,  with  varying 
success,  against  the  Athenian  armament. 

At  sea,  the  Athenians  sustained  a  defeat,  being  attacked  at  a 
moment  wdien  their  fleet  was  in  disorder,  so  that  they  lost  four  ships 
with  their  crews:  on  land  they  were  more  successful,  and  few  of  the 
Argeian  volunteers  survived  to  return  home.  The  general  of  the  lat- 
ter, Eurybates,  confiding  in  his  great  personal  strength  and  skill, 
challenged  the  best  of  the  Athenian  warriors  to  single  combat.  He 
slew  three  of  them  in  succession,  but  the  arm  of  the  fourth,  Sophanes 
of  Dekeleia,  was  victorious,  and  proved  fatal  to  him.  At  length  the 
invaders  were  obliged  to  leave  the  island  without  any  decisive  result, 
and  the  war  seems  to  have  been  prosecuted  by  frequent  descents  and 
privateering  on  both  sides — in  which  Nikodromus  and  the  iEginetan 
exiles,  planted  by  Athens  on  the  coast  of  Attica  near  Sunium,  took 
an  active  part;  the  advantage  on  the  whole  being  on  the  side  of 
Athens. 

The  general  course  of  this  war,  and  especially  the  failure  of  the 
enterprise  concerted  with  Nikodromus  in  consequence  of  delay  in 
borrowing  ships  from  Corinth,  were  well  calculated  to  impress  upon 
the  Athenians  the  necessity  of  enlarging  their  naval  force.  And  it  is 
from  the  present  time  that  we  trace  among  them  the  first  growth  of 
that  decided  tendency  toward  maritime  activity,  which  coincided  so 
happily  with  the  expansion  of  their  democracy,  and  opened  a  new 
phase  in  Grecian  history,  as  well  as  a  new  career  for  themselves. 

The  exciting  effect  produced  upon  them  by  the  repulse  of  the  Per- 
sians at  Marathon  has  been  dwelt  upon  in  a  preceding  chapter.  Mil- 
tiades,  the  victor  in  that  field,  having  been  removed  from  the  scene 
under  circumstances  already  described,  Aristeides  and  Themistokles 
became  the  chief  men  at  Athens:  and  the  former  was  chosen  archon 
during  the  succeeding  year.  His  exemplary  uprightness  in  magis- 
terial functions  insured  to  him  lofty  esteem  from  the  general  public, 
not  without  a  certain  proportion  of  active  enemies,  some  of  them  suf- 
ferers by  his  justice.  These  enemies  naturally  became  partisans  of 
his  rival,  Themistokles,  who  had  all  the  talente  necessary  for  bringing 
them  into  co-operation.  The  rivalry  between  the  two  chiefs  became 
so  bitter  and  menacing  that  even  Aristeides  himself  is  reported  to 
have  said,  "If  the  Athenians  were  wise  they  would  cast  both  of  us 
into  the  barathrum."  Under  such  circumstances  it  is  not  too  much 
to  say  that  the  peace  of  the  country  was  preserved  mainly  by  the 
institution  called  Ostracism,  the  true  character  of  which  I  have 
already  explained.     After  three  or  four  years  of  continued  political 


0(52  PROCEEDINGS  IX  GREECE. 

rivalry,  the  two  chiefs  appealed  to  a  vote  of  ostracism,  and  Aristeidei 
was  banished. 
Of  the  particular  points  on  which  their  rivalry  turned,  we  are 

unfortunately  little  informed.  Bui  it  is  highly  probable  thai  one  of 
them  was  the  i in p<  rtani  change  of  policy  above  alluded  to — the  con- 
version of  Athens  from  a  land-power  into  ;t  sea-power — the  develop- 
ment of  this  new  and  stirring  element  in  the  minds  of  the  people. 
By  all  authorities,  this  change  of  policy  is  ascribed  principally  and 
specially  to  Themistokles.  On  that  account,  if  for  no  other  reason, 
Aristeides  would  probably  be  found  opposed  to  it:  but  it  was  more- 
over a  change  not  in  harmony  with  that  old-fashioned  Hellenism, 
undisturbed  uniformity  of  life,  and  narrow  range  of  active  duty  and 
experience — which  Aristeides  seems  to  have  approved  in  common 
with  the  subsequent  philosophers.  The  seaman  was  naturally  more 
of  a  wanderer  and  cosmopolite  than  the  heavy-armed  soldier:  the 
modern  Greek  seaman  even  at  this  moment  is  so  to  a  remarkable 
degree,  distinguished  for  the  variety  of  his  ideas,  and  the  quickness 
of  his  intelligence.  The  land-service  was  a  type  of  steadiness  and 
inflexible  ranks;  the  sea-service  that  of  mutability  and  adventure. 
Such  was  the  idea  strongly  entertained  by  Plato  and  other  philoso- 
phers: though  we  may  remark  that  they  do  not  render  justice  to  the 
Athenian  seaman.  His  training  was  far  more  perfect  and  laborious, 
and  his  habits  of  obedience  far  more  complete,  than  that  of  the  Athe- 
nian hoplite  or  horseman:  a  training  beginning  with  Themistokles, 
and  reaching  its  full  perfection  about  the  commencement  of  the  Pelo- 
ponnesian  war. 

In  recommending  extraordinary  efforts  to  create  a  navy  as  well  as 
to  acquire  nautical  practice,  Themistokles  displayed  all"  that  saga- 
cious appreciation  of  the  circumstances  and  dangers  of  the  time  lor 
which  Thucydidcs  gives  him  credit:  and  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
Ari-teides,  though  the  honester  politician  of  the  two,  was  at  this  par- 
ticular crisis  the  less  essential  to  his  country.  Not  only  was  there 
the  struggle  with  ^E^ina,  a  maritime  power  equal  or  more  than  equal, 
and  within  sight  of  the  Athenian  harbor — but  there  was  also  in  the 
distance  a  still  more  formidable  contingency  to  guard  against.  The 
Persian  armament  had  been  driven  with  disgrace  from  Attica  back 
to  Asia;  but  the  Persian  monarch  still  remained  with  undiminished 
means  of  aggression  as  well  as  increased  thirst  for  revenge;  and  The- 
mistokles knew  well  that  the  danger  from  that  quarter  would  recur 
i-  than  ever.  He  believed  that  it  would  recur  again  in  the  same 
way,  by  an  expedition  across  the  ^Egean  like  that  of  Datis  to  Mara- 
thon; against  which  the  best  defense  would  be  found  in  a  numerous 
and  well-trained  fleet.  Nor  could  the  large  preparations  of  Darius 
for  renewing  the  attack  remain  unknown  to  a  vigilant  observer, 
extending  as  they  did  over  so  many  Greeks  subject  to  the  Persian 
empire.  Such  positive  warning  was  more  than  enough  to  stimulate 
the    active  genius  of    Themistokles,  who  now  prevailed  upon  bis 


VALUABLE  FUND  AVAILABLE.  263 

countrymen  to  begin  with  energy  the  work  of  maritime  preparation, 
as  well  against  ^Egina  as  agaiust  Persia.  Not  only  were  200  new 
ships  built,  and  citizens  trained  as  seamen — but  the  important  work 
was  commenced,  during  the  year  when  Themistokles  was  either 
archon  or  general,  of  forming  and  fortifying  a  new  harbor  for  Athens 
at  Pebraeus,  instead  of  the  ancient  open  bay  of  Phalerum.  The  lat- 
ter was  indeed  somewhat  nearer  to  the  city,  but  Peiraeus  with  its 
three  separate  natural  ports,  admitting  of  being  closed  and  fortified, 
was  incomparably  superior  in  safety  as  well  as  in  convenience.  It  is 
not  too  much  to  say,  with  Herodotus — that  the  iEginetan  "  war  was 
the  salvation  of  Greece,  by  constraining  the  Athenians  to  make  them- 
selves a  maritime  power."  The  whole  efficiency  of  the  resistance 
subsequently  made  to  Xerxes  turned  upon  this  new  movement  in  the 
organization  of  Athens,  allowed  as  it  was  to  attain  tolerable  com- 
pleteness through  a  fortunate  concurrence  of  accidents;  for  the 
important  delay  of  ten  years,  between  the  defeat  of  Marathon  and 
the  fresh  invasion  by  which  it  was  to  be  avenged,  was  in  truth  the 
result  of  accident.  First,  the  revolt  of  Egypt;  next,  the  death  of 
Darius;  thirdly,  the  indifference  of  Xerxes  at  his  first  accession 
toward  Hellenic  matters — postponed  until  480  B.C.,  an  invasion  which 
would  naturally  have  been  undertaken  in  487  or  486  B.C.,  and  which 
would  have  found  Athens  at  that  time  without  her  wooden  walls — 
the  great  engine  of  her  subsequent  salvation. 

Another  accidental  help,  without  which  the  new  fleet  could  not 
have  been  built — a  considerable  amount  of  public  money — was  also 
by  good  fortune  now  available  to  the  Athenians.  It  is  first  in  an 
emphatic  passage  of  the  poet  JEschylus,  and  next  from  Herodotus  on 
the  present  occasion,  that  we  hear  of  the  silver  mines  of  Laurium  in 
Attica,  and  the  valuable  produce  which  they  rendered  to  the  state. 
They  were  situated  in  the  southern  portion  of  the  territory,  not  very 
far  from  the  promontory  of  Suniuni,  amid  a  district  of  1owt  hills 
which  extended  across  much  of  the  space  between  the  eastern  sea  at 
Thorikus,  and  the  western  at  Anap'^ystus.  At  what  time  they  first 
began  to  be  worked,  we  have  no  information;  but  it  seems  hardly 
possible  that  they  could  have  been  worked  with  any  spirit  or  profita- 
ble result,  until  after  the  expulsion  of  Hippias  and  the  establishment 
of  the  democratic  constitution  of  Kleisthenes.  Neither  the  strong 
local  factions,  by  which  different  portions  of  Attica  were  set  agaiust 
each  other  before  the  time  of  Peisistratus — nor  the  rale  of  that  despot 
succeeded  by  his  two  sons — were  likely  to  afford  confidence  and 
encouragement.  But  when  the  democracy  of  Kleisthenes  first  brought 
Attica  into  one  systematic  and  comprehensive  whole,  with  equal 
rights  assigned  to  each  part,  and  with  a  common  center  at  Athens — 
the  power  of  that  central  government  over  the  mineral  wealth  of  the 
country,  and  its  means  of  binding  the  whole  people  to  respect  agree- 
ments concluded  with  individual  undertakers,  would  give  a  "hew 
stimulus  to  private  speculation  in  the  district  of  Laurium.     It  was 


2(54  PROCEEDINGS  IX  GREECE 

the  practice  of  the  Athenian  governmenl  either  to  sell,  or  to  let  for  a 
long  term  of  years,  particular  districts  of  this  productive  region  to 
individuals  or  companies ;  on  consideration  partly  of  a  sum  or  fine 
paid  down,  partly  of  a  reserved  rent  equal  to  one  twenty-fourth  part 
of  the  gross  produce. 

We  are  told  by  Herodotus  thai  there  was  in  the  Athenian  treasury, 
al  the  time  when  Themistokles  made  his  proposition  to  enlarge  the 
naval  force,  a  great  sum  arising  from  the  Laurian  mines,  out  of 
which  a  distribution  was  on  the  point  of  being  made  among  the 
citizens — ten  drachmas  to  each  man.  This  great  amount  in  hand  must 
probably  have  been  the  produce  of  the  purchase-money  or  tines 
received  from  recent  sales,  since  the  small  annual  reserved  rent  can 
hardly  have  been  accumulated  during  many  successive  years.  New 
and  enlarged  enterprises  in  mines  must  be  supposed  to  have  been 
recently  begun  by  individuals  under  contract  with  the  government: 
otherwise  there  could  hardly  have  been  at  the  moment  so  overflowing 
an  exchequer,  or  adequate  means  for  the  special  distribution  contem- 
plated. Themistokles  availed  himself  of  this  precious  opportunity — 
set  forth  the  necessities  of  the  war  with  iEgina,  and  the  still  more 
formidable  menace  from  the  great  enemy  in  Asia — and  prevailed  upon 
the  people  to  forego  the  promised  distribution  for  the  purpose  of 
obtaining  an  efficient  navy.  One  cannot  doubt  that  there  must  have 
been  many  speakers  who  would  try  to  make  themselves  popular  by 
opposing  this  proposition  and  supporting  the  distribution;  insomuch 
that,  the  power  of  the  people  generally  to  feel  the  force  of  a  distant 
motive  as  predominant  over  a  present  gain,  deserves  notice  as  an 
earnest  of  their  approaching  greatness. 

Immense  indeed  was  the  recompense  reaped  for  this  self-denial, 
not  merely  by  Athens  hut  by  Greece  generally,  when  the  prepa- 
rations of  Xerxes  came  to  he  matured,  and  his  armament  was  under- 
stood to  be  approaching.  The  orders  for  equipment  of  ships  and 
laying  in  of  provisions,  issued  by  the  Great  King  to  his  subject 
Greeks  in  Asia,  the  iEgean,  and  Thrace,  would  of  course  become 
known  throughout  Greece  Proper;  especially  the  vast  labor  bestowed 
on  the  canal  of  Mount  Athos,  which  would  be  the  theme  of  wonder- 
ing talk  with  every  Thasian  or  Akanthian  citizen  who  visited  the 
festival  games  in  Peloponnesus.  All  these  premonitory  evidences 
Were  public  enough,  without,  any  need  of  that  elaborate  stratagem 
whereby  the  exiled  Demaratus  is  alleged  to  have  secretly  transmitted, 
from  Susa  to  Sparta,  intelligence  of  the  approaching  expedition. 
The  formal  announcements  of  Xerxes  all  designated  Athens  as  the 
epecial  object  of  his  wrath  and  vengeance.  Other  Grecian  citiesmight 
thus  hope  to  escape  without  mischief;  so  that  the  prospect  of  the 
great  invasion  did  not  at  first  provoke  among  them  an}r  unani- 
mous dispositions  to  resist.  Accordingly,  when  the  first  heralds  dis- 
Eatched  by  Xerxes  from  Sardis  in  the  autumn  of  481  B.C.,  a  little 
efore  his  march  to  the  Hellespont,  addressed  themselves  to  the 


PAN-HELLENIC   CONGRESS.  265 

different  cities  with  demand  of  earth  and  water,  many  were  disposed 
to  comply.  Neither  to  Athens,  nor  to  Sparta,  were  any  heralds  sent; 
and  these  two  cities  were  thus  from  the  beginning  identified  in  inter- 
est and  in  the  necessity  of  defense.  Both  of  them  sent,  in  this  trying 
moment,  to  consult  the  Delphian  oracle;  while  hoth  at  the  same 
time  joined  to  convene  a  Pan-hellenic  congress  at  the  Isthmus  of 
Corinth,  for  the  purpose  of  organizing  resistance  against  the  expected 
invader. 

I  have  in  the  preceding  chapters  pointed  out  the  various  steps  wherehy 
the  separate  states  of  Greece  were  gradually  brought,  even  against 
their  own  natural  instincts,  into  something  approaching  more  nearly  to 
political  union.  The  present  congress,  assembled  under  the  influence 
of  common  fear  from  Persia,  has  more  of  a  Pan-hellenic  character 
than  any  political  event  which  has  yet  occurred  in  Grecian  history. 
It  extends  far  beyond  the  range  of  those  Poloponnesian  states  who 
constitute  the  immediate  allies  of  Sparta:  it  comprehends  Athens, 
and  is  even  summoned  in  part  by  her  strenuous  instigation:  moreover 
it  seeks  to  combine  every  city  of  Hellenic  race  and  language,  how- 
ever distant,  which  can  be  induced  to  take  part  in  it — even  the  Kre- 
tans,  Korkyraeans,  and  Sicilians.  It  is  true  that  all  these  states  do  not 
actually  come, — but  earnest  efforts  are  made  to  induce  them  to  come. 
The  dispersed  brethren  of  the  Hellenic  family  are  entreated  to  mar- 
shal themselves  in  the  same  ranks  for  a  joint  political  purpose — the 
defense  of  the  common  hearth  and  metropolis  of  the  race.  This  is  a 
new  fact  in  Grecian  history,  opening  scenes  and  ideas  alike  to  any- 
thing which  has  gone  before — enlarging  prodigiously  the  functions 
and  duties  connected  with  that  headship  of  Greece  which  had 
hitherto  been  in  the  hands  of  Sparta,  but  which  is  about  to  become 
too  comprehensive  for  her  to  manage — and  thus  introducing  increased 
habits  of  co-operation  among  the  subordinate  states,  as  well  as  rival 
hopes  of  aggrandizement  among  the  leaders.  The  congress  at  the 
Isthmus  of  Corinth  murks  such  further  advance  in  the  centralizing 
tendencies  of  Greece,  and  seems  at  first  to  promise  an  onward  march 
in  the  same  direction :  but  the  promise  will  not  be  found  realized. 

Its  first  step  was  indeed  one  of  inestimable  value.  While  most  of 
the  deputies  present  came  prepared,  in  the  name  of  their  respective 
cities,  to  swear  reciprocal  fidelity  and  brotherhood,  they  also 
addressed  all  their  efforts  to  appease  the  feuds  and  dissensions  which 
reigned  among  particular  members  of  their  own  meeting.  Of  these 
the  most  prominent,  as  well  as  the  most  dangerous,  was  the  war  still 
subsisting  between  Athens  and  ^Egina.  The  latter  was  not  exempt, 
even  now,  from  suspicions  of  medising  (i.e. ,  embracing  the  cause  of 
the  Persians),  which  had  been  raised  by  her  giving  earth  and  water 
ten  years  before  to  Darius.  But  her  present  couduct  afforded  no 
countenance  to  such  suspicions:  she  took  earnest  part  in  the  congress 
as  well  as  in  the  joint  measures  of  defense  and  willingly  consented  to 
accommodate  her  difference  with  Athens.     In  this  work  of  reconcil* 


206  PROCEEDINGS  IX  GREECE. 

Ing  feuds,  so  essentia]  to  the  Bafety  of  Greece,  the  Athenian  Themis- 
tokles  took  a  prominent  part,  as  well  as  Cbeileos  of  Tegea  in  Arcadia. 
The  Congress  proceeded  to  .-end  envoys  and  solicit  co-operation  from 
such  cities  as  were  yet  cither  equivocal  or  indifferent,  especially 
Argos,  Eorkyra,  and  theKretan  and  Sicilian  Greeks;  and  at  the  same 
time  to  dispatch  spies  across  to  Sardis,  for  the  purpose  of  learning 
the  state  and  prospects  of  the  assembled  army. 

These  spies  presently  returned,  having  been  detected,  and  con- 
demned to  deatli  by  the  Persian  generals,  but  released  by  express 
order  of  Xerxes,  who  directed  that  the  full  strength  of  his  assembled  ■' 
armament  should  be  shown  to  them,  in  order  that  the  terror  of  the 
Greeks  mighl  be  thus  magnified.  The  step  was  well  calculated  for 
such  a  purpose:  but  the  discouragement  throughout  Greece  was 
already  extreme,  at  this  critical  period  when  the  storm  was  about  to 
burst  upon  them.  Even  to  intelligent  and  well-meaning  Greeks, 
much  mere  to  the  careless,  the  timid,  or  the  treacherous — Xerxes 
with  his  countless  host  appeared  irresistible,  and,  indeed,  something 
more  than  human.  Of  course,  such  an  impression  would  be  encour- 
aged by  the  large  number  of  Greeks  already  his  tributaries:  and  we 
may  even  trace  the  manifestation  of  a  wish  to  get  rid  of  the  Atheni- 
ans altogether,  as  the  chief  objects  of  Persian  vengeance  and  chief 
hindrance  to  tranquil  submission.  This  despair  of  the  very  con- 
tinuance of  Hellenic  life  and  autonomy  breaks  forth  even  from  the 
sanctuary  of  Hellenic  religion,  the  Delphian  temple;  when  the  Athe- 
nians, in  their  distress  and  uncertainty,  sent  to  consult  the  oracle. 
Hardly  had  their  two  envoys  performed  the  customary  sacrifices,  and 
sat  down  in  the  inner  chamber  near  the  priestess  Aristonike,  when 
she  at  once  exclaimed — "Wretched  men.  why  sit  ye  there?  Quit 
your  land  and  city,  and  flee  afar!  Head,  body,  feet,  and  hands  are, 
alike  rotten;  fire  and  sword,  in  the  train  of  the  Syrian  chariot,  shall 
overwhelm  you:  nor  only  your  city,  but  other  cities  also,  as  well  as 
many  even  of  the  temples  of  the  gods — which  are  now  sweating  and 
trembling  with  fear,  and  foreshadow,  by  drops  of  blood  on  their 
roofs,  the  hard  calamities  impending.  Get  ye  away  from  the  sanc- 
tuary, with  your  souls  steeped  in  sorrow." 

So  terrific  a  reply  had  rarely  escaped  from  the  lips  of  the  priestess. 
The  envoys  were  struck  to  the  earth  by  it,  and  durst  not  carry  it 
back  to  Athens.  In  their  sorrow  they  Were  encouraged  yet  to  hope 
by  an  influential  Delphian  citizen  named  Timon  (we  trace  here  as 
elsewhere  the  underhand  working  of  these  leading  Delphians  on  the 
priestess),  Who  advised  them  to  provide  themselves  with  the  charac- 
teristic marks  of  supplication,  and  to  approach  flu1  oracle  a  second 
time  in  that  imploring  guise:  "()  lord,  we  pray  thee  (tiny  said),  have 
compassion  on  these  boughs  of  supplication,  and  deliver  to  us  some- 
thing more  comfortable  concerning  our  country;  else  we  quit  not  thy 
sanctuary,  but  remain  here,  until  death."  Upon  which  the  priestess 
replied— "Athene  with  all  her  prayers  and  all  her  sagacity  cannot 


SENTENCE  OF  TPIE  ORACLE.  267 

propitiate  Olympian  Zeus.  But  this  assurance  I  wUJ  give  you,  firm 
us  adamant.  When  everything  else  in  the  land  of  Kekrops  shall  be 
taken,  Zeus  grants  to  Athene  that  the  wooden  wall  alone  shall  remain 
unconquered,  to  defend  you  and  your  children.  Stand  not  to  await 
the  assailing  horse  and  foot  from  the  continent,  but  turn  your  backs 
and  retire:  you  shall  yet  live  to  fight  another  day.  O  divine  Salamis, 
thou  too  shalt  destroy  the  children  of  women,  either  at  the  seed  time 
or  at  the  harvest." 

This  second  answer  was  a  sensible  mitigation  of  the  first.  It  left 
open  some  hope  of  escape,  though  faint,  dark,  and  unintelligible:  and 
the  envoys  wrote  it  down  to  carry  back  to  Athens,  not  concealing 
probably  the  terrific  sentence  which  had  preceded  it.  When  read  to 
the  people,  the  obscurity  of  the  meaning  provoked  many  different 
interpretations.  What  was  meant  by  "  the  wooden  wall?"  Somd 
supposed  that  the  acropolis  itself,  which  had  originally  been  sur- 
rounded with  a  wooden  palisade,  was  the  refuge  poiuted  out;  but  tho 
greater  number,  and  among  them  most  of  those  who  were  by  profes- 
sion expositors  of  prophecy,  maintained  that  the  wooden  wall  indi- 
cated the  fleet.  But  these  professional  expositors,  while  declaring 
that  the  god  bade  them  go  on  shipboard,  deprecated  all  idea  of  a 
naval  battle,  and  insisted  on  the  necessity  of  abandoning  Attica  for- 
ever. The  last  lines  of  the  oracle,  wherein  it  was  said  that  Salamis 
would  destroy  the  children  of  women,  appeared  to  them  to  portend 
nothing  but  disaster  in  the  event  of  a  naval  combat. 

Such  was  the  opinion  of  those  who  passed  for  the  best  expositors 
of  the  divine  will.  It  harmonized  completely  with  the  despairing  tem- 
per then  prevalent,  heightened  by  the  terrible  sentence  pronounced 
in  the  first  oracle.  Emigration  to  some  foreign  land  presented  itself 
as  the  only  hope  of  safety  even  for  their  persons.  The  fate  of 
Athens, — and  of  Greece  generally,  which  would  have  been  helpless 
without  Athens, — now  hung  upon  a  thread,  when  Themistokles,  the 
great  originator  of  the  fleet,  interposed  with  equal  steadfastness  of 
heart  and  ingenuity,  to  insure  the  proper  use  of  it.  He  contended 
that  if  the  god  had  intended  to  designate  Salamis  as  the  scene  of  a 
naval  disaster  to  the  Greeks,  that  island  would  have  been  called  in 
the  oracle  by  some  such  epithet  as  "  wretched  Salamis:"  but  the  fact 
that  it  was  termed  "divine  Salamis,"  indicated  that  the  parties  des- 
tined to  perish  there  were  the  enemies  of  Greece,  not  the  Greeks 
themselves.  He  encouraged  his  countrymen,  therefore,  to  abandon 
their  city  and  country,  and  to  trust  themselves  to  the  fleet  as  tho 
wooden  wall  recommended  by  the  god,  but' with  full  determination 
to  fight  and  conquer  on  board.  Great,  indeed,  were  the  consequences 
which  turned  upon  this  bold  stretch  of  exegetical  conjecture.  Unless 
the  Athenians  had  been  persuaded,  by  some  plausible  show  of  inter- 
pretation, that  the  sense  of  the  oracle  encouraged  instead  of  forbid- 
ding a  naval  combat,  they  would  in  their  existing  depression  hava 
abandoned  all  thought  of  resistance. 


268  PROCEEDINGS  IN  GREECE. 

Even  with  the  help  of  an  encouraging  interpretation,  hov> 
nothing  less  than  the  most  unconquerable  resolution  and  patri 
could  have  enabled  the  Athenians  to  bear  up  against  such  terrific! 
denunciations  from  the  Delphian  god,  and  persist  in  resistance  in 
place  of  seeking  safely  by  emigration.  Herodotus  emphatically 
impresses  this  truth  upon  bis  readers:  nay,  he  even  steps  out  of  his 
way  to  do  so,  proclaiming  Athens  as  the  real  savior  of  Greece. 
Writing  as  he  did  about  the  beginning  of  the  Peloponnesian  war — at 
a  time  when  Athens,  having  attained  the  maximum  of  her  empire, 
was  alike  feared,  hated,  and  admired  by  most  of  the  Grecian  states 
— he  knows  that  the  opinion  which  he  is  giving  will  be  unpopular 
with  his  bearers  generally,  and  he  apologizes  for  it  as  something 
wrung  from  him  against  his  will  by  the  force  of  the  evidence.  Not 
only  did  the  Athenians  dare  to  stay  and  fight  against  immense  odds: 
they,  and  they  alone,  threw  into  the  cause  that  energy  and  forward- 
ness whereby  it  was  enabled  to  succeed,  as  will  appear  farther  in  the 
sequel. 

But  there  was  also  a  third  way,  not  less  deserving  of  notice,  in 
which  they  contributed  to  the  result.  As  soon  as  the  congress  of 
deputies  met  at  the  Isthmus  of  Corinth,  it  bee  nine  essential  to  recog- 
nize some  one  commanding  city.  With  regard  to  the  land-force,  no 
one  dreamt  of  contesting  the  pre-eminence  of  Sparta.  But  in  respect 
to  the  fleet,  her  pretensions  were  more  disputable,  since  she  furnished 
at  most  only  sixteen  ships,  and  little  or  no  nautical  skill;  while 
Athens  brought  two-thirds  of  the  entire  naval  force,  with  the  best  ships 
and  seamen.  Upon  these  grounds  the  idea  was  at  first  started,  that 
Athens  should  command  at  sea  and  Sparta  on  land:  but  the  majority 
of  the  allies  manifested  a  decided  repugnance,  announcing  that  they 
would  follow  no  one  but  a  Spartan.  To  the  honor  of  the  Athenians, 
they  at  once  waived  their  pretensions,  as  soon  as  they  saw  that  the 
unity  of  the  confederate  force  at  this  moment  of  peril  would  be  com- 
promised. To  appreciate  this  generous  abnegation  of  a  claim  in  it- 
self so  reasonable,  we  must  recollect  that  the  love  of  pre-eminence 
was  among  the  most  prominent  attributes  of  the  Hellenic  character; 
a  prolific  source  of  their  greatness  and  excellence,  but  producing  also 
no  small  amount  both  of  their  follies  and  their  crimes.  To  renounce 
at  the  call  of  public  obligation  a  claim  to  personal  honor  and  glory, 
is  perhaps  the  rarest  of  all  virtues  in  a  son  of  Hellen. 

We  find  thus  the  Athenians  nerved  up  to  the  pitch  of  resistance — 
prepared  to  see  their  country  wasted,  and  to  live  as  well  as  to  tight 
on  shipboard,  when  the  necessity  should  arrive — furnishing  two- 
thirds  of  the  whole  fleet,  and  yet  prosecuting  the  building  of  fresh 
ships  until  the  last  moment — sending  forth  the  ablest  and  most  for- 
ward leader  in  the  common  cause,  while  content  themselves  to  serve 
like  other  states  under  the  leadership  of  Sparta.  During  the  winter 
preceding  the  march  of  Xerxes  from  Sardis,  the  congress  at  the  Isth- 
mus was  trying,  with  little  success,  to  bring  the  Grecian  cities  into 


AMBIGUOUS  NEUTRALITY  OF  ARGOS.  269 

united  action.  Among  the  cities  north  of  Attica  and  Peloponnesus, 
the  greater  number  were  either  inclined  to  submit,  like  Thebes  and 
the  greater  part  of  Boeotia,  or  were  at  least  lukewarm  in  the  cause  of 
independence:  so  rare  at  this  trying  moment  (to  use  the  language  of 
the  unfortunate  Platseans  fifty  threey  ears  afterward)  was  the  exer 
tion  of  resolute  Hellenic  patriotism  against  the  invader. 

Even  in  the  interior  of  Peloponnesus,  the  powerful  Argos  main- 
tained an  ambiguous  neutrality.  It  was  one  of  the  first  steps  of  the 
congress  to  send  special  envoys  to  Argos,  setting  forth  the  common 
danger  and  soliciting  co-operation.  The  result  is  certain,  that  no  co- 
operation was  obtained — the  Argeians  did  nothing  throughout  the 
struggle;  but  as  to  their  real  position,  or  the  grounds  of  their  refusal, 
contradictory  statements  had  reached  the  ears  of  Herodotus.  They 
themselves  affirmed  that  they  were  ready  to  have  joined  the  Hellenic 
cause,  in  spite  of  dissuasion  from  the  Delphian  oracle — exacting  only 
as  conditions  that  the  Spartans  should  conclude  a  truce  with  them 
for  thirty  years,  and  should  equally  divide  the  honors  of  headship 
with  Argos.  To  the  proposed  truce  there  would  probably  have  been 
no  objection,  nor  was  there  any  as  to  the  principle  of  dividing  the 
headship.  But  the  Spartans  added,  that  they  had  two  kings,  while 
the  Argeians  had  only  one;  and  inasmuch  as  neither  of  the  two 
Spartan  kings  could  be  deprived  of  his  vote,  the  Argeian  king  could 
only  be  admitted  to  a  third  vote  conjointly  with  them.  This  propo- 
sition appeared  to  the  Argeians  (who  considered  that  even  the  un- 
divided headship  was  no  more  than  their  ancient  right)  as  nothing 
better  than  insolent  encroachment,  and  incensed  them  so  much  that 
they  desired  the  envoys  to  quit  their  territory  before  sunset;  prefer- 
ring even  a  tributary  existeuce  under  Persia  to  a  formal  degradation 
as  compared  with  Sparta. 

Such  was  the  story  told  by  the  Argeians  themselves,  but  seemingly 
not  credited  either  by  any  other  Greeks,  or  by  Herodotus  himself. 
The  prevalent  opinion  was,  that  the  Argeians  had  a  secret  under- 
standing with  Xerxes.  It  was  even  affirmed  that  they  had  been  the 
parties  who  invited  him  into  Greece,  as  a  means  both  of  protection 
to  themselves  and  of  vengeance  against  Sparta  after  their  defeat  by 
Kleomenes.  And  Herodotus  himself  evidently  believed  that  they 
medised,  though  he  is  half  afraid  to  say  so,  and  disguises  his  opinion 
in  a  cloud  of  words  which  betray  the  angry  polemics  going  on  about 
the  matter,  even  fifty  years  afterwards.  It  is  certain  that  in  act  the 
Argeians  were  neutral,  and  one  of  their  reasons  for  neutrality  was, 
that  they  did  not  choose  to  join  any  Pan-hellenic  levy  except  in  the 
capacity  of  chiefs.  But  probably  the  more  powerful  reason  was, 
that  they  shared  the  impression,  then  so  widely  diffused  throughout 
Greece,  as  to  the  irresistible  force  of  the  approaching  host,  and  chose 
to  hold  themselves  prepared  for  the  event.  They  kept  up  secret 
negotiations  even  with  Persian  agents,  yet  not  compromising  them- 
selves while  matters  were  still  pending.     Nor  is  it  improbable,  in 


270  PROCEEDINGS  TN  GREECE. 

their  vexation  against  Bparta,  thai  they  would  have  been  better 
pleased  it'  the  Persians  had  succeeded, — all  which  may  reasonably  be 
termed,  medising. 

The  absence  of  Hellenic  fidelity  in  Argos  was  borne  out  by  the 
parallel  exampiei  of  Kreteand  Korkyra,  to  which  places  envoys  from 
the  Isthmus  proceeded  al  the  same  time.  The  Cretans  declined  to 
take  any  part,  <>n  the  ground  of  prohibitory  injunctions  from  the 
oracle;  the  Korkyraeans  promised  without  performing,  and  even  with 
<mt  any  intention  to  perform.  Their  neutrality  was  a  serious  loss  li. 
the  Greeks,  since  they  could  fil  oul  a  naval  force  of  sixty  triremes, 
second  only  to  that  of  Alliens.     With  this  important  contingent  they 

engaged  to  join  the  Grecian  fleet,  and  actually  set  sail  from  Korkyra; 
but  they  took  care  not,  to  sail  round  Cape  Malea,  or  to  reach  the  scene 
of  action.  Their  fleet  remained  on  the  southern  or  western  coast  of 
Peloponnesus,  under  pretense  of  being  weather-bound,  until  the 
decisive  result  of  the  battle  of  Balamis  was  known.  Their  impression 
was  thai  the  Persian  monarch  would  be  victorious,  in  which  case  they 
would  have  made  a  merit  of  not  having  arrived  in  time;  hut  they 
were  also  prepared  with  the  plausible  excuse  of  detention  from  foul 
winds,  when  the  result  turned  out  otherwise,  and  when  they  were; 
reproached  by  the  Greeks  for  their  absence.  Such  duplicity  is  not 
very  astonishing,  When  we  recollect  that  it  was  the  habitual  policy  of 
Korkyra  to  isolate  herself  from  Hellenic  confederacies. 

The  envoys  who  visited  Korkyra  proceeded  onward  on  their  mis- 
sion to  Gelon  the  despot  of  Syracuse.  Of  that  potentate,  regarded 
by  Herodotus  as  more  powerful  than  any  state  in  Greece,  I  shall 
speak  more  fully  in  a  subsequent  chapter:  if  is  sufficient  to  mention 
now,  that  he  rendered  no  aid  against  Xerxes.  Nor  wash  in  his  power 
to  do  so,  whatever  might  have  been  his  inclinations;  for  the  same 
year  which  brought  the  Persian  monarch  against  Greece,  was  also 
selected  by  the  Carthaginians  for  a  formidable  invasion  of  Sicily, 
which  kept  the  Sicilian  Greeks  to  the  defense  of  their  own  island. 
It  seems  even  probable  that  this  simultaneous  invasion  had  been  con- 
certed between  the  Persians  and  Carthaginians. 

The  endeavors  of  the  deputies  of  Greeks  at  the  Isthmus  had  thus 
produced  no  other  re-enforcement  to  their  cause  except  some  fair  words 
from  the  Korkyrseans.  It  was  about  the  time  when  Xerxes  was  about 
to  pass  the  Hellespont,  in  the  beginning  of  4S0  BC,  that  the  first 
>»:.tual  step  for  resistance  was  taken,  at  the  instigation  of  the  Thessa- 
tians.  Though  the  greal  Thessalian  family  of  the  Aleuadae  were 
among  the  companions  of  Xerxes,  and  the  most  forward  in  inviting 
him  into  Greece,  with  every  promise  of  ready  submission  from  their 
countrymen— yet  it  seems  that  these  promises  were  in  reality  unwar- 
ranted The  Aleuadae  were  at,  the  head  only  of  a  minority,  and  per- 
haps were  even  in  exile,  like  the  Peisistratidse:  while  most  of  the 
Tbessalians  were  disposed  to  resist  Xerxes — for  which  purpose  they 
now  aent  envoys  to  the  Isthmus,  intimating  the  necessity  of  guarding 


DEFENCE   OF   TEMPE.  271 

the  passes  of  Olympus,  the  northernmost  entrance  of  Greece.  They 
offered  their  own  cordial  aid  in  this  defense,  adding  that  they 
should  he  under  the  necessity  of  making  their  own  separate  submis- 
sion, if  this  demand  were  not  complied  with.  Accordingly  ahody  of 
10,000  Grecian  heavy-armed  infantry,  under  the  command  of  the 
Spartan  Eusenetus  and  the  Athenian  Themistokles,  were  dispatched 
by  the  sea  to  Alus  in  Achsea  Phthiotis,  where  they  disembarked  and 
marched  by  land  across  Achsea  and  Thessaly.  Being  joined  by  the 
Tnessalian  horse,  they  occupied  the  defile  of  Tempe,  through  which 
the  river  Peneius  makes  its  way  to  the  sea,  by  a  cleft  between  the 
mountains  Olympus  and  Ossa. 

The  long,  narrow,  and  winding  defile  of  Tempe  formed  then,  and 
forms  still,  the  single  entrance,  open  throughout  winter  as  well  as 
summer,  from  Lower  or  maritime  Macedonia  into  Thessaly.  The 
lofty  mountain  precipices  approach  so  closely  as  to  leave  hardly  room 
enough  in  some  places  for  a  road:  it  is  thus  eminently  defensible,  and 
a  few  resolute  men  would  be  sufficient  to  arrest  in  it  the  progress  of 
the  most  numerous  host.  But  the  Greeks  soon  discovered  that  the 
position  was  such  as  they  could  not  hold, — first,  because  the  power- 
ful fleet  of  Xerxes  would  be  able  to  land  troops  in  their  rear; 
secondly,  because  there  was  also  a  second  entrance  passable  in  sum- 
mer, from  Upper  Macedonia  into  Thessaly,  by  the  mountain  passes 
over  the  range  of  Olympus;  an  entrance  which  traversed  the  country 
of  the  Perrlnebians  and  came  into  Thessaly  near  Gonnus,  about  the 
spot  where  the  defile  of  Tempe  begins  to  narrow.  It  was  in  fact  by 
this  second  pass,  evading  the  insurmountable  difficulties  of  Tempe, 
that  the  advancing  march  of  the  Persians  was  destined  to  be  made, 
under  the  auspices  of  Alexander  king  of  Macedon,  tributary  to  them 
and  active  in  their  service.  That  prince  sent  a  communication  of  the 
fact  to  the  Greeks  at  Tempe.  admonishing  them  that  they  would  be 
trodden  under  foot  by  the  countless  host  approaching,  and  urging 
them  to  renounce  their  hopeless  position.  He  passed  for  a  friend, 
and  probably  believed  himself  to  be  acting  as  such,  in  dissuading  the 
Greeks  from  unavailing  resistance  to  Persia:  but  he  was  in  reality  a 
very  dangerous  mediator;  and  as  such  the  Spartans  had  good  reason 
to  dread  him,  in  a  second  intervention  of  which  we  shall  hear  more 
hereafter.  On  the  present  occasion  the  Grecian  commanders  were 
quite  ignorant  of  the  existence  of  any  other  entrance  into  Thessaly, 
besides  Tempe,  until  their  arrival  in  that  region.  Perhaps  it  might 
have  been  possible  to  defend  both  entrances  at  once,  and  considering 
the  immense  importance  of  arresting  the  march  of  the  Persians  at 
the  frontiers  of  Hellas,  the  attempt  would  have  been  worth  some 
risk.  So  great  was  the  alarm,  however,  produced  by  the  unexpected 
discovery,  justifying  or  seeming  to  justify  the  friendly  advice  of 
Alexander,  that  they  remained  only  a  few  days  at  Tempe,  then  at 
once  retired  back  to  their  ships,  and  returned  b}'  sea  to  the  Isthmus  ■ 
of  Corinth — about  the  time  whan  Xerxes  was  crossing  the  Hellespont. 


272  BATTLES  OF  THERMOPYLAE  AND  AKTEMISIUM. 

This  precipitate  retreat  produced  consequences  highly  disastrous 
and  discouraging.  It  appeared  to  leave  all  Bellas  north  of  .Mount, 
Kithaeron  and  of  the  Megarid  territory  without  defense,  and  it  Berved 

either  as  reason  or  pretext  for  the  majority  of  the  Grecian  stale-, 
north  of  that  boundary,  to  make  their  submission  to  Xerxes,  which 
some  of  them  had  already  begun  to  do  before.  When  Xerxes  in  the 
course  of  his  march  reached  the  Thennaic  Gulf,  within  sight  of 
Olympus  and  Ossa,  the  heralds  whom  he  had  sent  from  Sardis 
brought  him  tokens  of  submission  from  a  third  portion  of  the  Hellenic 
name — the  Thessalians,  Dolopes,  ^Enianes,  Perrlnebians,  Magnetes, 
Lokrians,  Dorians,  Median.-.  Phthiotid  Acbseans,  and  Boeotians. 
Among  the  latter  is  included  Thebes,  bul  uol  Thespiffl  or  Platsea. 
The  Thessalians,  especially,  not  only  sul  tnitted,  but  manifested 
active  zeal  and  rendered  much  service  in  the  cause  of  Xerxes,  under 
the  stimulus  of  the  Aleuadse,  whose  party  now  became  predominant: 
they  were  probably  indignant  at  the  hasty  retreat  of  those  who  had 
come  to  defend  them. 

Had  the  Greeks  been  able  to  maintain  the  passes  of  Olympus  and 
Ossa,  all  this  northern  fraction  might  probably  have  been  induced  to 
partake  in  the  resistance  instead  of  becoming  auxiliaries  to  the  inva- 
der. During  the  six  weeks  or  two  months  which  elapsed  between 
the  retreat  of  the  Greeks  from  Tempe  and  arrival  of  Xerxes  at 
Therma,  no  new  plan  of  defense  was  yet  thoroughly  organized;  for 
it  was  not  until  that  arrival  became  known  at  the  Isthmus,  that  the 
Greek  army  and  fleet  made  its  forward  movement  to  occupy  Ther- 
mopylae and  Artemisium. 


CHAPTER  XL. 

BATTLES  OF  THERMOPYLAE  AND  ARTEMISIUM. 

It  was  while  the  northerly  states  of  Greece  wTere  thus  successively 
falling  off  from  the  common  cause,  that  tbe  deputies  assembled  at 
the  Isthmus  took  among  themselves  the  solemn  engagement,  in  the 
event  of  success,  to  inflict  upon  these  recusant  brethren  condign 
punishment;  to  tithe  them  in  property,  and  perhaps  to  consecrate  a 
tenth  of  their  persons,  for  the  profit  of  the  Delphian  god.  Exception 
was  to  be  made  iu  favor  of  those  states  which  had  been  driven  to 
yield  by  irresistible  necessity.  Such  a  vow  seemed  at  that  moment 
little  likely  to  be  executed.  It  was  the  manifestation  of  a  deter- 
mined feeling  binding  together  the  states  which  took  the  pledge,  but 
it  cannot  have  contributed  much  to  intimidate  the  rest. 

To  display  their  own  force,  was  the  only  effective  way  of  keeping 
together  doubtful  allies.  The  pass  of  Thermopylae  was  now  fixed 
upon  as  the  most  convenient  point  of  defense,  next  to  that  of  Tempe 
— leaving  out  indeed,  and  abandoning  to  the  enemy,  Thessalians, 


PASS  OF  THERMOPYLAE.  273 

Perrhsebians,  Magnetes,  Phthiotid  Achaeans,  Dolopes,  iEnianes, 
Malians.  etc.,  who  would  all  have  been  included  if  the  latter  line 
had  been  adhered  to;  but  comprising  the  largest  range  consistent 
with  safety.  The  position  of  Thermopylae  presented  another  advan- 
tage which  was  not  to  be  found  at  Tempe;  the  mainland  was  here 
separated  from  the  island  of  Eubcea  only  by  a  narrow  strait,  about 
two  English  miles  and  a  half  in  its  smallest  breadth,  between  Mount 
Knemis  and  Cape  Kenseum.  On  the  northern  portion  of  Eubcea, 
immediately  facing  Magnesia  and  Achsea  Phthiotis,  was  situated  the 
line  of  coast  called  Artemisium;  a  name  derived  from  the  temple  of 
Artemis,  which  was  its  most  conspicuous  feature,  belonging  to  the 
town  of  Histiasa.  It  was  arranged  that  the  Grecian  fleet  should  be 
mustered  there,  in  order  to  co-operate  with  the  land  force,  and  to 
oppose  the  progress  of  the  Persians  on  both  elements  at  once.  To 
fight  in  a  narrow  space  win  supposed  favorable  to  the  Greeks  on  sea 
not  less  than  on  land,  inasmuch  as  their  ships  were  both  fewer  in 
number  and  heavier  in  sailing  than  those  in  the  Persian  service. 
From  the  position  of  Artemisium,  it  was  calculated  that  they  might 
be  able  to  prevent  the  Persian  fleet  from  advancing  into  the  narrow 
strait  which  severs  Eubcea  to  the  north  and  west  from  the  mainland, 
and  which,  between  Chalkis  and  Bceotia,  becomes  not  too  wide  for  a 
bridge.  It  was  at  this  latter  point  that  the  Greek  seamen  would  have 
preferred  to  place  their  defense;  but  the  occupation  of  the  northern 
part  of  the  Eubcean  strait  was  indispensable  to  prevent  the  Persian 
fleet  from  lauding  troops  in  the  rear  of  the  defenders  of  Thermopylae. 

Of  this  Eubcean  strait,  the  western  limit  is  formed  by  what'was 
then  called  the  Maliac  Gulf,  into  which  the  river  Spercheius  poured 
itself — after  a  course  from  west  to  east  between  the  line  of  Mount 
Othrys  to  the  north,  and  Mounta  CEta  to  the  south — near  the  town 
of  Antikyra.  The  lower  portion  of  this  spacious  and  fertile  valley 
of  the  Spercheius  was  occupied  by  the  various  tribes  of  the  Malians, 
bordering  to  the  north  and  east  on  Acluea  Phthiotis:  the  southern- 
most Malians,  with  their  town  of  Trachis,  occupied  a  plain — in  some 
places  considerable,  in  others  very  narrow — enclosed  between  Mount 
03ta  and  the  sea.  From  Trachis  the  range  of  QSta  stretched  east- 
ward, bordering  close  on  the  southern  shore  of  the  Maliac  Gulf: 
between  the  two  lay  the  memorable  pass  of  Thermopyla?.  On  the 
road  from  Trachis  to  Thermopyla?,  immediately  outside  of  the  latter 
and  at  the  mouth  of  the  little  streams  called  the  Phcenix  and  the 
Asopus,  was  placed  the  town  of  Anthela,  celebrated  for  its  temples 
of  Amphiktyon  and  of  the  Amphiktyonic  Demeter,  as  well  as  for 
the  autumnal  assemblies  of  the  Amphiktyonic  council,  for  wdiom 
seats  were  provided  in  the  temple. 

Immediately  near  to  Anthela,  the  northern  slope  of  the  mighty  and 
prolonged  ridge  of  OZta  approached  so  close  to  the  gulf,  or  at  least 
to  an  inaccessible  morass  which  formed  the  edge  of  the  gulf,  as  to 
leave  no  more  than  one  single  wheel  track  between.     This  narrow 


274  BATTLES  OF  THERMOPYLAE  AND  ARTEMISIUM. 

entrance  formed  the  western  gate  of  Thermopylae.  At  some  little 
distance,  seemingly  ahout  a  mile,  to  the  eastward,  the  Bame  close 
conjunction  between  tlie  mountain  and  the  sea  was  repeated — tlms 
forming  the  eastern  gate  of  Thermopylae,  not  far  from  the  first  town 
of  tin-  Lokrians,  called  Alpeni.  The  space  between  these  two  gates 
was  wider  and  more  open,  but  it  was  distinguished,  and  is  still  dis- 
tinguished, by  its  abundant  How  of  thermal  springs,  salt  and  sulphu- 
reous. Some  cells  were  here  prepared  for  bathers,  which  procured 
for  the  place  the  appellation  of  Chytri  or  the  Tans:  hut  the  copious 
supply  of  mineral  water  spread  its  mud,  and  deposited  its  crust  over 
all  the  adjacent  ground;  and  the  Phokians,  some  time  before,  had 
designedly  endeavored  so  to  conduct  the  water  as  to  r<  nder  the  pass 
utterly  impracticable,  at  the  same  time  building  a  wall  acr<  ss  it  near 
to  the  western  gate.  They  had  done  this  in  order  to  keep  off  the 
attacks  of  the  Thessalians,  who  had  been  trying  to  extend  their  con- 
quests southward  and  eastward.  The  warm  springs  here,  as  in  other 
parts  of  Greece,  were  consecrated  to  Herakles,  whose  legendary 
exploits  and  sufferings  ennobled  all  the  surrounding  region — Mount 
02ta,  Trachis,  Cape  Kenaeum,  the  Lichades  islands,  the  river  Dyras. 
Some  fragments  of  these  legends  have  been  transmitted  and  adorned 
by  the  genius  of  Sophokles,  in  his  drama  of  the  Trachinian  Maidens. 

Such  was  the  general  scene — two  narrow  openings  with  an  inter- 
mediate mile  of  enlarged  road  and  hot  springs  between  them — which 
passed  in  ancient  times  by  the  significant  name  of  Th<  rmopylae,  the 
Hot  Gates;  or  sometimes,  more  briefly,  Pyla? — The  Gates.  At  a 
point  also  near  Trachis,  between  the  mountains  and  the  sea,  aboul 
two  miles  outside  or  westward  of  Thermopylae,  the  road  was  hardly 
less  narrow,  but  it  might  be  turned  by  marching  to  the  westward, 
since  the  adjacent  mountains  were  lower,  and  presented  less  difficulty 
of  transit:  while  at  Thermopylae  itself,  the  overhanging  projection 
of  Mount  CEta  was  steep,  woody,  and  impracticable,  leaving  access, 
from  Thessaly  into  Lokris  and  the  territories  south-east  of  (Eta,  only 
through  the  straight  gate;  save  and  except  an  unfrequented  as  well 
as  circuitous  mountain  path  which  will  he  presently  noticed.  The 
wall  originally  built  across  the  path  by  the  Phokians  was  new  half 
ruined  by  age  and  neglect;  but  .the  Greeks  easily  re-establishing  it, 
determined  "to  wait  in  this  narrow  pass,  in  that  age  narrower  even 
than  the  defile  of  Tempe — the  approach  of  the  invading  host.  The 
edge  of  the  sea  line  appears  to  have  been  for  the  mosl  part  marsh,  fit 
neither  for  walking  nor  for  sailing;  but  there  were  points  at  which 
boats  could  land,  so  that  constant  communication  could  be  main 
tained  with  the  fleet  at  Artcmisium,  while  Alpeni  was  immediately 
in  their  rear  to  supply  provisions. 

Though  a  general  resolution  of  the  Greek  deputies  assembled  at 
the  Isthmus,  to  defend  conjointly  Thermopylae  and  the  Eubcean 
strait,  had  been  taken  seemingly  not  long  after  the  retreat  from 
Tempe,  their  troops  and  their  fleet   did  not  actually  occupy   these 


LEONIDAS   CONDUCTS   THE  FORCE.  275 

positions  until  Xerxes  was  known  to  have  reached  the  Thermaic 
Gulf.  Both  were  then  put  in  motion :  the  land  force  under  the 
Spartan  king  Leonidas,  the  naval  force  under  the  Spartan  com- 
mander Eurybiades,  apparently  about  the  latter  part  of  the  month  of 
June.  Leonidas  was  the  younger  brother,  the  successor,  and  the 
son-in-law,  of  the  former  Eurystheneid  king  Kleomenes,  whose  only 
daughter  Gorgo  he  had  married.  Another  brother  of  the  same 
family — Dorieus,  older  than  Leonidas  —  had  perished,  even  before 
the  death  of  Kleomenes,  in  an  unsuccessful  attempt  to  plant  a  colony 
in  Sicily;  and  room  had  been  thus  made  for  the  unexpected  succession 
of  the  youngest  brother.  Leonidas  now  conducted  from  the  Isthmus 
to  Thermopylae  a  select  band  of  300  Spartans — all  being  citizens  of 
mature  age,  and  persons  who  left  at  home  sons  to  supply  their  places. 
Along  with  them  were  200  hoplites  from  Tegea,  500  from  Mantineia, 
120  from  the  Arcadian  Orrhomenus,  1000  from  the  rest  of  Arcadia, 
400  from  Corinth,  200  from  Philus,  and  $0  from  Mykense.  There  were 
also  doubtless  Helots  and  other  light  troops,  in  undefined  number, 
and  probably  a  certain  number  of  Lacedaemonian  hoplites,  not  Spar- 
tans. In  their  march  through  Bceotia  they  were  joined  by  700 
hoplites  of  Thespise,  hearty  in  the  cause,  and  by  400  Thebans  of 
more  equivocal  fidelity  under  Leontiades.  It  appears,  indeed,  that 
the  leading  men  of  Thebes,  at  that  time  under  a  very  narrow  oli- 
garchy, decidedly  medised.  or  espoused  the  Persian  interest,  as  much 
as  they  dared  before  the  Persians  were  actually  in  the  country:  and 
Leonidas,  when  he  made  the  requisition  for  a  certain  number  of  their 
troops  to  assist  in  the  defense  of  Thermopylae,  was  doubtful  whether 
they  would  not  refuse  compliance,  and  openly  declare  against  the 
Greek  cause.  The  Theban  chiefs  thought  it  prudent  to  comply, 
though  against  their  real  inclinations,  and  furnished  a  contingent  of 
400  men,  chosen  from  citizens  of  a  sentiment  opposed  to  their  own. 
Indeed,  the  Theban  people  and  the  Boeotians  generally,  with  the 
exception  of  Thespise  and  Plataea,  seem  to  have  had  little  sentiment 
on  either  side,  and  to  have  followed  passively  the  inspirations  of 
their  leaders. 

With  these  troops  Leonidas  reached  Thermopylae,  whence  he  sent 
envoys  to  invite  the  junction  of  the  Phokians  and  the  Lokrians  of 
Opus.  The  latter  had  been  among  those  who  had  sent  earth  and 
water  to  Xerxes,  of  which  they  are  said  to  have  repented:  the  step 
was  taken  probably  only  from  fear,  which  at  this  particular  moment 
prescribed  acquiescence  in  the  summons  of  Leonidas,  justified  by  the 
plea  of  necessity  in  case  the  Persians  should  prove  ultimately  victo- 
rious: while  the  Phokians,  if  originally  disposed  to  mediae,  were  now 
precluded  from  doing  so  by  the  fact  that  their  bitter  enemies,  the 
Thessalians,  were  active  in  the  cause  of  Xerxes,  and  influential  in 
guiding  his  movements.  The  Greek  envoys  added  strength  to  their 
summons  by  all  the  encouragements  in  their  power.  "  The  troops 
now  at  Thermopylae  (they  said)  were  a  mere  advanced  body,  preced- 


27G  BATTLES  OF  THEEMOPYL^E  AND  ARTEMISIUM. 

ing  the  main  strength  of  Greece,  which  was  expected  to  arrive  every 
day:  on  the  side  of  the  sea,  a  sufficient  fleet  was  already1  on  guard. 
Moreover,  there  was  do  cause  for  fear,  since  the  invader  was,  after 
all,  not  a  god,  but  a  man,  exposed  t<>  those  reverses  of  fortune  which 
came  inevitably  on  all  men,  and  m. ist  of  all,  upon  those  in  pre-eminent 
condition."  Such  arguments  prove  but  too  evidently  the  melancholy 
State  of  terror  which  then  pervaded  the  Greek  mind.  Whether  reas- 
sured by  them  or  not,  the  great  body  of  the  Opuntian  Lokrians,  and 
loiio  Phokians,  joined  Leonidas  at,  Thermopylae. 

Thai  this  terror  was  both  genuine  and  serious,  there  cannot  be  any 
doubt:  and  the  question  naturally  suggests  itself,  why  the  Greeks  did 
not  at  once  send  their  full  force  instead  of  a  mere  advanced  guard  ? 
The  answer  is  to  l>e  found  in  another  attribute  of  the  Greek  character 
— it  was  the  time  of  cehbrating  the  Olympic  festival-games  on  the 
banks  of  the  Alpheius,  and  the  Karneian  festival  at  Sparta  and  most 
of  the  other  Dorian  states.  Even  at  a  moment  when  their  whole 
freedom  and  existence  were  at  stake,  the  Greeks  could  not  bring 
themselves  to  postpone  these  venerated  solemnities:  especially  the 
Peloponnesian  Greeks,  among  whom  this  force  of  religious  routine 
appears  to  have  been  the  strongest.  At  a  period  more  than  a  century 
later,  in  the  time  of  Demosthenes,  when  the  energy  of  the  Athenians 
had  materially  declined,  we  shall  find  them,  too,  postponing  the  mil- 
itary necessities  of  the  state  to  the  complete  and  splendid  fulfillment 
of  their  religious  festival  obligations — starving  all  their  measures  of 
foreign  policy  in  order  that  the  Theoric  exhibitions  might  be  impos- 
ing to  the  people  and  satisfactory  to  the  gods.  At  present,  we  find 
little  disposition  in  the  Athenians  to  make  this  sacrifice — certainly 
much  less  than  in  the  Peloponnesians.  The  latter,  remaining  at 
home  to  celebrate  their  festivals  while  an  invader  of  superhuman 
might  was  at  their  gates,  remind  us  of  the  Jews  in  the  latter  clays  of 
their  independence,  who  suffered  the  operations  of  the  besieging 
Roman  army  round  their  city  to  be  carried  on  without  interruption 
during  the  Sabbath.  The  Spartans  and  their  confederates  reckoned 
that  Leonidas,  with  his  detachment,  would  be  strong  enough  to  hold 
the  pass  of  Thermopylae  until  the  Olympic  and  Karneian  festivals 
should  be  past,  after  which  period  they  were  prepared  to  march  to 
his  aid  with  their  whole  military  force.  They  engaged  to  assemble 
in  Boeotia  for  the  purpose  of  defending  Attica  against  attack  on  the 
land  side,  while  the  great  mass  of  the  Athenian  force  was  serving  on 
shipboard. 

At  the  time  when  this  plan  was  laid,  they  believed  that  the  narrow 
:  of  Thermopylae  was  the  only  means  of  possible  access  for  an 
invading  army.  But  Leonidas,  on  reaching  the  spot,  discovered  for 
the  first  time  that  there  was  also  a  mountain  path  starting  from  the 
iborhood  of  Trachis,  ascending  the  gorge  of  the  river  Asopus 
and  the  hill  called  Anopaea,  then  crossing  the  crest  of  CEta  and 
descending  in  the  rear  of  Thermopylae  near  the  Lokrian  town  of 


NUMBERS  OF  THE  GREEK  FLEET.  277 

A.lpeni.  This  path — then  hardly  used,  though  its  ascending  half 
now  serves  as  the  regular  track  from  Zeitun,  the  ancient  Lamia,  to 
Salona  on  the  Corinthian  Gulf,  the  ancient  Amphissa — was  revealed 
to  him  by  its  first  discoverers,  the  inhabitants  of  Trachis,  who,  in 
former  days,  had  conducted  the  Thessalians  over  it  to  attack  Phokis, 
after  the  Phokians  had  blocked  up  the  pass  of  Thermopylae.  It  was 
therefore  not  unknown  to  the  Phokians:  it  conducted  from  Trachis 
into  their  country,  and  they  volunteered  to  Leonidas  that  they  would 
occupy  and  defend  it.  But  the  Greeks  thus  found  themselves  at 
Thermopylae  under  the  same  necessity  of  providing  a  double  line  of 
defense,  for  the  mountain  path  as  well  as  for  the  defile,  as  that  which 
had  induced  their  former  army  to  abandon  Tempe;  and  so  insuffi- 
cient did  their  numbers  seem,  when  the  vast  host  of  Xerxes  was  at 
length  understood  to  be  approaching,  that  a  panic  terror  seized  them. 
The  Peloponnesian  troops  especially,  anxious  only  for  their  own 
separate  line  of  defense  at  the  Isthmus  of  Corinth,  wished  to  retreat 
thither  forthwith.  The  indignant  remonstrances  of  the  Phokians  and 
Lokrians,  who  would  thus  have  been  left  to  the  mercy  of  the  invader, 
induced  Leonidas  to  forbid  this  retrograde  movement:  but  he  thought 
it  necessary  to  send  envoys  to  the  various  cities,  insisting  on  the 
insufficiency  of  his  numbers,  and  requesting  immediate  reinforce- 
ments. So  painfully  were  the  consequences  now  felt,  of  having 
kept  back  the  main  force  until  after  the  religious  festivals  in  Pelo- 
ponnesus. 

Nor  was  the  feeling  of  confidence  stronger  at  this  moment  in  their 
naval  armament,  though  it  had  mustered  in  far  superior  numbers  at 
Artemisium,  on  the  northern  coast  of  Euboea,  under  the  Spartan 
Eurybiades.  It  was  composed  as  follows: — 100  Athenian  triremes, 
manned  in  part  by  the  citizens  of  Platsea,  in  spite  of  their  total  want 
of  practice  on  shipboard,  40  Corinthian,  20  Megarian,  20  Athenian, 
manned  by  the  inhabitants  of  Chalkis  and  lent  to  them  by  Athens,  18 
.^Eginetau,  12  Sikyonian,  10  Lacedaemonian,  8  Epidaurian,  7  Eretrian, 
5  Trcezenian,  2  from  Styris  in  Euboea,  and  2  from  the  island  of  Keos. 
There  were  thus  in  all  271  triremes;  together  with  9  pentekonters, 
furnished  partly  by  Keos  and  partly  by  the  Lokrians  of  Opus.  The- 
mistokles  was  at  the  head  of  the  Athenian  contingent,  and  Adeiman- 
thus  of  the  Corinthian;  of  other  officers  we  hear  nothing.  Three 
cruising  vessels,  an  Athenian,  an  iEginetan,  and  a  Trcezenian,  were 
pushed  forward  along  the  coast  of  Thessaly,  beyond  the  island  of 
Skiathos,  to  watch  the  advancing  movements  of  the  Persian  fleet  from 
Therma.  ' 

It  was  here  that  the  first  blood  was  shed  in  this  memorable  con- 
test. Ten  of  the  best  ships  in  the  Persian  fleet,  sent  forward  in  the 
direction  of  Skiathos,  fell  in  with  these  tkree  Grecian  triremes,  who 
probably  sapposimi:  them  to  be  the  precursors  of  the  entire  fleet  sought 
safety  in  flight.  The  Athenian  trireme  escaped  to  the  mouth  of  the 
Peneius,  where  the  crew  abandoned  her,  and  repaired  by  land  to 


278  BATTLES  OF  THERMOPYLAE  AND  ABTEMISIUM. 

Athens,  leaving  the  vessels  to  the  enemy:  the  other  two  ships  were 
overinki  d  ami  captured  afloal — nol  without  a  vigorous  resistance  on 
the  pari  of  the  JSginetan,  one  of  whose  hoplites,  ?yth€8,  fought 
with  desperate  bravery,  and  fell  covered  with  wounds.  So  much 
did  the  Persian  warriors  admire  him,  that  they  look  infinite  pains  to 
preserve  his  lite,  and  treated  him  with  the  most  signal  manifestations 
both  of  kindness  and  respect,  while  they  dealt  with  his  comrades  as 
slaves. 

On  board  the  Trcozenian  vessel,  which  was  the  first  to  lie  captured, 
they  found  a  soldier  named  Leon,  of  imposing  stature:  this  man  was 
immediately  taken  to  the  ship's  head  and  slain,  a-  a  presaging  omen  in 
the  approaching  contest:  perhaps  (observes  the  historian)  his  name 
may  have  contributed  to  determine  his  fate.  The  ten  Persian  ships 
advanced  no  farther  than  the  dangerous  rock  Myrmex,  between  Ski- 
athos  and  the  main  land,  which  had  been  made  known  to  them  by  a 
Greek  navigator  of  Skyros,  and  on  which  they  creeled  a  pillar  to 
serve  as  warning  for  the  coming  licet.  Still,  so  intense  was  the  alarm 
which  their  presence,  communicated  1>\  lire  signals  from  Skiathos, 
and  strengthened  by  the  capture  of  the  three  look  ou1  ships,  inspired 

to  the  fleet  at  Artemisium,  that  they  actually  abandoned  their  station, 
believing  that  the  entire  fleet  of  the  enemy  was  at  hand.  They  sailed 
up  the  Eubeean  strait  to  Chalkis,  as  the  narrowest  and  most  defensi- 
ble passage,  leaving  scouts  on  the  high  lands  to  watch  the  enemy's 
advance.   ' 

Probably  this  sudden  retreat  was  forced  upon  the  generals  by  the 
panic  of  their  troops,  similar  to  that  which  King  Leonidas,  more 
powerful  than  Eurybiades  and  Themistokles,  had  found  means  to 
arrest  at  Thermopylae.  It  ruined  for  the  time  the  whole  scheme  <<( 
defense,  by  laying  open  the  rear  of  the  army  at  Thermopylae  to  the 
operations  of  the  Persian  fleet.  But  that  which  the  Greeks  did  not 
do  for  themselves  was  more  than  compensated  by  the  beneficent 
intervention  of  their  gods,  who  opposed  to  the  invader  the  more  terri- 
ble arms  of  storm  and  hurricane.  lie  was  allowed  to  bring  his 
overwhelming  host,  land  force  as  well  as  naval,  to  the  brink  of 
Thermopylae  and  to  the  coast  of  Thessaly,  without  hindrance  or 
damage;  but  the  time  had  now  arrived  when  the  gods  appeared 
determined  to  humble  him.  and  especially  to  strike  a  series  of  blows 
at  his  fleet  which  should  reduce  it  to  a  number  not  beyond  what 
the  Greeks  could  contend  with.  Amidst  the  general  terror  which 
pervaded  Greece,  the  Delphianswere  the  first  to  earn  the  gratitude  of 
their  countrymen  by  announcing  that  divine  succor  was  at  hand. 
On  entreating  advice  from  their  own  oracle,  they  were  directed  to 
pray  to  the  Winds,  who  would  render  powerful  aid  to  Greece.  .More- 
over, the  Athenian  seamen,  in  their  retreat  al  Chalkis,  recollecting 
that  Boreas  was  the  husband  of  the  Attic  princess  or  heroine  Orel- 
thyia,  daughter  of  their  ancient  king  Erechtheus,  addressed  fervent 
prayers  to  their  son-in-law  for  his  help  in  need.     Never  was  help 


MOVEMENTS  OF   XERXES.  279 

more  effective,  or  more  opportune,  than  the  destructive  storm,  pres- 
ently to  be  recounted,  on  the  coast  of  Magnesia,  for  which  grateful 
thanks  and  annual  solemnities  were  still  rendered  even  in  the  time 
of  Herodotus,  at  Athens  as  well  as  at  Delphi. 

Xerxes  had  halted  on  the  Thermaic  Gulf  for  several  days,  employ- 
ing a  large  portion  of  his  numerous  army  in  cutting  down  the  woods, 
and  clearing  the  roads,  on  the  pass  over  Olympus  from  Upper  Mace- 
donia into  Perrhaebia,  which  was  recommended  by  his  Macedonian 
allies  as  preferable  to  the  defile  of  Tempe.  Not  intending  to  march 
through  the  latter,  he  is  said  to  have  gone  by  sea  to  view  it;  and 
remarks  are  ascribed  to  him  on  the  facility  of  blocking  it  up  so  as  to 
convert  all  Thessaly  into  one  vast  lake.  His  march  from  Therma 
through  Macedonia,  Perrhaebia,  Thessaly,  and  Acluea  Phthiotis,  into 
the  territory  of  the  Malians  and  the  neighborhood  of  Thermopylae, 
occupied  eleven  or  twelve  days:  the  people  through  whose  towns  he 
passed  had  already  made  their  submission,  and  the  Thessalians  espe- 
cially were  zealous  in  seconding  his  efforts.  His  numerous  host  was 
still  farther  swelled  by  the  presence  of  these  newly-submitted  people, 
and  by  the  Macedonian  troops  under  Alexander;  so  that  the  river 
Onochonus  in  Thessaly,  and  even  the  Apidanus  in  Achaea  Phthiotis, 
would  hardly  suffice  to  supply  it,  but  were  drunk  up,  according  to 
the  information  given  to  Herodotus,  At  Alus  in  Achaea,  he  conde- 
scended to  listen  to  the  gloomy  legend  connected  with  the  temple  of 
Zeus  Laphysteus  and  the  sacred  grove  of  the  Athamantid  family. 
He  respected  aud  protected  these  sacred  places:  an  incident  which 
shows  that  the  sacrilege  and  destruction  of  temples  imputed  to  him 
by  the  Greeks,  though  true  in  regard  to  Athens,  Abae,  Miletus,  etc., 
was  by  no  means  universally  exhibited,  and  is  even  found  qualified 
by  occasional  instances  of  great  respect  for  Grecian  religious  feeling. 
Along  the  shore  of  the  Malian  Gulf  he  at  length  came  into  the  Tra- 
chiniau  territory  near  Thermopylae,  where  he  encamped,  seemingly 
awaiting  the  arrival  of  the  fleet,  so  as  to  combine  his  farther  move- 
ments in  advance,  now  that  the  enemy  were  immediately  in  his  front. 

But  his  fleet  was  not  destined  to  reach  the  point  of  communication 
with  the  same  ease  as  he  had  arrived  before  Thermopylae.  After 
having  ascertained  by  the  ten  ships  already  mentioned  (which  cap- 
tured the  three  Grecian  guard-ship-)  that  the  channel  between  Skia- 
thos  and  the  main-laud  was  safe,  the  Persian  admiral  Magabates  sailed 
with  his  whole  fleet  from  Therma,  or  from  Pydna,  his  station  in  the 
Thermaic  Gulf,  eleven  days  after  the  monarch  had  begun  his  land 
march;  and  reached  in  one  long  day's  sail 'the  eastern  coast  of  Mag- 
ne-ia,  not  far  from  its  southernmost  promontory.  The  greater  part 
of  this  line  of  coast,  formed  by  the  declivities  of  Ossa  and  Pelion,  is 
thoroughly  rocky  and  inhospitable;  but  south  of  the  town  called 
Kasthanaea  there  was  a  short  extent  of  open  beach  where  the  t'.eet 
rested  for  the  night  before  coining  to  the  line  of  coast  called  t  ie 
Sepias  Akte.    The  first  line  of  ships  were  moored  to  the  land,  but 


280  BATTLES  OF  TIIKK.MOPYLiE  AND  ARTEMISIVM. 

the  larger  number  of  this  immense  fleel  swung  at  anchor  in  a  di  |  ill 
of  eight  lines.  In  this  condition  they  were  overtaken  the  next  morn- 
ing by  a  sudden  and  desperate  hurricani — a  wind  called  by  the  peo- 
ple of  the  country  Hellespontias,  which  blew  right  upon  the  sin. re. 
The  most  active  among  the  mariners  found  means  to  forestall  the 
danger  by  beaching  and  hauling  their  vessels  ashore;  but  a  large 
number,  unable  t"  lake  such  a  precaution,  were  carried  before  the 
wind  and  dashed  to  pieces  near  Mclibma,  Kasthamea,  and  other 
points  of  this  unfriendly  region.  Four  hundred  ships  of  war,  accord- 
ing to  the  lowest  estimate,  together  with  a  countless  heap  of  trans- 
ports and  provision  craft,  were  destroyed:  and  the  loss  of  life  as  well 
as  of  property  was  immense.  For  three  entire  days  did  the  terrors  of 
the  storm  last,  during  which  time  the  crews  ashore,  left  almost  with- 
out defense,  and  apprehensive  that  the  inhabitants  of  the  country 
might  assail  or  plunder  them,  were  forced  to  break  up  the  ships 
driven  ashore  in  order  to  make  a  palisade  out  of  the  timbers. 
Though  the  Magian  priests  who  accompanied  the  armament  were 
fervent  in  prayer  and  sacrifice — not  merely  to  the  Winds  hut  also  to 
Thetis  and  the  Nereids,  the  tutelary  divinities  of  Sepias  Aktc — they 
could  obtain  no  mitigation  until  the  fourth  day:  thus  long  did  the 
prayers  of  Delphi  and  Athens,  and  the  jealousy  of  the  gods  against 
superhuman  arrogance,  protract  the  terrible  visitation.  At  length 
on  the  fourth  day  calm  weather  returned,  when  all  those  ships  which 
were  in  condition  to  proceed  put  to  sea  and  sailed  along  the  land, 
round  the  southern  promontory  of  Magnesia  to  Aphetae  at  the 
entrance  of  the  Gulf  of  Pagasoe.  Little  indeed  had  Xerxes  gained 
by  the  laborious  cutting  through  Mount  Athos,  in  hopes  to  escape  the 
unseen  atmospheric  enemies  which  howl  around  that  formidable 
promontory;  the  work  of  destruction  to  his  fleet  was  only  transferred 
to  the  opposite  side  of  the  intervening  Thracian  sea. 

Had  the  Persian  fleet  reached  Aphetae  without  misfortune,  they 
would  have  found  the  Euhcean  strait  evacuated  by  the  Greek  fleet 
and  undefended,  so  that  they  would  have  come  immediately  into 
communication  with  the  land-army,  and  would  have  acted  upon  the 
rear  of  Leonidas  and  his  division.  But  the  storm  completely  altered 
this  prospect,  and  revived  the  spirits  of  the  Greek  tied  at  Chalkis. 
It  was  communicated  to  them  by  their  scouts  on  the  high  lands  of 
Eubcea,  who  even  sent  them  word  that  the  entire  Persian  fleet  was 
destroyed:  upon  which,  having  returned  thanks  and  offered  libations 
to  Poseidon  the  Saviour,  the  Greeks  returned  back  as  speedily  as  they 
could  to  Artemisium.  To  their  surprise,  however,  they  saw  the 
Persian  fleet,  though  reduced  in  number,  still  exhibiting  a  formidable 
total  and  appearance  at  the  opposite  station  of  Aphetae.  The  last 
fifteen  ships  of  that  fleet  having  been  so  greatly  crippled  by  the 
storm  as  to  linger  behind  the  rest,  mistook  the  Greek  ships  for  their 
own  comrades,  fell  into  the  midst  of  them,  and  were  all  captured. 
Sandokcs,    sub-satrap    of   the    JSolic    Kyme— Aridolis,    despot   of 


DELAY    OF    XERXES.  281 

Alabanda  in  Karia— and  Penthylus,  despot  of  Paphos  in  Cyprus— 
the  leaders  of  this  squadron,  were  sent  prisoners  to  the  Isthmus  of 
Corinth,  after  having  been  questioned  respecting  the  enemy  ;  the 
latter  of  these  three  had  brought  to  Xerxes  a  contingent  of  twelve 
snips,  out  of  which  eleven  had  foundered  in  the  storm,  while  the  last 
was  now  taken  with  himself  on  board. 

Meanwhile  Xerxes,  encamped  within  sight  of  Thermopylae,  suf- 
fered four  days  to  pass  without  making  any  attack.      A  probable 
reason  may  be  found  in  the  extreme  peril  of  his  fleet,  reported  to 
have  been  utterly  destroyed  by  the  storm;  but  Herodotus  assigns  a 
different  cause.    Xerxes  could  not  believe  (according  to  him)  that  the 
Greeks  at  Tkermopyla?,  few  as  they  were  in  number,  had  any  serious 
intention  to  resist.     He  had  heard  in  his  march  that  a  handful  of 
Spartans  and  other  Greeks,  under  a  Herakleid  leader,  had  taken  post 
there,  biit  he  treated  the  news  with  scorn;  and  when  a  horseman — ■ 
whom  he  sent  to  reconnoiter  them,  and  who  approached  near  enough 
to  survey  their  position,  without  exciting  any  attention  among  them 
by  his  presence — brought  back  to  him  a  description  of  the  pass,  the 
wall  of  defense,  and  the  apparent  number  of  the  division,  he  waa 
yet  more  astonished  and   puzzled.    It  happened,  too,  that  at  the 
moment  when  this  horseman  rode  up,  the   Spartans  were  in  the 
advance   guard,  outside  of  the  wall;  some  were  engaged   in   gym- 
nastic exercises,  others  in  combing  their  long  hair,  and  none  of  them 
heeded  the  approach  of  Mie  hostile  spy.     Xerxes  next  sent  for  the 
Spartan  king,  Demaratus,  to  ask  what  he  was  to  think  of  such  mad- 
ness ;  upon  which  the  latter  reminded  him  of  their  former  conversation 
at  Doriskus,  again  assuring  him  that  the  Spartans  in  the  pass  would 
resist  to  the  death,  in  spite  of  the  smallness  ot  their  number;  and 
adding,  that  it  was  their  custom,  in  moments  of  special  danger,  to 
comb  their  hair  with  peculiar  care.     In  spite  of  this  assurance  from 
Demaratus,  and  of  the  pass  not  only  occupied,  but  in  itself  so  narrow 
and  impracticable,  before  his  eyes — Xerxes  still  persisted  in  believing 
that  the  Greeks  did  not  intend  to  resist,  and  that  they  would  disperse 
of  their  own  accord.     He  delayed  the  attack  for  four  days;  on  the 
fifth  he  became  wroth  at  the  impudence  and  recklessness  of  the  petty 
garrison  before  him,  and  sent  against  them  the  Median  and  Kissian 
divisions,  with  orders  to  seize  them  and  bring  them  as  prisoners  into 
his  presence. 

Though  we  read  thus  in  Herodotus,  it  is  hardly  possible  to  believe 
that  we  are  reading  historical  reality.  We  rather  find  laid  out  be- 
fore us  a  picture  of  human  self-conceit  in  its  most  exaggerated  form, 
ripe  for  the  stroke  of  the  jealous  gods,  an'd  destined,  like  the  inter- 
view between  Croesus  and  Solon,  to  point  and  enforce  that  moral 
which  was  ever  present  to  the  mind  of  the  historian;  whose  religious 
and  poetical  imagination,  even  unconsciously  to  himself,  surrounds 
the  naked  facts  of  history  with  accompaniments  of  speech  and  motive 
which  neither  Homer  nor  iEschylus  would  have  deemed  unsuitable. 


282  BATTLES  OF  THERMOPYLAE  AND  ARTEMISITJM. 

The  whole  proceedings  of  Xerxes,  and  the  immensity  of  host  which 
he  summoned,  Bhow  that  he  calculated  on  an  energetic  resistance; 
and  though  the  numbers  of  Leonidas,  compared  with  the  Persians, 
were  insignificant,  thej  could  hardly  have  looked  inBigniflcanl  in  i  lie 
position  which  they  then  occupied — an  entrance  little  wider  than  a 
sii  rfe  carriage-road,  with  across  wall,  a  prolonged  space  Bomewhal 
widened,  and  then  another  equally  narrow  exit,  behind  it.  "We  are 
informed  by  Diodorus  that  tin:  Lokrians,  when  they  firs!  sent  earth 
and  water  to  the  Persian  monarch,  engaged  at  tin-  same  time  \<>  seize 

the  pass  of  Thermopylae  en  his  behalf,  anil  were  only  prevented  from 
doing  so  by  the  unexpected  arrival  of  Leonidas;  uor  is  it  unlikely 
that  the  Thessalians,  now  the  chief  guides  of  Xerxes,  together  with 
Alexander  of  Macedon,  would  try  the  same  means  of  frightening 
away  the  garrison  of  Thermopylae,  as  had  already  been  so  successful 
in  causing  the  evacuation  of  Tempe.  An  interval  of  two  or  three 
days  might  be  well  bestowed  for  the  purpose  of  leaving  to  such 
intrigues  a  fair  chance  of  success:  the  fleet  meanwhile  would  be 
arrived  at  Alphetae  after  the  dangers  of  the  storm.  We  may  thus 
venture  to  read  the  conduct  of  Xerxes  in  a  manner  somewhat  less 
childish  than  it  is  depicted  by  Herodotus. 

The  Medes,  whom  Xerxes  first  ordered  to  the  at  lack,  animated  as 
well  by  the  recollection  of  their  ancient  Asiatic  supremacy  as  by  the 
desire  "of  avenging  the  defeat  of  .Marathon,  manifested  great  personal 
bravery.  The  position  was  (lie  in  which  bows  and  arrows  were  of 
little  avail:  a  close  combat  hand  to  hand  was  indispensable,  and  in 
this  the  Greeks  bad  every  advantage  of  organization  as  well  as  armor. 
Short  spears,  light  wicker  shields,  and  tunics,  in  the  assailants,  were 
an  imperfect  match  for  the  long  spears,  heavy  and  spreading  shields, 
steady  ranks,  and  practiced  lighting  of  the  defenders.  Yet  the 
bravest  m  n  of  the  Persian  army  press*  d  on  from  Ik  hind,  and  having 
nothing  but  numbers  in  their  favor,  maintained  long  this  unequal 
combat,  with  great  slaughter  to  themselves,  and  little  loss  to  the 
Greeks.  Though  constantly  repulsed,  the  attack  was  as  constantly 
renewed,  for  two  successive  days :  the  Greek  troops  were  sufficit  ntly 
numerous  to  relieve  each  other  when  fatigued,  since  the'  space  was 
BO  narrow  that  few  eamlel  contend  at  once;  and  even  the  Immortals, 
or  10,000  choice  Persian  guards,  and  the  other  choice  troops  of 
the  army,  when  sent  to  the  attack  on  the  second  day,  were  driven 
back  with  the  same  disgrace  and  the  same  slaughter  as  the'  rest. 
Xerxes  surveyed  this  bumilia1in«r  repulse  from  a  lofty  tbronq 
expressly  provided  for  him:  "Thrice  (says  the  historian,  with 
Homeric  vivacity)  did  lie  spring  from  Lis  throne,  in  agony  for  Lis 
armv." 

At  the  end  of  two  days'  fighting  no  imprcs.'ion  bad  been  made. 
The  pass  appeared  impractia  ble,  i  n  1  the  d  ifense  not  \cbc  triumphant 
than  courageous— whin  a  Malian  named  Ephialtes  revealed  to  Xerxes 
the  existence  of  the  unfrequented  mountain-yuth.     This  at  least  was 


ARRIVAL  IN  THE  REAR  OF   LEONIDAS.         283 

the  man  singled  out  by  the  general  voice  of  Greece  at  the  betrayer  of 
the  fatal  secret.  After  the  final  repulse  of  the  Persians  he  tied  his 
country  for  a  time,  and  a  reward  was  proclaimed  by  the  Ampbik- 
tyonic  assembly  for  his  head;  having  returned  to  bis  country  loo 
soo  i.  he  was  slain  by  a  private  enemy,  whom  the  Lacedaemonians 
honored  as  a  patriot.  There  were,  however,  other  Greeks  who  were 
also  affirmed  to  have  earned  the  favor  of  Xerxes  by  the  same  valuable 
information;  and  very  probably  there  may  have  been  more  than  oue 
informant — indeed  the  Thessalians,  at  that  time  his  guides,  can  hardly 
have  been  ignorant  of  it.  So  little  had  the  path  been  thought  of, 
however,  that  no  one  in  the  Persian  army  knew  it  to  be  already 
occupied  bv  the  Phokians.  At  nightfall  Ilydarnes  with  a  deta  h- 
ment  of  Persians  proceeded  along  the  gorge  of  the  river  Asopus, 
ascended  the  path  of  Anopsia,  through  the  woody  region  between 
the  mountains  occupied  by  the  CE'.asans  and  those  possessed  by 
the  Trachiniaris,  and  found  himself  at  daybreak  near  the  summit, 
within  sight  of  the  Phokian  guard  of  1000  men.  In  the  stillness  of 
daybreak  the  noise  of  his  army  trampling  through  the  wood  aroused 
the  defenders;  but  the  surprise  was  mutual,  and  Ilydarnes  in  alarm 
asked  his  guides  whether  these  men  also  were  Lacedaemonians. 
Having  ascertained  the  negative,  he  began  the  attack,  and  over- 
whelmed the  Phokians  with  a  shower  of  arrows,  so  as  t,.  force  them 
to  abandon  the  path  an  1  seek  their  own  safety  on  a  higher  point  of 
the  mountain.  Anxious  only  for  their  own  safety,  iby  became 
unmind  id  of  the  inestimable  opening  Which  they  were  placed  to 
guard.  Had  the  full  uu  nerical  strength  of  the  Greeks  been  at  Ther- 
mopylae, instead  of  staying  behind  for  the  festivals,  they  might  have 
planted  such  a  force  on  the  mountain-path  as  would  have  rendered  it 
not  less  impregnable  than  the  pass  b  neath. 

Ilydarnes,  not  troubling  himself  to  pursue  the  Phokians,  fallowed 
the  descending  portion  of  the  mountain-path,  shorter  than  the  ascend- 
ing, and  arrived  in  the  rear  of  Thermopylae  not  long  after  midday. 
But  before  he  had  yet  completed  his  descent  the  fatal  truth  had 
already  been  made  known  to  Leonidas  that  the  enemy  were  closing 
in  upon  him  behind.  Scouts  on  the  hills,  and  deserters  from  the 
Persian  camp,  especially  a  Kymaean  named  Tyrastiadas,  had  both 
come  in  witii  the  news.  And  even  if  such  informants  had  been 
wanting,  the  prophet  Megistias,  descended  from  the  legendary  seer 
Mclampus,  read  the  approach  of  death  in  the  gloomy  aspect  of  the 
morning  sacrifices.  It  was  evident  that  Thermopylae  could  be  no 
longer  defended.  There  was,  however,  ample  time  for  the  defenders 
to  retire,  and  the  detachment  of  Leonidas  were  divided  in  opinion  on 
the  subject.  The  greater  number  of  them  were  inclined  to  abandon 
a  position  now  become  untenable,  and  to  reserve  themselves  for 
future  occasions  on  which  they  might  effectively  contribute  to  repel 
the  invader.  Nor  is  it  to  be  doubted  that  such  was  the  natural 
impulse,  both  of  brave  soldiers  and  of  prudent  officers,  under  the 


284  BATTLES  OF  THERMOPYLAE  AND  ARTEMISIUM. 

circumstances.  But  to  Leonidas  the  idea  of  retreat  was  intolerable. 
Sis  own  personal  honor,  together  with  that  of  his  Spartan  compan- 
ions and  of  Sparta  herself,  forbade  him  to  think  of  yielding  to  the 
enemy  the  pass  which  he  had  been  sent  to  defend.  The  laws  of  his 
country  required  him  to  conquer  or  die  in  the  posl  assigned  to  him, 
whatever  might  be  the  superiority  of  number  on  the  part  of  the 
enemy:  moreover,  we  arc  told  that  the  Delphian  oracle  had  declared 
that  either  Sparta  itself,  or  a  king  of  Sparta,  must  fall  victim  to  the 
Persian  arms.  Had  he  retired  he  could  hardly  have  escaped  that 
voice  of  reproach  which,  in  Greece  especially,  always  hurst  upon  the 
general  who  failed ;  while  his  voluntary  devotion  and  death  would 
not  only  silence  every  whisper  of  calumny,  but  exalt  him  to  the  pin- 
nacle of  glory  both  as  a  man  and  as  a  king,  and  set  an  example  of 
chivalrous  patriotism  at  the  moment  when  the  Greek  world  most 
needed  the  lesson. 

The  300  Spartans  under  Leonidas  were  found  fully  equal  to  this 
act  of  generous  and  devoted  self-sacrifice.  Perhaps  he  would  have 
wished  to  inspire  the  same  sentiment  to  the  whole  detachment:  hut 
when  he  found  them  indisposed,  he  at  once  ordered  them  to  retire, 
thus  avoiding  all  unseemly  reluctance  and  dissension.  The  same  order 
was  also  given  to  the  prophet  Megistias,  who,  however,  refused  to 
obey  it  and  staid,  though  he  sent  away  his  only  son.  None  of  the 
contingents  remained  with  Leonidas  except  the  Thespian  and  the 
Theban.  The  former,  under  their  general.  Hemophilus,  volunteered 
to  share  the  fate  of  the  Spartans,  and  displa3'ed  even  more  than 
Spartan  heroism,  since  they  were  not  under  that  species  of  moral 
constraint  which  arises  from  the  necessity  of  acting  up  to  a  pre- 
established  fame  and  superiority.  But  retreat  to  them  presented  no 
prospect  better  than  the  mere  preservation  of  life,  cither  in  slavery 
or  in  exile  and  misery;  since  Thespiae  was  in  Bceotia,  sure  to  be  over- 
run by  the  invaders;  while  the  Peloponnesian  contingents  had  behind 
them  the  Isthmus  of  Corinth,  which  they  doubtless  hoped  still  to  be 
able  to  defend.  With  respect  to  the  Theban  contingent  we  are  much 
perplexed;  for  H  rodotus  tells  us  that  they  were  detained  by  Leonh 
das  against  their  will  as  hostages,  that  they  took  as  little  part  as  pos- 
sible in  the  subsequent  battle,  aud  surrendered  themselves  prisoners 
to  Xerxes  as  soon  as  they  could.  Hiodorus  says  that  the  Thespians 
alone  remained  with  the  Spartans;  and  Pausanias,  though  he  men- 
tions the  eighty  Mykenaeans  as  having  staid  along  with  the  Thespians 
(which  is  probably  incorrect),  says  nothing  about  the  Thebans.  All 
-  considered,  it  seems  probable  that  the  Theban-  remained,  but 
remained  by  their  own  offer — being  citizens  of  the  anti-Persian  party, 
as  Diodorus  represents  them  to  have  been,  or  perhaps  because  it  may 
have  been  hardly  less  dangerous  for  them  to  retire  with  the  Pelo- 
ponnesians  than  to  remain,  suspected  as  they  were  of  medism.  But 
when  the  moment  of  actual  crisis  arrived,  their  courage  not  standing 
so  firm  as  that  of  the  Spartans  and  Thespians,  they  endeavored  to 


DEATH  OF  LEONIDAS.  285 

save  their  lives  by  taking  credit  for  medism,  and  pretending  to  have 
been  forcibly  detained  by  Leonidas. 

The  devoted  band  thus  left  with  Leonidas  at  Thermopylae  con- 
sisted of  the  300  Spartans,  with  a  certain  number  of  Helots  attending 
them,  together  with  700  Thespians  and  apparently  400  Thebans.  If 
there  had  been  before  any  Lacedaemonians  (not  Spartans)  present, 
they  must  have  retired  with  the  other  Peloponnesians.  By  previous 
concert  with  the  guide  Ephialtes,  Xerxes  delayed  his  attack  upon 
them  until  near  noon,  when  the  troops  under  Hydarnes  might  soon 
be  expected  in  the  rear.  On  this  last  day,  however,  Leonidas,  know- 
ing that  all  which  remained  was  to  sell  the  lives  of  his  detachment 
dearly,  did  not  confine  himself  to  the  defensive,  but  advanced  into 
the  wider  space  outside  of  the  pass;  becoming  the  aggressor  and  driv- 
ing before  him  the  foremost  of  the  Persian  host,  many  of  whom  per- 
ished as  well  by  the  spears  of  the  Greeks  as  in  the  neighboring  sea 
and  morass,  and  even  trodden  down  by  their  own  numbers.  It 
required  all  the  efforts  of  the  Persian  oflicers,  assisted  by  threats  and 
the  plentiful  use  of  the  whip,  to  force  their  men  on  to  the  fight.  The 
Greeks  fought  with  reckless  bravery  and  desperation  against  this 
superior  host,  until  at  length  their  spears  were  broken,  and  they  had 
no  weapon  left  except  their  swords.  It  wras  at  this  juncture  that 
Leonidas  himself  was  slain,  and  around  his  body  the  battle  became 
fiercer  than  ever:  the  Persians  exhausted  all  their  efforts  to  possess 
themselves  of  it,  but  were  repulsed  by  the  Greeks  four  several  times, 
with  the  loss  of  many  of  their  chiefs,  especially  two  brothers  of 
Xerxes.  Fatigued,  exhausted,  diminished  in  number,  and  deprived 
of  their  most  effective  weapons,  the  little  band  of  defenders  retired, 
with  the  body  of  their  chief,  into  the  narrow  strait  behind  the  cross 
wall,  where  they  sat  altogether  on  a  hillock,  exposed  to  the  attack 
of  the  main  Persian  army  on  one  side,  and  of  the  detachment  of 
Hydarnes,  which  had  now  completed  its  march,  on  the  other.  They 
were  thus  surrounded,  overwhelmed  with  missiles,  and  slain  to  a 
man;  not  losing  courage  even  to  the  last,  but  defending  themselves 
with  their  remaining  daggers,  with  their  unarmed  hands,  and  even 
with  their  mouths. 

Thus  perished  Leonidas  with  his  heroic  comrades — 300  Spartans 
and  700  Thespians.  Amid  such  equal  heroism,  it  seemed  difficult 
to  single  out  any  individual  as  distinguished :  nevertheless  Herodotus 
mentions  the  Spartan  Dienekes.  Alpheus,  and  Maron — and  the  Thes- 
pian Dithyrambus — as  standing  pre-eminent.  The  reply  ascribed  to 
the  first  became  renowned.  "  The  Persian,  host  (he  was  informed) 
is  so  prodigious  that  their  arrows  conceal  the  suu."  "  So  much  the 
better  (he  answered),  wye  shall  then  fight  them  in  the  shade."  Herod- 
otus had  asked  and  learnt  the  name  of  every  individual  among  this 
memorable  three  hundred.  And  even  six  hundred  years  afterward, 
Pausanias  could  still  read  the  names  engraved  on  a  column  at  Sparta. 
One  alone  among  them — Aristodemus — returned  home,  having  taken 


286  BATTLES  OF  THERMOPYLAE  AND  ARTEMISIUM. 

no  part  in  the  combat.  ITo,  together  with  Eurytua,  another  soldier, 
Lad  1  ecu  absent  Fro  n  the  detachment  on  leave,  and  1  >c > t li  were  lying 
at  Alpeni  suffering  from  ;i  severe  complaint  in  the  eyes.  Eurytus, 
appi  ised  thai  the  fatal  hour  of  the  detachment  was  come,  determined 
not  to  survive  it  asked  for  ins  armor,  and  desired  his  attendant  Helot 
t  >  lead  him  to  Lisplace,  in  the  ranks;  where  he  fell  gallantly  fighting, 
while  the  1  lelot  di  parted  and  survived.  Aristodemus  did  nol  imitate 
this  devotion  of  his  sick  comrade:  overpowered  with  physical  suffer- 
ing, he  was  carried  to  Sparta — but  l.e  returned  only  In  scorn  and  in- 
famy  among  Liis  fellow-citizens.  He  was  denounced  as  "the  coward 
Aristodemus;"  no  one  would  speak  or  communicate  with  hiin,  or 
even  grant  him  a  light  for  bis  fire.  After  a  year  of  such  bitter  dis- 
grace, lie  was  at  length  enabled  to  retrieve  his  honor  at  the  battle  of 
Plat.-ea.  where  he  was  slain,  after  surpassing  all  his  comrades  in 
heroic  and  even  reckless  valor. 

Amid  the  last  moments  of  this  gallant  hand,  we  turn  with  repug- 
nant- •  to  tin'  desertion  and  surr<  nder  of  the  Thebans.  They  are  said 
to  have  taken  part  in  the  final  battle,  though  only  to  save  appear- 
ances and  under  the  pressure  of  necessity:  but  when  the  Spartans 
and  Thespians,  exhausted  and  disarmed,  retreated  to  die  upon  the 
little  hillock  within  the  pass,  the  Thebans  then  separated  themselves, 
approached  the  eneim  with  outstretched  Lards  and  entreated 
quarter.  They  now  loudly  proclaimed  that  they  were  friends  and 
subjects  of  the  Great  King,  and  had  come  to  Thermopylae  against 
their  own  consent;  all  which  was  confirmed  by  the  Tbessali)  m  in  the 
Persian  army.  Though  some  few  were  slain  before  this  proceeding 
was  understood  by  the  Persians,  the  rest  were  admitted  to  quarter; 
not  without  the  signal  disgrace,  however,  of  being  branded  with  the 
regal  mark  as  untrustworthy  slaves — an  indignity  to  which  their 
commander  Leontiades  was  compelled  to  submit  along  with  the  rest 
Such  is  the  narrative  which  Herodotus  recounts,  without  any  expres- 
sion of  mistrust  or  even  of  doubt:  Plutarch  emphatically  contradicts 
it,  and  even  cites  a  Boeotian  author,  who  affirms  that  Anaxan  bus, 
not  Leontiades,  was  commander  of  the  Thebans  at  Thermopylae. 
Without  calling  in  question  the  equivocal  conduct  and  surrender  of 
this  Theban  detachment,  we  may  reasonably  dismiss  the  story  of  this 
ignominious  branding,  as  an  invention  of  that  strong  anti-Theban 
feeling  which  prevailed  in  Greece  after  the  repulse  of  Xerxes. 

The  wrath  of  that  monarch,  as  he  went  over  the  field  after  the  close 
of  the  action,  vented  itself  upon  the  corpse  of  the  gallant  Leonidas, 
whose  bead  be  directed  to  be  cut  off  and  fixed  on  a  cross.  But  it 
was  not  wrath  alone  which  tilled  his  mind.  He  was  farther  im- 
pressed  with  involuntary  admiration  of  the  little  detachment  which 
had  here  opposed  to  him  a  resistance  so  unexpected  and  so  nearly 
invincible.  He  now  learnt  to  be  anxious  respecting  the  farther  resist- 
ance which  remained  behind.  "  Demaratus  (said  lie  to  the  exiled 
Spartan  king  at  Ms  side),  thou  art  a  good  man:  all  thy  predictions 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  XERXES.  287 

have  turned  out  true:  now  tell  me  how  many  Lacedaemonians  are 
there  remaining,  and  are  they  all  such  warriors  as  these  fallen  men?" 
"  O  king  (replied  Demaratus),  the  total  of  the  Lacedaemonians  and 
of  their  towns  is  great;  in  Sparta  alone  there  are  8,000  adult  warriors, 
all  equal  to  those  who  have  here  fought;  and  the  other  Lacedaemo- 
nians, though  inferior  to  them,  are  yet  excellent  soldiers."  "Tell  me 
(rejoined  Xerxes),  what  will  be  the  least  difficult  way  of  conquering 
such  men?"  Upon  which  Demaratus  advised  him  to  send  a  division 
of  his  fleet  to  occupy  the  island  of  Kythera,  and  from  thence  to  make 
war  on  the  southern  coast  of  Laconia,  which  would  distract  the 
attention  of  Sparta,  and  prevent  her  from  co-operating  in  any  com- 
bined scheme  of  defense  against  his  land-force.  Unless  this  were 
done,  the  entire  force  of  Peloponnesus  would  be  assembled  to  main- 
tain the  narrow  isthmus  of  Corinth,  where  the  Persian  king  would 
have  far  more  terrible  battles  to  fight  than  anything  which  he  had 
yet  witnessed. 

Happily  for  the  safety  of  Greece,  Achaemenes  the  brother  of 
Xerxes  interposed  to  dissuade  the  monarch  from  this  prudent  plan 
of  action;  not  without  aspersions  on  the  temper  and  motives  of 
Demaratus,  who  (he  affirmed)  like  other  Greeks,  hated  all  power,  and 
envied  all  good  fortune  above  his  own.  The  fleet  (added  he),  after 
the  damage  sustained  by  the  recent  storm,  would  bear  no  farther 
diminuition  of  number:  and  it  was  essential  to  keep  the  entire  Per- 
sian force,  on  land  as  well  as  on  sea,  in  one  undivided  and  co-operat- 
ing mass. 

A  few  such  remarks  were  sufficient  to  revive  in  the  monarch  his 
habitual  sentiment  of  confidence  in  overpowering  number.  Yet 
while  rejecting  the  advice  of  Demaratus,  he  emphatically  repelled 
the  imputations  against  the  good  faith  and  sincere  attachment  of  that 
exiled  prince. 

Meanwhile  the  days  of  battle  at  Thermopylae  had  been  not  less 
actively  employed  by  the  fleets  at  Aphetae  and  Artemisium.  It  has 
already  been  mentioned  that  the  Greek  ships,  having  abandoned 
their  station  at  the  latter  place  and  retired  to  Chalkis,  were  induced 
to  return  by  the  news  that  the  Persian  fleet  had  been  nearly  ruined 
by  the  recent  storm;  and  that  on  returning  to  Artemisium,  the  Gre- 
cian commanders  felt  renewed  alarm  on  seeing  the  enemy's  fleet,  in 
spite  of  the  damage  just  sustained,  still  mustering  an  overwhelming 
number  at  the  opposite  station  of  Aphetae.  Such  was  the  effect  of 
this  spectacle,  and  the  impression  of  their  own  inferiority,  that  they 
again  resolved  to  retire  without  fighting,  leaving  the  strait  open  and 
undefended.  Great  consternation  was  caused  by  the  news  of  their 
determination  among  the  inhabitants  of  Euboea,  who  entreated  Eury- 
biades  to  maintain  his  position  for  a  few  days,  until  they  could  have 
time  to  remove  their  families  and  their  property.  But  even  such 
postponement  was  thought  unsafe  and  was  refused.  He  was  on 
the  point  of  giving  orders  for  retreat,  when  the  Euboeans  sent  their 


288  BATTLES  OF  THKR.MOPYL/E  AND  ARTEMISIUM. 

envoy  Pelagon  to  Themistokles  with  the  offer  of  thirty  talents,  on 
condition  thai  the  fleel  Bhould  keep  its  station  and  hazard  an  engage- 
ment in  defense  of  the  island.  Themistokles  employed  the  money 
adroitly  and  successfully,  giving  five  talents  to  Eurybiadea,  with 
large  presents  besides  to  the  other  leading  chiefs.  The  most  unman- 
ageable among  them  was  the  Corinthian  Adeimantus,—  who  a1  first 
threatened  todeparl  with  his  own  squadron  alone,  if  the  remaining 
Greeks  were  mad  enough  to  remain.  His  alarm  was  silenced,  if  not 
tranquillized,  by  a  present  of  three  talents. 

Bowever  Plutarch  may  lie  scandalized  at  such  inglorious  revela- 
tions preserved  to  us  by  Herodotus  respecting  the  underhand 
agencies  of  this  memorable  struggle,  there  is  no  reason  to  call  in 
question  the  bribery  here  described.  But  Themistokles  doubtless 
was  only  tempted  to  do,  and  enabled  to  do,  by  means  of  the  Euboean 
money,  that  which  he  would  have  wished,  and  had  probably  tried, 
to  accomplish,  without  the  money — to  bring  on  a  naval  engagement 
at  Artemisium.  It  was  absolutely  essential  to  the  maintenance  of 
Thermopylae,  and  to  the  general  plan  of  defense,  that  the  Enbo-an 
strait  should  be  defended  against  the  Persian  fleet;  and  the  Greeks 
could  not  expect  any  more  favorable  position  to  fight  in.  We  may 
reasonably  presume  that  Themistokles,  distinguished  not  less  by 
daring  than  by  sagacity,  and  the  great  originator  of  maritime  ener- 
gies in  his  country,  concurred  unwillingly  in  the  projected  aban- 
donment of  Artemisium.  But  his  high  mental  capacity  did  not 
exclude  that  pecuniary  corruption  which  rendered  the  presents  of  the 
Eubceans  both  admissible  and  welcome — yet  still  more  welcome  to 
him,  perhaps,  as  they  supplied  means  of  bringing  over  the  other 
opposing  chiefs  and  the  Spartan  admiral.  It  was  finally  determined 
therefore  to  remain,  and  if  necessary,  to  hazard  an  engagement  in 
the  Euboean  strait;  but  at  any  rate  to  procure  for  the  inhabitants  of 
the  island  a  short  interval  to  remove  their  families.  Had  these 
Eubceans  heeded  the  oracles  (says  Herodotus)  they  would  have  packed 
up  and  removed  long  before;  for  a  text  of  Bakis  gave  them  express 
warning:  but  having  neglected  the  sacred  writings  as  unworthy  of 
credit,  they  were  now  severely  punished  for  such  presumption. 

Among  the  Persian  fleet  at  Apheta?,  on  the  other  hand,  the  feeling 
prevalent  was  one  of  sanguine  hope  and  confidence  in  their  superior 
numbers,  forming  a  strong  contrast  with  the  discouragement  of  the 
Greeks  at  Artemisium.  Had  the  y  at  tacked  1  he  latter  immediately,  when 
both  fleets  first  saw  each  otherfrom  their  opposite  stations,  they  would 
have  gained  an  easy  victory,  for  the  Greek  fleet  would  have  fled,  as 
the  admiral  was  on  the  point  of  ordering,  even  without  an  attack. 
Hut  this  was  not  sufficient  for  Die  Persians,  w ho  wished  to  cut  off 
every  ship  among  their  enemies  even  from  flight  and  escape. 
Accordingly  they  detached  200  ships  to  circumnavigate  the  island 
of  Eubcea,  and  to  sail  up  the  Euboean  strait  from  the  south,  in  the 
rear  of  the  Greeks;  postponing  their  own  attack  in  front  until  this 


SEA-FIGHT  AT  ARTEMISIUM.  289 

squadron  should  be  in  position  to  intercept  the  retreating  Greeks. 
But  though  the  maneuver  was  concealed  by  sending  the  squadron 
round  outside  of  the  island  of  Skiathos,  it  became  known  imme- 
diately among  the  Greeks,  through  a  deserter — Skyllias  of  Skione. 
This  man,  the  best  swimmer  and  diver  of  his  time,  and  now  engaged 
like  other  Thracian  Greeks  in  the  Persian  service,  passed  over  to 
Artemisium,  and  communicated  to  the  Greek  commanders  both  par- 
ticulars of  the  late  destructive  storm,  and  the  dispatch  of  the  inter- 
cepting squadron. 

It  appears  that  his  communications,  respecting  the  effects  of  the 
storm  and  the  condition  of  the  Persian  fleet,  somewhat  reassured  the 
Greeks,  who  resolved  during  the  ensuing  night  to  sail  from  their 
station  at  Artemisium  for  the  purpose  of  surprising  the  detached 
squadron  of  200  ships; and  who  even  became  bold  enough,  under  the 
inspirations  of  Themistokles,  to  go  out  and  offer  battle  to  the  main 
fleet  near  Aphetas.  Wanting  to  acquire  some  practical  experience, 
which  neither  leadei^s  nor  soldiers  as  yet  possessed,  of  the  manner  in 
which  Phoenicians  and  others  in  the  Persian  fleet  handled  and  man- 
euvered their  ships,  they  waited  1 11  a  late  hour  of  the  afternoon, 
when  little  daylight  remained.  Their  boldness  in  thus  advancing 
out,  with  inferior  numbers  and  even  inferior  ships,  astonished  the 
Persian  admirals,  and  distressed  the  Ionians  and  other  subject 
Greeks  who  were  serving  them  as  unwilling  auxiliaries.  To  both,  it 
seemed  that  the  victory  of  the  Persian  fleet,  which  was  speedily 
brought  forth  to  battle,  and  was  numerous  enough  to  encompass  the 
Greeks,  would  be  certain  as  well  as  complete.  The  Greek  ships 
were  at  first  marshaled  in  a  circle,  wTith  their  sterns  in  the  interior, 
and  presenting  their  prows  in  front,  at  all  points  of  the  circumfer- 
ence. In  this  position,  compressed  into  a  narrow  space,  they  seemed 
to  be  waiting  the  attack  of  the  enemy,  who  formed  a  larger  circle 
around  them  :  but  on  a  second  signal  given,  their  ships  assumed  the 
aggressive,  rowed  out  from  the  inner  circle  in  direct  impact  against 
the  hostile  ships  around,  and  took  or  disabled  no  less  than  thirty  of 
them  :  in  one  of  which  Philaon,  brother  of  Gorgus,  despot  of  Sala- 
mis  in  Cyprus,  was  made  prisoner.  Such  unexpected  forwardness 
at  first  disconcerted  the  Persians,  who,  however,  rallied  and  inflicted 
considerable  damage  and  loss  on  the  Greeks.  But  the  near  approach 
of  night  put  an  end  to  the  combat,  and  each  fleet  retired  to  its  former 
station  ;  the  Persians  to  Aphetaa,  the  Greeks  to  Artemisium. 

The  result  of  this  first  day's  combat,  though  indecisive  in  itself, 
surprised  both  parties,  and  did  much  to  exalt  the  confidence  of  the 
Greeks.  But  the  events  of  the  ensuing  night  did  yet  more.  Another 
tremendous  storm  was  sent  by  the  gods  to  aid  them.  Though  it 
was  the  middle  of  summer — a  season  when  rain  rarely  falls  in  the 
climate  of  Greece — the  most  violent  wind,  rain,  and  thunder  pre- 
vailed during  the  whole  night,  blowing  right  on  the  shore  against  the 
Persians  at  Aphetae,  and  thus  but  little  troublesome  to  the  Greeks  on 
H.  G.  H.-10 


290    BATTLES  OF  THERMOPYLAE  AND  ARTEMISIUM. 

the  opposite  side  of  the  strait  The  fionmen  of  the  Persian  floet, 
ly  recovered  from  the  former  storm  at  Sepias  Akte,  were 
almost  driven  to  despair  by  tins  repetion  of  the  Bame  peril;  the 
more  so  wh<  a  they  found  the  prows  of  their  ships  snrronndi  d,  ami 
the  play  of  their  oars  impeded,  by  the  dead  bodies  and  the  spars 
from  the  recent  battle,  which  the  current  drove  toward  their  shore. 
If  this  storm  was  injurious  to  the  main  fleet  at  Aphetro,  it  proved  the 
entire  ruin  of  the  Bquadron  detached  to  circumnavigate  Euboea,  who, 
overtaken  by  it  near  the  dangerous  eastern  coast  of  that  island 
(called  the  Hollows  of  Euboea),  were  driven  upon  the  rocks  and 
wrecked.  The  news  of  this  second  conspiracy  of  the  elements,  or 
intervention  of  the  gods,  against  the  schemes  of  the  invaders,  was 
highly  encouraging  to  the  Greeks;  and  the  seasonable  arrival  of 
fifty-three  fresh  Athenian  ships,  who  re-enforced  them  the  next  day, 
raised  them  to  a  still  higher  pitch  of  confidence.  In  the  afternoon 
of  the  same  day,  they  sailed  out  against  the  Persian  fleet  at  Aphetas, 
and  attacked  and  destroyed  some  Kilikian  ships  even  at  their  moor- 
ings ;  the  fleet  having  been  too  much  damaged  by  the  storm  of  the 
pre  eding  night  to  come  out  and  fight. 

But  the  Persian  admirals  were  not  of  a  temper  to  endure  such 
insults — still  less  to  let  their  master  hear  of  them.  About  noon 
on  the  ensiling  day,  they  s;u  Led  with  their  entire  fleet  near  to  the 
Greek  station  at  Artemisium,  and  fornv  d  themselves  into  a  half- 
moon  ;  while  the  Greeks  kept  near  to  the  shore,  so  that  they  could 
not  be  surrounded,  nor  could  the  Persians  bring  their  entire  fleet  into 
action  ;  the  ships  running  foul  of  each  other,  and  not  finding  space  to 
attack.  The  battle  raged  fiercely  all  day,  and  with  great  loss  and 
damage  on  both  sides  :  the  Egyptians  bore  off  the  palm  of  valor 
among  the  Persians,  the  Athenians  among  the  Greeks.  Though  the 
positive  loss  sustained  by  the  Persians  was  by  far  the  greater,  and 
though  the  Greeks  being  near  their  own  shore,  became  masters  of  the 
dead  bodies  as  well  as  of  the  disabled  ships  and  floating  fragments — 
still  they  were  themselves  hurt  and  crippled  in  greater  proportion 
with  reference  to  their  inferior  total  :  and  the  Athenian  vessels 
especially  foremost  in  the  preceding  combat,  found  one  half  of  their 
number  out  of  condition  to  renew  it.  The  Egyptians  alone  had 
captured  five  Grecian  ships  with  their  entire  crews. 

Under  these  circumstances,  the  Greek  leaders — and  Themistokles, 
as  it  seems  among  them — determined  that  they  could  no  longer 
venture  to  hold  the  position  of  Artemisium,  but  must  withdraw  the 
naval  force  farther  into  Greece  :  though  this  was  in  fact  a  surrender 
of  the  pass  of  Thermopylae,  and  though  the  removal  which  the 
Eubceans  were  hastening  was  still  unfinished.  These  unfortunate 
men  were  forced  to  be  satisfied  with  the  promise  of  Themistokles  to 
give  them  convoy  for  their  boats  and  their  persons  ;  abandoning  their 
sheep  and  cattle  for  the  consumption  of  the  fleet,  as  better  than 
leaving  them  to  become  booty  for  the  enemy.     While  the  Greeks 


ADVANCE  OF  THE  PEKSIAN  FLEET,       291 

were  thus  employed  in  organizing  their  retreat,  they  received  news 
which  rendered  retreat  doubly  necessary.  The  Athenian  Abrony- 
chus,  stationed  with  his  ship  near  Thermopylae,  in  order  to  keep  up 
communication  between  the  army  and  fleet,  brought  the  disastrous 
intelligence  that  Xerxes  was  already  master  of  the  pass,  and  that  the 
division  of  Leonidas-was  either  destroyed  or  in  flight.  Upon  thisthe 
fleet  abandoned  Artemisium  forthwith,  and  sailed  up  the  Eubcean 
strait ;  the  Corinthian  ships  in  the  van,  the  Anthenians  bringing  up 
the  rear.  Themistokles,  conducting  the  latter,  staid  long  enough  at 
the  various  watering-stations  and  landing-places  to  inscribe,  on  some 
neighboring  stones,  invitations  to  the  Ionian  contingents  serving 
under  Xerxes  ;  whereby  the  latter  were  conjured  not  to  serve  against 
their  fathers,  but  to  desert,  if  possible— or  at  least,  to  fight  as  little 
and  as  backwardly  as  they  could.  Themistokles  hoped  by  this 
stratagem,  perhaps,  to  detach  some  of  the  Ionians  from  the  Persian 
side  ;  or  at  any  rate,  to  render  them  objects  of  mistrust,  and  thus  to 
diminish  their  efficiency.  With  no  longer  delay  than  was  requisite 
for  such  inscriptions,  he  followed  the  remaining  fleet,  which  sailed 
round  the  coast  of  Attica,  not  stopping  until  it  reached  the  island  of 
Salamis. 

The  news  of  the  retreat  of  the  Greek  fleet  was  speedily  conveyed  by 
a  citizen  of  Hist  ia?a  to  the  Persians  at  Aphetae,  who  at  first  disbelieved 
it,  and  detained  the  messenger  until  they  had  sent  to  ascertain  the 
fact.  On  the  next  day,  their  fleet  passed  across  to  the  north  of 
Eubcea,  and  became  master  of  Histiasa  and  the  neighboring  territory; 
from  whence  many  of  them,  by  permission  and  even  invitation  of 
Xerxes,  crossed  over  to  Thermopylae  to  survey  the  field  of  battle  and 
the  dead.  Kespecting  the  number  of  the  dead,  Xerxes  is  asserted  to 
have  deliberately  imposed  upon  the  spectators  :  he  buried  all  his  own 
dead,  except  1,000  whose  bodies  were  left  out — while  the  total  num- 
ber of  Greeks  who  had  perished  at  Thermopylae,  4,000  in  number, 
were  all  left  exposed,  and  in  one  heap,  so  as  to  create  an  impression 
that  their  loss  had  been  much  more  severe  than  their  own.  More- 
over the  bodies  of  the  slain  Helots  were  included  in  the  heap,  all  of 
them  passing  for  Spartans  or  Thespians  in  the  estimation  of  the 
spectators.  We  are  not  surprised  to  hear,  however,  that  this  trick, 
gross  and  public  as  it  must  have  been,  really  deceived  very  few. 
According  to  the  statement  of  Herodotus,  20,000  men  were  slain  on 
the  side  of  the  Persians — no  unreasonable  estimate,  if  we  consider 
that  they  wore  little  defensive  armor,  and  that  they  were  three  days 
fighting.  Tne  number  of  Grecian  dead  bodies  is  stated  by  the  same 
historian  as  4,000  :  if  this  be  correct,  it  must  include  a  considerable 
proportion  of  Helots,  since  there  were  no  hoplites  present  on  the  last 
day  except  the  300  Spartans,  the  700  Thespians,  and  the  400  Thebans. 
Some  hoplites  were  of  course  sl;iin  in  the  first  two  days'  battles, 
though  apparently  not  many.  The  number  who  orig'nally  came  to 
the  defense  of  the  pass  seems  to  have  been  about  7,000  :  but  the 


292  BATTLE  OF  BALAMTfl. 

ram  composed  Bhortly  afterward  ami  inscribed  on  the  spot  by 

i  insmitted  to  posterity  the 
forma]  boast  that  4,000  warriors  "from  Peloponnesus  had  here 
fought  with  300  myriads  or  3,000,000  of  enemies."  Respecting  this 
total,  some  remarks  have  already  been  made:  the 
statement  of  4,000  warriors  from  Peloponnesus,  must  indicate  all 
those  who  originally  marched  out  of  that  peninsula  under  Leonidas. 
Yet    the  Amphiktyonio  assembly,  when  they  furnished  words  to 

I  this  memorable  exploit,  ought  not  to  have  immortalized  the 

Peloponnesians  apart  from  their  eztra-Peloponnesian   comrades,  of 

merit  fully  equal;  especially  the  Thespians,  who  exhibited  the  same 

self-devotion  as  Leonidas  and  his  Spartans,  without  having 

prepared  for  it  by  the  same  elaborate  and  iron  discipline. 
While  this  inscription  was  intended  as  a  general  commemoration  of 
the  exploit,  there  was  another  near  it,  alike  simple  and  impressive, 
destined  for  the  Spartan  dead  separately:  "Stranger,  tell  tho  Lace- 
daemonians that  we  lie  here,  in  obedience  to  their  orders."  On  the 
hillock  within  the  pass,  where  this  devoted  hand  received  their  death- 
wonnds,  a  monument  was  erected,  with  a  marble  lion  in  honor  of 
Leonidas  :  decorated  apparently  with  an  epigram  by  the  poet  Sim- 
onides.  That  distinguished  genius  composed  at  least  one  ode,  of 
which  nothing  but  a  splendid  fragment  now  remains,  to  celebrate  the 
glories  of  Thermopylae  ;  besides  several  epigrams,  one  of  which  was 
consecrated  to  the  prophet  Megistias,  "  who,  though  well  aware  of 
the  fate  coming  upon  him,  would  not  desert  the  Spartan  chiefs." 


CHAPTEK  XLL 

BATTLE  OF  SAL  AMIS. — KETEEAT   OF  XEBXES. 

The  sentiment,  alike  durable  and  unanimous,  with  which  the 
Greeks  of  after-times  looked  back  on  the  battle  of  Thermopylae,  and 
which  they  have  communicated  to  all  subsequent  readers,  was  that 
of  just  admiration  for  the  courage  and  patriotism  of  Leonidas  and 
his  band.  But  among  the  contemporary  Greeks  that  sentiment, 
though  doubtless  sincerely  felt,  was  by  no  means  predominant.  It  was 
overpowered  by  the  more  pressing  emotions  of  disappointment  and 
terror.  So  confident  were  the  Spartans  and  Peloponnesians  in  the 
defensibility  of  Thermopylae  and  Artemisium,  that  when  the  news  of 
the  disaster  reached  them,  not  a  single  soldier  had  yet  been  put  in 
motion  ;  the  season  of  the  festival-games  had  passed,  but  no  active 
step  had  yet  been  taken.  Meanwhile  the  invading  force,  army  and 
fleet,  was  in  its  progress  towards  Attica  and  Peloponnesus,  without  the 
least  preparations — and  what  was  still  worse,  without  any  combined 
and  concerted  plan— for  defending  the  heart  of  Greece.    The  loss 


NO  ULTERIOR  PLAN  OP  DEFENSE.       293 

sustained  by  Xerxes  at  Thermopylae,  insignificant  in  proportion  to 
his  vast  total,  was  more  than  compensated  by  the  fresh  Grecian 
auxiliaries  which  he  now  acquired.  Not  merely  the  Maliaus,  Lok- 
rians,  and  Dorians,  but  also  the  great  mass  of  the  Boeotians,  with 
their  chief  town  Thebes,  all  except  Tkespiae  and  Plataea,  now  joined 
him.  Demaratus,  his  Spartan  companion,  moved  forward  to  Thebes 
to  renew  an  ancient  tie  of  hospitality  with  the  Theban  oligarchical 
leader  Attaginus,  while  small  garrisons  were  sent  by  Alexander  of 
Macedon  to  most  of  the  Boeotian  towns,  as  well  to  protect  them  from 
plunder  as  to  insure  their  fidelity.  The  Thespians  on  the  other  hand 
abandoned  their  city  and  fled  into  Peloponnesus  ;  while  the  Plataeans, 
who  had  been  serving  aboard  the  Athenian  ships  at  Artemisium, 
were  disembarked  atChalkis  as  the  fleet  retreated,  for  the  purpose  of 
marching  by  land  to  their  city  and  removing  their  families.  It  was 
not  only  the  land  force  of  Xerxes  which  had  been  thus  strengthened. 
His  fleet  also  had  received  some  accessions  fi-oin  Karystus  in  Euboea, 
and  from  several  of  the  Cyclades — so  that  the  losses  sustained  by  the 
storm  sx'j  Sepias  and  the  fights  at  Artemisium,  if  not  wholly  made  up, 
wero  a*  least  in  part  repaired,  while  the  fl  jet  remained  still  prodigi- 
ously superior  in  number  to  that  of  the  Greeks. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  near  fifty  years  after 
these  events,  the  Corinthian  envoys  reminded  Sparta  that  she  had 
allowed  Xerxes  time  to  arrive  from  the  extremity  of  the  earth  at  the 
threshold  of  Peloponnesus,  before  she  took  any  adequate  precautions 
against  him;  a  reproach  true,  almost  to  the  letter.  It  was  only  when 
roused  and  terrified  by  the  news  of  the  death  of  Leoniday,  that  the 
Lacedaemonians  and  the  other  Peloponnesians  began  to  put  forth 
their  full  strength.  But  it  was  then  too  late  to  perform  the. promise 
made  to  Athens  of  taking  up  a  position  in  Boeotta  so  as  to  protect 
Attica.  To  defend  the  Isthmus  of  Corinth  was  all  that  they  now 
thought  of,  and  seemingly  all  that  was  now  open  to  them.  Thither 
they  rushed  with  all  their  available  population  under  the  conduct  of 
Kleombrotus  king  of  Sparta  (brother  of  Leonidas\  and  began  to  draw 
fortifications  across  it,  as  well  as  to  break  up  the  Skironian  road 
from  Megara  to  Corinth,  with  every  mark  of  anxious  energy.  The 
Lacedaemonians,  Arcadians,  Eleians,  Corinthians,  Sikyonians,  Epi- 
daurians,  Phliasians,  Trcezenians,  and  Hermionians,  were  all  present 
here  in  full  numbers  ;  many  myriads  of  men  (bodies  of  10,000  each) 
working  and  bringing  materials  night  and  day.  As  a  defense  to 
themselves  against  attack  by  land,  this  was  an  excellent  position  ; 
they  considered  it  as  their  last  chance,  abandoning  all  hope  of  suc- 
cessful resistance  at  sea.  But  they  forgot  that  a  fortified  isthmus 
was  no  protection  even  to  themselves  againxt  the  navy  of  Xerxes, 
while  it  professedly  threw  out  not  only  Attica,  but  also  Megara  and 
2E:una.  And  thus  arose  a  new  peril  to  Greece  from  the  loss  of 
Thermopylae ;  no  other  position  could  be  found  which,  like  that 
memorable  strait,  comprehended  and  protected  at  once  all  the  sepa- 


294  BATTLE  OF  SALAMIS. 

rate  cities.  Tho  disunion  thus  produced  brought  them  within  a 
hair's  breadth  of  ruin. 

Jf  the  causes  of  aliirm  were  great  for  the  1'eloponnesians,  yet  more 
deepen  e  did  tho  position  or  the  Athenians  appear.  Expecting, 
according  to  agreement,  that  there  Mould  be  a  Peloponnesian  army 
in  Bceotia  ready  to  sustain  Leonidas,  or  at  any  rate  to  cooperate  in 
the  defence1  of  Attica,  they  had  taken  no  measures  to  remove  their 
families  or  property.  But  they  saw  with  indignant  dissappointment 
as  well  as  dismay,  on  retreating  from  Artemisium,  that  the  conqueror 
was  in  full  mareh  from  Thermopylae,  that  the  road  to  Attica  was 
to  him,  and  that  the  Peloponnesians  were  absorbed  exclusively 
in  the  defense  of  their  own  isthmus  and  their  own  separate  existence 
The  fleet  from  Artemisium  had  been  directed  to  muster  at  the  harbor 
of  Trcezen,  there  to  await  such  re-enforcements  as  could  be  got 
tier.  But  the  Athenians  entreated  Enrybiades  to  halt  at  Salamis 
so  as  to  allow  them  a  short  time  for  consultation  in  the  critical  state 
of  their  affairs,  and  to  aid  them  in  the  transport  of  their  families. 
While  Enrybiades  was  thus  Btaying  at  Salamis,  several  new  ships 
which  had  reached  Trcezen  came  over  to  join  him  ;  and  in  this  way 
Salamis  became  for  a  tiuie  the  naval  station  of  the  Greeks,  without 
any  deliberate  intention  beforehand. 

Meanwhile  Themistokles  and  tho  Athenian  seamen  landed  at  Pha- 
lerum,  and  made  their  mournful  entry  into  Athens.  Gloomy  as  the 
prospect  appeared,  there  was  little  room  for  difference  of  opinions, 
and  still  less  room  for  delay.  The  authorities  and  the  public  assem- 
bly at  once  issued  a  proclamation,  enjoining  every  Athenian  to 
removo  his  family  out  of  the  country  the  best  way  he  could.  We 
may  conceive  the  state  of  tumult  and  terror  which  followed  ou  this 
unexpected  proclamation,  -when  we  reflect  that  it  had  to  be  circulated 
and  acted  upon  throughout  all  Attica,  from  Sunium  to  Oropus, 
within  the  narrow  space  of  less  than  six  days  ;  for  no  longer  interval 
elapsed  before  Xerxes  actually  arrived  at  Athens,  where,  indeed,  he 
might  have  arrived  even  sooner.  The  whole  Grecian  fleet  was  doubt- 
less employed  in  carrying  out  the  helpless  exiles  ;  mostly  to  Trcezen, 
where  a  kind  of  reception  and  generous  support  were  provided  for 
them  (the  Troezenian  population  being  seemingly  semi-Ionic,  and 
having  ancient  rd.it  ions  of  religion  as  well  as  of  traffic  with  Athens) 
— but  in  part  also  to  iEgina  :  there  were,  however,  many  who  could 
not  or  would  not  go  farther  than  Salamis.  Themistokles  impressed 
upon  tho  sufferers  that  they  were  only  obeying  the  oracle,  which  had 
directed  them  to  abandon  the  city  and  to  take  refuge  behind  the 
wooden  walls  ;  and  either  his  policy,  or  the  mental  depression  of  the 
time,  gave  circulation  to  other  stories,  intimating  that  even  the  divine 
inmates  of  the  Aero  mlis  were  for  awhile  deserting  it.  In  the  ancient 
temple  of  Athene  Polias  on  that  rock,  there  dwelt,  or  was  believed 
to  dwell,  as  guar  lian  to  the  sanctuary  and  familiar  attendant  of  the 
goddess,  a  sacred  serpent,  for  whose  nourishment  a  honey-cake  was 


ENEKGY  OF  THE  ATHENIANS.        295 

placed  once  in  the  month.  The  honey-cake  had  been  hitherto  regu- 
larly consumed ;  but  at  this  fatal  moment  the  priestess  announced 
that  it  remained  untouched;  the  sacred  guardian  had  thus  set  the 
example  of  quitting  the  Acropolis,  and  it  behoved  the  citizens  to  fol- 
low the  example,  confiding  in  the  goddess  herself  for  future  return 
and  restitution. 

The  migration  of  so  many  ancient  men,  women,  and  children,  was 
a  scene  of  tears  and  misery  inferior  only  to  that  which  would  have 
ensued  on  the  actual  capture  of  the  city.  Some  few  individuals,  too 
poor  to  hope  for  maintenance,  or  too  old  to  care  for  life,  elsewhere- 
confiding,  moreover  in  their  own  interpretation  of  the  wooden  wall 
which  the  Pythian  priestess  had  pronounced  to  be  inexpugnable — 
shut  themselves  up  in  the  Acropolis  along  with  the  administrators  of 
the  temple,  obstructing  the  entrance  or  western  front  with  wooden 
doors  and  palisades.  When  we  read  how  great  were  the  sufferings 
of  the  population  of  Attica  near  half  a  century  afterward,  compressed 
for  refuge  within  the  spacious  fortifications  of  Athens  at  the  first 
outbreak  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  we  may  form  some  faint  idea  of 
the  incalculably  greater  misery  which  overwhelmed  an  emigrant 
population,  hurrying,  they  knew  not  whither,  to  escape  the  long  arm 
of  Xerxes.  Little  chance  did  there  seem  that  they  would  ever  revisit 
their  homes  except  as  his  slaves. 

In  the  midst  of  circumstances  thus  calamitous  and  threatening, 
neither  the  warriors  nor  the  leaders  of  Athens,  lost  their  energy  ; 
arm  as  well  as  mind  was  strung  to  the  loftiest  pitch  of  human  resolu- 
tion. Political  dissensions  were  suspended.  Themistokles  proposed 
to  the  people  a  decree,  and  obtained  their  sanction,  inviting  home 
all  who  were  under  the  sentence  of  temporary  banishment ;  moreover 
he  not  only  included,  but  even  specially  designated  among  them,  his 
own  great  opponent  Aristeides,  now  in  the  third  year  of  ostracism. 
Xanthippus  the  accuser,  and  Kimon  the  son,  of  Miltiades,  were 
partners  in  the  same  emigration.  The  latter,  enrolled  by  his  scale 
of  fortune  among  the  horsemen  of  the  state,  was  seen  with  his  com- 
panions cheerfully  marching  through  the  Eerameikus  to  dedicate 
their  bridles  in  the  Acropolis,  and  to  bring  away  in  exchange  some 
of  the  sacred  arms  there  suspended — thus  setting  an  example  of  ready 
service  on  shipboard,  instead  of  on  horseback.  It  was  absolutely 
essential  to  obtain  supplies  of  money,  partly  for  the  aid  of  the  poorer 
exiles,  but  still  more  for  the  equipment  of  the  fleet ;  yet  there  were 
no  funds  in  the  public  treasury.  But  the  Senate  of  Areiopagus,  then 
composed  in  large  proportion  of  men  from  the  wealthier  classes,  put 
forth  all  its  public  authority  as  well  as  its  private  contributions  and 
example  to  others,  and  thus  succeeded  in  raising  the  sum  of  eight 
drachms  for  every  soldier  serving. 

This  timely  help  was  indeed  partly  obtained  by  the  inexhaustable 
resources  of  Themistokles,  who,  in  the  hurry  of  embarkation,  either 
discovered  or  pretended  that  the  Gorgon's  head  from  the  statute  of 


29tf  BATTLE    OP    SALAMIS. 

Athene  was  lost,  and  directing  upon  this  ground  every  man's  baggage 
to  be  searched,  rendered  any  treasures,  which  private  citizens  might 
be  carrying  away,  available  to  the  public  service.  By  the  most 
strenuous  efforts,  these  few  important  days  were  made  to  suffice  for 
removing  the  whole  population  of  Attica— those  of  military  compe- 
tence to  the  fleet  at  Salamis, — the  rest  to  some  place  of  refuge, — 
together  with  as  much  property  as  the  case  admitted.  So  complete 
was  the  desertion  of  the  country  that  the  host  of  Xerxes,  when  it 
became  master,  cotild  not  seize  and  carry  off  more  than  five  hundred 
prisoners.  Moreover  the  fleet  itself,  which  had  been  brought  home 
from  Artemisium  partly  disabled,  was  quickly  repaired,  so  that  by 
the  lime  the  Persian  fleet  arrived,  it  was  again  in  something  like 
fighting  condition. 

The  combined  fleet  which  had  now  got  together  at  Salamis  con- 
sists! of  366  ships — a  force  greater  than  at  Artemisium.  Of  these 
no  less  than  200  were  Athenians  ;  twenty  among  which  however,  were 
lent  to  the  Chalkidians  and  manned  by  them.  Forty  Corinthian 
ships,  thirty  iEginetan,  twenty  Megarian,  sixteen  Lacedaemonian, 
fifteen  Sikyonian,  ten  Epidaunan,  seven  from  Ambrakiaand  as  many 
from  Eretria,  five  from  Troezen,  three  from  Hermoine,  and  the  same 
number  from  Leukas  ;  two  from  Keos,  two  from  Styra,  and  one 
from  Kythnos  ;  four  from  Naxos,  dispatched  as  a  contingent  to  the 
Persian  fleet,  but  brought  by  the  choice  of  their  captains  and  seamen 
to  Salamis  ;■-  all  these  triremes,  together  with  a  small  squadron  of 
the  inferior  vessels  called  pentekonters,  made  up  the  total.  From  the 
great  Grecian  cities  in  Italy  there  appeared  only  one  trireme,  a  volun- 
unteer,  equipped  and  commanded  by  an  eminent  citizen  named 
Phayllus,  thrice  victor  at  the  Pythian  games.  The  entire  fleet  was 
thus  a  trifle  larger  than  the  combined  force  (358  ships)  collected  by 
the  Asiatic  Greeks  at  Lade,  fifteen  years  earlier,  during  the  Ionic 
revolt.  We  may  doubt,  however,  whether  this  total,  borrowed  from 
Herodotus,  be  not  larger  than  that  which  actually  fought  a  little 
afterward  at  the  battle  of  Salamis,  and  which  iEschylus  gives  decid- 
edly as  consisting  of  300  sail,  in  addition  to  ten  prime  and  chosen 
ships.  That  great  poet,  himself  one  of  the  combatants,  and  speaking 
in  a  drama  represented  only  seven  years  after  the  battle,  is  better 
authority  on  the  point  even  than  Herodotus. 

Hardly  was  the  fleet  mustered  at  Salamis,  and  the  Athenian  popu- 
lation removed,  when  Xerxes  and  his  host  overran  the  deserted 
country  ;  his  fleet  occupying  the  roadstead  of  Phalerum  with  the 
coast  adjoining.  His  land  force  had  been  put  in  motion  under  the 
guidance  of  the  Thessalians,  two  or  three  days  after  the  battle  of 
Thermopylae)  ;  and  he  was  assured  by  some  Arcadians  who  came  to 
seek  service  ;  that  the  Peloponnesians  were,  even  at  that  moment, 
occupied  with  the  celebration  of  the  Olympic  games.  "What  prize 
does  the  victor  receive  ?"  he  asked.  Upon  the  reply  made,  that  the 
prize  was  nothing  more  than  a  wreath  of  the  wild  olive,  Traitan- 


RAVAGES  OP  THE  PERSIAN  ARMY.  297 

taschmes  son  of  the  monarch's  uncle  Artabanus  is  said  to  have  burst 
forth,  notwithstanding  the  displeasure  both,of  the  monarch  himself 
and  of  the  bystanders — ''Heavens,  Mardonius,  what  manner  of  men 
are  these  against  whom  thou  hast  brought  us  to  fight !  men  who 
contend  not  for  money,  but  for  honor  !  "  Whether  this  be  a  remark 
really  delivered,  or  a  dramatic  illustration  imagined  by  some  con- 
iemporary  of  Herodotus,  it  is  not  the  less  interesting  as  bringing  to 
view  a  characteristic  of  Hellenic  life,  which  contrasts  not  merely 
with  the  manners  of  contemporary  Orientals,  but  even  with  those  of 
the  earlier  Greeks  themselves  during  the  Homeric  times. 

Among  all  the  various  Greeks  between  Thermopylae  and  the  bor- 
ders of  Attica,  there  were  none  except  the  Phokians  disposed  to  refuse 
submission  ;  and  they  refused  only  because  the  paramount  influence 
of  their  bitter  enemies  the  Thessalians  made  them  despair  of  obtain- 
ing favorable  terms.  Nor  would  they  even  listen  to  a  proposition 
of  the  Thessalians,  who,  boasting  that  it  was  in  their  power  to  guide 
as  they  pleased  the  terrors  of  the  Persian  host,  offered  to  insure 
lenient  treatment  to  the  territory  of  Phokis,  provided  a  sum  of  fifty 
talents  were  paid  to  them.  The  proposition  being  indignantly 
refused,  they  conducted  Xerxes  through  the  little  territory  of  Doris, 
which  medised  and  escaped  plunder,  into  the  upper  valley  of  the 
Kephisus,  among  the  towns  of  the  inflexible  Phokians.  All  of  them 
were  found  deserted  ;  the  inhabitants  having  previously  escaped 
either  to  the  wide-spreading  summit  of  Parnassus  called  Tithorea,  or 
even  still  farther,  across  that  mountain  into  the  territory  of  the 
Ozolian  Lokrians.  Ten  or  a  dozen  small  Phokian  towns,  the  most 
considerable  of  which  were  Elateia  and  Hyanipolis,  were  sacked  and 
destroyed  by  the  invaders.  Even  Abas,  with  its  temple  and  oracle 
of  Apollo,  was  no  better  treated  than  the  rest ;  all  the  sacred  treasures 
were  pillaged,  and  it  was  then  burnt.  From  Panopeus  Xerxes  de- 
tached a  body  of  men  to  plunder  Delphi,  marching  with  his  main 
army  through  Boeotia,  in  which  country  he  found  all  the  towns 
submissive  and  willing,  except  Thespias  and  Plata?  ;  both  of  them 
had  been  deserted  by  their  citizens,  and  both  were  now  burnt. 
From  hence  he  conducted  his  army  into  the  abandoned  territory  of 
Attica,  reaching  without  resistance  the  foot  of  the  acropolis  at 
Athens. 

Very  different  was  the  fate  of  that  division  which  he  had  detached 
from  Panopeus  against  Delphi.  Apollo  defended  hia  temple  here 
more  vigorously  than  at  Abae.  The  cupidity  of  the  Persian  kiDg  was 
stimulated  by  accounts  of  the  boundless  wealth  accumulated  at 
Delphi,  especially  the  profuse  donations  of  Croesus.  The  Delphians, 
in  the  extreme  of  alarm,  while  they  sought  safety  for  themselves  on 
the  heights  of  Parnassus  and  for  their  families  by  transport  across 
the  gulf  into  Achaia,  consulted  the  oracle  whether  they  should  carry 
away  or  bury  the  sacred  treasures.  Apollo  directed  them  to  leave 
the  treasures  untouched,  saying  that  he  was  competent  himself  to 


098  BATTLE  OF  SALAMIS. 

take  care  of  his  own  property.  Sixty  Delphiang  alone  ventured  to 
remain,  together  with  Akeratus,  the  religiou.8  superior;  hut  evidences 
of  superhuman  aid  boos  appeared  to  encourage  them.  The  sacred 
arms  suspended  in  the  interior  cell,  which  no  mortal  hand  w..s  ever 
permitted  to  touch,  was  Been  lying  before  the  door  of  the  temple; 
an  1  when  tin-  Persians,  marching  along  the  road  called  Schiste  up 
thai  rugged  path  under  the  steep  dirt's  of  Parnassus  which  conducts  to 
Delphi,  had  reached  the  temple  of  Athene  Pronaea, — on  a  sudden, 
dreadful  thunder  was  heard —two  vast  mountain  crags  detached 
themselves  and  rushed  down  with  deafening  noise  among  them, 
crushing  many  to  death  the  war-shout  was  also  heard  from  the 
interior  of  the  temple  of  Athene.  Seized  \.  ith  a  panic  terror,  the 
invaders  turned  round  and  tied;  pursued  not  only  by  the  Delphians, 
but  also  (as  they  themselves  affirmed)  by  two  armed  warriors  of 
superhuman  statureand  destructive  arm.  The  triumphant  Delphians 
confirmed  this  report,  adding  that  the  two  auxiliaries  were  the  heroes 
Phylakus  andAutonous  whose  sacred  precincts  were  close  adjoining; 
and  Herodotus  himself,  when  he  visited  Delphi,  saw  in  the  sacred 
ground  of  Athene  the  identical  masses  of  rock  which  had  over- 
whelmed the  Persians.  Thus  did  the  god  repel  these  invaders  from 
his  Delphian  sanctuary  and  treasures,  which  remained  inviolate  until 
130  years  afterwards,  when  they  were  rifled  by  the  sacriligious  hands 
of  the  Phokian  Philomelus.  <  >n  this  occasion,  as  will  be  seen  pres- 
ently, the  real  protectors  of  the  treasures  were  the  conquerors  at  Sala- 
mis  and  Plafaea. 

Four  months  had  elapsed,  since  the  departure  from  Asia,  when 
Xerxes  reached  Athens,  the  last  term  of  his  advance.  He  brought  with 
him  the  members  of  the  Peisistratid  family,  who  doubtless  thought 
their  restoration  already  certain — and  a  few  Athenian  exiles  attached 
to  their  interest.  Though  the  country  was  altogether  deserted,  the 
handful  of  men  collected  in  the  acropolis  ventured  to  defy  him  ;  nor 
could  all  the  persuasions  of  the  Peisistratids,  eager  to  preserve  the 
holy  place  from  pillage,  induce  them  to  surrender.  The  Athenian 
acropolis— a  craggy  roclc  rising  abruptly  about  150  feet  with  aflat 
summit  of  about  10D0  feet  long  from  east  to  west,  by  500  feet  broad 
from  north  to  south  had  no  practicable  access  except  on  the  western 
side;  moreover  in  all  parts  where  there  seemed  any  possibility  of 
climbing  up,  it  was  defended  by  the  ancient  fortification  called  the 
Pelasgic  wall.  Obliged  to  take  the  place  by  force,  the  Persian  army 
were  posted  around  the  northern  and  western  sides,  and  commenced 
their  operations  from  the  eminence  immediately  adjoining  on  the 
northwest,  called  Areopagus:  from  whence  they  bombarded  (if  we 
may  venture  upon  the  expression)  with  hot  missiles  the  wood-work 
before  the  gates  ;  that  is,  they  poured  upon  it  multitudes  of  arrows 
with  burning  tow  attached  to  them.  The  wooden  palisades  and 
boarding  presently  took  tire  and  were  consumed  :  but  when  the  Per- 
sians tried  to  mount  to  the  assault  by  the  western  road  leading  up  to 


ATONING  VISIT  OF  THE  PEISISTEATIDS  299 

the  gate,  the  undaunted  little  garrison  still  kept  them  at  bay,  having 
provided  vast  stones,  which  they  rolled  down  upon  them  in  the  ascent. 
For  a  time,  the  great  king  seemed  likely  to  be  driven  to  the  slow  pro- 
cess of  blockade  ;  but  at  length  some  adventurous  men  among  the 
besiegers  tried  to  scale  the  precipitous  rock  before  them  on  its  north- 
ern side,  hard  by  the  temple  or  chapel  of  Aglaurus,  which  lay  nearly 
in  front  of  the  Persian  position,  but  behind  the  gates  and  the  west- 
ern ascent.  Here  the  rock  was  naturally  so  inaccessible,  that  it  was 
altogether  unguarded,  and  seemingly  even  unfortified  :  moreover  the 
attention  of  the  little  garrison  was  all  concentrated  on  the  host  which 
fronted  the  gates.  Hence  the  separate  escalading  party  were  enabled 
to  accomplish  their  object  unobserved,  and  to  reach  the  summit  in 
the  rear  of  the  garrison  ;  who  deprived  of  their  last  hope,  either  cast 
themselves  headlong  from  the  walls,  or  fled  for  safety  to  the  inner 
temple.  The  successful  escaladers  opened  the  gates  to  the  entire 
Persian  host,  and  the  whole  acropolis  was  presently  in  their  hands. 
Its  defenders  were  slain,  its  temple  pillaged,  and  all  its  dwellings 
and  buildings,  sacred  as  well  as  profane,  consigned  to  the  flames. 
The  citadel  of  Athens  fell  into  the  hands  of  Xerxes  by  a  surprise, 
very  much  the  same  as  that  which  had  placed  Sardis  in  those  of 
Cyrus. 

Thus  was  divine  prophecy  fulfilled  :  Attica  passed  entirely  into 
the  hands  of  the  Persians,  and  the  conflagration  of  Sardis  was 
retaliated  upon  the  home  and  citadel  of  its  captors,  as  it  also  was 
upon  their  sacred  temple  of  Eleusis.  Xerxes  immediately  dispatched 
to  Susa  intelligence  of  the  fact,  which  is  said  to  have  excited  unmea- 
sured demonstrations  of  joy,  confuting  seemingly  the  gloomy  pre- 
dictions of  his  uncle  Artabanus.  On  the  next  day  but  one,  the 
Athenian  exiles  in  his  suite  received  his  orders,  or  perhaps,  obtained 
his  permission,  to  go  and  offer  sacrifice  amidst  the  ruins  of  the  acro- 
polis, and  atone,  if  possible,  for  the  desecration  of  the  ground. 
They  discovered  that  the  sacred  olive  tree  near  the  capel  of  Er  ech- 
theus,  the  especial  gift  of  the  goddess  Athene,  though  burnt  to  the 
ground  by  the  recent  flames,  had  already  thrown  out  a  fresh  shoot  of 
one  cubit  long :  at  least  the  piety  of  restored  Athens  afterward 
believed  this  encouraging  portent,  as  well  as  that  which  was  said  to 
have  been  seen  by  Dikoeus  (an  Athenian  companion  of  the  Peisistra- 
tids)  in  the  Thriasian  plan.  It  was  now  the  day  set  apart  for  the 
celebration  of  the  Eleusinian  mysteries  ;  and  though  in  this  sorrow- 
ful year  there  was  no  celebration,  nor  any  Athenians  in  the  territory, 
Dikoeus  still  fancied  that  he  beheld  the  dust  and  heard  the  loud 
multitudinous  chant,  which  was  wont  to'  accompany  in  ordinary 
times  the  processional  march  from  Athens  to  Eleusis.  He  would 
even  have  revealed  the  fact  to  Xerxes  himself,  had  not  Demaratus 
deterred  him  from  doing  so  :  but  he  construed  it  as  an  evidence  that 
the  goddesses  themselves  were  passing  over  from  Eleusis  to  help  the 
Athenians  at  Salamis.     Yet  whatever  may    have  been  received  in 


300  BATTLE  OF   SAL  A  MIR. 

after  times,  on  that  day  certainly  no  man  could  believe  in  the  speedy 
resurrection  of  conquered  Atheus  as  a  free  city;  not  even  it'  he  had 
witnessed  the  portenl  of  the  burnl  olive  tree  suddenly  sprouting 
afresh  with  preternatural  vigor.  So  hopeless  did  the  circumstances 
of  the  Athenians  then  appear,  Dot  less  to  their  confederates  assem 
bled  at  Salamis  than  to  the  victorious  Persians. 

A.bout  the  time  of  the  capture  of  the  acropolis,  the  Persian  fleet 
also  arrived  safely  in  the  bay  of  Phalerum,  re-enforced  bj  ships  from 
Karystus  as  well  as  from  various  islands  of  the  Cyclades,  so  that 
Herodotus  reckons  it  to  have  been  as  strong  as  before  the  terrible 
storm  at  Sepias  Akte;  an  estimate  certainly  not  admissible. 

Soon  after  their  arrival  Xerxes  himself  descended  to  the  shore  to 
inspect  the  Beet,  as  well  as  to  take  counsel  with  the  various  naval 
leaders  aboul  the  expediency  of  attacking  the  hoBtile  fleet,  now  so 
near  him  in  the  narrow  strait  between  Salamis  and  the  coasts  of 
Attica.  He  invited  them  all  to  take  their  seats  in  an  assembly, 
wherein  the  King  of  Sidon  occupied  the  firsl  place  and  the  king  of 
Tyre  the  second.  The  question  was  pu1  to  each  of  them  separately 
1>\  Mardonius,  and  when  we  learn  that  all  pronounced  in  favor  of 
immediate  fighting,  we  may  be  satisfied  that  the  decided  opinion  of 
Xerxes  himself  must  have  been  well  known  to  them  beforehand. 
One  exception  alone  was  found  to  this  unanimity — Artemisia,  queen 
of  Halikarnassus  in  Karia;  into  whose  month  II  en  dotus  puts  a  spe<  eh 
of  -nine  length,  deprecating  all  idea  of  fighting  in  the  narrow  strait 
of  Salamis — predicting  thai  if  the  land  force  w<  re  moved  forward  to 
attack  Peloponnesus,  the  Peloponnesians  in  the  fleet  at  Salamis  would 
return  to  the  protection  of  their  own  homes,  and  that  thus  the  fleet 
would  disperse,  the  rather  as  there  was  little  or  no  food  in  the  island 
—and  intimating,  besides,  unmeasured  contempl  for  the  efficacy  of  the 
Persian  fleet  and  seamen  as  compared  with  the  Greek,  as  well  as  for 
the  subject  contingents  of  Xerxes  generally.  Thai  Queen  Artemisia 
gave  this  prudent  counsel,  there  is  no  reason  to  question;  and  the  his- 
torian of  Halikarnassus  may  have  had  means  of  Ik  aring  the  grounds 
on  which  her  opinion  rested.  But  1  find  a  difficulty  in  believing 
that  she  can  have  publicly  delivered  any  such  estimate  of  the  mari- 
time subjects  of  Persia;  an  estimate  not  merely  insulting  to  all  who 
heard  it,  but  at  the  time  not,  just — though  it  had  come  to  he  n<  arer 
the  truth  at  the  time  when  Herodotus  wrote,  and  though  Artem- 
isia herself  may  have  lived  to  entertain  the  conviction  afterward. 
Whatever  may  have  been  her  reasons,  the  historian  tells  us  that 
friends  as  well  as  rivals  were  astonished  at  her  rashness  in  dissuading 
the  monarch  from  a  naval  battle,  and  expected  that  she  would  he  put 
to  death.  But  Xerxes  heard  the  advice  with  perfect  good  temper, 
and  even  esteemed  the  Kariau  queen  the  more  highly;  though  he 
resolved  that  the  opinion  of  the  majority,  or  his  own  opinion,  should 
be  acted  upon.     Orders   were    accordingly  issued   for   the  fleet  to 


DISSENSIONS  AMONG  THE  GREEKS.  301 

attack  the  next  day,  and  for  the  land  force  to  move  forward  toward 
Peloponnesus. 

Whilst,  on  the  shore  of  Phalerum,  an  omnipotent  will  compelled 
seeming-  unanimity  and  precluded  all  real  deliberation — great  indeed 
was  the  contrast  presented  by  the  neighboring  Greek  armament  at 
Salamis;  among  the  members  of  which  unmeasured  dissension  had 
been  reigning.  It  has  already  been  stated  tha*>  the  Greek  fleet  had 
originally  got  together  at  that  island,  not  with  any  view  of  making 
U  a  naval  station,  but  simply  in  order  to  cover  and  assist  the  emigra- 
tion of  the  Athenians.  This  object  being  accomplished,  and  Xerxes 
being  already  in  Attica,  Eurybiades  convoked  the  chiefs  to  consider 
what  position  was  the  fittest  for  a  naval  engagement.  Most  of  them, 
especially  those  from  Peloponnesus,  were  averse  to  remaining  at 
Salamis,  and  proposed  that  the  fleet  should  be  transferred  to  the 
Isthmus  of  Corinth,  where  it  would  be  in  immediate  communication 
with  the  Peloponnesian  land-force,  so  that  in  case  of  defeat  at  sea, 
the  ships  would  find  protection  on  shore  and  the  men  would  join  in 
land  service — while  if  worsted  in  a  naval  action  near  Salamis,  they 
would  be  enclosed  in  an  island  from  whence  there  were  no  hopes  of 
escape.  In  the  midst  of  the  debate,  a  messenger  arrived  with  news 
of  the  capture  and  conflagration  of  Athens  and  her  acropolis  by  the 
Persians.  Such  was  the  terror  produced  by  this  intelligence,  that 
some  of  the  chiefs,  without  even  awaiting  the  conclusion  of  the  debate 
and  the  final  vote,  quitted  the  council  forthwith,  and  began  to  hoist 
sail,  or  prepare  their  rowers,  for  departure.  The  majority  came  to 
a  formal  vote  for  removing  to  the  Isthmus;  but  as  night  was 
approaching,  actual  removal  was  deferred  until  the  next  morning. 

Now  was  felt  the  want  of  a  position  like  that  of  Thermopylae, 
which  had  served  as  a  protection  to  all  the  Greeks  at  once,  so  as  to 
check  the  growth  of  separate  fears  and  interests.  "We  can  hardly 
wonder  that  the  Peloponnesian  chiefs — the  Corinthians  in  particular, 
who  furnished  so  large  a  naval  contingent,  and  within  whose  terri- 
tory the  land-battle  at  the  Isthmus  seemed  about  to  take  place — 
should  manifest  such  an  obstinate  reluctance  to  fight  at  Salamis,  and 
should  insist  on  removing  to  a  position  where,  in  case  of  naval 
defeat,  they  could  assist,  and  be  assisted  by,  their  own  soldiers  on 
land.  On  the  other  hand,  Salamis  was  not  only  the  most  favorable 
positiou,  in  consequence  of  its  narrow  strait,  for  the  inferior  num- 
bers of  the  Greeks,  but  could  not  be  abandoned  without  breaking 
up  the  unity  of  the  allied  fleet;  since  Megara  and  iEgina would  thus 
l)i'  left  uncovered,  and  the  continents  of'  each  would  immediately 
retire  for  the  defense  of  their  own  homes, — while  the  Athenians  also, 
a  large  portion  of  whose  expatriated  families  were  in  Salamis  and 
JEgiiia,  would  be  in  like  manner  distracted  from  combined  maritime 
efforts  at  the  Isthmus.  If  transferred  to  the  latter  place,  probably 
not  even  the  Peloponnesians  themselves  would  have  remained  in  one 


308  BATTLE  OF   SALAMIS. 

body;  for  the  squadrons  of  Epidaurus,  Troezen,  Hermionc,  ice., 
each  fearing  thai  the  Persian  fleet  might  make  a  descent  on  one  oi 
other  of  these  separate  ports,  would  go  borne  to  repel  Buch  a  con- 
tingency, in  sdUc  of  the  efforts  of  Eur \  biadea  to  keep  them  together. 
Ilenee  the  order  of  quitting Salamis and  repairing  i<>  Die  Isthmus  was 
nothing  less  than  a  sentence  of  extinction  for  all  combined  maritime 
defense:  and  it  thus  became  doubly  abhorrent  to  all  those  who,  like 
the  Athenians,  .lv/metans,  and  Megarians,  were  also  lead  by  their 
own  separate  Bafety  to  cling  to  the  defense  of  Salamis.  In  spite  oi 
all  such  opposition,  however,  and  in  spite  of  the  protest  of  Themis 
tokles,  the  obstinate  determination  of  the  Peloponnesian  leaders 
carried  the  vote  for  retreat,  and  each  of  them  went  to  his  ship  to  pre- 
pare for  it  on  the  following  morning. 

When  Themistokles  returned  to  his  ship,  with  the  gloom  of  this 
melancholy  resolution  full  upon  his  mind,  and  with  the  necessity  of 
providing  for  removal  of  the  expatriated  Athenian  families  in  the 
island  as  well  as  for  that  of  the  squadron — he  found  an  Athenian 
friend  named  Mnesiphilus,  who  asked  him  what  the  synod  of  chiefs 
had  determined.  Concerning  this  Mnesiphilus,  who  is  mentioned 
generally  as  a  sagacious  practical  politician,  we  unfortunately  have 
no  particulars:  but  it  must  have  been  no  common  man  whom  fame 
selected,  truly  or  falsely,  as  the  inspiring  genius  of  Themistokles. 
On  learning  what  had  been  resolved,  Mnesiphilus  burst  out  into 
remonstrance  on  the  utter  ruin  which  its  execution  would  entail: 
there  would  present]}1-  be  neither  any  united  fleet  to  fight,  nor  any 
aggregate  cause  and  country  to  fight  for.  lie  vehemently  urged 
Themistokles  again  to  open  the  question,  and  to  press  by  every 
means  in  his  power  for  a  recall  of  the  vote  in  favor  of  retreat,  as  well 
as  for  a  positive  resolution  to  stay  and  fight  at  Salamis.  Themis- 
tokles had  already  in  vain  tried  to  enforce  the  same  view:  but  though 
he  was  disheartened  by  ill-success,  the  remonstrances  of  a  respected 
friend  struck  him  so  forcibly  as  to  induce  him  to  renew  his  efforts. 
He  went  instantly  to  the  ship  of  Eurybiades,  asked  permission  to 
speak  to  him,  and  being  invited  aboard,  reopened  with  him  alone  the 
whole  subject  of  the  past  discussion,  enforcing  his  own  views  as 
emphatically  as  he  could.  In  this  private  communication,  all  the 
arguments  bearing  upon  the  case  were  more  unsparingly  laid  open 
than  it  had  been  possible  to  do  in  an  assembly  of  the  chiefs,  who 
would  have  been  insulted  if  openly  told  that  they  were  likely  to 
desert  the  fleet  when  once  removed  from  Salamis.  Speaking  thus 
freely  and  confidentially,  and  speaking  to  Eurybiades  alone,  Themis- 
tokles was  enabled  to  bring  him  partially  round,  and  even  prevailed 
upon  him  to  convene  a  fresh  synod.  So  soon  as  this  synod  hail 
assembled,  even  before  Eurybiades  had  explained  the  object  and 
formally  opened  the  discussion,  Themistokles  addressed  himself  to 
each  of  the  chiefs  separately,  pouring  forth  at  large  his  fears  and 
anxiety  as  to  the  abandonment  of  Salamis:  insomuch  that  the  Corin- 


SYNOD   OF  GRECIAN  CHIEFS   CONVENED.       303 

tlifaa  Adeimantus  rebuked  him  by  saying — "  Themistokles,  those 
who  m  the  public  festival-mutches  rise  up  before  the  proper  signal, 
are  scourged."  "True  (rejoined  the  Athenian),  but  those  who  lag 
behind  the  signal  win  no  crowns." 

Eurybiades  then  explained  to  the  synod  that  doubts  had  arisen  in 
his  mind,  and  that  he  called  them  together  to  reconsider  the  previous 
resolve:  upon  which  Themistokles  began  the  debate.  He  vehementlv 
enforced  the  necessity  of  fighting  in  the  narrow  sea  of  Salamis  and 
not  in  the  open  waters  at  the  Isthmus — as  well  as  of  preserving 
Megara  and  iEgina;  contending  that  a  naval  victory  at  Salamis  would 
be  not  less  effective  for  the  defense  of  Peloponnesus  than  if  it  took 
place  at  the  Isthmus;  whereas,  if  the  fleet  were  withdrawn  to  the 
hitter  point,  they  would  only  draw  the  Persians  after  them.  More- 
over, he  did  not  omit  to  add,  that  the  Athenians  bad  a  prophecy 
assuring  to  them  victory  in  this,  their  own  island.  But  his  speech 
made  little  impression  on  the  Peloponnesian  chiefs;  who  were  even 
exasperated  at  being  again  summoned,  to  reopen  a  debate  already 
concluded, — and  concluded  in  a  way  which  they  deemed  essential  to 
their  safet}^.  In  the  bosom  of  the  Corinthian  Adeimantus,  especially, 
this  feeling  of  answer  burst  all  bounds.  He  sharply  denounced  the 
presumption  of  Themistokles,  and  bade  him  be  silent  as  a  man  who 
had  now  no  free  Grecian  city  to  represent — Athens  being  in  the 
power  of  the  enemy.  Nay,  he  went  so  far  as  to  contend  that  Eury- 
biades had  no  right  to  count  the  vote  of  Themistokles  until  the  latter 
could  produce  some  free  city  as  accrediting  him  to  the  synod.  Such 
an  attack,  alike  ungenerous  and  insane,  upon  the  leader  of  more  than 
half  of  the  whole  fleet,  demonstrates  the  ungovernable  impatience  of 
the  Corinthians  to  carry  away  the  fleet  to  their  Isthmus.  It  provoked 
a  bitter  retort  against  them  from  Themistokles,  who  reminded  them 
that  while  he  had  around  him  200  well-manned  ships,  he  could  pro- 
cure for  himself  anywhere  both  city  and  territory  as  good  or  better 
than  Corinth.  But  he  now  saw  clearly  that  it  was  hopeless  to  think 
of  enforcing  his  policy  by  argument,  and  that  nothing  would  succeed 
except  the  direct  language  of  intimidation.  Turning  to  Eurybiades, 
ami  addressing  him  personally,  he  said— "If  thou  wilt  stay  here, 
and  light  bravely  here,  all  will  turn  out  well;  but  if  thou  wilt  not 
stay,  thou  wilt  bring  Hellas  to  ruin.  For  with  us,  all  our  means  of 
war  are  contained  in  our  ships.  Be  thou  yet  persuaded  by  me.  If 
not,  we  Athenians  shall  migrate  with  our  families  on  board,  just  as 
we  are,  to  Siris  in  Italy,  which  is  ours  from  of  old,  and  which  the 
prophecies  announce  that  we  are  one  day, to  colonize.  You  chiefs 
then,  when  bereft  of  allies  like  us,  will  hereafter  recollect  what  I  am 
now  saying." 

Eurybiades  had  before  been  nearly  convinced  by  the  impressive 
pleading  of  Themistokles.  But  this  last  downright  menace  clinched 
his  determination,  and  probably  struck  dumb  even  the  Corinthian 
and  Peloponnesian  opponents:  for  it  was  but  too  plain,  that  without 


304  BATTLE  OF  SALAMIS. 

the  Athenians  the  fleel  was  powerless.  He  did  not  however  put  the 
question  again  in  vote,  but  took  upon  himself  to  rescind  the  pre- 
vious resolution,  and  to  issue  orders  for  staying  at  Balamis  to  fight. 
In  this  order  all  acquiesced,  willing  or  unwilling.  The  succeeding 
dawn  saw  them  preparing  for  fighl  instead  of  for  retreat,  and  invok- 
ing the  protection  and  companionship  ©f  the  iEakid  heroes  of  Bala- 
mis— Telamon  and  Ajax:  they  even  sent  a  trireme  to  ^Egina  to 
implore  JSakus  himself  and  the  remaining  JSakids.  It  seems  to 
have  been  on  this  same  day,  also,  thai  the  resolution  of  fighting  at 
Salamis  was  taken  by  Xerxes,  whose  fleel  was  seen  in  motion,  towards 
the  close  of  the  day,  preparing  for  attack  the  next  morning. 

But  t lie  Peloponnesians,  though  not  venturing  to  diBobey  the  orders 
of  the  Spartan  admiral,  still  retained  unabated  their  former  fears  and 
reluctance,  which  began  again  after  a  short  interval  to  prevail  over 
the  formidable  menace  of  Themistokles,  and  were  further  strength- 
ened by  the  advices  from  the  Isthmus.  The  messenger  from  that 
quarter  depicted  the  trepidation  and  affrighl  of  theirabsenl  brethren 
while  constructing  their  cross-wall  at  thai  point,  to  resist  the  impend- 
ing land  invasion.  Why  were  they  not  there  also,  to  join  hand-  and 
to  help  in  the  defense, — even  if  worsted  at  sea.— at  hast  on  land, 
instead  of  wasting  their  efforts  in  defense  of  Attica,  already  in  the 
hands  of  the  enemy  V  Such  were  the  complaints  which  passed  from 
man  to  man,  with  many  a  bitter  exclamation  against  the  insanity  of 
Eurybiades:  at  length  the  common  feeling  broke  out  inpublicand 
mutinous  manifestation,  and  a  fresh  synod  of  the  chiefs  was  demanded 
and  convoked.  Here  the  same  angry  debate,  and  the  same  irrecon- 
cilable difference,  was  again  renewed;  the  Peloponnesian  chiefs 
clamoring  for  immediate  departure,  while  the  Athenians,  iESginetans, 
and  Megarians  were  equally  urgent  in  favor  of  staying  to  fight.  It 
was  evident  to  Themistokles  that  the  majority  of  votes  among  the 
chiefs  would  be  against  him,  in  spite  of  the  orders  of  Eurybiades; 
and  the  disastrous  crisis,  destined  to  deprive  Greece  of  all  united 
maritime  defense,  appeared  imminent — when  he  resorted  to  one  last 
stratagem  to  meet  the  desperate  emergency  by  rendering  flighl  impos- 
sible. Contriving  a  pretext  for  stealing  away  from  the  synod,  he 
dispatched  a  trusty  messenger  across  the  strait  with  a  secret  com- 
munication to  the  Persian  generals,  Sikinnus  his  slave — seemingly 
an  Asiatic  Greek  who  understood  Persian  and  had  perhaps  been  sold 
during  the  late  Ionic  revolt,  but  whose  superior  qualities  are  marked 
by  the  fact  that  he  had  the  care  and  teaching  of  the  children  of  his 
master — was  instructed  to  acquaint  them  privately  in  the  name  of 
Themistokles,  who  was  represented  as  wishing  success  at  heart  to 
the  Persians,  that  the  Greek  fleet  was  not  only  in  the  utmost  alarm, 
meditating  immediate  flight,  but  thai  the  various  portions  of  it  were 
in  such  violent  dissension,  that  they  were  more  likely  to  fighl  against 
each  other  than  against  any  common  enemy.  A  splendid  opportunity 
(it  was  added)  was  thus  opened  to  the  Persians,  if  they  chose  to  avail 


IMPATIENT  HASTE  OF  XERXES.  305 

themselves  of  it  without  delay,  first  to  inclose  and  prevent  their 
flight,  aud  then  to  attack  a  disunited  body,  many  of  whom  would, 
when  the  combat  began,  openly  espouse  the  Persian  cause. 

Such  was  the  important  communication  dispatched  by  Themis- 
tokles  across  the  narrow  strait  (only  a  quarter  of  a  mile  in  breadth  at 
the  narrowest  part)  which  divides  Salamis  from  the  neighboring  con- 
tinent on  which  the  enemy  were  posted.  It  was  delivered  with  so 
much  address  as  to  produce  the  exact  impression  which  he  intended, 
and  the  glorious  success  which  followed  caused  it  to  pass  for  a 
splendid  stratagem:  had  defeat  ensued,  his  name  would  have  been 
covered  with  infamy.  What  surprises  us  the  most  is,  that  after 
having  reaped  signal  honor  from  it  in  the  eyes  of  the  Greeks  as  a 
stratagem,  Themistokles  lived  to  take  credit  for  it,  during  the  exile 
of  his  latter  days,  as  a  capital  service  rendered  to  the  Persian  monarch. 
It  is  not  improbable,  when  we  reflect  upon  the  desperate  condition 
of  Grecian  affairs  at  the  moment,  that  such  facility  of  double  inter- 
pretation was  in  part  his  inducement  for  sending  the  message. 

It  appears  to  have  been  delivered  to  Xerxes  shortly  after  he  had 
issued  his  orders  for  fighting  on  the  next  morning:  and  he  entered  so 
greedily  into  tlie  scheme,  as  to  direct  his  generals  to  close  up  the 
strait  of  Salamis  on  both  sides  during  the  night,  to  the  north  as  well 
as  to  the  south  of  the  town  of  Salamis,  at  the  risk  of  their  heads  if 
any  opening  were  left  for  the  Greeks  to  escape.  The  station  of  the 
numerous  Persian  fleet  was  along  the  coast  of  Attica — ils  headquar- 
ters were  in  the  bay  of  Phalerum,  but  doubtless  parts  of  it  would 
occupy  those  three  natural  harbors,  as  yet  unimproved  by  art,  which 
belonged  to  the  deme  of  Peirseus — and  would  perhaps  extend  besides 
to  other  portions  of  the  western  coast  southward  of  Phalerum;  while 
the  Greek  fleet  was  in  the  harbor  of  the  town  called  Salamis,  in  the 
portion  of  the  island  facing  Mount  iEgaleos  in  Attica.  During  the 
night,  a  portion  of  the  Persian  fleet,  sailing  from  Peiraeus  northward 
along  the  western  coast  of  Attica,  closed  round  to  the  north  of  the 
town  and  harbor  of  Salamis,  so  as  to  shut  up  the  northern  issue  from 
the  strait  on  the  side  of  Eleusis;  while  another  portion  blocked  up 
the  other  issue  between  Peirseus  and  the  south-eastern  corner  of  the 
island,  landing  a  detachment  of  troops  on  the  desert  island  of  Psyt- 
taleia  near  to  that  corner.  These  measures  were  all  taken  during  the 
night,  to  prevent  the  anticipated  flight  of  the  Greeks,  and  then  to 
attack  them  in  the  narrow  strait  close  on  their  own  harbor,  the  next 
morning. 

Meanwhile  that  angry  controversy  among  the  Grecian  chiefs,  in 
the  midst  of  which  Themistokles  had  sent  over  his  secret  envoy,  con- 
tinued without  abatement  and  without  decision.  It  was  the  interest 
of  the  Athenian  general  to  prolong  the  debate,  and  to  prevent  any 
concluding  vote,  until  the  effect  of  his  stratagem  should  have  ren- 
dered retreat  impossible.  Such  prolongation  was  nowise  difficult  in 
a  case  so  critical,  where  the  majority  of  chiefs  was  on  one  side,  and 


306  BATTLE  OF  SALAMIS. 

that  of  naval  force  on  the  other — especially  as  Eurybiades  himself 
waa  favorable  to  the  view  of  Themistokles.    Accordingly  the  debate 

was  still  unfinished  at  nightfall,  and  either  continued  all  night,  or 
was  adjourned  to  an  hour  before  daybreak  on  the  following  morning 
— when  an  incident,  interesting  as  well  as  important,  gave  to  it  ;.  new 
turn.  The  ostracized  Aristeides  arrived  at  Salamis  from  /Egina. 
Since  the  revocation  of  his  sentence — a  revocation  proposed  1>\  The- 
mistokles himself — he  had  had  no  opportunity  of  revisiting  Athens, 
and  he  now  for  the  first  time  rejoined  his  countrymen  in  their  exile 
at  BalamiS;  not  uninformed  of  the  dissensions  raging,  and  of  the 
impatience  of  the  Peloponnesians  to  retire  to  the  [sthmus.  He  was 
the  lirst  to  bring  the  news  that  such  retirement  had  become  imprac- 
ticable from  the  position  of  the  Persian  fleet,  which  his  own  vessel 
in  coming  from  2Egina  had  only  eluded  under  favor  of  night,  lie 
caused  Themistokles  to  be  invited  out  from  the  assembled  synod  of 
chiefs;  and  alter  a  generous  exordium  wherein  he  expressed  his  hope 
that  their  rivalry  would  for  the  future  be  only  a  competition  in  doing 
good  to  their  common  country,  apprised  him  that  the  new  movement 
of  the  Persians  excluded  all  hope  of  now  reaching  the  Isthmus,  and 
rendered  farther  debate  useless.  Themistokles  exprcs-ed  his  joy  at 
the  intelligence;  communicating  his  own  secret  message  whereby  he 
had  himself  brought,  the  movement  about,  in  order  that  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  chiefs  might  be  forced  to  fight  at  Salamis  even  against  their 
own  consent.  He,  moreover,  desired  Aristeides  to  go  himself  into 
the  synod,  and  communicate  the  news;  for  if  it  came  from  the  lips 
of  Themistokles,  the  Peloponnesians  would  treat  it  as  a  fabrication. 
So  obstinate,  indeed,  was  their  incredulity  that  they  would  not 
accept  it  as  truth  even  on  the  assertion  of  Aristeides:  nor  was  it  until 
the  arrival  of  a  Tenian  vessel,  deserting  from  the  Persian  fleet,  that 
they  at  last  brought  themselves  to  credit  the  actual  posture  of  affairs 
and  the  entire  impossibility  of  retreat.  Once  satisfied  of  this  fact, 
they  prepared  themselves  al  dawn  for  the  impending  battle. 

Having  caused  his  land  force  to  lie  drawn  up  along  the  shore  oppo- 
site to  Salamis,  Xerxes  had  erected  for  himself  a  lofty  seat  or  throne, 
upon  one  of  the  projecting  declivities  of  Mount  ^Egaleos — near  the 
Herakleion  and  immediately  overhanging  the  sea — from  whence  he 
could  plainly  review  all  the  phases  of  the  combat  and  the  conduct  of 
his  subject  troops.  I  le  was  persuaded  that  they  had  not  done  their 
besl  at  Artemisium,  in  consequence  of  his  absence,  and  that  his  pres- 
ence would  inspire  them  with  fresh  valor:  moreover,  his  ro\  al  scribes 
stood  ready  by  his  side  to  record  the  names  both  of  the  brave  ami  of 
the  backward'  combatants.  On  the  right  wing  of  his  fleet,  which 
approached  Salamis  on  the  side  of  Kleiisis,  and  was  opposed  to  the 
Athenians  on  the  Grecian  left, — were  placed  the  Phoenicians  and 
Egyptians;  on  his  left,  wing  the  lonians — approaching  from  the  side 
of  Peir.-eus,  and  opposed  to  the  Lacedaemonians,  ZEginetans,  and 
Megarians.     The  seamen  of  the  Pc;sian  fleet,  however,  had  been  on 


DEFEAT   OF  THE  PERSIAN  FLEET.  307 

ship-board  all  night,  in  making  that  movement  which  had  brought 
them  iuto  their  actual  position ;  while  the  Greek  seamen  now  began 
without  previous  fatigue,  fresh  from  the  animated  harangues  of  The- 
mistokles  and  the  other  leaders.  Just  as  they  were  getting  on  board, 
they  were  joined  by  the  trireme  which  had  been  sent  to  iEgina  to 
bring  to  their  aid  iEakus  with  the  other  iEakid  heroes.  Honored 
with  this  precious  heroic  aid,  which  tended  so  much  to  raise  the 
spirits  of  the  Greeks,  the  JEginetan  trireme  now  arrived  just  in  time 
to  take  her  post  in  the  line,  having  eluded  pursuit  from  the  inter- 
vening enemy. 

The  Greeks  rowed  forward  from  the  shore  to  attack,  with  the 
usual  paean  or  war-shout,  which  was  confidently  returned  by  the 
Persians.  Indeed,  the  latter  were  the  most  forward  of  the  two  to 
begin  the  fight.  The  Greek  seamen,  on  gradually  nearing  the 
enemy,  became  at  first  disposed  to  hesitate — and  even  backed  water 
for  a  space,  so  that  some  of  them  touched  ground  on  their  own  shore; 
until  the  retrograde  movement  was  arrested  by  a  supernatural  femi- 
nine figure  hovering  over  them,  who  exclaimed  with  a  voice 
that  rang  through  the  whole  fleet — "Ye  worthies,  how  much 
farther  are  ye  going  to  back  water?"  The  very  circulation  of  this 
fable  attests  the  dubious  courage  of  the  Greeks  at  the  commence- 
ment.of  the  battle.  The  brave  Athenian  captains  Ameinias  and 
Lykomedes  (the  former,  brother  of  the  poet  ^Eschylus)  were  the  first 
to  obey  either  the  feminine  voice  or  the  inspirations  of  their  own 
ardor;  though,  according  to  the  version  current  at  ^Egina,  it  was 
the  iEginetan  ship,  the  carrier  of  the  /Eakid  heroes,  which  first  set 
this  honorable  example.  The  Naxian  Demokritus  was  celebrated  by 
Simonides  as  the  third  ship  in  action.  Ameinias,  darting  forth 
from  the  line,  charged  with  the  beak  of  his  ship  full  against  a  Phoe- 
nician, and  the  two  became  entangled  so  that  he  could  not  again  get 
clear:  other  ships  came  in  aid  on  both  sides,  and  the  action  thus 
became  general. 

Herodotus,  with  his  usual  candor,  tells  us  that  he  could  procure 
few  details  about  the  action,  except  as  to  what  concerned  Artemisia, 
the  queen  of  his  own  city:  so  that  we  know  hardly  anything  beyond 
the  general  facts.  But*  it  appears  that,  with  the  exception  of  the 
Ionic  Greeks,  many  of  whom  (apparently  a  greater  number  than 
Herodotus  likes  to  acknowledge)  were  lukewarm,  and  some  even 
averse — the  subjects  of  Xerxes  conducted  themselves  generally  with 
great  bravery :  Phenicians,  Cyprians,  Kilikians,  Egyptians,  vied 
with  the  Persians  and  Medes  serving  as  soldiers  on  shipboard,  in  try- 
ing to  satisfy  the  exigent  monarch  who  sat  on  shore  watching  their 
behavior.  Their  signal  defeat  was  not  owing  to  any  want  of  cour- 
age— but,  first,  to  the  narrow  space  which  rendered  their  superior 
number  a  hindrance  rather  than  a  benefit:  next,  to  their  want  of 
orderly  line  and  discipline  as  compared  with  the  Greeks:  thirdly,  to 
the  fact  that  when  once  fortune  seemed  to  turn  against  them,  they 


308  BATTLE   OF    SAL  AMIS. 

had  no  fidelity  or  reciprocal  attachment,  and  each  ally  was  willing 
to  sacrifice  or  even  to  run  down  others,  in  order  to  effect  his  own 
escape.  Their  numbers  and  absence  of  concerl  threw  them  into 
contusion  and  caused  them  to  run  foul  of  each  other.  Those  in  the 
lVuiii  could  r.iii  recede,  nor  could  those  in  the  rear  advance:  the  oar- 
blades  were  broken  by  collision— the  steersmen  lost  control  of  their 
ships,  and  could  do  longer  adjusl  the  ship's  course  so  as  to  strike  that 
direct  blow  with  the  beat  which  was  essential  in  ancient  warfare. 
After  some  time  of  combat,  the  whole  Persian  licet  was  driven  back  and 
became  thoroughly  unmanageable,  so  that  the  issue  was  no  longer 
doubtful,  and  nothing  remained  except  the  efforts  of  individual 
bravery  to  protracl  the  struggle.  While  the  Athenian  squadron  on 
the  left,  which  had  the  greatest  resistance  to  .surmount,  broke  up  and 
drove  before  them  the  Persian  light,  the  ^Eginetans  on  the  right 
intercepted  the  flight  of  the  fugitives  io  l'halcnim:    Demokritus,   the 

Naxian  captain,  was  said  to  have  captured  live  ships  of  the  Persians 
withhisown  single  trireme.  The  chief  admiral  Ariabignes,  brother  of 
Xerxes,  attacked  at  or.ee  by  two  Athenian  triremes,  fell  gallantly 
trying  to  board  one  of  them,  and  the  number  of  distinguished  Per- 
sians and  Medes  who  shared  his  fate  was  very  great;  the  more  so, 
as  few  of  them  knew  how  to  swim,  while  among  the  Greek  seamen 
who  were  cast  into  the  sea,  the  greater  number  were  swimmers, 
and  had  the  friendly  shore  of  Salamis  near  at  hand. 

It  appears  that  the  Phoenician  seamen  of  the  fleet  threw  the  blame 
of  defeat  upon  the  Tonic  Greeks;  and  some  of  them,  driven  ashore 
during  'he  heat  of  the  battle  under  the  immediate  throne  of  Xerxes, 
excused  themselves  by  denouncing  the  others  as  traitors.  The  heads 
of  the  Ionic  leaders  might  have  been  endangered  if  the  monarch  had 
not  seen  with  his  own  eyes  an  act  of  surprising  gallantry  by  one  of 
their  number.  An  Ionic  trireme  from  Samothrace  charged  and  dis- 
abled an  Attic  trireme,  but  was  herself  almost  immediately  run  down 
by  an  iEginetan.  The  Samothracian  crew,  as  their  vessel  lay  dis- 
abled on  the  water,  made  such  excellent  use  of  their  missile  weapons, 
that  they  cleared  the  decks  of  the  iF.ginetan,  sprung  on  hoard,  and 
became  masters  of  her.  This  exploit,  passing  under  the  eyes  of 
Xerxes  himself,  induced  him  to  treat  the  Phoenicians  as  dastardly 
calumniators,  and  to  direct  their  heads  to  he  cut  off.  His  wrath  and 
vexation  (Herodotus  tells  us)  were  boundless,  and  he  scarcely  knew 
on  whom  to  vent  his  feelings. 

In  this  disastrous  battle  itself,  as  in  the  debate  before  the  battle, 

the  e lucl   of  Artemisia  of  Ilalikamassus  was  such  as  Io  give  him 

full  satisfaction.  It  appears  that  this  queen  maintained  her  full  part 
in  the  battle  until  the  disorder  had  become  irretrievable.  She  then 
soughl  to  escape,  pursued  by  the  Athenian  trierarch  Ameinias,  but 
found  her  progress  obstructed  by  the  number  of  fugitive  or  embar- 
rassed comrades  before  her.  In  this  dilemma  she  preserved  herself 
from  pursuit  by  attacking  one  of  her  own  comrades;  she  charged  the 


GALLANTRY   OF  QUEEN  ARTEMISIA.  309 

trireme  of  the  Karian  prince  Damasithymus  of  Kalyndus,  ran  it 
down  and  sunk  it,  so  that  the  prince  with  all  his  crew  perished.  Had 
Ameinias  been  aware  that  the  vessel  which  he  was  following  was 
that  of  Artemisia,  nothing  would  have  induced  him  to  relax  in  the 
pursuit — for  the  Athenian  captains  were  all  indignant  at  the  idea  of 
a  female  invader  assailing  their  city.  But  knowing  her  ship  only  as 
one  among  the  enemy,  and  seeing  her  thus  charge  and  destroy 
another  enemy's  ship,  he  concluded  her  to  be  a  deserter,  turned  his 
pursuit  elsewhere,  and  suffered  her  to  escape.  At  the  same  time,  it 
so  happened  that  the  destruction  of  the  ship  of  Damasithymus  hap- 
pened under  the  eyes  of  Xerxes  and  of  the  persons  around  him  on 
shore,  who  recognized  the  ship  of  Artemisia,  but  supposed  the  ship 
destroyed  to  be  a  Greek.  Accordingly  they  remarked  to  him:  "Mas- 
ter, seest  thou  not  how  well  Artemisia  rights,  and  how  she  has  just 
sunk  an  enemy's  ship?"  Assured  that  it  was  really  her  deed,  Xerxes 
is  said  to  have  replied:  "My  men  have  become  women;  my  women, 
men."  Thus  was  Artemisia  not  only  preserved,  but  exalted  to  a 
higher  place  in  the  esteem  of  Xerxes  by  the  destruction  of  one  of  his 
own  ships;  among  the  crew  of  which  not  a  man  survived  to  tell  the 
true  story. 

Of  the  total  loss  of  either  fleet,  Herodotus  gives  us  no  estimate ; 
but  Diodorus  states  the  number  of  ships  destroyed  on  the  Grecian 
side  as  forty,  on  the  Persian  side  as  two  hundred;  independent  of 
those  which  were  made  prisoners  with  all  their  crews.  To  the  Per- 
sian loss  is  to  be  added,  the  destruction  of  all  those  troops  whom 
they  had  landed  before  the  battle  in  the  island  of  Psyttaleia.  As 
soon  as  the  Persian  fleet  was  put  to  flight,  Aristeides  carried  over 
some  Grecian  hoplites  to  that  island,  overpowered  the  enemy,  and 
put  them  to  death  to  a  man.  This  loss  appears  to  have  been  much 
deplored,  as  they  were  choice  troops;  in  great  proportion,  the  native 
Persian  guards. 

Great  and  capital  as  the  victory  was,  there  yet  remained  after  it  a 
sufficient  portion  of  the  Persian  fleet  to  maintain  even  maritime  war 
vigorously,  not  to  mention  the  powerful  land-force,  as  yet  unshaken. 
And  the  Greeks  themselves— immediately  after  they  had  collected  in 
their  island,  as  well  as  could  be  done,  the  fragments  of  shipping  and 
the  dead  bodies — made  ready  for  a  second  engagement.  But  they 
were  relieved  f  rom  this  necessity  by  the  pusillanimity  of  the  invading 
monarch,  in  whom  the  defeat  had  occasioned  a  sudden  revulsion 
from  contemptuous  confidence,  not  only  to  rage  and  disappointment, 
but  to  the  extreme  of  alarm  for  his  own'personal  safety.  He  was 
possessed  with  a  feeling  of  mingled  wrath  and  distrust  against  his 
naval  force,  which  consisted  entirely  of  subject  nations — Phenicians, 
Egyptians,  Kilikians,  Cyprians,  Pamphilians,  Ionic  Greeks,  etc., 
with  a  few  Persians  and  Medes  serving  on  board,  in  a  capacity  prob- 
ably not  well-suited  to  them.  None  of  these  subjects  had  any  inter- 
est in  the  success  of  the  invasion,  or  any  other  motive  for  service 


310  BATTLE  OF   SALAMIS. 

except  fear;  while  t  ho  sympathies  of  the  Ionic  Greeks  were 
decidedly  againsl  it.  Xerxes  now  came  to  suspect  the  fidelity,  or 
undervalue  the  courage,  of  all  these  naval  subjects.  He  fancied  that 
tiny  could  make  no  resistance  t<>  the  Greek  fleet,  and  dreaded  lest 
the  latter  should  sail  forthwith  to  the  Hellespont,  so  as  to  break  flown 
the  bridge  and  intercept  his  personal  retreat;  for  upon  the  mainten- 
ance of  that  bridge  he  conceived  his  nun  Bafety  to  turn,  not  Less  than 
thai  of  hi-  father  Darius,  when  retreating  from  Scythia,  upon  the 
preservation  of  the  bridge  over  the  Danube.  Againsl  the  Pheni- 
cians,  from  whom  he  had  expected  most,  his  rage  broke  out  in  such 
fierce  tin-rats,  thai  they  stole  away  from  the  fleel  in  the  night,  and 
departed  homeward.  Such  a  capital  desertion  made  future  naval 
struggle  still  more  hopeless,  and  Xerxes,  though  at  first  breathing 
je.  and  talking  about  a  vasl  mole  or  bridge  to  be  thrown  across 
the  strait  to  Salamis,  speedily  ended  by  giving  orders  to  the  whole 
fleet  to  have  Phalerum  in  the  night — not  without  disembarking, 
however,  the  best  soldiers  who  served  on  board.  They  were  directed 
to  make  straight  for  the  Hellespont,  and  there  to  guard  the  bridge 
against  his  arrival. 

This  resolution  was  prompted  by  Mardonius,  who  saw  the  real  ter- 
ror which  beset  his  master,  and  read  therein  sufficient  evidence  of 
danger  to  himself.  When  Xerxes  dispatched  to  Busa  intelligence  of 
his  disastrous  overthrow,  the  feel  inn' at  home  was  not  simply  that  of 
violent  grief  for  the  calamity,  and  fear  for  the  personal  safety  of  the 
monarch:  it  was  farther  imbittered  by  anger  against  Mardonius,  as 
the  instigator  of  this  ruinous  enterprise.  That  general  knew  full  well 
that  there  was  no  safety  for  him  in  returning  to  Persia  with  the 
shame  of  failure  on  his  head.  It  was  better  for  him  to  take  upon 
himself  the  chance  of  subduing  Greece,  which  he  had  good  hopes  of 
being  yet  able  to  do — and  to  advise  the  return  of  Xerxes  himself  to  a 
safe  aud  easy  residence  in  Asia.  Such  counsel  was  eminently  pala 
table  to  the  present  alarm  of  the  monarch,  while  it  opened  to  Mar 
donius  himself  a  fresh  chance  not  only  of  safety,  but  of  increased 
power  and  glory.  Accordingly  he  began  to  reassure  his  master  by 
representing  that  the  recent  blowr  was  alter  all  not  serious — that  it 
had  only  fallen  upon  the  inferior  part  of  his  force,  and  upon  worth- 
less foreign  slaves,  like  Phenicians,  Egyptians,  etc.,  while  the  native 
Persian  troops  yet  remained  unconquered  and  unconquerable,  fully 
adequate  to  execute  the  monarch's  revenge  upon  Hellas — that  Xerxes 
might  now  very  well  retire  with  the  bulk  of  his  army,  if  he  were  dis- 
posed, aud  that  he  (Mardonius)  would  pledge  himself  to  complete  the 
conquest,  at  the  head  of  800,000  chosen  troops.  This  proposition 
afforded  at  the  same  time  consolation  for  the  monarch's  wounded 
vanity,  aud  safety  for  his  person.  His  confidential  Persians,  and 
Artemisia  herself  on  being  consulted,  approved  of  the  step.  The 
latter  had  acquired  his  confidence  by  the  dissuasive  advice  which  she 
had  given  before  the  recent  deplorable  engagement,  and  she  had 


THE  GREEKS  PURSUE  THE  PERSIAN  FLEET.     JJH 

every  motive  now  to  encourage  a  proposition  indicating  solicitude 
for  his  person,  as  well  as  relieving  herself  from  the  obligation  of 
farther  service.  "If  Mardonius  desires  to  remain  (she  remarked 
contemptuously)  by  all  means  let  him  have  the  troops;  should  he  suc- 
ceed, thou  wilt  be  the  gainer;  should  he  even  perish,  the  loss  of  some 
of  thy  slaves  is  trifling,  so  long  as  thou  remain  est  safe,  and  thy  house 
in  power.  Thou  hast  already  accomplished  the  purpose  of  liiy  expe- 
dition, in  burning  Athens."  Xerxes,  while  adopting  this  counsel  and 
directing  the  return  of  his  fleet,  showed  his  satisfaction  with  the 
Halikarnassian  queen  by  intrusting  to  her  some  of  his  children,  with 
directions  to  transport  them  to  Ephesus. 

The  Greeks  at  Salamis  learnt  with  surprise  and  joy  the  departure 
of  the  hostile  fleet  from  the  bay  of  Phalerum.  and  immediately  put 
themselves  in  pursuit;  following  as  far  as  the  island  of  Andros  with- 
out success.  Themistokles  anil  the  Athenians  are  even  said  to  have 
been  anxious  to  push  on  forthwith  to  the  Hellespont,  and  there  break 
down  the  bridge  of  boats,  in  order  to  prevent  the  escape  of  Xerxes — 
had  they  not  been  restrained  by  the  caution  of  Eurybiades  ami  the 
Peloponuesiano,  who  represented  that  it  was  dangerous  to  detain  the 
Persian  monarch  in  the.  heart  of  Greece.  Themistokles  readily  suf- 
fered himself  to  be  persuaded,  and  contributed  much  to  divert  his 
countrymen  from  the  idea;  while  he  at  the  same  time  sent  the  faith- 
ful Sikiunus  a  second  time  to  Xerxes,  with  the  intimation  that  he 
(Themistokles)  had  restrained  the  impatience  of  the  Greeks  to  proceed 
without  delay  and  burn  the  Hellespoutic  bridge — and  that  he  had 
thus,  from  personal  friendship  to  the  monarch,  secured  for  him  a 
safe  retreat.  Though  this  is  the  story  related  by  Herodotus,  we  can 
hardly  believe  that  with  the  great  Persian  land-force  in  the  heart  of 
Attica,  there  could  have  been  any  serious  idea  of  so  distant  an  opera- 
tion as  that  of  attacking  the  bridge  at  the  Hellespont.  It  seems  more 
probahle  that  Themistokles  fabricated  the  intention,  with  a  view  of 
frightening  Xerxes  away,  as  well  as  of  establishing  a  personal  claim 
upon  his  gratitude  in  reserve  for  future  contingencies. 

Such  crafty  maneuvers,  and  long-sighted  calculations  of  possi- 
bility, seem  extraordinary:  but  the  facts  are  sufficiently  attested — 
since  Themistokles  lived  to  claim  as  well  as  to  receive  fulfillment  of 
the  obligation  thus  conferred.  Though  extraordinary,  they  will  not 
appear  inexplicable,  if  we  reflect,  first,  that  the  Persian  game,  even 
now  after  the  defeat  of  Salamis,  was  not  only  not  desperate,  but 
might  perfectly  well  have  succeeded,  if  it  had  been  played  with  rea- 
sonable prudence:  next,  that  there  existed  in' the  mind  of  this  emin- 
ent man  an  almost  unparalleled  combination  of  splendid  patriotism, 
long-sighted  cunning,  and  selfish  rapacity.  Themistokles  knew  better 
than  any  one  else  that  the  cause  of  Greece  had  appeared  utterly  des- 
perate, only  a  few  hours  before  the  late  battle :  moreover,  a  clever  man 
tainted  with  such  constant  guilt  might  naturally  calculate  on  being 
one  day  detected  and  punished,  even  if  the  Greeks  proved  successful, 


312  BATTLE   OF    SAL  AMIS. 

II,-  iim\\  employed  the  fleel  among  the  islands  of  the  Cyclades,  for 
the  purpose  of  levy  ing  fines  upon  them  as  a  punishment  for  adherence 
to  the  Persians.  He  firel  laid  siege  to  Andres,  telling  the  inhabitant? 
thai  he  came  to  demand  their  money,  bringing  with  him  two -rent 
Persuasion  and  Necessity.  To  which  the  Andrians  replied, 
thai  "Athens  wasa  great  city  and  blesl  with  excellenl  gods: but  that 
Viey  were  miserably  poor,  and  thai  there  were  two  unkind  gods  who 
always  stayed  with  them  and  would  never  quit  the  island — Poverty 
and  Helplessm  33.  [n  these  gods  the  Andrians  put  their  trust,  refus- 
ing tn  deliver  the  money  required;  for  .the  power  of  Athens  could 
overcome  their  inability."  While  the  fleel  was  engaged  in 
din-  againsl  the  Andrians  with  their  sad  protecting  deities, 
Thomistokles  sent  round  to  various  other  cities,  demanding  from 
them  private  sums  of  money  on  condition  of  securing  them  from 
attack.  From  Kury-tus,  Paros,  and  other  places,  he  thus  extorted 
bribes  for  himself  apart  from  the  other  generals,  but  it  appears  thai 
Andres  was  found  unprodu  live,  and  after  no  very  long  absence  the 
fleet  was  brought  back  to  Safamis. 

The  intimation  sent  by  Themistokles  perhaps  had  the  effect  of 
hastening  the  departure  of  Xerxes,  who  remained  in  Attica  only  a 
few  days  after  the  battle  of  Salamis,  and  then  withdrew  his  army 
ii  Bceotia  into  Thessaly,  where  Mardonius  made  choice  of  the 
troop-  to  lie  retained  for  his  future  operations,  lie  retained  the  Per- 
sians, Rdedes,  Sakae,  Baktrians,  and  Indians,  horse  as  well  as  foot, 
together  with  selecl  detachments  of  the  remaining  contingents;  mak- 
ing in  all.  according  to  Herodotus,  300,000  men.  But  as  it  was  now 
the  beginning  of  September,  and  a-  60,000  out  of  his  forces,  under 
Artabazus,  were  destined  to  escorl  Xerxes  himself  to  the  Hellespont, 
.Mardonius  proposed  to  winter  in  Thessaly,  and  to  postpone  farther 
military  operations  until  the  ensuing  spring. 

Having  left  most  of  these  troop-  under  the  orders  of  Mardonius  in 
Thessaly,  Xerxes  marched  away  with  the  resl  to  the  Hellespont,  by 
the  same  road  as  he  had  taken  in  his  advance  a  few  months  before. 
Respecting  his  retreat  a  plentiful  stock  of  stories  were  circulated — 
istent  with  each  other,  fanciful,  and  even  incredible.  Grecian 
nation,  in  the-  contemporary  poet  JEschylus,  as  well  as  in  the 
Latin  moralizers  Seneca  or  Juvenal,  delighted  in  handling  this  inva- 
sion with  the  maximum  of  light  and  shadow;  magnifying  the 
destructive  misery  and  humiliation  of  the  retreat  so  as  to  form  an 
impressive  contrast  with  the  super-human  pride  of  the  advance,  and 
illustrating  that  antithesis  with  unbounded  license  of  detail.  The 
sufferings  from  want  of  provision  were  doubtless  severe,  and  are 
described  a-  frightful  and  death-dealing.  The  magazines  stored  up 
for  the  advancing  march  had  been  exhausted,  so  that  the  retiring 
army  were  now  forced  to  seize  upon  the  corn  of  the  country  through 
which  they  passed — an  insufficient  maintenance,  eked  out  by  leaves, 
grass,  the   bark  of  trees,  and  other  wretched  substitutes  for  food 


JOY  OF   THE  GREEKS.  313 

Plague  and  dysentery  aggravated  their  misery,  and  occasioned  many 
to  be  left  behind  among  the  cities  through  whose  territory  the  retreat 
was  carried  ;  strict  orders  being  left  by  Xerxes  that  these  cities  should 
maintain  and  tend  them.  After  forty-five  days'  march  from  Attica, 
he  at  length  found  himself  at  the  Hellespont,  whither  his  fleet  retreat- 
ing from  Salamis,  had  arrived  long  before  him.  But  the  short-lived 
bridge  had  already  been  knocked  to  pieces  by  a  storm,  so  that  the 
army  was  transported  on  shipboard  across  to  Asia,  where  it  first 
obtained  comfort  and  abundance,  and  where  the  change  from  priva- 
tion to  excess  engendered  new  maladies.  In  the  time  of  Herodotus, 
the  citizens  of  Abdera  still  showed  the  gilt  scimitar  and  tiara,  which 
Xerxes  had  presented  to  them  when  he  halted  there  in  his  retreat,  in 
token  of  hospitality  and  satisfaction.  They  even  went  the  length  of 
affirming  that  never  since  his  departure  from  Attica  had  he  loosened 
his  girdle  until  he  reached  their  city.  So  fertile  was  Grecian  fancy 
in  magnifying  the  terror  of  the  repulsed  invader !  who  re-entered 
Sardis  with  a  broken  army  and  humbled  spirit,  only  eight  months 
after  he  had  left  it  as  the  presumed  conqueror  of  the  western  world. 
Meanwhile  the  Athenians  and  Peloponnesians,  liberated  from  the 
immediate  presence  of  the  enemy  either  on  land  or  sea,  and  passing 
from  the  extreme  of  terror  to  sudden  ease  and  security,  indulged  in 
the  full  delight  and  self-congratulation  of  unexpected  victory.  On 
the  day  before  the  battle,  Greece  had  seemed  irretrievably  lost  :  she 
was  now  saved  even  against  all  reasonable  hope,  and  the  terrific 
cloud  impending  over  her  was  dispersed.  At  the  division  of  the 
booty,  the  iEginetans  were  adjudged  to  have  distinguished  them- 
selves most  in  the  action,  and  to  be  entitled  to  the  choice  lot  ;  while 
various  tributes  of  gratitude  were  also  set  apart  for  the  gods.  Among 
them  were  three  Phenician  triremes,  which  were  offered  in  dedication 
to  Ajax  at  Salamis,  to  Athene  at  Sunium  and  to  Poseidon  at  the 
Isthmus  of  Corinth.  Farther  presents  were  sent  to  Apollo  at  Delphi, 
who  on  being  asked  whether  he  was  satisfied,  replied  that  all  had 
done  their  duty  to  him  except  the  2E«inetans;  from  them  he  required 
additional  munificence  on  account  of  the  prize  awarded  to  them,  and 
they  were  constrained  to  dedicate  in  the  temple  four  golden  stars 
upon  a  staff  of  brass,  which  Herodotus  himself  saw  there.  Next  to 
the  jEginetans,  the  second  place  of  honor  was  awarded  to  the 
Athenians ;  the  2Eginetan  Polykritus,  and  the  Athenians,  Eumenes 
and  Ameinias,  being  ranked  first  among  the  individual  combatants. 
Respecting  the  behavior  of  Adeimantus  and  the  Corinthians  in  the 
battle,  the  Athenians  of  the  time  of  Herodotus  drew  the  most  un- 
favorable picture,  representing  them  to  have  fled  at  the  commence- 
ment and  to  have  been  only  brought  baek'by  the  information  that 
the  Greeks  were  gaining  the  victory.  Considering  the  character  of 
the  debates  which  had  preceded,  and  the  impatient  eagerness  mani- 
fested by  the  Corinthians  to  fight  at  the  Isthmus  instead  of  at  Sala- 
mis, some  such  backwardness  on  their  part,  when  forced  into  a 


314  BATTLES  OP  PLAT.EA  AND  MYKALE. 

battle  at  tho  lattor  place,  would  not  be  in  itself  improbable.  Yet  in 
this  case  it  seems  that  not  only  the  Corinthians  themselves,  but  also 
the  general  voice  of  Greece,  contradicted  the  Athenian  story,  and 
defended  thorn  as  having  behaved  with  bravery  and  forwardness. 
Wernust  recollect  that  at  the  time'when  Herodotus  probably  col- 
lectedhia  information,  a  bitter  feeling  of  hatred  prevailed  between 
Athens  and  Corinth,  and  Aristeus  son  of  Adeiinantus  was  among  the 
most  efficient  enemies  of  the  former. 

Besides  the  first  and  second  prizes  of  -valor,  the  chiefs  at  the  Isth- 
mus tried  to  adjudicate  among  themselves  the  first  and  second  prizeB 
of  skill  and  wisdom.  Each  of  them  deposited  two  names  on  the 
altar  of  Poseidon  :  and  when  these  votes  came  to  be  looked  at,  it  was 
found  that  each  man  had  voted  for  himself  as  deserving  the  first 
prize,  but  that  Themistokles  had  a  large  majority  of  votes  for  the 
second.  The  result  of  such  voting  allowed  no  man  to  claim  the  first 
prize,  nor  could  the  chiefs  give  a  second  prize  without  it;  so  that 
Themistokles  was  disappointed  of  his  reward,  though  exalted  so 
much  the  higher,  perhaps  through  that  very  disappointment,  in  gen- 
eral renown.  He  went  shortly  after  to  .Sparta,  where  he  received 
from  the  Lacedaemonians  honors  such  as  were  never  paid  before  nor 
afterward,  to  any  foreigner.  A  crown  of  olive  was  indeed  given  to 
Eur\  blades  as  the  first  prize,  buta  like  crown  was  at  the  same  time 
conferred  on  Themistokles  as  a  special  reward  for  unparalleled 
sagacity  ;  together  with  a  chariot,  the  finest  which  the  city  afforded. 
Moreover  on  bis  departure,  the  300  select  youths  called  Hippies,  who 
formed  the  active  guard  and  police  of  the  country,  all  accompanied 
him  in  a  body  as  escort  of  honor  to  the  frontiers  of  Tegea.  Such 
demonstrations  were  so  astonishing,  from  the  haughty  and  immov- 
able Spartan,  that  they  were  ascribed  by  somo  authors  to  their  fear 
lest  Themistokles  should  be  offended  by  being  deprived  of  the 
general  prize  :  and  they  are  even  said  to  have  excited  the  jealousy  of 
the  Athenians  so  much,  that  he  was  displaced  from  his  place  of  gen- 
eral, to  which  Xanthippus  was  nominated.  Neither  of  these  last 
reports  is  likely  to  be  true,  nor  is  either  of  them  confirmed  by  Hero- 
dotus. The  fact  that  Xanthippus  became  general  of  the  fleet  during 
the  ensuing  year,  is  in  regular  course  of  the  Athenian  change  of  offi- 
cers, and  implies  no  peculiar  jealousy  of  Themistokles. 


CHAPTER  XLII. 

BATTLES   OF  PLAT.fi!A   AND   MYKAT.E. —  FINAL     REPULSE     OP    THE 
PEBSIANS. 

Though  the  defeat  at  Salamis  deprived  the  Persians  of  all  hope 
from  farther  maritime  attack  of  Greece,  they  still  anticipated  success 
by  land  from  the  ensuing  campaign  of  Mardonius.   Their  fleet,  after 


REVOLT  OP  POTID^SA  315 

haying  conveyed  the  monarch  himself  with  his  accompanying  land- 
force  across  the  Hellespont,  retired  to  winter  at  Kyme  and  Samoa  ; 
in  the  latter  of  which  places  large  rewards  were  bestowed  upon 
Theomestor  and  Phylakus,  two  Samian  captains  who  had  distin- 
guished themselves  in  the  late  engagement.  Theomestor  was  even 
nominated  despot  of  Samos  under  Persian  protection.  Early  in  the 
spring  they  were  reassembled — to  the  number  of  400  sail,  but  with- 
out the  Phenicians — at  the  naval  station  of  Samos,  intending  how- 
ever only  to  maintain  a  watchful  guard  over  Ionia,  and  hardly  sup- 
posing that  the  Greek  fleet  would  venture  to  attack  them. 

For  a  long  time,  the  conduct  of  that  fleet  was  such  as  to  justify 
such  belief  in  its  enemies.  Assembled  at  iEgina  in  the  spring,  to  the 
number  of  110  ships,  under  the  Spartan  king  Leotychides,  it 
advanced  as  far  as  Delos,  but  not  farther  eastward  :  nor  could  all 
the  persuasions  of  Chian  and  other  Ionian  envoys,  dispatched  both  to 
the  Spartan  authorities  and  to  the  fleet,  and  promising  to  revolt  from 
Persia  as  soon  as  the  Grecian  fleet  should  appear,  prevail  upon  Leoty- 
chides to  hazard  any  aggressive  enterprise.  Ionia  and  the  eastern 
waters  of  the  JEgean  had  now  been  for  fifteen  years  completely 
under  the  Persians,  and  so  little  visited  by  the  Greeks,  that  a  voyage 
thither  appeared  especially  to  the  maritime  inexperience  of  a  Spartan 
king,  like  going  to  the  Pillars  of  Herakles  :  not  less  venturesome 
than  the  same  voyage  appeared,  fifty-two  years  afterward,  to  the 
Lacedaemonian  admiral  Alkidas,  when  he  first  hazarded  his  fleet 
amidst  the  preserved  waters  of  the  Athenian  empire. 

Meanwhile  the  hurried  and  disastrous  retreat  of  Xerxes  had  pro- 
duced less  disaffection  among  his  subjects  and  allies  thanmighthave 
been  anticipated.  Alexander,  king  of  Macedon,  the  Thessalian 
Aleuadae,  and  theBceotian  leaders,  still  remained  in  hearty  co-opera- 
tion with  Mardonius  ;  nor  were  there  any,  except  the  Phokians, 
whose  fidelity  to  him  appeared  questionable,  among  all  the  Greeks 
northwest  of  the  boundaries  of  Attica  and  Megaris.  It  was  only 
in  the  Chalkidic  peninsula,  that  any  actual  revolt  occurred.  Potidaea, 
situated  on  the  Isthmus  of  Pallene,  as  well  as  the  neighboring  towns 
in  the  long  tongue  of  Pallene,  declared  themselves  independent :  and 
the  neighboring  town  of  Olynthus,  occupied  by  the  semi-Grecian 
tribe  of  Bottiaeans,  was  on  the  point  of  following  their  example. 
The  Persian  general  Artabazus,  on  his  return  from  escorting  Xerxes 
to  the  Hellespont,  undertook  the  reduction  of  these  towns,  and  suc- 
ceeded perfectly  with  Olynthus.  He  took  the  town,  slew  all  the 
inhabitants,  and  handed  it  over  to  a  fresh  population,  consisting  of 
Chalkidic  Greeks  under  Critobulus  of  Torone.  It  was  in  this  manner 
that  Glynthus,  afterward  a  city  of  so  much  consequence  and  interest, 
first  became  Grecian  and  Chalkidic.  But  Artabazus  was  not  equally 
successful  in  the  siege  of  Potidaea,  the  defense  of  which  was  aided 
by  citizens  from  the  other  towns  in  Pallene.  A  plot  which  he 
concerted  with  Timoxenus,  commander  of  the  Skionaean  auxiliaries 


316  BATTLES  OF  PLATiBA  AND  MYKALE. 

in  the  town,  became  accidentally  disclosed  :  a  considerable  body  of 
bis  troops  perished  while  attempting  to  pass  at  low  tide  under  the 
walls  of  the  city,  which  were  buili  across  the  entire  breadth  of  the 
narrow  isthmus  joining  the  Palleneean  peninsula  to  the  mainland  : 
and  after  three  months  of  blockade,  he  was  forced  to  renounce  the 
enterprise,  withdrawing  his  troops  to  rejoin  Mardonius  inThessaly. 

Mardonius,  before  he  put  himself  in  motion  for  the  spring  cam- 
paign, thought  it  advisable  to  consult  the  Grecian  oracles,  (specially 
those  within  the  limits  of  Bceotia  and  Phokis.  lie  sent  a  Karian 
named  Mys,  familiar  with  the  Greek  as  well  as  the  Karian  language, 
to  consult  Trophonius  at  Labedeia,  Amphiaraus,  and  thelsmenisn 
Apollo  at  Thebes,  Apollo  at  Mount  Ptoon  near  Akraephiae,  and  Apollo 
at  the  Phokian  Aliae.  This  step  was  probably  intended  as  a  sort  of 
ostentatious  respect  toward  the  religious  feelings  of  allies  upon  whom 
he  was  now  very  much  dependent.  But  neither  the  questions  put, 
nor  the  answers  given,  were  made  public.  The  only  remarkable 
fact  which  Herodotus  had  heard,  was,  that  the  priests  of  the  Ptoian 
Apollo  delivered  his  answer  in  Karian,  or  at  least  in  a  language 
intelligible  to  no  person  present  except  the  Karian  Mys  himself.  It 
appears,  however,  that  at  this  period,  when  Mardonius  was  seeking 
to  strengthen  himself  by  oracles,  and  laying  his  plans  for  establishing 
a  separate  peace  and  alliance  with  Athens  against  the  Peloponnes- 
ians,  some  persons  in  his  interest  circulated  predictions,  that  the  day 
was  approaching  when  the  Persians  and  the  Athenians  jointly  would 
expel  the  Dorians  from  Peloponnesus.  The  way  was  thus  paved  for 
him  to  send  an  envoy  to  Athens — Alexander  king  of  Macedon  ;  who 
was  instructed  to  make  the  most  seductive  offers  — to  promise  repara- 
tion of  all  the  damage  done  in  Attica,  as  well  as  the  active  future 
friendship  of  the  great  King — and  to  hold  out  to  the  Athenians  a 
large  acquisiton  of  new  territory  as  the  price  of  their  consent  to 
form  with  him  an  equal  and  independent  alliance.  The  Macedonian 
prince  added  warm  expressions  of  his  own  interest  in  the  welfare  of 
the  Athenians,  recommending  them  as  a  sincere  friend  to  embrace 
propositions  so  advantageous  as  well  as  so  honorable  :  especially  as 
the  Persian  power  must  in  the  end  prove  too  much  for  them,  and 
Attica  lay  exposed  to  Mardonius  and  his  Grecian  allies,  without  be- 
ing covered  by  any  common  defense  as  Peloponnesus  was  protected 
by  its  Isthmus. 

This  offer,  dispatched  in  the  spring,  found  the  Athenians  re-estab- 
lished wholly  or  partially  in  their  half-ruined  city.  A  simple  tender 
of  mercy  and  tolerable  treatment,  if  dispatched  by  Xerxes  from 
Thermopylae  the  year  before,  might  perhaps  have  gone  far  to  detach 
them  from  the  cause  of  Hellas  :  and  even  at  the  present  moment, 
though  the  pressure  of  overwhelming  terror  had  disappeared,  there 
were  many  inducements  for  them  to  accede  to  the  proposition  of 
Mardonius.  The  alliance  of  Athens  would  insure  to  the  Persian 
general  unquestionable  predominance  in  Greece,  and  to  Athens  her- 


TEMPTATION  TO  ATHENS.  317 

self  protection  from  farther  ravage  as  well  as  the  advantage  of  play- 
ing a  winning  game  :  while  his  force,  his  position,  and  his  alliances, 
even  as  they  then  stood,  threatened  a  desolating  and  doubtful  war, 
of  which  Attica  would  bear  the  chief  brunt.  Moreover  the  Athe- 
nians were  at  this  time  suffering  privations  of  the  severest  charac- 
ter ;  for  not  only  did  their  ruined  houses  and  temples  require  to  be 
restored,  but  they  had  lost  the  harvest  of  the  past  summer  together 
with  the  seed  of  the  past  autumn.  The  pruilential  view  of  the  case 
being  thus  favorable  to  Mardonius  rather  than  otherwise,  and  espe- 
cially strengthened  by  the  distress  which  reigned  in  Athens,  the  Lace- 
'  daemonians  were  so  much  afraid  lest  Alexander  should  carry  his 
point,  that  they  sent  envoys  to  dissuade  the  Athenians  from  listening 
to  him,  as  well  as  to  tender  succor  during  the  existing  poverty  of 
the  city.  After  having  heard  both  parties,  the  Athenians  delivered 
their  reply  in  terms  of  solemn  and  dignified  resoh;tion,  which  their 
descendants  delighted  in  repeating.  To  Alexander  they  said  :  "Cast 
not  in  our  teeth  that  the  power  of  the  Persian  is  many  times  greater 
than  ours  :  we  too  know  that,  as  well  as  thou  :  but  we  nevertheless 
love  freedom  well  enough  to  resist  him  in  the  best  manner  we  can. 
Attempt  not  the  vain  task  of  talking  us  over  into  alliance  with 
him.  Tell  Mardonius  that  as  long  as  the  sun  shall  continue  in  his 
present  path,  we  will  never  contract  alliance  with  Xerxes  :  we  will 
encounter  him  in  our  own  defense,  putting  our  trust  in  the  aid  of 
those  gods  and  heroes  to  whom  he  has  shown  no  reverence,  and 
whose  houses  and  statues  he  has  burnt.  Come  thou  not  to  us  again 
with  similar  propositions,  nor  pursuade  us  even  in  the  spirit  of 
good-will,  into  unholy  proceedings  :  thou  art  the  guest  and  friend 
of  Athens,  and  we  would  not  that  thou  shouldst  suffer  injury  at  our 
hands." 

To  the  Spartans,  the  reply  of  the  Athenians  was  of  a  similar  deci- 
sive tenor  ;  protesting  their  unconquerable  devotion  to  the  common 
cause  and  liberties  of  Hellas,  and  promising  that  no  conceivable 
temptations,  either  of  money  or  territory,  should  induce  them  to 
desert  the  ties  of  brotherhood,  common  language,  and  religion.  So 
long  as  a  single  Athenian  survived,  no  alliance  should  ever  be  made 
with  Xerxes.  They  then  thanked  the  Spartans  for  offering  them  aid 
during  the  present  privations  :  but  while  declining  such  offers,  they 
reminded  them  that  Mardonius,  when  apprised  that  his  propositions 
were  refused,  would  probably  advance  immediately,  and  they  there- 
fore earnestly  desired  the  presence  of  a  Peloponnesian  army  in 
Boeotia  to  assist  in  the  defense  of  Attica.  The  Spartan  envoys, 
promising  fulfillment  of  this  request,  and  satisfied  to  have  ascertained 
the  sentiments  of  Athens,  departed. 

Such  unshaken  fidelity  on  the  part  of  the  Athenians  to  the  general 
cause  of  Greece,  in  spite  of  present  suffering  combined  with  seductive 
offers  for  the  future,  was  the  just  admiration  of  their  descendants 
and  the  frequent  theme  of  applause  by  their  orators.    But  among 


318  BATTLES  OF   I'LAT.EA  AND  MYKALE. 

the  contemporary  Greeks  it  was  hailed  only  as  a  relief  from  danger, 
ami  repaid  by  a  selfish  and  ungenerous  neglect.  The  same  feeling 
of  indifference  toward  all  Greeks  outside  of  their  own  isthmus, 
which  hal  ho  deeply  endangered  the  march  of  affairs  before  the  bat- 
tle of  Salamis,  now  manifested  itself  a  s ml  time  among  the  Spar- 
tans and  PeloponnesianSi  The  wall  across  the  isthmus,  which  they 
had  been  bo  busy  in  constructing  and  on  which  they  had  relied  for 
protection  against  the  land  force  of  Xerxes,  had  been  intermitted  and 
left  unfinished  w  b<  D  he  retired  :  but  it  was  resumed  as  soon  as  the 
forward  march  of  Mardonius  was  anticipated.  It  was,  however,  still 
unfinished  at  the  time  of  the  embassy  of  the  Macedonian  prince  to 
Athens,  and  this  incomplete  condition  of  their  special  defense  was  one 
reason  of  their  alarm  lest  the  Athenians  should,  accept  terms  proposed. 
That  danger  being  for  the  time  averted,  they  redoubled  their  exertions 
at  the  Isthmus,  so  that  the  wall  was  speedily  brought  into  an  adequate 
state  of  defense  and  tho  battlements  along  the  summit  were  in  course 
of  being  constructed.  Thus  safe  behind  their  own  bulwark,  they 
thought  nothing  more  of  their  promise  to  join  the  Athenians  in 
Bceotia  and  to  assist  in  defending  Attica  against  Mardonius.  Indeed 
their  king  Cleombrotus,  who  commanded  the  force  at  tho  Isthmus, 
was  so  terrified  by  an  obscuration  of  the  sun  at  the  moment  when  he 
was  sacrificing  to  ascertain  the  inclinations  of  the  gods  in  reference 
to  the  coming  war,  that  he  even  thought  it  necessary  to  retreat  with 
the  main  force  to  Sparta,  where  he  soon  after  died.  Besides  these 
two  reasons— indifference  and  unfavorable  omens — which  restrained 
the  Spartans  from  aiding  Attica,  there  was  also  a  third  :  they  were 
engaged  in  celebrating  the  festival  of  tho  Ilyakinthia,  and  it  was 
their  paramount  object  (says  the  historian)  to  fulfill  "  the  exigences 
of  tho  god."  As  the  Olympia  and  the  Karneia  in  the  preceding  year, 
so  now  did  the  Hyakipthia  prevail  over  the  necessities  of  defense, 
putting  out  of  sight  both  the  duties  of  fidelity  toward  an  exposed 
ally  and  the  bond  of  an  express  promise. 

Meanwhile  Mardonius,  informed  of  the  unfavorable  reception 
which  his  proposals  had  received  in  Athens,  put  his  army  in  motion 
forthwith  from  Thessaly,  joined  by  all  his  Grecian  auxiliaries,  and 
by  fresh  troops  from  Thrace  and  Macedonia.  As  he  marched  through 
Bceotia,  the  Thebans,  who  heartily  espoused  his  cause,  endeavored 
to  dissuade  him  from  farther  military  operations  against  the  united 
force  of  his  enemies — urging  him  to  try  the  efficacy  of  bribes,  pre- 
sented to  the  leading  men  in  the  different  cities,  for  the  purpose  of 
disuniting  them.  But  Mardonius,  eager  to  repossess  himself  of 
Attica,  heeded  not  their  advice.  About  ten  months  after  the  retreat 
of  Xerxes  he  entered  the  country  without  resistance,  and  again  estab- 
lished the  Persian  headquarters  in  Athens  (May  or  June— 479  b.  c. ). 

Before  he  arrived,  the  Athenians  had  again  removed  to  Salamis, 
under  feelings  of  bitter  disappointment  and  indignation.  They  had 
in  vain  awaited  the  fulfillment  of  the  Spartan  promise  that  a  Pelo- 


SLACKNESS  OF  THE  SPARTANS        319 

ponnesian  army  should  join  them  in  Boeotia  for  the  defence  of  their 
frontier  ;  at  length,  being  unable  to  make  head  against  the  enemy 
alone,  they  found  themselves  compelled  to  transport  their  families 
across  to  Salamis.  The  migration  was  far  less  terrible  than  that  of 
the  preceding  summer,  since  Mardonius  had  no  fleet  to  harass  them. 
But  it  was  more  gratuitous,  and  might  have  been  obviated  had 
the  Spartans  executed  their  covenant,  which  would  have  brought 
about  the  battle  of  Plataea  two  months  earlier  than  it  actually  was 
fought. 

Mardonius,  though  master  of  Athens,  was  so  anxious  to  concilate 
the  Athenians,  that  he  at  first  abstained  from  damaging  either  the 
city  or  the  country,  and  dispatched  a  second  envoy  to  Salamis  to 
repeat  the  offers  made  through  Alexander  of  Macedon.  He  thought 
that  they  might  now  be  listened  to,  since  he  could  offer  the  exemption 
of  Attica  from  ravage  as  an  additional  temptation.  Mury chides,  a 
Hellespontine  Greek,  was  sent  to  renew  these  propositions  to  the 
Athenian  Senate  at  Salamis  ;  but  he  experienced  a  refusal  not  less 
resolute  than  what  had  been  returned  to  Alexander  of  Macedon, 
and  all  but  unanimous.  One  unfortunate  senator,  Lydikas,  made  an 
exception  to  this  unanimity,  venturing  to  recommend  acceptance 
of  the  propositions  of  Murychides.  So  furious  was  the  wrath,  or  so 
strong  the  suspicion  of  corruption,  which  his  single-voiced  negative 
provoked,  that  senators  and  people  both  combined  to  stone  him  to 
death  ;  while  the  Athenian  women  in  Salamis,  hearing  what  had 
passed,  went  of  their  own  accord  to  the  house  of  Lykidas,  and  stoned 
to  death  his  wife  and  children.  In  the  desperate  pitch  of  resolution 
to  which  the  Athenians  were  now  wound  up,  an  opponent  passed  for 
a  traitor  ;  unanimity,  even  though  extorted  by  terror,  was  essential  to 
their  feelings.  Murychides,  though  his  propositions  were  refused, 
was  dismissed  without  injury. 

While  the  Athenians  thus  gave  renewed  proofs  of  their  steadfast 
attachment  to  the  cause  of  Hellas,  they  at  the  same  time  sent  envoys 
conjointly  with  Megara  and  Plataea,  to  remonstrate  with  the  Spartans 
on  their  backwardness  and  breach  of  faith,  and  to  invoke  them  even 
thus  late  to  come  forth  at  once  and  meet  Mardonius  in  Attica  ;  not 
omitting  to  intimate,  that  if  they  were  thus  deserted,  it  would  become 
imperatively  necessary  for  them,  against  their  will,  to  make  terms 
with  the  enemy.  So  careless,  however,  were  the  Spartan  Ephors 
respecting  Attica  and  the  Megarid,  that  they  postponed  giving  an 
answer  to  these  envoys  for  ten  successive  days,  while  in  the  meantime 
they  pressed  with  all  their  efforts  the  completion  of  the  Isthmic  forti- 
fications. And  after  having  thus  amused  the  envoys  as  long  as  they 
could,  they  would  have  dismissed  them  at  last  with  a  negative  answer 
— such  was  their  fear  of  adventuring  beyond  the  Isthmus— had  not  a 
Tegean  named  Chileos,  whom  they  much  esteemed  and  to  whom  they 
communicated  the  application,  reminded  them  that  no  fortifications 
at  the  Isthmus  would  suffice  for  the  defense  of  Peloponnesus,  if  the 


320      BATTLES  OF  PLAT^A  AND  MYKALE. 

Athenians  became  allied  with  Mardonius,  and  thus  laid  the  peninsula 
open  by  sea. 

The  strong  opinion  of  this  respected  Togean,  proved  to  the  Ephors 
that  their  selfish  policy  would  not  be  seconded  by  their  chief  Pelo- 
ponnesian  allies;  and  brought  to  their  attention,  probably  for  the  first 
time,  that  danger  by  sea  might  again  be  renewed,  though  the  Persian 
fleet  had  been  beaten  in  the  preceding  year,  and  was  now  at  a  dis- 
tance from  Greece.  It  changed  their  resolution,  not  less  completely 
than  suddenly;  so  that  th<  y  <lispatched  forth  within  the  night  5,000 
Spurt  m  citizens  to  the  Isthmus — each  man  with  seven  Helots 
attached  to  him.  And  when  the  Athenian  envoys,  ignorant  of  this 
sudden  change  of  policy,  came  on  the  next  day  to  give  peremptory 
notice  that  Athens  would  no  longer  endure  such  t  reacherous  betrayal, 
but  would  forthwith  take  measures  for  her  own  security  and  separate- 
pacification,  the  Ephors  affirmed  on  their  oath  that  the  troops  were 
already  on  their  march,  and  were  probably  by  this  timeout  of  the 
Spartan  territory.  Considering  that  this  step  was  an  expiation 
imperfect,  tardy,  and  reluctant,  for  foregoing  desertion  and  breach 
of  promise — the  Ephors  may  probably  have  thought  that  the  mystery 
of  the  night  march,  and  the  sudden  communication  of  it  as  an  actual 
fact  to  the  envoys,  in  the  way  of  reply,  would  impress  more  emphat- 
ically the  minds  of  the  latter  ;  who  returned  with  the  welcome  tidings 
toSalamis,  and  prepared  their  countrymen  for  speedy  action.  Five 
thousand  Spartan  citizens,  each  with  seven  light-armed  Helots  as 
attendants,  were  thus  on  their  march  to  the  theatre  of  war.  Through- 
out the  whole  course  of  Grecian  History,  we  never  hear  of  any  num- 
ber of  Spartan  citizens  at  all  approaching  to  5, 000  being  put  on  foreign 
service  at  the  same  time.  But  this  was  not  all;  5,000  Lacedaemonian 
Periceki,  each  with  one  light-armed  Helot  to  attend  him,  were  also 
dispatched  to  the  Isthmus,  to  take  part  in  the  same  struggle.  Such 
unparalleled  efforts  afford  sufficient  measure  of  the  alarm  which, 
though  late,  yet  Teal,  now  reigned  at  Sparta.  Other  Peloponnesian 
cities  followed  the  example,  and  a  large  army  was  thus  collected 
under  the  Spartan  Pausanias. 

It  appears  that  Mardonius  was  at  this  moment  in  secret  correspond- 
ence with  the  Argeians,  who,  though  professing  neutrality,  are  said 
to  have  promised  him  that  they  would  arrest  the  march  of  the  Spartans 
beyond  their  own  borders.  If  they  ever  made  such  a  promise,  the 
suddenness  of  the  march,  as  well  as  the  greatness  of  the  force,  pre- 
vented them  from  fulfilling  it ;  and  may  perhaps  have  been  so  intended ' 
by  the  Ephors,  under  the  apprehension  that  resistance  might  possibly 
be  offered  by  the  Argeians.  At  any  rate,  the  latter  were  forced  to 
content  themselves  with  apprising  Mardonius  instantly  of  the  fact, 
through  their  swiftest  courier.  It  determined  that  general  to  evacuate 
Attica,  and  to  carry  on  the  war  in  Bceotia — a  country  in  every  way 
more  favorable  to  him.  He  had  for  some  time  refrained  from  com- 
mitting devastations  in  or  around  Athens,  hoping  that  the  Athenians 


APATHY  OF  THE  PERSIANS.  321 

might  be  induced  to  listen  to  his  propositions;  but  the  last  days  of 
his  stay  were  employed  in  burning  and  destroying  whatever  had  been 
spared  by  the  host  of  Xerxes  during  the  preceding  summer.  After  a 
fruitless  attempt  to  surprise  a  body  of  1000  Lacedaemonians  which 
had  been  detached  for  the  protection  of  Megara,  he  withdrew  all  his 
army  into  Bceotia,  not  taking  either  the  stratght  road  to  Platsea, 
through  Eleuthera?,  or  to  Thebes  through  Phyle,  botli  which  roads 
were  mountainous  and  inconvenient  for  cavalry,  but  marching  in  the 
north-easterly  direction  to  Dekeleia,  where  he  was  met  by  some  guides 
from  the  adjoining  regions  near  the  river  Asopus,  and  conducted 
through  the  deme  of  Splieudaleis  to  Tanagra.  He  thus  found  him 
self  after  a  route  longer  but  easier,  in  Bceotia,  on  the  plain  of  the 
Asopus;  along  which  river  he  next  day  marched  westward  to  Skolus, 
a  town  in  the  territory  of  Thebes  seemingly  near  to  that  of  Platasa. 
He  then  took  up  a  position  not  far  off,  in  the  plain  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  Asopus:  his  left  wing  over  against  Erythra,  his  center  over 
against  Hysise,  and  his  right  in  the  territory  of  Platrea  :  and  he 
employed  his  army  in  constructing  a  fortified  camp  of  ten  furlongs 
square,  defended  by  wooden  walls  and  towers,  cut  from  trees  in  the 
Theban  territory. 

Mardonius  found  himself  thus  with  his  numerous  army,  in  a  plain 
favorable  for  cavalry;  with  a  camp  more  or  less  defensible — the  for- 
tified city  of  Thebes  in  his  rear — and  a  considerable  stock  of  provis- 
ions as  well  as  a  friendly  region  behind  him  from  whence  to  draw 
more.  Few  among  his  army,  however,  were  either  hearty  in  the 
cause  or  confident  of  success:  even  the  native  Persians  had  been 
disheartened  by  the  flight  of  the  monarch  the  year  before,  and  were 
full  of  melancholy  auguries. 

A  splendid  banquet  to  which  the  Theban  leader  Attaginus  invited 
Mardonius,  along  with  fifty  Persian  and  fifty  Theban  or  Boeotian 
guests,  exhibited  proofs  of  this  depressed  feeling,  which  were  after- 
ward recounted  to  Herodotus  himself  by  one  of  the  guests  present — 
an  Orchomenian  citizen  of  note  named  Thersander.  The  banquet 
being  sc  arranged  that  each  couch  was  occupied  by  one  Persian  and 
one  Theban,  this  man  was  accosted  in  Greek  by  his  Persian  neigh- 
bor, who  inquired  to  what  city  he  belonged;  and  upon  learning  that 
he  was  an  Orchomenian,  continued  thus:  "  Since  thou  hast  now  par- 
taken with  me  in  the  same  table  and  cup,  I  desire  to  leave  with  thee 
some  memorial  of  my  convictions;  the  rather  in  order  that  thou  may- 
est  be  thyself  forewarned  so  as  to  take  the  best  counsel  for  thine  own 
safety.  Seest  thou  these  Persians  here  feasting,  and  the  army  which 
we  left  yonder  encamped  near  the  river?  Yet  a  little  while,  and  out 
of  all  these  thou  shalt  behold  but  few  surviving."  Thersander  lis- 
tened to  these  words  with  astonishment,  spoken  as  they  were  with 
strong  emotion  and  a  flood  of  tears,  and  replied — "Surely  thou  art 
bound  to  reveal  this  to  Mardonius,  and  to  his  confidential  advisers:" 
but  the  Persian  rejoined — "  My  friend,  man  cannot  avert  that  which 
H.  G.  II.— 11 


RATTLES  OF  PLAT.EA  A^  MYKALE. 

God  li:itii  decreed  to  come:  no  one 'will  believe  the  revelation,  sure 
though  11  l"'.  .Many  df  us  Persians  know  this  well,  and  are  here 
bi  n  ing  only  under  il'ic  bond  of  necessity .  And  truly  this  i*  the  most 
hateful  of  all  human  sufferings — to  lie  full  of  knowledge  and  al  the 
same  time  to  have  no  power  over  any  result." — " This  (observes 
Herodotus)  1  beard  myself  from  the  Orchomenian  Thereander,  who 
told  me  farther  that  he  mentioned  the  facl  to  several  persons  about 

him  even  before  llie  battle  of  l'iata.'i."  Il  is  certainly  one  of  the 
urious  revelations  in  the  whole  history;  no1  merely  as  it  brings 
forward  the  historian  in  his  own  personality,  communicating  with  a 
personal  friend  of  the  Theban  leaders,  and  thus  provided  with 
means  of  information  as  to  the  general  event-  of  the  campaign — but 
also  as  it  discloses  to  us,  on  testimony  nol  to  be  suspected,  the  real 
t<  mper  of  the  native  Persians,  and  even  of  the  chief  men  among  them. 
If  so  many  of  these  chiefs  were  nol  merely  apathetie,  bul  despondent, 
in  the  cause,  much  more  decided  woidd  be  the  same  absence  of  will 
and  hope  in  their  followers  and  the  subject  allies.  To  follow  t lie 
monarch  in  his  overwhelming  march  of  the  preceding  year,  was  grat- 
ifying in  many  ways  to  the  native  Persians:  but  every  man  was  sick 
of  the  enterprise  as  now  cut  down  under  .Mardonius:  and  Artaba/.us, 
the  second  in  command,  was  not  merely  slack,  but  jealous  of  his 
superior.  Under  such  circumstances  we  shall  presently  not  lie  sur- 
prised to  find  the  whole  army  disappearing  forthwith,  the  moment 
Mardonius  is  slain. 

Among-  die  Grecian  allies  of  Mardonius,  the  Thebans  and  Boeotians 
were  active  and  zealous,  most  of  the  remainder  lukewarm,  and  the 
Phokiansev<  n  of  doubtful  fidelity.  Their  contingent  of  1000 hoplites, 
under  Harmokydes,  had  been  tardy  in  joining  him,  having  only  come 
op  since  he  retired  from  Attica  into  Bceotia:  and  some  of  the  Pho- 
kians  even  remained  behind  in  the  neighborhood  of  Parnassus,  prose- 
cuting manifest  hostilities  against  the  Persians.  Awareof  the  feeling 
among  this  contingent,  which  the  Thessalians  took  care  to  place  before 
him  in  an  unfavorable  point  of  view,  Mardonius  determined  to 
impress  upon  them  a  lesson  of  intimidation.  Causing  them  to  form 
m  a  separate  body  on  the  plain,  he  brought  up  bis  numerous  cavalry 
all  around  them;  while  the  Pheme,  or  sudden  simultaneous  impres- 
sion, ran  through  the  Greek  allies  as  well  as  the  Phokians themselves, 

thai    he  was  about  to  shoot  them  down.      The   general    Harmokydes. 

directing  his  men  to  form  a  square  and  close  their  ranks,  addressed 

to  them  short  exhortations  to  sell  their  lives  Icarly.  and  to  behave 
like  brave  Greeks  against  barbarian  assassins — when  the  cavalry  rode 
ip  apparently  to  tin-  charge,  and  advanced  close  to  the  square,  with  up 
lifted  javelins  and  arrows  on  the  string,  some  few  of  which  were  even 
actually  discharged.  The  Phokians  maintained,  as  enjoined,  steadj 
ranks  with  a  firm  countenance,  and  the  cavalry  wheeled  about  with- 
out any  actual  attack  or  damage.  After  this  mysterious  demonstra 
tion,  Mardonius  condescended  to  compliment  the  Phokians  on  their 


NUMBERS  OF  GREEKS  UNDER  PAUSANIAS.      323 

courage,  and  to  assure  them  by  means  of  a  herald  that  he  had  beeu 
greatly  misinformed  respecting  them,  lie  at  the  same  time  exhorted 
them  to  be  faithful  and  forward  in  serviee  for  the  future,  and  prom- 
ised that  all  good  behavior  should  be  amply  recompensed.  Herodotus 
seems  uncertain— difficult  as  the  supposition  is  to  entertain — whether 
Mardonius  did  not  really  intend  at  first  to  massacre  the  Phokians  in 
the  held,  and  desisted  from  the  intention  only  on  seeing  how  much 
blood  it  would  cost  to  accomplish.  However  this  may  be,  the  scene 
itself  was  a  remarkable  reality,  and  presented  one  among  many  other 
proofs  of  the  lukewarmness  and  suspicious  fidelity  of  the  army. 

Conformably  to  the  suggestion  of  the  Thebans,  the  liberties  of 
Greece  were  now  to  be  disputed  in  Bceotia:  and  not  only  had  the 
position  of  Mardonius  already  been  taken,  but  his  camp  also  fortified, 
before  the  united  Grecian  army  approached  Kitha3ron  in  its  forward 
march  from  the  Isthmus.  After  the  full  force  of  the  Lacedaemonians 
had  reached  the  Isthmus,  they  had  to  await  the  arrival  of  their  Pelo- 
ponnesian  and  other  confederates.  The  hoplites  who  joined  them 
were  as  follows:  from  Tega,  1500;  from  Corinth,  5,000,  besides  a 
small  body  of  300  from  the  Corinthian  colony  of  Potidae;  from  the 
Arcadian  Orchomeuus,  600;  from  Sikyon,  3,000;  from  Epidaurus, 
800;  from  Trcezen,  1000;  from  Lepreon,  200;  from  Mykenaa  and 
Tiryns,  400;  from  Phlius,  1000;  from  Hermione,  300;  from  Eretria 
and  Styra,  600;  from  Chalkis,  400;  from  Ambrakia,  500;  from  Leu- 
kas  and  Anaktorium,  800;  from  Pale  in  Kephallenia,  200;  from 
iEgina,  500.  On  marching  from  the  Isthmus  to  Megara,  they  took 
up  3,000  Megarian  hoplites;  and  as  soon  as  they  reached  Eleusis 
in  their  forward  progress,  the  army  was  completed  by  the  junction  of 
8,000  Athenian  hoplites,  and  600  Platiean,  under  Aristeides,  who 
passed  over  from  Salamis.  The  total  force  of  hoplites  or  heavy- 
armed  troops  was  thus  38,700  men.  There  were  no  cavalry,  and  but 
very  few  bowmen — but  if  we  add  those  who  are  called  light-armed 
or  unarmed  generally,  some  perhaps  with  javelins  or  swords,  but  none 
with  any  defensive  armor — the  grand  total  was  not  less  than  110,000 
men.  Of  these  light-armed  or  unarmed,  there  were,  as  computed  by 
Herodotus,  35,000  in  attendance  on  the  5,000  Spartan  citizens,  and 
34,500  in  attendance  on  the  other  hoplites;  together  with  1800  Thes- 
pians who  were  properly  hoplites,  yet  so  badly  armed  as  not  to  be 
reckoned  in  the  ranks. 

Such  was  the  number  of  Greeks  present  or  near  at  hand  in  the  com- 
bat against  the  Persians  at  Platrea,  which  took  place  some  little  time 
afterward.  But  it  seemed  that  the  contingents  were  not  at  first  com- 
pletely full,  and  that  new  additions  continued  to  arrive  until  a  few 
days  before  the  battle,  along  with  the  convoys  of  cattle  and  pro- 
visions which  came  for  the  subsistence  of  the  army.  Pausanias 
marched  first  from  the  Isthmus  to  Eleusis,  where  he  was  joined  by 
the  Athenians  from  Salamis.  At  Eleusis  as  well  as  at  the  Isthmus, 
the  sacrifices  were  found  encouraging,  and  the  united  army  then 


334  BATTLES   OF  PI.AT.KA    AND    MY  KALE. 

advanced  across  the  ridge  of  Kithaeron,  so  as  to  come  within  sighl  of 
the  Persians.  W  hen  Pausanias  sav»  them  occupy  the  line  of  the 
Asopus  in  the  plain  beneath,  he  kepi  his  own  arm]  on  the  mountain 
declivity  near  Erythrae,  without  i  hoosing  to  adventure  himself  in  thu 
level  ground.  IVlardonius,  finding  them  not  disposed  to  seek  battle 
in  the  plain,  dispatched  liis  numerous  and  excellent  cavaln  under 
Masistius,  the  most  distinguished  officer  in  his  army,  to  attack  them 
For  the  mosl  part,  the  ground  was  so  uneven  as  to  check  their 
approach;  bul  the  WEeganan  contingent,  which  happened  to  be  more 
exposed  than  the  rest,  were  so  hard  pressed  thai  they  were  forced  to 
Mini  tn  Pausanias  for  aid.  They  appear  to  have  had  not  only  no 
cavalry,  hut  no  bowmen  or  lighl  armed  troops  of  any  sort  with  mis- 
sile weapons;  while  the  Persians,  excellent  archers  and  darters,  using 
very  large  bows  and  trained  in  such  accomplishments  from  their 
earliest  childhood,  charged  in  successive  squadrons  and  overwhelmed 
the  Cicrks  with  darts  and  arrows — not  omitting  contemptuous  taunts 
on  their  cowardice  for  keeping  hack  from  the  plain.  So  general  was 
then  the  tear  of  the  Persian  cavalry,  that  Pausanias  could  find  none 
of  the  Greeks,  except  the  Athenians,  willing  to  volunteer  and  go  to 
the  rescue  of  the  Megarians.  A  body  of  Athenians,  however,  espe 
dally  300  chosen  troops  under  Olympiodorus,  strengthened  wish 
some  bowmen,  immediately  marched  to  the  spot  and  took  up  the  com- 
bat with  the  Persian  cavalry.  For  some  time  the  struggle  was  sharp 
aud  doubtful:  at  length  the  general  Masistius — a  man  renowned  for 
bravery,  lofty  in  stature,  clad  in  conspicuous  armor,  and  mounted  on 
a  Nissean  horse  with  golden  trappmgs— diarging  at  the  head  of  his 
troops,  had  his  horse  struck  by  an  arrow  in  his  side.  The  animal 
immediately  reared  and  threw  his  master  on  the  ground,  close  to  the 
ranks  of  the  Athenians,  who.  rushing  forward,  seized  the  horse,  and 
overpowered  Masistius  before  he  could  rise.  So  impenetrable  were 
the  defenses  of  his  helmet  and  breastplate,  however,  that  the)'  had 
considerable  difficulty  in  killing  him,  though  he  was  in  their  power: 
at  length  a  spearman  pierced  him  in  the  eye.  The  death  of  the  gen- 
eral passed  unobserved  by  the  Persian  cavalry,  but  as  soon  as  they 
missed  him  and  became  aware  of  the  loss,  they  charged  furiously  and 
in  one  mass,  to  recover  the  dead  body.  At  first  the  Athenians,  too 
few  in  number  to  resist  the  onset,  were  compelled  for  a  while  to  give 
way,  abandoning  the  body;  but  reinforcements  presently  arriving  at 
their  call,  the  Persians  were  driven  back  with  loss,  and  it  finally 
remained  in  their  possession. 

The  death  of  Masistius,  coupled  with  that  final  repulse  of  the  cav- 
alry which  left  his  body  in  possession  of  the  Greeks,  produced  a 
strong  effect  on  both  armies,  encouraging  the  one  as  much  as  it  dis- 
heartened the  other.  Throughout  the  camp  of  Mardonius,  the  grief 
was  violent  and  unbounded,  manifested  by  wailing  SO  loud  as  to  echo 
over  all  Bceotia;  while  the  hair  of  men,  horses,  and  cattle,  was  abun- 
dantly cut  in  token  of  mourniug.     The  Greeks,  on  the  other  hand, 


THE  GREEKS  ADVANCE  TOWARD  PLAT^EA.     325 

overjoyed  at  their  success,  placed  the  dead  body  in  a  cart  and  paraded 
it  round  the  army:  even  the  hoplites  ran  out  of  their  ranks  to  look  at 
it;  not  only  hailing  it  as  a  valuable  trophy,  but  admiring  its  stature 
and  proportions. 

So  much  was  their  confidence  increased,  that  Pausanias  now  ven- 
tured to  quit  the  protection  of  the  mountain-ground,  inconvenient 
from  its  scanty  supply  of  water,  and  to  take  up  his  position  in  tho 
plain  beneath,  interspersed  only  with  low  hillocks.  Marching  from 
Erythrae  in  a  westerly  direction  along  the  declivities  of  Kitlneron,  and 
passing  by  Hysia?,  the  Greeks  occupied  a  line  of  camp  inthePlataean 
territory  along  the  Asopus  and  on  its  right  bank;  with  their  right 
wing  near  to  the  fountain  called  Gargaphia,  and  their  left  wing  near 
the  chapel,  surrounded  by  a  shady  grove,  of  the  Plata?an  hero  Andro- 
krates.  In  this  position  they  were"  marshaled  according  to  nations, 
or  separate  fractions  of  the  Greek  name — the  Lacedaemonians  on  the 
right  wing,  with  the  Tegeans  and  Corinthians  immediately  joining 
them — and  the  Athenians  on  the  left  wing;  a  post  which,  as  second 
in  point  of  dignity,  was  at  first  claimed  by  the  Tegeans,  chiefly  on 
grounds  of  mythical  exploits,  to  the  exclusion  of  the  Athenians,  but 
ultimately  adjudged  by  the  Spartans,  after  hearing  both  sides,  to 
Athens.  In  the  field  even  Lacedaemonians  followed  those  demo- 
cratic formswhich  pervaded  so  generally  Grecian  military  operations: 
in  this  case,  it  was  not  the  generals,  but  the  Lacedaemonian  troops  in 
a  body,  who  heard  the  argument  and  delivered  the  verdict  by  unani- 
mous acclamation. 

Mardonius,  apprised  of  this  change  of  position,  marched  his  army 
also  a  little  further  to  the  westward,  and  posted  himself  opposite  to 
the  Greeks,  divided  from  them  by  the  river  Asopus.  At  the  sugges- 
tion of  the  Thebans,  he  himself  with  his  Persians  and  Modes,  the 
picked  men  of  his  army,  took  post  on  the  left  wing,  immediately 
opposite  to  the  Lacedaemonians  on  the  Greek  right,  and  even  extend- 
ing so  far  as  to  cover  the  Tegean  ranks  on  the  left  of  the  Lacedoemo 
nians:  Baktrians,  Indians,  Saka\  with  other  Asiatics  and  Egyptians, 
filled  the  ceuter;  and  the  Greeks  and  Macedonians  in  the  service  of 
Persia,  the  right — over  against  the  hoplites  of  Athens.  The  num- 
bers of  these  last-mentioned  Greeks  Herodotus  coidd  not  learn,  though 
he  estimates  them  conjecturally  at  50,000:  nor  can  we  place  any 
confidence  in  the  total  of  300,000  which  he  gives  as  belonging  to  the 
other  troops  of  Mardonius,  though  probably  it  cannot  have  been  much 
less. 

In  this  position  lay  the  two  armies,  separated  only  by  a  narrow 
space  including  the  river  Asopus,  and  each  expecting  a  battle,  whilst 
the  sacrifices  on  behalf  of  each  were  offerabup.  Pausanias,  Mardo- 
nius, and  the  Greeks  in  the  Persian  army,  had  each  a  separate  prophet 
to  offer  sacrifice,  and  to  ascertain  the  dispositions  of  the  gods;  the 
two  first  had  men  from  the  most  distinguished  prophetic  families  in 
Elis — the  latter  invited  one  from  Leukas.     All  received  large  pay, 


32G  BATTLES  OP  PLAT  .E  A   AND   MY  KALE. 

and  the  prophet  of  Pausanias  had,  indeed,  been  honored  with  a 
recompense  above  aD  pay  the  gift  of  full  Spartan  citizenship  for 
himself  as  well  as  for  his  brother.  It  happened  thai  the  prophets  on 
both  sides  delivered  the  same  reporl  of  their  respective  sacrifices: 
favorable  for  resistance  if  attacked — unfavorable  tor  beginning  the 
battle.  At  a  moment  when  doubt  and  indecision  was  the  reigning 
feeling  on  both  sides,  this  was  the  safesl  answer  for  the  prophel  to 
give,  and  the  mosl  satisfactory  for  the  Boldiers  to  hear.  And  though 
the  answer  from  Delphi  had  been  sufficiently  encouraging,  and  the 
kindness  of  the  patron-heroes  of  Plataea  had  been  solemnly  invoked, 

yet  Pausanias  did   nut   venture  to   CT0S8  the   AsopUB  and   begin    the 

attack,  in  the  face  of  a,  pronounced  declaration  from  his  prophet. 
Nor  did  even  Hegesistratus,  the  prophet  employed  byMardonius, 

choose;  on  Ids  side  to  urge  an  aggressive  movement,  though  lie  had  a 
deadly  persona]  hatred  against  the  Lacedaemonians,  and  would  have 
been  delighted  to  see  them  worsted.  Then;  arose  commencements 
of  conspiracy,  perhaps  encouraged  by  promises  or  bribes  from  the 
enemy,  among  the  wealthier  Athenian  hoplites,  to  establish  an 
oligarchy  al  Athens  under  Persian  supremacy,  like  that  which  now 
existed  at  Thebes — a  conspiracy  full  of  danger  at  such  a  moment, 
though  fortunately  repressed  by  Aristeides,  with  a  hand  at  once  gen- 
tle and  decisive. 

The  annoyance  inflicted  by  the  Persian  cavalry,  under  the  guidance 
of  the  Thebans,  was  incessant.  Their  constant  assaults,  and  missile: 
weapons  from  the  other  side  of  the  Asopus,  prevented  the  Greeks 
from  using  the  river  for  supplies  of  water,  so  that  the  whole  army 
■was  forced  to  water  at  the  fountain  Gaigaphia,  at  the  extreme  right 
of  the  position,  near  the  Lacedaemonian  hoplites.  Moreover,  the 
Theban  leader  Timegenidas,  remarking  the  convoys  which  arrived 
over  the  passes  of  Kiiharon  in  the  rear  of  t  lie  Grecian  camp,  and 
the  constant  reinforcements  of  hoplites  which  accompanied  them, 
prevailed  upon  Mardonius  to  employ  his  cavalry  in  cutting  off  such 
communication.  The  first  movement  of  this  sort,  undertaken  by 
nighl  againsl  the  pass  called  the  Oak  Heads,  was  eminently  success 
ful.  A  train  of  500  beasts  of  burden  with  supplies,  was  attacked 
descending  into  the  plain  with  its  escort,  all  of  whom  were  either 
slain  or  carried  prisoners  to  the  Persian  camp;  so  that  it  became 
unsafe  for  any  further  convoys  to  approach  the  Greeks.  Eighl  days 
had  already  been  passed  in  inaction  before  Timegenidas  suggested, 
or  Mardonius  executed  this  maneuver;  which  it  is  fortunate  for  the 
Greeks  that  he  did  not  attempt  earlier,  and  which  afforded  clear 
proof  how  much  might  be  hoped  from  an  efficient  employment  of 
his  cavalry,  without  the  ruinous  risk  of  a  general  action.  Neverthe- 
less, after  waiting  two  days  longer,  his  impatience  became  uncon- 
trollable, and  lie  determined  on  a  general  battle  forthwith.  In  vain 
did  Artabazus  endeavor  to  dissuade  him  from  the  step;  taking  the 
same  view  as  the  Thebans,  that  in  a  pitched  battle  the  united  Grecian. 


IMPATIENCE  OF  MARDONIUS.  327 

army  was  invincible,  and  that  the  only  successful  policy  was  that  of 
delay  and  corruption  to  disunite  them.  He  recommended  standing 
on  the  defensive,  by  means  of  Thebes,  well  fortified  and  amply  pro- 
visioned ;  so  as  to  allow  time  of  distributing  effective  bribes  among 
the  leading  men  throughout  the  various  Grecian  cities.  This  sugges- 
tion, which  Herodotus  considers  as  wise  and  likely  to  succeed,  was 
repudiated  by  Mardonius  as  cowardly  and  unworthy  of  the  recog- 
nized superiority  of  the  Persian  arms. 

But  while  he  overruled,  by  virtue  of  superior  authority,  the  objec- 
tions of  all  around  him,  Persians  as  well  as  Greek,  he  could  not  but 
feel  daunted  by  their  reluctant  obedience,  which  he  suspected  to  arise 
from  their  having  heard  oracles  or  prophecies  of  unfavorable  augury. 
He  therefore  summoned  the  chief  officers,  Greek  as  well  as  Persian, 
and  put  the  question  to  them  whether  they  knew  any  prophecy 
announcing  that  the  Persians  were  doomed  to  destruction  in  Greece. 
All  were  silent;  some  did  not  know  the  prophecies,  but  others  (Herod- 
otus intimates)  knew  them  full  well,  though  they  did  not  dare  to 
speak.  Receiving  no  answer,  Mardonius  said :  ' '  Since  ye  either  do 
not  know,  or  will  not  tell,  I  who  know  well  will  myself  speak  out. 
There  is  an  oracle  to  the  effect  that  Persian  invaders  of  Greece  shall 
plunder  the  temple  of  Delphi,  and  shall  afterward  all  be  destroyed. 
Now  we,  being  aware  of  this,  shall  neither  go  against  that  temple, 
nor  try  to  plunder  it;  on  that  ground,  therefore,  we  shall  not  be 
destroyed.  Rejoice  ye,  therefore,  ye  who  are  well-affected  to  the 
Persians — we  shall  get  the  better  of  the  Greeks."  With  that  he  gave 
orders  to  prepare  everything  for  a  general  attack  and  battle  on  the 
morrow. 

It  is  not  improbable  that  the  Orchomenian  Thersander  was  present 
at  this  interview,  and  may  have  reported  it  to  Herodotus.  But  the 
reflection  of  the  historian  himself  is  not  the  least  curious  part  of  the 
whole,  as  illustrating  the  manner  in  which  these  prophecies  sunk  into 
men's  minds,  and  determined  their  judgments.  Herodotus  knew 
(though  he  does  not  cite  it)  the  particular  prophecy  to  which  Mardo- 
nius made  allusion ;  and  he  pronounces,  in  the  most  affirmative  tone, 
that  it  had  no  reference  to  the  Persians;  it  referred  to  an  ancient 
invasion  of  Greece  by  the  Illyrians  and  the  Encheleis.  But  both 
Bakis  (from  whom  he  quotes  four  lines)  and  Musasus  had  prophesied, 
in  the  plainest  manner,  the  destruction  of  the  Persian  army  on  the 
banks  of  the  Thermodon  and  Asopus.  And  these  are  the  prophecies 
which  we  must  suppose  the  officers  convoked  by  Mardonius  to  have 
known  also,  though  they  did  not  dare  to  speak  out;  it  was  the  fault 
of  Mardonius  himself  that  he  did  not  take  warning. 

The  attack  of  a  multitude  like  that  of  Mardonius  was  not  likely 
under  any  eircumstances  to  be  made  so  rapidly  as  to  take  the  Greeks 
by  surprise;  but  the  latter  were  forewarned  of  it  by  a  secret  visit 
from  Alexander,  king  of  Macedon,  who,  riding  up  to  the  Athenian 
advanced  posts  in  the  middle  of  the  night,  desired  to  speak  with  Axis- 


928  RATTLES  OP  PLAT^EA   AND   MYKALB. 

teides  and  the  other  generals.  Announcing  to  them  alone  hie  name 
and  proclaiming  his  earnest  sympathy  for  the  Grecian  cause,  as  well 
as  the  hazard  which  he  incurred  by  this  nightly  visit;  he  apprised 
them  that  Mardonius,  though  eager  for  a  battle  long  ago,  could  aot 
by  any  effort  obtain  favorable  sacrifices,  but  was  nevertheless,  even. 
in  spite  of  this  obstacle,  determined  on  an  attack  the  next  morning. 
■■  Be  ye  prepared  accordingly;  and  if  ye  succeed  in  this  war  (said  be), 
remember  to  liberate  me  also  from  the  Persian  yoke;  1  too  am  a 
Greek  by  descent,  and  thus  risk  my  head  because  1  cannot  endure  to 
see  Greece  enslaved." 

The  communication  of  this  important  message,  made  by  Aristeides 
to  Pausanias,  elicited  from  him  a  proposal  not  a  little  surprising  as 
coming  from  a  Spartan  general.  He  requested  the  Athenians  to 
change  places  with  the  Lacedaemonians  in  the  line.  "We  Lace 
oians  (said  he)  now  stand  opposed  to  the  Persians  and  MedeS 
against  \\  horn  we  have  never  yet  contended,  while  ye  Athenians  have 
fought  and  conquered  them  at  Marathon.  March  ye  then  over  to  the 
righl  wing  and  take  our  places,  while  we  will  take  yours  in  the  left 
wmg  against  the  Boeotians  and  Thessalians,  with  whose  arms  and 
attack  we  are  familiar."  The  Athenians  readily  acceded,  and  the 
reciprocal  change  of  order  was  accordingly  directed.  It  was  not  yet 
quite  completed,  when  day  broke  and  the Theban  allies  of  Mardonius 
immediately  took  notice  of  what  had  been  done.  That  general  com- 
manded a  corresponding  change  in  his  own  line,  so  as  to  place  the 
native  Persians  once  more  over  against  the  Lacedaemonians;  upon 
winch  Pausanias.  seeing  that  his  maneuver  had  failed,  led  back  his 
Lacedaemonians  lo  the  right  wing,  while  a  second  movement  on  the 
part  of  Mardonius  replaced  both  armies  in  the  order  originally 
observed. 

No  incident  similar  to  this  will  be  found  throughout  the  whole 
course  of  Lacedaemonian  history.  To  evade  encountering  the  best 
troops  in  the  enemy's  line,  and  to  depart  for  this  purpose  from  their 
privileged  post  on  the  right  wing,  was  a  step  well-calculated  to  lower 
them  in  the  eyes  of  Greece,  and  could  hardly  hare  failed  to  produce 
that  effect,  if  the  intention  had  been  realized.  It  is  at  the  same  time 
no  mean  compliment  to  the  formidable  reputation  of  the  native  Per- 
sian troops — a  reputation  recognized  by  Herodotus,  and  well  sustained 
at  least  by  their  personal  bravery.  Nor  can  we  wonder  that  this 
publicly  manifested  reluctance  on  the  part  of  the  leading  troops  in 
the  Grecian  army  contributed  much  to  exalt  the  rash  confidence  of 
Mardonius:  a  feeling  which  Herodotus,  in  Homeric  style,  casts  into 
the  speech  of  a  Persian  herald  sent  to  upbraid  the  Lacedaemonians, 
and  challenge  them  to  a  "single  combat  with  champions  of  equal 
numbers,  Lacedaemonians  againsl  Persians."  This  herald,  whom  no 
one  heard  or  eared  fur.  and  who  serves  but  as  a  mouthpiece  for  bring- 
ing out  the  feelings  belonging  to  the  moment,  was  followed  by  some- 
thing very  real  and  terrible — a  vigorous  attack  on  the  Greek  line  by 


NIGHT-MOVEMENT   OF  THE  GIJEEKS.  329 

the  Persian  cavalry;  whose  rapid  motions,  and  showers  of  arrows 
and  javelins,  annoyed  the  Greeks  on  this  day  more  than  ever.  The 
latter  (as  has  been  before  stated)  had  no  cavalry  whatever;  nor  do 
their  light  troops,  though  sufficiently  numerous,  appear  to  have  ren- 
dered any  service,  with  the  exception  of  the  Athenian  bowmen. 
How  great  was  the  advantage  gained  by  the  Persian  cavalry,  is  shown 
by  the  facl  that  they  for  a  time  drove  away  the  Lacedaemonians  from 
the  fountain  of  Gargaphia,  so  as  to  choke  it  up  and  render  it  unfit 
for  use.  As  the  army  had  been  prevented  by  the  cavalry  from  resort- 
ing to  the  river  Asopus,  this  fountain  had  been  of  late  the  only  water- 
ing place;  and  without  it  the  position  which  they  then  occupied 
became  untenable — while  their  provisions  also  were  exhausted,  inas- 
much as  the  convoys,  from  fear  of  the  Persian  cavalry,  could  not 
descend  from  Kithaeron  to  join  them. 

In  this  dilemma  Pausanias  summoned  the  Grecian  chiefs  to  his 
tent.  After  an  anxious  debate,  the  resolution  was  taken,  in  case 
Mardonius  should  not  bring  on  a  general  action  in  the  course  of  the 
day,  to  change  their  position  during  the  night,  when  there  would  be 
no  interruption  from  the  cavalry;  and  to  occupy  the  ground  called 
the  Island,  distant  about  ten  furlongs  in  a  direction  nearly  west,  and 
seemingly  north  of  the  town  of  Plataea,  which  was  itself  about 
twenty  furlongs  distant.  This  island,  improperly  so  denominated, 
included  the  ground  comprised  between  two  branches  of  the  river 
Oeroe;  both  of  which  flow  from  Kithaeron,  and  after  flowing  for  a 
certain  time  in  channels  about  three  furlongs  apart,  form  a  junction 
and  run  in  a  north-westerly  direction  towards  one  of  the  recesses  of 
the  Gulf  of  Corinth — quite  distinct  from  the  Asopus,  which,  though 
also  rising  near  at  hand  in  the  lowest  declivities  under  Kithaeron, 
takes  an  easterly  direction  and  discharges  itself  into  the  sea  opposite 
Euboea.  When  encamped  in  this  so-called  island,  the  army  would 
be  secure  of  water  from  the  stream  in  their  rear;  nor  would  they, 
as  now,  expose  an  extended  breadth  of  front  to  a  numerous  hostile 
cavalry  separated  from  them  only  by  the  Asopus.  It  was  farther 
resolved,  that  so  soon  as  the  army  should  once  be  in  occupation  of 
the  island,  half  of  the  troops  should  forthwith  march  onward  to  dis- 
engage the  convoys  blocked  up  on  Kithaeron  and  conduct  them  to 
the  camp.  Such  was  the  plan  settled  in  council  among  the  different 
Grecian  chiefs;  the  march  was  to  be  commenced  at  the  beginning  of 
the  second  night-watch,  when  the  enemy's  cavalry  would  have  com- 
pletely withdrawn. 

In  spite  of  what  Mardonius  is  said  to  have  determined,  he  passed 
the  whole  day  without  any  general  attack.  But  his  cavalry,  probably 
elated  by  the  recent  demonstration  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  were  on 
that  day  more  daring  and  indefatigable  than  ever,  and  inflicted  much 
loss  as  well  as  severe  suffering;  insomuch  that  the  center  of  the  Greek 
force  (Corinthians,  Megarians,  etc.,  between  the  Lacedaemonians  and 
Tegeans  on  the  right,  and  the  Athenians  on  the  left),  when  the  hour 


330  BATTLES  OF  PLAT2EA   and  MYKAI.E. 

arrived  for  retiring  to  the  bland,  commenced  their  march  indeed, 
but  forgot  or  disregarded  the  preconcerted  plan  and  the  orders  of 
1  '.in  tamas  in  their  impatience  to  obtain  a  complete  Bhelter  against  the 
attacks  of  the  cavalry.  Instead  of  proceeding  to  the  island,  they 
marched  a  distance  of  twentj  furlongs  directly  to  the  to'vi  n  of  Plata?a, 
and  (imkup  a  position  in  front  of  the  Beroeum  or  temple  of  Here, 
where  they  were  protected  partly  by  the  buildings,  partly  by  the 
comparatively  high  ground  on  which  the  town  w  itb  its  temple  Btood. 
Between  the  position  which  the  Greeks  were  about  to  leave  and  that 
which  they  had  resolved  to  occupy  (i.e.,  between  the  course  of  Aso 
pus  and  thai  of  the  <  >ero<  I,  there  appear  to  have  been  a  range  of  low 
hills.  The  Lacedaemonians,  starting  from  the  righl  wing,  bad  to 
march  directly  over  these  hills,  while  the  Athenians,  from  the  left, 
were  to  turn  them  and  get  into  the  plain  ou  the  other  side,  l'.m 
sanias,  apprised  that  the  divisions  of  the  center  had  commenced  their 
night-march,  and  concluding  of  course  that  thej  would  proceed  to 
the  island  according  to  orders,  allowed  a  certain  interval  of  time  in 
older  tn  prevent  confusion,  and  then  directed  that  the  Lacedaemoni 

ans  and  Tegeans  should  also  begin  their  movement  towards  that  same 

position.  But  here  he  found  himself  embarrassed  by  an  unexpected 
obstacle.  The  movement  was  retrograde,  receding  from  the  enemy, 
and  not  consistent  with  the  military  honor  of  a  Spartan:  nevertheless 
most  of  the  taxiarchs  or  leaders  of  companies  obeyed  without  mur- 
muring, but  Amompharetus,  Lochage  or  captain  of  that  band  which 
Herodotus  calls  the  lochus  of  Pitana,  obstinately  refused.  Not  hav- 
ing been  present  at  the  meeting  in  which  the  resolution  had  been 
taken,  lie  now  heard  it  for  the  flrsl  time  with  astonishment  and  dis- 
dain, declaring  "  thai  he  for  one  would  never  so  far  disgrace  Sparta 
as  to  run  away  from  the  foreigner."  Pausanias,  with  the  second  in 
command  Euryanax,  exhausted  every  effort  to  overcome  his  reluc 
tance.  Bui  they  could  by  no  means  induce  him  to  retreat;  nor  did 
they  dare  to  move  without  him,  leaving  his  entire  lochus  exposed 
alone  to  the  enemy. 

Amidst  the  darkness  of  night,  and  in  this  scene  of  indecision  and 
dispute,  an  Athenian  messenger  on  horseback  readied  Pausanias, 
instructed  to  ascertain  what  was  passing,  and  to  ask  for  the  last  direc- 
tions. F<  •  in  spite  of  the  resolution  taken  after  formal  debate,  the 
Athenian  generals  still  mistrusted  the  Lacedanionians,  and  doubted 
whether,  after  all,  they  would  act  a-  they  had  promised.  The  move- 
ment of  the  central  division  having  become  known  to  them,  they  sent 
at  the  last  moment  before  they  commenced  their  own  march,  to 
assure  themselves  thai  the  Spartans  were  about  to  movealso.  A  pro- 
found, and  even  an  exaggerated  mistrust,  but  loo  well  justified  by  the 
previous  behavior  of  the  Spartans  toward  Athens,  is  visible  in  this 
proceeding;  yet  it  proved  fortunate  in  its  results — for  if  the  Atheni- 
ans, satisfied  with  executing  their  part  in  the  preconcerted  plan,  had 
marched  at  once  to  the  Island,  the  Grecian  army  would  have  been 


ASTONISHMENT   OF  MARDONIUS.  331 

Severed  without  the  possibility  of  reuniting,  and  the  issue  of  the  bat- 
tle might  have  proved  altogether  different.  The  Athenian  herald 
found  the  Lacedaemonians  still  stationary  in  their  position,  and  the 
generals  in  hot  dispute  with  Amompharetus,  who  despised  the  threat 
of  being  left  alone  to  make  head  against  the  Persians,  and  when 
reminded  that  the  resolution  had  been  taken  by  general  vote  of  the 
officers,  took  up  with  both  hands  avast  rock  tit  for  the  hands  of  Ajax 
or  Hektor,  and  cast  it  at  the  feet  of  Pausanias,  saying — •'-  This  is  my 
pebble,  wherewith  I  give  my  vote  not  to  run  away  from  the  strangers." 
Pausanias  denounced  him  as  a  inadman— desiring  the  herald  to  report 
the  scene  of  embarrassment  which  he  had  just  come  to  witness,  and 
to  entreat  the  Athenian  generals  not  to  commence  their  retreat  until 
the  Lacedaemonians  should  also  be  in  march.  In  the  meantime  the 
dispute  continued,  and  was  even  prolonged  by  the  perverseness  of 
Amompharetus  until  the  morning  began  to  dawn;  when  Pausanias, 
afraid  to  remain  longer,  gave  the  signal  for  retreat— calculating  that 
the  refractory  captain,  when  he  saw  his  lochus  really  left  alone, 
would  probably  make  up  his  mind  to  follow.  Having  marched  about 
ten  furlongs,  across  the  hilly  ground  which  divided  him  from  the 
Island,  he  commanded  a  halt;  either  to  await  Amompharetus  if  he 
chose  to  follow,  or  to  be  near  enough  to  render  aid  and  save  him,  if 
he  were  rash  enough  to  stand  his  ground  single-handed.  Happily 
the  latter,  seeing  that  his  general  had  really  departed,  overcame  his 
scruples,  and  followed  him;  overtaking  and  joining  the  main  body  in 
its  first  halt  near  the  river  Moloeis  and  the  temple  of  Eleusinian 
Demeter.  The  Athenians,  commencing  their  movement  at  the  same 
time  with  Pausanias,  got  round  the  hills  to  the  plain  on  the  other  side 
and  proceeded  on  their  march  toward  the  Island. 

When  the  day  broke,  the  Persian  cavalry  were  astonished  to  find 
the  Grecian  position  deserted.  They  immediately  set  themselves  to 
the  pursuit  of  the  Spartans,  whose  march  lay  along  the  higher  and 
more  conspicuous  ground,  and  whose  progress  had  moreover  been 
retarded  by  the  long  delay  of  Amompharetus:  the  Athenians,  on  the 
contrary,  marching  without  halt,  and  being  already  behind  the  hills, 
were  not  open  to  view.  To  Mardonius,  this  retreat  of  his  enemy 
inspired  an  extravagant  and  contemptuous  confidence  which  he  ven- 
ted in  full  measure  to  the  Thessalian  Aleuadse — "These  are  your 
boasted  Spartans,  who  changed  their  place  just  now  in  the  line, 
rather  than  fight  the  Persians,  and  have  here  shown  by  a  barefaced 
flight  what  they  are  really  worth!"  With  that  he  immediately  di- 
rected his  whole  army  to  pursue  and  attack  with  the  utmost  expedi- 
tion. The  Persians  crossed  the  Asopus,  ancfran  after  the  Greeks  at 
their  best  speed,  pell-mell,  without  any  thought  of  order  or  prepara- 
tions for  overcoming  resistance :  the  army  already  rang  with  shouts 
of  victory,  in  full  confidence  of  swallowing  up  the  fugitives  as  soon 
as  they  were  overtaken. 

The  Asiatic  allies  all  followed  the  example  of  this  disorderly  rusk 


332  BATTLES  OP  PLAT^EA  AND  MYKALE. 

forward:  hut  the  Thebansand  the  other  Grecian  allies  on  the  right 
wing  of  Mardonius,  appeared  to  have  maintained  somewhat  better 
order. 

Pausanias  had  not  hcen  ahle  to  retreat  farther  than  the  neighbor- 
hood of  the  Demetrion  or  temple  of  Eleusinian  Demeter,  where  he 
had  baited  to  take  up  Amompbaretus.  Overtaken  first  I)}-  the  Per 
sian  horse  and  next  by  Mardoniue  with  the  main  body,  he  sent  a 
horseman  forthwith  to  apprise  the  Athenians,  and  to  entreat  their 
aid.  The  Athenians  were  prompt  in  complying  with  his  request: 
hut  they  speedily  found  themselves  engaged  in  conflict  against  the 
Theban  allies  of  the  enemy,  and  therefore  unable  to  reach  him. 
Accordingly  the  Lacedaemonians  and  Tegeans  had  to  encounter  the 
Persians  single-handed  without  any  assistance  from  the  other  Greeks. 
The  Persians,  on  arriving  within  bowshot  of  their  enemies,  planted 
in  the  ground  the  spiked  extremities  of  their  gerrha  (or  long  wicker 
shields),  forming  a  continuous  breastwork,  from  behind  which  they 
poured  upon  the  Greeks  a  shower  of  arrows:  their  bows  were  of  the 
largest  size,  and  drawn  with  no  less  power  than  skill.  In  spite  of  the 
wounds  and  distress  thus  indicted,  Pausanias  persisted  in  the  indis- 
pensable duty  of  offering  the  battle-sacrifice,  and  the  victims  were  for 
some  time  unfavorable,  so  that  he  did  not  venture  to  give  orders  for 
advance  and  close  combat.  Many  were  here  wounded  or  slain  in  the 
ranks,  among  them  the  brave  Kallikrates,  the  handsomest  and  strong- 
est man  in  the  army:  until  Pausanias,  wearied  out  with  this  compul- 
sory and  painful  delay,  at  length  raised  his  eyes  to  the  conspicuous 
Heraeum  of  the  Plata:ans,  and  invoked  the  merciful  intervention  of 
Here  to  remove  that  obstacle  which  confined  him  to  the  spot.  Hardly 
had  he  pronounced  the  words,  when  the  victims  changed  and  became 
favorable:  but  the  Tegeans,  while  he  was  yet  praying,  anticipated  the 
effect  and  hastened  forward  against  the  enemy,  followed  by  the  Lace- 
daemonians as  soon  as  Pausanias  gave  the  word.  The  wicker  breast- 
work before  the  Persians  was  soon  overthrown  by  the  Grecian  charge: 
nevertheless  the  Persians,  though  thus  deprived  of  their  tutelary 
hedge  and  having  no  defensive  armor,  maintained  the  fight  with  indi- 
vidual courage,  the  more  remarkable  because  it  was  totally  unassisted 
by  discipline  or  trained  collective  movement,  against  the  drilled  array, 
the  regulated  step,  the  well-defended  persons,  and  the  long  spears,  of 
the  Greeks.  They  threw  themselves  upon  the  Lacedaemonians,  seiz- 
ing hold  of  their  spears,  and  breaking  them:  many  of  them  devoted 
themselves  in  small  parties  of  ten  to  force  by  their  bodies  a  way  into 
the  lines,  and  to  get  to  individual  close  combat  with  the  short  spear 
and  the  dagger.  Mardonius,  himself,  conspicuous  upon  a  white 
horse,  was  among  the  foremost  warriors,  and  the  thousand  select 
troops  who  formed  his  body-guard  distinguished  themselves  beyond 
all  the  rest,  At  length  he  was  shun  by  the  hand  of  a  distinguished 
Spartan  named  Aeimnestus;  his  thousand  guards  mostly  perished 
around  him,  and  the  courage  of  the  remaining  Persians,  ahead y  worn 


DEATH  OF  MARDONIUS.  333 

out  by  the  superior  troops  against  which  they  had  been  long  contend- 
ing, was  at  last  thoroughly  broken  by  the  death  of  their  general. 
They  turned  their  backs  and  fled,  not  resting  until  they  got  into  the 
wooden  fortified  camp,  constructed  by  Mardonius  behind  the  Asopus. 
Fhe  Asiatic  allies  also,  as  soon  as  they  saw  the  Persians  defeated, 
took  to  flight  without  striking  a  blow. 

The  Athenians  on  the  left,  meanwhile,  had  been  engaged  in  a  seri- 
ous conflict  with  the  Boeotians;  especially  the  Theban  leaders  with  the 
hoplites  immediately  around  them,  who  fought  with  great  bravery, 
but  were  at  length  driven  back,  after  the  loss  of  300  of  their  best 
troops.  Tbe  Theban  cavalry  however  still  maintained  a  good  front, 
protecting  the  retreat  of  the  infantry  and  checking  the  Athenian 
pursuit,  so  that  the  fugitives  were  enabled  to  reach  Thebes  in  safety; 
a  better  refuge  than  the  Persian  fortified  camp.  With  the  exception 
of  the  Thebans  and  Bcsotians,  none  of  the  other  medising  Greeks 
rendered  any  real  service.  Instead  of  sustaining  or  reinforcing  the 
Thebans,  they  never  once  advanced  to  the  charge,  but  merely  fol- 
lowed in  the  first  movement  of  flight.  So  that  in  point  of  fact  the 
only  troops  in  this  numerous  Perso-Grecian  army  who  really  fought, 
were,  the  native  Persians  and  Sakae  on  the  left,  and  the  Boeotians  on 
the  right ;  the  former  against  the  Lacedaemonians,  the  latter  against 
the  Athenians. 

Nor  did  even  all  the  native  Persians  take  part  in  the  combat.  A 
body  of  40,000  men  under  Artabazus,  of  whom  some  must  doubt- 
less have  been  native  Persians,  left  the  field  without  fighting  and 
without  loss.  That  general,  seemingly  the  ablest  man  in  the  Persian 
army,  had  been  from  the  first  disgusted  with  the  nomination  of  Mar- 
donius as  commander-in-chief,  and  had  farther  incurred  his  dis- 
pleasure by  deprecating  any  general  action.  Apprised  that  Mardonius 
was  hastening  forward  to  attack  the  retreating  Greeks,  he  marched 
his  division  and  led  them  out  toward  the  scene  of  action,  though 
desparing  of  success  and  perhaps  not  very  anxious  that  his  own  proph- 
ecies should  be  proved  false.  And  such  had  been  the  headlong 
impetuosity  of  Mardonius  in  his  first  forward  movement, — so  com- 
plete his  confidence  of  overwhelming  the  Greeks  when  he  discovered 
their  retreat, — that  he  took  no  pains  to  insure  the  concerted  action  of 
his  whole  army.  Accordingly  before  Artabazus  arrived  at  the  scene 
of  action,  he  saw  the  Persian  troops,  who  had  been  engaged  under  the 
commander-in-chief,  already  defeated  and  in  flight.  Without  making 
the  least  attempt  either  to  save  them  or  to  retrieve  the  battle,  he 
immediately  gave  orders  to  his  own  division  to  retreat ;  not  repairing, 
however,  either  to  the  fortified  camp  or  to  Thebes,  but  abandoning 
at  once  the  whole  campaign,  and  taking  the  direct  road  through 
Phokis  to  Thessaly,  Macedonia,  and  the  Hellespont. 

As  the  native  Persians,  the  Sakae,  and  the  Boeotians  were  the  only 
real  combatants  on  the  one  side,  so  also  were  the  Lacedaemonians, 
Tegeans,  and  Athenians,  on  the  other.     It  has  already  been  mentioned 


334  BATTLES  OF  PLATJIA    AND   MYKALE. 

that  the  central  troops  of  the  Grecian  army,  disobeying  the  general 
order  of  march,  had  gone  during  the  nighl  to  the  town  of  Plataea 
instead  of  to  the  island.  Thej  were  thus  completely  Bevered  from 
Pausanias,  and  the  firsl  thing  which  they  In  Mid  about  the  battle  was, 
thai  the  Lacedaemonians  wi  e  victory.     Elate  witb  this 

news,  ami  anxious  to  come  in  for  some  share  of  the  honor,  they 
rushed  to  the  Bccne  of  action,  without  any  heed  of  military  order: 
the  Corinthians  taking  the  direcl  track  across  the  hills,  while  the 
Megarians,  Phliasians,  and  others,  marched  by  the  longer  route  along 
the  plain,  so  as  to  turn  the  hills,  and  arrive  al  the  Athenian  position. 
The  Theban  horse  under  Asopodorus,  employed  in  checking  the  pur- 
suit of  the  victorious  Athenian  hoplites,  seeing  these  fresh  troops 
coining  up  in  thorough  disorder,  charged  tbem  vigorously  and  drove 
them  hack,  to  take  refuge  in  the  high  ground,  with  the  loss  of  cud 
men.  But  this  partial  success  had  uo  effect  in  mitigating  the  general 
defeat. 

Followingup  their  pursuit,  the  Lacedaemonians  proceeded  to  attack 
the  wooden  redoubt  wherein  the  Persians  had  taken  refuge.  But 
though  they  were  here  aided  by  all  or  most  of  the  central  Grecian 

divisions,  who  had  taken  no  part  in  the  battle,  they  were  yet  so  igno- 

ranl  of  the  mode  of  assailing  walls,  that  they  made  no  progress,  and 

were  completely  baffled,  until  the  Athenians  arrived  to  their  assist- 
ance. The  redoubt  was  then  stormed,  not  without  a  gallant  and 
prolonged  resistance  on  the  part  of  the  defenders.  The  Tegeans, 
being  the  firsl  to  penetrate  into  the  interior,  plundered  the  rich  tent 

of  Mardonius,  whose  manger  for  his  horses,  made  of  brass,  remained 
long  afterward  exhibited  in  their  temple  of  Athene  A  lea—while  his 
silver  footed  throne,  and  scimitar,  were  preserved  in  the  acropolis  of 
Athens,  along  with  the  breastplate  of  Masistius.  Once  within  the 
wall,  effective  resistance  ceased,  and  the  Greeks  slaughtered  without 

mercy  as  well  as  without  limit ;  so  that  if  we  are  1"  Credil  Herodotus, 
there' survived  only  3,000  men  out  of  the  300,000  which  had  com 
posed  the  army  of  Mardonius — save  and  except  the  40,000  men  who 
accompanied  Artabazus  in  his  retreat. 

Respecting  these  numbers,  the  historian  had  probably  little  to  give 
except  some  vague  reports  without  any  pretense  of  computation: 
about  the  Grecian  loss  his  statement  deserves  more  attention,  when 
he  tells  us  thai  there  perished  ninety  one  Spartans,  sixteen  Tegeans, 
and  fifty  two  Athenians.  Herein  however  is  not  included  the  loss  of 
the  Megarians  when  attacked  bythe Theban  cavalry,  nor  is  the  num- 
ber of  slain  Lacedaemonians,  not  Spartans,  specified:  while  even  the 
other  numbers  actually  Stated  an-  decidedly  smaller  than  the  probable 

truth,  considering  the  multitude  of  Persian  arrows  and  the  unshielded 
right  side  of  the  Grecian  hoplite.  On  the  whole,  the  affirmation  of 
Plutarch,  thai  not  less  than  1360  Greeks  were  slain  in  the  action 
appears  probable:  all  doubtless  hoplites — for  little  account  was  then 
made  of  the  light-armed,  nor  indeed  arc  we  told  that  they  took  any 


FUNERAL  OBSEQUIES.  335 

active  part  in  the  battle.  Whatever  may  have  been  the  numerical 
loss  of  the  Persians,  this  defeat  proved  the  total  ruin  of  their  army: 
but  we  may  fairly  presume  that  many  were  spared  and  sold  into 
slavery,  while  many  of  the  fugitives  probably  found  means  to  join 
the  retreating  division  of  Artabazus.  The  general  made  a  rapid 
march  across  Thessaly  and  Macedonia,  keeping  strict  silence  about 
the  recent  battle,  and  pretending  to  be  sent  on  a  special  enterprise  by 
Mardouius,  whom  he  reported  to  be  himself  approaching.  If  Herodo- 
tus Is  correct  (thought  it  may  well  be  doubted  whether  the  change  of 
sentiment  in  Thessaly  and  the  other  medising  Grecian  states  was  so 
rapid  as  he  implies),  Artabazus  succeeded  in  traversing  these  countries 
before  the  news  of  the  battle  became  generally  known,  and  then 
retreated  by  the  straightest  and  shortest  route  through  the  interior  of 
Thrace  to  Byzantium,  from  whence  he  passed  into  Asia.  The 
interior  tribes,  unconquered  and  predatory,  harassed  his  retreat  con- 
siderably; but  we  shall  tind  long  afterward  Persian  garrisons  in 
possession  of  many  principal  places  on  the  Thraciau  coast.  It  will  be 
seen  that  Artabazus  subsequently  rose  higher  than  ever  in  the  estima- 
tion of  Xerxes. 

Ten  days  did  the  Greeks  employ  after  their  victory,  first  in  burying 
the  slain,  next  in  collecting  and  apportioning  the  booty.  The  Lace- 
demonians, the  Athenians,  the  Tegeaus,  the  Megarians,  and  the 
Phliasians  each  buried  their  dead  apart,  erecting  a  separate  tomb  in 
commemoration.  The  Lacedaemonians,  indeed,  distributed  their  dead 
into  three  fractions,  in  three  several  burial  places:  oue  for  those 
champions  who  enjoyed  individual  renown  at  Sparta,  and  among 
whom  were  included  the  most  distinguished  men  slain  in  the  recent 
battle,  such  as  Poscidonius,  Amompharetus  the  refractory  captain, 
Philokyou,  and  Kallikrates — a  second  for  the  other  Spartans  and 
Lacedaemonians — and  a  third  for  the  Helots.  Besides  these  sepul- 
chral monuments,  erected  in  the  neighborhood  of  Plataea  by  those 
cities  whose  citizens  had  really  fought  and  fallen,  there  were  several 
similar  monuments  to  be  seen  in  the  days  of  Herodotus,  raised  by 
other  cities  which  falsely  pretended  to  the  same  honor,  with  the  con- 
nivance and  aid  of  the  Plataeans,  The  body  of  Mardouius  was  dis- 
covered amoug  the  slain,  and  treated  with  respect  by  Pausanias,  who 
is  even  said  to  have  indignantly  repudiated  advice  offered  to  him  by 
an  ^Eginetan,  that  he  should  retaliate  upon  it  the  ignominious  treat- 
ment indicted  by  Xerxes  upon  the  dead  Leonidas.  On  the  morrow 
the  body  was  stolen  away  and  buried;  by  whom  wTas  never  certainly 
known,  for  there  were  many  different  pretenders  who  obtained 
reward  on  this  plea  from  Artyntes,  the  son  of  Mardonius.  The 
funereal  monument  was  yet  to  be  seen  in  tlfe  time  of  Pausanias. 

The  spoil  was  rieh  aud  multifarous — gold  and  silver  in  Darics  as 
well  as  in  implements  and  ornaments,  carpets,  splendid  arms  and 
clothing,  norses,  camels,  etc.,  even  the  magnificent  tent  of  Xerxes, 
left  on  his  retreat  with  Mardouius,  was  included.     By  order  of  the 


336  F..YTTLES  OF  PLAT.EA    AND    MYKALE. 

genera]  Pausanias,  the  Helots  collected  all  the  valuable  articles  into 
one  spot  for  division;  nol  without  Btealing  many  of  the  golden  orna- 
ments, which,  it;  ignorance  of  the  value,  they  were  persuaded  by  the 
^Eginetans  to  Bell  as  brass.  Alter  rea  rving  a  tithe  for  the  Delphian 
Apollo,  together  with  ample  offerings  for  the  Olympic  Zeus  and  the 
Isthmian  Poseidon,  as  well  as  for  Pausanias  a-  general — the  remaining 
booty  was  distributed  among  the  different  contingents  of  the  army  in 
proportion  to  their  respective  cumbers.  The  concubines  of  the  Per 
sian  chiefs  were  among  the  prizes  distributed:  there  were  probably 
however  among  them  many  of  Grecian  birth,  restored  to  their  fam- 
ilies; and  one  especially,  overtaken  in  her  chariot  amidst  the  flying 
Persians,  with  rich  jewels  and  a  numerous  suite,  threw  herself  at  the 
feet  of  Pausanias  himself,  imploring  his  protection.  She  proved  to  be 
the  daughter  of  hi-  personal  friend  Hegetorides  of  Cos,  carried  off  by 
the  Persian  Pharandates;  and  he  had  the  satisfaction  of  restoring  her 
to  her  father.  Large  as  the  booty  collected  was.  there  yet  remained 
many  valuable  treasures  buried  in  the  ground,  which  the  Plateean 
inhabitants  afterward  discovered  and  appropriated. 

The  real  victors  in  the  battle  of  Platsea  were  the  Lacedaemonians, 
Athenians,  and  Tegeans.  The  Corinthians  and  others,  forming  part 
of  the  army  opposed  to  Mardonius,  did  not  reach  the  field  until  the 
battle  was  ended,  though  they  doubtless  aided  both  in  the  assault  of 
the  fortified  camp  and  in  the  subsequent  operations  against  Thebes, 
and  were  universally  recognized,  in  inscriptions  ami  panegyrics, 
among  the  champions  who  had  contributed  to  the  liberation  of  On  ece. 
It  was  not  till  after  the  taking  of  the  Persian  camp  that  the  contin- 
gents of   Eli-  and  Mantineia,  who  may  perhaps  have  been  among  the 

convoys  prevented  by  the  Persian  cavalry  from  descending  the  ; 
of  Kithaeron  first  reached  the  scene  of  action.     Mortified  at  having 
missed  their  share  in  the  glorious  exploit,  the  new-comers  were  at 
firsl  eager  to  Bet  off  in  pursuit  of  Artabazus:  but  the  Lacedaemonian 

commander  forbade  them,  and  they  returned  home  without  any 
other  consolation  than  that  of  banishing  their  generals  for  not  having 
led  them  forth  more  promptly. 

There  yet  remained  the  most  efficient  ally  of  Mardonius— the  city 
of  Thebes;  which  Pausanias  summoned  on  the  eleventh  day  after  the 
battle,  requiring  that  the  medtsing  leaders  should  be  delivered  up. 
especially  Timegenidas  and  Attaginus.  On  receiving  a  refusal,  he 
begun  to  batter  their  walls,  and  to  adopt  the  still  more  effective  mea- 
sure of  laying  waste  their  territory;  giving  notice  that  the  work  of 
destruction  would  be  continued  until  these  chiefs  were  given  up. 
After  twenty  days  of  endurance,  the  chiefs  at  length  proposed,  if  it 
should  prove  that  Pausanias  peremptorily  required  their  persons  and 
refused  to  accept  a  sum  of  money  in  commutation,  to  surrender  them- 
selves voluntarily  as  the  price  of  liberation  for  their  country.  A 
negotiation  was  accordingly  entered  into  with  Pausanias,  and  the 
persons  demanded  were   surrendered  to  him,  excepting  Attaginus, 


HONORS  AMONG  THE  GREEK   WARRIORS.        337 

"who  found  means  to  escape  at  the  last  moment.  Ilis  sons,  whom  he 
left  behind,  were  delivered  up  as  substitutes,  but  Pausanias  refused 
to  touch  them,  with  the  just  remark,  which  in  those  times  was  even 
generous,  that  they  were  nowise  implicated  in  the  medism  of  their 
father.  Timegenidas  and  the  remaining  prisoners  were  carried  off  to 
Corinth  and  immediately  put  to  death,  without  the  smallest  discus- 
sion or  form  of  trial:  Pausanias  was  apprehensive  that  if  any  delay  or 
consultation  were  granted,  their  wealth  and  that  of  their  friends 
would  effectually  purchase  voices  for  their  acquittal — indeed  the 
prisoners  themselves  had  been  induced  to  give  themselves  up  partly 
in  that  expectation.  It  is  remarkable  that  Pausanias  himself  only  a 
few  years  afterward,  when  attainted  of  treason,  returned  and  sur- 
rendered himself  at  Sparta  under  similar  hopes  of  being  able  to  buy 
himself  off  by  money.  In  this  hope,  indeed,  he  found  himself 
deceived,  as  Timegenidas  had  been  deceived  before:  but  the  fact  is 
not  the  less  to  be  noted  as  indicating  the  general  impression  that  the 
leading  men  in  a  Grecian  city  were  usually  open  to  bribes  in  judicial 
matters;  and  that  individuals  superior  to  this  temptation  were  rare 
exceptions.  I  shall  have  occasion  to  dwell  upon  this  recognized 
unlrustworthiness  of  the  leading  Greeks  when  I  come  to  explain  the 
extremely  popular  cast  of  the  Athenian  judicature. 

Whether  there  was  any  positive  vote  taken  among  the  Greeks 
respecting  the  prize  of  valor  at  the  battle  of  Plataea  may  well  be 
doubted:  and  the  silence  of  Herodotus  goes  far  to  negative  an 
important  statement  of  Plutarch  that  the  Athenians  and  Lacedaemo- 
nians were  on  the  point  of  coming  to  an  open  rupture,  each  thinking 
themselves  entitled  to  the  prize — that  Aristeides  appeased  the  Athe- 
nians, and  prevailed  upon  them  to  submit  to  the  general  decision  of 
the  allies — and  that  Megarian  and  Corinthian  leaders  contrived  to 
elude  the  dangerous  rock  by  bestowing  the  prize  on  the  Plataeans,  to 
which  proposition  both  Aristeides  and  Pausanias  acceded.  But  it 
seems  that  the  general  opinion  recognized  the  Lacedaemonians  and 
Pausanias  as  bravest  among  the  brave,  seeing  that  they  had  overcome 
the  best  troops  of  the  enemy  and  slain  the  general.  In  burying  their 
dead  warriors,  the  Lacedaemonians  singled  out  for  peculiar  distinction 
Philokyon,  Poseidonius,  and  Amompharetus  the  lochage,  whose  con- 
duct in  the  fight  atoned  for  his  disobedience  to  orders.  There  was 
one  Spartan,  however,  who  had  surpassed  them  all — Aristodemus,  the 
single  survivor  of  the  troop  of  Leonidas  at  Thermopylae.  Having 
ever  since  experienced  nothing  but  disgrace  and  insult  from  his  fei- 
low-citizens,  this  unfortunate  man  had  become  reckless  of  life,  and  at 
Plataea  he  stepped  forth  single-handed  from  his  place  In  the  ranks, 
performing  deeds  of  the  most  heroic  valor  and  determined  to  regain 
by  his  death  the  esteem  of  his  countrymen.  But  the  Spartans  refused 
to  assign  to  him  the  same  funereal  honors  as  were  paid  to  the  other 
distinguished  warriors,  who  had  manifested  exemplary  forwardness 
and   6kill,  yet  without  any  desperate   rashness,   and   without   any 


338  BATTLES  OF  PLAT.EA  AND   MYKALE. 

previous  taint  such  as  to  render  life  a  burden  to  them.     Bubsequi  at 
valor  might  lie  held  to  efface  thia  taint,  bul  could  nol  suffice  to 
Aristodemus  to  a  level  with  the  mosl  honored  citizens. 

But  though  we  cannot  believe  the  statement  of  Plutarch  that  the 
Platseans  received  by  general  rote  the  prize  of  valor,  it  is  certain  that 
they  were  largely  honored  and  recompensed,  as  the  proprietoi  i  I 
that  ground  <m  which  the  liberation  of  Greece  had  been  achieved. 
The  market  place  and  center  of  then:  town  was  selected  be  the  mimic 
for  the  solemn  sacrifice  of  thanksgiving,  offered  up  by  Pausanias 
after  the  battle,  to  Zeus  Eleutherius,  in  the  name  and  presence  of  all 
the  assembled  allies.  'The  local  gods  and  heroes  of  the  Platsean  ter- 
ritory, who  had  been  invoked  in  prayer  before  the  battle,  and  who 
had  granted  their  soil  as  a  propitious  held  for  the  Greek  arms,  were 
made  partakers  of  the  ceremony,  and  witnesses  as  well  as  guarantees 
of  the  engagements  with  which  it  was  accompanied.  The  Platseans, 
now  re-entering  their  city,  which  the  Persian  invasion  had  compelled 
them  to  desert,  were  invested  with  the  honorable  duty  of  celebrating 
the  periodica]  sacrifice  in  commemoration  of  this  greal  victory,  as 
well  as  of  rendering  care  and  religious  service  at  the  tombs  of  the 
fallen  warriors.  As  an  aid  to  enable  them  to  discharge  this  obligation, 
which  probably  might  have  pressed  hard  upon  them  at  a  time  when 
their  city  was  half-ruined  and  their  fields  unsown,  they  received  out 
of  the  prize-money  the  large  allotment  of  eighty  talents,  which  was 
partly  employed  in  building  and  adorning  a  handsome  temple  of 
Athene — the  symbol  probably  of  renewed  connection  with  Athens. 
They  undertook  to  render  religious  honors  every  year  to  the  tombs  of 
the  warriors,  and  to  celebrate  in  every  lifth  year  the  grand  public 
solemnity  of  the  Eleutheria  with  gymnastic  matches  analogous  to  the 
other  great  festival  games  of  Greece.  In  consideration  id'  the  dis- 
charge of  these  duties,  together  with  the  sanctity  of  the  ground, 
Pausanias  and  tin'  whole  body  of  allies  hound  themselves  by  oath 
to  guarantee  the  autonomy  of  Platsea,  and  the  inviolability  of  her  ter 
ritory.  This  was  an  emancipation  of  the  town  from  the  bond  of  the 
Boeotian  federation,  and  from  the  enforcing  supremacy  of  Thel 
its  child'. 

But  the  engagement  of  the  allies  appears  to  have  had  other  objects 
also,  larger  than  that  of  protecting  Platsea,  or  establishing  commemo 
rative  ceremonies.  The  defensive  league  against  the  Persians  was 
again  sworn  to  by  all  of  them,  and  rendered  permanent.  An  a 
gate  force  of  10,000  hoplites,  1000  cavalry,  and  100  triremes,  for  the 
purpose  of  carrying  on  'he  war,  was  agreed  to  and  promised,  the  con- 
tingent of  each  ally  being  specified.  Moreover,  the  town  of  Platsea 
was  fixed  on  as  the  annual  place  of  meeting,  where  deputies  from  all 
of  them  were  annually  to  assemble. 

This  resolution  i-  said  to  have  been  adopted  on  the  proposition  of 
Aristeides,  whose  motives  it  is  not  difficult  to  trace.  Though  the 
Persian  army  had  sustained  a  signal  defeat,  no  one  knew  how  soon  if, 


MOVEMENTS  OF  THE  GRECIAN  FLEET.         339 

might  reassemble,  or  be  reinforced.  Indeed,  even  Liter,  after  the 
battle  of  Mykale  had  become  known,  a  fresh  invasion  of  the  Persians 

was  still  regarded  as  not  improbable;  nor  did  anyone  then  anticipate 
that  extraordinary  fortune  and  activity  whereby  the  Athenians  after- 
ward organized  an  alliance  such  as  to  throw  Persia  on  the  defensive. 
Moreover,  the  northern  half  of  Greece  was  still  medising,  either  in 
reality  or  in  appearance,  and  new  efforts  on  the  part  of  Xerxes  might 
probably  keep  up  his  ascendency  in  those  parts.  Now  assuming  the 
war  to  be  renewed.  Aristeides  and  the  Athenians  had  the  strongest 
interest  in  providing  a  line  of  defense  which  should  cover  Attica  as 
well  as  Peloponnesus;  and  in  preventing  the  Peloponnesians  from 
confining  themselves  to  their  Isthmus,  as  they  had  done  before.  To 
take  advantage  of  this  purpose  of  the  new-born  reverence  and  grati- 
tude which  now  bound  the  Laceda;monians  to  Plataea,  was  an  idea 
eminently  suitable  to  the  moment;  though  the  unforeseen  subsequent 
start  of  Athens,  combiued  with  other  events,  prevented  both  the 
extensive  alliance  and  the  inviolability  of  Plataea,  projected  by  Aris- 
teides, from  taking  effect. 

On  the  same  day  that  Pausauias  and  the  Grecian  land  army  con- 
quered at  Plataaa  the  naval  armaments  under  Leotychides  and  Xan- 
thippus  was  engaged  in  operations  hardly  less  important  at  Mykale 
on  the  Asiatic  coast.  The  Grecian  commanders  of  the  fleet  (which 
numbered  110  triremes),  having  advanced  as  far  as  Delos,  were  afraid 
to  proceed  farther  eastward,  or  to  undertake  any  offensive  operations 
against  the  Persians  at  Samos,  for  the  rescue  of  Ionia — although 
Ioniau  envoys,  especially  from  Chios  and  Samos,  had  urgently  soli- 
cited aid  both  at  Sparta  and  at  Delos.  Three  Samians,  one  of  them 
named  Hegesistratus,  came  to  assure  Leotychides  that  their  coun- 
trymeu  were  ready  to  revolt  from  the  despot  Theomestor,  whom  the 
Persians  had  installed  there,  so  soon  as  the  Greek  fleet  shouldappear 
oif  the  island.  In  spite  of  emphatic  appeals  to  the  community  of 
religion  and  race,  Leotychides  was  long  deaf  to  the  entreaty;  but  his 
reluctance  gradually  gave  way  before  the  persevering  earnestness  of 
the  orator.  While  yet  not  thoroughly  determined,  lie  happened  to 
ask  the  Samian  speaker  what  was  his  name.  To  which  the  latter 
replied,  "  Hegesistratus,"  i.e.,  army-leader.  "  I  accept  Hegesistratus 
as  an  omen  (replied  Leotychides,  struck  with  the  significance  of  this 
name),  pledge  thou  thy  faith  to  accompany  us — let  thy  companions 
prepare  the  Sr.miaus  to  receive  us,  and  we  will  go  forthwith." 
Engagements  wTere  at  once  exchanged,  and  wmile  the  other  two 
envoys  were  sent  forward  to  prepare  matters  in  the  island,  Hegesis- 
tratus remained  to  conduct  the  fleet,  which  was  farther  encouraged 
by  favorable  sacrifices,  and  by  the  assurances  of  the  prophet  Deiph- 
onus  hired  from  the  Corinthian  colony  of  Apollonia. 

When  they  reached  the  Heraeum  near  Kalami  in  Samos,  and  had 
prepared  themselves  for  a  naval  engagement,  they  discovered  that  the 
enemy's  fleet  had  already  been  withdrawn  from  the  island  to  the 


340  BATTLES  OP  PLAT/EA  AND  MYKALE. 

neighboring  continent.  For  ilio  Persian  commanders  had  been  so 
disheartened  with  the  defeat  of  Salamis  that  they  were  nol  disposi  '1 
to  fighl  again  at  sen:  we  « 1  < »  not  know  the  numbers  of  their  fleet,  but 
perhaps  a  considerable  proportion  of  it  may  have  consisted  of  Ionic 
Greeks,  whose  fidelity  was  now  very  doubtful.  Having  abandoned 
the  idea  of  a  sea-fight,  they  permitted  their  Phoenician  squadron  to 
.  ami  sailed  with  their  remaining  fleet  to  the  promontory  of 
Mykale  mar  Miletus.  Here  they  were  under  the  protection  of  a 
land  force  of  60,000  men,  under  the  command  of  Tigranes — the 
main  reliance  of  Xerxes  for  the  defense  of  Ionia.  The  ships  were 
ed  ashore,  and  a  rampart  of  stones  and  stakes  was  erected  to 
proteel  them,  while  the  defending  army  lined  the  shore,  and  seemed 
amply  sufficient  to  repel  attack  from  seaward. 

It  was  not  long  before  the  Greek  fleet  arrived.  Disappointed  of 
their  intention  of  fighting  by  the  llight  of  the  enemy  from  Samos, 
they  had  at  first  proposed  either  to  return  home,  or  to  turn  aside  to 
the  Hellespi  nt:  but  they  were  at  last  persuaded  by  the  Ionian 
envoys  to  pursue  the  enemy's  fleet  and  again  offer  battle  at  Mykale. 
On  reaching  that  point  they  discovered  that  the  Persians  had  aban- 
doned ihe  sea.  intending  to  fifdit  only  on  land.  So  much  had  the 
Greeks  now  become  emboldened  that  they  ventured  to  disembark 
and  attack  the  united  land-force  and  sea-force  before  them.  But 
since  much  of  their  chance  of  success  depended  on  the  desertion  of 
the  [onians,  the  first  proceeding  of  Leotychides  was  to  copy  the 
previous  maneuver  of  Themistokles,  when  retreating  from  Arte- 
misium,  at  the  watering-places  of  Euboea.  Sailing  along  close  to  the 
coast,  he  addressed  through  a  herald  of  loud  voice,  earnest  appeals 
to  the  Ionians  among  the  enemy  to  revolt;  calculating,  even  if  they 
did  not  listen  to  him,  that  he  should  at  leasl  render  them  mistrusted 
by  the  Persians,  lie  then  disembarked  his  troops  and  marshaled 
them  for  the  purpose  of  attacking  the  Persian  camp  on  land:  while 
tin-  Persian  generals,  surprised  by  this  daring  manifestation  and 
suspecting,  either  from  his  maneuver,  or  from  previous  evidences, 
that  the  Ionians  were  in  secret  collusion  with  him,  ordered  the 
Samian  contingent  to  lie  disarmed,  and  the  Milesians  to  retire  to  the 
rear  of  the  army,  for  the  purpose  of  oecupjrin<r  the  various  mountain 
roads  up  to  the  summit  of  Mykale — with  which  the  latter  were 
familiar  as  a  part  of  their  own  territory. 

Serving  as  these  Greeks  in  the  fleet  were,  at  a  distance  from  their 
own  homes,  and  having  left  a  powerful  army  of  Persians  and  Greeks 
under  Mardonius  in  Boeotia,  they  were  of  course  full  of  anxiety  lest 
his  arms  might  pro\  e  victorious  and  extinguish  the  freedom  of  their 
country.  It  was  under  these  feelings  of  solicitude  for  their  absent 
brethren  that  they  disembarked  and  were  made  ready  for  attack  by 

the  afternoon.  Hut  it  was  the  afternoon  of  an  ever-memorable  day 
—the  fourth  of  the  month  Jioedromion  (aboul  September),  479  B.C. 
By  a  remarkable  coincidence,  the  victory  of  Platsea  in  Bceotia  had 


DEFEAT  OF  THE  PERSIANS.  341 

been  gained  by  Pausanias  that  very  morning.  At  the  moment  when 
the  Greeks  were  advancing  to  the  charge,  a  divine  Pheme  or  message 
flew  into  the  camp.  While  a  herald's  staff  was  seen  floated  to  the 
shore  by  the  western  wave,  the  symbol  of  electric  transmission  across 
the  ^gean — the  revelation,  sudden,  simultaneous,  irresistible,  struck 
at  once  upon  the  minds  of  all,  as  if  the  multitude  had  one  common 
soul  and  sense,  acquainting  them  that  on  that  very  morning  their 
countrymen  inBceotia  had  gained  a  complete  victory  over  Mardonius. 
At  once  the  previous  anxiety  was  dissipated,  and  the  whole  army,  full 
of  joy  and  confidence,  charged  with  redoubled  energy.  Such  is  the 
account  given  by  Herodotus,  and  doubtless  universally  accepted  in 
his  time,  when  the  combatants  of  Mykale  were  alive  to  tell  their 
own  story.  He,  moreover,  mentions  another  of  those  coincidences 
which  the  Greek  mind  always  seized  upon  with  so  much  avidity: 
there  was  a  chapel  of  the  Eleusinian  Demeter  close  to  the  field  of 
battle  at  Mykale,  as  well  as  at  Plataea.  Diodorus  and  other  later  writers, 
who  wrote  when  the  impressions  of  the  time  had  vanished,  and  when 
divine  interventions  were  less  easily  and  literally  admitted,  treat  the 
whole  proceeding  as  if  it  were  a  report  designedly  circulated  by  the 
generals  for  the  purpose  of  encouraging  their  army. 

The  Lacedaemonians  on  the  right  wing,  and  the  portion  of  the 
army  near  them,  had  a  difficult  path  before  them,  over  hilly 
ground  and  ravine;  while  the  Athenians,  Corinthians,  Sikyonians, 
and  Tioezeuians,  and  the  left  half  of  the  army,  marching  only 
along  the  beach,  came  much  sooner  into  conflict  with  the  enemy. 
The  Persians,  as  at  Platsea,  employed  their  gerrha,  or  wicker  buck- 
lers planted  by  spikes  in  the  ground,  as  a  breastwork,  from  behind 
which  they  discharged  their  arrows;  and  they  made  a  strenuous 
resistance  to  prevent  this  defense  from  being  overthrown.  Ulti- 
mately, the  Greeks  succeeded  in  demolishing  it;  driving  the  enemy 
into  the  interior  of  the  fortification,  where  they  in  vain  tried  to 
maintain  themselves  against  the  ardor  of  their  pursuers,  wdio  forced 
their  way  into  it  almost  along  with  the  defenders.  Even  when  this 
last  rampart  was  carried,  and  when  the  Persian  allies  had  fled,  the 
native  Persians  still  continued  to  prolong  the  struggle  with  undimin- 
ished bravery.  Unpracticed  in  line  and  drill,  and  acting  only  in 
small  knots,  with  disadvantages  of  armor  such  as  had  been  felt 
severely  at  Platsea,  they  still  maintained  an  unequal  conflict  with  the 
Greek  hoplites;  nor  was  it  until  the  Lacedaemonians  with  their  half 
of  the  army  arrived  to  join  in  the  attack  that  the  defense  was  aban- 
doned as  hopeless.  The  revolt  of  the  Ionians  in  the  camp  put  the 
finishing  stroke  to  this  ruinous  defeat.  Firet,  the  disarmed  Samians 
— next,  other  Ionians  and  vEolians — lastly,  the  Milesians,  who  had 
been  posted  to  guard  the  passes  in  the  rear — not  only  deserted,  but 
took  an  active  part  in  the  attack.  The  Milesians  especially,  to  whom 
the  Persians  had  trusted  for  guidance  up  to  the  summits  of  Mykale, 
led  them  by  wroug  roads,  threw  them  into  the  hands  of  their  pur- 


342  BATTLES  OF  PLAT.  E  A   AND  MYKALE. 

suns,  and  at  last  set  upon  them  with  their  own  hands.  A  large 
number  of  the  Dative  Persians,  together  with  both  the  generals  of  the 
land-force,  Tigranes  and  Mardontes,  perished  in  iliis  disastrous  bat- 
tle: the  two  Persian  admirals,  Artayntes  and  Ithamithres,  escaped, 
but  the  army  was  irretrievably  dispersed,  while  all  the  ships  which 
bad  been  dragged  up  on  the  shore  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  i 
ants,  and  were  burnt.  Bui  the  victory  of  the  Greeks  was  by  no 
means  bloodless.  Among  the  left  wing,  upon  which  the  brunt  of 
the  action  had  fallen,  a  considerable  number  of  men  were  slain, 
especially  Sikyonians,  with  their  commander  Perilaua    The  honors 

of    the    battle    were    aw  aided,    first   to    the    Athenians,    next    to    tlio 

Corinthians,  Sikyonians,  and  Trcezenians;  the  Lacedaemonians  having 
done  comparatively  little.  Hermolykus  the  Athenian,  a  celebrated 
pankratiast,  was  the  warrior  most  distinguished  for  individual  feats 
of  arms. 

The  dispersed  Persian  army,  so  much  of  it  at  least  as  had  at  first 
found  protection  on  the  heights  of  Mykale,  was  withdrawn  from  the 
coast  forthwith  to  Bardis  under  the  command  of  Artayntes,  whom 
Masistes,  the  brother  of  Xerxes,  bitterly  reproached  on  the  score  of 

cowardice  in  the  recent  defeat.  The  general  was  at  length  so  mad- 
dened by  a  repetition  of  these  insults,  that  lie  drew  his  scimitar  and 
would  have  slain  Masistes,  had  he  not  been  prevented  by  a  Greek  of 
Halikarnassus  named  Xenagoras,  who  was  rewarded  by  Xerxes  with 
the  government  of  Kilikia.  Xerxes  was  still  at  Sardis,  where  he  bad 
remained  ever  since  his  return,  and  where  he  conceived  a  passion  tor 
the  wife  of  his  brother  Masistes.  The  consequences  of  his  passion 
entailed  upon  that  unfortunate  woman  sufferings  loo  tragical  to  be 
described,  by  the  orders  of  his  own  queen,  the  jealous  and  savage 
Amestris.  Put  he  had  no  fresh  army  ready  lo  send  down  to  the 
coast;  so  that  the  Greek  cities,  even  on  the  continent,  were  for  the 
time  practically  liberated  from  Persian  supremacy,  while  the  insular 
Greeks  were  in  a  position  of  still  greater  safety. 

The  commanders  of  the  victorious  Grecian  fleet,  having  full  confi- 
dence in  their  power  of  defending  the  islands,  willingly  admitted  the 
Chians,  Samians,  Lesbians,  and  the  other  islanders  hitherto  subjects 
of  Persia,  to  the  protection  and  reciprocal  engagements  of  their  alli- 
ance. We  may  presume  that  the  despots  Strattis  and  Theomestor 
were  expelled  from  Chios  and  Samos.  But  the  Peloponnesian  com- 
manders hesitated  in  guaranteeing  the  same  secure  autonomy  to  the 
continental  cities,  which  could  not  be  upheld  against  the  great  inland 
power  without  efforts  incessant  as  well  as  exhausting.  Never 
not  enduring  to  abandon  these  continental  Ionians  to  the  mercy  of 
Xerxes,  they  made  the  offer  to  transplant  them  into  European 
Greece,  and  to  make  room  for  them  by  expelling  the  medising 
Greeks  from  their  sea-port  towns.  But  this  proposition  was  at  once 
repudiated  by  the  Athenians,  who  would  not  permit  that  colonies 
originally  planted  by  themselves  should  be  abandoned,  thus  imp 


GRECIAN  FLEET   SAILS  TO  THE  HELLESPONT.     343 

the  metropolitan  dignity  of  Athens.  The  Lacedaemonians  readily 
ucquiesced  in  this  objection,  and  were  glad,  in  all  probability,  to 
hud  honorable  grounds  for  renouncing  a  scheme  of  wholesale  dispos- 
session eminently  difficult  to  execute — yet  at  the  same  time  to  be 
absolved  from  onerous  obligations  towards  the  Ionians,  and  to  throw 
upon  Athens  either  the  burden  of  defending  or  the  shame  of  aban- 
doning them.  The  first  step  was  thus  taken,  wmich  we  shall  quickly 
see  followed  by  others,  for  giving  to  Athens  a  separate  ascendency 
and  separate  duties  in  regard  to  the  Asiatic  Greeks,  and  for  introduc- 
ing first,  the  confederacy  of  Delos — next,  Athenian  maritime  em- 
pire. 

From  the  coast  of  Ionia  the  Greek  fleet  sailed  northward  to  the 
Hellespont,  chiefly  at  the  instance  of  the  Athenians,  and  for  the  pur- 
pose of  breaking  down  the  Xerxeiau  bridge.  For  so  imperfect  was 
their  information,  that  they  believed  this  bridge  to  be  still  firm  and  in 
passable  condition  in  September,  479  B.C.,  though  it  had  been  broken 
and  useless  at  the  time  when  Xerxes  crossed  the  strait  in  his  retreat, 
ten  months  before  (about  November,  480  B.C.).  Having  ascertained 
on  their  arrival  at  Abydos  the  destruction  of  the  bridge,  Leotychides 
and  the  Peloponnesiaus  returned  home  forthwith;  but  Xanthippus 
with  the  Athenian  squadron  resolved  to  remain  and  expel  the  Per- 
sians from  the  Thracian  Chersonese.  This  peninsula  had  been  in 
great  part  an  Athenian  possession,  for  the  space  of  more  than  forty 
years,  from  the  first  settlement  of  the  elder  Miltiades  down  to  the 
suppression  of  the  Ionic  revolt,  although  during  part  of  that  time 
tributary  to  Persia.  From  the  flight  of  the  second  Miltiades  to  the 
expulsion  of  Xerxes  from  Greece  (493-480  B.C.),  a  period  during 
which  the  Persian  monarch  was  irresistible  and  full  of  hatred  to 
Athens,  no  Athenian  citizen  would  find  it  safe  to  live  there.  But  the 
Athenian  squadron  from  Mykale  were  now  naturally  eager  both  to 
re-establish  the  ascendency  of  Athens,  and  to  regain  the  properties  of 
Athenian  citizens  in  the  Chersonese.  Probably  many  of  the  leading 
men,  especially  Kimon,  son  of  Miltiades,  had  extensive  possessions 
there  to  recover,  as  Alkibiades  had  in  after  days,  with  private  forts  of 
his  own.  To  this  motive  for  attacking  the  Chersonese  may  be  added 
another — the  importance  of  its  corn-produce,  as  well  as  of  a  clear 
passage  through  the  Hellespont  for  the  corn  ships  out  of  the  Pro- 
pontis  to  Athens  and  iEgina.  Such  were  the  reasons  which  induced 
Xanthippus  and  the  leading  Athenians,  even  without  the  co-oper- 
ttion  of  the  Peloponnesians,  to  undertake  the  siege  of  Sestus — the 
strongest  place  in  the  peninsula,  the  key  of  the  strait,  and  the  center 
in  which  all  the  neighboring  Persian  garrisons,  from  Kardia  and  else- 
j  frhere,  had  got  together  under  (Eobazus  and  Artayktes. 
j  The  Grecian  inhabitants  of  the  Chersonese  readily  joined  the 
/Athenians  in  expelling  the  Persians,  who,  taken  altogether  by  sur- 
/prise,  had  been  constrained  to  throw  themselves  into  Sestus,  without 
stores  of  provisions  or  means  of  making  a  long  defense.     But  of 


344  BATTLES  OF  PLATTE  A  AND  MYKALE. 

sill  the  Chersonesites  the  most  forward  and  exasperated  were  tho 
inhabitants  of  Elseus — the  southernmost  town  of  the  peninsula,  cele- 
brated for  its  tomb,  temple,  and  Bacred  grove  of  the  hero  Protesilaus, 
wiio  figured  in  the  Trojan  legend  as  the  foremost  warrior  in  tin-  host 
df  Agamemnon  to  leap  ashore,  ami  as  the  Orel  victim  to  the  spear  of 
Hektor.  The  temple  of  l'rotesilaus,  conspicuously  placed  on  the  sir 
shore,  was  a  scene  of  worship  and  pilgrimage  not  merely  for  the 
inhabitants  of  Elseus,  but  also  for  the  neighboring  Greeks  generally, 
insomuch  that  it  bad  been  enriched  with  ample  votive  offerings  and 
probably  deposits  Eor  security — money,  gold  and  silver  saucers,  brazen 
implements,  robes,  and  various  other  presents.  The  story  ran  that 
when  Xerxes  was  on  his  march  across  the  Hellespont  into  Greece, 
Artayktes,  greedy  of  all  this  wealth,  and  aware  that  the  monarch  would 
not  knowingly  permit  the  sanctuary  to  he  despoiled,  preferred  a  wily 
request  to  him — "  Master,  here  is  the  house  of  a  Greek,  who  in  invad- 
ing thy  territory  met  his  just  reward  and  perished:  1  pray  thee  give 
his  house  to  me,  in  order  that  people  may  learn  for  the  future  not  to 
invade//;//  land" — the  whole  Boil  of  Asia  being  regarded  by  the  Per- 
sian monarchs  as  their  rightful  possession,  and  l'rotesilaus  having 
been  in  this  sense  an  aggressor  against  them.  Xerxes,  interpreting 
therequesl  literally,  and  not  troubling  himself  to  ask  who  the  inva- 
der was,  consented:  upon  which,  Artayktes,  while  the  army  were 
engaged  in  their  forward  march  into  Greece,  stripped  the  sacred 
grove  of  Protesilaus,  carrying  all  the  treasures  to  Bestus.  lie  was 
not  content  without  still  farther  outraging  Grecian  sentiment:  he 
turned  cattle  into  the  grove,  plowed  and  sowed  it,  and  was  even 
said  to  have  profaned  the  sanctuary  by  visiting  it  with  his  concubines. 
Such  proceedings  were  more  than  enough  to  raise  the  strongest  antip- 
athy against  him  anion-  the Cheresonesite  Greeks,  who  now  crowded 
to  re-enforce  the  Athenians  and  blocked  him  up  in  Septus.  After  a 
certain  length  of  siege,  the  stock  of  provisions  in  the  town  failed,  and 
famine  began  to  make  itself  felt  among  the  garrison ;  which  neverthe- 
less Still  held  out  by  painful  shifts  and  endurance,  until  a  late  period 
in  the  autumn,  when  the  patience  even  of  the  Athenian  besiegers  was 
well-nigh  exhausted.  It  was  with  difficulty  thai  the  leader,-  repn  »ed 
the  clamorous  desire  manifested  in  their  own  camp  to  return  to 
Athens. 

Imtwience  having  been  appeased,  and  the  seamen  kept  together, 
the  siege  was  prosed  without,  relaxation,  and  presently  the  privations 
of  the  garrison  became  intolerable;  bo  that  Artayktes  and  (Eobazus 
were  at  last  reduced  to  the  necessity  of  escaping  by  stealth,  letting 
themselves  down  with  a  few  followers  from  the  wall  at  a  point  where 
it  was  imperfectly  blockaded.  OZobazus  found  his  way  into  Thrace, 
where,  however,  he  was  taken  captive  by  the  Abysinthian  natives 
and  offered  up  as  a  sacrifice  to  their  god  Pleistorus:  Artayktes  lied 
northward  along  the  shores  of  the  Hellespont,  but  was  pursued  by 
the  Greeks,  and  made  prisoner  near  JfJ^ospotumi,  after  a  strenuous 


PlIALARIS  DESPOT  OF  AGRIGENTUM.        ,    345 

resistance.  He  was  brought  with  his  son  in  chains  to  Sestus,  which 
immediately  after  his  departure  had  been  cheerfully  surrendered  by 
its  inhabitants  to  the  Atheuians.  It  was  in  vain  that  he  offered  a  sum 
of  100  talents  as  compensation  to  the  treasury  of  Protesilaus,  and  a 
farther  sum  of  200  talents  to  the  Athenians  as  personal  ransom  fol 
himself  and  his  son.  So  deep  was  the  wrath  inspired  by  his  insults 
to  the  sacred  ground,  that  both  the  Athenian  commander  Xauthippus, 
and  the  citizens  of  Ekeus,  disdained  everything  less  than  a  severe 
ami  even  cruel  personal  atonement  for  the  outraged  Protesilaus. 
Artayktes.  after  having  first  seen  his  son  stoned  to  death  before  his 
eyes,  was  hung  up  to  a  lofty  board  fixed  for  the  purpose,  and  left  to 
perish,  on  the  spot  where  the  Xerxeian  bridge  had  been  fixed.  There 
is  something  in  this  proceeding  more  Oriental  than  Grecian:  it  is  not 
in  the  Grecian  character  to  aggravate  death  by  artificial  and  lingering 
preliminaries. 

After  the  capture  of  Sestus  the  Athenian  fleets  returned  home  with 
their  plunder,  toward  the  commencement  of  winter,  not  omitting  to 
carry  with  them  the  vast  cables  of  the  Xerxeian  bridge,  which  had 
been  taken  in  the  town,  as  a  trophy  to  adorn  the  acropolis  of  Athena 


CHAPTER  XLIII. 

EVENTS  IN  SICILY  DOWN  TO  TITE  EXPULSION  OP  TIIE  GELONTAN 
DYNASTY  AND  TIIE  ESTABLISHMENT  OP  POPULAR  GOVERNMENTS 
THROUGHOUT  TIIE  ISLAND. 

I  have  already  mentioned,  in  the  preceding  volume  of  this  history, 

the  foundation  of  the  Greek  colonies  in  Italy  and  Sicily,  together 
with  the  general  fact,  that  in  the  sixth  century  before  the  Christian 
era,  they  were  among  the  most  powerful  and  flourishing  cities  that 
bore  the  Hellenic  name.  Beyond  this  general  fact,  we  obtain  little 
insight  into  their  history. 

Though  Syracuse,  after  it  fell  into  the  hands  of  Gelo,  about  485 
B.C.,  became  the  most  powerful  city  in  Sicily,  yet  in  the  preceding 
century  Gela  and  Agrigentum,  on  the  south  side  of  the  island,  had 
been  its  superiors.  The  latter,  within  a  few  years  of  its  foundation, 
fell  under  the  dominion  of  one  of  its  own  citizens  named  Phalaris; 
a  despot  energetic,  warlike,  and  cruel.  An  exile  from  Astypalaea 
near  Rhodes,  but  a  rich  man,  and  an  early  settler  at  Agrigentum,  he 
contrived  to  make  himself  despot  seemingly  about  the  year  570  b.c. 
lie  had  been  named  to  one  of  the  chief  posts  in  the  city,  and  having 
undertaken  at  his  own  cost  the  erection  of  a  temple  to  Zeus  Polieus 
in  the  acropolis  (as  the  Athenian  Alkmaeonids  rebuilt  the  burnt  tem- 
ple of  Delphi),  he  was  allowed  on  this  pretense  to  assemble  therein  a 
considerable  number  of  men;  whom  he  armed,  and  availed  himself 


346  EVENTS  IN   SICILY. 

of  the  opportunity  of  a  festival  of  Demeter  to  turn  them  against  tlw 
people.  He  is  said  to  have  made  many  conquests  over  the  petty 
Bikan  communities  in  the  neighborhood:  but  exaction  and  cruelties 
towards  his  own  subjects  are  noticed  as  his  mosl  prominenl  charac- 
teristic, and  his  brazen  hull  passed  into  imperishable  memory.  This 
piece  of  mechanism  was  hollow,  and  sufficiently  capacious  to  contain 
one  or  more  victims  inclosed  within  it,  to  perish  in  tortures  when  the 
metal  was  heated:  theories  of  these  suffering  prisoners  passed  for 
the  roarings  of  the  animal.  The  artist  was  named  lVrillus,  and  is 
said  to  have  been  himself  the  first  person  burnt  in  it  by  order  of  the 
despot.  In  spite  of  the  odium  thus  incurred,  Phalaris  maintained 
himself  as  despot  for  sixteen  years;  at  the  end  of  which  period,  a 
general  rising  of  the  people,  headed  by  a  leading  man  named  Tele- 
machus,  terminated  both  his  reign  and  his  life.  Whether  Telemachus 
became  despot  or  not,  we  have  no  information:  sixty  years  after- 
ward, we  shall  find  Ins  deseendant  Thero  established  in  that  posi- 
tion. 

It  was  about  the  period  of  the  death  of  Phalaris  that  the  Syra- 
cusans  reconquered  their  revolted  colony  of  Kamarina  (in  the  south- 
east of  the  island  between  Syracuse  and  Gela),  expelled  or  dispos- 
sessed the  inhabitants,  and  resumed  the  territory.  With  the  excep- 
tion of  this  accidental  circumstance,  we  are  without  information 
about  the  Sicilian  cities  until  a  lime  rather  before  500  B.C.,  just  when 
the  war  between  Kroton  and  Sybaris  had  extinguished  the  power  of 
the  latter,  and  when  the  despotism  of  the  IVisistratids  at  Athens  had 
been  exchanged  for  the  democratical  constitution  of  Kleisthenes. 

The  first  forms  of  government  among  the  Sicilian  Greeks,  as  among 
the  cities  of  Greece  proper  in  the  early  historical  age.  appear  to  have 
been  all  oligarchical.  ^Yc  do  not  know  under  what  particular  modi- 
fications they  were  kept  up,  but  probably  all  more  or  less  resembled 
that  of  Syracuse,  where  the  Gamori  (or  wealthy  proprietors  descended 
from  the  original  colonizing  chiefs),  possessing  large  landed  proper- 
ties tilled  by  a  numerous  Sikel  serf  population  called  Kyllyrii,  formed 
the  qualified  citizens — out  of  whom,  as  well  as  by  whom,  magistrates 
and  generals  were  chosen;  while  the  Demos,  or  non-privileged  free- 
men, comprised,  first,  the  small  proprietary  cultivators  who  main- 
tained themselves,  by  manual  labor  and  without  slaves,  from  their 
own  lands  or  gardens — next,  the  artisans  and  tradesmen.  In  the 
course  of  two  or  three  generations,  many  individuals  of  the  privileged 
class  would  have  fallen  into  poverty,  and  would  find  themselves 
more  nearly  on  a  par  with  the  non-privileged;  while  such  members 
of  the  latter  as  might  rise  to  opulence  were  not  for  that  reason 
admitted  into  the  privileged  body.  Here  were  amply  materials  for 
discontent.  Ambitious  leaders,  often  themselves  members  of  tho 
privileged  bod}',  put  themselves  al  the  head  of  the  popular  opposi- 
tion, overthrew  the  oligarchy,  and  made  themselves  despots;  democ- 
racy being  at  that  time  hardly  known  anywhere  in  Greece.     The 


DESPOTS  OF  GELA.  347 

general  fact  of  this  change,  preceded  by  occasional  violent  dissensions 
among  the  privileged  class  themselves,  is  all  that  we  are  permitted 
to  know,  without  those  modifying  circumstances  by  which  it  must 
have  been  accompanied  in  every  separate  city.  Toward  or  near  the 
year  500  B.C.,  we  rind  Anaxilaus  despot  at  Rhegium,  Skythes  at 
Zankle,  Terillus  at  Himera,  Peithagoras  at  Selinus,  Kleander  at  Gela, 
and  Pansetius  at  Leoutini.  It  was  about  the  year  509  B.C.  that  the 
Spartan  prince  Dorieus  conducted  a  body  of  emigrants  to  the  terri- 
tories of  Eryx  and  Egesta,  near  the  north-western  corner  of  the 
ifiland,  in  hopes  of  expelling  the  non-Hellenic  inhabitants  and  found 
a  new  Grecian  colony.  But  the  Carthaginians,  whose  Sicilian  pos- 
sessions were  close  adjoining  and  who  had  already  aided  in  driving 
Dorieus  from  a  previous  establishment  at  Kinyps  in  Libya,  now 
lent  such  vigorous  assistance  to  the  Egestaean  inhabitants,  that  the 
Spartan  prince,  after  a  short  period  of  prosperity,  was  defeated  and 
slain  with  most  of  his  companions.  Such  of  them  as  escaped,  under 
the  orders  of  Euryleon,  took  possession  of  Minoa,  which  bore  from 
henceforward  the  name  of  Herakleia — a  colony  and  dependency  of  the 
neighboring  town  of  Selinus,  of  which  Peithagoras  was  then  despot. 
Euryleon  joined  the  malcontents  at  Selinus,  overthrew  Peithagoras, 
and  established  himself  as  despot,  until,  after  a  short  possession  of 
power,  he  was  slain  in  a  popular  mutiny. 

We  are  here  introduced  to  the  first  known  instance  of  that  series 
of  contests  between  the  Phoenicians  and  Greeks  in  Sicily,  which, 
like  the  struggles  between  the  Saracens  and  the  Normans  in  the 
eleventh  and  twelfth  centuries  after  the  Christian  era,  were  destined 
to  determine  whether  the  island  should  be  a  part  of  Africa  or  a  part 
of  Europe — and  which  were  only  terminated,  after  the  lapse  of  three 
centuries,  by  the  absorption  of  both  into  the  vast  bosom  of  Rome. 
It  seems  that  the  Carthaginians  and  Egestseans  not  only  over- 
whelmed Dorieus,  but  also  made  some  conquests  of  the  neighboring 
Grecian  possessions,  which  were  subsequently  recovered  by  Gelo  of 
Syracuse. 

Not  long  after  the  death  of  Dorieus,  Kleander  despot  of  Gela  began 
to  raise  his  city  to  ascendency  over  the  other  Sicilian  Greeks,  who  had 
hitherto  been,  if  not  all  equal,  at  least  all  independent.  His  powerful 
mercenary  force,  levied  in  part  among  the  Sikel  tribes,  did  not  pre- 
serve him  from  the  sword  of  a  Geloan  citizen  named  Sabyllus,  who 
slew  him  after  a  reign  of  seven  years:  but  it  enabled  his  brother  and 
successor  Hippokrates  to  extend  his  dominion  over  nearly  half  of  the 
island.  In  that  mercenary  force  two  officers,  Gelo  and  iEnesidemus 
(the  latter  a  citizen  of  Agrigentum,  of  the  conspicuous  family  of  the 
Emmenida?,  and  descended  from  Telemachus  the  deposer  of  Phalaris), 
particularly  distinguished  themselves.  Gelo  was  descended  from  a 
native  of  Telos  near  the  Triopian  Cape,  one  of  the  original  settlers 
who  accompanied  the  Rhodian  Antiphemus  to  Sicily.  His  immedi- 
ate ancestor,  named  Telines,  had  first  raised  the  family  to  distinction 


348  EVENTS  IN   SICILY. 

by  valuable  aid  to  a  defeated  political  party,  who  had  been  worsted 
in  a  struggle  and  forced  t<>  seek  Bhelter  in  the  neighboring  town  of 
Maktorium.  Telines  was  possessed  of  certain  peculiar  sacred  rites 
(or  visible  and  portable  holy  symbols,  with  a  privileged  knowledge 
of  the  ceremonial  acts  and  formalities  of  divine  service  under  which 
they  were  to  be  shown)  for  propitiating  the  Subterranean  Godd< 
Demeter  and  Persephone:  "from  whom  he  obtained  them,  or  how 
begot  at  them  himself  (says  Herodotus),  I  cannot  say;"  but  such 
was  the  Imposing  effecl  of  his  presence  and  manner  of  exhibiting 
them,  that  he  ventured  to  march  into  Gela  at  the  head  of  the  exiles 
from  Maktorium,  and  was  enabled  to  reinstate  them  in  power— 
deterring  the  people  from  resistance  in  the  same  manner  as  the 
Athenians  had  been  overawed  by  the  spectacle  of  1'live- Athene  in 
the  chariot  along  with  Peisistratus.  The  extraordinary  boldness  of 
this  proceeding  excites  the  admiration  of  Herodotus,  especially  as  lie- 
had  been  informed  that  Telines  was  of  an  unwarlike  temperament 
The  restored  exiles  rewarded  it  by  granting  to  him,  ami  to  bis 
descendants  after  him,  the  hereditary  dignity  of  hierophants  of  the 
tw o  goddesses — a  function  certainly  honorable,  and  probably  Lucra- 
tive, connected  witli  the  administration  of  consecrated  property  and 
with  the  enjoyment  of  a  large  portion  of  its  fruits. 

Gelo  thus  belonged  to  an  ancient  and  distinguished  hierophantic 
family  at  (Tela,  being  theeldest  of  four  brothers,  sons  of  Deinomenes 
— Gelo,  Jliero,  Polyzelus,  and Thrasybulus :  and  he  further  ennobled 
himself  by  such  personal  exploits,  in  the  army  of  the  despot  Hippok- 
rates,  as  to  be  promoted  to  the  supreme  command  of  the  cavalry7. 
It  was  greatly  to  the  activity  of  Gelo  that  the  despot  owed  a  succes- 
sion of  victories  and  conquests,  in  which  the  Ionic  or  Chalkidic 
cities  of  Kallipolis,  Naxos,  Leontini,  and  Zankle  were  successively 
reduced  to  dependence. 

The  fate  of  Zankle — seemingly7  held  by  its  despot  Skythes  in  a 
state  of  dependent  alliance  under  Hippokrates,  and  in  standing  feud 
with  Anaxilaus  of  Iihcgium  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  strait  of  .Mes- 
sina— was  remarkable.  At  the  time  when  the  Ionic  revolt  in  Asia 
was  suppressed,  and  Miletus  reconquered  by  the  Persians  (jj.c.  494, 
493),  a  natural  sympathy  was  manifested  by  the  Ionic  Greeks  in 
Sicily  toward  the  sufferers  of  the  same  race  on  the  cast  of  the 
yEgean  sea.  Projects  were  devised  for  assisting  the  Asiatic  refugees 
to  a  new  abode;  and  the  Zanklseans  especially  invited  them  to  form 
a  new  pan-Ionic  colony  upon  the  territory  of  the  Sikels,  called  Kale 
Akte,  on  the  north  coast  of  Sicily;  a  coast  presenting  fertile  and 
attractive  situations,  and  along  the  whole  line  of  which  there  was 
only  one  Grecian  colony — Ilimera.  This  invitation  was  accepted  by 
the  refugees  from  Samoa  and  Miletus,  who  accordingly7  put  them- 
selves on  shipboard  for  Zankle;  steering,  as  was  usual,  along  the 
coast  of  Akarnania  to  Korkyra,  from  thence  across  to  Tarentum,  and 
along  the  Italian  coast  to  the  strait  of  Messina.     It  happened  that 


CONDUCT  OF  HIPPOKRATES.  349 

■when  they  reached  the  town  of  Epizephyrian  Lokri,  Skytlics,  tlie 
despot  of  Zankle,  was  absent  from  his  city,  together  with  the  larger 
portion  of  his  military  force  on  an  expedition  against  the  Sikels— 
perhaps  undertaken  to  facilitate  the  contemplated  colony  at  Kale 
Akte.  His  enemy,  the  Rhegian  prince  Anaxilaus,  taking  advantage 
of  this  accident,  proposed  to  the  refugees  at  Lokri  that  they  should 
seize  for  themselves,  and  retain,  the  unguarded  city  of  Zankle.  They 
followed  his  suggestion,  and  possessed  themselves  of  the  city, 
together  with  the  families  and  property  of  the  absent  Zankkeans; 
who  speedily  returned  to  repair  their  loss,  while  their  prince  Skythes 
farther  invoked  the  powerful  aid  of  his  ally  and  superior,  Hippok- 
rates.  The  latter,  however,  provoked  at  the  loss  of  one  of  his 
dependent  cities,  seized  and  imprisoned  Skythes,  whom  he  consid- 
ered as  the  cause  of  it,  at  Inykus,  in  the  interior  of  the  island.  But 
he  found  it  at  the  same  time  advantageous  to  accept  a  proposition 
made  to  him  by  the  Samians,  captors  of  the  city,  and  to  betray  the 
Zankloeans  whom  he  had  come  to  aid.  By  a  convention  ratified  with 
an  oath,  it  was  agreed  that  Hippokrates  should  receive  for  himself 
all  the  extra-mural,  and  half  the  intra-mural,  property  and  slaves 
belonging  to  the  Zanklaeans,  leaving  the  other  half  to  the  Samians. 
Among  the  property  without  the  walls,  not  the  least  valuable  part 
consisted  in  the  person  of  those  Zanklreaus  whom  Hippokrates  had 
come  to  assist,  but  whom  he  now  carried  away  as  slaves:  excepting, 
however,  from  this  lot,  three  hundred  of  the  principal  citizens,  whom 
he  delivered  over  to  the  Samians  to  be  slaughtered — probably  lest 
they  might  find  friends  to  procure  their  ransom,  and  afterward  dis- 
turb the  Samian  possession  of  the  town.  Their  lives  were,  however, 
spared  by  the  Samians,  though  we  are  not  told  what  became  of  them. 
This  transaction,  alike  perfidious  on  the  part  of  the  Samians  and 
of  Hippokrates,  secured  to  the  former  a  flourishing  city,  and  to  the 
latter  an  abundant  booty.  We  are  glad  to  learn  that  the  imprisoned 
Skythes  found  means  to  escape  to  Darius,  king  of  Persia,  from  whom 
he  received  a  generous  shelter:  imperfect  compensation  for  the 
iniquity  of  his  fellow-Greeks.  The  Samians,  however,  did  not  long 
retain  possession  of  their  conqsest,  but  were  expelled  by  the  very 
person  who  had  instigated  them  to  seize  it — Anaxilaus  of  Rhegium. 
He  planted  in  it  new  inhabitants,  of  Dorian  and  Mcssenian  race, 
recolonizing  it  under  the  name  of  Messene — a  name  which  it  ever 
afterward  bore;  and  it  appears  to  have  been  governed  either  by  him- 
self or  by  his  son  Kleophron,  until  his  death  about  B.C.  476. 

Besides  the  conquests  above  mentioned,  Hippokrates  of  Gela  was 
on  the  point  of  making  the  still  more  important  acquisition  of  Syra- 
cuse, and  was  only  prevented  from  doing  so,  after  defeating  the  Syra- 
cusans  at  the  river  Helorus,  and  capturing  many  prisoners,  by  the 
mediation  of  the  Corinthians  and  Korkyraans,  who  prevailed  on  him 
to  be  satisfied  with  the  cession  of  Kamarina  and  its  territory  as  a  ran- 
som.    Having  repeopled  this  territory,  which  became  tnu*>  annexed 


350  EVENTS  IN  SICILY. 

to  Gela,  he  was  prosecuting  bis  conquests  Farther  among  the  Sikels, 
when  he  died  or  was  killed  al  Hybla.  Sis  death  caused  a  mutiny 
among  the  <  leloans,  \\  ho  r.  fm  ed  to  acknowledge  his  sons,  and  strove 
to  regain  their  freedom;  bul  Gelo,  the  general  of  horse  in  the  army, 
espousing  the  cause  of  the  Bons  with  energy,  put  down  by  force  the 
resistance  of  the  people.  As  soon  as  this  was  dime,  he  threw  off  the 
mask,  deposed  the  suns  of  Hippokrates,  and  seized  the  scepter 
himself. 

Thus  master  of  Gela,  and  succeeding  probably  to  the  ascendency 
enjoyed  by  bis  predecessor  over  the  ionic  cities,  Gelo  became  the 
most  powerful  man  in  the  island;  but  an  incident  which  occurred  a 
few  years  afterward  (n.v.  485),  while  it  aggrandized  him  still  farther, 
transferred  the  seat  of  his  power  from  Gela  to  Syracuse.  The  Syra- 
cusan  Gamori,  or  oligarchical  order  of  proprietary  families,  probably 
humbled  by  their  ruinous  defeat  at  the  Helorus,  were  dispossessed  of 
the  government  by  a  combination  between  their  serf  cultivators  called 
the  Kyllyrii,  and  the  smaller  freemen  called  the  Demos;  they  were 
forced  to  retire  to  Kasmeiue,  where  they  invoked  the  aid  of  Gelo  to 
restore  them.  Thai  ambitious  prince  undertook  the  task,  and  accom- 
plished it  with  facility;  for  the  Syracusan  people,  probably  unable  to 
resist  their  political  opponents  when  backed  by  such  powerful  foreign 
aid,  surrendered  to  him  without  striking  a  blow.  But  instead  of  restor- 
ing- the  place  to  the  previous  oligarchy,  Gelo  appropriated  it  to  him- 
self, leaving  Gela  to  be  governed  by  bis  brother  Hiero.  lie  greatly 
enlarged  the  city  of  Syracuse,  and  strengthened  its  fortifications: 
probably  it  was  he  who  first  carried  it  beyond  the  islet  of  Ortygia,  so 
as  to  include  a  larger  space  of  the  adjacent  main  land  (or  rather  island 
of  Sicily)  which  bore  the  name  of  Achradina.  To  people  this  enlarged 
space  he  brought  all  the  residents  in  Kamarina,  which  town  he  dis- 
mantled— and  more  than  half  of  those  in  Gela;  which  was  thus 
reduced  in  importance,  while  Syracuse  became  the  first  city  in 
Sicily,  and  even  received  fresh  addition  of  inhabitants  from  the 
neighboring  towns  of  Megara  and  Eubcea. 

Both  these  towns,  Megara  and  Eubcea,  like  Syracuse,  were  gov- 
erned by  oligarchies,  with  serf-cultivators  dependent  upon  them, 
and  a  Demos  or  body  of  smaller  freemen  excluded  from  the  political 
franchise:  both  were  involved  in  war  with  Gelo,  probably  to  resist 
his  encroachments:  both  were  besieged  and  taken.  The  oligarchy 
who  ruled  these  cities,  and  who  were  the  authors  as  well  as  leaders 
of  the  war,  anticipated  nothing  but  ruin  at  the  hands  of  the  con- 
queror; while  the  Demos,  who  had  not  been  consulted  and  had 
taken  no  part  in  the  war  (which  we  must  presume  to  have  been 
carried  on  by  the  oligarchy  and  their  serfs  alone),  felt  assured  that  no 
barm  would  be  done  to  them.  His  behavior  disappointed  the  expec- 
tations of  both.  After  transporting  both  of  them  to  Syracuse,  he 
established  the  oligarchs  in  thai  town  as  citizens,  and  sold  the  Demos 
as  Slaves  under  covenant   that  they  should   be  exported  from   Sicily. 


SYRACUSE  UNDER  GELO.  3ol 

"His  conduct  (says  Herodotus)  was  dictated  by  the  conviction,  that 
a  Demos  was  a  most  troublesome  companion  to  live  with."  It 
appears  that  the  state  of  society  which  he  wished  to  establish  was 
that  of  Patricians  and  clients,  without  any  Plebs;  something  like  that 
of  Thessaly,  where  there  was  a  proprietary  oligarchy  living  in  the 
cities,  with  Penestae  or  dependent  cultivators  occupying  and  tilling 
the  land  on  their  account — but  no  small  self-working  proprietors  or 
tradesmen  in  sufficient  number  to  form  a  recognized  class.  And 
since  Gelo  was  removing  the  free  population  from  these  conquered 
towns,  leaving  in  or  around  the  towns  no  one  except  the  serf-cnlti- 
vators,  we  may  presume  that  the  oligarchical  proprietors  when 
removed  might  still  continue,  even  as  residents  at  Syracuse,  to  receive 
the  produce  raised  for  them  by  others:  but  the  small  self-working  pro- 
prietors, if  removed  in  like  manner,  would  be  deprived  of  subsis- 
tence, because  their  land  would  be  too  distant  for  persoual  tillage, 
and  they  had  no  serfs.  While  therefore  we  fully  believe,  with 
Herodotus,  that  Gelo  considered  the  small  free  proprietors  as 
"troublesome  yoke-fellows" — a  sentiment  perfectly  natural  to  a 
Grecian  despot,  unless  where  he  found  them  useful  aids  to  his  own 
ambition  against  a  hostile  oligarchy — we  must  add  that  they  would 
become  peculiarly  troublesome  in  his  scheme  of  concentrating  the 
free  population  of  Sj'racuse,  seeing  that  he  would  have  to  give  them 
land  in  the  neighborhood  or  to  provide  in  some  other  way  for  their 
maintenance. 

So  large  an  accession  of  size,  walls,  and  population  rendered 
Syracuse  the  first  Greek  city  in  Sicily.  And  the  power  of  Gelo, 
embracing  as  it  did  not  merely  Syracuse,  but  so  considerable  a  por- 
tion of  the  rest  of  the  island,  Greek  as  well  as  Sikel,  was  the  greatest 
Hellenic  force  then  existing.  It  appears  to  have  comprised  the 
Grecian  cities  on  the  east  and  south-east  of  the  island  from  the  bor- 
ders of  Agrigentum  to  those  of  Zankle  or  Messene,  together  with  no 
small  proportion  of  the  Sikel  tribes.  Messene  was  under  the  rule  of 
Anaxilaus  of  Rhegium,  Agrigentum  under  that  of  Thero,  son  of 
^Enesidemus,  Himera  under  that  of  Terillus;  while  Selinus,  close  on 
the  borders  of  Egesta  and  the  Carthaginian  possession,  had  its  own 
government,  free  or  despotic,  but  appears  to  have  been  allied  with  or 
dependent  upon  Carthage.  A  dominion  thus  extensive  doubtless 
furnished  ample  tribute,  besides  which  Gelo,  having  conquered  and 
dispossessed  many  landed  proprietors  and  having  recolonized  Syra- 
cuse, could  easily  provide  both  lands  and  citizenship  to  recompense 
adherents.  Hence  he  was  enabled  to  enlarge  materially  the  military 
force  transmitted  to  him  by  Hippokrates,  and  to  form  a  naval  force 
besides.  Phormis  the  Msenalian,  who  took  service  under  him  and 
became  citizen  of  Syracuse,  with  fortune  enough  to  send  donatives 
to  Olympia — and  Agesias,  the  lamid  prophet  from  Stymphalus — are 
doubtless  not  the  only  examples  of  emigrants  joining  him  from 
Arcadia.     For  the  Arcadian  population  were  poor,  brave,  and  ready 


352  EVENTS  IN  SICILY. 

for  mercenary  soldiership;  while  the  Berviceof  a  Greek  despot  In 
Sicily  must  have  been  more  attractive  to  them  than  thai  of  Xerxes. 
Moreover  during  the  ten  years  between  the  battles  of  Marathon 
and  Salamis,  when  nol  only  so  large  a  portion  of  the  Greet  cities 
had  become  subject  to  Persia,  but  the  prospect  of  Persian  invasion 
hung  like  a  cloud  over  Greece  Proper — the  incr<  ased  Feeling  of  inse- 
curily  throughout  the  latter  probably  rendered  emigration  to  Sicily 
unusually  inviting. 

These  circumstances  in  part  explain  the  immense  power  and  posi- 
tion which  Herodotus  represents  Gelo  to  have  enjoyed,  toward  the 
autumnof481  B.C.,  when  the  Greeks  from  the  Isthmus  of  Corinth, 
confederated  to  resist  Xerxes,  sent  to  solicit  his  aid.  Be  was  then 
imperial  leader  of  Sicily :  he  could  offer  to  the  Greeks  (so  the  historian 
tells  u^)  20,000  hoplites,  200  triremes,  2,0110  cavalry,  2,000  archers, 
2,000  slingers,  2.000  light-armed  horse,  besides  furnishing  provisions 
for  the  entire  Grecian  force  as  long  as  the  war  might  last.  If  this 
numerical  statement  could  he  at  all  trusted  (winch  I  do  not  believe), 
Herodotus  would  be  much  within  the  truth  in  saying,  that  there  was 
no  other  Hellenic  power  which  would  bear  the  least  comparison  with 
that  of  Gelo:  and  we  may  well  assume  such  general  superiority  to  be 
substantially  true,  though  the  numbers  above-mentioned  may  be  an 
empty  boast  rather  than  a  reality. 

( >wing  to  the  great  power  of  Gelo,  we  now  for  the  first  time  trace 
an  incipient  tendency  in  Sicily  to  combined  and  central  operations. 
It  appears  that  G<  lo  had  formed  the  plan  of  uniting  the  Greek  forces 
in  Sicily  for  the  purpose  of  expelling  the  Carthaginians  and  Eges- 
tseans,  either  wholly  or  partially,  from  their  maritime  possessions  in 
the  western  corner  of  the  island,  and  of  avenging  the  death  of  the 
Spartan  prince  Dorieus — that  he  even  attempted,  though  in  vain,  to 
induce  the  Spartans  and  other  central  Greeks  to  co-operate  in  this 
plan— and  that  upon  their  refusal,  he  had  in  part  executed  it  with  the 
Sicilian  forces  alone.  We  have  nothing  but  a  brief  and  vague  allu- 
sion to  this  exploit,  wherein  Gelo  appears  as  the  chief  and  champion 
of  Hellenic  against  barbaric  interests  in  Sicily — the  forerunner  of 
Dionysius,  Timoleon,  and  Agathokles.  I'ut  lie  had  already  begun 
to  conceive  himself,  and  had  already  been  recognized  by  others,  in 
this  commanding  position,  when  "the  envoys  of  Sparta,  Athens, 
Corinth,  etc.,  reached  him  from  the  Isthmus  of  Corinth,  in  481  B.C., 
to  intreat  his  aid  for  the  repulse  of  the  vast  host  of  invaders  about 
to  cross  the  Hellespont.  Gelo,  after  reminding  them  that  they  had 
refused  a  similar  application  for  aid  from  him,  said  that,  far  from 
requiting  them  at  the  hour  of  need  in  the  like  ungenerous  spirit, 
he  would  bring  to  them  an  overwhelming  reinforcement  (the  num- 
bers as  given  by  Herodotus  have  been  already  stated),  but  upon 
one  condition  only — that  lie  should  be  recognized  as  generalissimo  of 
the  entire  Grecian  force  against  the  Persians.  His  offer  was  repu- 
diated, with  indignant  scorn,  by  the  Spartan  envoy;  and  Gelo  then 


CARTHAGINIAN  INVASION  OF  SICILY.  353 

bo  fur  abated  in  his  demand,  as  to  be  content  with  the  command 
cither  of  the  land  force  or  the  naval  force,  whichever  might  be  judged 
preferable.  But  here  the  Athenian  envoy  interposed  his  protest — 
"  We  are  sent  here  (said  he)  to  ask  for  an  army,  and  not  for  a  gen- 
eral; and  thou  givest  us  the  army,  only  in  order  to  make  thyself  gen- 
eral. Know  that,  even  if  the  Spartans  would  allow  thee  to  command 
at  sea,  we  would  not.  The  naval  command  is  ours,  if  they  decline 
it:  we  Athenians,  the  oldest  nation  in  Greece — the  only  Greeks  who 
have  never  migrated  from  home — whose  leader  before  Troy  stands 
proclaimed  by  Homer  as  the  best  of  all  the  Greeks  for  marshaling 
and  keeping  order  in  an  army — we,  who  moreover  furnish  the  largest 
naval  contingent  in  the  fleet — we  will  never  submit  to  be  commanded 
by  a  Syracusan. " 

"Athenian  stranger  (replied  Gclo),  ye  seem  to  be  provided  with 
commanders,  but  ye  are  not  likely  to  have  soldiers  to  be  commanded. 
Ye  may  return  as  soon  as  you  please,  and  tell  the  Greeks  that  their 
year  is  deprived  of  its  spring." 

That  envoys  were  sent  from  Peloponnesus  to  solicit  assistance 
from  Gelo  against  Xerxes,  and  that  they  solicited  in  vain,  is  an  inci- 
dent not  to  be  disputed:  but  the  reason  assigned  for  refusal — conflict- 
ing pretensions  about  the  supreme  command — may  be  suspected  to 
have  arisen  less  from  historical  transmission  than  from  the  concep- 
tions of  the  historian,  or  of  his  informants,  respecting  the  relations 
between  the  parties.  In  his  time,  Sparta,  Athens,  and  Syracuse  were 
the  three  great  imperial  cities  of  Greece;  and  his  Sicilian  witnesses, 
proud  of  the  great  past  power  of  Gelo,  might  well  ascribe  to  him 
that  competition  for  pre-eminence  and  command  which  Herodotus 
has  dramatized.  The  immense  total  of  forces  which  Gelo  is  made  to 
promise  becomes  the  more  incredible,  when  we  reflect  that  he  had 
another  and  a  better  reason  for  refusing  aid  altogether.  He  was 
attacked  at  home,  and  was  fully  employed  in  defending  himself. 

The  same  spring  which  brought  Xerxes  across  the  Hellespont  into 
Greece,  also  witnessed  a  formidable  Carthaginian  invasion  of  Sicily. 
Gelo  had  already  been  engaged  in  war  against  them  (as  has  been 
above  stated)  and  had  obtained  successes,  which  they  would  naturally 
6eek  the  first  opportunity  of  retrieving.  The  vast  Persian  invasion 
of  Greece,  organized  for  three  years  before,  and  drawing  contingents 
not  only  from  the  whole  eastern  world,  but  especially  from  their  own 
metropolitan  brethren  at  Tyre  and  Sidon,  was  well  calculated  to 
encourage  them :  and  there  seems  good  reason  for  believing  that  the 
simultaneous  attack  on  the  Greeks  both  in  Peloponnesus  and  in  Sicily 
was  concerted  between  the  Carthaginians  and  Xerxes — probably  by 
the  Phoenicians  on  behalf  of  Xerxes.  Nevertheless  this  alliance  does 
not  exclude  other  concurrent  circumstances  in  the  interior  of  the 
island,  which  supplied  the  Carthaginians  both  with  invitation  and 
with  help.  Agrigentum,  though  not  under  the  dominion  of  Gelo, 
was  ruled  by  his  friend  and  relative  Thero;  while  Rhegiurn  and  Mes- 
H.  G.  II.— 12 


354  EVENTS  IN  SICILY. 

scne  under  the  government  of  Anaxilaus, — Bimera  under  that  of  his 
father-in-law  Terillus — and  Selinas, — seems  to  have  formed  an  impos- 
ing minority  among  the  Sicilian  Greeks;  at  variance  with  Gelo  and 

Thero,  but  in  amity  and  corres] lence  witli  Carthage.     It.  was 

B(  emingly  about  the  year  481  B.C.,  thai  Thero,  perhaps  in\  ited  by  an 
Bimersean  party,  expelled  from  Bimera  the  despot  Terillus,  and 
became  possessed  of  the  town.  Terillus  applii  d  for  aid  to  Carthage; 
backed  by  his  son-in  law  Anaxilaus,  who  espoused  the  quarrel  so 
warmly,  as  even  to  tender  his  own  children  as  hostages  to  Batnilkai 
the  Carthaginian  Suffel  or  general,  the  personal  friend  orguesl  ol 
Terillus.  The  application  was  favorably  entertained,  and  Bamiikar, 
arriving  at  Panormus  in  the  eventful  year  480  B.C.,  witli  a  fleet  of 
3,000  ships  of  war  and  a  still  larger  number  of  Btore  ships,  disem- 
barked a  land-force  of  300,000  men:  which  would  inch  have  been 
larger,  bad  not  tin'  vessels  carrying  the  eavalry  and  the  chariots  hap- 
pened to  he  dispersed  by  storms.  These  numbers  we  can  only  repeat 
as  we  find  them,  without  trusting  them  any  farther  than  as  proof  that 
the  armament  was  on  the  most  extensive  scale.  But  the  different 
nations  of  whom  Herodotus  reports  the  land-force  to  have  consisted 
are  trustworthy  and  curious:  ii  included  Phoenicians,  Libyans,  Ibe- 
rians. Ligyes,  BelisyM,  Sardinians,  and  Corsicans.  This  is  the  first 
example  known  to  us  of  those  numerous  mercenary  armies  which  it 
was  the  policy  of  Carthage  to  compose  of  nations  dill'eniit  in  race 
and  language,  in  order  to  obviate  conspiracy  or  mutinj-  against  the 
general. 

Having  landed  at  Panormus,  Bamiikar  marched  to  Bimera, 
dragged  his  vessels  on  shore  under  the  shelter  of  a  rampart,  and  then 
laid  siege  to  the  town;  while  the  Himerians,  re-enforced  by  Thero, 
and  the  army  of  Agrigentum,  determined  on  an  obstinate  defense, 
and  even  bricked  up  the  gates.  Pressing  messages  were  dispatched 
to  solicited  from  Gelo,  who  collected  his  whole  force,  said  to  have 
amounted  to  50,000  foot  and  5,000  horse,  and  marched  to  Bimera. 
His  arrival  restored  the  courage  of  the  inhabitants,  and  after  some 
partial  fighting,  which  turned  out  to  the  advantage  of  the  Greeks,  a 
general  battle  ensued.  It  was  obstinate  and  bloody,  lasting  from 
sunrise  until  late  iu  the  afternoon;  and  its  success  was  mainly  deter- 
mined by  an  intercepted  letter  which  fell  into  the  hands  of  Gelo — 
a  communication  from  the  Selinuntines  to  Bamiikar,  promising  to 
send  a  body  of  horse  to  his  aid,  and  intimating  the  time  at  whicb 
they  would  arrive.  A  party  of  Gelo's  horse,  instructed  to  pen  onate 
this  re-enforcement  from  Selinus,  were  received  into  the  camp  of 
Bamiikar,  where  they  spread  consternation  and  disorder,  and  an; 
even  said  to  have  slain  the  general  and  set  fire  to  the  ships;  while  the 
Greek  army,  brought  to  action  at  this  opportune  moment,  at  length 
succeeded  in  triumphing  over  both  superior  numbers  and  a  deter- 
mined resistance.  If  we  are  to  believe  Diodorus,  150,000  men  were 
slain  on  the  side  of  the  Carthaginians;  the  rest  lied — partly  to  the 


SUPREMACY   OF   GELO   IN   SICILY.  355 

Sikanian  mountains,  where  they  became  prisoners  of  the  Agrigentines 
— partly  to  a  hilly  ground,  where,  from  want  of  water,  they  were 
obliged  to  surrender  at  discretion.  Twenty  ships  alone  escaped  with 
a  few  fugitives,  and  these  twenty  were  destroyed  by  a  storm  on  the 
passage,  so  that  only  one  small  boat  arrived  at  Carthage  with  the  dis- 
astrous tidings.  Dismissing  such  unreasonable  exaggerations,  we 
can  only  venture  to  assert  that  the  battle  was  strenuously  disputed, 
the  victory  complete,  and  the  slain  as  well  as  the  prisoners  numer- 
ous. The  body  of  Hamilkar  was  never  discovered,  in  spite  of  care- 
ful search  ordered  by  Gelo:  the  Carthaginians  affirmed,  that  as  soon 
as  the  defeat  of  his  army  became  irreparable,  he  had  cast  himself  into 
the  great  sacrificial  lire  wherein  he  had  been  offering  entire  victims 
(t&e  usual  sacrifice  consisting  only  of  a  small  part  of  the  beast)  to 
propitiate  the  gods,  and  had  there  been  consumed.  The  Carthagin- 
ians erected  funereal  monuments  to  him,  graced  with  periodical 
sacrifices,  both  in  Carthage  and  in  their  principal  colonies:  on  the 
field  of  battle  itself  also,  a  monument  was  raised  to  him  by  the 
Greeks.  On  that  monument,  seventy  years  afterward,  his  victorious 
grandson,  fresh  from  the  plunder  of  this  same  city  of  Himera, 
offered  the  bloody  sacrifice  of  3,000  Grecian  prisoners. 

We  may  presume  that  Anaxilaus  with  the  forces  of  Rhegium 
shared  in  the  defeat  of  the  foreign  invader  whom  he  had  called  in, 
and  probably  other  Greeks  besides.  All  of  them  were  now  compelled 
to  sue  for  peace  from  Gelo,  and  to  solicit  the  privilege  of  being 
enrolled  as  his  dependent  allies,  which  was  granted  to  them  without 
any  harder  imposition  than  the  tribute  probably  involved  in  that  rela- 
tion. Even  the  Carthaginians  themselves  were  so  intimidated  by 
the  defeat,  that  they  sent  envoys  to  ask  for  peace  at  Syracuse,  which 
they  are  said  to  have  obtained  mainly  by  the  solicitation  of  Damarete 
wife  of  Gelo,  on  condition  of  paying  2,000  talents  to  defray  the  costs 
of  the  war,  and  of  erecting  two  temples  in  which  the  terms  of  the 
treaty  were  to  be  permanently  recorded.  If  we  could  believe  the 
assertion  of  Theophrastus,  Gelo  exacted  from  the  Carthaginians  a 
stipulation  that  they  would  for  the  future  abstain  from  human  sacri- 
fices in  their  religious  worship.  But  such  an  interference  with  for- 
eign religious  rites  would  be  unexampled  in  that  age,  and  we  know 
moreover  that  the  practice  was  uot  permanently  discontinued  at 
Carthage.  Indeed,  we  may  considerably  suspect  that  Diodorus,  copy- 
ing from  writers  like  Ephorus  and  Timaeus,  long  after  the  events, 
has  exaggerated  considerably  the  defeat,  the  humiliation,  and  the 
amercement  of  the  Carthaginians.  For  the  words  of  the  poet  Pindar, 
a  very  few  years  after  the  battle  of  Himera,  represent  a  fresh  Cartha- 
ginian invasion  as  matter  of  present  uneasiness  and  alarm:  and  the 
Carthaginian  fleet  is  found  engaged  in  aggressive  warfare  on  the  coast 
of  Italy,  requiring  to  be  coerced  by  the  brother  and  successor  of  Gelo. 

The  victory  of  Himera  procured  for  the  Sicilian  cities  immunity 
from  foreign  war,  together  with  a  large  plunder.     Splendid  offerings 


356  EVENTS  IX   SKILY. 

of  thanksgiving  to  the  gods  were  dedicated  in  the  temples  of 
Himera,  Byracuse,  and  Delphi;  while  the  epigram  of  Bimonides, 
composed  for  the  tripod  offered  in  the  latter  temple,  described  Gelo 
with  his  three  brothers  Hiero,  Polyzelus,  and  Thrasybulus,  as  the 
joinl  liberators  of  Greece  from  the  Barbarian,  along  with  the  victors 
of  Salamis  ami  Platsea.  And  the  Sicilians  alleged  thai  he  was  on  the 
point  of  actually  sending  re-enforcements  to  the  Greeks  against 
is,  in  spite  of  the  necessity  of  submitting  to  Spartan  command, 
when  the  intelligence  of  the  defeat  and  retreat  of  thai  prince  reached 
him.  Bui  we  find  another  statement  decidedly  more  probable — that 
he  sent  a  confidential  envoy  named  Kadmus  to  Delphi  with  orders 
to  watch  the  turn  of  the  Xerxeian  invasion,  and  in  case  it  should 
prove  successful  (as  he  thought  that  it  probably  would  lie)  to  tender 
presents  and  submission  to  the  victorious  invader  on  behalf  of  Syra- 
cuse. When  we  consider  that  until  the  very  morning  of  the  battle 
of  Salamis,  the  cause  of  Grecian  independence  must  have  appeared 
to  an  impartial  spectator  almost  desperate,  we  cannot  wonder  that 
Gelo  should  take  precautions  for  preventing  the  onward  progress  of 
the  Persians  toward  Sicily,  which  was  already  sufficiently  imperiled 
by  its  formidable  enemies  in  Africa.  The  defeat  of  the  Persians  at 
Salamis  and  of  the  Carthaginians  at  Himera  cleared  away  suddenly 
and  unexpectedly  the  terrific  cloud  from  Greece  as  well  as  from 
Sicily,  ami  left  a  sky  comparatively  brilliant  with  prosperous  hopes. 

To  the  victorious  army  of  Gelo,  there  was  abundant  plunder  for 
recompense  as  well  as  distribution.  Among  the  most  valuable  part 
of  the  plunder  were  the  numerous  prisoners  taken,  who  were  divided 
among  the  cities  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  troops  furnished  by 
each.  Of  course  the  largest  shares  must  have  fallen  to  Syracuse  and 
Agrigentum;  while  the  number  acquired  by  the  latter  was  still  far- 
ther increased  by  the  separate  capture  of  those  prisoners  who  had 
dispersed  throughout  the  mountains  in  and  near  the  Agrigentine  ter- 
ritory. All  the  Sicilian  cities  allied  with  or  dependent  on  Gelo,  but 
especially  the  two  last-mentioned,  were  thus  put  in  possession  of  a 
number  of  slaves  as  public  property,  who  were  kept  in  chains  to 
work,  and  were  either  employed  on  public  undertakings  for  defense, 
ornament,  and  religious  solemnity — or  let  out  to  private  masters  so 
as  to  afford  a  revenue  to  the  state.  So  great  was  the  total  of  these 
public  slaves  at  Agrigentum,  that  though  many  were  employed  on 
state-work-,  which  elevated  the  city  to  signa]  grandeur  during  the 
nourishing  period  of  seventy  years  which  intervened  between  the 
recent  battle  and  its  subsequent  capture  by  the  Carthaginians — there 
nevertheless  remained  great  numbers  to  be  let  out  to  private  individ- 
uals, some  of  whom  had  no  less  than  five  hundred  slaves  respectively 
in  their  employment. 

The  peace  which  now  ensued  left  Gelo  master  of  Syracuse  and 
Gela,  with  the  C'halkidic  Greek  towns  on  the  east  of  the  island;  while 
Thero  governed  in  Agrigentum,  and  his  son  Thrasydseus  in  Himera. 


NEW   CITIZENS  AT   SYRACUSE.  357 

In  power  as  well  as  in  reputation,  Gelo  was  unquestionably  the  chief 
person  in  the  island ;  moreover  he  was  connected  by  marriage,  and 
Hved  on  terms  of  uninterrupted  friendship,  with  Thero.  His  con- 
duct, both  at  Syracuse  and  loward  the  cities  dependent  upon  him  was 
mild  and  conciliating.  But  his  subsequent  career  was  very  short:  be 
died  of  a  dropsical  complaint  not  much  more  than  a  year  after  the 
battle  of  Himera,  while  the  glories  of  that  day  were  fresh  in  every 
one's  recollection.  As  the  feyracusan  law  rigorously  interdicted 
expensive  funerals.  Gelo  had  commanded  that  his  own  obsequies 
should  be  conducted  in  strict  conformity  to  the  law:  nevertheless  the 
zeal  of  his  successor  as  well  as  the  attachment  of  the  people  disobeyed 
these  commands.  The  great  mass  of  citizens  followed  his  funeral 
procession  from  the  city  to  the  estate  of  his  wife,  fifteen  miles  dis- 
tant: nine  massive  towers  were  erected  to  distinguish  the  spot;  and 
the  solemnities  of  heroic  worship  were  rendered  to  him.  The  respect- 
ful recollections  of  the  conqueror  of  Himera  never  afterward  died  out 
among  the  Syracusan  people,  though  his  tomb  was  defaced  first  by 
the  Carthaginians,  and  afterward  by  the  despot  of  Agathokles.  And 
when  we  recollect  the  destructive  effects  caused  by  the  subsequent 
Carthaginian  invasions,  we  shall  be  sensible  how  great  was  the  debt 
of  gratitude  owing  to  Gelo  by  his  contemporaries. 

It  was  not  merely  as  conqueror  of  Himera,  but  as  a  sort  of  second 
founder  of  Syracuse  that  Gelo  was  thus  solemnly  worshiped.  The 
size,  the  strength,  and  the  population,  of  the  town  were  all  greatly 
increased  under  him.  Besides  the  number  of  the  new  inhabitants 
which  he  brought  from  Gela,  the  Hybkeu  Megara,  and  the  Sicilian 
Euboea,  we  are  informed  that  he  also  inscribed  on  the  roll  of  citizens 
no  less  than  10.000  mercenary  soldiers.  It  will  moreover  appear  that 
these  new-made  citizens  were  in  possession  of  the  islet  of  Ortygia — 
the  interior  stronghold  of  Syracuse.  It  has  already  been  stated  that 
Ortygia  was  the  original  settlement,  and  that  the  city  did  not  over- 
step the  boundaries  of  the  islet  before  the  enlargements  of  Gelo.  We 
do  not  know  by  what  arrangements  Gelo  provided  new  lands  for  so 
large  a  number  of  new-comers:  but  when  we  come  to  notice  the 
antipathy  with  which  these  latter  were  regarded  by  the  remaining 
citizens,  we  shall  be  inclined  to  believe  that  the  old  citizens  had  been 
dispossessed  and  degraded. 

Gelo  left  a  son  in  tender  years,  but  his  power  passed,  by  his  own 
direction,  to  two  of  his  brothers,  Polyzelus  and  Hiero;  the  former  of 
whom  married  the  widow  of  the  deceased  prince,  and  was  named, 
according  to  his  testamentary  directions,  commander  of  the  military 
force — while  Hiero  was  intended  to  enjoy  the  government  of  the  city. 
Whatever  may  have  been  the  wishes  of  Gelo,  however,  the  real  power 
fell  to  Hiero;  a  man  of  energy  and  determination,  and  munificent  as 
a  patron  of  contemporary  poets,  Pindar,  Simonides,  Bacchylides, 
Epicharmus,  iEschylus,  and  others;  but  the  victim  of  a  painful  inter- 
nal complaint — jealous  in  his  temper — cruel  aud  rapacious  in  his  gov- 


358  EVENTS  IN  SICILY. 

eminent — and  noted  as  nn  organizer  of  that  systematic  espionago 
which  broke  up  all  freedom  of  speech  among  his  subjects.  Espe- 
cially jealous  of  his  brother  Polyzelus,  who  was  \  ery  popular  in  I  lie  city, 
he  dispatched  him  on  a  military  expedition  against  the  Krotoniates, 
with  a  view  of  indirectly  accomplishing  his  destruction.  But  Polyzelus, 
aware  of  the  snare,  flea  to  Agrigentum,  and  Boughl  protection  from 
liis  brother-in-law  the  despol  There;  from  whom  Hiero  redemanded 
him,  and  on  receiving  a  refusal,  prepared  to  enforce  the  demand  by 
arms,  lie  had  already  advanced  on  his  inarch  as  far  as  the  river 
Gela,  but  no  actual  battle  appears  to  have  taken  place.  It  is  Inter- 
esting to  hear  thai  Simonides  the  poet,  esteemed  and  rewarded  by  both 
these  princes,  was  the  mediator  of  peace  between  them. 

The  temporary  breach*,  and  sudden  reconciliation,  between  these 
two  powerful  despots,  proved  the  cause  of  sorrow  and  ruin  at  Ilim- 
era.  That  city,  under  the  dominion  of  the  Agrigentine  Thero,  was 
administered  by  his  son  Thrasydaeus — a  youth  whose  oppressive  con- 
duct speedily  excited  the  strongest  antipathy.  The  Bimeraeans,  know- 
ing that  they  had  Utile  chance  of  redress  from  Thero  against  his  son, 
took  advantage  of  the  quarrel  between  him  and  Hiero  to  make  propo- 
sitions to  the  latter,  and  to  entreat  his  aid  for  the  expulsion  of  Thrasy- 
daeus, tendering  themselves  as  subjects  of  Syracuse.  It  appear^  that 
Kapys  and  Hippokrates,  cousins  of  Thero,  but  at  variance  with  him, 
ami  also  candidates  for  the  protection  of  Hiero,  were  concerned  in 
this  scheme  for  detaching  Himera  from  the  dominion  of  Thero.  Rut 
so  soon  as  peace  had  been  concluded,  Hiero  betrayed  to  Thero  both 
the  schemes  and  the  malcontents  at  Himera.  "We  .seem  to  make  out 
that  Kapys  and  Hippokrates  collected  some  forces  to  resist  Thero, 
but  were  defeated  by  him  at  the  river  Himera:  his  victory  was  fol- 
lowed up  by  seizing  and  putting  to  death  a  large  number  of  Himer- 
8ean  citizens.  So  great  Avas  the  numher  slain,  coupled  with  the  loss 
of  others  who  fled  for  fear  of  being  slain,  that  the  population  of  the 
city  was  sensibly  and  inconveniently  diminished.  Thero  invited  and 
enrolled  a  large  addition  of  new  citizens,  elderly  of  Dorian  blood. 

The  power  of  Hiero,  now  reconciled  both  with  Thero  and  with  his 
brother  Polyzelus,  is  marked  by  several  circumstances  as  noway  infe- 
rior to  that  of  Gelo,  and  probably  the  greatest,  not  merely  in  Sicily, 
but  throughout  the  Grecian  world.  The  citizens  of  the  distant  city 
of  Cuma3,  on  the  coast  of  Italy,  harassed  by  Carthaginian  and  Tyr- 
rhenian fleets,  entreated  his  aid,  and  received  from  him  a  squadron 
which  defeated  and  drove  off  their  enemies:  he  even  settled  a  Syra 
cusan  colony  in  the  neighboring  island  of  Pithekusa.  Anaxilaus, 
de-pot  of  Rhegium  and  Messene,  had  attacked,  and  might  probably 
have  overpowered,  his  neighbors  the  Epizephyrian  Lokrians;  but  the 
menacesof  Hiero,  invoked  by  the  Lokrians,  and  conveyed  by  the  em  oy 
Chromius,  compelled  him  to  desist.  Those  heroic  honors,  which  in 
Greece  belonged  to  the  (Ekist  of  a  new  city,  were  yet  wanting  to 
him.     He  procured  them  by  the  foundation  of  the  new  city  of  iEtna 


DEATH   OF  ANAXILAUS  OF  RHEGIUM.  359 

on  the  site  and  in  the  place  of  Katana,  the  inhabitants  of  which  he 
expelled,  as  well  as  those  of  Naxos.  While  thess  Naxians  and 
Katauueans  were  directed  to  take  up  their  abode  at  Leontini 
along  with  the  existing  inhabitants,  Hiero  planted  10,000  new 
inhabitants  in  his  adopted  city  of  iEtna;  5,000  of  them  from  Syra- 
cuse and  Gela — with  an  equal  number  from  Peloponnesus.  They 
served  as  an  auxiliary  force,  ready  to  be  called  forth  in  the  event  of 
discontents  at  Syracuse,  as  we  shall  see  by  the  history  of  bis  succes- 
sor: he  gave  them  not  only  the  territory  which  had  before  be- 
longed to  Katana,  but  also  a  large  addition  besides,  chiefly  at  the 
expense  of  the  neighboring  Sikel  tribes.  His  son  Deinomenes,  and 
his  friend  and  contidant  Chromius,  enrolled  as  an  iEtnrean,  became 
joint  administrators  of  the  city,  whose  religious  and  social  customs 
were  assimilated  to  the  Dorian  model.  Pindar  dreams  of  future 
relations  between  the  despot  and  citizens  of  iEtna,  analogous  to 
those  between  king  and  citizens  at  Sparta.  Both  Hiero  and  Chro- 
mius were  proclaimed  as  xEtmeans  at  the  Pythian  and  Nemean 
games,  when  their  chariots  gained  victories;  on  which  occasion  the 
assembled  crowd  heard  for  the  first  time  of  the  new  Hellenic  city  of 
iEtna.  We  see,  by  the  compliments  of  Pindar,  that  Hiero  was  vain 
of  his  new  title  of  founder.  But  we  must  remark  that  it  was  pro- 
cured, not,  as  in  most  cases,  by  planting  Greeks  on  a  spot  previously 
barbarous,  but  by  the  dispossession  and  impoverishment  of  other 
Grecian  citizens,  who  seem  to  have  given  uo  ground  of  offense. 
Both  in  Gelo  and  Hiero  we  see  the  first  exhibition  of  that  propensity 
to  violent  and  wholesale  transplantation  of  inhabitants  from  one 
seat  to  another,  which  was  not  uncommon  among  Assyrian  and  Per- 
sian despots,  and  which  was  exhibited  on  a  still  larger  scale  by  the 
successors  of  Alexander  the  Great  in  their  numerous  new-built  cities. 
Auaxilaus  of  PJiegium  died  shortly  after  that  message  of  Hiero 
which  had  compelled  him  to  spare  the  Lokrians.  Such  was  the 
esteem  entertained  for  his  memory,  and  so  efficient  the  government 
of  Mikythus,  a  manumitted  slave  whom  he  constituted  regent,  that 
PJiegium  and  Messene  were  preserved  for  his  children,  yet  minors. 
But  a  still  more  important  change  in  Sicily  was  caused  by  the  death 
of  the  Agrigentine  Thero,  which  took  place  seemingly  about  472  b.c. 
This  prince,  a  partner  with  Gelo  in  the  great  victory  over  the  Cartba- 
ginians,  left  a  reputation  of  good  government  as  well  as  ability 
among  the  Agrigentines,  which  we  find  perpetuated  in  the  laureate 
strains  of  Pindar:  and  his  memory  doubtless  became  still  farther 
endeared  from  comparison  with  his  son  and  successor.  Thrasydaeus, 
now  master  both  of  Himera  and  Agrigentiyn,  displayed  on  a  larger 
scale  the  same  oppressive  and  sanguinary  dispositions  which  had 
before  provoked  robellion  at  the  former  city.  Feeling  himself 
detested  by  his  subjects,  he  enlarged  the  military  force  which  had 
been  left  by  his  father,  and  engaged  so  many  new  mercenaries  that 
he  became  master  of  a  force  of  20,000  men,  horse  and  foot.     And  in 


360  EVENTS  IX  SICILY. 

his  own  territory,  perhaps  lie  might  long  have  trodden  with  impu 
niiy  in  the  footsteps  of  Phalaris,  had  he  nol  imprudently  provoked 
his  more  powerful  neighbor  Hiero.  In  an  obstinate  and  murderous 
battle  between  these  two  princes,  2,000  men  were  slain  on  the  side  of 
the  Syracusans,  and  4,000  on  thai  of  the  Agrigentines:  an  immense 
slaughter,  considering  thai  il  mostly  fell  upon  the  Greeks  in  the  two 
armies,  and  not  upon  the  non-Hellenic  mercenaries.  But  the  defeat 
of  Thrasydseus  was  so  complete  thai  he  was  compelled  to  flee  not 
only  from  Agrigentum,  but  from  Sicily:  he  retired  to  Megara  in 
Greece  Eloper,  where  be  was  condemned  to  death  and  perished. 
The  Agrigentines,  thus  happily  released  from  their  oppressor,  sued 
for  and  ob  ained  peace  from  llicro.  They  are  said  to  have  estab- 
lished a  democratic  government,  bul  we  learn  that  Hiero  sent  many 
citizens  into  banishment  from  Agrigentum  and  Himera,  as  well  as 
from  Gela,  nor  can  we  doubt  that  all  the  three  were  numbered 
among  his  subject  cities.  The  moment  of  freedom  only  commenced 
for  them  when  theGelonian  dynasty  shared  the  fate  of  the  Theronian. 

The  victory  over  Thrasydseus  rendered  Hiero  more  completely 
master  of  Sicily  than  his  brother  Gelo  had  been  before  him.  The 
last  act  which  we  hear  of  him  is,  his  interference  on  behalf  of  his 
brothers-in-law  the  sons  of  Anaxilaus  of  Rhegium,  who  were  now 
of  age  to  govern.  He  encouraged  them  to  prefer,  and  probably 
showed  himself  ready  to  enforce,  their  claim  against  Mikythus,  who 
had  administered  Rhegium  siuce  the  death  of  Anaxilaus,  for  the 
property  as  well  as  the  scepter.  Mikythus  complied  readily  with  the 
demand,  rendering  an  account  so  exact  and  faithful  that  the  sons  of 
Anaxilaus  themselves  intreated  him  to  remain  and  govern — or  more 
probably  to  lend  his  aid  to  their  government.  This  request  he  \\  as 
wise  enough  to  refuse:  he  removed  his  own  property  and  retired  to 
Tegea  in  Arcadia.  Hiero  died  shortly  afterward,  of  the  complaint 
under  which  he  had  so  long  suffered,  after  a  reign  of  ten  years. 

On  the  death  of  Hiero,  the  succession  was  disputed  between  his 
brother  Thrasybulus,  and  his  nephew  the  youthful  son  of  Gelo,  so 
that  the  partisans  of  the  family  became  thus  divided.  Thrasybulus, 
surrounding  his  nephew  with  temptations  to  luxurious  pleasure,  con- 
trived to  put  him  indirectly  aside,  and  thus  to  seize  the  government 
for  himself.  This  family'  division — a  curse  often  resting  upon  the 
blood-relations  of  Grecian  despots,  and  leading  to  the  greatest 
atrocities — coupled  with  the  conduct  of  Thrasybulus  himself,  caused 
the  downfall  of  the  mighty  Gelonian  dynasty.  The  bad  qualities  of 
Hiero  were  now  seen  greatly  exaggerated,  but  without  his  accom- 
panying energy,  in  Thrasybulus;  who  put  to  death  many  citizens, 
and  banished  still  more,  for  the  purpose  of  seizing  their  property, 
until  at  length  he  provoked  among  the  Syracusans  intense  and  uni- 
versal haired,  shared  even  by  many  of  the  old  Gelonian  partisans. 
Though  he  tried  to  strengthen  himself  by  increasing  his  mercenary 
force,  he  could  not  prevent  a  general  revolt  from  breaking  out  among 


EXPULSION  OF  THRASYBULUS.  361 

the  Syracusan  population.  By  summoning  those  cities  which  Hiero 
had  planted  in  his  new  city  of  ^Etna,  as  well  as  various  troops  from 
his  dependent  allies,  he  found  himself  at  the  head  of  15,000  men,  and 
muster  of  the  inner  city;  that  is,  the  islet  of  Ortygia,  which  was  the 
primitive  settlement  of  Syracuse,  and  was  not  only  distinct  and 
defensible  in  itself,  but  also  contained  the  docks,  the  shipping,  and 
comm  iqd  of  the  harbor.  The  revolted  people  on  their  side  were 
masters  of  the  outer  city,  better  known  under  its  latter  name  of 
Achradina,  which  lay  on  the  adjacent  mainland  of  Sicily,  was  sur- 
round by  a  separate  wall  of  its  own,  and  was  divided  from  Ortygia 
by  an  intervening  space  of  low  ground  used  for  burials.  Though 
superior  in  number,  yet  being  no  match  in  military  efficiency  for  the 
forces  of  Thrasybulus,  they  were  obliged  to  invoke  aid  from  the 
other  cities  in  Sicily,  as  well  as  from  the  Sikel  tribes — proclaiming 
the  Gelouian  dynasty  as  the  common  enemy  of  freedom  in  the  island, 
and  holding  out  universal  independence  as  the  reward  of  victory.  It 
was  fortunate  for  them  that  there  was  no  brother-despot  like  the 
powerful  Tlie.ro  to  espouse  the  cause  of  Thrasybulus.  Gela,  Agri- 
gentum,  Selinus,  Himera,  and  even  the  Sikel  tribes,  all  responded  to 
the  call  with  alacrity,  so  that  a  large  force,  both  military  and  naval, 
came  to  re-enforce  the  Syracusans;  and  Thrasybulus,  being  totally 
defeated,  first  in  naval  action,  next  on  land,  was  obliged  to  shut  him- 
self up  in  Ortygia,  where  he  soon  found  his  situation  hopeless.  He 
accordingly  opened  a  negotiation  with  his  opponents,  which  ended 
in  his  abdication  and  retirement  to  Lokri,  while  the  mercenary 
troops  whom  he  had  brought  together  were  also  permitted  to  depart 
unmolested.  The  expelled  Thrasybulus  afterward  lived  and  died 
as  a  private  citizen  at  Lokri — a  very  different  fate  from  that  which 
had  befallen  Thrasydseus  (son  of  Thero)  at  Megara,  though  both 
seem  to  hsrVe  given  the  same  provocation. 

Thus  fell  the  powerful  Gelonian  dynasty  at  Syracuse,  after  a  con- 
tinuance of  eighteen  years.  Its  fall  was  nothing  less  than  an  exten- 
sive revolution  throughout  Sicily.  Among  the  various  cities  of  the 
island  there  had  grown  up  many  petty  despots,  each  with  his  sepa- 
rate mercenary  force;  acting  as  the  instruments,  and  relying  on  the 
protection,  of  the  great  despot  at  Syracuse.  All  these  were  now 
expelled,  and  governments  more  or  less  democratic  were  estab- 
lished everywhere.  The  sons  of  Anaxilaus  maintained  themselves  a 
little  longer  at  Jlhegium  and  Messene,  but  the  citizens  of  these  two 
towns  at  length  followed  the  general  example,  compelled  them  to 
retire,  and  began  their  era  of  freedom. 

But  though  the  Sicilian  despots  had  thus  been  expelled,  the  free 
governments  established  in  their  place  were  exposed  at  first  to  much 
difficulty  and  collision.  It  has  been  already  mentioned  that  Gelo, 
Hiero,  Thero,  Thrasydaeus,  Thrasybulus,  etc.,  had  all  condemned  many 
citizens  to  exile  with  confiscation  of  property;  and  had  planted  on 
the  soil  new  citizens  and  mercenaries,  in  numbers  no  less  consider- 


362  EVENTS  IX  SICILY. 

able.  To  what  rare  these  mercenaries  belonged,  we  are  not  told:  it 
is  probable  that  tiny  were  only  in  part  Greeks.  Such  violent  imita- 
tions, both  of  persons  and  property,  could  not  occur  without  raising 
bitter  conflicts,  of  interest  as  well  as  feeling,  between  the  old,  the 
in  w,  and  the  dispossessed  proprietors,  as  soon  as  the  iron  hand  of 
compression  was  removed.  This  source  of  angry  dissension  was 
common  to  all  the  Sicilian  cities,  but  in  none  did  it  Bow  more  profusely 
than  in  Syracuse.  In  that  city,  the  new  mercenaries  hist  introduced 
by  Thrasybulus  had  retired  at  the  same  time  with  him,  many  of 
them  to  the  Ilieronian  city  of  iEtna,  from  whence  they  had  been 
brought.  But  there  yet  remained  the  more  numerous  body  intro- 
duced principally  by  Gelo,  partly  also  by  Hiero;  the  former  alone 
having  enrolled  10,000,  of  whom  more  than  7.000  yet  remained.  What 
part  these  Gelonian  citizens  had  taken  in  the  late  revolution,  we  do  not 
find  distinctly  stated:  they  seem  not  to  have  supported  Thrasylnilus 
as  a  body,  and  probably  many  of  them  took  part  against  him. 

After  the  revolution  had  been  accomplished,  a  public  assembly  of 
the  Syracusans  was  convened,  in  which  the  first  resolution  was,  to 
provide  for  the  religious  commemoration  of  the  event,  by  erecting  a 
colossal  statue  of  Zeus  Elcutherius,  and  by  celebrating  an  annual  fes- 
tival to  be  called  the  Eleutberia,  with  solemn  matches  and  sacrifices. 
They  next  proceeded  to  determine  the  political  constitution,  and  such 
was  the  predominant  reaction,  doubtless  aggravated  by  the  returned 
exiles,  of  hatred  and  fear  against  the  expelled  dynasty — thai  the 
whole  body  of  new  citizens,  who  had  been  domiciliated  under  Gelo 
and  Hiero,  were  declared  ineligible,  to  magistracy  or  honor.  This 
harsh  and  sweeping  disqualification,  falling  at  once  upon  a  numerous 
minority,  naturally  provoked  renewed  irritation  and  civil  war.  The 
Gelonian  citizens,  the  most  warlike  individuals  in  the  state,  and 
occupying,  as  favored  p artisans  of  the  previous  dynasty,  the  inner 
section  of  Syracuse — Ortygia — placed  themselves  in  open  revolt; 
while  the  general  mass  of  citizens,  masters  of  the  outer  city,  were  not 
strong  enough  to  assail  with  success  this  defensible  position.  But 
they  contrived  to  block  it-  up  nearly  altogether,  and  to  intercept  both 
its  supplies  and  its  communication  with  the  country,  by  means  of  a 
new  fortification  carried  out  from  the  outer  city  toward  the  Great 
Harbor,  and  stretching  between  Ortygia  and  Epipolse.  The  garrison 
within  could  thus  only  obtain  supplies  at  the  cost  of  perpetual  con- 
flicts. This  disastrous  internal  war  continued  for  some  months,  with 
many  partial  engagements  both  by  land  and  sea:  whereby  the  general 
body  of  citizens  became  accustomed  to  arms,  while  a  chosen  regiment 
of  000  trained  volunteers  acquired  especial  efficiency.  Unable  to 
maintain  themselves  longer,  the  Gelonians  were  forced  to  hazard  a 
general  battle,  which,  after  an  obstinate  struggle,  terminated  in  their 
complete  defeat.  The  chosen  band  of  000,  who  had  eminently  con- 
tributed to  this  victory,  received  from  their  fellow  citizens  a  crown  of 
honor,  and  a  reward  of  one  mina  per  head. 


DISORDERS  IN  OTHER  SICILIAN  CITIES.        363 

The  meager  annals,  wherein  these  interesting  events  are  indicated 
rather  than  described,  tell  us  scarcely  anything  of  the  political 
arrangements  which  resulted  from  so  important  a  victory.  Probably 
many  of  the  Gelonians  were  expelled :  but  we  may  assume  as  certain, 
that  they  were  deprived  of  tbe  dangerous  privilege  of  a  separate  res- 
idence in  the  inner  stronghold  or  islet  Ortygia. 

Meanwhile  the  rest  of  Sicily  had  experienced  disorders  analogous 
in  character  to  those  of  Syracuse.  At  Gela,  at  Agrigen'tum,  at  Him- 
era,  the  reaction  against  the  Gelonian  dynasty  had  brought  back  in 
crowds  the  dispossessed  exiles;  who,  claiming  restitution  of  their 
properties  and  influence,  found  their  demands  sustained  by  the  pop- 
ulation generally.  The  Katanseaus,  whom  Hiero  had  driven  from 
their  own  city  to  Leontini,  in  order  that  he  might  convert  Katana 
into  his  own  settlement  .ZEtna,  assembled  in  arms  and  allied  them- 
selves with  the  Sikel  prince  Duketius,  to  reconquer  their  former 
home  and  to  restore  to  the  Sikels  that  which  Hiero  had  taken  from 
them  for  enlargement  of  the  zEtugean  territory.  They  were  aided  by 
the  Syracusans,  to  whom  the  neighborhood  of  these  Hieronian  parti- 
sans wras  dangerous:  but  they  did  not  accomplish  their  object  until 
after  a  long  contest  and  several  battles  with  the  ^Etuseaus.  A  con- 
vention was  at  length  concluded,  by  which  the  latter  evacuated 
Katana  and  were  allowed  to  occupy  the  town  and  territory  (seemingly 
Sikel)  of  Ennesia  or  Inessa,  upon  which  they  bestowed  the  name  of 
iEtna,  with  monuments  commemorating  Hiero  as  the  founder — while 
the  tomb  of  the  latter  at  Katana  was  demolished  by  the  restored 
inhabitants. 

These  conflicts,  disturbing  the  peace  of  all  Sicily,  came  to  be  so 
intolerable,  that  a  general  congress  was  held  between  the  various 
cities  to  adjust  them.  It  was  determined  by  joint  resolution  to  re- 
admit the  exiles  and  to  extrude  the  Gelonian  settlers  everywhere:  but 
an  establishment  was  provided  for  these  latter  in  the  territory  of 
Messene.  It  appears  that  the  exiles  received  back  their  property,  or 
at  least  an  assignment  of  other  lauds  in  compensation  for  it.  The 
inhabitants  of  Gela  were  enabled  to  provide  for  their  own  exiles  by 
re-establishing  the  city  of  Kamarina,  which  had  been  conquered  from 
Syracuse  by  Kippokrates,  despot  of  Gela,  but  which  Gelo,  on  trans- 
ferring his  abode  to  Syracuse,  had  made  a  portion  of  the  Syracusan 
territory,  conveying  its  inhabitants  to  the  city  of  Syracuse.  The 
Syracusans  now  renounced  the  possession  of  it — a  cession  to  be 
explained  probably  by  the  fact,  that  among  the  new-comers  trans- 
ferred by  Gelo  to  Syracuse,  there  were  included  not  only  the  previous 
Kamarinaeans,  but  also  many  who  had  before  been  citizens  of  Gela. 
For  these  men,  now  obliged  to  quit  Syracuse,  it  wo\ild  be  convenient 
to  provide  an  abode  at  Kamarina,  as  well  as  for  the  other  restored 
Geloan  exiles ;  and  we  may  farther  presume  that  this  new  city  served 
as  a  receptacle  for  other  homeless  citizens  from  all  parts  of  the  island. 
It  was  consecrated    by  the  Geloans  as  an  independent  city,  with 


364  EVENTS  IN  SICILY. 

Dorian  rites  and  customs .  its  lands  were  distributed  anew,  and 
among  its  settlers  were  men  rich  enough  to  send  prize  chariots  to 
Peloponnesus,  as  well  as  to  pay  for  odes  of  Pindar.  The  Olympic 
victories  of  the  Kamarinsean  Psaumia  secured  for  his  new  city  an 
Hellenic  celebrity,  at  a  moment  when  it  had  hardly  yet  emerged  from 
the  hardships  of  an  initiatory  settlement. 

Such  was  the  great  reactionary  movement  in  Sicily  against  the 
high-handed  violences  of  the  previous  despots.  We  are  only  enabled 
to  follow  it  generally,  but  we  see  that  all  their  transplantations  and 
expulsions  of  inhabitants  were  reversed,  and  all  their  arrangements 
overthrown.  In  the  correction  of  the  past  injustice,  we  cannot 
doubt  that  new  injustice  was  in  many  cases  committed,  nor  are  we 
surprised  to  hear  that  at  Syracuse  many  new  enrollments  of  citizens 
took  place  without  any  rightful  claim,  probably  accompanied  by 
grants  of  land.  The  reigning  feelm  at  Syracuse  would  now  be 
quite  opposite  to  that  of  the  days  of  Uelo,  when  the  Demos  or  aggre- 
gate of  small  self -working  proprietors  was  considered  as  "a  trouble- 
some yokefellow,"  fit  oniy  to  be  sold  into  slavery  for  exportation. 
It  is  highly  probable  that  the  new  taMe  of  citizens  now  prepared 
included  that  class  of  men  in  larger  numbers  than  ever,  on  principles 
analogous  to  the  liberal  enrollments  of  Kleisthenes  at  Athens  In 
spite  of  all  the  confusion,  however,  with  which  this  period  of  popular 
government  opens,  lasting  for  more  than  fifty  years  until  the  despot- 
ism of  the  elder  Dionysius,  we  shall  find  it  far  the  best  and  most 
prosperous  portion  of  Sicilian  history.  We  shall  arrive  at  it  in  a  sub- 
sequent chapter. 

Respecting  the  Grecian  cities  along  the  coast  of  Italy,  during  the 
period  of  the  Gelonian  dynasty,  a  few  words  will  exhaust  the  whole 
jf  our  knowledge.  Rhegium,  with  its  despots  Anaxilaus  and  Miky- 
thus,  figures  chiefly  as  a  Sicilian  city,  and  has  been  noticed  as  such 
in  the  stream  of  Sicilian  politics.  But  it  is  also  involved  in  the  only 
event  which  has  been  preserved  to  us  respecting  this  portion  of  the 
history  of  the  Italian  Greeks.  It  was  about  the  year  B.C.  473,  that 
the  Tarentines  undertook  an  expedition  against  their  non-Hellenic 
neighbors  the  Iapygiaus,  in  hopes  of  conquering  Ilvria  and  the  other 
towns  belonging  to  them.  Mikythus,  despot  of  Rhegium,  against 
the  will  of  his  citizens,  dispatched  3,000  of  them  by  constraint  as 
auxiliaries  to  the  Tarentines.  But  the  expedition  proved  signally 
disastrous  to  both.  The  Iapygians,  to  the  dumber  of  20,000  men, 
encountered  the  united  Grecian  forces  in  the  field,  and  completely 
defeated  them.  The  battle  having  taken  place  in  a  hostile  country, 
it  seems  that  the  larger  portion  both  of  Rhegians  and  Tarentines  per- 
ished, insomuch  that  Herodotus  pronounces  it  to  have  been  the 
greatest  Hellenic  slaughter  within  his  knowledge.  Of  the  Tarentines 
slain  a  great  proportion  were  opulent  and  substantial  citizens,  the 
loss  of  whom  sensibly  affected  the  government  of  the  city;  strength- 
ening the  Demos,  and  rendering  the  constitution  more  democraticah 


CAUSES  OF  THE  REPULSE   OF  XERXES.         3G5 

In  What  particulars  the  change  consisted  we  do  not  know:  the  expres- 
sion of  Aristotle  gives  reason  to  suppose  that  even  before  this  event 
the  constitution  had  been  popular. 


CHAPTER  XLIV. 

FROM  THE   BATTLES   OF  PLAT^EA  AND  MYKALE  DOWN  TO   THE 
DEATHS    OF    THEMISTOKLES  AND   ARISTEIDES. 

After  having  in  the  last  chapter  followed  the  repulse  of  the  Car- 
thaginians by  the  Sicilian  Greeks,  we  now  return  to  the  central 
Greeks  and  the  Persians — a  case  in  which  the  triumph  was  yet  more 
interesting  to  the  cause  of  human  improvement  generally. 

The  disproportion  between  the  immense  host  assembled  by  Xerxes, 
and  the  little  which  he  accomplished,  naturally  provokes  both  a  con- 
tempt for  Persian  force  and  an  admiration  for  the  comparative  hand- 
ful of  men  by  whom  they  were  so  ignominiously  beaten.  Both  these 
sentiments  are  just,  but  both  are  often  exaggerated  beyond  the  point 
which  attentive  contemplation  of  the  facts  will  justify.  The  Persian 
mode  of  making  war  (which  we  may  liken  to  that  of  the  modern 
Turks,  now  that  the  period  of  their  energetic  fanaticism  has  passed 
away)  was  in  a  high  degree  disorderly  and  inefficient.  The  men 
indeed,  individually  taken,  especially  the  native  Persians,  were  not 
deficient  in  the  qualities  of  soldiers,  but  their  arms  and  their  organi- 
zation were  wretched — and  their  leaders  yet  worse.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  Greeks,  equal,  if  not  superior,  in  individual  bravery,  were 
incomparably  superior  in  soldierdike  order  as  well  as  in  arms:  but 
here  too  the  leadership  was  defective,  and  the  disunion  a  constant 
source  of  peril.  Those  who,  like  Plutarch  (or  rather  the  Pseudo- 
Plutarch)  in  his  treatise  on  the  Malignity  of  Herodotus,  insist  on 
acknowledging  nothing  but  magnanimity  and  heroism  in  the  pro- 
ceedings of  the  Greeks  throughout  these  critical  years,  are  forced  to 
deal  harshly  with  the  inestimable  witness  on  whom  our  knowledge 
of  the  facts  depends.  That  witness  intimates  plainly  that,  in  spite 
of  the  devoted  courage  displayed  not  less  by  the  vanquished  at  Ther- 
mopylae, than  by  the  victors  at  Salamis,  Greece  owed  her  salvation 
chiefly  to  the  imbecility,  cowardice,  and  credulous  rashness,  of  Xer- 
xes. Had  he  indeed  possessed  either  the  personal  energy  of  Cyrus, 
or  the  judgment  of  Artemisia,  it  maybe  doubted  whether  any  excel- 
lence of  management,  or  any  intimacy  of  union,  could  have  preserved 
the  Greeks  against  so  great  a  superiority  of  force.  But  it  is  certain 
that  all  their  courage  as  soldiers  in  line  would  have  been  unavailing 
for  that  purpose,  without  a  higher  degree  of  generalship,  and  a  more 
hearty  spirit  of  co-operation,  than  that  which  they  actually  mani- 
fested. 


3GG    GRECIAN  AFFAIRS  AFTER  PERSIAN  INVASION. 

Oue  hundred  and  fifty  years  after  tins  event  ful  period,  we  shall  Fee 
the  tables  turned,  and  tine  uniti  d  fore  -  of  Greece  under  Alexander 
of  Macedon  becoming  invaders  of  Persia,  We  shall  find  that  in 
i  no  improvement  has  taken  place  during  this  long  interval — 
that  the  scheme  of  defense  under  Darius  Codomannus  labors  under 
the  same  defects  as  that  of  attack  under  Xerxes — that  there  is  the 
same  blind  and  exclusive  confidence  in  pitched  battles  with  superior 
numbers — that  the  advice  of  Mentor  the  Rhodian,  and  of  Charidc- 
mus,  is  despised  like  that  of  Demaratus  and  Artemisia — thai  Darius 
( !odomannus,  essentially  of  the  same  stamp  as  Xerxes,  is  hurried  into 
the  battle  of  Issusby  the  same  ruinous  temerity  as  that  which  threw 
away  the  Persian  fleet  at  Salamis — and  thai  the  Persian  native  infan- 
try (not  the  cavalry)  even  appear  to  have  lost  that  individual  gal- 
lantry which  they  displayed  so  conspicuously  al  Plataja.  But  on  the 
Grecian  side,  the  improvement  in  every  way  is  very  great:  the 
orderly  courage  of  the  soldier  has  beeD  sustained  and  even  augmented, 
while  the  generalship  and  power  of  military  combination  has  reached 
a  point  unexampled  in  the  previous  history  of  mankind.  Military 
science  may  be  esteemed  a  sort  of  creation  during  this  interval,  and 
will  be  found  to  go  through  various  stages — Demosthenes  and  Brasidas 
— the  Cyreian  army  and  Xenophon — Agesilaus — Iphikrates — Epam- 
inondas — Philip  of  Macedon — Alexander:  for  the  Macedonian  princes 
are  borrowers  of  Greek  tactics,  though  extending  and  applying  them 
with  a  personal  energy  peculiar  to  th<  mselves,  and  with  advantages 
of  position  such  as  no  Athenian  or  Spartan  ever  enjoyed..  In  this 
comparison  between  the  invasion  of  Xerxes  and  that  of  Alexander, 
we  contrast  the  progressive  spirit  of  Greece,  serving  as  herald  and 
stimulus  to  the  like  spirit  in  Europe — with  the  stationary  mind  of 
Asia,  occasionally  roused  by  some  splendid  individual,  but  never 
appropriating  to  itself  new  social  ideas  or  powers,  either  for  a  war  or 
for  peace. 

It  is  out  of  the  invasion  of  Xerxes  that  those  new  powers  of  com- 
bination, political  as  well  as  military,  which  lighten  up  Grecian  history 
during  the  next  century  and  more,  take  their  rise.  They  are  brought 
into  agency  through  the  altered  position  and  character  of  the  Athenians 
— improvers,  to  a  certain  extent,  of  military  operations  on  land,  but 
the  great  creators  of  marine  tactics  and  maneuvering  in  Greece — and 
the  earliest  of  all  Greeks  who  showed  themselves  capable  of  organ iz 
ing  and  directing  the  joint  action  of  numerous  allies  and  dependents- 
thus  uniting  the  two  distinctive  qualities  of  the  Homeric  Agamemnon 
— ability  in  command,  with  vigor  in  execution. 

In  the  general  Hellenic  confederacy,  which  had  acted  against 
Persia  under  the  presidency  of  Sparta.  Alliens  could  hardly  be  said 
to  occupy  any  ostensible  rank  above  that  of  an  ordinary  member. 
The  post  of  second  dignity  in  the  line  at  Platsea  had  indeed  been 
adjudged  to  her.  yet  only  after  a  contending  claim  from  Tegea.  But 
without  any  difference  in  ostensible  rank,  she  was  in  the  eye  and 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  ATHENIANS.  367 

feeling  of  Greece  no  longer  the  same  power  as  before.  She  had  suf- 
fered more,  and  at  sea  had  certainly  done  more,  than  all  the  other 
allies  put  together.  Even  on  land  at  Platsea,  her  hoplites  had  mani- 
fested a  combination  of  bravery,  discipline,  and  efficiency  against 
the  formidable  Persian  cavalry,  superior  even  to  the  Spartans.  No 
Athenian  officer  had  committed  so  perilous  an  act  of  disobedience  as 
the  Spartan  Amompharetus.  After  the  victory  of  Mykale,  when  the 
Peloponnesians  all  hastened  home  to  enjoy  their  triumph,  the  Athe- 
nian forces  did  not  shrink  from  prolonged  service  for  the  important 
object  of  clearing  the  Hellespont,  thus  standing  forth  as  the  willing 
and  forward  champions  of  the  Asiatic  Greeks  against  Persia.  Besides 
these  exploits  of  Athens  collectively,  the  only  two  individuals,  gifted 
with  any  talents  for  command,  whom  this  momentous  contest  had 
thrown  up,  were  both  of  them  Athenians:  first,  Themistokles;  next, 
Aristeides.  From  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  the  struggle,  Athens 
had  displayed  an  unreserved  Pan-Hellenic  patriotism  which  had 
been  most  ungenerously  requited  by  the  Peloponnesians;  who  had 
kept  within  their  Isthmian  walls,  and  betrayed  Attica  twice  to  hostile 
ravage;  the  first  time,  perhaps,  unavoidably — but  the  second  time  by 
a  culpable  neglect  in  postponing  their  outward  march  against  Mar- 
donius.  And  the  Peloponnesians  could  not  but  feel,  that  while  they 
bad  left  Attica  unprotected,  they  owed  their  own  salvation  at  Salamis 
altogether  to  the  dexterity  of  Themistokles  and  to  the  imposing  Athe- 
nian naval  force. 

Considering  that  the  Peloponnesians  had  sustained  little  or  no  mis- 
chief by  the  invasion,  while  the  Athenians  had  lost  for  the  time  even 
their  city  and  country,  with  a  large  proportion  of  their  movable 
property  irrecoverably  destroyed — we  might  naturally  expect  to  find 
the  former,  if  not  lending  their  grateful  and  active  aid  to  repair  the 
damage  in  Attica,  at  least  cordially  welcoming  the  restoration  of  the 
ruined  city  by  its  former  inhabitants.  Instead  of  this,  we  find  the 
selfishness  again  prevalent  among  them.  Ill-will  and  mistrust  for 
the  future,  aggravated  by  an  admiration  which  they  could  not  help 
feeling,  overlays  all  their  gratitude  and  sympathy. 

The  Athenians,  on  returning  from  Salamis  after  the  battle  of 
Plataea,  found  a  desolate  home  to  harbor  them.  Their  country  was 
laid  waste — their  city  burnt  or  destroyed,  so  that  there  remained  but 
a  few  houses  standing,  wherein  the  Persian  officers  had  taken  up  their 
quarters — and  their  fortifications  for  the  most  part  razed  or  over- 
thrown. It  was  their  first  task  to  bring  home  their  families  and 
effects  from  the  temporary  places  of  shelter  at  Trcezen,  ^Egina,  and 
Salamis.  After  providing  what  was  indispensably  necessary  for 
immediate  wants,  they  began  to  rebuild  fheir  city  and  its  fortifica- 
tions on  a  scale  of  enlarged  size  in  every  direction.  But  as  soon  as 
they  were  seen  to  been  employed  on  this  indispensable  work,  without 
which  neither  political  existence  nor  personal  safety  was  practicable, 
the  allies  took  the  alarm,  preferred  complaints  to  Sparta,  and  urged 


368    GRECIAN  AFFAIRS  AFTER  PERSIAN  INVASION. 

her  to  arrest  the  work.  In  the  from  of  these  complainants  probably 
stood  the  /Eginetans,  .-is  the  old  enemies  of  Athens,  and  as  Laving 
mosl  to  apprehend  from  her  might  at  sea.  The  Spartans,  perfectly 
sympathizing  with  the  jealousj  and  uneasiness  of  their  allies,  were 
even  disposed,  from  old  association,  to  cany  their  dislike  of  fortifica- 
tions siill  farther,  so  thai  they  would  have  been  pleased  to  see  all  the 
other  Grecian  cities  systematically  defenseless  like  Sparta  itself.  But 
while  sending  an  embassy  to  Athens,  to  oiler  a  friendly  remonstrance 
against  the  projecl  of  refortifying  the  city,  they  could  not  openly  and 
peremptorily  forbid  the  exercise  of  a  right  common  to  every  auton- 
omous community.  Nor  did  they  even  venture,  at  a  moment  when 
tin'  events  of  the  past  months  were  fresh  in  every  one's  remembrance, 
to  divulge  their  real   jealousies  as   to  the  future.    They  affected 

lo  offer  prudential  reasons  against  the  scheme,  founded  on  the 
chance  of  a  future  Persian  invasion;  in  which  case  it  would  be  a 
dangerous  advantage  for  the  invader  to  find  any  fortified  city  outside 
of  Peloponnesus  to  further  his  operations,  as  Thebes  had  recently 
seconded  Mardonius.  They  proposed  to  the  Athenians,  therefore, 
not  merely  to  desist  from  their  own  fortifications,  hut  also  to  assist 
them  in  demolishing  all  fortifications  of  Other  cities  beyond  the  limits 
of  Peloponnesus — promising  shelter  within  the  Isthmus,  in  case  of 
need,  to  all  exposed  parties. 

A  statesman  like  Themistokles  was  not  likely  to  he  imposed  upon 
by  this  displomacy :  hut  he  saw  that  the  Spartans  had  the  power  of 
preventing  the  work  if  they  chose,  and  that  it  could  only  he  executed 
by  the  help  of  successful  deceit.  By  his  advice  the  Athenians  dis- 
missed the  Spartan  envoys,  saying  that  they  would  themselves  send 
to  Sparta  and  explain  their  views.  Accordingly  Themistokles  him- 
self was  presently  dispatched  thither,  as  one  among  three  envoys 
instructed  to  enter  into  explanations  with  the  Spartan  authorities. 
But  his  two  colleagues,  Aristeides  and  Abronichus,  by  previous  con- 
ceit, were  tardy  in  arriving — and  he  remained  inactive  at,  Sparta, 
making  use  of  their  absence  as  an  excuse  for  not  even  demanding  an 
audience,  yet  affecting  surprise  that  their  coming  was  so  long  delayed. 
But  while  Aristeides  and  Abronichus,  the  other  two  envoys,  were 
thus  studiously  kept  hack,  the  whole  population  of  Athens  labored 
unremittingly  at  the  walls.  3Fen,  women,  and  children  all  tasked 
their  strength  to  the  utmost  during  this  precious  interval.  Neither 
private  houses  nor  sacred  edifices  were  spared  to  furnish  materials; 
and  such  was  their  ardor  iu  the  enterprise,  that  before  the  three 
envoys  were  united  at  Sparta,  the  wall  had  already  attained  a  height 
sufficient  at  least  to  attempt  defense.  Yet  the  interval  had  been  long 
enough  to  provoke  suspicion,  even  in  the  slow  mind  of  the  Spartans; 
while  the  mare  watchful  iEginetans  sent  them  positive  intelligence 
that  the  wall  was  rapidly  advancing 

Themistokles,  on  hearing  this  allegation,  peremptorily  denied  the 
truth  of  it;  and  the  personal  esteem  entertained  toward  him  was  at 


ATHENS  FORTIFIED.  309 

that  time  so  great,  that  his  assurance  obtained  for  some  time  unquali- 
fied credit,  until  fresh  messengers  again  raised  suspicions  in  the  minds 
of  the  Spartans.  In  reply  to  these,  Themistokles  urged  the  Ephors 
to  send  envoys  of  their  own  to  Athens,  and  thus  convince  themselves 
of  the  state  of  the  facts.  They  unsuspectingly  acted  upon  his  recom- 
mendation, while  he  at  the  same  time  transmitted  a  private  commu- 
nication to  Athens,  desiring  that  the  envoys  might  not  be  suffered  to 
depart  until  the  safe  return  of  himself  and  his  colleagues,  which  he 
feared  might  be  denied  them  when  his  trick  came  to  be  divulged. 
Aristeides  and  Abronichus  had  now  arrived — the  wall  was  announced 
to  be  of  a  height  at  least  above  contempt — and  Themistokles  at  once 
threw  off  the  mask.  He  avowed  the  statagem  practiced — told  the 
Spartans  that  Athens  wras  already  fortified  sufficiently  to  insure  the 
safety  and  free  will  of  its  inhabitants — and  warned  them  that  the 
hour  of  constraint  was  now  passed,  the  Athenians  being  in  a  condition 
to  define  and  vindicate  for  themselves  their  own  rights  and  duties  in  ref- 
erence to  Sparta  and  the  allies.  He  reminded  them  that  the  Athenians 
had  always  been  found  competent  to  judge  for  themselves,  whether 
in  joint  consultation,  or  in  any  separate  affair  such  as  the  momentous 
crisis  of  abandoning  their  city  and  taking  to  their  ships.  They  had 
now,  in  the  exercise  of  this  self-judgment,  resolved  on  fortifying  their 
city,  as  a  step  indispensable  to  themselves  and  advantageous  even  to 
the  allies  generally.  No  equal  or  fair  interchange  of  opinion  could 
subsist,  uuless  all  the  allies  had  equal  means  of  defense:  either  all 
must  be  unfortified,  or  Athens  must  be  fortified  as  well  as  the  rest. 

Mortified  as  the  Spartans  were  by  a  revelation  which  showed  that 
they  had  not  only  been  detected  in  a  dishonest  purpose,  but  com- 
pletely outwitted — they  were  at  the  same  time  overawed  by  the 
decisive  tone  of  Themistokles,  whom  they  never  afterward  forgave. 
To  arrest  beforehand  erection  of  the  walls,  would  have  been  practi- 
cable, though  not  perhaps  without  difficulty;  to  deal  by  force  with  the 
fact  accomplished,  was  perilous  in  a  high  degree.  Moreover  the 
inestimable  services  just  rendered  by  Athens  became  again  predomi- 
nant in  their  minds,  so  that  sentiment  and  prudence  for  the  time 
coincided.  They  affected  therefore  to  accept  the  communication 
without  manifesting  any  offense,  nor  had  they  indeed  put  forward 
any  pretense  which  required  to  be  formally  retracted.  The  envoys 
on  both  sides  returned  home,  and  the  Athenians  completed  their 
fortifications,  without  obstruction — yet  not  without  murmurs  on  the 
part  of  the  allies,  who  bitterly  reproached  Sparta  afterward  for 
having  let  slip  this  golden  opportunity  of  arresting  the  growth  of  the 
giant. 

If  the  allies  were  appreheusive  of  Athens  before,  the  mixture  of 
audacity,  invention,  and  deceit,  whereby  she  had  just  eluded  the 
hindrance  opposed  to  her  fortifications,  was  well  calculated  to  aggra- 
vate their  uneasiness.  On  the  other  hand,  to  the  Athenians,  the  mere 
hint  of  intervention  to  debar  them  from  that  common  right  of  self- 


370    GRECIAN  AFFAIRS  AFTER  PERSIAN  INVASION. 

defense  which  was  exercised  by  every  autonomous  city  except  Sparta, 
musl  have  appeared  outrageous  injustice — aggravated  by  the  fact 
thai  it  was  brought  upon  them  by  their  peculiar  Bufferings  in  the 
common  cause,  and  by  the  very  allies  who  without  their  devoted  for- 
wardness would  now  have  been  slaves  of  the  Great  King.  And  the 
intention  of  the  allies  to  obstruct  the  fortifications  must  have  been 
known  to  every  soul  in  Athens,  from  the  universal  pros  of  hands 
required  to  hurry  the  work  and  escape  interference;  just  as  it  was 
proclaimed  to  after-generations  by  the  shapeless  fragments  and  irreg- 
ular structure  of  the  wall,  in  which  even  sepulchral  stones  and 
inscribed  columns  were  seen  imbedded.  Assuredly  the  sentiment, 
connected  with  this  work— performed  as  it  was  alike  by  rich  and 
poor,  strong  and  weak — men,  women,  and  children — must  have  been 
intense  as  well  as  equalizing.  All  had  endured  the  common  miseries 
of  exile,  all  had  contributed  to  the  victory,  all  were  now  sharing  the 
same  fatigue  for  the  defense  of  their  recovered  city,  in  order  to 
counterwork  the  ungenerous  hindrance  of  their  Peloponnesian  allies. 
We  must  take  notice  of  these  stirring  circumstances,  peculiar  to  the 
Athenians  and  acting  upon  a  generation  which  had  now  been  nursed 
in  democracy  for  a  quarter  of  a  century  and  had  achieved  unaided 
the  victory  of  .Marathon — if  we  would  understand  that  still  stronger 
burst  of  aggressive  activity,  persevering  self-confidence,  and  aptitude 
as  well  as  thirst  for  command — together  with  that  still  wider  spread 
of  democratical  organization — which  marks  their  character  during 
the  age  immediately  following. 

The  plan  of  the  new  fortification  was  projected  on  a  scale  not 
unworthy  of  the  future  grandeur  of  the  city.  Its  circuit  was  sixty 
stadia  or  about  seven  miles,  with  the  acropolis  nearly  in  the  center: 
but  the  circuit  of  the  previous  walls  is  unknown,  so  that  we  are 
unable  to  measure  the  extent  of  that  enlargement  which  Thucydides 
testifies  to  have  been  carried  out  on  every  side.  It  included  within 
the  town  the  three  hills  of  the  Areopagus,  Pnyx,  and  the  Museum; 
while  on  the  south  of  the  town  it  was  carried  for  a  space  even  on  the 
southern  bank  of  the  Ilissus,  thus  also  comprising  the  fountain 
Kallirhoe.  In  spite  of  the  excessive  hurry  in  which  it  was  raised, 
the  structure  was  thoroughly  solid  and  sufficient  against  every  exter- 
nal enemy:  but  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  its  very  large  inner 
area  was  never  filled  with  buildings.  Empty  spaces,  for  the  tempo- 
rary shelter  of  inhabitants  driven  in  from  the  country  with  their 
property,  were  eminently  useful  to  a  Grecian  city-community;  to 
none  more  useful  than  to  the  Athenians,  whose  principal  strength 
lay  in  their  Beet,  and  whose  citizens  habitually  resided  in  large  pro- 
portion in  their  separate  demes  throughout  Attica. 

The  first  indispensable  step  in  the  renovation  of  Athens  after  her 
temporary  extinction,  was  now  happily  accomplished:  the  city  was 
made  secure  against  external  enemies.  But  Theinistokles.  to  whom 
the  Athenians  owed  the  late  successful  stratagem,  and  whose  iuflu- 


PEIRAEUS  FORTIFIED.  371 

ence  must  have  been  much  strengthened  by  its  success,  had  con- 
ceived plans  of  a  wider  and  more  ambitious  range.  He  had  been  the 
original  adviser  of  the  great  maritime  start  taken  by  his  countrymen, 
as  well  as  of  the  powerful  naval  force  which  they  had  created  during 
the  last  few  years,  and  which  had  so  recently  proved  their  salvation. 
He  saw  in  that  force  both  the  only  chance  of  salvation  for  the  future, 
in  case  the  Persians  should  renew  their  attack  by  sea — a  contingency 
at  that  time  seemingly  probable — and  boundless  prospects  of  future 
ascendency  over  the  Grecian  coasts  and  islands.  It  was  the  great 
engine  of  defense,  of  offense,  and  of  ambition.  To  continue  this 
movement  required  much  less  foresight  and  genius  than  to  begin  it. 
Themistokles,  the  moment  that  the  walls  of  the  city  had  been  fin- 
ished, brought  back  the  attention  of  his  countrymen  to  those  wooden 
walls  which  had  served  them  as  a  refuge  against  the  Persian  mon- 
arch. He  prevailed  upon  them  to  provide  harbor-room  at  once  safe 
and  adequate,  by  the  enlargement  and  fortification  of  the  Peiraeus. 
This  again  was  only  the  prosecution  of  an  enterprise  previously 
begun ;  for  he  had  already,  while  in  office  two  or  three  years  before, 
made  his  countrymen  sensible  that  the  open  roadstead  of  Phalerum 
was  thoroughly  insecure,  and  had  prevailed  upon  them  to  improve 
and  employ  in  part  the  more  spacious  harbor  of  Peiraeus  and  Muny- 
chia — three  natural  basins,  all  capable  of  being  closed  and  defended. 
Something  had  then  been  done  toward  the  enlargement  of  this  port, 
though  it  had  probably  been  subsequently  ruined  b)r  the  Persian 
invaders.  But  Themistokles  now  resumed  the  scheme  on  a  scale  far 
grander  than  he  could  then  have  ventured  to  propose — a  scale  which 
demonstrates  the  vast  auguries  present  to  his  mind  respecting  the 
destinies  of  Athens. 

Peiraeus  and  Munychia,  in  his  newr  plan,  constituted  a  fortified 
space  as  large  as  the  enlarged  Athens,  and  with  a  wall  far  more  elabo- 
rate and  unassailable.  The  wall  which  surrounded  them,  sixty  stadia 
in  circuit,  was  intended  by  him  to  be  so  stupendous,  both  in  height 
and  thickness,  as  to  render  assault  hopeless,  and  to  enable  the  whole 
military  population  to  act  on  shipboard,  leaving  only  old  men  and 
boys  as  a  garrison.  We  may  judge  how  vast  his  project  was,  when 
we  learn  that  the  wTall,  though  in  practice  always  found  sufficient, 
was  only  carried  up  to  half  the  height  which  he  had  contemplated. 
In  respect  to  thickness  however  his  ideas  were  exactly  followed:  two 
carts  meeting  one  another  brought  stones  which  were  laid  together 
right  and  left  on  the  outer  side  of  each,  and  thus  formed  two  pri 
rnary  parallel  walls,  between  which  the  interior  space  (of  course  at 
least  as  broad  as  the  joint  breadth  of  the  two  carts)  was  filled  up, 
"not  with  rubble,  in  the  usual  manner  of  the* Greeks,  but  constructed, 
throughout  the  whole  thickness,  of  squared  stones,  cramped  together 
with  metal."  The  result  was  a  solid  wall,  probably  not  less  than 
fourteen  or  fifteen  feet  thick,  since  it  was  intended  to  carry  so  very 
unusual  a  height.     In  the  exhortations  whereby  he  animated   the 


373     GRECIAN   AFFAIRS  AFTEB   PERSIAN   INVASION. 


pi  ople  to  this  fatiguing  and  costly  work,  he  labored  to  impress  upon 
[hem  ili.i1  Peiraeu  wa  oi  more  value  to  them  than  Alliens  itself,  and 
Vli.ii  ii  afforded  a  shelter  into  which,  if  their  territory  should  be  again 
overwhelmed  by  a  superior  land-force,  they  might  Becurely  retire, 
with  full  1  i  i  n  - 1 •  t  \  of  thai  maritime  action  in  which  thej  were  a  match 
for  all  the  world.  We  may  even  suspect  thai  if  Themistokles  could 
have  followed  his  own  feelings,  he  would  have  altered  the  site  of  the 
City  from  Athens  to  Peirojus;  the  attachment  of  the  people  to  their 
incienl  and  holy  rock  doubtless  prevented  any  such  proposition. 
Nor  did  he  al  thai  time,  probably,  contemplate  the  possibility  of 
long  walls  which  in  a  fe"w  years  afterward  consolidated  the 
two  cities  Into  one. 

l\<\\\  five  years  afterward,  a1  the  beginning  of  the  Peloponnesian 
War,  we  shall  hear  from  Perikles,  who  espoused  and  carried  oul  the 
large  ideas  of  Themistokles,  this  same  language  about  the  capacity  of 
Alliens  to  sustain  a  greal  power  exclusively  or  chii  By  upon  mari 
time  action.  But  the  Athenian  empire  was  then  an  established 
reality,  whereas  in  the  time  of  Themistokles  ii  was  yet  a  dream,  and 
his  bold  predictions,  surpassed  as  they  were  by  the  future  reality, 

mark  that  <  \  I  raori  I'm  an  power  of  practical  divination  wliieh  Thueyd- 

Ides  so  emphatically  extols  in  him,  And  it  proves  the  exuberant 
hope  which  had  now  passed  into  the  temper  of  the  Athenian  people, 
w  in  n  we  find  them,  on  the  faith  of  these  predictions,  undertaking  a 
new  enterprise  of  so  much  toil  and  expense;  and  that  too  when  just 
returned  from  exile  into  a  desolated  country,  at  a  moment  of  private 
distress  and  public  impoverishment. 

I  low  ever,  Peireeus  served  other  purposes  besides  its  direct  use  as  a 
dockyard  for  military  marine,  [ts  secure  fortifications  and  the  pro 
lection  of  the  Athenian  navy  were  well  calculated  to  call  back  those 
ineiies  or  resident  foreigners,  who  had  been  driven  away  by  the 
on  of  Xerxes,  and  who  might  feel  themselves  insecure  in  return- 
ing   unless   some    new    and    eonspieiious   means    of    protection    Were 

exhibited.  To  invite  them  hack,  and  to  attracl  new  residents  of  a 
similar  description,  Themistokles  proposed  to  exempl  them  from  the 

Mel  oik  ion  or  lion  freeman's  annual  tax  :   but  this  exemption  can  only 

have  lasted  for  a  time,  and  the  .ureal  temptation  for  them  to  return 
must  have  consisted  in  the  new  securities  and  facilities  for  trade, 
which  Alliens,  with  her  fortified  poris  and  navy,  now  afforded.   The 

presence   of  numerous   mcl  ies  was  prolilahie   to    the    Athenians,  both 

privately  and  publicly.  Much  of  the  trading,  professional,  and 
handicraft  business  was  in  their  hands:  and  the  Athenian  legislation, 
while  ii  excluded  them  from  i lie  political  franchise,  was  in  other  res- 
pects equitable  and  protectn  e  to  them.  In  regard  to  trading-pursuits, 
the  meticshad  this  advantage  over  the  citizens — thai  they  were  less  fre- 
quent ly  carried  aw  a\  for  foreign  m  Hit  an  sen  ice.  The  great  increase 
of  their  numbers,  from  this  period  forward,  while  it  tended  materi- 
ally to  increase  the  value  of  property  all  throughout,  Attica,  but 


GREEK  EXPEDITION  AGAINST  ASIA.  373 

especially  in  Peirseus  and  Athens,  where  they  mostly  resided,  helps 
us  to  explain  the  extraordinary  prosperity,  together  with  the  excellent 
cultivation,  prevalent  throughout  the  country  before  the  Peloponne- 
sian  war.  The  barky,  vegetables,  tigs,  and  oil,  produced  in  most 
parts  of  the  territory — the  charcoal  prepared  in  the  flourishing  dcine 
of  Achanuc — and  the  lish  obtained  in  abundance  near  the  coast — all 
found  opulent  buyers  and  a  constant  demand  from  the  augmenting 
town  population. 

We  are  farther  told  that  Themistokles  prevailed  on  the  Athenians 
to  build  every  year  twenty  new  ships  of  the  lin< — so  we  may  designate 
the  trireme.  Whether  this  number  was  always  strictly  adhered  to,  it 
is  impossible  to  say:  but  to  repair  the  ships  as  well  as  to  keep  up  their 
numbers,  was  always  regarded  among  the  most  indispensable  obliga 
tions  of  the  executive  government. 

It  does  not  appear  that  the  Spartans  offered  any  opposition  to  the 
fortification  of  the  Peirseus,  though  it  was  an  enterprise  greater,  more 
novel,  and  more  menacing  than  that  of  Athens.  But  Diodorus  tells 
us,  probably  enough,  that  Themistokles  thought  it  necessary  to  send 
an  embassy  to  Sparta,  intimating  that  his  scheme  was  to  provide  a 
safe  harbor  for  the  collective  navy  of  Greece,  in  the  event  of  future 
Persian  attack. 

Works  on  so  vast  a  scale  must  have  taken  a  considerable  time,  and 
absorbed  much  of  the  Athenian  force:  yet  they  did  not  prev<  nt 
Athens  from  lending  active  aid  toward  the  expedition  which,  in  the 
year  after  the  battle  of  Plalaea  (B.C.  478),  set  sail  for  Asia  under  the 
Spartan  Pausanias.  Twenty  ships  from  the  various  cities  of  Pelo- 
ponnesus were  under  his  command:  the  Athenians  alone  furnished 
thirty,  under  the  orders  of  Aristcides  and  Kimon:  other  triremes  also 
came  from  the  Ionian  and  insular  allies.  They  lirst  sailed  to  Cyprus, 
in  which  island  they  liberated  most  of  the  Grecian  cities  from  the 
Persian  government.  Next  they  turned  to  the  Bosphorus  of  Thrace, 
and  undertook  the  siege  of  Byzantium,  which,  like  Sestus  in  the 
Chersonese,  was  a  post  of  great  moment  as  well  as  of  great  st length 
— occupied  by  a  considerable  Persian  force,  with  several  leading 
Persians  and  even  kinsmen  of  the  monarch.  The  place  was  captured" 
seemingly  after  a  prolonged  siege:  it  might  probably  hold  out  even 
longer  than  Sestus,  as  being  taken  less  unprepared.  The  line  of 
communication  between  the  Euxine  sea  and  Greece  was  thus  cleared 
of  obstruction. 

The  capture  of  Byzantium  proved  the  signal  for  a  capital  and  un- 
expected change  in  the  relations  of  the  various  Grecian  cities;  a 
change,  of  which  the  proximate  cause  lay  in  the  misconduct  of  Pau- 
sanias,  but  toward  which  other  causes,  deep-seated  as  well  as  various, 
also  tended.  In  recounting  the  history  of  Milliades,  I  noticed  the 
deplorable  liability  of  the  Grecian  leading  men  to  be  spoiled  by  suc- 
cess. This  distemper  worked  with  singular  rapidity  on  Pausanias. 
As  conqueror  of  Plataea,  he  had  acquired  a  renown  unparalleled  in 


374    GRECIAN  AFFAIRS  AFTER  PERSIAN  INVASION. 

Grecian  experience,  together  with  a  prodigious  share  of  the  plunder. 
The  concubines,  horses,  camels,  and  gold  plate,  which  had  thus 
passed  into  his  possession,  were  well  calculated  to  make  the  sobriety 
and  discipline  of  Spartan  life  irksome,  while  his  power  also,  though 
great  on  foreign  command,  became  subordinate  to  thai  of  the  Ephors 
when  he  returned  home.  Bis  newly-acquired  insolence  was  mani- 
ed  immediately  alter  the  battle,  in  the  commemorative  tripod 
dedicated  by  his  order  at  Delphi,  which  proclaimed  himself  by  name 
and  singly,  as  commander  of  the  Greeks  and  destroyer  of  the  Per- 
sians: an  unseemly  boast,  of  which  the  Lacedaemonians  themselves 
were  the  first  to  mark  their  disapprobation,  by  causing  the  inscrip- 
tion to  be  erased,  and  the  names  of  the  cities  who  had  taken  part  in 
the  combat  to  be  all  enumerated  on  the  tripod.  Nevertheless  he  was 
still  sent  on  the  command  against  Cyprus  and  Byzantium,  and  it  was 
on  the  capture  of  this  latter  place  that  his  ambition  and  discontent 
first  ripened  into  distinct  treason.  He  entered  into  correspondence 
with  Gongylus  the  Eretrian  exile  (now  a  subject  of  Persia,  and 
invested  with  the  property  and  government  of  a  district  in  My6ia), 
to  whom  he  intrusted  his  new  acquisition  of  Byzantium,  and  the  care 
of  the  valuable  prisoners  taken  in  it. 

These  prisoners  were  presently  suffered  to  escape,  or  rather  sent 
away  underhand  to  Xerxes;  together  with  a  letter  from  the  hand  of 
Pausanias  himself ,  to  the  following  effect:  "  Pausanias  the  SpartaD 
commander  having  taken  these  captives,  sends  them  hack  in  his  anx- 
iety  to  oblige  thee.  I  am  minded,  if  it  so  please  thee,  to  marry  thy 
daughter,  and  to  bring  under  thy  dominion  both  Sparta  and  the  rest 
of  Greece:  with  thy  aid  I  think  myself  competent  to  achieve  this. 
If  my  proposition  be  acceptable,  send  some  confidential  person  down 
to  the  seaboard,  through  whom  we  may  hereafter  correspond." 
Xerxes,  highly  pleased  with  the  opening  thus  held  out,  immediately 
sent  down  Artabazus  (the  same  who  had  been  second  in  command  in 
Bceotia),  to  supersede  Megabates  in  the  satrapy  of  Daskylium.  The 
new  satrap,  furnished  with  a  letter  of  reply  bearing  the  regal  seal, 
was  instructed  to  promote  actively  the  projects  of  Pausanias.  The 
letter  was  to  this  purport:  "Thus  saith  King  Xerxes  to  Pausanias. 
Thy  name  stands  for  ever  recorded  in  my  house  as  a  well-doer,  on 
account  of  the  men  whom  thou  hast  saved  for  me  beyond  sea  at 
Byzantium;  and  thy  propositions  now  received  arc  acceptable  to  me. 
Relax  not  either  night  or  day  in  accomplishing  that  which  thou 
promisest,  nor  let  thyself  be  held  back  by  cost,  either  gold  or  silver, 
or  numbers  of  men,  if  thou  standest  in  need  of  them;  but  transact  in 
confidence  thy  business  and  mine  jointly  with  Artabazus,  the  good 
man  whom  I  have  now  sent,  in  such  manner  as  may  be  best  for  both 
of  us." 

Throughout  the  whole  of  this  expedition,  Pausanias  had  been  inso- 
lent and  domineering;  degrading  the  allies  at  quarters  and  watering- 
places  in  the  most  offensive  manner  as  compared  with  the  Spartans. 


PAUSANIAS  RECALLED  TO  SPARTA.     375 

and  treating  the  whole  armament  in  a  manner  which  Greek  warriors 
could  not  tolerate,  even  in  a  Spartan  Herakleid  and  a  victorious  gen- 
eral. But  when  he  received  the  letter  from  Xerxes,  and  found  him- 
self in  immediate  communication  with  Artahazus,  as  well  as  supplied 
with  funds  for  corruption,  his  insane  hopes  knew  no  hounds,  and  he 
already  fancied  himself  son-in  law  of  the  Great  King  as  well  as  despot 
of  Hellas.  Fortunately  for  Greece,  his  treasonahle  plans  were  neither 
deliberately  laid,  nor  veiled  until  ripe  for  execution,  but  manifested 
with  childish  impatience.  He  clothed  himself  in  Persian  attire  (a 
proceeding  which  the  Macedonian  armj7,  a  century  and  a  half  after- 
ward, could  not  tolerate  even  in  Alexander  the  Great) — he  traversed 
Thrace  with  a  body  of  Median  and  Egyptian  guards — he  copied  the 
Persian  chiefs  both  in  the  luxury  of  Ids  table  and  in  his  conduct 
toward  the  free  women  of  Byzantium.  Kleonike,  a  Byzantine  maiden 
of  conspicuous  family,  having  been  ravished  from  her  parents  by  his 
order,  was  brought  to  his  chamber  at  night:  he  happened  to  be  asleep, 
and  being  suddenly  awakened,  knew  not  at  first  who  was  the  person 
approaching  his  bed,  but  seized  his  sword  and  slew  her.  Moreover 
his  haughty  reserve,  with  uncontrolled  bursts  of  wrath,  rendered  him 
unapproachable;  and  the  allies  at  length  came  to  regard  him  as  a 
despot  rather  than  a  general.  The  news  of  such  outrageous  behavior, 
and  the  manifest  evidences  of  his  alliance  with  the  Persians,  were 
soon  transmitted  to  the  Spartans,  wdio  recalled  him  to  answer  for  his 
conduct,  and  seemingly  the  Spartan  vessels  along  with  him. 

In  spite  of  the  flagrant  conduct  of  Pausanias,  the  Lacedaemonians 
acquitted  him  on  the  allegations  of  positive  and  individual  wrong; 
yet  mistrusting  his  conduct  in  reference  to  collusion  with  the  enemy, 
they  sent  out  Dorkis  to  supersede  him  as  commander.  But  a  revolu 
tion,  of  immense  importance  for  Greece,  had  taken  place  in  the  minds 
of  the  allies.  The  headship,  or  hegemony,  was  iu  the  hands  of 
Athens,  and  Dorkis  the  Spartan,  found  the  allies  not  disposed  to 
recognize  his  authority. 

Even  before  the  battle  of  Salamis,  the  question  had  been  raised, 
whether  Athens  was  not  entitled  to  the  command  at  sea,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  preponderance  of  her  naval  contingent.  The  repug- 
nance of  the  allies  to  any  command  except  that  of  Sparta,  either  on 
land  or  water,  had  induced  the  Athenians  to  waive  their  pretensions 
at  that  critical  moment.  But  the  subsequent  victories  had  materially 
exalted  the  latter  iu  the  eyes  of  Greece;  while  the  armament  now 
serving,  differently  composed  from  that  which  had  fought  at  Salamis, 
contained  a  large  proportion  of  the  newdy-enfranchised  Ionic  Greeks, 
who  not  only  had  no  preference  for  Spartan  command,  but  were 
attached  to  the  Athenians  on  every  ground — as  well  from  kindred 
race,  as  from  the  certainty  that  Athens  with  her  superior  fleet  wTas 
the  only  protector  upon  whom  they  could  rely  against  the  Persians. 
Moreover,  it  happened  that  the  Athenian  generals  on  this  expedition. 
Aristeides  and  Kimon,  were  personally  just  and  conciliating,  forming 


376    GRECIAN  AFFAIRS  AFTER  PERSIAN  INVASION. 

a  striking  contrast  with  Pausanias.  Hence  the  Ionic  Greeks  in  the 
fleet,  when  they  found  thai  the  behavior  of  the  latter  was  not  only 
oppressive  toward  themselves  but  also  revolting  to  Grecian  sentiment 
generally — addressed  themselves  to  the  Athenian  commanders  for 
protection  ami  redress,  on  the  plausible  ground  of  kindred  race; 
entreating  to  be  allowed  to  serve  under  Athens,  as  leader  instead  of 
Sparta. 

Plutarch  tells  us  that  Aristeides  not  only  tried  to  remonstrate  with 
Pausanias,  who  repelled  him  with  arrogance — which  is  exceedingly 
probahle — but  that  he  also  required,  as  a  condition  of  his  compliance 
with  the  Ionic  allies,  that  they  should  personally  insult  Pausanias,  so 
as  to  make  reconciliation  impracticable:  upon  which  a  Samian  and  a 
Chian  captain  deliberately  attacked  and  damaged  the  Spartan  admiral- 
ship  in  the  harbor  of  Byzantium.  The  historians  from  whom  Plu- 
tarch copied  this  latter  statement  must  have  presumed  in  the  Athenians 
a  disposition  to  provoke  that  quarrel  with  Sparta  which  afterwards 
sprung  up  as  it  were  spontaneously;  but  the  Athenians  had  no  inter- 
est in  doing  so,  nor  can  we  credit  the  story — which  is  moreover 
unnoticed  by  Thucydides.  To  give  the  Spartans  a  just  ground  of 
indignation,  would  have  been  glaring  imprudence  on  the  part  of 
Aristeides.  Yet  having  every  motive  to  entertain  the  request  of  the 
allies,  he  began  to  take  his  measures  for  acting  as  their  protector  and 
chief.  And  his  proceedings  were  much  facilitated  by  the  circum- 
stance that  the  Spartan  government  about  this  time  recalled  Pausanias 
to  undergo  an  examination,  in  consequence  of  the  universal  com- 
plaints against  him  which  had  reached  them.  He  seems  to  have  left 
no  Spartan  authority  behind  him — even  the  small  Spartan  squadron 
accompanied  him  home:  so  that  the  Athenian  generals  had  the  best 
opportunity  for  insuring  to  themselves  and  exercising  that  command 
which  the  allies  besought  them  to  undertake.  So  effectually  did 
they  improve  the  moment,  that  when  Dorkis  arrived  to  replace  Pau- 
sanias, they  were  already  in  full  supremacy;  while  Dorkis,  having 
only  a  small  force  and  being  in  no  condition  to  employ  constraint, 
found  himself  obliged  to  return  home. 

This  incident,  though  not  a  declaration  of  war  against  Sparta,  was 
the  first  open  renunciation  of  her  authority  as  presiding  state  among 
the  Greeks;  the  first  avowed  manifestation  of  a  competitor  for  that 
dignity,  with  numerous  and  willing  followers;  the  first  separation 
of  Greece  (considered  in  herself  alone  and  apart  from  foreign  solici 
tations  such  as  the  Persian  invasion)  into  two  distinct  organized 
camps,  each  with  collective  interests  and  projects  of  its  own.  In 
spite  of  mortified  pride,  Sparta  was  constrained,  and  even  in  some 
points  of  view  not  indisposed,  to  patient  acquiescence.  She  had  no 
means  of  forcing  the  dispositions  of  the  Ionic  allies,  while  the  war 
with  Persia  altogether — having  now  become  no  longer  strictly  defen- 
sive, and  being  withal  maritime  as  well  as  distant  from  her  own  ter- 
ritory— had  ceased  to   be  in  harmony  with  her  home-routine  and 


LEOTYCHIDES.  377 

strict  discipline.  Her  grave  senators,  especially  an  ancient  Herakleid 
named  Hetcemaridas,  reproved  the  impatience  of  the  younger  citi- 
zens, and  discountenanced  the  idea  of  permanent  maritime  command 
as  a  dangerous  innovation.  They  even  treated  it  as  an  advantage, 
that  Athens  should  take  the  lead  in  carrying  on  the  Persian  war, 
since  it  could  not  he  altogether  dropped;  nor  had  the  Athenians  as 
yet  manifested  any  sentiments  positively  hostile  to  excite  their  alarm. 
Nay,  the  Spartans  actually  took  credit  in  the  eyes  of  Athens,  about 
a  century  afterward,  for  having  themselves  advised  this  separation  of 
command  at  sea  from  command  on  land.  Moreover,  if  the  war 
continued  under  Spartan  guidance,  there  would  be  a  continued 
necessity  for  sending  out  their  kings  or  chief  men  to  command,  and 
the  example  of  Pausauias  showed  them  the  depraving  effect  of  such 
military  power,  remote  as  well  as  unchecked. 

The  example  of  their  king  Leotychides,  too,  near  about  this  time, 
was  a  second  illustration  of  the  same  tendency.  At  the  same  time, 
apparently,  that  Pausanias  embarked  for  Asia  to  carry  on  the  war 
agaiust  the  Persians,  Leotychides  was  sent  with  an  army  into  Thes- 
saly  to  put  down  the  Aleuadce  and  those  Thessaliau  parties  who  had 
sided  with  Xerxes  and  Mardonius.  Successful  in  this  expedition, 
he  suffered  himself  to  be  bribed,  and  was  even  detected  with  a  large 
sum  of  money  actually  on  his  person;  in  consequence  of  which  the 
Lacedaemonians  condemned  him  to  banishment  and  razed  his  house 
to  the  ground.  He  died  afterward  in  exile  at  Tegea.  Two  such 
instances  were  well  calculated  to  make  the  Lacedaemonians  distrust 
the  conduct  of  their  Herakleid  leaders  when  on  foreign  service,  and 
this  feeling  weighed  much  in  inducing  them  to  abandon  the  Asiatic 
headship  in  favor  of  Athens.  It  appears  that  their  Peloponnesian 
allies  retired  from  this  contest  at  the  same  time  as  they  did,  so  that 
the  prosecution  of  the  war  was  thus  left  to  Athens  as  chief  of  the 
newly-emancipated  Greeks. 

It  was  from  these  considerations  that  the  Spartans  were  induced  to 
submit  to  that  loss  of  command  which  the  misconduct  of  Pausanias 
had  brought  upon  them.  Their  acquiescence  facilitated  the  immense 
change  about  to  take  place  in  Grecian  politics. 

According  to  the  tendencies  in  progress  prior  to  the  Persian  inva- 
sion, Sparta  had  become  gradually  more  and  more  the  president  of 
something  like  a  Pan-hellenic  union,  comprising  the  greater  part  of 
the  Grecian  states.  Such  at  least  was  the  point  toward  which  things 
seemed  to  be  tending;  and  if  many  separate  states  stood  aloof  from 
this  union,  none  of  them  at  least  sought  to  form  any  counter-union, 
if  we  except  the  obsolete  and  important  prehensions  of  Argos. 

The  preceding  volumes  of  this  history  have  shown  that  Sparta  had 
risen  to  such  ascendancy,  not  from  her  superior  competence  on  the 
umntiii'ement  of  collective  interests,  nor  even,  in  the  main,  from 
ambitious  efforts  on  her  own  part  to  acquire  it — but  from  the  con- 
verging tendencies  of  Grecian  feeling  which  required  some  such 


378    GRECIAN  AFFAIRS  AFTER  PERSIAN  INVASION. 

presiding  state — and  from  the  commanding  military  power,  rigid 
discipline,  and  ancient  undisturbed  constitution,  which  attracted  that 
feeling  toward  Sparta.  The  necessities  of  common  defense  against 
Persia  greatly  strengthened  these  tendencies;  and  the  success  of  the 
defense,  whereby  so  many  Greeks  were  emancipated  who  required 
protection  against  their  former  master,  seemed  destined  to  have  the 
like  effecl  still  more.  For  an  instant,  alter  the  battles  of  Plataes  i  nd 
Mykale — when  the  town  of  Plata'  was  set  apart  as  a  consecrated 
neutral  spot  for  an  armed  confederacy  against  the  Persian,  with 
periodical  solemnities  and  meetings  of  deputies — Sparta  was  exalted 
to  be  the  chief  of  a f ull  Pan-hellenic  union,  Athens  being  only  one 
of  the  principal  members.  And  had  Sparta  been  capable  either  of 
comprehensive  policy,  of  self-directed  and  persevering  efforts,  or  of 
the  requisite  flexibility  of  dealing,  embracing  distant  Greeks  as  well 
as  near — her  position  was  now  such,  that  her  own  ascendency, 
together  with  undivided  Pan-hellenic  union,  might  long  have  been 
maintained.  But  she  was  lamentably  deficient  in  all  the  requisite 
qualities,  and  the  larger  the  union  became,  the  more  her  deficiency 
stood  manifest.  On  the  other  hand,  Athens,  now  entering  into 
rivalry  as  a  sort  of  leader  of  opposition,  possessed  all  those  qualities 
in  a  remarkable  degree,  over  and  above  that  actual  maritime  force 
which  was  the  want  of  the  day;  so  that  the  opening  made  by  Spartan 
incompetence  and  crime  (so  far  as  Pausanias  was  concerned)  found 
her  in  every  respect  prepared. 

But  the  sympathies  of  the  Peloponnesians  still  clung  to  Sparta, 
while  those  of  the  Ionian  Gre<  ks  had  turned  to  Athens:  and  thus  not 
only  the  short  lived  symptoms  of  an  established  Pan-hellenic  union, 
but  even  all  tendencies  toward  it,  from  this  time  disappear.  There 
now  stands  out  a  manifest  schism,  with  two  pronounced  parties, 
toward  one  of  which  nearly  all  the  constituent  atoms  of  the  Grecian 
world  gravitate:  the  marititime  states,  newly  enfranchised  from  Per- 
sia, toward  Athens — the  land-states,  which  had  formed  most  part  of 
the  confederate  army  at  Plataea,  toward  Sparta.  Along  with  this 
national  schism,  and  called  into  action  by  it,  appears  the  internal  politi- 
cal schism  in  each  separate  city  between  oligarchy  and  democracy. 
Of  course  the  germ  of  these  parties  had  already  previously  existed  in 
the  separate  states.  But  the  energetic  democracy  of  Athens,  and  the 
pronounced  tendency  of  Syarta  to  rest  upon  the  native  oligarchies 
in  each  separate  city  as  her  chief  support,  now  began  to  bestow,  on 
the  conflict  of  the  internal  political  parties,  an  Hellenic  importance, 
and  an  aggravated 'bitterness,  which  had  never  before  belonged  to  it. 

The  departure  of  the  Spartan  Dorkis  left  the  Athenian  generals  at 
liberty;  and  their  situation  imposed  upon  them  the  duty  of  organizing 
the  new  confederacy  which  they  had  been  chosen  to  conduct.  The 
Ionic  allies  at  this  time  were  not  merely  willing  and  unanimous,  but 
acted  as  the  forward  movers  in  the  enterprise;  for  they  stood  in 
obvious  need  of  protection  against  the  attacks  of  Persia,  and  had  no 


ASSESSMENT   OF   THE  CONFEDERACY.  379 

farther  kindness  to  expect  from  Sparta  or  the  Peloponnesians. 
But  even  had  they  been  less  under  the  pressure  of  necessity,  the  con- 
duct of  Athens,  and  of  Aristeides  as  the  representative  of  Athene, 
might  have  sufficed  to  bring  them  into  harmonious  co-operation. 
The  new  leader  was  no  less  equitable  towards  the  confederates  than 
energetic  against  the  common  enemy.  The  general  conditions  of  the 
confederacy  were  regulated  in  a  common  synod  of  the  members, 
appointed  to  meet  periodically  for  deliberative  purposes,  in  the 
temple  of  Apollo  and  Artemis  at  Delos — of  old  the  venerated  spot  for 
the  religious  festivals  of  the  Ionic  cities,  and  at  the  same  time  a  con- 
venient center  for  the  members.  A  definite  obligation,  either  in 
equipped  ships  of  war  or  in  money,  was  imposed  upon  every  separate 
city,  and  the  Athenians,  as  leaders,  determined  in  which  form  contri- 
bution should  be  made  by  each.  Their  assessment  must  of  course 
have  been  reviewed  by  the  synod.  They  had  no  power  at  this  time 
to  enforce  any  regulation  not  approved  by  that  body. 

It  had  been  the  good  fortune  of  Athens  to  profit  by  the  genius  of 
Themistokles  on  two  recent  critical  occasions  (the  battle  of  Salamis 
and  the  rebuilding  of  her  walls),  where  sagacity,  craft,  and  decision 
were  required  in  extraordinary  measure,  and  where  pecuniary  probity 
was  of  less  necessity.  It  was  no  less  her  good  fortune  now — in  the 
delicate  business  of  assessing  a  new  tax  and  determining  how  much 
each  state  should  bear,  when  unimpeachable  honesty  in  the  assessor 
was  the  first  of  all  qualties — not  to  have  Themistokles;  but  to  employ 
in  his  stead  the  well-known,  we  might  almost  say  the  ostentatious, 
probity  of  Aristeides.  This  must  be  accounted  good  fortune,  since 
at  the  moment  when  Aristeides  was  sent  out,  the  Athenians  could  not 
have  anticipated  th  it  any  such  duty  would  devolve  upon  him.  His 
assessment  not  only  found  favor  at  the  time  of  its  original  proposition, 
when  it  must  have  been  freely  canvassed  by  the  assembled  allies — 
but  also  maintained  its  place  in  general  esteem,  as  equitable  and 
moderate,  after  the  once  responsible  headship  of  Athens  had  degen- 
erated into  an  unpopular  empire. 

Respecting  this  first  assessment  we  scarcely  know  more  than  one 
single  fact— the  aggregate  in  money  was  460  talents  (=about  £106,000, 
sterling).  Of  the  items  composing  such  aggregate — of  the  individual 
cities  which  paid  it — of  the  distribution  of  obligations  to  furnish 
ships  and  to  furnish  money — we  are  entirely  ignorant.  The  little 
information  which  we  possess  on  these  points  relates  to  a  period  con- 
siderably later,  shortly  before  the  Peloponnesian  war,  under  the  un- 
controlled empire  then  exercised  by  Athens.  Thucydides  in  his  brief 
sketch  makes  us  clearly  understand  the  difference  between  presiding 
Athens  with  her  autonomous  and  regularly  assembled  allies  in  476 
B.C.,  and  imperial  Athens  with  her  subject  allies  in  432  B.C.  The 
Greek  word  equivalent  to  ally  left  either  of  these  epithets  to  be 
understood,  by  an  ambiguity  exceedingly  convenient  to  the  powerful 
states.     From  the  same  author,  too,  we' learn  the  general  cause*  of 


380    GRECIAN  AFFAIRS  AFTER  PERSIAN  INVASION. 

the  change:  but  he  gives  us  few  particulars  as  to  the  modifying 
circumstances,  and  none  at  all  as  to  the  first  start.  He  tells  us  only 
that  the  Athenians  appointed  a  peculiar  board  of  officers  called  the 
Hellenotamise,  to  receive  and  administer  the  common  fund — that 
Delos  was  constituted  the  general  treasury,  where  the  money  was  to 

be  kept — and  that  the  payment  thus  Levied  was  called  the  jJiorus;  a. 

name  which  appears  then   to  have  been  first  put  into  circulation, 

though  afterward  usual — and  to  have  conveyed  at  first  no  degrading 
import,  though  it  afterward  became  so  odious  as  to  be  exchanged 
for  a  more  innocent  synonym. 

Endeavoring  as  well  as  we  can  to  conceive  the  Athenian  alliance 
in  its  infancy,  we  are  first  struck  with  the  magnitude  of  the  total  sum 
contributed,  which  will  appear  the  more  remarkable  when  we  reflect 
that  many  of  the  contributing  cities  furnished  ships  besides.  We 
may  be  certain  that  all  which  was  done  a',  first  was  done  by  general 
consent,  and  by  a  freely  determining  majority.  For  Athens,  at  the 
time  when  the  Ionic  allies  bfiSOUghl  her  protection  againsl  arrogance, 
could  have  had  no  power  of  constraining  panics,  especially  when 
the  loss  of  supremacy,  though  quietly  borne,  was  yet  fresh  and  rank- 
ling among  the  countrymen  of  Pausanias.  So  large  a  total  implies, 
from  the  very  first,  a  great  number  of  contributing  states,  and  we 
learn  from  hence  to  appreciate  the  powerful,  wide  spread,  and  volun- 
tary movement  which  then  brought  together  the  maritime  and  insu- 
lar Greeks  distributed  throughout  the  zEgean  sea  and  the  Hellespont. 

The  Phoenician  fleet,  and  the  Persian  land-force,  mighl  at  any  mo- 
ment re-appear,  and  there  was  no  hope  of  resisting  either  except  by 
confederacy:  so  that  confederacy  under  such  circumstances  became 
with  these  exposed  Greeks  not  merely  a  genuine  feeling,  but  at  that 
time  the  first  of  all  their  feelings.  It  was  their  common  fear,  rather 
than  Athenian  ambition,  which  gave  birth  to  the  alliance;  and  they 
were  grateful  to  Athens  for  organizing  it.  The  public  import  of  the 
name  Hellenotamise,  coined  for  the  occasion — the  selection  of  Delos 
as  a  center — and  the  provision  for  regular  meetings  of  the  members 
—demonstrate  the  patriotic  and  fraternal  purpose  which  the  league 
was  destined  to  serve.  In  truth  the  protection  of  the  ^Egean  sea 
against  foreign  maritime  force  and  lawless  piracy,  as  well  as  that  of 
the  Hellespont  and  Bosphorus  against  the  transit  of  a  Persian  force, 
was  a  purpose  essentially  public,  for  which  all  the  parties  interested 
were  bound  inequity  to  provide  by  way  of  common  contribution. 
Any  island  or  sea-port  which  might  refrain  from  contributing  was  a 
gainer  at  the  cost  of  others.  The  general  feeling  of  this  common 
clanger,  as  well  as  equitable  obligation,  at  a  moment  when  the  fear  of 
Persia  was  yet  serious,  was  the  real  cause  which  brought  together  so 
many  contributing  members,  and  enabled  the  forward  parties  to 
shame  into  concurrence  such  as  were  more  backward.  How  the  con- 
federacy came  to  be  turned  afterwards  to  the  purposes  of  Athenian 
ambition,  we  shall  see  at  the  proper  time:  but  in  its  origin  it  was  an 


CONFEDERACY  OF  DELOS.  381 

equal  alliance,  in  so  far  as  alliance  between  the  strong  and  the  weal: 
can  ever  be  equal — not  an  Athenian  empire.  Nay,  it  was  an  alliance 
in  which  every  individual  member  was  more  exposed,  more  defense- 
leas,  and  more  essentially  benefited  in  the  way  of  protection  than 
Athens.  We  have  here  in  truth  one  of  the  few  moments  in  Grecian 
history  wherein  a  purpose  at  once  common,  equal,  useful,  and  inno- 
cent brought  together  spontaneously  many  fragments  of  this  disunited 
race,  and  overlaid  for  a  time  that  exclusive  bent  towards  petty  and 
isolated  autonomy  which  ultimately  made  slaves  of  them  all.  It 
was  a  proceeding  equitable  and  prudent,  in  principle  as  well  as  in 
detail:  promising  at  the  time  the  most  beneficent  consequences — not 
merely  protection  against  the  Persians,  but  a  standing  police  of  the 
.<E°;ean  sea,  regulated  by  a  common  superintending  authority.  And 
if  such  promise  was  not  realized,  we  shall  find  that  the  inherent 
defects  of  the  allies,  indisposing  them  to  the  hearty  appreciation  and 
steady  performance  of  their  duties  as  equal  confederates,  are  at  least 
as  much  chargeable  with  the  failure  as  the  ambition  of  Athens.  We 
may  add,  that  in  selecting  Delos  as  a  center,  the  Ionic  allies  were  con- 
ciliated by  a  renovation  of  the  solemnities  which  their  fathers,  in  the 
days  of  former  freedom,  had  crowded  to  witness  in  that  sacred 
island. 

At  the  time  when  this  alliance  was  formed,  the  Persians  still  held 
not  only  the  important  posts  of  Eiou  on  the  Strymon  and  Doriskus 
in  Thrace,  but  also  several  other  posts  in  that  country  which  are  not 
specified  to  us.  We  may  thus  understand  why  the  Greek  cities  on 
and  near  the  Chalkidic  peninsula — Argilus,  Stageirus,  Akanthus, 
Skolus,  Olynthus,  etc. — which  we  know  to  have  joined  under  the  first 
assessment  of  Aristeides,  were  not  less  anxious  to  seek  protection  in 
the  bosom  of  the  new  confederacy,  than  the  Dorian  islands  of  Rhodes 
and  Kos,  the  Ionic  islands  of  Samos  and  Chios,  the  iEolic  Lesbos  and 
Tenedos,  or  continental  towns  such  as  Miletus  and  Byzantium:  by  all 
of  whom  adhesion  to  this  alliance  must  have  been  contemplated,  in 
477  or476  B.C.,  as  the  sole  condition  of  emancipation  from  Persia. 
Nothing  more  was  required,  for  the  success  of  a  foreign  enemy 
against  Greece  generally,  than  complete  autonomy  of  every  Grecian 
city,  small  as  well  as  great — such  as  the  Persian  monarch  prescribed 
and  tried  to  enforce  ninety  years  afterwards,  through  the  Lacedemo- 
nian Antalkidas,  in  the  pacification  which  bears  the  name  of  the  lat- 
ter. Some  sort  of  union,  organized  and  obligatory  upon  each  city, 
was  indispensable  to  the  safety  of  all.  Indeed,  even  with  that  aid,  at 
the  time  when  the  confederacy  of  Delos  was  first  formed,  it  was  by 
no  means  certain  the  Asiatic  enemy  would  be  effectually  kept  out; 
especially  as  the  Persians  were  strong  not  merely  from  their  own 
force,  but  also  from  the  aid  of  internal  parties  in  many  of  the  Grecian 
states — traitors  within,  as  well  as  exiles  without. 

Among  these  traitors,  the  first  in  rank  as  well  as  the  most  formida- 
ble, was  "the  Spartan  Pausanias.     Summoned  home  from  Byzantium 


;}S2    GRECIAN  AFFAIRS  AFTER  PERSIAN  INVASION. 

to  Sparta,  in  order  that  the  loud  complaints  against  him  might  be 
examined,  he  had  been  acquitted  of  the  charges  of  wrong  and  oppres- 
sion against  individuals.  Yet  the  presumptions  of  medisin  (or  treach- 
erous correspondence  with  the  Persians)  appeared  so  strong,  that, 
though  not  found  guilty,  he  was  still  nol  re-appointed  to  the  command. 
Such  treatment  s<  ems  to  have  only  emboldened  him  in  the  prosecu- 
tion of  liis  eloigns  against  Greece;  for  which  purpose  he  came  out  to 
Byzantium  in  a  trireme  belonging  to  Hermione,  under  pretense  of  aid- 
ing as  a  volunteer  without  any  formal  authority  in  the  war.  He  there 
resumed  his  negotiations  with  Artabazus.  His  great  station  and 
celebrity  still  gave  him  80  strong  a  hold  on  men's  opinions,  that  he 
appears  to  bave  established  a  sort  ofmasteiy  in  Byzantium,  from' 
whence  the  Athenians,  already  recognized  heads  of  the  confederacy, 
were  constrained  to  expel  him  by  force.  And  we  may  be  sure  that 
the  terror  excited  by  his  presence,  as  well  as  by  his  known  designs, 
tended  materially  to  accelerate  the  organization  of  the  confederacy 
under  Athens.  lie  then  retired  to  Kolonse  in  the  Troad,  where  he 
continued  for  some  time  in  the  farther  prosecution  of  his  schemes, 
trying  to  form  a  Persian  party,  despatching  emissaries  to  distribute 
Persian  gold  among  various  cities  of  Greece,  and  probably  employing 
the  name  of  Sparta  to  impede  the  formation  of  the  new  confederacy: 
until  at  length  the  Spartan  authorities,  apprised  of  his  proceedings, 
sent  a  herald  out  to  him  witli  peremptory  orders  that  he  should  come 
home  immediately  along  with  the  herald:  if  he  disobeyed,  "the  Spar- 
tans would  declare  war  against  him,"  or  constitute  him  a  public 
enemy. 

As  the  execution  of  this  threat  would  have  frustrated  all  the  ulte- 
rior schemes  of  Pausanias,  he  thought  it  prudent  to  obey;  t lie  rather, 
as  he  felt  entire  confidence  of  escaping  all  the  charges  against  him 
at  Sparta  by  the  employment  of  bribes,  the  means  for  which  were 
doubtless  abundantly  furnished  to  him  through  Artabazus.  lie 
accordingly  returned  along  with  the  herald,  and  was,  in  the  first 
moments  of  indignation,  imprisoned  by  order  of  the  Ephors — who, 
it  seems,  were  legally  competent  to  imprison  him,  even  had  he  been 
king  instead  of  regent.  But  he  was  soon  let  out,  on  his  own  requisi- 
tion and  under  a  private  arrangement  with  friends  and  partisans,  to 
take  his  trial  against  all  accusers.  Even  to  stand  forth  as  accuser 
against  so  powerful  a  man  was  a  serious  peril:  to  undertake  the  proof 
of  specific  matter  of  treason  against  him  was  yet  more  serious:  noi 
does  it  appear  that  any  Spartan  ventured  to  do  either.  It  was  known 
that  nothing  short  of  the  most  manifest  and  invincible  proof  would 
be  held  to  justify  his  condemnation,  and  amidst  a  long  chain  of  acts 
carrying  conviction  when  taken  in  the  aggregate,  there  was  no  single 
treason  sufficiently'  demonstrable  for  the  purpose.  Accordingly 
Pausanias  remained  not  only  at  large  but  unaccused,  still  audaciously 
persisting  both  in  his  intrigues  at  home  and  his  correspondence 
abroad  with  Artabazus.     He  ventured  to  assail  the  unshielded  *ide 


PAUSANIAS  DETECTED  BY  A  SLAVE.     383 

of  Sparta  by  opening  negotiations  with  the  Helots,  and  instigating 
theui  to  revolt;  promising  thera  both  liberation  and  admission  to 
political  privilege;  with  a  view,  first  to  destroy  the  board  of  Ephors 
and  render  himself  despot  in  his  own  country — next,  to  acquire 
through  Persian  help  the  supremacy  of  Greece.  Some  of  those 
Helots  to  whom  he  addressed  himself  revealed  the  ploi;  to  the  Ephors, 
who  nevertheless,  in  spite  of  such  grave  peril,  did  not  choose  to  take 
measures  against  Pausanias  upon  no  better  information — so  imposing 
was  still  his  name  and  position.  But  though  some  few  Helots  might 
inform,  probably  many  others  both  gladly  heard  the  proposition  and 
faithfully  kept  the  secret:  we  shall  find,  by  what  happened  a  few 
years  afterward,  that  there  were  a  large  number  of  them  who  had 
their  spears  in  readiness  for  revolt.  Suspected  as  Pausanias  was,  j-et 
by  the  fears  of  some  and  the  connivance  of  others,  he  was  allowed  to 
bring  his  plans  to  the  very  brink  of  consummation;  and  his  last 
letters  to  Artabazus,  intimating  that  he  was  ready  for  action,  and 
bespeaking  immediate  performance  of  the  engagements  concerted 
between  them,  were  actually  in  the  hands  of  the  messenger.  Sparta 
was  saved  from  an  outbreak  of  the  most  formidable  kind,  not  by 
the  prudence  of  her  authorities,  but  by  a  mere  accident — or  rather  by 
the  fact  that  Pausanias  was  not  only  a  traitor  to  his  country,  but  also 
base  and  cruel  in  his  private  relations. 

The  messenger  to  whom  these  last  letters  were  intrusted  was  a 
native  of  Argilus  in  Thrace,  a  favorite  and  faithful  slave  of  Pausa- 
nias; once  connected  with  him  by  that  intimate  relation  which  Grecian 
manners  tolerated — and  admitted  even  to  the  full  confidence  of  his 
treasonable  projects.  It  was  by  no  means  the  intention  of  this 
Argilian  to  betray  his  master.  But  on  receiving  the  letter  to  carry, 
he  recollected  with  some  uneasiness  that  none  of  the  previous  mes- 
sengers had  ever  come  back.  Accordingly  he  broke  the  seal  and 
read  it,  with  the  full  view  of  carrying  it  forward  to  its  destination  if 
he  found  nothing  inconsistent  with  his  own  personal  safety:  he  had 
farther  taken  the  precaution  to  counterfeit  his  master's  seal,  so  that 
he  could  easily  reclose  the  letter.  On  reading  it,  he  found  his  suspi- 
cions confirmed  by  an  express  injunction  that  the  bearer  was  to  be 
put  to  death — a  discovery  wdiich  left  him  no  alternative  except  to 
deliver  it  to  the  Ephors.  But  those  magistrates,  who  had  before 
disbelieved  the  Helot  informers,  still  refused  to  believe  even  the 
confidential  slave  with  his  master's  autograph  and  seal,  and  with  the 
full  account  besides,  which  doubtless  he  wTould  communicate  at  the 
same  time,  of  all  that  had  previously  passed  in  the  Persian  corre- 
spondence, not  omitting  copies  of  those  letters  between  Pausanias 
and  Xerxes  which  I  have  alreadj^  cited  from  Thucydides — for  in  no 
other  way  can  they  have  become  public.  Partly  from  the  suspicion 
which  in  antiquity  always  attached  to  the  testimony  of  slaves,  except 
when  it  was  obtained  under  the  pretended  guarantee  of  torture — 
partly  from  the  peril  of  dealing  with  so  exalted  a  criminal — the 


384    GRECIAN  AFFAIRS  AFTER  PERSIAN  INVASION. 

Ephors  would  not  be  satisfied  with  any  evidence  less  than  his  own 
Bpeecb  and  their  own  ears.  They  directed  the  Argilian  slave  to  plant 
himself  as  a  Buppliant  in  the  sacred  precincl  of  Poseidon,  near  Cape 
Tsenarus,  under  the  shelter  of  a  double  tent  or  but,  behind  which 
two  of  them  concealed  themselves.  Apprised  of  this  unexpected 
mark  of  alarm,  Pausanias  hastened  to  the  temple,  and  demanded  the 
reason:  upon  which  the  slave  disclosed  his  knowledge  of  the  contents 
of  the  letter,  and  complained  bitterly  that  alter  long  and  faithful 
service,  with  a  secrecy  never  once  betrayed,  throughout  this  danger- 
ous correspondence,— he  was  at  length  rewarded  with  nothing  better 
than  the  same  miserable  fate  which  had  befallen  the  previous  mes- 
sengers. Pausanias,  admitting  all  these  facts,  tried  to  appease  the 
slave's  disquietude,  ami  gave  him  a  solemn  assurance  of  safety  if  he 
would  quit  the  sanctuary ;  urging  him  at  the  same  time  to  proceed  on 
the  journey  forthwith,  in  order  that  the  schemes  in  progress  might 
not  be  retarded. 

All  this  passed  within  the  hearing  of  the  concealed  Ephors;  who 
at  length,  thoroughly  satisfied,  determined  to  arrest  Pausanias  imme- 
diately on  his  return  to  Sparta.  They  met  him  in  the  public  street 
not  far  from  the  temple  of  Athene  Chalkicekus  (or  of  the  Brazen 
House).  But  as  they  came  near,  either  their  menacing  looks,  or  a 
significant  nod  from  one  of  them,  revealed  to  this  guilty  man  their 
purpose.  He  fled  for  refuge  to  the  temple,  which  was  so  near  that 
he  reached  it  before  they  could  overtake  him.  He  planted  himself 
as  a  suppliant,  far  more  hopeless  than  the  Argilian  slave  whom  he 
had  so  recently  talked  over  at  Taenarus,  in  a  narrow  roofed  chamber 
belonging  to  the  sacred  building;  where  the  Ephors,  not  warranted 
in  torching  him,  took  off  the  roof,  built  up  the  doors,  and  kept  watch 
until  he  was  on  the  point  of  death  by  starvation.  According  to  a 
current  story — not  recognized  by  Thucydides,  yet  consistent  with 
Spartan  manners — his  own  mother  was  the  person  who  placed  the 
first  stor.e  to  build  up  the  door,  in  deep  abhorrence  of  his  treason. 
His  last  moments  being  carefully  observed,  he  was  brought  away  just 
in  time  to  expire  without,  and  thus  to  avoid  the  desecration  of  the 
temple.  The  first  impulse  of  the  Ephors  was  to  cast  his  body  into 
the  ravine  or  hollow  called  the  Kseadas,  the  usual  place  of  punishment 
for  criminals;  probably  his  powerful  friends  averted  this  disgrace, 
and  he  was  buried  not  far  off,  until  some  time  afterward,  under  the 
mandate  of  the  Delphian  oracle,  his  body  was  exhumed  and  trans- 
ported to  the  exact  spot  where  he  had  died.  However,  the  oracle, 
not  satisfied  even  with  this  reinterment,  pronounced  the  whole  pro- 
ceeding to  be  a  profanation  of  the  sanctity  of  Athene,  enjoining  that 
two  bodies  should  be  presented  to  her  as  an  atonement  for  the  one 
carried  away.  In  the  very  early  days  of  Greece — or  among  the 
Carthaginians,  even  at  this  period — such  an  injunction  would  prob- 
ably have  produced  the  slaughter  of  two  human  victims:  on  the 
present  occasion,  Athene,  or  Hikesius,  the  tutelary  god  of  suppliants, 


THEMISTOKLES  COMPROMISED  385 

was  supposed  to  be  satisfied  by  two  brazen  statues;  not  however 
without  some  attempts  to  make  out  that  the  expiation  was  inade- 
quate. 

Tims  perished  a  Greek  who  reached  the  pinnacle  of  renown  simply 
from  the  accidents  of  his  lofty  descent  and  of  his  being  general  at 
Piatrea,  where  it  does  not  appear  that  he  displayed  any  superior 
qualities.  His  treasonable  projects  implicated  and  brought  to  dis 
grace  a  man  far  greater  than  himself — the  Athenian  Themistokles. 

The  chronology  of  this  important  period  is  not  so  fully  known  as  to 
enable  us  to  make  out  the  precise  dates  of  particular  events.  But  we 
are  obliged  (in  consequence  of  the  subsequent  incidents  connected 
with  Themistokles,  whose  flight  to  Persia  is  tolerably  well  marked 
as  to  date)  to  admit  an  interval  of  about  nine  years  between  the 
retirement  of  Pausanias  from  his  command  at  Byzantium,  and  his 
death.  To  suppose  so  long  an  interval  engaged  in  treasonable  cor- 
respondence, is  perplexing;  and  we  can  only  explain  it  to  ourselves 
very  imperfectly  by  considering  that  the  Spartans  were  habitually 
alow  in  their  movements,  and  that  the  suspected  regent  may  perhaps 
have  communicated  with  partisans,  real  or  expected,  in  many  parts 
of  Greece.  Among  those  whom  he  sought  to  enlist  as  accomplices 
was  Themisrokles,  still  in  great  power — though,  as  it  would  seem,  in 
declining  power — at  Athens.  The  charge  of  collusion  with  the 
Persians  connects  itself  with  the  previous  movement  of  political 
parties  in  that  city. 

The  rivalry  of  Themistokles  and  Aristeides  had  been  greatly  ap- 
peased by  tho  invasion  of  Xerxes,  which  had  imposed  upon  both  the 
peremptory  necessity  of  co-operation  against  a  common  enemy.  And 
apparently  it  was  not  resumed  during  the  times  which  immediately 
succeeded  the  return  of  the  Athenians  to  their  country:  at  least  we 
hear  of  both,  m  effective  service  and  in  prominent  posts.  Themis- 
tokles stands  forward  as  the  contriver  of  the  city  walls  and  architect 
of  Peirams:  Aristeides  is  commander  of  the  fleet,  and  first  organizer 
of  the  confederacy  of  Delos.  Moreover  we  seem  to  detect  a  change 
in  the  character  of  the  latter.  He  had  ceased  to  be  the  champion  of 
Athenian  old-fashioned  landed  interest,  against  Themistokles  as  the 
originator  of  the  maritime  innovations.  Those  innovations  had 
now,  since  the  battle  of  Salamis,  become  an  established  fact;  a  fact 
of  overwhelming  influence  on  the  destinies  and  character,  public  as 
well  as  private,  of  the  Athenians.  During  the  expatriation  at  Sala- 
mis, every  man,  rich  or  poor,  landed  proprietor  or  artisan,  had  been 
for  the  time  a  seaman:  and  the  anecdote  of  Kimon,  who  dedicated 
the  bridle  of  his  horse  int'>e  acropolis  as  a  token  that  he  was  about 
to  pass  from  the  cavalry  to  service  on  shipboard,  is  a  type  of  that 
change  of  feeling  which  must  have  been  impressed  more  or  less  upon 
every  rich  man  in  Athens.  From  henceforward  the  fleet  is  endeared 
to  every  man  as  the  grand  force,  offensive  and  defensive,  of  the  state, 
in  which  character  all  the  political  leaders  agree  in  accepting  it.  We 
H.  G.   II.— 13 


380    GRECIAN  AFFAIRS  AFTEB  PERSIAN  INVASION. 

ought  to  add,  al  the  same  time,  thai  this  change  was  attended  with 
no  detrimenl  either  to  the  land  force  or  to  the  landed  cultivation  ot 
Attica,  I 'i  iih  of  which  will  be  found  to  acquire  extraordinary  dev<  lop- 
ii 'i  mi  during  the  interval  between  the  Persian  and  Peloponnesian 
wars.  Still  the  triremes,  and  tbe  men  who  manned  them,  taken  col- 
lectively, wen  now  the  determining  elemenl  in  the  state.  Moreover 
the  men  who  manned  them  bad  jusl  returned  from  Salamis,  fresh 
fri  mi  a  scene  ol  trial  and  danger,  and  from  a  harvest  of  victory, 
which  had  equalized  for  the  momenl  all  Athenians  as  sufferers,  as 
combatants,  and  as  patriots.  Such  predominance  of  the  maritime 
impulse  having  become  pronounced  immediately  after  the  return 
from  Salamis,  was  further  greatly  strengthened  by  the  construction 
and,  fortification  of  the  Peirseus— a  new  maritime  Athens  as  large  as 
tlic  old  inland  city — as  well  as  bj  the  unexpected  formation  ol  the 
confederacy  at  Delos,  with  all  its  untried  prospects  and  stimulating 
duties 

The  political  change  arising  from  hence  in  Athens  was  not  less 
important  than  the  military.  "The  maritime  multitude,  authors  of 
the  victory  of  Salamis,"  and  instrunu  nts  of  the  new  vocation  of 
Athens  as  head  of  the  Delian  confi  deracy,  appear  now  ascendant  in 
the  political  constitution  also;  not  in  any  way  as  a  separate  or  privi 
leged  class,  but  as  leavening  the  whole  mass,  strengthening  tbe 
democratical  sentiment,  and  protesting  againsl  all  recognized  politi- 
cal inequalities.  In  fact,  during  the  Btruggle  at  Salamis,  the  whole 
city  of  Athens  had  been  nothing  else  than  "a  maritime  multitude," 
among  which  the  proprietors  and  chief  men  had  been  confounded, 
until,  by  the  efforts  of  all,  the  common  country  had  been  recon- 
quered. Nor  was  it  likely  that  this  multitude,  altera  trying  period 
of  forced  equality,  during  which  political  privilege  had  been  effaced, 
would  patiently  acquiesce  in  the  full  restoration  of  such  privilege  at 
home.  We  see  by  the  active  political  sentiment  of  the  German  peo- 
ple, after  the  great  struggles  of  1813  and  1814,  how  much  an  ener- 
getic  and  successful  military  effort  of  the  people  at  large,  blended 
with  endurance  of  serious  hardship,  tends  to  stimulate  the  sense  of 
political  dignity  and  the  demand  for  developed  citizenship:  and  if 
this  be  the  tendency  even  among  a  people  habitually  passive  on  such 
subjects,  much  more  was  it  to  be  expected  in  tbe  Athenian  popula- 
tion, who  had  gone  through  a  previous  training  of  near  thirty  years 
under  the  democracy  of  Kleisthenes.  At  the  time  when  that  consti- 
tution was  first  established,  it  was  perhaps  the  most  democratical  in 
Greece.  It  had  worked  extremely  well,  and  had  diffused  among  the 
people  a  sentiment  favorable  to  equal  citizen-hip  and  unfriendly  to 
avowed  privilege:  so  thai  the  impressions  made  by  the  struggle  at 
Salamis  found  the  popular  mind  prepared  to  receive  them. 

Marly  after  the  return  to  Attica,  the  KleistheMcan  constitution  was 
enlarged  as  respects  eligibility  to  the  magistracy.  According  to  that 
constitution,  the  fourth  or  last  class  on  the  Solonian  census,  includ- 


INCREASE   OF  POWER  OF  THE  STRATEGI.      387 

ing  the  considerable  majority  of  the  freemen,  were  not  admissible  to 
offices  of  state,  though  they  possessed  votes  in  common  with  the  rest: 
no  person  was  eligible  to  be  a  magistrate  unless  he  belonged  to  one 
of  the  three  higher  classes.  This  restriction  was  now  annulled,  and 
eligibility  extended  to  all  the  citizens.  We  may  appreciate  the 
strength  of  feeling  with  which  such  reform  was  demanded,  when  we 
find  that  it  was  proposed  by  Aristeides,  a  man  the  reverse  of  what  is 
called  a  demagogue,  and  a  strenuous  friend  of  the  Kleisthenean  con- 
stitution. No  political  system  would  work,  after  the  Persian  war, 
which  formally  excluded  "the  maritime  multitude"  from  holding 
magistracy.  I  rather  imagine  (as  has  been  stated  in  my  preceding 
volume)  that  election  of  magistrates  was  still  retained,  and  not  ex- 
changed for  drawing  lots  until  a  certain  time,  though  not  a  long  time 
afterward.  That  which  the  public  sentiment  first  demanded  was 
the  recognition  of  the  equal  and  open  principle;  after  a  certain 
length  of  experience  it  was  found  that  poor  men,  though  legally 
qualified  to  be  chosen,  were  in  point  of  fact  rarely  chosen:  then  came 
the  lot,  to  give  them  an  equal  chance  with  the  rich.  The  principle 
of  sortition,  or  choice  by  lot,  was  never  applied  (as  I  have  before 
remarked)  to  all  offices  at  Athens — never  for  example  to  the  Strategi 
or  Generals,  whose  functions  were  more  grave  and  responsible  than 
those  of  any  other  person  in  the  service  of  the  state,  and  who  always 
continued  to  be  elected  by  show  of  hands. 

In  the  new  position  into  which  Athens  was  now  thrown,  with  so 
great  an  extension  of  what  may  be  termed  her  foreign  relations,  and 
with  a  confederacy  which  imposed  the  necessity  of  distant  military 
service,  the  functions  of  the  Strategi  naturally  tended  to  become  both 
more  absorbing  and  complicated;  while  the  civil  administration  be- 
came more  troublesome  if  not  more  difficult,  from  the  enlargement 
of  the  city  and  the  still  greater  enlargement  of  Peirgeus — leading  to 
an  increase  of  town  population,  and  especially  to  an  increase  of  the 
metics  or  resident  non-freemen.  And  it  was  probably  about  this 
period,  during  the  years  immediately  succeeding  the  battle  of  Salamis 
— when  the  force  of  old  habit  and  tradition  had  been  partially  en- 
feebled by  so  many  stirring  novelties — that  the  Archons  were  with- 
drawn altogether  from  political  and  military  duties,  and  confined  to 
civil  or  judicial  administration.  At  the  battle  of  Marathon,  the  Pole- 
march  is  a  military  commander,  president  of  the  ten  Strategi:  we 
know  him  afterward  only  as  a  civil  magistrate,  administering  justice 
to  the  metics  or  non-freemen,  while  the  Strategi  perform  military 
duties  without  him:  a  change  not  unlike  that  which  took  place  at 
Rome,  when  the  Prsetor  was  created  to  undertake  the  judicial  branch 
of  the  large  original  duties  of  the  Consul,  i  conceive  that  this  alter- 
ation, indicating  as  it  does  a  change  in  the  character  of  the  Archons 
generally,  must  have  taken  place  at  the  time  which  we  have  now 
reached — a  time  when  the  Athenian  establishments  on  all  sides 
required  a  more  elaborate  distribution  of  functionaries.     The  distri- 


388    GRECIAN  AFFAIRS  AFTER  PERSIAN  INVASION. 

button  of  so  many  Athenian  boards  of  functionaries,  part  to  do 
nut',     in    the     City,    and     pari    in    the    Peirseus,    cannot    have    com- 

menced  until  after  this  period,  when  Peirseus  had  been  raised 
by  Tliemistokles  to  the  dignity  of  town,  fortness,  and  state-harbor. 

Such  boards  were  the  A-iynonii  and  Agoranomi,  Who  main- 
tained    the    police    of    Streets    and    markets — the     Metronomi,  who 

watched  over  weights  and  measures — the  siiophylakcs.  who  carried 
into  effeel  various  state  regulations  respecting  the  custody  and  sale 
of  corn— with  various  others  who  acted  not  less  in  Peirseus  than  iu 
the  city.     We  may  presume  that  each  of  these  boards  was  originally 

created  as  the  exigency  appeared  to  call  for  it,  at  a  period  later  than 
that  which  we  have  now  reached;  most  of  these  duties  of  detail  hav- 
ing been  at  first  discharged  by  the  Archons,  and  afterward  (when 

these     latter    became   loo   full    of    Occupation)   confided   to    separate 

administrators.  The  special  and  important  change  which  character- 
ized  the  period   immediately  succeeding  the   battle  of  Salamisc  was 

the  more  accurate  line  drawn  between  the  Archons  and  the  Strategi; 
assigning  the  foreign  and  military  department  entirely  to  the  Stra- 
tegi, and  rendering  the  Archons  purely  civil  magistrates,  adminis- 
trative as  well  as  judicial:  while  the  first,  creation  of  the  separate 
boards  above  named  was  probably  an  ulterior  enlargement,  arising 
out  of  increase  of  population,  power,  and  trade,  between  the  Persian 
and  Peloponnesian  wars.  It  was  by  some  such  steps  that  the  Athe- 
nian administration  gradually  attained  that  complete  development 
which  it  exhibts  in  practice  during  the  century  from  the  Pelopon- 
nesian war  downward,  to  which  nearly  all  our  positive  and  direct 
information  relates. 

With  this  expansion  both  of  democratieal  feeling  and  of  military 
activity  at  Athens,  Aristeides  appears  to  have  sympathized.  And 
the  popularity  thus  insured  to  him,  probably  heightened  by  some 
regret  for  his  previous  ostracism,  was  calculated  to  acquire  perma- 
nence from  his  straightforward  and  incorruptible  character,  now 
brought  into  strong  relief  by  his  function  as  assessor  to  the  new  Delian 
confederacy. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  ascendency  of  Tliemistokles,  though  so 
often  exalted  by  his  unrivaled  political  genius  and  daring,  as  well  as 
by  the  signal  value  of  his  public  recommendations,  was  as  often  over- 
thrown by  his  duplicity  of  means  and  unprincipled  thirst  for  money. 
New  political  opponents  sprung  up  against  him,  men  sympathizing 
with  Aristeides  and  far  more  violent  in  their  antipathy  than  Aris- 
teides himself.  Of  these  the  chief  were  Ivimon  (son  of  Miltiades)  and 
Alkmseon:  moreover  it  seems  that  the  Lacedaemonians,  though  full 
of  esteem  for  Tliemistokles  immediately  after  the  battle  of  Balamis, 
had  now  become  extremely  hostile  to  him — a  change  which  may  be 
sufficiently  explained  from  his  stratagem  respecting  the  fortifications 
of  Athens,  and  his  subsequent  ambitious  projects  in  reference  to  the 
Periams.     The  Lacedaemonian  influence,  then  not  inconsiderable  in 


THEMISTOKLES  CHARGED  WITH  CORRUPTION.    389 

Athens,  was  employed  to  second  the  political  combinations  against 
him.  He  is  said  to  have  given  offense  by  manifestations  of  personal 
vanity — by  continual  boasting  of  his  great  services  to  the  state,  and  by 
the  erection  of  a  private  chapel,  close  to  his  own  house,  in  honor  of 
Artemis  Aristobule,  or  Artemis  of  admirable  counsel;  just  as  Pausa- 
nias  had  irritated  the  Lacedaemonians  by  inscribing  his  own  single 
name  on  the  Delphian  tripod,  and  as  the  friends  of  Aristeides  had 
displeased  the  Athenians  by  endless  encomiums  upon  his  justice. 

But  the  main  cause  of  his  discredit  was  the  prostitution  of  hie 
great  influence  for  abitrary  and  corrupt  purposes.  In  the  unsettled  con- 
dition of  so  many  different  Grecian  communities,  recently  emancipated 
from  Persia,  when  there  was  past  misrule  to  avenge,  wrong-doers  to 
be  deposed  and  perhaps  punished,  exiles  to  be  restored,  and  all  the 
disturbance  and  suspicions  accompanying  so  .great  a  change  of  politi- 
cal condition  as  well  as  of  foreign  policy,  the  influence  of  the  leading 
men  at  Athens  must  have  been  great  in  determining  the  treatment  of 
particular  individuals.  Themistokles,  placed  at  the  head  of  an  Athe- 
nian squadron  and  sailing  among  the  islands,  partly  for  the  purposes 
of  war  against  Persia,  partly  for  organizing  the  new  confederacy,  is 
affirmed  to  have  accepted  bribes  without  scruple,  for  executing  sen- 
tences just  and  unjust — restoring  some  citizens,  expelling  others,  and 
even  putting  some  to  death.  We  learn  this  from  a  friend  and  guest 
of  Themistokles — the  poet  Timokreon  of  Ialysus  in  Rhodes,  who  had 
expected  his  own  restoration  from  the  Athenian  commander,  but 
found  that  it  was  thwarted  by  a  bribe  of  three  talents  from  his  oppo- 
nents; so  that  he  was  still  kept  in  exile  on  the  charge  of  medism, 
The  assertions  of  Timokreon,  personally  incensed  on  this  ground 
against  Themistokles,  are  doubtless  to  be  considered  as  passionate  and 
exaggerated:  nevertheless  they  are  a  valuable  memorial  of  the  feelings 
of  the  time,  and  are  far  too  much  in  harmony  with  the  general  char- 
acter of  this  eminent  man  to  allow  of  our  disbelieving  them  entirely. 
Timokreon  is  as  emphatic  in  his  admiration  of  Aristeides  as  in  his 
censure  of  Themistokles,  whom  he  denounces  as  "a  lying  and  unjust 
traitor." 

Such  conduct  as  that  described  by  this  new  Archilochus,  even 
making  every  allowance  for  exaggeration,  must  have  caused  Themis- 
tokles to  be  both  hated  and  feared  among  the  insular  allies,  whose 
opinion  was  now  of  considerable  importance  to  the  Athenians.  A 
similar  sentiment  grew  up  partially  against  him  in  Athens  itself,  and 
appears  to  have  been  connected  with  suspicions  of  treasonable  inclina- 
tions toward  the  Persians.  As  the  Persians  could  offer  the  highest 
bribes,  a  man  open  to  corruption  might  naturally  be  suspected  of 
inclinations  toward  their  cause;  and  if  Themistokles  had  rendered 
pre-eminent  service  against  them,  so  also  had  Pausanias,  whose  con- 
duct had  undergone  so  fatal  a  change  for  the  worse.  It  was  the 
treason  of  Pausanius — suspected  and  believed  against  him  by  the 
Athenians  even  when  he  was  in  command  at  Byzantium,  though  not 


390    GRECIAN  AFFAIRS  AFTER  PERSIAN  INVASION. 

proved  against  him  at  Sparta  until  long  afterward — which  first  seems 
to  have  raised  the  presumption  of  medism  against  Themistokles  also, 
when  combined  with  the  corrupl  proceedings  which  stained  his  public 
conduct.  We  must  recoiled  also  thai  Themistokles  had  given  some 
color  to  these  presumptions  even  by  the  stratagems  in  reference  to 
Xerxes,  winch  wore  a  double  faced  aspect,  capable  of  being  construed 
either  in  a  Persian  or  in  a  Grecian  sense.  The  Lacedaemonians,  hos- 
tile to  Themistokles  since  the  time  when  he  had  outwitted  them 
respecting  the  walls  of  Athens — and  fearing  him  also  as  a  supposed 
accomplice  of  the  suspected  Pausanias — procured  the  charge  of  medism 
to  be  preferred  againsl  him  at  Athens,  by  secret  instigations  and,  as 
it  is  said,  by  bribes  to  his  political  opponents.  But  no  satisfactory 
proof  could  be  furnished  of  the  accusation,  winch  Themistokles  him- 
self strenuously  denied,  not  without  emphatic  appeals  to  his  illus- 
trious services.  In  spite  of  violent  invectives  against  him  from  Alk- 
mseon  and  Kimon,  tempered  indeed  by  a  generous  moderation  on  the 
pari  of  Aristi  ides,  his  defense  was  successful.  He  carried  the. people 
with  him  and  was  acquitted  of  the  charge.  Nor  was  he  merely  acquit- 
ted, but,  as  might  naturally  be  expected,  a  reaction  took  place  in  his 
favor.  His  splendid  qualities  and  exploits  were  brought  impressively 
before  the  public  mind,  and  he  seemed  for  the  time  to  acquire 
greater  ascendency  than  ever. 

Such  a  charge,  and  such  a  failure,  must  have  exasperated  to  the 
utmost  the  animosity  between  him  and  his  chief  opponents — Aris- 
teides,  Kimon,  Alkmseon,  and  others;  and  we  can  hardly  wonder 
that  they  were  anxious  to  get  rid  of  him  by  ostracism.  In  explain- 
ing this  peculiar  process,  I  have  already  stated  that  it  could  never  be 
raised  against  any  one  individual  separately  and  ostensibly;  and  that 
it  could  never  be  brought  into  operation  at  all,  unless  its  necessity 
were  made  clear,  not  merely  to  violent  party  men,  but  also  to  the 
assembled  senate  and  people,  including  of  course  a  considerable  pro- 
portion of  the  more  moderate  citizens.  We  may  reasonably  conc<  ive 
that  the  conjuncture  was  deemed  by  many  dispassionate  Athenians 
well  suited  for  the  tutelary  intervention  of  ostracism,  the  express 
benefit  of  which  consisted  in  its  separating  political  opponents  when 
the  antipathy  between  them  threatened  to  push  one  or  the  other  into 
extra-constitutional  proceedings — especially  when  one  of  those  parties 
was  Themistokles,  a  man  alike  va>t  in  his  abilities  and  unscrupulous 
in  his  morality.  Probably  also  there  were  not  a  few  who  wished  to 
revenge  the  previous  ostracism  of  Aristeides:  and  lastly  the  friends 
of  Themistokles  himself,  elated  with  his  acquittal  and  his  seeming 
augmented  popularity,  might  indulge  hopes  that  the  vote  of  ostracism 
would  turn  out  in  his  favor,  and  remove  one  or  other  of  his  chief 
political  opponents.  From  all  these  circumstances  we  learn  without 
astonishment  that  a  vote  of  ostracism  was  soon  after  resorted  to. 
It  ended  in  the  temporary  banishment  of  Themistokles. 

He  retired  into  exile,  and  was  residing  at  Argos,  whither  he  carried 


FLIGHT  OF  THEMISTOKLES.  391 

a  considerable  property,  yet  occasionally  visitiug  other  parts  of  Pelo- 
ponnesus— when  the  exposure  and  death  of  Pausanias,  together  with 
the  discovery  of  his  correspondence,  took  place  at  Sparta.  Among 
this  correspondence  were  found  proofs,  which  Thucydides  seems  to 
have  considered  as  real  and  sufficient,  of  the  privity  of  Themistokles. 
By  Ephorus  and  others,  he  is  admitted  to  have  been  solicited  by 
Pausanias,  and  to  have  known  his  plans — but  to  have  kept  them 
secret  while  refusing  to  co-operate  in  them.  Probably  after  his  exile 
he  took  a  more  decided  share  in  them  than  before;  being  well-placed 
for  that  purpose  at  Argos,  a  city  not  only  unfriendly  to  Sparta, 
but  strongly  believed  to  have  been  in  collusion  with  Xerxes  at  hi& 
invasion  of  Greece.  On  this  occasion  the  Lacedaemonians  sent  to 
Athens  publicly  to  prefer  a  formal  charge  of  treason  against  him,  and 
to  urge  the  necessity  of  trying  him  as  a  Pan-hellenic  criminal  before 
the  synod  of  the  allies  assembled  at  Sparta. 

Whether  this  latter  request  would  have  been  granted  or  whether 
Themistokles  would  have  been  tried  at  Athens,  we  cannot  tell :  for 
no  sooner  was  he  apprised  that  joint  envoys  from  Sparta  and  Athens 
had  been  dispatched  to  arrest  him,  than  he  fled  forthwith  from  Argos 
to  Korkyra.  The  inhabitants  of  that  island,  though  owing  gratitude 
to  him  and  favorably  disposed,  could  not  venture  to  protect  him 
against  the  two  most  powerful  states  in  Greece,  but  sent  him  to  the 
neighboring  continent.  Here  however,  being  still  tracked  and  fol- 
lowed by  the  envoys,  he  was  obliged  to  seek  protection  from  a  man 
whom  he  had  formerly  thwarted  in  a  demand  at  Athens,  and  who 
had  become  his  personal  enemy — Admetus,  king  of  the  Molossians. 
Fortunately  for  him,  at  the  moment  when  he  arrived,  Admetus  was 
not  at  home;  and  Themistokles,  becoming  a  suppliant  to  his  wife, 
conciliated  her  sympathy  so  entirely,  that  she  placed  her  child  in  his 
arms  and  planted  him  at  the  hearth  in  the  full  solemnity  of  supplica- 
tion to  soften  her  husband.  As  soon  as  Admetus  returned,  Themis- 
tokles revealed  his  name,  his  pursuers,  and  his  danger — entreating 
protection  as  a  helpless  suppliant  in  the  last  extremity.  He  appealed 
to  the  generosity  of  the  Epirotic  prince  not  to  take  revenge  on  a  man 
now  defenseless,  for  offense  given  under  such  very  different  circum- 
stances; and  for  an  offense,  too,  after  all,  not  of  capital  moment, 
while  the  protection  now  entreated  was  to  the  suppliant  a  matter  of 
life  or  death.  Admetus  raised  him  up  from  the  hearth  with  the  child 
in  his  arms — an  evidence  that  he  accepted  the  appeal  and  engaged  to 
protect  him ;  refusing  to  give  him  up  to  the  envoys,  and  at  last  only 
sending  him  away  on  the  expression  of  his  own  wish  to  visit  the  King 
of  Persia.  Two  Macedonian  guides  conducted  him  across  the  moun- 
tains to  Pydua  in  the  Thermaic  gulf,  where  he  found  a  merchant- 
ship  about  to  set  sail  for  the  coast  of  Asia  Minor,  and  took  a  passage 
on  board;  neither  the  master  nor  the  crew  knowing  his  name.  An 
untoward  storm  drove  the  vessel  to  the  island  of  Naxos,  at  that 
moment  besieged  by  an  Athenian  armament.    Had  he  been  forced  to 


!    GRECIAN  AFFAIRS  AFTER  PER8IAN  INVASION. 

there,  be  would  of  course  have  fa  nized  and  seized,  but 

bis  wonted  Bubtlety  did  not  desert  bim.  Having  communicated  both 
bis  n.uiic  and  the  peril  which  awaited  bim,  he  conjured  the  master  of 
the  ship  to  assist  in  saving  bim,  and  nol  to  suffer  an  j  one  of  the  crew 
to  Land;  menacing  thai  if  by  any  accident  he  were  discovered,  he 
would  bring  the  master  i<>  ruin  along  with  himself,  by  representing 
bim  as  an  accomplice  induced  by  money  to  facilitate  the  escape  01 
Themistokles:  on  the  other  hand,  in  case  of  safety,  he  promised  a 
large  r<  ward,  Su<  li  promises  and  threats  weighed  with  the  master, 
who  controlled  his  cre^s ,  and  forced  them  to  beat  about  during  a  day 
and  a  nighl  off  the  coast  withoul  seeking  to  land.  After  that  danger- 
ous interval,  the  storm  abated  and  the  ship  reached  Ephesus  in 
safety. 

'1  bus  did  Themistokles,  after  a  Beries  of  perils,  find  himself  safe  on 
the  Persian  side  of  the  iEgean.  At  Athens  be  was  proclaimed  a 
traitor,  and  his  property  confiscated :  nevertheless  (as  it  frequently 
happened  in  eases  of  confiscation),  his  friends  secreted  a  considerable 
sum,  and  sent  it  over  to  him  in  Asia,  together  with  the  money  which 
be  had  left  at  ArgOS;  so  that  he  was  thus  enabled  liberally  to  reward 

the  ship-captain  who  had  preserved  him.  With  all  this  deduction, 
the  property  which  be  possessed  oi  a  character  not  susceptible  of  con- 
cealment, and  which  was  therefore  actually  seized,  was  found  to 
amount  to  eighty  talents,  according  to  Theopbrastus — to  100  talents, 
according  to  Theopompus.  In  contrast  with  this  large  sum,  it  is 
melancholy  to  leal  n   that   he  had    begun   his    political    career   with   a 

property  no1  greater  than  three  talents.     The  poverty  of  Aristeides  at 

the  end  of  his  life  presents  an  impressive  contrast  to  the  enrichment 
Of  his  rival. 

The  escape  of  Themistokles,  and  his  adventures  in  Persia,  appear 
to  havy  formed  a  favorite  theme  for  the  fancy  and  exaggeration  of 

authors  a  century  afterward.  We  have  thus  many  anecdotes  which 
contradict  either  directly  or  by  implication  the  simple  narrative  of 
Thucydides.  Thus  we  are  told  thai  at  the  moment  when  be  was 
running  away  from  the  Greeks,  the  Persian  king  also  bad  proclaimed 

a  reward  of  200  talents  fOT  his  head,  and  that  some  Greeks  on  the 
(cast  of  Asia  were  watching  to  take  him  for  this  reward:  that  he  was 
forced  to  conceal  himself  strictlj  mar  the  coast,  until  means  wire 
found  to  send  him  up  to  Susa,  in  a  closed  litter,  under  pretense  that  it 
was  a  woman  for  the  king's  harem:  that  Mandane,  sister  of  Xerxes, 
insisted  upon  having  bim  delivered  up  to  her  as  ati  expiation  for  the 
toss  of  her  son  at  the  battle  of  Salamis:  thai  he  learnt  Persian  so 
well,  and  discoursed  in  it  bo  eloquently,  as  to  procure  tor  himself  an 
acquittal  from  tin  Persian  judges,  when  put  upon  bis  trial  through 
the  importunity  of  Mandane;  thai  the  <  ffic<  rs  of  the  king's  household 
at  Susa,  and  the  satraps  in  his  way  back,  threatened  him  with  still 
farther  perils:  thai  he  was  admitted  to  see  the  king  in  person,  after 
having  received  a  lecture  from  the  chamberlain  on  the  indispensable 


TREATMENT  OF  THEMISTOKLES  IX  PERSIA.     393 

duty  of  falling  down  before  him  to  do  homage,  etc.,  with  several 
other  uncertified  details,  which  make  us  value  more  highly  the  narra- 
tive of  Thucydides.  Indeed  Ephorus,  Deino,  Kleitarchus,  and 
Herakleides,  from  whom  these  anecdotes  appear  mostly  to  be  derived, 
even  affirmed  that  Themistoklea  had  found  Xerxes  himself  alive  and 
seen  him;  whereas  Thucydides  and  Charon,  the  two  contemporary 
authors  (for  the  former  is  nearly  contemporary),  asserted  that  he  had 
found  Xerxes  recently  dead,  and  his  sou  Artaxerxes  on  the  throne. 

According  to  Thucydides,  the  eminent  exile  does  not  seem  to  have 
been  exposed  to  the  least  danger  in  Persia.  He  presented  himself  as 
a  deserter  from  Greece,  and  was  accepted  as  such:  moreover — what 
is  more  strange,  though  it  seems  true — he  was  received  as  an  actual 
benefactor  of  the  Persian  king,  and  a  sufferer  from  the  Greeks  on 
account  of  such  dispositions — in  consequence  of  his  communications 
made  to  Xerxes  respecting  the  intended  retreat  of  the  Greeks  from 
Salamis,  and  respecting  the  contemplated  destruction  of  the  Helles- 
pontine  bridge.  He  was  conducted  by  some  Persians  on  the  coast 
up  to  Susa,  where  he  addressed  a  letter  to  the  king  couched  in  the 
following  terms,  such  as  probably  no  modern  European  king  would 
tolerate  except  from  a  Quaker: — "  I,  Themistokles,  am  come  to  thee, 
having  done  to  thy  house  more  mischief  than  any  other  Greek,  as 
long  as  I  was  compelled  in  my  own  defense  to  resist  the  attack  of 
thy  father — but  having  also  done  him  yet  greater  good,  when  I  could 
do  so  with  safety  to  myself,  and  when  his  retreat  was  endangered. 
Reward  is  yet  owing  to  me  for  my  past  service:  moreover,  I  am  now 
here,  chased  away  by  the  Greeks  in  consequence  of  my  attachment  to 
thee,  but  able  still  to  serve  thee  with  great  effect.  I  wish  to  wait  a 
year,  and  then  to  come  before  thee  in  person  to  explain  my  views." 

Whether  the  Persian  interpreters,  who  read  this  letter  to  Artaxer- 
xes Longimauus,  exactly  rendered  its  brief  and  direct  expression,  we 
cannot  say.  But  it  made  a  strong  impression  upon  him,  combined 
with  the  previous  reputation  of  the  writer — and  he  willingly  granted 
the  prayer  for  delay:  though  we  shall  not  readily  believe  that  he  was 
so  transported  as  to  show  his  joy  by  immediate  sacrifice  to  the  gods, 
by  an  unusual  measure  of  convivial  indulgence,  and  by  crying  out 
thrice  in  his  sleep,  "  I  have  got  Themistokles  the  Athenian" — as  some 
of  Plutarch's  authors  informed  him.  In  the  course  of  the  year 
granted,  Themistokles  had  learned  so  much  of  the  Persian  language 
and  customs  as  to  be  able  to  communicate  personally  with  the  king, 
and  acquire  his  confidence.  Xo  Greek  (says  Thucydides)  had  evei 
before  attained  such  a  commanding  influence  and  position  at  the 
Persian  court.  His  ingenuity  was  now  displayed  in  laying  out 
schemes  for  the  subjugation  of  Greece  to  Persia,  which  were  evi- 
dently captivating  to  the  monarch,  who  rewarded  him  with  a  Per- 
sian wife  and  large  presents,  sending  him  down  to  Magnesia  on  the 
Mreander,  not  far  from  the  coast  of  Ionia.  The  revenues  of  the  dis- 
trict round  that  town,  amounting  to  the  large  sum  of  fifty  talent* 


394    GRECIAN  AFFAIRS  AFTER  PERSIAN  INVASION. 

yearly,  were  assigned  to  him  for  bread;  those  of  the  neighboring  sea- 
porl  of  Myus,  for  articles  of  condiment  to  his  bread,  which  was 
always  accounted  the  main  nourishmenl :  those  of  Lampsakus  on  the 
Hellespont,  forwine.  Nbl  knowing  the  amount  of  these  two  latter 
items,  we  cannol  determine  how  much  revenue  Themistokles 
received  altogether;  but  there  can  be  no  doubt,  judging  from  the 
revenues  of  Magnesia  alone,  that  he  was  a  great  pecuniary  gainer  by 
bis  change  of  country.  Alter  having  visited  various  parts  of  Asia, 
he  lived  for  a  certain  time  at  Magnesia,  in  which  place  his  family 
joined  him  from  Allans. 

How  long  his  residence  at  Magnesia  lasted,  we  do  not  know,  but 
seemingly  long  enough  to  acquire  local  estimation  and  leave  memen- 
to- behind  him.  He  at  length  died  of  sickness,  when  sixty-five  years 
old,  without  having  taken  any  step  toward  the  accomplishment  of 
those  victorious  campaigns  which  he  had  promised  to  Artaxerxes. 
That  sickness  was  the  real  cause  of  his  death,  we  may  believe  on  the 
distinct  statement  of  Tlmeydides;  who  at  the  same  time  notices  a 
rumor  partially  current  in  his  own  time,  of  poison  voluntarily  taken, 
from  painful  consciousness  on  the  part  of  Themistokles  himself  that 
the  promises  made  could  never  lie  performed — a  farther  proof  of  the 
general  tendency  to  surround  the  last  years  of  this  distinguished  man 
with  impressive  adventures,  and  to  dignify  his  last  moments  with  a 
revived  feeling  not  unworthy  of  his  earlier  patriotism.  The  report 
may  possibly  have  been  designedly  circulated  by  his  friends  and  rela- 
tive-, in  order  to  conciliate  some  tenderness  toward  his  memory; 
since  his  sons  still  continued  citizens  at  Athens,  and  his  daughters 
were  married  there.  These  friends  farther  stated  that  they  had 
brought  back  his  bones  to  Attica  at  his  own  express  command,  and 
buried  them  privately  without  the  knowledge  of  the  Athenians;  no 
condemned  traitor  being  permitted  1o  be  buried  in  Attic  soil.  If, 
however,  we  even  suppose  that  this  statement  was  true,  no  one  could 
point  out  with  certainty  the  spot  wherein  such  interment  had  taken 
place.  Nor  does  it  seem,  when  we  mark  the  cautious  expressions 
of  Thucydides.  that  he  himself  was  satisfied  of  the  fact.  Moreover, 
we  may  affirm  with  confidence  that  the  inhabitants  of  Magnesia, 
when  they  showed  the  splendid  sepulchral  monument  erected  in  honor 
of  Themistokles  in  their  own  market-place,  were  persuaded  that  his 
bones  were  really  inclosed  within  it. 

Aristeides  died  about  three  or  four  years  after  the  ostracism  of 
Themistokles;  bul  respecting  the  place  and  manner  of  his  death, 
there  were  several  contradictions  among  the  authors  whom  Plutarch 
had  before  him.  Some  affirmed  that,  he  perished  on  foreign  service 
in  the  Euxine  sea;  others,  thai  he  died  at  home,  amidst  the  universal 
esteem  and  grief  of  hi-  fellow-citizens.  A  third  story,  confined  to 
the  single  statement  of  Kraterus,  and  strenuously  rejected  by  Plu- 
tarch, represents  Aristeides  as  having  been  falsely  accused  'before 
the  Athenian  judicature  and  condemned  to  a  fine  of  fifty  minse,  on 


CONFEDERACY   OF  DELOS.  395 

the  allegation  of  having  taken  bribes  during  the  assessment  of  the 
tribute  upon  the  allies — which  fine  he  was  unable  to  pay,  and  was 
therefore  obliged  to  retire  to  Ionia,  where  he  died.  Dismissing  this 
last  story,  we  rind  nothing  certain  about  his  death  except  one  fact — 
but  that  fact  at  the  same  time  the  most  honorable  of  all — that  he  died 
very  poor.  It  is  even  asserted  that  he  did  not  leave  enough  to  pay 
funeral  expenses — that  a  sepulcher  was  provided  for  him  at  Phalerum 
at  the  public  cost,  besides  a  handsome  donation  to  his  son  Lysim- 
achus  and  a  dowry  to  each  of  his  two  daughters.  In  the  two  or 
three  ensuing  generations,  however,  his  descendants  still  continued 
poor,  and  even  at  that  remote  day  some  of  them  received  aid  out  of 
the  public  purse,  from  the  recollection  of  their  incorruptible  ances- 
tor. Nearly  a  century  and  a  half  afterwards,  a  poor  man  named 
Lysimachus,  descendant  of  the  Just  Aristeides,  was  to  be  seen  at 
Athens  near  the  chapel  of  Iacchus,  carrying  a  mysterious  tablet,  and 
obtaining  his  scanty  fee  of  two  oboli  for  interpreting  the  dreams  of 
the  passers-by :  Demetrius  the  Phalerean  procured  from  the  people, 
for  the  mother  and  aunt  of  this  poor  man,  a  small  daily  allowance. 
On  all  these  points  the  contrast  is  marked  when  we  compare  Aris- 
teides with  Themistokles.  The  latter,  having  distinguished  himself 
by  ostentatious  cost  at  Olympia,  and  by  a  choragic  victory  at  Athens, 
with  little  scruples  as  to  the  means  of  acquisition — ended  his  life  at 
Magnesia  in  dishonorable  affluence  greater  than  ever,  and  left  an 
enriched  posterity  both  at  that  place  and  at  Athens.  More  than  five 
centuries  afterwards,  his  descendant,  the  Athenian  Themistokles 
attended  the  lectures  of  the  philosopher  Ammonius  at  Athens,  as  the 
comrade  and  friend  of  Plutarch  himself. 


CHAPTER  XLV. 

PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY  UNDER  ATHENS  AS  HEAD. — 
FIRST  FORMATION  AND  RAPID  EXPANSION  OF  THE  ATHENIAN 
EMPIRE. 

I  have  already  recounted,  in  the  preceding  chapter,  how  the 
Asiatic  Greeks,  breaking  loose  from  the  Spartan  Pausanias,  entreated 
Athens  to  organize  a  new  confederacy,  and  to  act  as  presiding  city 
(Vorort) — and  how  this  confederacy,  framed  not  only  for  common 
and  pressing  objects,  but  also  on  principles  of  equal  rights  and  constant 
control  on  the  part  of  the  members,  attrapted  soon  the  spontaneous 
adhesion  of  a  large  proportion  of  Greeks,  insular  or  maritime,  near  the 
JSgean  sea.  I  also  noticed  this  event  as  giving  commencement  to  a 
new  era  in  Grecian  politics.  For  whereas  there  had  been  before  a 
tendency,  not  very  powerful,  yet  on  the  whole  steady  and  increasing, 
toward  something  like  one   Pan-hellenic  league   under   Sparta  as 


396      <;i;i:<  IAN   CONFEDERACY    UNDER  ATHENS. 

president-  from  henceforward  thai  tendency  disappears,  and  a  bifur- 
cation begins:  Athens  and  Sparta  divide  the  Grecian  world  between 
them,  and  briug  a  much  larger  Dumber  of  its  members  into  co-opera- 
tion either  with  one  or  the  other,  than  hud  ever  been  so  arranged 
before. 

Thucydides  marks  precisely,  as  far  as  general  words  can  eo,  the 
character  of  the  new  confederacy  during  the  ftrsi  years  alter  its 
commencement.  Bui  unhappily  he  gives  us  scarcely  any  particular 
facts;  and  in  the  absence  of  such  controlling  evidence,  a  habit  has 
grown  up  of  describing  looselj  the  entire  period  between  477  B.C. 

and  405  B.C.  (the  latter  dale   is  thai  of  the  Wattle  of  .  Kuos-potami)  as 

constituting  "the  Athenian  empire."  This  word  denotes  correctly 
enough  the  last  pari,  perhaps  the  lasl  forty  years,  of  the  seventy  two 
years  indicated;  bul  it  is  misleading  when  applied  to  the  first  part: 
nor  indeed  can  any  single  word  be  found  which  faithfully  charac- 
terizes as  well  the  one  pan  as  the  other.  A  great  and  serious  change 
had  taken  place,  and  we  disguise  the  facl  of  thai  change  if  we  talk 
of  the  Athenian  hegemony  or  headship  as  a  portion  of  the  Athenian 
empire.  Thucydides  carefully  distinguishes  the  two.  speaking  of 
the  Spartans  as  having  lost,  and  of  the  Athenians  as  having  acquired, 
not  empire,  inn  headship  or  hegemony. 

The  transition  from  the  Athenian  hegemony  to  the  Athenian  empire 
was  doubtless  gradual,  so  that  no  one  could  determine  precisely 
Where  the  former  ends  and  the  latter  begins;  but  it  had  been  con- 
summated before  the  thirty  years'  truce,  which  was  concluded  four- 
teen years  before  the  Peloponnesian  war— and  it  was  in  fact  the  sub- 
stantial cause  of  that  war.  Empire  then  came  to  be  held  by  Athens 
—partly  as  a  fact  established,  resting  on  acquiescence  rather  than 
attachment  or  consent  on  the  minds  of  the  subjects — partly  as  a 
corollary  from  necessity  of  union  combined  with  her  superior  force: 
while  this  latter  point,  superiority  of  force  a-  a  legitimate  title,  stood 
more  and  more  forward  both  in  the  language  of  her  speakers  and  in 
the   conceptions  of  her  citizen-.      Nay,  the  Athenian  orators  of  the 

middle  of  the  Peloponnesian  war  venture  to  affirm  that  their  empire 

had  been  of  this  same  <  haia<  terever  since  the  repulse  of  the  Persians: 
an  inaccuracy  so  manifest,  thai  if  we  could  suppose  the  speech  made 
by  the  Athenian  Euphemus  at  Kamarina  in  415  B.C.  to  have  been 
heard  by  Themistokles  or  Aristeides  fifty  years  before,  it  would 
have  been  alike  offensive  to  the  prudence  of  the  one  and  to  the  jus- 
tice of  the  olber. 

The  imperial  condition  of  Athens,  that  which  she  held  at  the 
beginning  of  the  Peloponnesian  war.  when  her  allies  (excepl  Chios 
and  Lesbos)  were  tributary  subjects,  and  when  the  ^Egean  sea  was 
an  Athenian  lake  was  of  course  the  period  of  her  greatest  splendor 
and  greatest  action  upon  the  (in  elan  world.      It  was  also  the   period 

most  impressive  to  historian-,  orators,  and  philosophers— suggesting 
the  idea  of  some  one  state  exercising  dominion  over  the  2Egeah,  as 


THE  AMBITION  OF  ATHENS.  397 

the  natural  condition  of  Greece,  so  that  if  Athens  lost  such  domin- 
ion, it  would  be  transferred  to  Sparta — holding  out  the  dispersed 
maritime  Greeks  as  a  tempting  prize  for  the  aggressive  schemes  of 
some  new  conqueror — and  even  bringing  up  by  association  into  men's 
fancies  the  mythical  Minos  of  Krete,  and  others,  as  having  been 
rulers  of  the  JEge&n  in  times  anterior  to  Athens. 

Even  those  who  lived  under  the  full-grown  Athenian  empire  had 
before  them  no  good  accounts  of  the  incidents  between  479-450  B.C. 
For  we  may  gather  from  the  intimation  of  Thucydid.es,  as  well  as 
from  his  barrenness  of  facts,  that  while  there  were  chroniclers  both 
for  the  Persian  invasion  and  for  the  times  before  it,  no  one  cared  for 
the  time  immediately  succeeding.  Hence,  the  little  light  which  has 
fallen  upon  this  blank  has  all  been  borrowed  (if  we  except  the  care- 
ful Thucydides)  from  a  subsequent  age;  and  the  Athenian  hegemony 
has  been  treated  as  a  mere  commencement  of  the  Athenian  empire. 
Credit  has  been  given  to  Athens  for  a  long-sighted  ambition,  aiming 
from  the  Persian  war  downwards  at  results,  which  perhaps  Themis- 
tokles  may  have  partially  divined,  but  which  only  time  and  succes- 
sive accidents  opened  even  to  distant  view.  But  such  systematic 
anticipation  of  subsequent  results  is  fatal  to  any  correct  understand- 
ing, either  of  the  real  agents  or  of  the  real  period;  both  of  which  are 
to  be  explained  from  the  circumstances  preceding  and  actually 
present,  with  some  help,  though  cautious  and  sparing,  from  our 
acquaintance  with  that  which  was  then  an  unknown  future.  When 
Aristeides  and  Kimon  dismissed  the  Lacedaemonian  admiral  Dorkis, 
and  drove  Pausanias  away  from  Byzantium  on  his  second  arrival, 
they  had  to  deal  with  the  problem  immediately  before  them.  They 
had  to  complete  the  defeat  of  the  Persian  power,  still  formidable — 
and  to  create  and  organize  a  confederacy  as  yet  only  inchoate.  This 
was  quite  enough  to  occupy  their  attention,  without  ascribing  to  them 
distant  views  of  Athenian  maritime  empire. 

In  that  brief  sketch  of  incidents  preceding  the  Peloponnesian  war, 
which  Thucydides  introduces  as  "the  digression  from  this  narrative," 
he  neither  gives,  nor  professes  to  give,  a  complete  enumeration  of  all 
which  actually  occurred.  During  the  interval  between  the  first  deser- 
tion of  the  Asiatic  allies  from  Pausanias  to  Athens,  in  477  B.C. — and 
the  revolt  of  Naxos  in  466  b.c — he  recites  three  incidents  only:  first, 
the  siege  and  capture  of  Eion  on  the  Strymon  with  its  Persian  gar- 
rison—next, the  capture  of  Skyros,  and  appropriation  of  the  island 
to  Athenian  kleruchs  or  out-citizens — thirdly,  the  war  with  Karystus 
in  Euboea,  and  reduction  of  the  place  by  capitulation.  It  has  been 
too  much  the  practice  to  reason  as  if  these  three  events  were  the  full 
history  of  ten  or  eleven  years.  Considering  what  Thucydides  states 
respecting  the  darkness  of  this  period,  we  might  perhaps  suspect  that 
they  were  all  which  he  could  learn  about  it  on  good  authority:  and 
they  are  all"  in  truth,  events  having  a  near  and  special  bearing  on  the 
subsequent  history  of  Athens  herself — for  Eion  was  the  first  stepping- 


393   GRECIAN  <  ONEEDERACY  UNDER  ATHENS. 

stone  to  the  important  settlemenl  of  Amphipolis,  and  Skyros  in  ihc 
time  of  Thucydfides  was  the  property  of  outlying  Athenian  citizens 
or  kleruchs.  Still,  we  are  left  in  almosl  entire  ignorance  of  the  pro- 
ceedings of  Athens,  as  conducting  the  newly-established  confederate 
force:  for  il  is  certain  that  the  firel  ten  years  of  the  Athenian  hege- 
mony musl  have  been  years  of  most  active  warfare  against  the  Per- 
sians. <  )ii<'  positive  testimony  to  this  effect  has  been  accidentally 
preserved  to  us  by  Herodotus,  who  mentions  that  "before  the  inva- 
sion of  Xerxes,  there  were  Persian  commanders  and  garrisons  every- 
where in  Thrace  and  the  Hellespont,  all  of  whom  wen'  conquered  by 
the  Greeks  after  that  invasion,  with  the  single  exception  of  Maska- 
vernor  of  Doriskus,  who  could  never  be  taken,  though  many 
different  Grecian  attempts  were  made  upon  the  fortress." 

Of  those  who  were  captured  by  the  Greeks,  not  one  made  any 
defe/ise  sufficient  to  attract  the  admiration  of  Xerxes,  except  Boges 
governor  of  Eton.  Boges,  after  bravely  defending  himself,  and  refits- 
ing  oilers  of  capitulation,  found  his  provisions  exhausted,  and  farther 
resistance  impracticable,  lie  then  kindled  a  vast  funeral  pile — slew 
his  wives,  children,  concubines,  and  family,  and  cast  them  into  it- 
threw  his  precious  effects  over  the  wall  into  the  Strymon — and  lastly, 
precipitated  himself  into  the  flames.  His  brave  despair  was  the  theme 
of  warm  encomium  among  the  Persians,  and  his  relatives  in  Persia 
were  liberally  rewarded  by  Xerxes.  This  capture  of  Eion,  effected 
by  Kimon,  has  been  mentioned  (as  already  stated)  hy  Thucydides; 
but  Herodotus  here  gives  us  to  understand  that  it  was'  only  one  of  a 
string  of  enterprises,  all  unnoticed  by  Tlmcydides,  against  the  Per- 
sians. Nay,  it  would  seem  from  his  language  that  Maskames  main- 
tained himself  in  Doriskus  during  the  whole  reign  of  Xerxes,  and 
perhtips  longer,  repelling  successive  Grecian  assaults. 

The  valuable  indication  here  cited  from  Herodotus  would  be  itself 
a  sufficient  proof  that  the  first  years  of  the  Athenian  hegemony  were 
full  of  busy  and  successful  hostility  against  the  Persians.  And  in 
truth  this  is  what  we  should  expect.  The  battles  of  Salamis,  Platsea, 
and  Mykale,  drove  the  Persians  out  of  Greece  and  overpowered  their 
main  armaments,  but  did  not  remove  them  at  once  from  all  the  vari- 
ous posts  which  they  occupied  throughout  the  JEgvan  and  Thrace. 
Without  doubt  the  Athenians  had  to  clear  the  coasts  and  the  islands 
of  a  great  number  of  different  Persian  detachments;  an  operation 
neither  short  nor  easy,  with  the  then  imperfect  means  of  siege,  as  we 
may  see  by  the  cases  of  Sestus  and  Eion;  nor  indeed  always  practi- 
cable, as  the  case  of  Doriskus  teaches  us.  The  fear  of  these  Persians, 
yet  remaining  in  the  neighborhood,  and  even  the  chance  of  a 
renewed  Persian  invading  armament,  formed  one  pressing  motive 
for  Grecian  cities  to  join  the  new  confederacy;  while  the  expulsion 
of  the  enemy  added  to  it  those  places  which  he  had  occupied.  It  was 
by  these  years  of  active  operations  at  se»  agaiost  the  common  enemy 
that  the  Athenians  first  established  that   constant,   systematic,  and 


CONFEDERACY  OF  DELOS  399 

laborious  training,  among  their  own  ships'  crews,  which  transmitted 
itself  with  continual  improvements  down  to  the  Peloponnesian  war. 
It  was  by  these,  combined  with  present  fear,  that  they  were  enabled 
to  organize  the  largest  and  most  efficient  confederacy  ever  known 
among  Greeks — to  bring  together  deliberative  deputies — to  plant 
their  own  ascendency  as  enforcers  of  the  collective  resolutions — and 
to  raise  a  prodigious  tax  from  universal  contribution.  Lastly,  it  was 
by  the  same  operations,  prosecuted  so  successfully  as  to  remove 
present  alarm,  that  they  at  length  fatigued  the  more  lukewarm  and 
passive  members  of  the  confederacy,  and  created  in  them  a  wish 
either  to  commute  personal  service  for  pecuniary  contribution,  or  to 
escape  from  the  obligation  of  service  in  any  way.  The  Athenian 
nautical  training  would  never  have  been  acquired — the  confederacy 
would  never  have  become  a  working  realitj- — the  fatigue  and  discon- 
tent among  its  members  would  never  have  arisen — unless  there  had 
been  a  real  fear  of  the  Persians,  and  a  pressing  necessity  for  vigorous 
and  organized  operations  against  them,  during  the  ten  years  between 
477  and  4(56  B.C. 

As  to  these  ten  years,  then,  we  are  by  no  means  to  assume  that  the 
particular  incidents  mentioned  by  Thucydides  about  Eion,  Skyros, 
Karystus,  and  Naxos  constitute  the  sum  total  of  events.  To  contra- 
dict this  assumption,  I  have  suggested  proof  sufficient,  though 
indirect,  that  they  are  only  part  of  Uie  stock  of  a  very  busy  period — 
the  remaining  details  of  which,  indicated  in  outline  by  the  large 
general  language  of  Thucydides,  we  are  condemned  not  to  know. 
Nor  are  we  admitted  to  be  present  at  the  synod  of  Delos,  wiiich  dur- 
ing all  this  time  continued  its  periodical  meetings:  though  it  would 
have  been  highly  interesting  to  trace  the  steps  whereby  an  institution 
which  at  first  promised  to  protect  not  less  the  separate  rights  of  the 
members  than  the  security  of  the  whole,  so  lamentably  failed  in  its 
object.  "We  must  recollect  that  this  confederacy,  formed  for  objects 
common  to  all,  limited  to  a  certain  extent  the  autonomy  of  each 
member;  both  conferring  definite  rights,  and  imposing  definite 
obligations.  Solemnly  sworn  to  by  all,  and  by  Aristeides  on  behalf 
of  Athens,  it  was  intended  to  bind  the  members  in  perpetuity — 
marked  even  in  the  form  of  the  oath,  which  was  performed  by  cast- 
ing heavy  lumps  of  iron  into  the  sea,  never  again  to  be  seen.  As  this 
confederacy  was  thus  both  perpetual  and  peremptory,  binding  each 
member  to  the  rest  and  not  allowing  either  retirement  or  evasion,  so 
it  was  essential  that  it  should  be  sustained  by  some  determining 
authority  and  enforcing  sanction.  The  determining  authority  was 
provided  by  the  synod  at  Delos:  the  enforcing  sanction  was  exer- 
cised by  Athens  as  president.  And  there  is  every  reason  to  presume 
that  Athens,  for  a  long  time,  performed  this  duty  in  a  legitimate  and 
honorable  manner,  acting  in  execution  of  the  resolves  of  the  synod, 
or  at  least  in  full  harmony  with  its  general  purposes.  She  exacted 
from  every  member  the  regulated  quota  of  men  or  money,  employ- 


400      GRE<  [AN  CONFEDERACY  UNDER  ATHENS. 

lug  coercion  againsl  recusants,  and  visiting  neglecl  of  military  duty 
wjili  r  In  all  these  requirements  -lie  only  discharged  her 

appropriate  functions  as  chosen  leader  of  the  confederacy.     There 
can  be  m>  reasonable  doubl  tbal  the  general  synod  went  cordially 
with  her  in  strictness  of  dealing  toward  those  defaulters  who 
obtained  protection  without  bearing  their  share  of  the  burden. 

Bui  after  a  few  years,  several  of  the  confederates,  becoming  weary 
of  personal  military  service,  prevailed  upon  the  Athenians  to  pro- 
vide 3hips  and  men  in  their  place,  and  imposed  upon  themselves  in 
,  \,  bange  a  mone}  paymenl  of  suitable  amount.  This  commutation, 
at  first  probably  introduced  to  meet  some  special  case  of  incon- 
venience, was  found  so  suitable  to  the  taste  of  all  parties,  that  it 
gradually  spread  through  the  larger  portion  of  the  confederacy.  To 
unwarlike  allies,  hating  labor  and  privation,  it  was  a  welcome  relief-, 
while  to  the  Athenians,  full  of  ardor,  and  patient  of  labor  as  well  as 
discipline  for  the  aggrandizement  of  their  country,  it  afforded  con- 
stant   pay  for  a  licet  more  numerous  than  they  could  otherwise   have 

kept  afloat,  [t  is  plain  from  the- statement  of  Thucydides  thai  this 
altered  practice  was  introduced  from  the  petition  of  the  confederal  s 
themselves,  ool  from  any  pressure  or  stratagem  on  the  part  of 
Athens.  But  though  such  was  its  real  source,  it  did  not  the  less 
fatally  degrade  the  allies  in  reference  to  Athens,  and  extinguish  the 

original  feeling  of  equal  rights  and  partnership  in  the  confederacy, 
with  communion  of  danger  as  well  as  of  glory,  which  had  once 
bound  them  together.  The  Athenians  came  to  consider  themselves 
as  military  chiefs  and  soldiers,  with  a  body  of  tribute-paying  Bub 
iects,  whom  they  were  entitled  to  hold  in  dominion,  and  restrict, 
both   as  to  foreign  policy  and  internal  government,  to  such  extent    as 

they  thoughl  expedient — but  whom  they  were  also  bound  to  protect 
againsl  foreign  enemies.  The  military  force  of  these  subject  states 
was  tin:-  iii  a  greal  degree  transferred  to  Athens  by  their  own  act, 
just  as  thai  of  so  many  of  the  native  princes  in  India  has  been  made 
over  to  the  English.  But  the  military  efficiency  of  the  confederacy 
against  the  Persians  was  much  increased,  in  proportion  as  the 
vigorous  resolves  of  Athens  were  less  and  less  paralyzed  by  the  con- 
tentions and  irregularity  of  a  synod:  so  that  the  war  was  prosecuted 
with  greater  success  than  ever,  while  those  motives  of  alarm,  which 
had  served  as  the  flrsl  pressing  stimulus  to  the  formation  of  the  con- 
f<  deracy,  became  every  j  ear  farther  and  farther  removed. 

Under  such  circumstances,  several  of  the  confederate  states  grew 
tired  even  of  paying  their  tribute — and  averse  to  continuance  as 
member8.      They  made    successive  attempts   to   secede:   but    Athens, 

acting  seemingly  in  conjunction  with  the  synod,  repressed  their 

attempts  one  alter  the  other — conquering,  lining,  and  disarming  the 
revolters;  which  was  the  more  easily  done,  since  in  most  cases  their 
naval  force  bad  been  in  great  pari  banded  over  to  her.  As  these 
events  took  place,  not  all  at  once,  but  successively  in  different  years 


GROWING  UNPOPULARITY  OF  ATHENS.        401 

— the  number  of  mere  tribute-paying  allies  as  well  as  of  subdued 
revolters  continually  increasing — so  there  was  never  any  one  moment 
of  conspicuous  change  in  the  character  of  the  confederacy.  Tin' 
allies  slid  unconsciously  into  subjects,  while  Athens,  without  any 
predetermined  plan,  passed  from  a  chief  into  a  despot.  By  strict  ly 
enforcing  the  obligations  of  the  pact  upon  unwilling  members,  and 
by  employing  coercion  against  revolters,  she  had  become  unpopular 
in  the  same  proportion  as  she  acquired  new  power — and  that,  ton 
without  any  guilt  of  her  own.  In  this  position,  even  if  she  had  been 
inclined  to  relax  her  hold  upon  the  tributary  subjects,  considerations 
of  her  own  safety  would  have  deterred  her  from  doing  so;  for  there 
was  reason  to  apprehend  that  they  might  place  their  strength  at,  the 
disposal  of  her  enemies.  It  is  very  certain  that  she  never  was  so 
inclined.  It  would  have  required  a  more  self-denying  public  moralit}'" 
than  has  ever  been  practiced  by  any  state,  either  ancient  or  modern, 
even  to  conceive  the  idea  of  relinquishing  voluntarily  an  immense 
ascendency  as  well  as  a  lucrative  revenue:  least  of  all  was  such  an 
idea  likely  to  be  conceived  bjr  Athenian  citizens,  whose  ambition 
increased  with  their  power,  and  among  whom  the  love  of  Athenian 
ascendency  was  both  passion  and  patriotism.  But  though  the  Athe- 
nians were  both  disposed,  and  qualified,  to  push  all  the  advantages 
offered  and  even  to  look  out  for  new — we  must  not  forget  that  the 
foundations  of  their  empire  were  laid  in  the  most  honorable  causes: 
voluntary  invitation — efforts  both  unwearied  and  successful  against 
a  common  enem}7 — unpopularity  incurred  in  discharge  of  an  impera- 
tive duty — and  inability  to  break  up  the  confederacy,  without 
endangering  themselves  as  well  as  laying  open  the  yEgean  sea  to  the 
Persians. 

There  were  two  other  causes,  besides  that  which  has  been  just  ad- 
verted to,  for  the  unpopularity  of  imperial  Athens.  First,  the  exist- 
ence of  the  confederacy,  imposing  permanent  obligations,  was  in 
conflict  with  the  general  instinct  of  the  Greek  mind,  tending  toward 
separate  political  autonomy  of  each  city — as  well  as  with  the  partic- 
ular turn  of  the  Ionic  mind,  incapable  of  that  steady  personal  effort 
which  was  requisite  for  maintaining  the  synod  of  Delos  on  its  first 
large  and  equal  basis.  Next — and  this  is  the  great  cause  of  all — Ath- 
ens, having  defeated  the  Persians  and  thrust  them  to  a  distance,  be-\ 
gan  to  employ  the  force  and  the  tribute  of  her  subject-allies  in  war- 
fare against  Greeks,  wherein  these  allies  had  nothing  to  gain  from 
success — everything  to  apprehend  from  defeat — and  a  banner  to  fighf 
for,  offensive  to  Hellenic  sympathies.  On  this  head  the  subject  alTies 
had  great  reason  to  complain,  throughout  the  prolonged  wars  of 
Greek  against  Greek  for  the  purpose  of  sustaining  Athenian  predom- 
inance. But  on  the  point  of  practical  grievances  or  oppressions  they 
had  little  ground  for  discontent,  and  little  feeling  of  actual  discon- 
tent, as  I  shall  show  more  fully  hereafter.  Among  the  general  body 
of  citizens  in  the  subject-allied  cities,  the  feeling  toward  Athens  was 


402      QBECIAN  CONFEDERACY  I'NDER  ATHENS. 

rather  indiffi  rence  than  hatred.    The  movemenl  of  revolt  against  her 

eded  from  Bmall  parties  of  leadiDg  nun,  acting  apart  from  t  tie 

citizens,  and  generally  with  collateral  views  of  ambition  for  tbem- 

Belves.     The  positive  hatred  toward  her  was  felt  chiefly  by  those  who 

wire  not  her  subjects. 

It  is  probable  that  the  same  indisposition  to  personal  effort,  which 
prompted  the  confederates  of  Delos  to  tender  money-payment  as  a 
substitute  for  military  service,  also  induced  them  to  neglect  attend- 
ance at  the  >\  nod.  But  we  do  not  know  the  steps  whereby  this  as- 
sembly, at  first  an  effective  reality,  gradually  dwindled  into  a  mere 
form,  and  vanished.  Nothing  however  can  more  forcibly  illustrate 
the  difference  of  character  between  the  maritime  allies  of  Alliens  and 
the  Peloponnesian  allies  of  Sparta,  than  the  fact  thai  while  the 
former  shrank  from  personal  service  and  thoughl  it  an  advantage  to 
tax  themselves  in  place  of  it,  the  hitler  were  "ready  enough  with 
their  bodies,"  but  uncomplying  and  impracticable  as  to  contributions. 
The  contempt  felt  by  these  Dorian  landsmen  for  the  military  effi- 
ciency of  the  Ionian--  recurs  frequently,  and  appears  even  to  exceed 
what  the  reality  justified.  But  when  we  turn  to  the  conduct  of  the 
latter  twenty  years  earlier,  at  the  battle  of  Lade,  in  the  very  crisis  of 
the  Ionic  revoll  from  Persia — we  detect  the  same  want  of  energy,  the 
same  incapacity  of  personal  effort  and  Labor,  as  that  which  broke  up 
the  Confederacy  of  Delos  with  all  its  beneficial  promise.  To  appre- 
ciate fully  the  indefatigable  activity  and  daring,  together  with  the 
patient  endurance  of  Laborious  maritime  training,  which  characterized 
the  Athenians  of  that  day — we  have  only  to  contrast  them  with  these 
confederates,  so  remarkably  destitute  of  both.  Amid  such  glaring 
inequalities  of  merit,  capacity,  and  power,  to  maintain  a  confederacy 
of  equal  members  was  impossible.  It  was  in  the  nature  of  things 
that  the  confederacy  should  either  break  up,  or  be  transmuted  into 
an  Athenian  empire. 

I  have  already  mentioned  that  the  first  aggregate  assessment  of 
tribute,  proposed  byAristeides  and  adopted  by  the  synod  at  Delos, 
was  four  hundred  and  sixty  talents  in  money.  At  that  time  many 
of  the  confederates  paid  their  quota,  not  in  money,  but  in  ships. 
lint  this  practice  gradually  diminished,  as  the  commutations  above 
alluded  to,  of  money  in  place  of  ships,  were  multiplied,  while  the 
aggregate  tribute  of  course  became  larger.  It  was  no  more  than  six 
hundred  talents  at  the  commencement  of  the  Peloponnesian  war, 
forty-six  years  after  the  first  formation  of  the  confederacy  ;  from 
whence  we  may  infer  that  it  was  never  at  all  increased  upon  indi- 
vidual members  during  the  interval.  For  the  difference  bet  ween  four 
hundred  and  sixty  talents  and  six  hundred  admits  of  being  fully  ex- 
plained by  the  numerous  commutations  of  service  for  money  as  well 
as  by  the  acquisitions  Of  new  members,  which  doubtless  Athens  had 
more  or  less  the  opportunity  of  making.  It  is  not  to  be  imagined 
that  the  confederacy  had  attained  its  maximum  number  at  the  date 


EION—SKYROS— KARYSTOS.  403 

of  the  first  assessment  of  tribute:  there  must  have  been  various  cities, 
like  Sinope  and  iEgina,  subsequently  added. 

Without  some  such  preliminary  statements  as  those  just  given  re- 
specting the  new  state  of  Greece  between  the  Persian  and  Pelopou- 
nesian  wars,  beginning  with  the  Athenian  hegemony  or  headship, 
ami  ending  with  the  Athenian  empire,  the  reader  would  hardly  un- 
derstand the  bearing  of  those  particular  events  which  our  authorities 
enable  us  to  recount;  events  unhappily  few  in  number,  though  the 
period  must  have  been  full  of  action,  and  not  well  authenticated  as 
to  dates.  The  first  known  enterprise  of  the  Athenians  in  their  new 
capacity  (whether  the  first  absolutely  or  not  we  cannot  determine) 
between  476  B.C.  and  466  B.C.  was  the  conquest  of  the  important 
post  of  Eion  on  the  Strynion,  where  the  Persian  governor  Boges, 
starved  out  after  a  desperate  resistance,  destroyed  himself  rather  than 
capitulate,  together  with  his  family  and  precious  effects,  as  has 
already  been  stated.  The  next  events  named  are  their  enterprises 
against  the  Dolopes  and  Pelasgi  in  the  island  of  Skyros  (seemingly 
about  470  b.o.)  and  the  Dn'opes  in  the  town  and  district  of  Karysius 
in  Eubcea.  To  the  latter,  who  were  of  a  different  kindred  from  the 
inhabitants  of  Chalkis  and  Eretria,  and  received  no  aid  from  them, 
they  granted  a  capitulation:  the  former  were  more  rigorously  dealt 
with  and  expelled  from  their  island.  Skyros  was  barren,  and  had 
little  to  recommend  it  except  a  good  maritime  position  and  an  excel- 
lent harbor;  while  its  inhabitants,  seemingly  akin  to  the>  Pelasgian 
residents  in  Lemnos  prior  to  the  Athenian  occupation  of  that  spot, 
were  alike  piratical  and  cruel.  Some  Thessaliau  traders,  recently 
plundered  and  imprisoned  by  them,  had  raised  a  complaint  ag;tinst 
them  before  the  Amphictyonic  synod,  which  condemned  the  island 
to  make  restitution.  The  mass  of  the  islanders  threw  the  burden 
upon  those  who  had  committed  the  crime:  and  these  men,  in  order 
to  evade  payment,  invoked  Kimon  with  the  Athenian  armament. 
He  conquered  the  island,  expelled  the  inhabitants,  and  peopled  it 
with  Athenian  settlers. 

Such  clearance  was  a  beneficial  act,  suitable  to  the  new  character 
of  Athens  as  guardian  of  the  ^Egean  sea  against  piracy:  but  it  seems 
also  connected  with  Athenian  plans.  The  island  lay  very  convenient 
for  the  communication  with  Lemnos  (which  the  Athenians  had 
doubtless  reoccupied  after  the  expulsion  of  the  Persians),  and  be- 
came, as  well  as  Lemnos,  a  recognized  adjunct  or  outlying  portion 
of  Attica.  Moreover  there  were  old  legends  which  connected  the 
Athenians  with  it,  as  the  tomb  of  their  hero  Theseus;  whose  name, 
as  the  mythical  champion  of  democracy,  was  in  peculiar  favor  at  the 
period  immediately  following  the  return  from  Salamis.  It  was  in 
the  year  476  B.C.  that  the  oracle  had  directed  them  to  bring  home 
the  bones  of  Theseus  from  Skyros,  and  to  prepare  for  that  hero  a 
splendid  entombment  and  edifice  in  their  new  city.  They  had  tried 
to  effect  this,  but  the  unsocial  manners  of  the  Dolopians  had  pre 


404       GRECIAN  CONFEDERACY  UNDER  ATHENS. 

vented  a  search,  and  it  was  only  after  Kimon  had  taken  the  island 
thai  he  found,  or  pretended  to  find,  the  body.  It  was  brought  to 
Athens  in  the  year  169  b.c.,  and  after  being  welcomed  by  the  people 
-inn  and  joyous  pr< icession,  as  if  the  hero  himself  had  come 
was  deposited  in  the  interior  of  the  city.  On  the  spot  was 
built  the  monumenl  called  the  Theseium  with  its  sacred  precinct,  In- 
vested with  the  privilege  of  a  sanctuary  for  men  of  poor  condition 
who  mighl  feel  ground  for  dreading  the  oppressions  of  the  powerful, 
S  •  well  as  for  slaves  in  case  of  cruel  usage.  Such  were  the  protective 
functions  of  the  mythical  hero  of  democracy,  whose  installation  is 
interesting  as  marking  the  growing  intensity  of  democratical  feeling 
in  Athens  since  the  Persian  war. 

It  was  about  two  years  or  more  after  this  incident  that  the  first 
breach  of  union  in  the  Confederacy  of  Delos  took  place.  The  im- 
portant island  of  Naxos,  the  largest,  of  the  Cyclades — an  island  which 
thirty  y<  ars  before  had  boasted  a  large  marine  force  and  8,000  hop- 
lites— revolted;  on  what  special  ground  we  do  not  know:  but  proba- 
bly the  greater  islands  fancied  themselves  better  able  to  dispense 
with  the  protection  of  the  confederacy  than  the  smaller — at  the  same 
time  that  they  were  more  jealous  of  Athens.  After  a  siege  of  un- 
known duration,  by  Athens  and  the  confederate  force,  it  was  forced 
to  surrender,  and  reduced  to  the  condition  of  a  tributary  subject;  its 
armed  ships  being  doubtless  taken  away,  and  its  fortifications  razed. 
Whether  any  line  or  ulterior  penalty  was  levied,  we  have  uo  infor- 
mation. 

We  cannot  doubt  that  the  reduction  of  this  powerful  island,  haw- 
ever  untoward  in  its  effects  upon  the  equal  and  self-maintained 
character  of  the  confederacy,  strengthened  its  military  force  by 
placing  the  whole  Naxian  fleet  with  new  pecuniary  contributions 
in  the  hands  of  the  chief.  Nor  is  it  surprising  to  hear  that  Athens 
both  to  employ  this  new  force,  and  to  obliterate  the  late  act  of 
severity,  by  increased  exertions  against  the  common  enemy.  Though 
Ave  know  no  particulars  respecting  operations  against  Persia,  since 
the  attack  on  Eion,  such  operations  must  have  been  going  on ;  but 
.pedition  under  Kimon,  undertaken  not  long  after  the  K ax ian 
revolt,  was  attended  with  memorable  results.  That  commander, 
having  under  him  200  triremes  from  Athens,  and  100  from  the  vari- 
ous confederate,-,  was  dispatched  to  attack  the  Persians  on  the  south- 
western and  southern  coa,-t  of  Asia  Minor.  He  attacked  and  drove 
out  si  vera]  of  their  garrisons  from  various  Grecian  settlements,  both 
in  Karia  and  Lykia;  among  others,  the  important  trading  city  of 
Phaselis,  though  at  firsl  resisting  and  even  standing  a  siege,  was  pre- 
vailed upon  by  the  friendly  suggestions  of  the  Chians  in  Kimon's 
armament  to  pay  a  contribution  of  ten  talents  and  join  the  expedi- 
tion. From  the  length  of  time  occupied  in  these  various  under- 
takings, the  Persian  satraps  had  been  enabled  to  assemble  a  powerful 
force,  both  fleet  and  army,  near  the  mouth  of  the  river  Eurymedon 


DEFEAT  OF  THE  PERSIANS  BY   KIMON.        405 

in  Pamphylia,  under  the  command  of  Tithraustes  and  Pherendates, 
both  of  the  regal  blood.  The  fleet,  chiefly  Phoenician,  seems  to  have 
consisted  of  200  ships,  but  a  farther  re-enforcement  of  eighty  Phoeni- 
cian ships  was  expected,  and  was  actually  near  at  hand,  so  that  the 
commanders  were  unwilling  to  hazard  a  battle  before  its  arrival 
Kimon,  anxious  for  the  same  reason  to  hasten  on  the  combat,  attacked 
them  vigorously.  Partly  from  their  inferiority  of  numbers,  partly 
from  discouragement  at  the  absence  of  the  reinforcement,  they  seem 
to  have  made  no  strenuous  resistance.  They  were  put  to  flight  and 
driven  ashore;  so  speedily,  and  with  so  little  loss  to  the  Greeks,  that 
Kimon  was  enabled  to  disembark  his  men  forthwith,  and  attack  the 
land-force  which  was  drawn  up  on  shore  to  protect  them.  The 
battle  on  land  was  long  and  gallantly  contested,  but  Kimon  at  length 
gained  a  complete  victory,  dispersed  the  army  with  the  capture  of  many 
prisoners,  and  either  took  or  destrooed  the  entire  fleet.  As  soon  as 
his  victory  and  his  prisoners  were  secured,  he  sailed  to  Cyprus  for 
the  purpose  of  intercepting  the  re-enforcement  of  eighty  Phoenician 
ships  in  their  way,  and  was  fortunate  enough  to  attack  them  while 
yet  they  were  ignorant  of  the  victories  of  the  Eurymedon.  These 
ships  too  were  all  destroyed,  though  most  of  the  crews  appear  to 
have  escaped  ashore  on  the  island.  Two  great  victories,  one  at  sea 
and  the  other  on  land,  gained  on  the  same  day  by  the  same  arma- 
ment, counted  with,  reason  among  the  most  glorious  of  all  Grecian 
exploits,  and  were  extolled  as  such  in  the  inscription  of  the  com- 
memorative offering  to  Apollo,  set  up  out  of  the  tithe  of  the  spoils. 
The  number  of  prisoners,  as  well  as  the  booty  taken  by  the  victors, 
was  immense. 

A  victory  thus  remarkable,  which  thrust  back  the  Persians  to  the 
region  eastward  of  Phaselis,  doubtless  fortified  materially  the  posi- 
tion of  the  Athenian  confederacy  against  them.  But  it  tended  not 
less  to  exalt  the  reputation  of  Athens,  and  even  to  popularize  her 
with  the  confederates  generally,  from  the  large  amount  of  plunder 
divisible  among  them.  Probably  this  increased  power  and  popularity 
stood  her  in  stead  throughout  her  approaching  contest  with  Thasos, 
at  the  same  time  that  it  explains  the  increasing  fear  and  dislike  of 
the  Peloponnesians. 

Thasos  was  a  member  of  the  confederacy  of  Delos ;  but  her  quarrel 
with  Athens  seems  to  have  arisen  out  of  causes  quite  distinct  from 
confederate  relations.  It  has  been  already  stated  that  the  Athenians 
had  within  the  last  few  jrears  expelled  the  Persians  from  the  impor- 
tant post  Eion  on  the  Stryinon,  the  most  convenient  post  for  the 
neighboring  region  of  Thrace,  which  was  not  less  distinguished  for 
its  fertility  than  for  its  mining  wealth.  In  the  occupation  of  this 
post,  the  Athenians  had  had  time  to  become  acquainted  with  the 
productive  character  of  the  adjoining  region,  chiefly  occupied  by 
the  Edonian  Thracians;  and  it  is  extremely  probable  that  many 
private  settlers  arrived  from  Athena,  with   the  view  of  procuring 


406        GRECIAN  CONFEDERACY  UNDER  ATHENS. 

grants,  or  making  their  fortunes  by  partnership  with  powerful 
Thracians  i'1  working  the  gold-mines  round  Mount  Pangseus.  In  so 
doing,  they  speedily  found  themselves  in  collision  with  the  Greeks 

of  the  opposite  island  of  Mount  Thasos,  who  possessed  a  con  ul'  r- 
able  Strip  Of  land  With  various  dependent  towns  on   the   eontinent   of 

Thrace,  and  derived  a  large  revenue  from  the  mines  of  Skapte  Hyle, 
as  well  as  from  others  in  the  neighborhood.  The  condition  of 
Thasos  at  this  time  (about  465  B.C.)  indicates  to  us  the  progri  - 
which  the  Grecian  states  in  the  ZEgean  had  made  since  their  libera- 
tion from  Persia.  It  had  been  deprived  both  of  its  fortifications  and 
of  its  maritime  force,  by  order  of  Darius,  about  491  B.C.,  and  must 
have  remained  in  this  condition  until  after  the  repu'se  of  Xerxes; 
hut  we  now  find  it  well  fortified  and  possessing  a  powerful  maritime 
force. 

In  what  precise  manner  the  quarrel  between  the  Thasians  of  Eion 
manifested  itself,  respecting  the  trade  and  the  mines  in  Thrace,  we  are 
not  informed.  But  it  reached  such  a  height  that  Die  Athenians  were 
induced  to  send  a  powerful  armament  against  the  island,  under  the 
command  of  Kimon.  Having  vanquished  the  Thasian  force  at  sea, 
they  disembarked,  gained  various  battles,  and  blocked  up  the  city  by 
land  as  well  as  by  sea.  And  at  the  same  time  they  undertook — what 
seems  to  have  been  part  and  parcel  of  the  same  scheme— the  estab- 
lishment of  a  larger  and  more  powerful  colony  on  Thracian  ground 
not  far  from  Eion.  On  the  Strymon,  about  three  miles  higher  up 
than  Eion,  near  the  spot  where  the  river  narrows  itself  again  out  of 
a  broad  expanse  of  the  nature  of  a  lake,  was  situated  the  Edonian 
town  or  settlement  called  Ennea  Hodoi  (Nine  Ways),  a  little  above 
the  bridge,  which  here  served  as  an  important  communication  for 
all  the  people  of  the  interior.  Both  Histiaeus  ami  Aristagoras,  the 
two  Milesian  despots,  had  been  tempted  by  the  advantages  of  this 
place  to  commence  a  settlement  there:  both  of  them  had  failed,  and 
a  third  failure  on  a  still  grander  scale  was  now  about  to  be  added. 
The  Athenians  sent  thither  a  large  body  of  colonists,  10,000  ii> 
number,  partly  from  their  own  citizens,  partly  collected  from  their 
allies;  the  temptations  of  the  site  probably  rendering  volunteers 
numerous.  As  far  as  Eiinea  Hodoi  was  concerned,  they  were  suc- 
cessful in  conquering  it  and  driving  away  the  Edonian  possessors. 
Bu1  on  trying  to  extend  themselves  farther  to  the  eastward,  to  a  spot 
called  Drabekus,  convenient  for  the  mining  region,  they  encountered 
a  more  formidable  resistance  from  a  powerful  alliance  of  Thracian 
tribes,  who  had  come  to  aid  the  Edonians  in  decisive  hostility 
against  the  new7  colony — probably  not  without  instigation  from 
the  inhabitants  of  Thasos.  All  or  most  of  the  10,000  colonists 
were  slain  in  this  warfare,  and  the  new  colony  was  for  the  time 
completely  abandoned.     We  shall  find  it  resumed  hereafter. 

Disappointed  as  the  Athenians  were  in  this  enterprise,  they  did  not 
abandon  the  blockade  of  Thasos,   which  held  out  more  than  two 


APPLICATION  TO  SPARTA  FOR  AID.  407 

years,  and  only  surrendered  in  the  third  year.  Its  fortifications  were 
razed;  its  ships  of  war,  thirty-three  in  number,  were  taken  away; 
its  possessions  and  mining  establishments  on  the  opposite  continent 
were  relinquished.  Moreover  an  immediate  contribution  in  money 
was  demanded  from  the  inhabitants,  over  and  above  the  annual  pay- 
ment assessed  upon  them  for  the  future.  The  subjugation  of  this 
powerful  island  was  another  step  in  the  growing  dominion  of  Athens 
over  her  confederates. 

The  year  before  the  Thasiana  surrendered,  however,  they  had 
taken  a  step  which  deserves  particular  notice,  as  indicating  the 
newly-gathering  clouds  in  the  Grecian  political  horizon  They  had 
made  secret  application  to  the  Lacedaemonians  for  aid,  entreating 
them  to  draw  off  the  attention  of  Athens  by  invading  Attica;  and  the 
Lacedaemonians,  without  the  knowledge  of  Athens,  having  actually 
engaged  to  comply  with  this  request,  were  only  prevented  from  per- 
forming their  promise  by  a  grave  and  terrible  misfortune  at  home. 
Though  accidentally  unperformed,  this  hostile  promise  is  a  most  sig- 
nificant event.  It  marks  the  growing  fear  ar.d  hatred  on  the  part  of 
Sparta  and  the  Peloponnesians  towards  Athens,  merely  on  general 
grounds  of  the  magnitude  of  her  power,  and  without  any  special 
provocation.  Nay,  not  only  had  Athens  given  no  provocation,  but 
she  was  still  actually  included  as  a  member  of  the  Lacedaemonian 
alliance,  and  we  shall  find  her  presently  both  appealed  to  and  acting 
as  such.  We  shall  hear  so  much  of  Atnens,  and  that  too  with  truth, 
as  pushing  and  aggressive — and  of  Sparta  as  home-keeping  and 
defensive— that  the  incident  just  mentioned  becomes  important  to 
remark.  The  first  intent  of  unprovoked  and  even  treacherous  hos- 
tility— the  germ  of  the  future  Peloponnesian  war — is  conceived  and 
reduced  to  an  engagement  by  Sparta. 

We  are  told  by  Plutarch,  that  the  Athenians,  after  the  surrender 
of  Thasos  and  the  liberation  of  the  armament,  had  expected  from 
Kimon  some  farther  conquests  in  Macedonia — and  even  that  he  had 
actually  entered  upon  that  project  with  such  promise  of  success,  that 
its  farther  consummation  wTas  certain  as  well  as  easy.  Having  under 
these  circumstances  relinquished  it  and  returned  to  Athens,  he  was 
accused  by  Perikles  and  others  of  having  been  bought  off  by  bribes 
from  the  Macedonian  king  Alexander;  but  was  acquitted  after  a  pub- 
lic trial. 

During  the  period  which  had  elapsed  between  the  first  formation 
of  the  confederacy  of  Delos  and  the  capture  of  Thasos  (about  thir- 
teen or  fourteen  years,  B.C.  477-463),  the  Athenians  seem  to  have 
been  occupied  almost  entirely  in  their  maritime  operations,  chiefly 
against  the  Persians — having  been  free  from  embarrassments  imme- 
diately round  Attica.  But  this  freedom  was  not  destined  to  last 
much  longer.  During  the  ensuing  ten  years,  their  foreign  relations 
near  home  become  both  active  and  complicated;  while  their  strength 
expands  so  wonderfully,  that  they  are  found  competent  at  once  to 


408       GRECIAN  CONFEDERACY  UNDER  ATHENS. 

obligations  on  both  sides  of  the  iEgean  sea,  the  distant  as  well  as  the 
near. 

Of  the  incidents  which  had  taken  place  is  Central  Greece  during 
the  twelve  or  fifteen  years  immediately  succeeding  the  battle  of 
PI  itsea,  we  have  scarcely  any  information.  The  feelings  of  the  time, 
n  those  Greeks  who  had  supported  and  those  who  had  re.--i.sted 
the  Persian  invader,  must  nave  remained  unfriendly  even  alter  the 
war  was  at  an  end;  while  the  mere  Occupation  of  the  Persian  num- 
erous host  must  have  inflicted  severe  damage  both  upon  Thessaly 
and  Bceotia.  At  the  meeting  of  the  Amphiktyonic  synod  which 
succeeded  the  expulsion  of  the  invaders,  a  reward  was  proclaimed 
for  the  life  of  the  Melian  Kphia'.tes,  who  had  betrayed  to  Xerxes 
the  mountain-path  over  (Eta,  and  thus  caused  the  ruin  of  Leonidas 
at  Thermopylae.  Moreover,  if  we  may  trust  Plutarch,  it  was  even 
proposed  by  Eaeediemon  that  all  the  virilizing  Greeks  should  be 
expelled  from  the  synod— a  proposition  which  the  more  long-sighted 
views  of  Themistokles  successfully  resisted.  Even  the  stronger 
measure  of  razing  the  fortifications  of  all  the  extra-Peloponnesian 
cities,  from  fear  that  they  might  be  used  to  aid  some  future  invasion, 
had  suggested  itself  to  the  Lacedaemonians — as  we  see  from  their 
language  on  the  occasion  of  rebuilding  the  walls  of  Athens.  In 
regard  to  Bceotia,  it  appears  that  the  headship  of  Thebes  as  well  as 
the  coherence  of  the  federation  was  for  the  time  almost  suspended. 
The  destroyed  towns  of  Plataea  and  Thespiae  were  restored,  and  the 
latter  in  part  repeopled,  under  Athenian  influence.  The  general  senti- 
ment of  Peloponnesus  as  well  as  ct  Athens  would  have  sustained  these 
townsagainst  Thebes,  if  the  latter  had  tried  at  that  time  to  enforce  her 
supremacy  over  them  in  the  name  of  "  ancient  Boeotian  right  and 
usage."  The  Theban  government  was  then  in  discredit  for  its  pre- 
vious ?«<  dism — even  in  the  eyes  of  Thebans  themselves;  while  the  party 
opposed  to  Thebes  in  the  other  towns  was  so  powerful,  that  many 
of  them  would  probably  have  been  severed  from  the  federation  to 
become  allies  of  Athens  like  Plataea,  if  the  interference  of  Lace- 
diuiioii  had  not  arrested  such  a  tendency.  Laceda'mon  was  in  even- 
other  part  of  Greece  an  enemy  to  organized  aggregation  of  cities, 
either  equal  or  unequal,  and  was  constantly  bent  on  keeping  the 
little  autonomous  commun'ties  S'p-rate;  whence  she  sometimes 
became  by  accident  the  protector  of  the  weaker  cities  against  com- 
pulsory  alliance  imposed  upon  them  by  the  stronger.  The  interest 
of  her  own  ascendency  was  in  this  respect  analogous  to  that  of  the 
Persians  when  they  dictated  the  peace  of  Antalkidas — of  the  Romans 
in  administering  their  extensive  conquests — and  of  the  kings  of 
Medieval  Europe  in  breaking  the  authority  of  the  barons  over  their 
vassals.  But  though  such  was  the  policy  of  Sparta  elsewhere,  hei 
fear  of  Athens,  which  grew  up  during  the  ensuing  twenty  years, 
made  her  act  differently  in  regard  to  Bceotia.  She  had  no  other  mean? 
of  maintaining  that  country  as  her   own  ally  and  as  the  enemy  of 


EVENTS  IN  PELOPONNESUS.  409 

Athens,  except,  by  organizing  the  federation  effectively,  and  strength- 
ening the  authority  of  Thebes.  It  is  to  this  revolution  in  Spartan 
politics  that  Thebes  owed  the  recovery  of  her  ascendency — a  revolu- 
tion so  conspicuously  marked,  that  the  Spartans  even  aided  in 
enlarging  her  circuit  and  improving  her  fortifications.  It  was  not 
without  difficulty  that  she  maintained  this  position  even  when  recov- 
ered, against  the  dangerous  neighborhood  of  Athens— a  circumstance 
which  made  her  not  only  a  vehement  partisan  of  Sparta,  but  even 
more  furiously  anti-Athenian  than  Sparta,  down  to  the  close  of  the 
Pcloponnesiau  war. 

The  revolution,  just  noticed,  in  Spartan  politics  toward  Bceotia, 
did  not  manifest  itself  until  about  twenty  years  after  the  commence- 
ment of  the  Athenian  maritime  confederacy.  During  the  course  of 
those  twenty  years,  we  know  that  Sparta  had  had  more  than  one  battle 
to  sustain  in  Arcadia,  against  the  towns  and  villages  of  that  country, 
in  which  she  came  forth  victorious;  but  we  have  no  particulars  respect- 
ing these  incidents.  We  also  know  that  a  few  years  after  the  Persian 
invasion,  the  inhabitants  of  Elis  concentrated  themselves  from  many 
dispersed  townships  into  the  one  main  city  of  Elis:  and  it  seems 
probable  that  Lepreum  in  Triphylia,  and  one  or  two  of  the  towns  of 
Achaia,  were  either  formed  or  enlarged  by  a  similar  process  near 
about  the  same  time.  Such  aggregation  of  towns  out  of  the  pre-ex- 
isting separate  villages  was  not  conformable  to  the  views,  nor  favor- 
able to  the  ascendency  of  Lacedaemon.  But  there  can  be  little  doubt 
that  her  foreign  policy  after  the  Persian  invasion  was  both  embar- 
rassed and  discredited  by  the  misconduct  of  her  two  contemporary 
kings,  Pausanias  (who  though  only  regent  was  practically  equivalent 
to  a  king)  and  Leotychides — not  to  mention  the  rapid  development  of 
Athens  and  Peirasus. 

Moreover,  in  the  year  b.c.  464  (the  year  preceding  the  surrender  of 
Thasos  to  the  Athenian  armament),  a  misfortune  of  yet  more  terrific 
moment  befell  Sparta.  A  violent  earthquake  took  place  in  the  imme- 
diate neighborhood  of  Sparta  itself,  destroying  a  large  portion  of 
the  towm,  and  a  vast  number  of  lives,  many  of  them  Spartan  citizens. 
It  wTas  the  judgment  of  the  earth-shaking  god  Poseidon  (according  to 
the  view  of  the  Lacedaemonians  themselves)  for  a  recent  violation  of 
his  sanctuary  at  Taenarus,  from  whence  certain  suppliant  Helots  had 
been  dragged  away  not  long  before  for  punishment:  not  improbably 
some  of  those  Helots  whom  Pausanias  had  instigated  to  revolt.  The 
sentiment  of  the  Helots,  at  all  times  one  of  enmity  toward  their  mas- 
ters, appears  at  this  moment  to  have  been  unusually  inflammable:  so 
that  an  earthquake  at  Sparta,  especially  an  earthquake  construed  as 
divine  vengeance  for  Helot  blood  recently  spilt,  was  sufficient  to 
rouse  many  of  them  at  once  into  revolt,  together  with  some  even  of 
the  Perioeki.  The  insurgents  took  arms  ana  marched  directly  upon 
Sparta,  which  they  were  on  the  point  of  mastering  during  the  first 
moments  of  consternation,  had  not  the  bravery  and  presence  of  mind 


410        GREC'IVX  CONFEDERACY  UNDER  ATHENS. 

of  the  young  king  Archidamus  reanimated  the  surviving  citizens  and 
repelled  the  attack.  But  though  repelled,  the  insurgents  were  not 
Bubdued,  They  maintained  the  field  against  the  Spartan  force, 
sometimes  with  considerable  advantage,  since  Aeimnestus  (the  war- 
rior by  whose  hand  Mardonius  had  fallen  at  Plataea)  was  defeated  and 
slain  with  300  followers  in  the  plain  of  Stenvklerus,  overpowered  by 
superior  numbers.  When  at  length  defeated,  they  occupied  and 
fortified  the  memorable  hill  of  Ithome,  the  ancient  citadel  of  Iheir 
Messenian  forefatheis.  Here  they  made  a  long  and  obstinate 
defense,  supporting  themselves  doubtless  by  incursions  throughout 
Laconia.  Defense  indeed  was  not  difficult,  seeing  that  the  Lacedae- 
monians were  at  that  time  confessedly  incapable  of  assailing  even 
the  most  imperfect  species  of  fortification.  Alter  the  siege  had  lasted 
some  two  or  three  years,  without  any  prospect  of  success,  the  Lace- 
daemonians, beginning  to  despair  of  their  own  sufficiency  for  the 
undertaking,  invoked  the  aid  of  their  various  allies,  among  whom  we 
find  specified  the  iEginetans,  the  Athenians,  and  the  Plataeans.  The 
Athenian  troops  are  said  to  have  consisted  of  4,000  men,  under  the 
command  of  Kimon;  Athens  being  still  included  in  the  list  of  Lace- 
daemonian allies. 

So  imperfect  were  the  means  of  attacking  walls  at  that  day,  even 
for  the  most  intelligent  Greeks,  that  this  increased  force  made  no 
immediate  impression  on  the  fortified  hill  of  Ithome.  And  when  the 
Lacedaemonians  saw  that  their  Athenian  allies  were  not  more  success- 
ful than  they  had  been  been  themselves,  they  soon  passed  from  sur- 
prise into  doubt,  mistrust,  and  apprehension.  The  troops  had  given 
no  ground  for  such  a  feeling,  while  Kimon  their  general  was  notorious 
for  his  attachment  to  Sparta.  Yet  the  Lacedaemonians  could  not 
help  suspecting  the  ever-wakeful  energy  and  ambition  of  these  Ionic 
strangers  whom  they  introduced  into  the  interior  of  Laconia.  Call- 
ing to  mind  their  own  promise — though  doubtless  a  secret  promise — 
to  invade  Attica  not  long  before,  for  the  benefit  of  the  Thasians — 
they  even  began  to  fear  that  the  Athenians  might  turn  against  them, 
and  listen  to  solicitations  for  espousing  the  cause  of  the  besieged. 
Under  the  influence  of  such  apprehensions,  they  dismissed  the  Athe- 
nian contingent  forthwith,  on  pretense  of  having  no  farther  occasion 
for  them;  while  all  the  other  allies  were  retained,  and  the  siege  or 
blockade  wTent  on  as  before. 

This  dismissal,  ungracious  in  the  extreme  and  probably  rendered 
even  more  offensive  by  the  habitual  roughness  of  Spartan  dealing, 
excited  the  strongest  exasperation  both  among  the  Athenian  soldiers 
and  the  Athenian  people — an  exasperation  heightened  by  circum- 
stances immediately  preceding.  For  the  resolution  to  send  auxili- 
aries into  Laconia,  when  the  Lacedaemonians  first  applied  for  them, 
had  not  been  taken  without  considerable  debate  at  Athens.  The 
party  of  Perikles  and  Ephialtes,  habitually  in  opposition  to  Kimon, 
and  partisans  c>(  the  forward  democratical  movement,  had  strongly 


MISTRUST  OF    IB£  ATHENIAN  AUXILIARIES.     4H 

discountenanced  it,  and  conjured  their  countrymen  not  to  assist 
in  renovating  and  strengthening  their  most  formidable  rival. 
Perhaps  the  previous  engagement  of  the  Lacedaemonians  to  invade 
Attica  on  behalf  of  the  Thasians  may  have  become  known  to 
them,  though  not  so  formally  as  to  exclude  denial.  And  even 
supposing  this  engagement  to  In  ve  remained  unknown  at  that 
time  to  every  one,  there  were  not  wanting  other  grounds  to 
render  the  policy  of  refusal  plausible.  But  Kimon — with  an  ear- 
nestness which  even  the  philo-Laccnian  Kritias  afterward  charac- 
terized as  a  sacrifice  of  the  grandeur  of  Athens  to  the  advantage 
of  Lacedaemon — employed  all  his  credit  and  influence  in  seconding 
the  application.  The  maintenance  of  alliance  with  Sparta  on  equal 
footing — peace  among  the  great  powers  of  Greece  and  common  war 
against  Persia — together  with  the  prevention  of  all  further  demo- 
crat ical  changes  in  Athens — were  the  leading  points  of  his  political 
creed.  As  yet,  both  his  personal  and  political  ascendency  wrere  pre- 
dominant over  his  opponents.  As  yet,  there  was  no  manifest  ci in- 
flict, which  had  only  just  begun  to  show  itself  in  the  case  of  Thasos, 
between  the  maritime  power  of  Athens  and  the  union  of  land  force 
uuder  Sparta;  and  Kimon  could  still  treat  both  of  these  phenomena 
as  coexisting  necessities  of  Hellenic  well-being.  Though  noway  dis- 
tinguished as  a  speaker,  he  carried  with  hin  the  Athenian  assembly 
by  appealing  to  a  large  and  generous  patriotism,  which  forbade  them 
to  permit  the  humiliation  of  Sparta.  "Consent  not  to  see  Hellas 
lamed  of  one  leg  and  Athens  drawing  without  her  yoke-fellow;" — 
such  was  his  language,  as  we  learn  from  his  friend  and  companion 
the  Chion  poet  Ion:  and  in  the  lips  of  Kimon  it  proved  effective.  It 
is  a  speech  of  almost  melancholy  interest,  since  ninety  years  passed 
over  before  such  an  appeal  was  ever  again  addressed  to  an  Athenian 
assembly.  The  dispatch  of  the  auxiliaries  was  thus  dictated  by  a 
generous  sentiment,  to  the  disregard  of  what  might  seem  political 
prudence.  And  we  may  imagine  the  violent  reaction  which  took 
place  in  Athenian  feeling  when  the  Lacedaemonians  repaid  them  by 
singling  out  their  troops  from  all  the  other  allies  as  objects  of  insult 
ing  suspicion.  We  may  imagine  the  triumph  of  Perikles  and  Eph*- 
altes,  who  had  opposed  the  mission — and  the  vast  loss  of  influence  to 
Kimon,  who  had  brought  it  about — when  Athens  received  again  into 
her  public  assembly  the  hoplites  sent  back  from  Ithome. 

Both  in  the  internal  constitution,  indeed  (of  which  more  presently), 
and  in  the  external  policy,  of  Athens,  the  dismissal  of  these  soldiers 
was  pregnant  with  results.  The  Athenians  immediately  passed  a 
formal  resolution  to  renounce  the  alliance 'between  themselves  and 
Lacedaemon  against  the  Persians.  They  did  more:  they  looked  out 
for  land-enemies  of  Lacedaemon,  with  whom  to  ally  themselves. 

Of  these  by  far  the  first,  both  in  Hellenic  rank  and  in  real  power, 
was  Argos.  That  city,  neutral  during  the  Persian  invasion,  had 
now  recovered  the  effects  of  the  destructive  defeat  suffered  about 


412      GRECIAN  CONFEDERACY   UNDER  ATHENS. 

thirty  year.-  before  from  the  Spartan  king  Kleomenes,  The  - 
the  ancienl  citizens  Lad  grown  to  manhood,  and  the  temporary  pre- 
dominance of  the  Pcrioeki,  acquired  in  consequence  of  the  ruinous 
of  citizens  in  thai  defeat,  Lad  been  again  pul  down,  In  the 
neighborhood  of  Argos,  ami  dependenl  upon  it,  wen •  situated  Mykenae, 
Tiryns,  and  Midea— small  in  power  and  importance,  but  rich  in 
mythical  renown.  Disdaining  the  inglorious  example  of  Argos  at 
the  period  of  danger,  these  towns  had  furnished  contingents  botb  to 
Tli  rmopylse  and  Platsea,  which  their  powerful  neighbor  Lad  in  en 
unable  either  to  prevent  at  the  time  or,to  avenge  afterward,  from 
fear  of  the  intervention  of  Lacedsemon.  But  so  soon  as  the  latter 
was  seen  to  be  endangered  and  occupied  at  home,  with  a  formidable 
Messenian  revolt,  the  Argeians  availed  themselves  of  the  opportunity 
to  attack  not  only  Mykenae  and  Tiryns,  but  also  Orneae,  Midea,  and 
other  si  mi  dependent  towns  around  them.  Several  of  these  were 
reduced;  and  the  inhabitants,  robbed  of  their  autonomy,  were  incor- 
porated with  the  domain  of  iLrgos:  but  the  Mykenaeans,  partly  from 
the  superior  gallantry  of  their  resistance,  partly  from  jealousy  of 
their  mythical  renown,  were  either  sold  as  slaves  or  driven  into 
banishment.  Through  these  victories  Argos  was  now  more  powerful 
than  ever,  and  the  propositions  of  alliance  made  to  her  by  Athens, 
while  strengthening  both  the  two  against  Lacedaemon,  opened  to  her 
u  new  chance  of  recovering-  her  lost  headship  in  Peloponnesus.  The 
Thessalians  became  members  of  this  new  alliance,  which  was  a 
defensive  alliance  against  Lacedsemon:  and  hopes  -were  doubtless 
entertained  of  drawing  in  some  of  the  habitual  allies  of  the  latter. 

The  new  character  which  Athens  had  thus  assumed,  as  a  com- 
petitor for  landed  alliances  not  less  than  for  maritime  ascendency, 
came  opportunely  for  the  protection  of  the  neighboring  towu  of 
Megara.  It  appears  that  Corinth,  perhaps  instigated  like  Argos  by 
the  helplessness  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  bad  been  making  border 
encroachments  on  the  one  side  upon  Kleonse — on  the  other  side  upon 
Megara:  on  which  ground  the  latter,  probably  despairing  of  protec- 
tion from  Lacedsemon,  renounced  the Laceaaemonian  connection,  and 
obtained  permission  to  enroll  herself  as  an  ally  of  Athens.  This  was 
an  acquisition  of  signal  value  to  the  Athenians,  since  it  both  opened 
to  them  the  whole  range  of  territory  across  the  outer  Isthmus  of 
Corinth  to  the  interior  of  the  Krissoean  Gulf,  on  which  the  Megarian 
port  of  Peg83  was  situated — and  placed  them  in  possession  of  the 
passes  of  Mount  Geraneia,  so  that  they  could  arrest  the  march  of  a 
Peloponnesian  army  over  the  Isthmus,  and  protect  Attica  from  inva- 
sion. It  was  moreover  of  great  importance  in  its  effects  on  Grecian 
politics:  for  it  was  counted  as  a  wrong  by  Lacedsemon,  gave  deadly 
offense  to  the  Corinthians,  and  lighted  up  the  flames  of  war  between 
them  and  Athens;  their  allies  the  Epidaurians  and  /Eginetans  taking 
their  part.  Though  Athens  had  not  yet  been  guilty  of  unjust 
encroachment   against    any   Peloponnesian  state,  her   ambition   and 


CENTER  CROUP  ENLARCED. 
THE  CABLE-CROUP  OF  THE  TEMPLE  OF  MINERVA  AT  AECINA. 


ACTION  OF  THE  ATHENIANS.  413 

energy  had  inspired  universal  awe;  while  the  maritime  states  in  the 
neighborhood,  such  as  Corinth,  Epidaurus,  and  JEgina,  saw  these 
terror-striking  qualities  threatening  them  at  their  own  doors,  through 
her  alliance  with  Argos  and  Megara.  Moreover.it  is  probable  that 
the  ancient  feud  between  the  Athenians  and  J3ginetans,  though  dor- 
mant since  a  little  before  the  Persian  invasion,  had  never  been 
appeased  or  forgotten:  so  that  the  iEginetans,  dwelling  within  sight 
of  Peirseus,  were  at  once  best  able  to  appreciate,  and  most  likely  to 
dread,  the  enormous  maritime  power  now  possessed  by  Athens. 
Perikles  was  wont  to  call  JEgiua  the  eyesore  of  Peirseus:  but  we  may 
be  sure  that  Peirseus,  grown  into  a  vast  fortified  port  within  tin- 
existing  generation,  was  in  a  much  stronger  degree  the  eyesore  of 
JEgina. 

The  Athenians  were  at  this  time  actively  engaged  in  prosecuting 
the  war  against  Persia,  having  a  fleet  of  no  less  than  two  hundred 
sail,  equipped  by  or  from  the  confederacy  collectively,  now  serving 
in  Cyprus  and  on  the  Phenician  coast.  Moreover  the  revolt  of  the 
Egyptians  under  Inaros  (about  460  B.C.)  opened  to  them  new  means 
of  action  against  the  Great  King.  Their  fleet,  by  invitation  of  the 
revolters,  sailed  up  the  Nile  to  Memphis,  where  there  seemed  at  first 
a  good  prospect  of  throwing  off  the  Persian  dominion.  Yet  in  spite 
of  so  great  an  abstraction  from  their  disposable  force,  their  military 
operations  near  home  were  conducted  with  unabated  vigor:  and  the 
inscription  which  remains — a  commemoration  of  their  citizens  of  the 
Erechtheid  tribe  who  were  slain  in  one  and  the  same  year  in  Cyprus, 
Egypt,  Phenicia,  the  Halieis,  iEgina,  and  Megara — brings  forcibly 
before  us  that  energy  which  astonished  and  even  alarmed  their  con- 
temporaries. 

Their  first  proceedings  at  Megara  were  of  a  nature  altogether  novel, 
in  the  existing  condition  of  Greece.  It  was  necessary  for  the  Athe- 
nians to  protect  their  new  ally  against  the  superiority  of  Pelopon- 
n'esian  land-force,  and  to  insure  a  constant  communication  with  it 
by  sea.  But  the  city  (like  most  of  the  ancient  Hellenic  towns)  was 
situated  on  a  hill  at  some  distance  from  the  sea,  separated  from  its 
port  Nisoea  by  a  space  of  nearly  one  mile.  One  of  the  earliest  pro- 
ceedings of  the  Athenians  was  to  build  two  lines  of  wall,  near  and 
parallel  to  each  other,  connecting  the  city  with  Nissea;  so  that  the 
two  thus  formed  one  continuous  fortress,  wnerein  a  standing  Athe- 
nian garrison  was  maintained,  with  the  constant  means  of  succor 
from  Athens  in  case  of  need.  These  "  Long  Walls,"  though  after- 
ward copied  in  other  places  and  on  a  larger  scale,  were  at  that 
juncture  an  ingenious  invention,  for  the  purpose  of  extending  the 
maritime  arm  of  Athens  to  an  inland  city. 

The  first  operations  of  Corinth  however  were  not  directed  against 
Megara.  The  Athenians,  having  undertaken  a  landing  in  the  territory 
of  the  Halieis  (the  population  of  the  southern  Argolic  peninsula, 
bordering  on  Trcezen  and  Hermione),  were  defeated  on  land  by  the 


414      GRECIAN   CONFEDERACY    UrN'DER    ATHENS. 

Corinthian  and  Epidaurian  forces:  possibly  it  mt^  have  been  in  this 
expedition  that  they  acquired  possession  of  Truv.cn,  which  we  find 
afterward  in  their  dependence,  without  knowing  when  ii  became  so. 
But  in  a  sea-fighl  which  took  place  off  the  island  of  Kekryphaleia 
(between  .Egina  and  the  Argolic  peninsula)  the  Athenians  gained  the 
victon-.  After  this  victory  and  defeat — neither  of  them  apparently 
very  decisive — the  /Eginetans  began  to  take  a  more  energetic  part  in 
the  war,  and  brought  out  their  full  naval  force  together  with  that  of 
their  allies— Corinthians,  Epidaurians,  and  other  Peloponnesians: 
while  Athens  equipped  a  fleet  of  corresponding  magnitude,  sum- 
moning her  allies  also;  though  we  do  not  know  the  actual  numbers 
on  either  side'.  In  the  great  naval  battle  which  ensued  ofT  the  island 
of  ./Egina,  the  superiority  of  the  new  nautical  tactics  acquired  by 
twenty  years'  practice  of  the  Athenians  since  the  Persian  war — over 
the  old  Hellenic  ships  and  seamen,  as  shown  in  those  states  where 
at  the  time  of  the  battle  of  Marathon  the  maritime  strength  of  Greece 
had  resided — was  demonstrated  by  a  victory  most  complete  and 
decisive.  The  Peloponnesian  and  Dorian  seamen  had  as  yet  had  no 
experience  of  the  improved  seacraft  of  Athens,  and  when  we  find 
how  much  they  were  disconcerted  with  it  even  twenty-eight  years 
afterward  at  the  beginning  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  we  shall  not 
wonder  at  its  destructive  effect  upon  them  in  this  early  battle.  The 
maritime  power  of  iEgina  was  irrecoverably  ruined.  The  Athenians 
captured  seventy  ships  of  war,  landed  a  large  force  upon  the  island, 
and  commenced  the  siege  of  the  city  by  land  as  well  as  by  sea. 

If  the  Lacedaemonians  had  not  been  occupied  at  home  by  the 
blockade  of  Ithomc,  they  would  have  been  probably  induced  to 
invade  Attica  as  a  diversion  to  the  iEginetans;  especially  as  the 
Persian  Megabazus  came  to  Sparta  at  this  time  on  the  part  of  Artax- 
erxes  to  prevail  upon  them  to  do  so,  in  order  that  the  Athenians 
might  be  constrained  to  retire  from  Egypt.  This  Persian  brought 
with  him  a  large  sum  of  money,  but  was  nevertheless  obliged  to 
return  without  effecting  his  mission.  The  Corinthians  and  Epidau- 
rians however,  while  they  carried  »o  iEgina  a  re-enforcement  of  300 
hoplites,  did  their  best  to  aid  her  farther  by  an  attack  upon  Megara; 
winch  place,  jt  was  supposed,  the  Athenians  could  not  possibly 
relieve  without  "withdrawing  their  forces  from  iEgina,  inasmuch  as 
so  many  o/  their  men  were  at  the  same  time  serving  in  Egypt.  But 
the  Athenians  showed  themselves  equal  to  all  these  three  exigencies 
at  one  and  the  same  time — to  the  great  disappointment  of  their 
enemies.  Myronides  marched  from  Athens  to  Megara  at  the  head 
of  the  citizens  in  the  two  extremes  of  military  age,  old  and  young; 
these  being  the  only  troops  at  home.  He  fought  the  Corinthians 
near  the  town,  gaining  a  slight,  but  debatable,  advantage,  which  he 
commemorated  by  a  trophy,  as  soon  as  the  Corinthians  had  returned 
home.  But  the  latter,  when  they  arrived  at  home,  were  so  much 
reproached  by  their  own  old  citizens,  for  not  having  vanquished  the 


WALLS  BETWEEN  ATHENS  AND  PEIILEUS.      415 

refuse  of  the  Athenian  military  force,  that  they  returned  back  at  the 
end  of  twelve  days  and  erected  a  trophy  on  their  side,  laying  claim 
to  a  victory  in  the  past  battle.  The  Athenians,  marching  out  of 
Megara,  attacked  them  a  second  time,  and  gained  on  this  occasion  a 
decisive  victory.  The  defeated  Corinthians  were  still  more  unfor- 
tunate in  their  retreat;  for  a  body  of  them,  missing  their  road, 
became  entangled  in  a  space  of  private  ground  inclosed  on  every 
side  by  a  deep  ditch,  and  having  only  one  narrow  entrance.  Myro- 
nides,  detecting  this  fatal  mistake,  planted  his  hoplites  at  the 
entrance  to  prevent  their  escape,  and  then  surrounded  the  inclosure 
with  his  light-armed  troops,  who  with  their  missile  weapons  slew  all 
the  Corinthian  hoplites,  without  possibility  either  of  flight  or  resis- 
tance. The  bulk  of  the  Corinthian  army  effected  their  retreat,  but 
the  destruction  of  this  detachment  was  a  sad  blow  to  the  city. 

Splendid  as  the  success  of  the  Athenians  had  been  during  this  year, 
both  on  land  and  at  sea,  it  was  easy  for  them  to  foresee  the  power 
of  their  enemies  would  presently  be  augmented  by  the  Lacedaemon- 
ians taking  the  field.  Partly  on  this  account — partly  also  from  the, 
more  energetic  phase  of  democracy,  and  the  long-sighted  views  of 
Perikles,  which  were  now  becoming  ascendent  in  the  city — the 
Athenians  began  the  stupendous  undertaking  of  connecting  Athens 
with  the  sea  by  means  of  long  walls.  The  idea  of  this  measure  had 
doubtless  been  first  suggested  by  the  recent  erection  of  long  walls, 
though  for  so  much  smaller  a  distance,  between  Megara  and  Nisaea; 
for  without  such  an  intermediate  stepping-stone,  the  project  of  a 
wall  forty  stadia  (=about  4^  Engl,  miles)  to  join  Athens  with 
Peiraeus,  and  another  wall  of  thirty-five  stadia  (==nearly  4  Eng. 
miles)  to  join  it  with  Phalerum,  would  have  appeared  extravagant 
even  to  the  sanguine  temper  of  Athenians — as  it  certainly  would  nave 
seemed  a  few  years  earlier  to  Themistokles  himself.  Coming  as  an 
immediate  sequal  of  great  recent  victories,  and  while,  ^Egina,  the 
great  Dorian  naval  power,  was  prostrate  and  under  blockade,  it 
excited  the  utmost  alarm  among  the  Peloponnesians — being  regarded 
as  the  second  great  stride,  at  once  conspicious  and  of  lasting  effect, 
in  Athenian  ambition,  next  to  the  fortification  of  Peiraus. 

But  besides  this  feeling  in  the  bosom  of  enemies,  %i*e  measure  was 
also  interwoven  with  the  formidable  contention  of  political  parties 
then  going  on  at  Athens.  Kimon  had  been  recently  ostracized ; 
and  the  democratical  movement  pressed  by  Perikks  and  Ephialtes 
(of  which  more  presently)  was  in  its  full  tide  of  success;  yet  not 
without  a  violent  and  unprincipled  opposition  on  the  part  of  those 
who  supported  the  existing  constitution.  Npw  the  long  walls  formed 
a  part  of  the  foreign  policy  of  Perikles,  continuing  on  a  gigantic 
scale  the  plans  of  Themistokles  when  he  first  schemed  the  Peiraeus. 
They  were  framed  to  render  Athens  capable  of  carrying  on  war 
against  any  superiority  of  landed  attack,  and  of  bidding  defiance  to 
the  united  force  of  Peloponnesus.     But  though  thus  calculated  for 


416      GRECIAN   CONFEDERACY   UNDER  ATHENS. 

contingencies  which  a  long-sighted  man  mighl  Bee  gathering  in  the 
distance,  the  new  walls  were,  almost  on  the  same  grounds,  obnoxious 
to  a  considerable  number  of  Athenians;  to  the  party  recently  headed 
by  Kiinon,  who  were  attached  to  the  Lacedaemonian  connection,  and 
desired  above  all  things  to  maintain  peace  at  home  reserving  the 
energies  of  the  state  for  ami  Persian  enterprise:  t<>  many  landed  pro- 
prietors in  Attica,  whom  they  seemed  to  threaten  with  approaching 
invasion  ami  destruction  of  their  territorial  possession:  to  the  rich 
men  and  aristocrats  of  Athens,  averse  in  a  still  closer  contact  and 
amalgamation  with  the  maritime  multitude  in  Peiraeue:  lastly,  per- 
haps to  a  certain  vein  of  old  Attic  feeling,  which  might  look  upon 
the  junction  of  Athens  with  the  separate  demesof  Peira?usand  Phale- 
rnm  as  effacing  the  special  associations  connected  with  the  holy  rock 
of  Athene.  When  to  all  these  grounds  of  opposition,  we  add,  the 
expense  and  trouble  of  the  undertaking  itself,  the  interference  with 
private  property,  the  peculiar  violence  of  party  which  happened 
then  to  be  raging,  and  the  absence  of  a  large  proportion  of  military 
citizens  in  Egypt — we  shall  hardly  be  surprised  to  find  that  the  pro- 
jected long  walls  broughton  a  risk  of  the  most  serious  character  both 
for  Athens  and  her  democracy.  If  any  farther  proof  were  wanting 
of  the  vast  importance  of  these  long  walls,  in  the  eyes  both  of  friends 
and  of  enemies,  we  might  find  it  in  the  fact  that  their  destruction 
lie  prominent  mark  of  Athenian  humiliation  after  the  battle  of 
JSgospotami,  and  their  restoration  the  immediate  boon  of  Pharna- 
bazus  and  Konon  after  the  victory  of  Knidus. 

Under  the  influence  of  the  alarm  now  spread  by  the  proceedings  of 
Athens,  the  Lacedaemonians  were  prevailed  upon  to  undertake  an 
expedition  out  of  Peloponnesus,  although  the  Helots  in  Ithome  were 
not  yet  reduced  to  surrender.  Their  force  consisted  of  1500  troops 
of  their  own,  and  10,000  of  their  various  allies,  under  the  regent 
Nikomedes.  The  ostensible  motive,  or  the  pretense,  for  this  march, 
was  the  protection  of  the  little  territory  of  Doris  against  the  Pho- 
kians,  who  had  recently  invaded  it  and  taken  one  of  its  three  towns. 
The  mere  approach  of  bo  large  a  force  immediately  compelled  the 
Pnokians  to  relinquish  their  conquest,  but  it  was  soon  seen  that  this 
was  only  a  small  part  of  the  objects  of  Sparta,  and  that  her  main 
purpose,  under  instigation  of  the  Corinthians,  was,  to  arrest  the 
aggrandizement  of  Athens.  It  could  not  escape  the  penetration  of 
Corinth,  that  the  Athenians  might  presently  either  enlist  or  constrain 
the  towns  of  Bceotia  in  their  alliance,  as  they  had  recently  acquired 
Megara,  in  addition  to  their  previous  ally  Plataea:  for  the  Boeotian 
federation  was  at  this  time  much  disorganized,  and  Thebes,  its  chief, 
had  never  recovered  her  ascendency  since  the  discredit  of  her  sup- 
port lent  to  the  Persian  invasion.  To  strengthen  Thebes  and  to 
render  her  ascendency  effective  over  the  Boeotian  cities,  was  the  best 
way  of  providing  a  neighbor  at  once  powerful  and  hostile  to  the 
Athenians,  so  as  to  prevent  their  farther  aggrandizement  by  land:  it 


INTENTION  OF  THE   SPARTAN  ARM\.  417 

was  the  same  policy  as  Epaminondas  pursued  eighty  years  after- 
ward, iu  organizing  Arcadia  and  Messene  against  Sparta.  Accord- 
ingly the  Peloponnesian  force  was  now  employed  partly  iu  enlarging 
and  strengthening  the  fortifications  of  Thebes  herself,  partly  in  con- 
straining the  other  Boeotian  cities  into  effective  obedience  to  her 
supremacy;  probably  by  placing  their  governments  in  the  hands  of 
citizens  of  known  oligarchical  politics,  and  perhaps  banishing  sus- 
pected opponents.  To  this  scheme  the  Thebans  lent  themselves  with 
earnestness;  promising  to  keep  down  for  the  future  their  border 
neighbors,  so  as  to  spare  the  necessity  of  armies  coming  from  Sparta. 
But  there  was  also  a  farther  design,  yet  more  important,  in  con- 
templation by  the  Spartans  and  Corinthians.  The  oligarchic  op- 
position at  Athens  were  so  bitterly  hostile  to  the  Long  Walls,  to 
Perikles,  and  to  the  Democratic  movement,  that  several  of  them 
opened  a  secret  negotiation  with  the  Peloponnesian  leaders;  inviting 
them  into  Attica,  and  entreating  their  aid  in  an  internal  rising  forth'* 
purpose  not  only  of  putting  a  stop  to  the  Long  Walls,  but  also  of 
subverting  the  democracy.  The  Peloponnesian  army,  while  prose- 
cuting its  operations  in  Bceotia,  waited  in  hopes  of  seeing  the  Athe- 
nian malcontents  in  arms,  and  encamped  at  Tanagra  on  the  very 
borders  of  Attica  for  the  purpose  of  immediate  co-operation  with 
them.  The  juncture  was  undoubtedly  one  of  much  hazard  for 
Athens,  especially  as  the  ostracized  Kimon  and  his  remaining  friends 
in  the  city  were  suspected  of  being  implicated  in  the  conspiracy. 
But  the  Athenian  leaders,  aware  of  the  Lacedaemonian  operations  in 
Bceotia,  knew  also  what  was  meant  by  the  presence  of  the  army  on 
their  immediate  borders — and  took  decisive  measures  to  avert  the 
danger.  Having  obtained  a  re-enforcement  of  1000  Argeians  and 
some  Thessalian  horse,  they  marched  out  to  Tanagra.  with  the  full 
Athenian  force  then  at  home;  which  must  of  course  have  consisted 
chiefly  of  the  old  and  the  young,  the  same  who  had  fought  under 
Myronides  at  Megara;  for  the  blockade  of  ^Egina  was  still  going  on 
Nor  was  it  possible  for  the  Lacedaemonian  armj'  to  return  into  Pel- 
oponnesus without  fighting;  for  the  Athenians,  masters  of  the  Meg- 
arid,  were  in  possession  of  the  difficult  high  lands  of  Geraneia,  the 
road  or  march  along  the  isthmus;  while  the  Athenian  fleet,  by  means 
of  the  harbor  of  Pegae,  was  prepared  to  intercept  them  if  they  tried 
to  come  by  sea  across  the  Krissaean  Gulf,  by  which  way  it  would 
appear  that  they  had  come  out.  Near  Tanagra  a  bloody  battle  took 
place  between  the  two  armies,  wherein  the  Lacedaemonians  were  vic- 
torious, chiefly  from  the  desertion  of  the  Thessalian  horse  who 
passed  over  to  them  in  the  very  heat  of  the  engagement.  But 
though  the  advantage  was  on  their  side, 'it  was  not  sufficiently 
decisive  to  favor  the  contemplated  rising  in  Attica.  Nor  did  the 
Peloponuesians  gain  anything  by  it  except  an  undisturbed  retreat 
over  the  high  lands  of  Geraneia.  after  having  partially  ravaged  the 
Megarid. 

H.  G.  IL— 14 


418   GRECIAN  CONFEDERACY  UNDER  ATHENS. 

Though  the  brittle  of  Tanagra  was  a  defeat,  yet  there  were  circum 
stances  connected  with  it  which  rendered  its  effects  highly  beneficial 
to  Athens.     The  ostracized  Kimon  presented  himself  on  the  field,  as 

goon  as  the  jinny  bad  passed  over  the  boundaries  of  Anita,  request- 
ing to  be  allowed  to  occupy  his  station  as  a  boplite  and  fight  in  the 

ranks  of  his  tribe — the  CEneis.  But  such  was  the  belief,  entertained 
by  the  members  of  the  senate  and  by  his  political  enemies  present, 
that  he  was  an  accomplice  in  the  conspiracy  known  to  he  on   Eoot, 

that  permission  was  refused  and  lie  was  forced  to  retire.  In  depart- 
ing he  conjured  his  personal  friends,  Euthippus  (of  the  deme  Ana- 
phlystus)  and  others,  to  behave  in  such  a  manner  as  might  wipe  away 
the  slain  resting  upon  his  fidelity,  and  in  part  also  upon  theirs.  His 
friends  retained  his  panoply  and  assigned  to  it  the  station  in  the 
ranks  which  he  would  himself  have  occupied:  they  then  entered  the 
engagement  with  desperate  resolution  and  one  hundred  of  them  fell 
side  by  side  in  their  ranks.  Perikles  on  his  part,  who  was  present 
among  the  hoplites  of  his  own  tribe  the  Akamantis,  aware  of  this 
application  and  repulse  of  Kimon,  thought  it  incumbent  upon  him  to 
display  not  merely  his  ordinary  personal  courage,  but  an  unusual 
recklessness  of  life  and  safety,  though  it  happened  that  he  escaped 
unwounded.  All  these  incidents  brought  about  a  generous  sympa- 
thy and  spirit  of  compromise  among  the  contending  parties  at 
Athens;  while  the  unshaken  patriotism  of  Kimon  and  his  friends 
discountenanced  and  disarmed  those  conspirators  who  had  entered 
into  correspondence  with  the  enemy,  at  the  same  time  that  it  roused 
a  repentant  admiration  toward  the  ostracized  leader  himself.  Such 
was  the  happy  working  of  this  new  sentiment  that  a  decree  was 
shortly  proposed  and  carried — proposed  too  by  Perikles  himself — to 
abridge  the  ten  years  of  Kimon's  ostracism,  and  permit  his  imme- 
diate return.  We  may  recollect  that  under  circumstances  partly 
analogous,  Themistokles  had  himself  proposed  the  restoration  of  his 
rival  Aristeides  from  ostracism,  a  little  before  the  battle  of  Salamis; 
and  in  both  cases,  the  suspension  of  enmity  between  the  two  leaders 
was  partly  the  sign,  partly  also  the  auxiliary  cause,  of  reconciliation 
and  renewed  fraternity  among  the  general  body  of  citizens.  It  was 
a  moment  analogous  to  that  salutary  impulse  of  compromise,  and 
harmony  of  parties,  which  followed  the  extinction  of  the  Oligarchy 
of  Four  Hundred,  forty-six  years  afterward,  and  on  which  Thucyd 
ides  dwells  emphatically  as  the  salvation  of  Athens  in  her  distress — 
a  moment  rare  in  free  communities  generally,  not  less  than  among 
the  jealous  competitors  for  political  ascendency  at  Athens. 

So  powerful  was  this  burst  of  fresh  patriotism  and  unanimity  after 
the  battle  of  Tanagra,  which  produced  the  recall  of  Kimon  and 
appears  to  have  overlaid  the  pre-existing  conspiracy,  that  the  Atheni 
ans  were  quickly  in  a  condition  to  wipe  oil  the  stain  of  their  defeat. 
It  was  on  the  sixty-second  day  after  the  battle  that  they  undertook 
an  aggressive  march  under  Myronides  into  Bceotia :  the  extreme  pre- 


VICTORY  OF  CENOPHYTA.  419 

cision  of  this  date — being  tlie  single  case  throughout  the  summary  of 
events  between  the  Persian  and  Peloponnesian  wars  wherein  Thucyd- 
ides  is  thus  precise — marks  how  strong  an  impression  it  made  upon 
the  memory  of  the  Athenians.  At  the  battle  of  CEnophyta,  engaged 
against  the  aggregate  Thebanand  Boeotian  forces — or,  if  Diodorus  is 
to  be  trusted,  in  two  battles,  of  which  that  of  CEnophyta  was  the  last — 
Myronidea  was  completely  victorious.  The  Athenians  became  masters 
of  Thebes  as  well  as  of  the  remaining  Boeotian  towns:  reversing  all 
the  arrangements  recently  made  bjr  Sparta — establishing  democratic 
governments — and  forcing  the  aristocratic  leaders,  favorable  to 
Theban  ascendency  and  Lacedaemonian  connection,  to  become 
exiles.  Nor  was  it  only  Boeotia  which  the  Athenians  thus  acquired: 
Phokis  and  Lokris  were  both  successively  added  to  the  list  of  their 
dependent  allies — the  former  being  in  the  main  friendly  to  Athens 
and  not  disinclined  to  the  change,  while  the  latter  were  so  decidedly 
hostile  that  one  hundred  of  their  chiefs  were  detained  and  sent  to 
Athens  as  hostages.  The  Athenians  thus  extended  their  influence — 
maintained  through  internal  party  management,  backed  by  the  dread 
of  interference  from  without  in  case  of  need — from  the  borders  of 
the  Corinthian  territory,  including  both  Megara  and  Pegae,  to  the 
strait  of  Thermopylae. 

These  important  acquisitions  were  soon  crowned  by  the  com- 
pletion of  the  Long  Walls  and  the  conquest  of  iEgina.  That  island, 
doubtless  starved  out  its  protracted  blockade,  was  forced  to  capit- 
ulate on  condition  of  destroying  its  fortifications,  surrendering  all 
its  ships  of  war,  and  submitting  to  annual  tribute  as  a  dependent  ally 
of  Athens.  The  reduction  of  this  once  powerful  maritime  city 
marked  Atheus  as  mistress  of  the  sea  on  the  Peloponnesian  coast  not 
less  than  on  the  ,35gian.  Her  admiral  Tolmides  displayed  her  strength 
by  sailing  round  Peloponnesus,  and  even  by  the  insult  of  burning 
the  Lacedaemonian  ports  of  Methone  and  of  Gythium.  He  took  Chal- 
kis,  a  possession  of  the  Corinthians,  and  Naupaktus,  belonging  to 
the  Ozolian  Lokrians,  near  the  mouth  of  the  Corinthin  Gulf,  disem- 
barked troops  near  Sikyon,  with  some  advantage  in  a  battle  against 
opponents  from  that  town,  and  either  gained  or  forced  into  the 
Athenian  alliance  not  only  Zakynthus  and  Kephallenia,  but  also 
some  of  the  towns  of  Achaia;  for  we  afterward  find  these  latter 
attached  to  Athens  without  knowing  when  the  connection  began. 
During  the  ensuing  year  the  Athenians  renewed  their  attack  upon 
Sikyon  with  a  force  of  1000  hoplites  under  Perikles  himself,  sailing 
from  the  Megarian  harbor  of  Pegae  in  the  Krissaean  Gulf.  This  emi- 
nent man,  however,  gained  no  greater  advantage  than  Tolmides — 
defeating  the  Sikyonian  forces  in  the  field  and  driving  them  within 
their  walls.  He  afterward  made  an  expedition  into  Akarnania,  tak- 
ing the  Achseau  allies  in  addition  to  his  own  forces,  but  miscarried 
in  his  attack  on  CEniadae  and  accomplished  nothing.  Nor  were  the 
Athenians  more  successful  in  a  march  undertaken  this  same  year 


420      GRECIAN  CONFEDERACY   UNDER   ATHENS. 

against  Thessaly,  for  the  purpose  of  restoring  Orestes,  one  of  the 
exiled  princes  or  nobles  of  Pharsalus.  Thougn  they  took  with  them 
mi  imposing  force,  including  their  Boeotian  and  Phokian  allies,  the 
powerful  Thessalian  cavalry  forced  them  to  keep  in  a  compact  body 
and  confined  them  to  the  ground  actually  occupied  by  their  hoplites: 
while  all  their  attempts  against  the  city  failed,  and  their  hopes  of 
internal  rising  were  disappointed. 

Had  the  Athenians  succeeded  in  Thessaly,  they  would  have 
acquired  to  their  alliance  nearly  the  whole  of  extra-Peloponnesian 
Greece.  But  even  without  Thessaly  their  power  was  prodigious,  and 
had  now  attained  a  maximum  height  from  which  it  never  varied 
except  to  decline.  As  a  counterbalancing  loss  against  so  many  suc- 
cesses, we  have  to  reckon  their  ruinous  d<  leal  in  Egypt,  after  a  war 
of  six  years  against  the  Persians  (r,.c.  460-455).  At  first  they  had 
gained  brilliant  advantages,  in  conjunction  with  the  insurgent  prince 
Inai'os;  expelling  the  Persians  from  all  Memphis  except  the  strong- 
est part  called  the  White  Fortress.  And  such  was  the  alarm  of'the 
Persian  king  Artaxerxes  at  the  presence  of  the  Athenians  in  Eg\  pi 
that  he  sent  Megaby/.us  with  a  large  sum  of  money  to  Sparta,  in 
order  to  induce  the  Lacedaemonians  to  invade  Attica.  This  envoy 
however  failed,  and  an  augmented  Persian  force,  being  sent  to 
Egypt  under  Megaby/.us,  son  of  Zopyrus,  drove  the  Athenians  and 
their  allies,  after  an  obstinate  struggle,  out  of  Memphis  into  the 
island  of  the  Nile  called  Prosopitis.  Here  they  were  blocked  up  for 
eighteen  months,  until  at  length  Megaby/.us  tinned  the  arm  of  the 
river,  laid  the  channel  dry,  and  stormed  the  island  by  land.  A  very 
few  Athenians  escaped  by  land  to  Kyrene:  the  rest  were  either  slain 
or  made  captive,  and  Inaros  himself  was  crucified.  And  the  calam- 
ity of  Athens  was  further  aggravated  by  the  arrival  of  fifty  fresh 
Athenian  ships,  which,  coming  after  the  defeat,  but  without  being 
aware  of  it,  sailed  into  the  Mendesian  branch  of  the  Nile,  and  thus 
fell  unawares  into  the  power  of  the  Persians  and  Phoenicians;  very 
few  either  of  the  ships  or  men  escaping.  The  whole  of  Egypt 
became  again  subject  to  the  Persians,  except  Amyrtaeus,  who  con- 
trived by  retiring  into  the  inaccessible  fens  still  to  maintain  his  inde- 
pendence. One  of  the  largest  armaments  ever  sent  forth  by  Athens 
and  her  confederacy  was  thus  utterly  ruined. 

It  was  about  the  time  of  the  destruction  of  the  Athenian  army  in 
Egypt,  and  of  the  circumnavigation  of  Peloponnesus  by  Tolmides, 
that  the  internal  war,  carried  on  by  the  Lacedaemonians  against  the 
Helots  or  Messenians  at  Ithome,  ended.  These  besieged  men,  no 
longer  able  to  stand  out  against  a  protracted  blockade,  were  forced 
to  abandon  this  last  fortress  of  ancient  Messenian  independence, 
stipulating  for  a  safe  retreat  from  Peloponnesus  with  their  wives  and 
families;  with  the  proviso  that,  if  any  one  of  them  ever  returned  to 
Peloponnesus,  he  should  become  the  slave  of  the  first  person  who 
seized  him.     They   were  established    by   Tolmides  at  Naupaktus 


TRUCE  FOR  FIVE  YEARS.  421 

(recently  taken  by  the  Athenians  from  the  Ozolian  Lokrians),  where 
they  will  be  found  rendering  goou  service  to  Athens  in  the  following 
wars. 

After  the  victory  of  Tanagra,  the  Lacedaemonians  made  no  further 
expeditions  out  of  Peloponnesus  for  several  succeeding  years,  not  even 
to  prevent  Bceotia  and  Phokis  from  being  absorbed  into  the  Athenian 
alliance.  The  reason  of  this  remissness  lay,  partly,  in  their  general 
character;  partly  in  the  continuance  of  the  siege  of  Ithome,  which 
occupied  them  at  home;  but  still  more,  perhaps,  in  the  fact  that  the 
Athenians,  masters  of  the  Megarid,  were  in  occupation  of  the  road 
over  the  high  lands  of  Geraneia,  and  could  therefore  obstruct  the 
march  of  any  army  out  from  Peloponnesus.  Even  after  the  sur- 
render of  Ithome,  the  Lacedaemonians  remained  inactive  for  three 
years,  after  which  time  a  formal  truce  was  concluded  with  Athens 
by  the  Peloponuesians  generally,  for  five  years  longer.  This  truce 
was  concluded  in  a  great  degree  through  the  influence  of  Kimon, 
who  was  eager  to  resume  effective  operations  against  the  Persians; 
while  it  was  not  less  suitable  to  the  political  interest  of  Perikles  that 
his  most  distinguished  rival  should  be  absent  on  foreign  service,  so 
as  not  to  interfere  with  his  influence  at  home.  Accordingly  Kimon, 
having  equipped  a  fleet  of  200  triremes  from  Athens  and  her  con- 
federates, set  sail  for  Cyprus,  from  whence  he  dispatched  sixty  ships 
to  Egypt,  at  the  request  of  the  insurgent  prince  Amyrtseus,  who  was 
still  maintaining  himself  against  the  Persians  amidst  the  fens — while 
with  the  remaining  armament  he  laid  siege  to  Kitium.  In  the  prose- 
cution of  this  siege,  he  died  either  of  disease  or  of  a  wound.  The 
armament,  under  his  successor  Anaxikrates,  became  so  embarrassed 
for  want  of  provisions,  that  they  abandoned  the  undertaking  alto- 
gether, and  went  to  fight  the  Phoenician  and  Kilikian  fleet  near 
Salamis  in  Cyprus.  They  were  here  victorious,  first  on  sea  and 
afterwards  on  land,  though  probably  not  on  the  same  day,  as  at 
the  Eurymedon;  after  which  they  returned  home,  followed  by  the 
sixty  ships  which  had  gone  to  Egypt  for  the  purpose  of  aiding 
Amyrtseus. 

From  this  time  forward  no  further  operations  were  undertaken  by 
Athens  and  her  confederacy  against  the  Persians.  And  it  appears 
that  a  convention  was  concluded  between  them,  whereby  the  Great 
King  on  his  part  promised  two  things:  To  leave  free,  undisturbed, 
and  untaxed  the  Asiatic  maritime  Greeks,  not  sending  troops  within 
a  given  distance  of  the  coast:  To  refrain  from  sending  any  ships  of 
war  either  westward  of  Phaselis  (others  place  the  boundary  at  the 
Chelidonean  islands,  rather  more  to  the  westward)  or  within  the 
Kyanean  rocks  at  the  confluence  of  the  Thracian  Bosphorus  with  the 
Euxine.  On  their  side  the  Athenians  agreed  to  leave  him  in  undis- 
turbed possession  of  Cyprus  and  Egypt.  Kallias,  an  Athenian  of 
distinguished  family,  with  some  others  of  his  countrymen,  went  up 
to  Susa  to  negotiate  this  convention :  and  certain  envoys  from  Argos, 


4±>      GRECIAN   CONFEDERACY  UNDER  ATHENS. 

then  in  alliance  with  Athens,  look  the  opportunity  of  going  thither 
at  the  same  time  to  renew  the  friendly  understanding  which  their 
city  had  established  with  Xerxes  at  the  period  of  his  invasion  of 
Greece. 

As  is  generally  the  ease  with  treaties  after  hostility,  this  conven- 
tion did  little  more  than  recognize  the  existing  state  of  things,  with- 
out introducing  any  new  advantage  or  disadvantage  on  either  side, 
or  calling  for  any  measures  to  be  taken  in  consequence  of  it.  We 
may  hence  assign  a  reasonable  ground  for  the  silence  of  Thucydides, 
who  does  not  even  notice  the  convention  as  having  been  made:  we 
are  to  recollect  always  that  in  the  interval  between  the  Persian  and 
Peloponnesian  wars  he  does  not  profess  to  do  more  than  glance 
briefly  at  the  main  events.  Rut  the  boastful  and  inaccurate  authors 
of  the  ensuing  century,  orators,  rhetors,  and  historians,  indulged  in 
so  much  exaggeration  and  untruth  respecting  this  convention,  both 
as  to  date  and  as  to  details,  and  extolled  as  something  so  glorious 
the  fact  of  having  imposed  such  hard  conditions  on  the  Great  King, 
that  they  have  raised  a  suspicion  against  themselves.  Especially 
they  have  occasioned  critics  to  ask  the  very  natural  question,  how 
this  splendid  achievement  of  Athens  came  to  be  left  unnoticed  by 
Thucydides?  Now  the  answer  to  such  question  is,  that  the  treaty 
itself  was  really  of  no  great  moment:  it  is  the  state  of  facts  and  rela- 
tions implied  in  the  treaty,  and  existing  substantially  before  it  was 
concluded,  which  constitutes  the  real  glory  of  Athens.  Rut  to  the 
later  writers  the  treaty  stood  forth  as  the  legible  evidence  of  facts 
which  in  their  time  were  past  and  gone:  while  Thucydides  and  his 
contemporaries,  living  in  the  actual  fullness  of  the  Athenian  empire, 
would  certainly  not  appeal  to  the  treaty  as  an  evidence,  and  might 
well  pass  it  over  even  as  an  event,  when  studying  to  condense  the 
narrative.  Though  Thucj'dides  has  not  mentioned  the  treaty,  he 
5ays  nothing  which  disproves  its  reality,  and  much  which  is  in  full 
harmony  with  it.  For  we  may  show  even  from  him — 1.  That  all 
Dpen  and  direct  hostilities  between  Athens  and  Persia  ceased  after 
the  last  mentioned  victories  of  the  Athenians  near  Cyprus.'  that  this 
island  is  renounced  by  Athens,  not  being  included  by  Thucydides  in 
his  catalogue  of  Athenian  allies  prior  to  the  Peloponnesian  war;  and 
that  no  further  aid  is  given  by  Athens  to  the  revolted  Amyrtseus  in 
Egypt.  2.  That  down  to  the  time  when  the  Athenian  power  was 
prostrated  by  the  ruinous  failure  at  Syracuse,  no  tribute  was  collected 
by  the  Persian  satraps  in  Asia  Minor  from  the  Greek  cities  on  the 
coast,  nor  were  Persian  ships  of  war  allowed  to  appear  in  the  waters 
of  the  JEgeaU,  nor  was  the  Persian  king  admitted  to  be  sovereign  of 
the  Country  down  to  the  coast.  Granting,  therefore,  that  we  were 
even  bound  from  the  silence  of  Thucydides  to  infer  that  no  treaty 
was  concluded,  we  should  still  lie  obliged  also  to  infer,  from  his  pos- 
itive averments,  that  a  state  of  historical  fact,  such  as  the  treaty 
acknowledged  and  prescribed,  became  actually  realized.     Rut  when 


THUCYDIDES  SUCCEEDS   KIMON.  423 

we  reflect,  further,  that  Herodotus  certifies  the  visit  of  Kallias  and 
other  Athenian  envoys  to  the  court  of  Susa,  we  can  assign  no  other 
explanation  of  such  visit  so  probable  as  the  reality  of  this  treaty. 
Certainly  no  envoys  would  have  gone  thither  during  a  state  of  rec- 
ognized war;  and  though  it  may  be  advanced  as  possible  that  they 
may  have  gone  with  the  view  to  conclude  a  treaty,  and  yet  not  have 
succeeded — this  would  be  straining  the  limits  of  possibility  beyond 
what  is  reasonable. 

We  may,  therefore,  believe  in  the  reality  of  this  treaty  between 
Athens  and  Persia,  improperly  called  the  Kimonian  treaty  improp- 
erly, since  not  only  was  it  concluded  after  the  death  of  Kimon,  but 
the  Athenian  victories  by  which  it  was  immediately  brought  on  were 
gained  after  his  death.  Nay  more — the  probability  is,  that  if  Kimon 
had  lived,  it  would  not  have  been  concluded  at  all.  For  his  interest 
as  well  as  his  glory  led  him  to  prosecute  the  war  against  Persia, 
since  he  was  no  match  for  his  rival  Perikles  either  as  a  statesman  or 
as  an  orator,  and  could  only  maintain  his  popularity  by  the  same 
means  whereby  he  had  earned  it — victories  and  plunder  at  the  cost 
of  the  Persiaus.  His  death  insured  more  complete  ascendency  to 
Perikles,  whose  policy  and  character  were  of  a  cast  altogether  oppo- 
site: while  even  Thucydides,  son  of  Milesias,  who  succeeded  Kimon 
his  relation  as  leader  of  the  anti-Periklean  party,  was  also  a  man  of 
the  senate  and  public  assembly  rather  than  of  campaigns  and  con- 
quests. Averse  to  distant  enterprises  and  precarious  acquisitions, 
Perikles  was  only  anxious  to  maintain  unimpaired  the  Hellenic 
ascendency  of  Athens,  now  at  its  very  maximum.  He  was  well 
aware  that  the  undivided  force  and  vigilance  of  Athens  would  not  be 
too  much  for  this  object — nor  did  they  in  fact  prove  sufficient,  as  we 
shall  presently  see.  With  such  dispositions  he  wTas  naturally  glad 
to  conclude  a  peace,  which  excluded  the  Persians  from  all  the  coasts 
of  Asia  Minor  westward  of  the  Chelidoueans,  as  well  as  from  all  the 
waters  of  the  ^Egean,  under  the  simple  condition  of  renouncing  on 
the  part  of  Athens  further  aggressions  against  Cyprus,  Phoenicia, 
Kilikia,  and  Egypt.  The  Great  King  on  his  side  had  had  sufficient 
experience  of  Athenian  energy  to  fear  the  consequences  of  such 
aggressions,  if  prosecuted.  He  did  not  lose  much  by  relinquishing 
formally  a  tribute  which  at  the  lime  he  could  have  little  hope  of  real- 
izing, and  which  of  course  he  intended  to  resume  on  the  first  favorable 
opportunity.  Weighing  all  these  circumstances,  we  shall  find  that 
the  peace,  improperly  called  Kimonian,  results  naturally  from  the 
position  and  feelings  of  the  contracting  parties. 

Athens  was  now  at  peace  both  abroad  and»at  home,  under  the  ad 
ministration  of  Perikles,  with  a  great  empire,  a  great  fleet,  and  a 
great  accumulated  treasure.  The  common  fund  collected  from  the 
contributions  of  the  confederates,  and  originally  deposited  at  Delos, 
had  before  this  time  been  transferred  to  the  acropolis  at  Athens.  At 
what  precise  time  such  transfer  took  place,  we  cannot  state      Nor 


42-1   GRECIAN  CONFEDERACY  UNDEB  ATHENS. 

are  we  enabled  to  assign  thi  thereby  the  confeder- 

acy, chieflj  with  the  free  will  of  its  own  members,  became  transformed 
from  a  body  of  armed  and  active  warriors  under  the  guidance  of 
Athens,  into  disarmed  and  passive  tribute-payers  defended  by  the  mill 
tan  force  of  Athens:  from  allies  tree,  meeting  at  Delos,  and  self- 
determining,  into  subjects  isolated,  sending  their  annual  tribute,  and 
awaiting  Athenian  orders.  Bu1  it  would  appear  thai  the  chang 
been  made  before  this  time.  Some  of  the  more  resolute  of  the  allies 
had  tried  to  secede,  but  Athens  had  coerced  them  by  force,  and 
reduced  them  to  the  condition  of  tribute-payers  without  ships  or 
defense.  Chios,  Lesbos,  and  Samos  were  now  the  only  allies  free  and 
armed  on  the  original  footing.  Every  successive  changeofan  aimed 
ally  into  a  tributary — ever}-  subjugation  of  a  seceder— tended  of  course 
to  cut  down  the  numbers  and  enfeeble  the  authority  of  the  Delias 
synod.  And  what  was  still  worse,  it  altered  the  reciprocal  relation 
and  feelings  both  of  Athens  and  her  allies — exalting  the  former  into 
something  like  a  despot,  and  degrading  the  latter  into  mere  passive 
subjects. 

Of  course  the  palpable  manifestation  of  the  change  must  have  been 
the  transfer  of  the  confederate  fund  from  Delos  to  Athens.  The 
only  circumstance  which  we  know  respecting  this  transfer  is.  that  it 
was  proposed  by  the  Samians — the  second  power  in  the  confederacy, 
inferior  only  to  Athens,  and  least  of  all  likely  to  favor  any  job  or 
sinister  purpose  of  the  Athenians.  It  is  further  said  that  when  the 
Samians  proposed  it,  Aristeides  characterized  it  as  a  motion  unjust, 
but  useful:  we  may  reasonably  doubt,  however,  whether  it  was  made 
during  his  lifetime.  When  the  synod  at  Delos  ceased  to  be  so  fully 
attended  as  to  command  respect — when  war  was  lighted  up  not 
only  with  Persia,  but  with  iEgina  and  Peloponnesus — the  Samians 
might  not  unnaturally  feel  that  the  large  accumulated  fund,  with  its 
constant  annual  accessions,  would  lie  safer  at  Athens  than  at  Delos, 
which  latter  island  would  require  a  permanent  garrison  and  squadron 
to  insure  it  against  attack.  But  whatever  may  have  been  the  grounds 
on  which  the  Samians  proceeded,  when  we  find  them  coming  forward 
to  propose  the  transfer,  we  may  fairly  infer  that  it  was  not  disph  as- 
ing,  and  did  not  appear  unjust,  to  the  larger  members  of  the  con- 
federacy, and  that  it  was  no  high-handed  and  arbitrary  exercise  of 
power,  as  it  is  often  called,  on  the  part  of  Athens. 

After  the  conclusion  of  the  war  with  JEgina,  and  the  consequences 
of  the  battle  of  CEnophyta,  the  position  of  Athens  became  altered 
more  and  more.  She  acquired  a  large  catalogue  of  new  allies,  partly 
tributary,  like  Mgina — partly  in  the  same  relation  as  Chios,  Lesbos, 
and  Samos:  that  is,  obliged  only  to  a  conformity  of  foreign  policy 
and  to  military  service.  In  this  last  category  were  Megara,  the 
Boeotian  cities,  the  Phokians,  Lokrians,  etc.  All  these,  though  allies 
of  Athens,  were  strangers  to  Delos  and  the  confederacy  against 
Persia;   and  accordingly  that  confederacy  passed   insensibly  into 


POSITION  OF  ATHENS.  425 

a  matter  of  history,  giving  place  to  the  new  conception  of  imperial 
Atiiens  -with  her  extensive  list  of  allies,  partly  free,  partly  subject. 
Such  transition,  arising  spontaneously  out  of  the  character  and  cir- 
cumstances of  the  confederates  themselves,  was  thus  materially  for- 
warded by  the  acquisitions  of  Athens  extraneous  to  the  confederacy. 
She  was  now  not  merely  the  first  maritime  state  in  Greece,  but  per- 
haps equal  to  Sparta  even  in  land-power — possessing  in  her  alliance 
Megara,  Bceoiia,  Phokis,  Lokris,  together  with  Achsea  and  Trcezen 
in  Peloponnesus.  Large  as  this  aggregate  already  was,  both  at  sea 
anil  on  land,  yet  the  magnitude  of  the  annual  tribute,  and  still  more 
the  character  of  the  Athenians  themselves,  superior  to  all  Greeks 
in  that  combination  of  energy  and  discipline  which  is  the  grand 
cause  of  progress,  threatened  still  farther  increase.  Occupying  the 
Megarian  harbor  of  Pegse,  the  Athenians  had  full  means  of  naval 
action  on  both  sides  of  the  Corinthian  Isthmus:  but  what  was  of  still 
greater  importance  to  them,  by  their  possession  of  the  Megarid  and 
of  the  high  lands  of  Geraneia,  they  could  restrain  any  land-force 
from  marching  out  of  Peloponnesus,  and  were  fhus  (considering 
besides  their  mastery  at  sea)  completely  unassailable  in  Attica. 

Ever  since  the  repulse  of  Xerxes,  Athens  had  been  advancing  in  an 
uninterrupted  course  of  power  and  prosperity  at  home,  as  well  as  of 
victory  and  ascendency  abroad — to  which  there  was  no  exception 
except  the  ruinous  enterprise  in  Egypt.  Looking  at  the  position 
of  Greece  therefore  about  488  B.C., — after  the  conclusion  of  the  five 
years'  truce  between  the  Peloponncsiaus  and  Athens,  and  of  the 
so-called  Kimoniau  peace  between  Persia  and  Athens,  a  discerning 
Greek  might  well  calculate  upon  farther  aggrandizement  of  this 
imperial  state  as  the  tendency  of  the  age.  And  accustomed  as  every 
Greek  was  to  the  conception  of  separate  town-autonomy  as  essential 
to  a  freeman  and  a  citizen,  such  prospect  could  not  but  inspire  terror 
and  aversion.  The  sympathy  of  the  Peloponnesians  for  the  islanders 
and  ultra-maritime  states,  who  constituted  the  original  confederacy 
of  Athens,  was  not  considerable.  But  when  the  "Dorian  island  of 
JSgina  was  subjugated  also,  and  passed  into  the  condition  of  a 
defenseless  tributary,  they  felt  the  blow  sorely  on  every  ground. 
The  ancient  celebrity,  and  eminent  service  rendered  at  the  battle 
of  Salamis,  of  this  memorable  island,  had  not  been  able  to  protect  it; 
while  those  great  ^Eginetan  families,  whose  victories  at  the  sacred 
festival-games  Pindar  celebrates  in  a  large  proportion  of  his  odes, 
would  spread  the  language  of  complaint  and  indignation  throughout 
their  numerous  "guests"  in  every  Hellenic  city.  Of  course,  the 
same  anti-Athenian  feeling  would  pervach?  those  Peloponuesian 
states  who  had  been  engaged  in  actual  hostility  wi!h  Athens — Cor- 
inth, Sikyon,  Epidaurus,  etc.,  as  well  as  Sparta,  the  once-recognized 
head  of  Hellas,  but  now  tacitly  degraded  from  her  pre-eminence, 
baffled  in  her  projects  respecting  Boeotia,  and  exposed  to  the  burn- 
ing of  her  port  at  Gythium  without  being  able  even  to  retaliate  upon 


42G      GRECIAN  CONFEDERACY  UNDER  ATHENS. 

Attica.  Putting  all  those  circumstances  together,  we  may  compre- 
hend the  powerful  feeling  of  dislike  ami  apprehension  now  diffused 
so  widely  o\cr  Greece  against  the  upstart  despot  city;  whose  ascend- 
ency, newly  acquired,  maintained  by  superior  force,  and  not  recog- 
nized as  legitimate  —  threatened  nevertheless  still  farther  increase. 

Sixteen  years  hence,    this  same    sentiment  will   be  found   exploding 

into  the  Peloponnesian  war.  But  it  became  rooted  in  the  Greek 
mind  during  the  period  which  we  have  now  reached,  when  Athens 
was  much  more  formidable  than  she  had  come  to  be  at  the  com- 
mencement of  that  war.  We  can  hardly  explain  or  appreciate  the 
ideas  of  that  later  period,  unless  we  take  them  as  handed  down  from 
the  earlier  date  of  the  five  years'  truce  (about  451-446  B.C.). 

Formidable  as  the  Athenian  empire  both  really  was  and  appeared 
to  be,  however,  this  wide-spread  feeling  of  antipathy  proved  still 
stronger,  so  that  instead  of  the  threatened  increase,  the  empire 
underwent  a  most  material  diminution.  This  did  not  arise  from  the 
attack  of  open  enemies;  for  during  the  five  years'  truce,  Sparta 
undertook  only  one  movement,  and  that  not  against  Attica:  she  sent 
troops  to  Delphi,  in  an  expedition  dignified  with  the  name  of  the 
Sacred  War — expelled  the  Phokians,  who  had  assumed  to  themselves 
the  management  of  the  temple — and  restored  it  to  the  native  Del- 
phians.  To  this  the  Athenians  made  no  direct  opposition:  but  as 
soon  as  the  Lacedaemonians  were  gone,  they  themselves  marched 
thither  and  placed  the  temple  again  in  the  hands  of  the  Phokians, 
who  were  then  their  allies.  The  Delphians  were  members  of  the 
Phokian  league,  and  there  was  a  dispute  of  old  standing  as  to  the 
administration  of  the  temple — whether  it  belonged  to  them  separ- 
ately or  to  the  Phokians  collectively.  The  favor  of  those  who 
administered  it  counted  as  an  element  of  considerable  moment  in 
Grecian  politics;  the  sympathies  of  the  leading  Delphians  led  them 
to  embrace  the  side  of  Sparta,  but  the  Athenians  now  hoped  to 
counteract  this  tendency  by  means  of  their  preponderance  in  Phokis. 
We  are  not  told  that  the  Lacedaemonians  took  any  ulterior  step  in 
consequence  of  their  views  being  frustrated  by  Athens— a  significant 
evidence  of  the  politics  of  that  day. 

The  blow  which  brought  down  the  Athenian  empire  from  this 
its  greatest  exaltation  was  struck  by  the  subjects  themselves.  The 
Athenian  ascendency  over  Bceotia,  Phokis,  Lokris,  and  Eubcea  was 
maintained,  not  by  means  of  garrisons,  but  through  domestic  parties 
favorable  to  Athens,  and  a  suitable  form  of  government — just  in  the 
same  way  as  Sparta  maintained  her  influence  over  her  Peloponnesian 
allies.  After  the  victory  of  (Enophyta,  the  Athenians  had  broken 
up  the  governments  in  the  Boeotian  cities  established  by  Sparta 
before  the  battle  of  Tanagra,  and  converted  them  into  democracies 
at,  Thebes  and  elsewhere.  Many  of  the  previous  leading  men  had 
thus  been  sent  into  exile:  and  as  the  same  'process  had  taken  place  in 
Phokis  and  Lokris,  there  was  at  this  time  a  considerable  aggregate 


EVACUATION  OF  BG30TIA.  427 

body  of  exiles,  Boeotian,  Phokian,  Lokrian,  Eubcean,  ^Eginetan, 
etc.,  all  bitterly  hostile  to  Athens,  and  ready  to  join  in  any  attack 
upon  her  power.  We  learn  farther  that  the  democracy  established 
at  Thebes  after  the  battle  of  (Enophyta  was  ill-conducted  aud  disor- 
derly: which  circumstance  laid  open  Bceotia  still  farther  to  the 
schemes  of  assailants  on  the  watch  for  every  weak  point. 

These  various  exiles,  all  joining  their  forces  and  concerting  meas- 
ures with  their  partisans  in  the  interior,  succeeded  in  mastering 
Orchomenus,  Choeroneia,  aud  some  other  less  important  places  in 
Bceotia.  The  Athenian  general  Tolmides  marched  to  expel  them, 
with  1000  Athenian  hoplites  and  an  auxiliary  body  of  allies.  It 
appears  that  this  march  was  undertaken  in  haste  and  rashness.  The 
hoplites  of  Tolmides,  principally  youthful  volunteers  and  belonging 
to  the  best  families  of  Athens,  disdained  the  enemy  too  much  to 
await  a  larger  and  more  commanding  force :  nor  would  the  people 
listen  even  to  Perikles,  when  he  admonished  them  that  the  march 
would  be  full  of  hazard,  and  adjured  them  not  to  attempt  it  without 
greater  numbers  as  well  as  greater  caution.  Fatally  indeed  were  his 
predictions  justified.  Though  Tolmides  was  successful  in  his  first 
enterprise — the  recapture  of  Choeroneia,  wherein  he  placed  a  garrison 
— yet  in  his  march,  probably  incautious  and  disorderly,  when  depart- 
ing from  that  place,  he  was  surprised  and  attacked  unawares,  near 
Koroneia,  by  the  united  body  of  exiles  and  their  partisans.  No 
defeat  in  Grecian  history  was  ever  more  complete  or  ruinous.  Tol- 
mides himself  was  slain,  together  with  many  of  the  Athenian  hop- 
lites, while  a  large  number  of  them  were  taken  prisoners.  In  order 
to  recover  these  prisoners,  who  belonged  to  the  best  families  in  the 
city,  the  Athenians  submitted  to  a  convention  whereby  they  agreed 
to  evacuate  Bceotia  altogether.  In  all  the  cities  of  that  country  the 
exiles  were  restored,  the  democratical  government  overthrown,  and 
Bceotia  was  transformed  from  an  ally  of  Athens  into  her  bitter  enemy. 
Long  indeed  did  the  fatal  issue  of  this  action  dwell  in  the  memory 
of  the  Athenians,  and  inspire  them  with  ao  apprehension  of  Boeotian 
superiority  in  heavy  armor  on  land.  But  if  the  hoplites  under 
Tolmides  had  been  all  slain  on  the  field,  their  death  would  probably 
have  been  avenged  and  Bceotia  would  not  have  been  lost — whereas 
in  the  case  of  living  citizens,  the  Athenians  deemed  no  sacrifice 
too  great  to  redeem  them.  We  shall  discover  hereafter  in  the  Lace- 
daemonians a  feeling  very  similar  respecting  their  brethren  captured 
at  Sphakteria. 

The  calamitous  consequences  of  this  defeat  came  upon  Athens 
in  thick  and  rapid  succession.  The  unheal  exiles,  having  carried 
their  point  in  Bceotia,  proceeded  to  expel  the  philo- Athenian  govern- 
ment both  from  Phokis  and  Lokris,  and  to  carry  the  flame  of  revolt 
into  Eubcea.  To  this  important  island  Perikles  himself  proceeded 
forthwith,  at  the  head  of  a  powerful  force;  but  before  he  had  time  to 
complete  the  reconquest,  he  was  summoned  home  by  news  of  a  still 


408      GRECIAN  CONFEDERACY  UNDER  ATHENS. 

more  formidable  character.  The  Megarians  had  revolted  from  Athena 
By  a  conspiracy  previously  planned,  a  division  of  hoplites  from 
Corinth,  Sikyon,  and  Epidaurus,  was  already  admitted  as  garrison 
into  their  city:  the  Athenian  soldiers  who  kepi  watch  over  the  long 
walls  had  been  overpowered  and  slain,  except  a  few: who  escaped 
into  the  fortified  port  of  Nissea.  Asif  to  make  the  Athenians  a1  once 
sensible  how  seriously  this  disaster  affected  them,  by  throwing  open 
the  road  over  Geraneia — Pleistoanax  king  of  Sparta  was  announced 
as  already  <>n  bis  march  "for  an  invasion  of  Attica.  lie  did  in  truth 
conduci  an  army,  of  mixed  Lacedsemonians  and  Peloponnesian  allies, 
into  Attica,  as  far  as  the  neighborhood  of  Eleusias  and  the  Thriasian 
plain,  lie  was  a  very  youngman,  so  thai  a  Spartan  of  mature  years. 
Kleand  rides,  had  been  attached  to  him  bythe  Ephors  as  adjutant  and 
counselor.  Perikles  (it  is  said)  persuaded  both  the  one  and  the 
other,  by  means  of  large  bribes,  to  evacuate  Attica  without  advanc- 
ing to  Athens.  We  may  fairly  doubt  whether  they  had  force 
enough  to  adventure  so  far  into  the  interior,  and  we  shall  hereafter 
observe  the  great  precautions  with  which  Archidamus  thought  it 
necessary  to  conduct  his  invasion,  during  the  first  year  of  the  Pelo- 
ponnesian war,  though  at  the  head  of  a  more  commanding  force. 
Nevertheless,  on  their  return,  the  Lacedsemonians,  believing  that 
they  might  have  achieved  it,  found  both  of  them  guilty  of  corrup- 
tion. Both  were  banished:  Kleandrides  never  came  hack,  and  PleiS- 
toanax  himself  lived  for  a  long  time  in  sanctuary  near  the  temple  of 
Athene  at  Tegea,  until  at  length  he  procured  his  restoration  by  tam- 
pering with  the  Pythian  priestess,  and  by  bringing  her  bought 
admonitions  to  act  upon  the  authorities  at  Sparta. 

So  soon  as  the  Lacedsemonians  had  retired  from  Attica,  Perikles 
returned  with  his  forces  to  Eubcea,  and  reconquered  the  island  com- 
pletely. With  that  caution  which  always  distinguished  him  as  a 
military  man,  so  opposite  to  the  fatal  rashness  of  Tolmides,  he  took 
with  him  an  overwhelming  force  of  fifty  triremes  and  5000  hoplites. 
He  admitted  most  of  the  Eubcean  towns  to  surrender,  altering  the  gov- 
ernment of  Chalkis  hy  the  expulsion  of  the  wealthy  oligarchy  called 
the  Ilippohot.-e.  But  the  inhabitants  of  Histisea  at  the  north  of  the 
island,  who  had  taken  an  Athenian  merchantman  and  massacred  all 
the  crew,  were  more  severely  dealt  wi!h— the  free  population  being 
nil  or  in  great  part  expelled,  and  the  land  distributed  among  Athenian 
kleruchs  or  out-settled  citizens. 

Vet  the  reeonquest  of  Eubcea  was  far  from  restoring  Athens  to  the 

5>osition  which  she  had  occupied  before  the  fatal  engagement  of 
xoroncia.  Her  land-empire  was  irretrievably  gone,  together  with  her 
recently  acquired  influence  over  the,  Delphian  o'-acle;  and  she  reverted 
toher  former  condii ion  of  an  exclusively  maritime  potentate.  For 
though  sh  still  continued  to  hold  Nissea  and  Pegse,  yet  her  commu- 
nication with  the  latter  harbor  was  now  cut  off  bythe  loss  of  Megara 
and  its  appertaining  territory,  so  that  she  thus  lost  her  means  of 


FEUD  BETWEEN  ATHENS  AND  MEGARA.        429 

( 

acting  in  the  Corinthian  gulf,  and  of  protecting  as  well  as  of  con- 
straining her  allies  in  Achaia.  Nor  was  the  port  of  Nisrea  of  much 
value  to  her,  disconnected  from  the  city  to  which  it  belonged,  except 
as  a  post  for  annoying  that  city. 

Moreover,  the  precarious  hold  which  she  possessed  over  unwilling 
allies  had  been  demonstrated  in  a  manner  likely  to  encourage  similar 
attempts  among  her  maritime  subjects;  attempts  which  would  now 
be  seconded  by  Peloponnesian  armies  invading  Attica.  The  fear  of 
such  a  combination  of  embarrassments,  and  especially  of  an  irresisti- 
ble enemy  carrying  ruin  over  the  flourishing  territory  round  Eleusis 
and  Athens,  was  at  this  moment  predominant  in  the  Athenian  mind. 
We  shall  find  Perikles,  at  the  beginning  of  the  Peloponnesian  war 
fourteen  years  afterward,  exhausting  all  his  persuasive  force,  and 
not  succeeding  without  great  difficulty,  in  prevailing  upon  his  coun- 
trymen to  endure  the  hardship  of  invasion — even  in  defense  of  their 
maritime  empire,  and  when  events  had  been  gradually  so  ripening  as 
to  render  the  prospect  of  war  familiar,  if  not  inevitable.  But  the 
late  series  of  misfortunes  had  burst  upon  them  so  rapidly  and  unex- 
pectedly, as  to  discourage  even  Athenian  confidence,  and  to  render 
the  prospect  of  continued  war  full  of  gloom  and  danger.  The  pru- 
dence of  Perikles  would  doubtless  counsel  the  surrender  of  their 
remaining  landed  possessions  or  alliances,  which  had  now  become 
unprofitable,  in  order  to  purchase  peace.  But  we  may  be  sure  that 
nothing  short  of  extreme  temporary  despondency  could  have  induced 
the  Athenian  assembly  to  listen  to  such  advice,  ami  to  accept  the 
inglorious  peace  which  followed.  A  truce  for  thirty  years  was  con- 
cluded with  Sparta  and  her  allies,  in  the  beginning  of  445  B.C., 
whereby  Athens  surrendered  Nisaea,  Pegae,  Achaia.  and  Trcezen— thus 
abandoning  Peloponnesus  altogether,  and  leaving  the  Megarians  (with 
their  full  territory  and  their  two  ports)  to  be  included  among  the 
Peloponnesian  allies  of  Sparta. 

It  was  to  the  Megarians,  especially,  that  the  altered  position  of 
Athens  after  this  truce  was  owing:  it  was  their  secession  from  Attica 
and  junction  with  the  Peloponnesians.  which  la:d  open  Attica  to 
invasion.  Hence  arose  the  deadly  hatred  on  the  part  of  the  Athenians 
towards  Megara,  manifested  during  the  ensuing  years — a  sentiment 
the  more  natural,  as  Megara  had  spontaneously  sought  the  alliance  of 
Athens  a  few  years  before  as  a  protection  against  the  Corinthians, 
ami  had  then  afterward,  without  any  known  ill-usage  on  the  part  oi 
Athens,  broken  off  from  the  alliance  and  become  her  enemy,  with 
the  fatal  consequence  of  rendering  her  vulnerable  on  the  land-side. 
Under  such  circumstances  we  shall  not, be  surprised  to  find  the 
antipathy  of  the  Athenians  against  Megara  strongly  pronounced, 
insomuch  that  the  system  of  exclusion  which  they  adopted  against 
her  was  among  the  most  prominent  causes  of  the  Peloponnesian  war. 

Having  traced  what  we  may  call  the  foreign  relations  of  Athens 
down  to  this  thirty  years'  truce,  we  must  notice  the  important  inter- 


430   CHANGES  AT  ATHENS  UNDER  PERIKLES. 

Dal  and  constitutional  changes  which  she  had  experienced  during  the 
same  interval. 


CHAPTER  XL VI. 

CONSTITUTIONAL   AND   JUDICIAL   CHANGES   AT   ATHENS   UNDER 

TKKIKI.KS. 

Tite  period  which  we  have  now  passed  over  appears  to  have  been 
that  in  which  the  democratical  cast  of  Athenian  public  life  was  first 
brought  into  its  fullest  play  and  development,  as  to  judicature,  legis- 
lation, and  administration. 

The  great  judicial  change  was  made  by  the  methodical  distrihution 
of  a  large  proportion  of  the  citizens  into  distinct  judicial  divisions, 
by  the  great  extension  of  their  direct  agency  in  that  department,  and 
by  the  assignment  of  a  constant  pay  to  every  citizen  so  engaged.  It 
has  been  already  mentioned,  thai  even  under  the  democracy  of  Kleis- 
thenes,  and  until  the  time  succeeding  the  battle  of  Platsea,  large  pow- 
ers still  remained  vested  both  in  the  individual  archons  and  in  the 
senate  of  Areopagus  (which  latter  was  composed  exclusively  of  the 
past  archons  after  their  year  of  office,  sitting  in  it  for  life);  though 
the  check  exercised  by  the  general  body  of  citizens,  assembled  for 
law-making  in  the  Ekklesia  and  for  judging  in  the  Helisea,  was  at  the 
same  time  materially  increased.  We  must  farther  recollect,  that  the 
distinction  between  powers  administrative  and  judicial,  so  highly 
valued  among  the  more  elaborate  governments  of  modern  Europe, 
since  the  political  speculations  of  the  last  century,  was  in  the  early 
history  of  Athens  almost  unknown.  Like  the  Roman  kings,  and 
the  Roman  consuls  before  the  appointment  of  the  Praetor,  the  Athe- 
nian archons  not  only  administered,  but  also  exercised  jurisdiction, 
voluntary  as  well  as  contentious — decided  disputes,  inquired  into 
crimes,  and  inflicted  punishment.  Of  the  same  mixed  nature  were 
the  functions  of  the  senate  of  Areopagus,  and  even  of  the  annual 
senate  of  Five  Hundred,  the  creation  of  Kleisthenes.  The  Strategi, 
too.  as  well  as  the  archons,  had  doubtless  the  double  competence,  in 
reference  to  military,  naval,  and  foreign  affairs,  of  issuing  orders 
and  of  punishing  by  their  own  authority  disobedient  parties:  the 
impcrium  of  the  magistrates,  generally,  enabled  them  to  enforce  their 
own  mandates  as  well  as  to  decide  in  cases  of  doubt  whether  any 
private  citizen  had  or  had  not  been  guilty  of  infringement.  Nor  was 
there  any  appeal  from  these  magisterial  judgments:  though  the  mag- 
istrates were  subject,  under  the  Kleisthenian  constitution,  to  personal 
responsibility  for  their  general  behavior,  before  the  people  judicially 
assembled,  at  the  expiration  of  their  year  of  office — and  to  the  farther 
animadversion  of  the  Ekklesia  (or  public  deliberative  assembly)  meet- 


MAGISTRATES  GENERALLY  WEALTHY.  431 

ing  periodically  during  the  course  of  that  year;  in  some  of  which 
assemblies,  the  question  might  formally  be  raised  for  deposing  any 
magistrate  even  before  his  year  was  expired.  Still,  in  spite  of  such 
partial  checks,  the  accumulation,  in  the  same  hand,  of  powers  to 
administer,  judge,  punish,  and  decide  civil  disputes,  without  any 
other  canon  than  the  few  laws  then  existing,  and  without  any 
appeal — must  have  beeu  painfully  felt,  and  must  have  often  led  to 
corrupt,  arbitrary,  and  oppressive  dealing.  And  if  this  be  true  of 
individual  magistrates,  exposed  to  annual  accountability,  it  is  not 
likely  to  have  been  less  true  of  the  senate  of  Areopagus,  which,  act- 
ing collectively,  could  hardly  be  rendered  accountable,  and  in  which 
the  members  sat  for  life. 

I  have  already  meutioned  that  shortly  after  the  return  of  the  expat- 
riated Athenians  from  Salamis,  Aristeides  had  been  impelled  by  the 
strong  democratical  sentiment  which  he  found  among  his  country- 
men to  propose  the  abolition  of  all  pecuniary  qualification  for  mag- 
istracies, so  as  to  render  every  citizen  legally  eligible.  This  innova- 
tion, however,  was  chiefly  valuable  as  a  victory  and  as  an  index  of 
the  predominant  sentiment.  Notwithstanding  the  enlarged  promise 
of  eligibility,  little  change  probably  took  place  in  the  fact,  and  rich 
men  were  still  most  commonly  chosen.  Hence  the  magistrates,  pos- 
sessing the  large  powers  administrative  and  judicial  above  described 
— and  still  more  the  senate  of  Areopagus,  which  sat  for  life — still 
belonging  almost  entirely  to  the  wealthier  class,  remained  animated 
more  or  less  with  the  same  oligarchical  interests  and  sympathies,  which 
manifested  themselves  in  the  abuse  of  authority.  At  the  same  time 
the  democratical  sentiment  among  the  mass  of  Athenians  went  on 
steadily  increasing  from  the  time  of  Aristeides  to  that  of  Perikles: 
Athens  became  more  and  more  maritime,  the  population  of  Peiraeus 
augmented  in  number  as  well  as  in  importance,  and  the  spirit  even 
of  the  poorest  citizen  was  stimulated  by  that  collective  aggrandize- 
ment of  his  city  to  which  he  himself  individually  contributed. 
Before  twenty  years  had  elapsed,  reckoning  from  the  battle  of  Pla- 
taea,  this  new  fervor  of  democratical  sentiment  made  itself  felt  in  the 
political  contests  of  Athens,  and  found  able  champions  in  Perikles 
and  Ephialtes,  rivals  of  what  may  be  called  the  conservative  party 
headed  by  Kimon. 

We  have  no  positive  information  that  it  was  Perikles  who  intro- 
duced the  lot,  in  place  of  election,  for  the  choice  of  archons  and 
various  other  magistrates.  But  the  change  must  have  been  intro- 
duced nearly  at  this  time,  and  with  a  view  of  equalizing  the  chances 
of  office  to  every  candidate,  poor  as  well  as  rich,  who  chose  to  give 
in  his  name  and  who  fulfilled  certain  personal  and  family  conditions 
ascertained  in  the  dokimasy  or  preliminary  examination.  But  it  wa3 
certain!}'  to  Perikles  and  Ephialtes  that  Athens  owed  the  elaborate 
constitution  of  her  popular  Dikasteries  or  Jury-courts  regularly  paid, 
which  exercised  so  important  an  influence  upon  the  character  of  the 


CHANGES  AT  ATHENS  UNDER  PERIKLES. 

citizens.  These  two  eminent  men  deprived  both  the  magistrates,  and 
the  senate  of  Areopagus,  of  all  the  judicial  and  penal  competence 
which  they  had  hitherto  possessed,  save  and  except  the  power  of 
imposing  a  small  fine.  This  judicial  power,  civil  as  n  ell  as  criminal, 
was  transferred  to  numerous  dikasts,  or  pan<  Is  of  jurors  selected  from 
<:,,  ,  Ltizens;  6,000  of  whom  were  annually  drawn  by  lot,  sworn,  and 
then  distributed  into  ten  panels  of  500  each;  the  remainder  forming 
a  Bupplemenl  in  case  of  vacancies.  The  magistrate,  instead  of  decid- 
ing causes  pr  inflicting  punishment  by  his  own  authority,  was  now- 
constrained  to  impanel  a  jury — that  is,  to  submit  each  particular  case, 
which  might  call  for  a  penalty  greater  than  the  small  fine  to  which 
is  competent,  to  the  iudgmenl  of  one  or  oilier  among  these 
numerous  popular  dikasteries.  Which  of  the  ten  he  should  take 
was  determined  by  lot,  so  that  no  one  knew  befon  hand  what  dikas- 
tery  would  try  any  particular  cause.  The  magistrate  himself  presided 
over  it  during  the  trial  and  submitted  to  it  the  question  at  issue, 
together  with  the  results  of  his  own  preliminary  examination ;  after 
which  came  the  speeches  of  accuser  and  accused^  with  the  Statements 
of  their  witnesses.  So  also  the  civil  judicature,  which  had  before 
been  exercised  in  controversies  bet  ween  man  and  man  by  the  archons, 
was  withdrawn  from  them  and  transferred  to  these  dikasteries  under 
the  presidence  of  an  archon.  Ii  is  to  be  remarked  that  the  system 
Of  reference  to  arbitration,  for  private  causes,  was  extensively  applied 
at  Athens.  A  certain  number  of  public  arbitrators  were  annually 
appointed,  to  one  of  whom  (or  to  some  other  citizen  adopted  by 
mutual  consent  of  the  parties),  all  private  disputes  w<  re  submitted  in 
the  first  instance.  If  dissatisfied  with  the  decision,  either  party  might 
afterward  carry  the  matter  before  the  dikastery;  but  it  appears  that 
in  many  cases  the  decision  of  the  arbitrator  was  acquiesced  in  with- 
out this  ultimate  resort. 

I  do  not  here  mean  to  affirm  that  there  never  was  any  trial  by  the 
people  before  the  time  of  Perikles  and  Ephialtes.  I  doubt  not  that 
before  their  time  the  numerous  judicial  assembly,  called  Heliaea,  pro- 
nounced upon  charges  against  accountable  magistrates  as  well  as  upon 
various  other  accusations  of  public,  importance;  and  perhaps  in  some 
casesseparate  bodies  of  them  may  have  been  drawn  by  lot  for  particu- 
lar trials.  But  it  is  not  the  less  true  that  the  systematic  distribution  and 
constant  employment  of  the  numerous  dikasts  of  Athens  cannot  have 
begun  before  the  age  of  these  two  statesmen,  since  it  was  only  then 
that  the  practice  of  paying  them  began.  For  so' large  a  sacrifice  of 
time  on  the  part  of  poor  men,  wherein  M.  Boeckh  states  (in  some- 
what exaggerated  language)  that  "nearly  one-third  of  the  citizens 
sat  as  judges  every  day,"  cannot  be  conceived  without  an  assured 
remuneration.  From  and  after  the  time  of  Perikles.  these  dikasteries 
were  the  exclusive  assemblies  for  trial  of  all  causes  civil  as  well  as 
criminal,  with  some  special  exceptions,  such  as  cases  of  homicide  and 
a  few  others:  but  before  his  time,  the  greater  number  of  such  causes 


SEXATE  OP  AREOPAGUS.  433 

had  been  adjudged  either  by  individual  magistrates  or  by  the  senate 
of  Areopagus.  We  ma}'  therefore  conceive  how  great  and  important 
was  the  revolution  wrought  by  that  statesman,  when  he  first  organ- 
ized these  dikastic  assemblies  into  systematic  action,  and  transferred 
to  them  nearly  all  the  judicial  power  which  had  before  been  exercised 
by  magistrates  and  senate.  The  position  and  influence  of  these  latter 
became  radically  altered.  The  most  commanding  functions  of  the 
arehon  were  abrogated,  so  that  he  retained  only  the  power  of  receiv- 
ing complaints,  inquiring  into  them,  exercising  some  small  prelimi- 
nary interference  with  the  parties  for  the  furtherance  of  the  cause  or 
accusation,  fixing  the  day  for  trial,  and  presiding  over  the  dikastic 
assembly  by  whom  peremptory  verdict  was  pronounced.  His  admin- 
istrative functions  remained  unaltered,  but  his  powers,  inquisitorial 
and  determining,  as  a  judge,  passed  away. 

In  refereuce  to  the  senate  of  Areopagus,  also,  the  changes  intro- 
duced were  not  less  considerable.  That  senate,  anterior  to  the  democ- 
racy in  point  of  date,  and  standing  alone  in  the  enjoyment  of  a  life 
tenure,  appears  to  have  exercised  an  undefined  and  extensive  control 
which  long  continuance  had  gradually  consecrated.  It  was  invested 
with  a  kind  of  religious  respect,  and  believed  to  possess  mysterious 
traditions  emanating  from  a  divine  source.  Especially,  the  cognizance 
which  it  took  of  intentional  homicide  was  a  part  of  old  Attic  religion 
not  less  than  of  judicature.  Though  put  in  the  background  for  a 
time  after  the  expulsion  of  the  Peisistratids,  it  had  gradually  recovered 
itself  when  recruited  by  the  new  archons  under  the  Kleisthenian  con- 
stitution; and  during  the  calamitous  sufferings  of  the  Persian  inva- 
sion, its  forwardness  and  patriotism  had  been  so  highly  appreciated 
as  to  procure  for  it  an  increased  sphere  of  ascendency.  Trials  for 
homicide  were  only  a  small  part  of  its  attributions.  It  exercised 
judicial  competence  in  many  other  cases  besides:  and  what  was  of 
still  greater  moment,  it  maintained  a  sort  of  censorial  police  over  the 
live-  ami  habits  of  the  citizens — it  professed  to  enforce  a  tutelary  and 
paternal  discipline  beyond  that  which  the  strict  letter  of  the  law  could 
mark  out,  over  the  indolent,  the  prodigal,  the  undutiful,  and  the 
deserters  from  old  rite  and  custom.  To  crown  all,  the  senate  of 
Areopagus  also  exercised  a  supervision  over  the  public  assembly,  tak- 
ing care  that  none  of  the  proceedings  of  those  meetings  should  be 
such  as  to  infringe  the  established  laws  of  the  country.  These  were 
powers  immense  as  well  as  undefined,  not  derived  from  any  formal 
grant  of  the  people,  but  having  their  source  in  immemorial  antiquity 
and  sustained  by  general  awe  and  reverence.  When  we  read  the 
serious  expressions  of  this  sentiment  in  the  mouths  of  the  later  ora- 
tors— Demosthenes,  ^Echines,  or  Deinarchus — we  shall  comprehend 
how  strong  it  must  have  been  a  century  and  a  half  before  them,  at 
the  period  of  the  Persian  invasion.  Isokrates,  in  his  discourse  usually 
called  Areopagiticus,  written  a  century  and  a  quarter  after  that  inva- 
sion, draws  a  picture  of  what  the  senate  of  Areopagus  had  been  while 


43-4        CHANGES  AT  ATHENS  cJNDER  PERIKLES. 

its  competence  was  yet  undiminished,  and  ascribes  to  it  a  power  of 
interference   lilt'-j  BUOrt  of   paternal    despotism,  which    lie   asserts  to 

have  been  most  s&iutaryand  improving  in  its  effect.  That  the  pic- 
lure  of  tbis  rhetoric  is  inaccurate — and  to  a  ureal  degree  indeed  ideal, 

insinuating  bis  own  recommendations  under  the  color  of  pasl  realities 
—is  suihciently  obvious.  But  it  enables  us  to  presume  generally  the 
extensive  regulating  power  of  the  senate  of  Areopagus,  in  affairs  both 
public  and  private,  at  the  time  which  we  are  now  describing. 

Such  powers  were  pretty  sure  to  be  abused.  When  we  fears  that 
ihe  Spartan  senate  was  lamentably  open  to  bribery,  we  can  hardly 
presume  much  better  of  the  life-sitting  elders  at  Athens.  Bui  even 
if  their  powers  had  been  guided  by  all  that  beneficence  of  intention 
Which  Isokrates  affirms,  they  were  in  their  nature  such  as  could  only 
be  exercised  over  a  passive  and  stationary  people :  while  the  course 
of  events  at  Athens,  at  that  time  peculiarly,  presented  conditions 
altogether  the  reverse.  During  the  pressure  of  the  Persian  invasion. 
indeed,  the  senate  of  Areopagus  had  been  armed  with  more  than 
ordinary  authority,  which  it  had  employed  so  creditably  as  to 
strengthen  its  influence  and  tighten  its  supervision  during  the  period 
immediately  following.  But  that  same  trial  had  also  called 
forth  in  the  general  body  of  the  citizens  a  fresh  burst  of  dcino- 
cratical  sentiment,  and  an  augmented  consciousness  of  force,  both 
individual  and  national.  Here  then  were  two  forces,  not  only 
distinct  but  opposite  and  conflicting,  both  put  into  increased  action 
at  the  same  time.  Nor  was  this  all:  a  novel  cast  was  just  then  given 
to  Athenian  life  and  public  habits  by  many  different  circumstances — 
the  enlargement  of  the  city,  the  creation  of  the  fortified  port  and 
new  town  of  Pcincus,  the  introduction  of  an  increased  nautical  popu- 
lation, the  active  duty  of  Athens  as  head  of  the  Delian  confederacy, 
etc.  All  these  circumstances  tended  to  open  new  veins  of  hope  and 
feeling,  and  new  lines  of  action,  in  the  Athenians  between  480-460 
B.C.,  and  by  consequence  to  render  the  interference  of  the  senate  of 
Areopagus,  essentially  old-fashioned  and  conservative  as  it  was,  more 
and  more  difficult.  But  at  the  time  when  prudence  would  have 
counseled  that  it  should  have  been  relaxed  or  modified,  the  senate 
appear  to  have  rendered  it  stricter,  or  at  least  to  have  tried  to  do  so; 
which  could  not  fail  to  raise  against  them  a  considerable  body  of 
enemies.  Not  merely  the  democratical  innovators,  but  also  the 
representatives  of  the  new  interests  generally  at  Athens,  became 
opposed  to  the  senate  as  an  organ  of  vexatious  repression,  employed 
for  oligarchical  purposes. 

From  the  character  of  the  senate  of  Areopagus  and  the  ancient 
reverence  with  which  it  was  surrounded,  it  served  naturally  as  a 
center  of  action  to  the  oligarchial  or  conservative  party;  that  party 
which  desired  to  preserve  the  Kleisthenean  constitution  unaltered — 
with  undiminished  authority,  administrative  as  weii  as  judicial,  both 
to  individual  magistrates  and  to  the  collective  Areopagus.     Of  this 


OPPOSITION  BETWEEN  KIMON  AND  PERIKLES.     436 

sentiment,  at  the  time  of  which  we  are  now  speaking,  Kimon  was  the 
most  conspicuous  leader.  His  brilliant  victories  at  the  Eurymedon, 
as  well  as  his  exploits  in  other  warlike  enterprises,  doubtless  streng- 
thened very  much  his  political  influence  at  home.  The  same  party 
also  probably  included  the  large  majority  of  rich  and  old  families  at 
Athens;  who,  so  long  as  the  magistrates  were  elected  and  not  chosen 
by  lot,  usually  got  themselves  chosen,  and  had  every  interest  in  keep- 
ing the  power  of  such  offices  as  high  as  they  could.  Moreover  the 
party  was  farther  strengthened  by  the  pronounced  support  of  Sparta, 
imparted  chiefly  through  Kimon,  proxenus  of  Sparta  at  Athens.  Of 
course  such  aid  could  only  have  been  indirect,  yet  it  appears  to  have 
been  of  no  inconsiderable  moment — for  when  we  consider  that  ^Egina 
had  been  in  ancient  feud  with  Athens,  and  Corinth  in  a  temper  more 
hostile  than  friendly,  the  good  feeling  of  the  Lacedaemonians  might 
well  appear  to  Athenian  citizens  eminently  desirable  to  preserve-  and 
the  philo-Laconian  character  of  the  leading  men  at  Athens  contrib- 
uted to  disarm  the  jealousy  of  Sparta  during  that  critical  period 
while  the  Athenian  maritime  ascendency  was  in  progress. 

The  political  opposition  between  Perikles  and  Kimon  was  heredi- 
tary, since  Xanthippus  the  father  of  the  former  had  been  the  accuser 
of  Miltiades,  the  father  of  the  latter.  Both  were  of  the  first  families 
in  the  city,  and  this,  combined  with  the  military  talents  of  Kimon 
and  the  great  statesmanlike  superiority  of  Perikles,  placed  both  the 
one  and  the  other  at  the  head  of  the  two  political  parties  which 
divided  Athens.  Perikles  must  have  begun  his  political  career  very 
young,  since  he  maintained  a  position  first  of  great  influence,  and 
afterward  of  unparalleled  moral  and  political  ascendency,  for  the 
long  period  of  forty  years,  against  distinguished  rivals,  bitter  assail- 
ants, and  unscrupulous  libelers  (about  467-428  B.C.).  His  public  life 
began  about  the  time  when  Themistokles  was  ostracized,  and  when 
Aristeides  was  passing  off  the  stage,  and  he  soon  displayed  a  charac- 
ter which  combined  the  pecuniary  probity  of  the  one  with  the 
resource  and  large  views  of  the  other;  superadding  to  both,  a  discre- 
tion and  mastery  of  temper  never  disturbed — an  excellent  musical 
and  lettered  education  received  from  Pythokleides — an  eloquence 
such  as  no  one  before  had  either  heard  or  conceived — and  the  best 
philosophy  which  the  age  afforded.  His  military  duties  as  a  youth- 
ful citizen  were  faithfully  and  strenuously  performed,  but  he  was 
timid  in  his  first  political  approaches  to  the  people — a  fact  perfectly 
in  unison  with  the  caution  of  his  temperament,  but  which  some  of 
his  biographers  explained  by  saying  that  he  was  afraid  of  being 
ostracized,  and  that  his  countenance  resembled  that  of  the  despot 
Peisistratus.  We  may  be  pretty  sure,  however,  that  this  personal 
resemblance  (like  the  wonderful  dream  ascribed  to  his  mother  when 
pregnant  of  him)  was  an  after-thought  of  enemies  when  his  ascend- 
ency was  already  established — and  that  young  beginners  were  in  little 
danger  of  ostracism.     The  complexion  of  political  parties  in  Athens 


436        CHANGES  AT  ATHENS  UNDER  PERIKLES. 

reatly  changed  since  tlio  days  of  Themistokles  and  Aristeides. 
For  the  KJeisthenean  con  titution,  though  enlarged  by  the  latter  after 
the  return  from  Salamis  i  o  the  extent  of  making  all  citizens  without 
exception  eligible  for  magistracy,  had  become  unpopular  with  the 
poorer  citizens  and  to  the  keener  democraticai  feeling  which  now  ran 
through  Athens  and  Peiraeus. 

li  was  to  this  democraticai  parly — the  party  of  movement 
against  thai  of  resistance,  or  of  reformers  againsl  conservative-,  if 
we  arc  to  employ  modern  phraseology— thai  Perikles  devoted  his 
great  rank,  character,  and  abilities.  From  the  low  arts,  which  it  is 
common  to  ascribe  to  one  who  espouses  the  political  interests  of  the 

) r  againsl    the   rich,   he  was   remarkably  exempt.     He  was  inde- 

ble  in  his  attention  to  public  business,  but  he  went  little  into 
,  and  di  regarded  almost  to  excess  the  airs  of  popularity. 
His  eloquence  was  irresistibly  impressive;  yel  he  was  by  no  means 
prodigal  of  it,  taking  care  to  reserve  himself,  like  the  Salaminian 
trireme,  for  solemn  occasions:,  and  preferring  for  the  most  part 
to  employ  the  agency  of  friends  and  partisans.  Moreover  he 
imbibed  from  his  friend  and  teacher  Anaxagoras  a  tinge  of  physical 
philosophy  which  greatly  strengthened  his  mind  and  armed  him 
againsl  many  of  the  reigning  superstitions — but  which  at  the  same 
lime  tended  to  rob  him  of  the  sympathy  of  the  vulgar,  rich  as  well  as 
poor.  The  arts  of  demagogy  were  in  fact  much  more  cultivated  by 
the  oligarchic  Kimon,  whose  open-hearted  familiarity  of  manner  was 
extolled,  by  his  personal  friend  the  poet  Ion,  in  contrast  with  the 
reserved  and  stately  demeanor  of  his  rival  Perikles.  Kimon  employed 
the  rieh  plunder,  procured  by  his  maritime  expeditions,  in  public 
decorations  as  well  as  in  largesses  to  the  poorer  citizens;  throwing 
open  his  fields  and  fruits  to  all  the  inhabitants  of  his  deme,  and 
causing  himself  to  be  attended  in  public  by  well-dressed  slaves, 
directed  to  tender  their  warm  tunics  in  exchange  for  the  threadbare 
garments  of  those  who  seemed  in  want.  But  the  property  of  Perikles 
was  administered  with  a  strict  though  benevolent  economy,  by  Ids 
anci(  mi  steward  Evangelus — the  produce  of  his  lands  being  all  sold, 
and  the  consumption  of  his  house  supplied  by  purchase  in  the  market. 
It  was  by  such  regularity  that  his  perfect  and  manifest  independence 
of  all  pecuniary  seduction  was  sustained.  In  taste,  in  talent,  and  in 
character,  Kimon  was  the  very  opposite  of  Perikles:  a  brave  and 
( iiiei<  ni  commander,  a  lavish  distributor,  a  man  of  convivial  and 
amorous  habits — but  incapable  of  sustained  attention  to  business, 
untaught  in  music  or  letters,  and  endued  with  Laconian  aversion  to 
rhetoric  and  philosophy;  while  the  ascendency  of  Perikles  was 
founded  oh  his  admirable  combination  of  civil  qualities — probity, 
firmness,  diligence,  judgment,  eloquence,  and  power  of  guiding  par- 
tisans. As  a  military  commander,  though  no  way  d<  ficient  in  per- 
sonal courage,  he  rarely  courted  distinction  and  was  principally 
famous  for  his  care  of  the  lives  of  the  citizens,  discountenancing  all 


MAGISTERIAL  ABUSE.  437 

rash  or  distant  enterprises.  His  private  habits  were  sober  and  recluse 
his  chief  conversation  was  with  Anaxagoras,  Protagoras,  Zeno,  the 
musician  Damon,  and  other  philosophers — while  the  tenderest  domes- 
tic attachment  bound  him  to  the  engaging  and  cultivated  Aspasia. 

Such  were  the  two  men  who  stood  forward  at  this  time  as  most 
conspicuous  in  Athenian  party-contest — the  expanding  democracy 
against  the  stationary  democracy  of  the  past  generation,  which  now- 
passed  by  the  name  of  oligarchy — the  ambitious  and  talkative  energy, 
spread  even  among  the  poor  population,  which  was  now  forming 
more  and  more  the  characteristic  of  Athens,  against  the  unlettered 
and  uninquiriug  valor  of  the  conquerors  of  Marathon.  Ephialtes, 
son  of  Sophonides,  was  at  this  time  the  leading  auxiliary,  seemingly 
indeed  the  equal  of  Perikles,  and  no  way  inferior  to  him  in  personal 
probity,  though  he  was  a  poor  man.  As  to  aggressive  political  war- 
fare, he  was  even  more  active  than  Perikles,  who  appears  throughout 
his  long  public  life  to  have  manifested  but  little  bitterness  against 
political  enemies.  Unfortunately  our  scanty  knowledge  of  the  history 
of  Athens  brings  before  us  only  some  general  causes  and  a  few  marked 
facts.  The  details  and  the  particular  persons  concerned  are  not 
within  our  sight:  yet  the  actual  course  of  political  events  depends 
everywhere  mainly  upon  these  details,  as  well  as  upon  the  general 
causes.  Before  Ephialtes  advanced  his  main  proposition  for  abridg- 
ing the  competence  of  the  senate  of  Areopagus,  he  appears  to  have 
been  strenuous  in  repressing  the  practical  abuse  of  magisterial 
authority,  by  accusations  brought  against  the  magistrates"  at  the 
period  of  their  regular  accountability.  After  repeated  efforts  to 
check  the  practical  abuse  of  these  magisterial  powers,  Ephialtes  and 
Perikles  were  at  last  conducted  to  the  proposition  of  cutting  them 
down  permanently,  and  introducing  an  altered  s}rstem. 

Such  proceedings  naturally  provoked  extreme  bitterness  of  party 
feeling.  It  is  probable  that  this  temper  may  have  partly  dictated  the 
accusation  preferred  against  Kimon  (about  4G3  b.c.)  after  the  sur- 
render of  Thasos,  for  alleged  reception  of  bribes  from  the  Macedonian 
prince  Alexander — an  accusation  of  which  he  was  acquitted.  At  this 
time  the  oligarchical  or  Kimonian  party  was  decidedly  the  most  pow- 
erful: and  when  the  question  was  proposed  for  sending  troops  to  aid 
the  Lacedaemonians  in  reducing  the  revolted  Helots  on  Ithome,  Kimon 
carried  the  people  along  with  him  to  comply,  by  an  appeal  to  their 
generous  feelings,  in  spite  of  the  strenuous  opposition  of  Ephialtes. 
But  when  Kimon  and  the  Athenian  hoplites  returned  home,  having 
been  dismissed  by  Sparta  under  circumstances  of  insulting  suspicion 
(as  lias  been  mentioned  in  the  preceding  chapter),  the  indignation  of 
the  citizens  was  extreme.  They  renounced  their  alliance  with  Sparta, 
and  entered  into  amity  with  Argos.  Of  course  the  influence  of  Kimon, 
and  the  position  of  the  oligarchical  party,  was  materially  changed  by 
thk  incident.  And  in  the  existing  bitterness  of  political  parties  it  is 
not  surprising  that  his  opponents  should  take  the  opportunity  for 


438   CHANGES  AT  ATHENS  UNDER  PERIKLES. 

proposing  Boon  afterward  a  vote  of  ostracism — a  challenge,  indeed, 
which  may  perhaps  have  been  accepted  not  unwillingly  by  Kimon 
and  his  party,  since  they  mighl  still  fancy  themselves  the  strongest, 
and  suppose  that  t lie  sentence  of  banishment  would  fall  upon  Ephialtes 
or  Penkles.  However,  the  vote  ended  in  the  expulsion  of  Kimon,  a 
sure  proof  thai  his  opponents  were  nowin  the  ascendant.  On  this 
occasion,  as  on  the  preceding,  we  see  the  ostracism  invoked  to  meet 
a  period  of  intense  political  conflict,  the  violence  of  which  it  would 
at  least  abate,  by  removing  for  the  time  one  of  the  contending  leaders. 

It  was  now  thai  IVrikles  and  Ephialtes  carried  their  important 
scheme  of  judicial  reform.  The  senate  of  Areopagus  was  deprived 
of  its  discretionary  censorial  power,  as  well  as  of  all  its  judicial  com 
petenee,  except  that  which  related  to  homicide.  The  individual 
magistrates,  as  well  as  the  senate  of  Five  Hundred,  were  also  stripped 
of  their  judicial  attributes  (except  the  power  of  imposing  a  small  fine), 
which  were  transferred  to  the  newly-created  panels  of  salaried  dikasts, 
lotted  off  in  ten  divisions  from  the  aggregale  Helisea.  Ephialtes  first 
brought  down  the  laws  of  Solon  from  the  acropolis  to  the  neighbor- 
hood of  the  market-place,  where  the  dikasteries  sat — a  visible  proof 
that  the  judicature  was  now  popularized. 

In  the  representations  of  man}-  authors,  the  full  bearing  of  this 
great  constitutional  change  is  very  inadequately  conceived.  What 
we  are  commonly  told  is  that  Perikles  was  the  firsl  to  assign  a  salary 
to  these  numerous  dikasteries  at  Athens.  He  bribed  the  people  with 
the  public  money  (says  Plutarch),  in  order  to  make  head  against 
Kimon,  who  bribed  them  out  of  his  own  private  purse  as  if  the  pay 
were  the  main  feature  in  the  case,  and  as  if  all  which  Perikles  did 
was  to  make  himself  popular  by  paying  the  dilkasts  for  judicial  ser- 
vice which  they  had  before  rendered  gratuitously.  The  truth  is  that 
this  numerous  army  of  dikasts,  distributed  into  ten  regiments,  and 
summoned  to  act  systematically  throughout  the  year,  was  now  for  the 
first  time  organized:  the  commencement  of  their  pay  is  also  the  com- 
mencement of  their  regular  judicial  action.  What  Perikles  really 
effected  was  to  sever  for  the  first  time  from  the  administrative  com- 
petence of  the  magistrates  that  judicial  authority  which  bad  origi- 
nally gone  along  with  it.  The  great  men  who  had  been  accustomed 
to  hold  these  offices  were  lowered  both  in  influence  and  authority: 
while  on  the  other  hand  a  new  life,  habit,  and  sense  of  power  sprung 
up  among  the  poorer  citizens.  A  plaintiff  having  cause  of  civil 
action,  or  an  accuser  invoking  punishment  against  citizens  guilty  of 
injury  either  to  himself  or  to  the  state,  had  still  to  address  himself  to 
one  or  other  of  the  archons,  but  it  was  only  with  a  view  of  ultimately 
arriving  before  the  dikastery  by  whom  the  cause  was  to  lie  tried. 
While  the  magistrates  acting  individually  were  thus  restricted  to 
simple  administration  and  preliminary  police,  they  experienced  a  still 
more  serious  loss  of  power  in  their  capacity  of  members  of  the  Are 
opag us,  after  the  year  of  archonship  was  expired.     Instead  of  thei, 


ASSASSINATION  OF  EPHIALTES.  439 

previous  unmeasured  range  of  supervision  and  interference,  they 
were  now  deprived  of  all  judicial  sanction  beyond  that  small  power 
of  fining  which  was  still  left  both  to  individual  magistrates  and  to 
the  senate  of  Five  Hundred.  But  the  cognizance  of  homicide  was 
still  expressly  reserved  to  them — for  the  procedure,  in  this  latter  case 
religious  not  less  than  judicial,  was  so  thoroughly  consecrated  by 
ancient  feeling,  that  no  reformer  could  venture  to  disturb  or  remove  it. 

It  was  upon  this  same  ground  probably  that  the  stationary  party 
defended  all  the  prerogatives  of  the  senate  of  Areopagus — denounc- 
ing the  curtailments  proposed  by  Ephialtes  as  impious  and  guilty 
innovations.  How  extreme  their  resentment  became,  when  these 
reforms  were  carried — and  how  fierce  was  the  collision  of  political 
parties  at  this  moment — we  may  judge  by  the  result.  The  enemies 
of  Ephialtes  caused  him  to  be  privately  assassinated,  by  the  hand  of  a 
Boeotian  of  Tanagra  named  Aristodikus.  Such  a  crime— rare  in  the 
political  anuals  of  Athens,  for  we  come  to  no  known  instance  of  it 
afterward  until  the  oligarchy  of  the  Four  Hundred  in  411  b.c. — marks 
at  once  the  gravity  of  the  change  now  introduced,  the  fierceness  of 
the  opposition  offered,  and  the  unscrupulous  character  of  the  con- 
servative party.  Kimon  was  in  exile  and  had  no  share  in  the  deed. 
Doubtless  the  assassination  of  Ephialtes  produced  an  effect  unfavor- 
able in  every  way  to  the  party  who  procured  it.  The  popular  party 
in  their  resentment  must  have  become  still  more  attached  to  the  judi- 
cial reforms  just  assured  to  them,  while  the  hands  of  Perikles,  the 
superior  leader  left  behind  and  now  acting  singly,  must  have  been 
materially  strengthened. 

It  is  from  this  poiut  that  the  administration  of  that  great  man  may 
be  said  to  date :  he  was  now  the  leading  adviser  (we  might  almost  say 
Prime  Minister)  of  the  Athenian  people.  His  first  years  were  marked 
by  a  series  of  brilliant  successes — already  mentioned — the  acquisition 
of  Megara  as  an  ally,  and  the  victorious  war  against  Corinth  and 
^Egina.  But  when  he  proposed  the  great  and  valuable  improvement 
of  the  Long  Walls,  thus  making  one  city  of  Athens  and  Peiraeus,  the 
same  oligarchic  party,  which  had  opposed  his  judicial  changes  and 
assassinated  Ephialtes,  again  stood  forward  in  vehement  resistance. 
Finding  direct  opposition  unavailing,  they  did  not  scruple  to  enter 
into  treasonable  correspondence  with  Sparta — invoking  the  aid  of  a 
foreign  force  for  the  overthrow  of  the  democracy :  so  odious  had  it 
become  in  their  eyes,  since  the  recent  innovations.  How  serious  was 
the  hazard  incurred  by  Athens,  near  the  time  of  the  battle  of  Tana- 
gra, has  been  already  recounted;  together  with  the  rapid  and  unex- 
pected reconciliation  of  parties  after  that  battle,  principally  owing  to 
the  generous  patriotism  of  Kimon  and  his  immediate  friends.  Kimon 
was  restored  from  ostracism  on  this  occasion,  before  his  full  time  had 
expired  ;  while  the  rivalry  between  him  and  Perikles  henceforward 
becomes  mitigated,  or  even  converted  into  a  compromise,  whereby 
the  internal  affairs  of  the  city  were  left  to  the  one,  and  the  conduct 


4-10        CHANGES  AT  ATHENS  UNDER  PERIKLES. 

of  foreign  expeditions  to  the  other.  The  Bueeessee  of  Alliens  during 
the  ensuing  ten  years  were  more  brilliant  than  ever,  and  she  attained 
the  maximum  of  her  power;  which  doubtless  bad  a  material  effect  in 

imparting  stability  to  the  dei -racy,  as  well  as  to  the  administration 

of  Perikles— and  enabled  both  the  one  and  the  other  to  stand  the 
shock  of  those  great  public  reverses  which  deprived  the  Athenians 
of  their  dependent  landed  alliances,  during  the  interval  between  the 
defeat  of  Koroneia  and  the  thirty  years'  truce. 

A  ong  with  the  important  judicial  revolution  brought  about  by 
Perikles,  were  introduced  other  changes  belonging  to  the  same  scheme 
and  system. 

Thus  a  general  power  of  supervision,  both  over  the  magistrates  and 
over  the  public  assembly,  was  vested  in  seven  magistrates,  now  named 
for  the  first  time,  called  Nomophylakes,  or  Law-Guardians,  and  doubt 
1  ss  changed  every  year.  These  Nomophylakes  sal  alongside  of  the 
Proedri  or  presidents  both  in  the  senate  and  in  the  public  assembly, 
and  were  charged  with  the  duty  of  interposing  whenever  any  step  was 
taken  or  any  proposition  made  contrary  to  the  existing  laws.  They 
were  also  empowered  to  constrain  the  magistrates  to  act  according  to 

law.      We  do  not  know  whether  they  possessed  the  presidency  of  a 

dikastery — that  is,  whether  they  could  themselves  cause  one  of  the 
panels  of  jurors  to  be  summoned,  and  put  an  alleged  delinquent  on 
his  trial  before  it,  under  their  presidency — or  whether  they  were 
restricted  to  entering  a  formal  protest,  laying  the  alleged  illegality 
before  the  public  assembly.  To  appoint  magistrates,  however, 
invested  w  h  this  special  trust  of  watching  and  informing,  was  not  an 
unimportant  step;  for  it  would  probably  enable  Ephialtes  to  satisfy 
many  objectors  who  feared  to  abolish  the  superintending  power  of 
the  Areopagus  without  introducing  any  substitute.  The  Nomophy- 
lakes were  honored  with  a  distinguished  place  at  the  public  proces- 
sions and  festivals,  and  were  even  allowed  (like  the  Archons)  to  enter 
the  Benate  of  Areopagus  after  their  year  of  office  had  expired:  but 
they  mver  acquired  any  considerable  power  such  as  that  senate  had 
itself  exercised.  Their  interference  must  have  been  greatly  super- 
seded by  the  introduction  and  increasing  application  of  the  Graphe 
Paranomon,  presently  to  be  explained.  They  are  not  even  noticed 
in  the  description  of  that  misguided  assembly  which  condemned  the 
six  generals,  after  the  battle  of  Arginusa?,  to  be  tried  by  a  novel  proc- 
ess which  violated  legal  form  not  Tees  than  substantial  justice.  After 
the  expulsion  of  the  Thirty,  the  senate  of  Areopagus  was  again 
invested  with  a  supervision  over  magistrates,  though  without  any- 
thing like  its  ancient  ascendency. 

Another  important  change,  which  we  may  with  probability  refer  to 
Perikles,  is  the  institution  of  the  Nomothetse.  These  men  were  in 
point  of  fact  dikasts,  members  of  the  6,000  citizens  annually  sworn  in 
that  capacity.  Jjut  they  were  not,  like  the  dikasts  for  trying  causes, 
distributed  into  panels  or  regiments  known  by  a  particular  letter  and 


THE  NOMOTHET^E.  441 

acting  together  throughout  the  entire  year:  they  were  lotted  off  to  sit 
together  only  on  special  occasions  and  as  the  necessity  arose.  Accord- 
ing to  the  reform  now  introduced,  the  Ekklesia  or  public  assembly, 
even  with  the  sanction  of  the  senate  of  Five  Hundred,  became  incom. 
petent  either  to  pass  a  new  law  or  to  repeal  a  law  already  in  exist- 
ence; it  could  only  enact  a  psephwn — that  is,  properly  speaking,  a 
decree  applicable  only  to  a  particular  case;  though  the  word  was 
used  at  Athens  in  a  very  large  sense,  sometimes  comprehending 
decrees  of  general  as  well  as  permanent  application.  In  reference  to 
laws,  a  peculiar  judicial  procedure  was  established.  The  Thesmothetae 
were  directed  annually  to  examine  the  existing  laws,  noting  any  con- 
tradictious or  double  laws  on  the  same  matter;  and  in  the  first  pry- 
tany  (tenth  part)  of  the  Attic  year,  on  the  eleventh  day,  an  Ekklesia 
was  he*d,  in  which  the  first  business  was  to  go  through  the  laws 
seriatim,  and  submit  them  for  approval  or  rejection;  first  beginning 
with  the  laws  relating  to  the  senate,  next,  coming  to  those  of  more 
general  import,  especially  such  as  determined  the  functions  and  com- 
petence of  the  magistrates  If  any  law  wascondemned  by  the  vote  of 
the  public  assembly,  or  if  any  citizen  had  a  new  law  to  propose,  the 
third  assembly  of  the  Prytany  was  employed,  previous  to  any  other 
business,  in  the  appointment  of  ISlomothetae  and  in  the  provision  of 
means  to  pay  their  salary  Previous  notice  was  required  to  be  given 
publicly  by  every  citizen  who  had  new  propositions  of  the  sort  to 
make,  in  order  that  the  time  necessary  for  the  sitting  of  the  Nomoth- 
etae  'might  be  measured  according  to  the  number  of  matters  to  be 
submitted  to  their  cognizance.  Public  advocates  were  farther  named 
to  undertake  the  formal  defense  of  all  the  laws  attacked,  and  the 
citizen  who  proposed  to  repeal  them  had  to  make  out  his  case  against 
this  defense,  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  assembled  Nomothetic.  These 
latter  were  taken  from  the  6,000  sworn  dikasts,  and  were  of  different 
numbers  according  to  circumstances:  sometimes  we  hear  of  them  as 
500,  sometimes  as  1000— and  we  may  be  certain  that  the  number  was 
always  considerable. 

The  effect  of  this  institution  was,  to  place  the  making  or  repealing 
of  laws  under  the  same  solemnities  and  guarantees  as  the  trying  of 
causes  or  accusations  in  judicature.  We  must  recollect  that  the  citi- 
zens who  attended  the  Ekklesia  or  public  assembly  were  not  sworn 
like  the  dikasts;  nor  had  they  the  same  solemnity  of  procedure,  nor 
the  same  certainty  of  hearing  both  sides  of  the  question  set  forth,  nor 
the  same  full  preliminary  notice.  How  much  the  oath  sworn  was 
brought  to  act  upon  the  minds  of  the  dikasts,  we  may  see  by  the  fre- 
quent appeals  to  ii  in  the  orators,  who  contrast  them  with  the  unsworn 
public  assembly.  And  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  Nomothetse 
afforded  much  greater  security  than  the  public  assembly,  for  a  proper 
decision.  That  security  depended  upon  the  same  principle  as  we  see 
to  pervade  all  the  constitutional  arrangements  of  Athens;  upon  a  frac- 
tion of  the  people  casually  taken,  but  sufficiently  numerous  to  have 


442        CHANGES  AT  ATHENS  UNDER  PERIKLES 

the  same  interest  with  the  whole — not  permanent  but  delegated  for 
the  occasion — assembled  under  a  solemn  sanction — and  furnished  with 
a  full  exposition  of  both  sides  of  the  case.  The  power  of  passing  pse- 
phism,  or  special  decrees,  still  remained  with  the  public  assembly, 
which  was  doubtless  much  more  liable  to  be  surprised  into  hasty  or 
inconsiderate  decision  than  either  the  Dikastery  or  the  Nbmothetse— 
in  spite  of  the  necessity  of  previous  authority  from  the  senate  of  Five 
Hundred,  before  any  proposition  could  be  submitted  to  it. 

As  an  additional  security  both  to  the  public  assembly  and  the  Nomo 

thetse  against  being  entrapped  into  decisions  contrary  to  existing  law, 

another  remarkable  provision  has  yet  to  be  mentioned — a  provision 
probably  introduced  by  Perikles  at  the  same,  time  as  the  formalities  of 
law-making  by  means  of  specially  delegated  Nomothetic.  This  was 
the  Graphe  Paranomon — indictment  for  informality  or  illegality — 
which  might  be  brought  on  certain  grounds  against  the  proposer  of 
any  law  or  any  psephism,  and  rendered  him  liable  to  punishment  by 
the  dikastery.  Jle  was  required  in  bringing  forward  his  new  meas- 
ure to  take  care  thai  it,  should  not  be  iu  contradiction  with  any  pre- 
existing law — or  if  there  were  any  such  contradiction,  to  give  formal 
notice  of  it,  to  propose  the  repeal  of  that  which  existed,  ami  to  write 
up  publicly  beforehand  what  his  proposition  was — in  order  that  there 
might  never  be  two  contradictory  laws  at  the  same  time  in  operation, 
nor  any  illegal  decree  passed  either  by  the  senate  or  by  the  public 
assembly.  If  he  neglected  this  precaution,  he  was  liable  to  prosecu- 
tion under  the  Graphe  Paranomon,  which  any  Athenian  citizen  might 
bring  against  him  before  the  dikastery,  through  the  intervention  and 
under  the  presidency  of  the  Thesmothetse. 

Judging  from  the  title  of  this  indictment,  it  was  originally  confined 
to  the  special  ground  of  formal  contradiction  between  the  new  and 
the  old.  But  it  had  a  natural  tendency  to  extend  itself:  the  citizen 
accusing  would  strengthen  his  case  by  showing  that  the  measure  which 
he  attacked  contradicted  not  merely  the  letter,  but  the  spirit  and  pur- 
pose of  existing  laws — and  he  would  proceed  from  hence  to  denounce 
it  as  generally  mischievous  and  disgraceful  to  the  state.  In  this 
unmeasured  latitude  we  find  the  Graphe  Paranomon  at  the  time  of 
Demosthenes.  The  mover  of  a  new  law  or  psephism,  even  after  it 
had  been  regularly  discussed  and  passed,  was  liable  to  be  indicted, 
and  had  to  defend  himself  not  only  against  alleged  informalities  in  his 
procedure,  but  also  against  alleged  mischiefs  in  the  substance  of  his 
measure.  If  found  guilty  by  the  dikastery,  the  punishment  inflicted 
upon  him  by  them  was  not  fixed,  but  variable  according  to  circum- 
stances. For  the  indictment  belonged  to  that  class  whcrei  n,  after  the  ver- 
dict of  guilty,  first  agiven  amount  of  punishment  was  proposed  by  the 
accuser,  next  another  and  lighter  amount  was  named  by  the  accused 
party  against  himself — the  dikastery  being  bound  to  make  their  option 
between  one  and  the  other,  without  admitting  any  third  modification 
— so  that  it  was  the  interest  even  of  the  accused  party  to  name  against 


WORKING  OF  THE  GRAPHE  PARANOMON.      443 

himself  a  measure  of  punishment  sufficient  to  satisfy  the  sentiment  of 
the  dikasts,  in  order  that  they  might  not  prefer  the  more  severe  propo- 
sition of  the  accuser.  At  the  same  time,  the  accuser  himself  (as  in 
other  public  indictments)  was  fined  in  the  sum  of  1000  drachms,  unless 
the  verdict  of  guilty  obtained  at  least  one-fifth  of  the  suffrages  of  the 
dikastery.  The  personal  responsibility  of  the  mover,  however,  con- 
tinued only  one  year  after  the  introduction  of  his  new  law.  If  the 
accusation  was  brought  at  a  greater  distance  of  time  than  one  year, 
the  accuser  could  invoke  no  punishment  against  the  mover,  and  the 
sentence  of  the  dikasts  neither  absolved  nor  condemned  anything  but 
the  law.  Their  condemnation  of  the  law  with  or  without  the  author, 
amounted  ipso  facto  to  a  repeal  of  it. 

Such  indictment  against  the  author  of  a  law  or  of  a  decree  might 
be  preferred  either  at  some  stage  prior  to  its  final  enactment — as  after 
its  acceptance  simply  by  the  senate,  if  it  was  a  decree,  or  after  its 
approval  by  the  public  assembly,  and  prior  to  its  going  before  the 
Nomothetae,  if  it  was  a  law — or  after  it  had  reached  full  completion  by 
the  verdict  of  the  Nomothetoe.  In  the  former  case  the  indictment 
staid  its  farther  progress  until  sentence  had  been  pronounced  by  the 
dikasts. 

This  regulation  is  framed  in  a  thoroughly  conservative  spirit,  to 
guard  the  existing  laws  against  being  wholly  or  partially  nullified  by  a 
new  proposition.  As,  in  the  procedure  of  the  Nomothetae,  whenever 
any  proposition  was  made  for  distinctly  repealing  any  existing  law, 
it  was  thought  unsafe  to  intrust  the  defense  of  the  law  so  assailed  to 
the  chance  of  some  orator  gratuitously  undertaking  it.  Paid  advo- 
cates were  appointed  for  the  purpose.  So  also,  when  any  citizen 
made  a  new  positive  proposition,  sufficient  security  was  not  supposed 
to  be  afforded  by  the  chance  of  opponents  rising  up  at  the  time. 
Accordingly  a  farther  guarantee  was  provided  in  the  personal  responsi- 
bility of  the  mover.  That  the  latter,  before  lie  proposed  a  new  decree 
or  a  new  law,  should  take  care  that  there  was  nothing  in  it  inconsistent 
with  existing  laws — or,  if  there  were,  that  he  should  first  formally  bring 
forward  a  direct  proposition  for  the  repeal  of  such  pre-existing  law — 
was  in  no  way  unreasonable.  It  imposed  upon  him  an  obligation  such 
as  he  might  perfectly  well  fulfill.  It  served  as  a  check  upon  the  use  of 
thai  right,  of  free  speech  and  initiative  in  the  public  assembly,  which 
belonged  to  every  Athenian  without  exception,  and  which  was  cher- 
ished by  the  democracy  as  much  as  it  was  condemned  by  oligarchical 
thinkers.  It  was  a  security  to  the  dikasts,  who  were  called  upon  to 
apply  the  law  to  particular  cases,  against  the  perplexity  of  having  con- 
flicting laws  quoted  before  them,  and  being  obliged  in  their  verdict 
to  set  aside  either  one  or  the  other.  In  modern  European  governments, 
even  the  most  free  and  constitutional,  laws  have  been  both  made  and 
applied  either  by  select  persons  or  select  assemblies,  under  an  organi- 
eation  so  different  as  to  put  out  of  sight  the  idea  of  personal  respon- 
sibility on  the  proposer  of  a  new  law.  Moreover,  even  in  such  assem- 


444        CHANGES  AT  ATHENS  UNDER  PERIKLES. 

blics.  private  initiative  baa  i  ithemot  existed  at  all,  or  has  beep  of  com- 
paratively  little  effect,  iu  law  making;  whue  in  the  application  of  lawa 
when  made,  there  has  always  been  a permanent  judicial  body  exercis- 
in-  an  acti  m  of  its  own,  more  or  leas  independent  of  the  legislature, 
neralh  interpreting  away  thetezl  of  contradictory  laws  so  as  to 
keep  up  a  tolerably  consistent  course  of  Eorensic  tradition.  But  at 
Athens,  the  fact  thai  the  proposer  of  a  new  decree,  or  of  a  new  law 
had  induced  the  senate  or  the  public  assembly  to  pass  it,  was  by  n< 
means  supposed  to  cancel  his  personal  responsibility,  if  the  proposi- 
tion was  illegal.  He  had  deceived  the  senate  or  the  people,  in  deli- 
berately ke<  ping  hack  from  them  a  fact  which  he  knew,  or  at  Least 
mighl  and  oughl  to  have  known. 

But  though  a  full  justification  may  thus  be  urged  on  behalf  <>f  the 
Graphe  Paranomon  as  originally  conceived  and  intended,  it,  will 
hardly  apply  to  thai  indictment  as  applied  afterward  in  its  plenary 
and  abusive  latitude.  Thus  .Em  hines  indicts  Ktesiphon  under  it  lor 
having  under  certain  circumstances  proposed  a  crown  to  Demosthe- 
nes. He  begins  by  showing  that  the  proposition  was  illegal — for 
this  was  the  essential  foundation  of  the  indictment:  he  then  goes  on 
further  to  demonstrate,  in  a  splendid  harangue,  thai  Demosthenes 
was  a  vile  man  and  a  mischievous  politician:  accordingly  (assuming 
the  argument  to  lie  just)  Ktesiphon  had  deceived  the  people  in  an 
aggravated  way— first  by  proposing  a  reward  under  circumstances 
contrary  to  law,  next  by  proposing  it  in  favor  of  an  unworthy  man. 
The  first  part  of  the  argument  only  is  of  the  essence  of  the  Graphe 
Paranomon:  the  second  part  is  iu  the  nature  of  an  abuse  growing 
out  of  it — springing  from  that  venom  of  personal  and  party  enmity 
"which  is  inseparable,  in  a  greater  or  less  degree,  from  free  political 
action,  and  which  manifested  itself  with  virulence  at  Athens,  though 
within  the  limits  of  legality.  That  this  indictment,  as  one  of  the 
most  direct  vents  for  such  enmity,  was  largely  applied  and  abused  at 
Athens,  is  certain.  But  though  it  probably  deterred  unpracticcd  cit- 
izens from  originating  new  propositions,  it  did  not  produce  the  same 
effect  upon  those  orators  who  made  politics  a  regular  business,  and 
who  could  therefore  both  calculate  the  temper  of  the  people  and 
reckon  upon  support  from  a  certain  knot  of  friends.  Aristophon, 
toward  the  close  of  his  political  life,  made  it  a  boast  that  he  had 
been  thus  indicted  and  acquitted  seventy-five  times.  Probably  the 
worst  effect  which  it  produced  was  that  of  encouraging  the  vein  of 
personality  and  bitterness  which  pervades  so  large  a  proportion  of 
Attic  oratory,  even  in  its  most  illustrious  manifestations;  turning 
deliberative  into  judicial  eloquence,  and  interweaving  the  discussion 
of  a  law  or  decree  along  with  a  declamatory  harangue  against  the 
character  of  its  mover.  We  may  at  the  same  time  add  that  the 
Giaphe  Paranomon  was  often  the  most  convenient  way  of  getting 
a  law  or  a  psephism  repealed,  so  that  it  was  used  even  when  the 
annual  period  had  passed  over,  and  when  the  mover  was  therefore 


NUMBERS  AND  PAY  OF  THE  DIKASTS.        445 

out  of  danger — the  indictment  being  then  brought  only  against  the 
law  or  decree,  as  in  the  case  which  forms  the  subject  of  the  harangue 
of  Demosthenes  against  Leptines.  If  the  speaker  of  this  harangue 
obtained  a  verdict,  lie  procured  at  once  the  repeal  of  the  law  or 
decree,  without  proposing  any  new  provision  in  its  place;  which  he 
would  he  required  to  do — if  not  peremptorily,  at  least  by  common 
usage — if  he  carried  the  law  lor  repeal  before  the  Nomothetse. 

The  dikasteries  provided  under  the  system  of  Periklcs  varied  in 
number  of  members:  we  never  hear  of  less  than  200  members — most 
generally  of  500— and  sometimes  also  of  1000,  1500,  2,000  members, 
on  important  trials.  Each  man  received  pay  from  the  treasurers 
called  Kolakretoe,  after  his  day's  business  was  over,  of  three  oboli  or 
half  a  drachma:  at  least  this  was  the  amount  paid  during  the  early 
part  of  the  Peloponnesian  war.  M.  Boeckh  supposes  that  the  origi- 
nal pay  proposed  by  Perikles  was  one  obolus,  afterward  tripled  by 
Kleon;  but  his  opiuion  is  open  to  much  doubt.  It  was  indispensa- 
ble to  propose  a  measure  of  pay  sufficient  to  induce  citizens  to  come, 
and  come  frequently,  if  not  regularly.  Now  one  obolus  seems  to 
have  proved  afterward  an  inadequate  temptation  even  to  the  ekkle- 
siasts  (or  citizens  who  attended  the  public  assembly),  who  were  less 
frequently  wanted,  and  must  have  had  easier  sittings  than  the  di- 
kasts:  much  less  therefore  would  it  be  sufficient  in  the  case  of  the 
latter.  I  incline  to  the  belief  that  the  pay  originally  awarded  was 
three  oboli:  the  rather,  as  these  new  institutions  seem  to  have  nearly 
coincided  in  point  of  time  with  the  transportation  of  the  confederate 
treasure  from  Delos  to  Athens — so  that  the  Exchequer  would  then 
appear  abundantly  provided.  As  to  the  number  of  dikasts  actually 
present  ou  each  day  of  sitting,  or  the  minimum  number  requisite  to 
form  a  sitting,  we  are  very  imperfectly  informed.  Though  each  of 
the  ten  panels  or  divisions  of  dikasts  included  500  individuals,  seldom 
probably  did  all  of  them  attend.  But  it  also  seldom  happened, 
probably,  that  all  the  ten  divisions  sat  on  the  same  day:  there  was 
therefore  an  opportunity  of  making  up  deficiencies  in  division  A — 
when  its  lot  was  called  and  when  its  dikasts  did  not  appear  in  suffi- 
cient numbers — from  those  who  belonged  to  division  B  or  A,  besides 
the  supplementary  dikasts  who  were  not  comprised  in  any  of  the  ten 
divisions:  though  on  all  these  points  we  cannot  go  beyond  conjec- 
ture. Certain  it  is,  however,  that  the  dikasteries  were  always 
numerous,  and  that  none  of  the  dikasts  could  know  in  what  causes 
they  would  be  employed,  so  that  it  was  impossible  to  tamper  with 
them  beforehand. 

Such  were  the  great  constitutional  innovations  of  Perikles  and 
Ephialtes — changes  full  of  practical  results — the  transformation,  as 
well  as  the  complement,  of  that  democratical  system  which  Kleis- 
thenes  had  begun  and  to  which  the  tide  of  Athenian  feeling  had 
been  gradually  mounting  up  during  the  preceding  twenty  years.  The 
entire  force  of  these  changes  is  generally  not  perceived,  because  the 


446        CHANGES  AT  ATHENS  UNDER  PERIKLES. 

popular  diVroteries  and  the  Nomothetse  arc  so  often  represented  as 
institution*  of  Bolon,  and  as  merely  supplied  with  pay  by  Perikles. 
Thia  erron  sous  supposition  prevents  all  clear  view  of  the  growth  of 
the  Athenian  democracy  by  throwing  back  its  last  elaborations  to  the 
period  of  its  early  and  imperfeel  start.  To  strip  the  magistrates  of 
all  their  judicial  power,  except  that  of  imposing  a  small  fine,  and 
the  Arerpagus  of  all  its  jurisdiction  except  in  cases  of  homicide — 
providing  popular,  numerous,  and  salaried  dikasts  to  decide  all  the 
judicial  business  at  Athens  as  well  as  to  repeal  and  enact  laws — this 
was  the  consummation  of  the  Athenian  democracy.  No  serious 
constitutional  alteration  (1  except  the  temporary  interruptions  of 
the  Four  Hundred  and  the  Thirty)  was  afterward  made  until  the 
days  of  Macedonian  interference.  As  Perikles  made  it,  so  it 
remained  in  the  days  of  Demosthenes — though  with  a  sensible 
change  in  the  character,  and  abatement  in  the  energies,  of  the  people, 
rich  as  well  as  poor. 

In  appreciating  the  practical  working  of  these  numerous  dikasteries 
at  Athens,  in  comparison  with  such  justice  as  might  have  been 
expected  from  individual  magistrates,  we  have  to  consider,  first — 
That  personal  and  pecuniary  corruption  seems  to  have  been  a  com- 
mon vice  among  the  leading  men  of  Alliens  and  Sparta,  when  acting 
individually  or  in  boards  of  a  few  members,  and  not  uncommon  even 
with  the  kings  of  Sparta, — next,  That  in  the  Grecian  cities  generally, 
as  we  know  even  from  the  oligarchical  Xenophon  (he  particularly 
excepts  Sparta),  the  rich  and  great  men  were  not  only  insubordinate 
to  the  magistrates,  but  made  a  parade  of  showing  that  they  cared 
nothing  about  them.  We  know  also  from  the  same  unsuspected 
source,  that  while  the  poorer  Athenian  citizens  who  served  on  ship- 
board were  distinguished  for  the  strictest  discipline,  the  hoplites  or 
middling  burghers  who  formed  the  infantry  were  less  obedient,  and 
the  rich  citizens  who  served  on  horseback  the  most  disobedient  of  all. 
To  make  rich  and  powerful  criminals  effectively  amenable  to  justice 
has  indeed  been  found  so  difficult  everywhere,  until  a  recent  period 
of  his'.ory,  that  we  should  be  surprised  if  it  were  otherwise  in  Greece. 
Whe  j  we  follow  the  reckless  demeanor  of  rich  men  like  Kritias,  Alki- 
biar'.es,  and  Meidias,  even  under  the  full-grown  democracy  of  Athens, 
we  may  be  sure  that  their  predecessors  under  the  Kleisthenean  con- 
stitution would  have  been  often  too  formidable  to  be  punished  or 
kept  down  by  an  individual  archon  of  ordinary  firmness,  even  assum- 
ing him  to  be  upright  and  well-intentioned.  Now  the  dikasteries 
established  by  Perikles  were  inaccessible  both  to  corruption  and 
intimidation:  their  number,  their  secret  suffrage,  and  the  impossi- 
bility of  knowing  beforehand  what  individuals  would  sit  in  any  par- 
ticular cause,  prevented  both  the  one  and  the  other.  And  besides 
that,  the  magnitude  of  their  number,  extravagant  according  to  our 
ideas  of  judicial  business,  was  essential  to  this  tutelary  effect — it 
served  farther  to  render  the  trial  solemn  and  the  verdict  imposing  on 


THE   ATHENIAN  DIKASTERIES.  447 

tin.1  minds  of  parties  and  spectators,  as  we  may  see  by  the  fact,  that 
in  important  causes  the  dikastery  was  doubled  or  tripled.  Nor  was 
it  possible  by  any  other  means  than  numbers  to  give  dignity  to  an 
assembly  of  citizens,  of  wbom  many  were  poor,  some  old,  and  all 
were  despised  individually  by  rich  accused  persons  who  were  brought 
before  them — as  Aristophanes  and  Xenopbon  give  us  plainly  to  under- 
stand. If  we  except  the  strict  and  peculiar  educational  discipline  of 
Sparta,  these  numerous  dikasteries  afforded  the  only  organ  which 
Grecian  politics  could  devise,  for  getting  redress  against  powerful 
criminals,  public  as  well  as  private,  and  for  obtaining  a  sincere  and 
uncorrupt  verdict. 

Taking  the  general  working  of  the  dikasteries,  we  shall  find  that 
they  are  nothing  but  jury-trial  applied  on  a  scale  broad,  systematic, 
unaided,  and  uncontrolled,  beyond  all  other  historical  experience — 
and  that  they  therefore  exhibit  in  exaggerated  proportions  both  the 
excellences  and  the  defects  characteristic  of  the  jury-system,  as  com- 
pared with  decision  by  trained  and  professional  judges.  All  the 
encomiums,  which  it  is  customary  to  pronounce  upon  jury-trial,  will 
be  found  predicable  of  the  Athenian  dikasteries  in  a  still  greater 
degree ;  all  the  reproaches,  which  can  be  addressed  on  good  ground 
to  the  dikasteries,  will  apply  to  modern  juries  also,  though  in  a  less 
degree.  Such  parallel  is  not  less  just,  though  the  dikasteries,  as  the 
most  democratical  feature  of  democracy  itself,  have  been  usually  criti- 
cised with  marked  disfavor — every  censure  or  sneer  or  joke  against 
them  which  can  be  found  in  ancient  authors,  comic  as  well  as  serious, 
being  accepted  as  true  almost  to  the  letter;  while  juries  are  so  popu- 
lar an  institution,  that  their  merits  have  been  overstated  (in  Eng- 
land at  least)  and  their  defects  kept  out  of  sight.  The  theory  of  the 
Athenian  dikastery,  and  the  theory  of  jury-trial  as  it  has  prevailed 
in  England  since  the  Revolution  of  1688,  are  one  and  the  same- 
recourse  to  a  certain  number  of  private  citizens,  taken  by  chance  or 
without  possibility  of  knowing  beforehand  who  they  will  be,  sworn 
to  hear  fairly  and  impartially  plaintiff  and  defendant,  accuser  and 
accused,  and  to  find  a  true  verdict  according  to  tneir  consciences 
upon  a  distinct  issue  before  them.  But  in  Athens  this  theory  was 
worked  out  to  its  natural  consequences;  while  English  practice,  in 
this  respect  as  in  so  many  others,  is  at  variance  with  English  theory. 
The  jury,  though  an  ancient  and  a  constant  portion  of  the  judicial 
system,  has  never  been  more  than  a  portion — kept  in  subordination, 
trammels,  and  pupilage,  by  a  powerful  crown  and  by  judges  presiding 
over  an  artificial  system  of  law.  In  the  English  state  trials,  down  to 
a  period  not  long  before  the  Revolution  of  1688.  any  jurors  who 
found  a  verdict  contrary  to  the  dictation  'of  the  .nudge  were  liable 
to  fine;  and  at  an  earlier  period  (if  a  second  jury  on  being  sum- 
moned found  an  opposite  verdict)  even  to  the  terrible  punishment  of 
attaint.  And  though,  for  the  last  century  and  a  half,  the  verdict  of 
the  jury  has  been  free  as  to  .matters  of  fact,  new  trials  having  taken 


448        CHANGES  AT  ATHENS  UNDER  PERIKLE8. 

the  place  of  the  old  attaint — yel  the  ascendency  of  the  presiding 
judge  over  their  minds,  and  hie  influence  over  the  procedure  as  the 
authority  on  matters  of  law,  has  always  been  Mich  a-  id  overrule  the 
natural  play  of  their  feelings  and  judgment  as  men  and  citizens 
sometimes  to  the  detriment,  much  oftener  to  the  benefll  (always 
excepting  political  trials),  of  substantial  justice.  IJut  in  Alliens  the 
dikasts  judged  of  the  law  as  well  as  of  the  fact.  The  laws  were 
not  numerous,  and  were  couched  in  few,  for  the  most  pari  familiar, 
words.  To  determine  how  the  lads  stood,  and  whether,  if  the  facts 
were  undisputed,  the  law  invoked  was  properly  applicable  to  them, 
were  parts  of  the  integral  question  submitted  to  them,  and  compre- 
hended in  their  verdict.  Moreover,  each  dikastcry  construed  the 
law  for  itself  without  being  bound  to  follow  tbe  decisions  of  those 
which  had  preceded  it,  except  in  bo  far  as  such  analogy  might  really 
influence  the  convictions  of  the  members.  They  were  free,  self- 
judging  persons — unassisted  by  the  schooling,  but  at  the  same  time 
u n trammeled  by  the  awe-striking  ascendency,  of  a  professional  judge 
— obeying  the  spontaneous  inspirations  of  their  own  consciences,  and 
recognizing  no  authority  except  the  laws  of  the  city,  with  which  they 
were  familiar. 

Trial  by  jury,  as  practiced  in  England  since  1688,  has  been  politi- 
cally most  valuable,  as  a  security  against  the  encroachments  of  an 
anti-popular  executive.  Partly  for  this  reason,  partly  for  others 
not  necessary  to  state  here,  it  has  had  greater  credit  as  an  instru- 
ment of  judicature  generally,  and  lias  been  supposed  to  produce 
much  more  of  what  is  good  in  English  administration  of  jus- 
tice, then  really  belongs  to  it.  Amidst  the  unqualified  enco- 
miums so  frequently  bestowed  upon  the  honesty,  the  unprejudiced 
rectitude  of  appreciation,  the  practical  instinct  for  detecting  false- 
hood and  resisting  sophistry,  in  twelve  citizens  taken  by  hazard  and 
put  into  a  jury-box — comparatively  little  account  is  taken  either  of 
the  aids,  or  of  the  restrictions,  or  of  the  corrections  in  the  shape  of 
new  trials,  under  which  they  act,  or  of  the  artificial  forensic  medium 
into  which  they  are  plunged  for  the  time  of  their  service:  so  that  the 
theory  of  the  case  presumes  them  to  be  more  of  spontaneous  agents, 
and  more  analogous  to  the  Athenian  dikasts,  than  the  practice  con- 
firms. Accordingly,  when  we  read  these  encomiums  in  modern 
authors,  we  shall  find  that  both  the  direct  benefits  ascribed  to  jury- 
trial  in  insuring  pure  and  even-handed  justice,  and  still  more  its 
indirect  benefits  in  improving  and  educating  the  citizens  generally — 
might  have  been  set  forth  yet  more  emphatically  in  a  laudatory 
harangue  of  Periklcs  about  the  Athenian  dikasteries.  If  it  be  true 
that  an  Englishman  or  an  American  counts  more  certainly  on  an 
impartial  and  uncomrpl  verdict  from  a  jury  of  his  country  than  from 
a  permanent  professional  judge,  much  more  would  this  be  the  Feel- 
ing of  an  ordinary  Athenian,  when  he  compared  the  dikasteries  with 
the  archon.     The  juror  hears  and  judges  under  full  persuasion  that 


IMPERFECTIONS  OF  JURY- TRIAL.  449 

he  himself  individually  stands  in  need  of  the  same  protection  or 
redress  invoked  bv  others-  so  aNo  did  the  dikast.  As  to  the  effects 
of  jury-trial  in  diffusing  respect  to  the  laws  and  constitution — in 
giving  to  every  citizen  a  personal  interest  in  enforcing  the  former  and 
maintaining  the  latter — in  imparting  a  sentiment  of  dignity  to  small 
ami  poor  men,  through  the  discharge  of  a  function  exalted  as  well  as 
useful — in  calling  forth  the  patriotic  sympathies,  and  exercising  the 
mental  capacities  of  every  individual — all  these  effects  were  pro- 
duced in  a  still  higher  degree  by  the  dikasteries  at  Athens ;  from 
their  greater  frequency,  numbers,  and  spontaneity  of  mental  action, 
without  any  professional  judge,  upon  whom  they  could  throw  the 
responsibility  of  deciding  for  them. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  imperfections  inherent  in  jury  trial  were 
likewise  disclosed  in  an  exaggerated  form  under  the  Athenian  sys- 
tem. Both  juror  and  dikast  represent  the  average  man  of  the  time 
and  of  the  neighborhood,  exempt  indeed  from  pecuniary  corruption 
or  personal  fear, — deciding  according  to  what  he  thinks  justice  or  to 
some  genuine  feeling  of  equity,  mercy,  religion,  or  patriotism,  which 
in  reference  to  the  case  before  him  he  thinks  as  good  as  justice — but 
not  exempt  from  sympathies,  antipathies,  and  prejudices,  all  of  which 
act  the  more  powerfully  because  there  is  often  no  consciousness  of  their 
presence,  and  because  they  even  appear  essential  to  his  idea  of  plain 
and  straightforward  good  sense.  According  as  a  jury  is  composed  of 
Catholics  or  Protestants,  Irishmeu  or  Englishmen,  tradesmen,  farm- 
ers, or  inhabitants  of  a  frontier  on  which  smuggling  prevails, — there 
is  apt  to  prevail  among  them  a  corresponding  bias.  At  the  time  of 
any  great  national  delusion,  such  as  the  Popish  Plot — or  of  any 
powerful  local  excitement,  such  as  that  of  the  Church  and  King  mobs 
at  Birmingham  in  1791  against  Dr.  Priestley  and  the  Dissenters — 
juries  are  found  to  perpetrate  what  a  calmer  age  recognizes  to  have 
been  °;ross  injustice.  A  jury  who  disapprove  of  the  infliction  of 
capital  punishment  for  a  particular  crime,  will  acquit  prisoners  in 
spite  of  the  clearest  evidence  of  guilt.  It  is  probable  that  a  delin- 
quent, indicted  for  any  state  offense  before  the  dikastery  at  Athens, 
— having  only  a  private  accuser  to  contend  against,  with  equal  power 
of  speaking  in  his  own  defense,  of  summoning  witnesses  and  of  pro- 
curing friends  to  speak  for  him — would  have  better  chance  of  a  fair 
trial  than  he  would  now  have  anywhere  except  in  England  and  the 
United  States  of  America;  and  better  than  he  would  have  had  in 
England  down  to  the  seventeenth  century.  Juries  bring  the  common 
feeling  as  well  as  the  common  reason  of  the  public — or  often,  indeed, 
only  the  separate  feeling  of  particular  fractions  of  the  public — to 
dictate  the  application  of  the  law  to  particular  cases.  They  are  a 
protection  against  anything  worse — especially  against  such  corrup- 
tion or  servility  as  are  liable  to  taint  permanent  official  persons — but 
they  cannot  possibly  reach  anything  better.  Now,  the  dika^f -trial  at 
Athens  effected  the  same  object,  and  had  in  it  only  the  same  ingre 
H.  G.  II.— 15 


450       CHANGES  AT  ATITENo  UNDER  PERIKLES. 

clients  of  error  and  misdeoision  as  the  English  jury:  but  it  had  them 
in  stronger  d<  ise,  without  the  counteracting  authority  of  a  judge,  and 
without  the  benefii  of  a  pr<  <  edure  such  a-  has  now  been  obtained  in 
England.  The  feelings  <>!  the  dikasts  counted  for  more,  and  their 
reason  for  less:  not  merely  because  of  their  greater  numbers,  which 
naturally  heightened  the  pitch  of  feeling  in  each  individual — but  also 
because  the  addresses  of  oratorsor  parties  formed  the  prominent  part 

of  the  procedure,  and  the  depositions  of  witnesses  only  a  very  subor- 
dinate part.  Tin  dikast,  therefore,  heard  little  of  the  naked  facts,  the 
appropriate  subjects  for  his  reason — but  he  was  abundantly  supplied 
with  the  plausible  falsehoods,  calumnies,  irrelevant  statements  and 
suggestions,  etc.,  of  the  parties,  and  that  too  in  a  manner  skillfully 
adapted  to  bis  temper.  To  keep  the  facts  of  the  case  before  the 
jury,  apart  from  the  falsehood  and  coloring  of  parties,  is  the  most 
useful  function  of  the  modern  judge,  whose  influence  is  also  consider- 
able as  a  restraint  upon  the  pleader.  The  helps  to  the  reason  of  the 
dikast  were  thus  materially  diminished,  while  the  action  upon  his 
feelings,  of  anger  as  well  as  of  compassion,  was  sharpened,  as  com- 
pared with  the  modern  juror.  Wfe  see  in  the  remaining  productions  of 
the  Attic  orators  how  much  there  is  of  plausible  deception,  departure 
from  the  true  issue,  and  appeals  to  sympathies,  antipathies,  and  prej- 
udices of  every  kind,  addressed  to  the  dikasteries.  Of  course,  such 
artifices  were  resorted  to  by  opposite  speakers  in  each  particular  trial. 
We  have  no  means  of  kLowingto  what  extent  they  actually  perverted 
the  judgment  of  the  hearers.  Probably  the  frequent  habit  of  sitting 
in  dikastery  gave  them  a  penetration  in  detecting  sophistry  not  often 
possessed  by  non-professional  citizens.  Nevertheless  it  cannot  be 
doubted  that,  in  a  considerable  proportion  of  cases,  success  depended 
less  upon  the  intrinsic  merits  of  a  case  than  upon  apparent  airs  of 
innocence  and  truth  telling,  dexterity  of  statement,  and  good  general 
character,  in  the  parties,  their  witnesses,  and  the  friends  who  ad- 
dressed the  court  on  their  behalf.  The  accusatory  speeches  in  Attic 
oratory,  wherein  punishment  is  invoked  upon  an  alleged  delinquent, 
are  expressed  with  a  bitterness  which  is  now  banished  from  English 
criminal  judicature,  though  it  wTas  common  in  the  state  trials  of  two 
centuries  ago.  Against  them  may  be  set  the  impassioned  and  empha- 
tic appeals  made  by  defendants  and  their  friends  to  the  commisera- 
tion of  the  dikasts;  appeals  the  more  often  successful,  because  they 
came  last,  immediately  before  decision  was  pronounced.  This  is  true 
of  Rome  as  well  as  of  Athens. 

As  an  organ  for  judicial  purposes,  the  Athenian  dikasteries  were 
thus  a  simple  and  plenary  manifestation  of  jury-trial,  with  its  inher- 
ent excellences  and  defects  both  brought  out  in  exaggerated  relief. 
They  insured  a  decision  at  once  uncorrupt,  public-minded,  and 
imposing — together  with  the  best  security  which  the  case  admitted 
against  illegal  violences  on  the  parUof  the  rich  and  great.  Their 
extreme  publicity — as  well  as  their  simple  and  oral  procedure,  divest- 


NECESSITY  OF  LEARNING  TO   SPEAK.  451 

ed  of  that  verbal  and  ceremonial  technicality  which  marked  the  law 
of  Rome  even  at  its  outset — was  no  small  benefit.  And  as  the  ver- 
dicts of  the  dikasts,  even  when  wrong,  depended  upon  causes  of 
misjudgment  common  to  them  with  the  general  body  of  the  citi- 
zens, so  they  never  appeared  to  pronounce  unjustly,  nor  lost  the 
confidence  of  their  fellow-citizens  generally.  But  whatever  may 
have  been  their  defects  as  judicial  instruments,  as  a  stimulus  both  to 
thought  and  speech,  their  efficacy  was  unparalleled,  in  the  circum- 
stances of  Athenian  society.  Doubtless  they  would  not  have  pro- 
duced the  same  effect  if  established  at  Thebes  or  Argos.  The 
susceptibilities  of  the  Athenian  mind,  as  well  as  the  previous  prac- 
tice and  expansive  tendencies  of  democratical  citizenship,  were 
also  essential  conditions — and  that  genuine  taste  for  sitting  in  judg- 
ment and  hearing  both  sides  fairly,  which,  however  Aristophanes 
may  caricature  and  deride  it,  was  alike  honorable  and  useful  to  the 
people.  The  first  establishment  of  the  dikasteries  is  nearly  coinci- 
dent with  the  great  improvement  of  Attic  tragedy  in  passing  from 
JEschylus  to  Sophokles.  The  same  development  of  the  national 
genius,  now  preparing  splendid  manifestations  both  in  tragic  and 
comic  poetry,  was  called  with  redoubled  force  into  the  path  of  ora- 
tory, by  the  new  judicial  system.  A  certain  power  of  speech  now 
became  necessary,  not  merely  for  those  who  intended  to  take  a  promi- 
nent part  in  politics,  but  also  for  private  citizens  to  vindicate  their 
rights  or  repel  accusations,  in  a  court  of  justice.  It  was  an  accom- 
plishment of  the  greatest  practical  utility,  even  apart  from  ambitious 
purposes;  hardly  less  so  than  the  use  of  arms  or  the  practice  of  the 
gymnasium.  Accordingly,  the  teachers  of  grammar  and  rhetoric, 
and  the  composers  of  written  speeches  to  be  delivered  by  others,  now 
began  to  multiply  and  to  acq  ;ire  an  unprecedented  importance — as 
well  at  Athens  as  under  the  contemporary  democracy  of  Syracuse,  in 
which  also  some  form  of  popular  judicature  was  established.  Style 
and  speech  began  to  be  reduced  to  a  system,  and  so  communicated; 
not  always  happily,  for  several  of  the  early  rhetors  adopted  an  arti- 
ficial, ornate,  and  conceited  manner,  from  which  Attic  good  taste 
afterward  liberated  itself.  But  the  very  character  of  a  teacher  of 
rhetoric  as  an  art — a  man  giving  precepts  and  putting  himself  for- 
ward in  show-lectures  as  a  model  for  others,  is  a  feature  first  belong- 
ing to  the  Periklean  age,  and  indicates  a  new  demand  in  the  minds 
of  the  citizens. 

We  begin  to  hear,  in  the  generation  now  growing  up,  of  the  rhetor 
and  the  sophist,  as  persons  of  influence  and  celebrity.  These  two 
names  denoted  persons  of  similar  moral  and  intellectual  endowments, 
or  often  indeed  the  same  person,  considered  in  different  points  of 
view;  either  as  professing  to  improve  the  moral  character — or  as  com- 
municating power  and  facility  of  expression — or  as  suggesting  premi- 
ses for  persuasion,  illustrations  on  the  common-places  of  morals  and 
politics,  argumentative  abundance  on  matters  of  ordinary  experience, 


452   CHANGES  AT  ATHENS  UNDER  PERTKLES. 

dialectical  subtlety  in  confuting  an  opponent,  etc  Antipho  of  the 
deme  Rhamnusin  Attica,  Thrasymachus  of  Chalkedon,  Tisiasof  Byra 
cuse,  Gorgias  of  Leontiui,  Protagoras  of  Abdera,  Prodikus  of  K-eos, 
Theodoras  of  Byzantium,  Hippias  of  Elis,  Zen©  of  Elea,  were  among 
t lit-  lirst  who  distinguished  themselves  in  these  departments  of  teach- 
ing. Antipho  was  the  author  of  the  earliest  composed  speech  really 
spoken  in  a  dikastery  and  preserved  down  to  the  later  critics.  These 
men  were  mostly  not  citizens  of  Alliens,  though  many  of  them  be- 
longed to  towns  comprehended  in  the  Athenian  empire,  at  a  time 
w  In  n  important  judicial  causes  belonging  to  these  towns  were  often 
carried  up  to  be  tried  at  Alliens — while  all  of  them  looked  to  that 
city  as  a  central  point  of  action  and  distinction.  The  term  Sophist, 
which  Herodotus  applies  with  sincere  respect  to  men  of  distinguished 
wisdom  such  as  Solon,  Anacharsis,  Pythagoras,  etc.,  now  came  to  be 
applied  to  these  teachers  of  virtue,  rhetoric,  conversation,  and  dispu- 
tation; many  of  whom  professed  acquaintance  with  the  whole  circle 
of  human  science,  physical  as  well  as  moral  (then  narrow  enough),  so 
far  as  was  necessary  to  talk  ahout  any  portion  of  it  plausibly  and 
effectively,  and  to  acswTer  any  question  which  might  be  proposed  to 
them.  Though  they  passed  from  one  Grecian  town  to  another,  partly 
in  the  capacity  of  envoys  from  their  fellow-citizens,  partly  as  exhib- 
iting their  talents  to  numerous  hearers,  with  much  renown  and  large 
gain — they  appear  to  have  been  viewed  with  jealousy  and  dislike  by 
a  large  portion  of  the  public.  For  at  a  time  when  every  citizen 
pleaded  his  own  cause  before  the  dikastery,  they  imparted,  to  those 
who  were  rich  enough  to  purchase  it,  a  peculiar  skill  in  the  common 
weapons,  which  made  them  like  fencing-masters  or  professional 
swordsmen  amidst  a  society  of  untrained  duellists.  Moreover  Sok- 
rates — himself  a  product  of  the  same  age,  a  disputant  on  the  same 
subjects,  and  bearing  the  same  name  of  a  Sophist — but  despising 
political  and  judicial  practice,  and  looking  to  the  production  of  intel- 
lectual stimulus  and  moral  impressions  upon  his  hearers — Sokrates — 
or  rather,  Plato  speaking  through  the  person  of  Sokrates — carried  on 
throughout  his  life  a  constant  polemical  warfare  against  the  sophists 
and  rhetors,  in  that  negative  vein  in  which  he  was  unrivalled.  And 
as  the  works  of  these  latter  have  not  remained,  it  is  chiefly  from  the 
observations  of  their  opponents  that  we  know  them;  so  that  they  are 
in  a  situation  such  as  that  in  which  Sokrates  himself  would  have 
been,  if  we  had  been  compelled  to  judge  of  him  only  from  the 
Clouds  of  Aristophanes,  or  from  those  unfavorable  impressions  re- 
specting his  character  which  we  know,  even  from  the  Apologies  of 
Plato  and  Xenophon,  to  have  been  generally  prevalent  at  Athens. 

This  is  not  the  opportunity  however  for  trying  to  distinguish  the 
good  from  the  evil  in  the  working  of  the  sophists  and  rhetors.  At 
present  it  is  enough  that  they  were  the  natural  product  of  the  age; 
supplying  those  wants,  and  answering  to  that  stimulus,  which  arose 
partly  from  the  deliberations  of  the  Kkklesia,  but  still  more  from  the 


COMPOSITION  OF  THE  DIKASTERIES.  453 

contentious  before  the  dikastery — in  which  latter  a  far  greater  num- 
ber of  citizens  took  active  part,  with  or  without  their  own  consent. 
The  public  and  frequent  dikasteries  constituted  by  Perikles  opened 
to  the  Athenian  mind  precisely  that  career  of  improvement  which 
was  best  suited  to  its  natural  aptitude.  They  were  essential  to  the 
development  of  that  demand  out  of  which  grew  not  only  Grecian 
oratory,  but  also,  as  secondary  products,  the  speculative  moral  and 
political  philosophy,  and  the  didactic  analysis  of  rhetoric  and  gram- 
mar, which  long  survived  after  Grecian  creative  genius  had  passed 
away.  And  it  was  one  of  the  first  measures  of  the  oligarchy  of 
Thirty,  to  forbid,  by  an  express  law,  any  teaching  of  the  art  of  speak- 
ing. Aristophanes  derides  the  Athenians  for  their  love  of  talk  and 
controversy,  as  if  it  had  enfeebled  their  military  energy;  but  in  his 
time  most  undoubtedly,  that  reproach  was  not  true — nor  did  it  become 
true,  even  in  part,  until  the  crushing  misfortunes  which  marked  the 
close  of  the  Peloponnesian  war.  During  the  course  of  that  war, 
restless  and  energetic  action  was  the  characteristic  of  Athens  even  in 
a  greater  degree  than  oratory  or  political  discussion,  though  before 
the  time  of  Demosthenes  a  material  alteration  had  taken  place. 

The  establishment  of  these  paid  dikasteries  at  Athens  was  thus  one 
of  the  most  important  and  prolific  events  in  all  Grecian  history.  The 
pay  helped  to  furnish  a  maintenance  for  old  citizens,  past  the  age  of 
military  service.  Elderly  men  were  the  best  persons  for  such  a  ser- 
vice, and  were  preferred  for  judicial  purposes  both  at  Sparta,  and  as 
it  seems,  in  heroic  Greece.  Nevertheless,  we  need  not  suppose  that 
all  the  dikasts  were  either  old  or  poor,  though  a  considerable  propor- 
tion of  them  were  so,  and  though  Aristophanes  selects  these  qualities 
as  among  the  most  suitable  subjects  for  his  ridicule.  Perikles  has 
been  often  censured  for  this  institution,  as  if  he  had  been  the  first  to 
insure  pay  to  dikasts  who  before  served  for  nothing,  and  had  thus 
introduced  poor  citizens  into  courts  previously  composed  of  citizens 
above  poverty.  But  in  the  first  place,  this  supposition  is  not  correct 
in  point  of  fact,  inasmuch  as  there  were  no  such  constant  dikasteries 
previously  acting  without  pay;  next,  if  it  had  been  true,  the  habitual 
exclusion  of  the  poor  citizens  would  have  nullified  the  popular  work- 
ing of  these  bodies,  and  would  have  prevented  them  from  answering 
any  longer  to  the  reigning  sentiment  at  Athens.  Nor  could  it  be 
deemed  unreason  ible  to  assign  a  regular  pay  to  those  who  thus  ren- 
dered regular  service.  It  was  indeed  an  essential  item  in  the  whole 
scheme  and  purpose,  so  that  the  suppression  of  the  pay  of  itself  seems 
to  have  suspended  the  dikasteries,  while  the  oligarchy  of  Four 
Hundred  was  established — and  it  can  only  be  discussed  in  that  light. 
As  the  fact  stands,  we  may  suppose  that  the  45,000  Heliasts  wiio  filled 
the  dikasteries  were  composed  of  the  middling  and  poorer  citizens 
indiscriminately;  though  there  was  nothing  to  exclude  the  richer,  if 
they  chose  to  serve. 


454    ATHENS  BEFORE  THE  PELOPOXXESIAX  WAR 


CHAPTER  XLVII. 

PROM  TTIE  THIRTY  YEARS*  Tl:n  1  .,  Vol  K  II  I  N  YEARS  BEFORE  TITE 
l'KI.oi'oNNl.siAX  WAR,  DOWN  TO  THE  BLOCKADE  OK  POTTDiEA,  in 
TUE  TEAS  BEFORE  THE  PELOPONNESIAN   WAR. 

The  judicial  alterations  effected  at  Athens  by  Periklea  andEphi- 
altes,  described  in  the  preceding  chapter,  gave  to  a  large  proportion 
of  the  citizens  direct  jury  functions  and  an  active  interest  in  the 
constitution,  such  as  they  had  never  before  enjoyed ;  the  change  being 
at  once  a  mark  of  previous  growth  of  democratical  sentiment  during 
the  past,  and  a  cause  of  its  further  development  during  the  future. 
The  Athenian  people  were  at  this  time  ready  for  personal  exertion  in 
all  directions.  .Military  service  on  land  or  sea  was  not  less  conform- 
able to  their  dispositions  than  attendance  in  the  ekklcsia  or  in  the 
dikastery  at  home.  The  naval  service  especially  was  prosecuted 
with  a  degree  of  assiduity  which  brought  about  continual  improve- 
ment in  .skill  and  efficiency;  while  the  poorer  citizens,  of  whom  it 
chiefly  consisted,  were  more  exact  in  obedience  and  discipline  than 
any  ot  the  more  opulent  persons  from  whom  the  infantry  or  the  cavalry 
Were  drawn.  The  maritime  multitude,  in  addition  to  self-confidence 
and  courage,  acquired  by  this  laborious  training  an  increased  skill, 
which  placed  the  Athenian  navy  every  year  more  and  more  above 
the  rest  of  Greece.  And  the  perfection  of  this  force  became  the 
more  indispensable  as  the  Athenian  empire  was  now  again  confined 
to  the  sea  and  sea  port  towns;  the  reverses  immediately  precedingthe 
Thirty  years' truce  having  broken  up  all  Athenian  land  ascendency 
over  Megara,  Bceotia,  and  the  other  continental  territories  adjoining 
to  Attica. 

The  maritime  confederacy — originally  commenced  at  Delos  under 
the  headship  of  Athens,  but  with  a  common  synod  and  deliberative 
voice  on  the  part  of  each  member — had  now  become  transformed 
into  a  confirmed  empire  on  the  part  of  Athens,  over  the  remaining 
stales  as  foreign  dependencies;  all  of  them  rendering  tribute  excepl 
Chin-,  Samos,  and  Lesbos.  These  three  still  remained  on  their 
original  fooling  of  autonomous  allies,  retaining  their  armed  force, 
ships,  and  fortifications,  with  the  obligation  of  furnishing  military 
and  naval  aid  when  required,  but  not  of  paying  tribute.  The  dis- 
continuance of  the  deliberative  synod,  however,  had  deprived  them 
of  their  original  security  against  the  encroachments  of  Athens.  1 
have  already  stated  generally  the  steps  (we  do  not  know  them  in 
detail)  whereby  this  important  change  was  brought  about,  gradually 
and  without  any  violent  revolution — for  even  the  transfer  of  the 
common  treasure  from  Delos  to  Athens,  which  was  the  mosl  palpable- 
symbol  and  evidence  of  the  change,  was  not  an  act  of  Athenian 


ATHENS  AND  HER  ALLIES.  455 

violence,  since  it  was  adopted  on  the  proposition  of  the  Samians. 
The  change  resulted  in  fact  almost  inevitably  from  the  circumstances 
of  the  case,  and  from  the  eager  activity  of  the  Athenians  contrasted 
with  the  backwardness  and  aversion  to  personal  service  on  the  part 
of  the  allies.  We  must  recollect  that  the  confederacy,  even  in  its 
original  structure,  was  contracted  for  permanent  objects,  and  was 
permanently  binding  by  the  vote  of  its  majority,  like  the  Spartan 
confederacy,  upon  every  individual  member.  It  was  destined  to 
keep  out  the  Persian  fleet,  and  to  maintain  the  police  of  the  !/Egean. 
Consistently  with  these  objects,  no  individual  member  could  be 
allowed  to  secede  from  the  confederacy,  and  thus  to  acquire  the 
benefit  of  protection  at  the  cost  of  the  remainder:  so  that  wdien 
Naxos  and  other  members  actually  did  secede,  the  step  was  taken 
as  a  revolt,  and  Athens  only  performed  her  duty  as  president  of  the 
confederacy  in  reducing  them.  By  every  such  reduction,  as  well  as 
by  that  exchange  of  personal  service  for  money-payment,  which 
most  of  the  allies  voluntarily  sought,  the  power  of  Athens  increased 
until  at  length  she  found  herself  with  an  irresistible  navy  in  the 
midst  of  disarmed  tributaries,  none  of  whom  could  escape  from  her 
constraining  power — and  mistress  of  the  sea,  the  use  of  which  was 
indispensable  to  them.  The  synod  of  Delos,  even  if  it  had  not 
before  become  partially  deserted,  must  have  ceased  at  the  time  when 
the  treasure  was  removed  to  Athens — probably  about  460  B.C.,  or 
shortly  afterward. 

The  relations  between  Athens  and  her  allies  were  thus  materially 
changed,  by  proceedings  which  gradually  evolved  themselves  and 
followed  one  upon  the  other  without  any  preconcerted  plan.  She 
became  an  imperial  or  despot  city,  governing  an  aggregate  of  depend- 
ent subjects  all  without  their  own  active  concurrence,  and  in  many 
cases  doubtless  contrary  to  their  own  sense  of  political  right.  It  was 
not  likely  that  they  should  conspire  unanimously  to  break  up  the 
confederacy,  and  discontinue  the  collection  of  contribution  from 
each  of  the  members;  nor  would  it  have  been  at  all  desirable  that 
they  should  do  so:  for  while  Greece  generally  would  have  been  a 
great  loser  by  such  a  proceeding,  the  allies  themselves  would  have 
been  the  greatest  losers  of  all,  inasmuch  as  they  would  have 
been  exposed  without  defense  to  the  Persian  and  Phcenican  fleets. 
But  the  Athenians  committed  the  capital  fault  of  taking  the  whole 
alliance  into  their  own  hands,  and  treating  the  alRes  purely  as  sub- 
jects, without  seeking  to  attach  them  by  any  form  of  political  incor- 
poration or  collective  meeting  and  discussion— without  taking  any 
pains  to  maintain  community  of  feeling  or 'idea  of  a  joint  interest — 
without  admitting  any  control,  real  or  even  pretended,  over  them- 
selves as  managers.  Had  they  attempted  to  do  this,  it  might  have 
proved  difficult  to  accomplish,  so  powerful  was  the  force  of  geo- 
graphical dissemination,  the  tendency  to  isolated  civic  life,  and  the 
repugnance    to    any  permanent    extramural    obligations,    in  every 


456    ATHENS  BEFORE  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR 

Gre<  ian  community.  But  they  do  not  appear  to  have  ever  made  the 
attempt.  Finding  Athens  exalted  by  circumstances  to  empire,  and 
the  allies  degraded  into  subjects,  the  Athenian  statesmen  grasped  at 
the  exaltation  as  a  matter  oi  pride  as  well  as  profit.  Even  Perikles, 
the  most  prudent  and  far-sighted  of  them,  betrayed  no  consciousness 

that  an  empire  without    the  cement  of  some  all-pervading  interest  or 

attachment,  although  not  practically  oppressive,  must  nevertheless 
have  a  natural  tendency  to  become  more  and  more  unpopular,  and 

ultimately  to  crumble  in  pieces.  Such  was  the  course  of  events 
which,  it  the  judicious  counsels  of  Perikles  had  been  followed,  might 
have  been  postponed,  though  it  could  not  have  been  averted. 

Instead  of  trying  to  cherish  or  restore  the  feelings  of  equal  alliance, 
Perikles  formally  disclaimed  it.  He  maintained  that  Athens  owed  to 
her  subject  allies  no  account  of  the  money  received  from  them,  so 
long  as  she  performed  her  contract  by  keeping  away  the  Persian 
enemy  and  maintaining  the  safety  of  the  iEgean  waters.  This  was, 
as  he  represented,  the  obligation  which  Athens  had  undertaken;  and 
provided  it  were  faithfully  discharged,  the  allies  had  no  right  to  ask 
questions  or  exercise  control.  That  it  was  faithfully  discharged  no 
one  could  deny.  No  ship  of  war  except  from  Athens  and  her  allies 
was  ever  seen  between  the  eastern  and  western  shores  of  the  ^Egean. 
An  Athenian  fleet  of  sixty  triremes  was  kept  on  duty  in  these  waters, 
chiefly  managed  by  Athenian  citizens,  and  beneficial  as  well  from  the 
protection  afforded  to  commerce  as  for  keeping  the  seamen  in  con- 
stant pay  and  training.  And  such  was  the  effective  superintendence 
maintained,  that  in  the  disastrous  period  preceding  the  Thirty  years' 
truce,  when  Athens  lost  Megara  and  Bceotia,  and  with  difficulty 
recovered  Eubcea,  none  of  her  numerous  maritime  subjects  took  the 
opportunity  to  revolt. 

The  total  of  these  distinct  tributary  cities  is  said  to  have  amounted 
to  1000,  according  to  a  verse  of  Aristophanes  which  cannot  be  under 
the  truth,  though  it  may  well  be,  and  probably  is,  greatly  above  the 
truth.  The  total  annual  tribute  collected  at  the  beginning  of  the 
Peloponnesian  war,  and  probably  also  for  the  years  preceding  it,  is 
given  by  Thucydides  at  about  600  talents.  Of  the  sums  paid  by 
particular  states,  however,  we  have  little  or  no  information.  It  was 
placed  under  the  superintendence  of  the  Hellenotamiae;  originally 
officers  of  the  confederacy  but  now  removed  from  Delos  to  Athens, 
and  acting  altogether  as  an  Athenian  treasury-board.  The  sum  total 
of  the  Athenian  revenue  from  all  sources,  including  this  tribute,  at 
the  beginning  of  the  Peloponnesian  war  is  stated  by  Xenophon  at 
1000  talents.  Customs,  harbor  and  market  dues,  receipt  from  the 
silver-mines  at  Laurium,  rents  of  public  property,  fines  from  judicial 
sentences,  a  tax  per  head  upon  skives,  the  annual  payment  made  by 
each  metic,  etc.,  may  have  made  up  a  larger  sum  than  400  talents: 
which  sum  added  to  the  600  talents  from  tribute  would  make  the 
total  named  by  Xenophon.     But  a  verse  of  Aristophanes  during  the 


IMPERIAL  POWER   OF   ATHENS.  457 

ninth  year  of  the  Peloponnesian  war(B.c.  422)  gives  the  general  total 
of  that  time  as  'nearly  2,000  talents:"  this  is  in  all  probability  much 
above  the  truth,  though  we  may  reasonably  imagine  that  the  amount 
of  tribute-money  levied  upon  the  allies  had  been  augmented  during 
the  interval.  I  think  that  the  alleged  duplication  of  the  tribute  by 
Alkibiades,  which  Thucydidcs  nowhere  notices,  is  not  borne  out  by 
any  good  evidence,  nor  can  I  believe  that  it  ever  reached  the  sum  of 
1200  talents.  Whatever  may  have  been  the  actual  magnitude  of  the 
Athenian  budget,  however,  prior  to  the  Peloponnesian  war,  we  know 
that  during  the  larger  part  of  the  administration  of  Periklcs,  the 
revenue  including  tribute  was  so  managed  as  to  leave  a  large  annual 
surplus;  insomuch  that  a  treasure  of  coined  money  was  accumulated 
in  the  Acropolis  during  the  years  preceding  the  Peloponnesian  war 
— which  treasure  when  at  its  maximum  reached  the  great  sum  of 
9,700  talents  (=£2,230,000),  and  was  still  at  6.000  talents  after  a  seri- 
ous drain  for  various  purposes,  at  the  moment  when  that  war  began. 
This  system  of  public  economy,  constantly  laying  by  a  considerable 
sum  year  after  year,  in  which  Athens  stood  alone,  since  none  of  the 
Peloponnesian  states  had  any  public  reserve  whatever,  goes  far  of 
itself  to  vindicate  Perikles  from  the  charge  of  having  wasted  the 
public  money  in  mischievous  distributions  for  the  purpose  of  obtain- 
ing popularity;  and  also  to  exonerate  the  Athenian  Demos  from  that 
reproach  of  a  greedy  appetite  for  living  by  the  public  purse  which  it 
is  common  to  advance  against  them.  After  the  death  of  Kimon,  no 
further  expeditions  were  undertaken  against  the  Persians.  Even  for 
some  years  before  his  death,  not  much  appears  to  have  been  done.  The 
tribute-money  thus  remained  unexpended,  and  kept  in  reserve,  as 
the  presidential  duties  of  Athens  prescribed,  against  future  attack, 
which  might  at  any  time  be  renewed. 

Though  we  do  not  know  the  exact  amount  of  the  other  sources  of 
Athenian  revenue,  however,  we  know  that  tribute  received  from 
allies  was  the  largest  item  in  it.  And  altogether  the  exercise  of 
empire  abroad  became  a  prominent  feature  in  Athenian  life,  and  a 
necessity  in  Athenian  sentiment,  not  less  than  democracy  at  home. 
Athens  was  no  longer,  as  she  had  been  once,  a  single  city,  with  Attica 
for  her  territory.  She  was  a  capital  or  imperial  city — a  despot-city, 
was  the  expression  used  by  her  enemies,  and  even  sometimes  by  her 
own  citizens — with  many  dependencies  attached  to  her,  and  bound 
to  follow  her  orders.  Such  was  the  manner  in  which  not  merly 
Perikles  and  the  other  leading  statesmen,  but  even  the  humblest 
Athenian  citizen,  conceived  the  dignity  of  Athens.  The  sentiment 
was  one  which  carried  with  it  both  personal  pride  and  stimulus  to 
active  patriotism.  To  establish  Athenian  interests  among  the  de- 
pendent territories  was  one  important  object  in  the  eyes  of  Perikles. 
While  discouraging  all  distant  and  rash  enterprises,  such  as  invasion 
of  Egypt  or  Cyprus,  he  planted  out  many  kleruchies,  and  colonies  of 
Athenian  citizens  intermingled  with  allies,  on  islands  and  parts  of 


458  ATHENS  BEFOPE  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR. 

the  coast.  He  conducted  1000  citizeDS  to  the  Thracian  Chersonese, 
500  to  Naxos,  and  250  to  Andros.  Id  the  Chersonese,  lie  further 
repelled  1 1  j  *  -  barbarous  Thracian  invaders  from  without,  and  even 
Undertook  the  labor  of  carrj  ing  a  wall  of  defense  across  the  isthmus 
Which  connected  the  peninsula  with  Thrace;  since  the  barbarous 
Thracian  tribes,  though  expelled  sonic  time  before  by  Kimon,  had 
still  continued  to  renew  their  incursions  from  time  to  time.  Ever 
since  the  occupation  of  the  elder  Miltiades  about  eighty  years  before, 
there  had  been  in  this  peninsula  many  Athenian  proprietors,  appar- 
ently intermingled  with  half-civilized  Thracians:  the  settlers  now 
acquired  both  greater  numerical  strength  and  better  protection, 
though  it  does  riot  appear  that  the  cross-wall  was  permanently  main- 
tained. The  maritime  expeditions  of  Perikles  even  extended  into 
the  Euxine  sea,  as  far  as  the  important  Greek  city  of  Sinope, 
then  governed  by  a  despot  named  Timesilaus,  against  whom  a  large 

E)roportion  of  the  citizens  were  in  active  discontent.  Lamachus  was 
eft  with  thirteen  Athenian  triremes  to  assisl  in  expelling  the  despot, 
who  was  driven  into  exile  along  with  his  friends  and  party.  The 
properties  of  these  exiles  were  confiscated,  and  assigned  to  the  main- 
tenance of  six  hundred  Athenian  citizens,  admitted  to  equal  fellow- 
ship and  residence  with  the  Sinopians.  We  may  presume  that  on 
this  occasion,  Sinope  became  a  member  of  the  Athenian  tributary 
alliance,  if  it  had  not  been  so  before:  but  we  do  not  know  whether 
Kotyora  and  Trapezus,  dependencies  of  Sinope  further  eastward, 
which  the  10,000  Greeks  found  on  their  retreat  fifty  years  afterward, 
existed  in  the  time  of  Perikles  or  not.  Moreover,  the  numerous  and 
well-equippedAthenian  fleet  under  the  command  of  Perikles  produced 
an  imposing  effect  upon  the  barbarous  princes  and  tribes  along  the 
coast,  contributing  certainly  to  the  security  of  Grecian  trade,  and 
probably  to  the  acquisition  of  new  dependent  allies. 

It  was  by  successive  proceedings  of  this  sort  that  many  detach- 
ments of  Athenian  citizens  became  settled  in  various  portions  of  the 
maritime  empire  of  the  city — some  rich,  investing  their  property  in 
the  islands  as  more  secure  (from  the  incontestable  superiority  of 
Athens  at  sea)  even  than  Attica,  which  since  the  loss  of  the  Megarid 
could  not  be  guarded  against  a  Peloponnesian  land  invasion — others 
poor,  and  hiring  them -elves  out  as  laborers.  The  islands  of  Lemnos, 
Imbros,  and  Skyros,  as  well  as  the  territory  of  Estisea,  on  the  north 
of  Eubcea,  were  completely  occupied  by  Athenian  proprietors  and 
citizens:  other  places  were  partially  SO  occupied.  And  it  was  doubt- 
less advantageous  to  the  islanders  to  associate  themselves  with  Athe- 
nians in  trading  enterprises,  since  they  thereby  obtained  a  better 
chance  of  the  protection  of  the  Athenian  fleet.  It  seems  that  Athens 
passed  regulations  occasionally  for  the  commerce  of  her  dependent 
allies,  as  we  see  by  the  fact  that  shortly  before  the  Peloponnesian 
war  she  excluded  the  Megarians  from  all  their  ports.  The  commer- 
cial relations  between  Peiraeus  and  the  iEtrean   reached  their  maxi- 


AMPHIPOLIS  POUNDED  BY  ATHENS.  45& 

mum  during  the  interval  immediately  preceding  the  Peloponnesian 
war.  These  relations  were  not  confined  to  the  country  east  and 
north  of  Attica:  they  reached  also  the  western  regions.  The  most 
important  settlements  founded  by  Athens  during  this  period  were 
Amphipolis  in  Thrace  and  Thurii  in  Ital}'. 

Amphipolia  was  planted  by  a  colony  of  Athenians  and  other 
Greeks,  under  the  conduct  of  the  Athenian  Agnon,  in  437  B.C.  It  was 
situated  near  the  river  Stryinou  in  Thrace,  on  the  eastern  bank,  and 
at  the  spot  where  the  Strymon  resumes  its  river-course  after  emerg- 
ing from  the  lake  above.  It  was  originally  a  township  or  settlement 
of  the  Edonian  Thracians,  called  Enuea  Hodoi  or  Nine  Ways — in  a 
situation  doubly  valuable,  both  as  being  close  upon  the  bridge  over 
the  Strymon  and  as  a  convenient  center  for  the  ship  timber  and  gold 
and  silver  mines  of  the  neighboring  region.  It  was  distant  about 
three  English  miles  from  the  Athenian  settlement  of  Eion  at  the 
mouth  of  the  river.  The  previous  unsuccessful  attempts  to  form 
establishments  at  Ennea  Hodoi  have  already  been  noticed — first  that 
of  Histiaeus  the  Milesian,  followed  up  by  his  brother  Aristagoras 
(about  497—495  B.C.),  next  that  of  the  Athenians  about  465  B.C.  under 
Leagrus  and  others — on  both  which  occasions  the  intruding  settlers 
had  been  defeated  and  expelled  by  the  native  Thracian  tribes,  though 
on  the  second  occasion  the  number  sent  by  Athens  was  not  less  than 
10,000.  So  serious  a  loss  deterred  the  Athenians  for  a  long  time 
from  any  repetition  of  the  attempt.  But  it  is  highly  probable  that 
individual  Athenian  citizens,  from  Eion  and  from  Thasus,  connected 
themselves  with  powerful  Thracian  families  and  became  in  this 
manner  actively  engaged  in  mining — to  their  own  great  profit,  as 
well  as  to  the  profit  of  the  city  collectively,  since  the  property  of  the 
kleruchs,  or  Athenian  citizens  occupying  colonial  lands,  bore  its 
share  in  case  of  direct  taxes  being  imposed  on  property  generally. 
Among  such  fortunate  adventurers  we  may  number  the  historian 
Thucydides  himself,  seemingly  descended  from  Athenian  parents 
intermarrying  with  Thracians,  and  himself  married  to  a  wife  either 
Thracian  or  belonging  to  a  family  of  Athenian  colonists  in  that 
region,  through  whom  he  became  possessed  of  a  large  property  in  the 
mines,  as  well  as  of  great  influence  in  the  districts  around.  This 
was  one  of  the  various  ways  in  which  the  collective  power  of  Athens 
enabled  her  chief  citizens  to  enrich  themselves  individually. 

The  colony  under  Agnon,  dispatched  from  Athens  in  the  year  437 
B.C.,  appears  to  have  been  both  numerous  and  well  sustained,  inas- 
much as  it  conquered  and  maintained  the  valuable  position  of  Ennea 
Hodoi  in  spite  of  those  formidable  Edonian  neighbors  who  had 
baffled  the  two  preceding  attempts.  Its  name  of  Ennea  Hodoi  was 
exchanged  for  that  of  Amphipolis — the  hill  on  which  the  new  town 
was  situated  being  bounded  on  three  sides  by  the  river.  The  settlers 
seem  to  have  been  of  mixed  extraction,  comprising  no  large  propor- 
tion of  Athenians.     Some  were  of  Chalkidic  race,  others  came  from 


460    ATHENS  BEFORE  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR 

Ajgilus,  a  Grecian  city  colonized  from  Andros,  which  possessed  the 
territory  on  the  western  bank  of  the  Strymon  immediately  opposite 

to  Amphipolis.  and  which  was  included  among  the  subject  allies  of 
Athens.  Amphipolis,  connected  with  the  sea  by  the  Strymon  and 
the  port  of  Minn,  became  the  most  important  of  all  the  Athenian 

dependencies  in  reference  to  Thrace  and  Macedonia. 

The  colony  of  Thurii  on  the  coast  of  the  Gulf  of  Tarentum  in 
Italy,  near  tlie  site  and  on  the  territory  of  the  ancient  Sybaris,  was 
founded  by  Athens  about  seven  years  earlier  than  Amphipolis,  not 
long  after  the  conclusion  of  the  Thirty  years'  truce  with  Sparta,  b.c. 
443.  Since  the  destruction  of  the  old  Sybaris  by  the  Krotoniates,  in 
509  B.C.,  its  territory  had  for  the  most  part  remained  unappropriated. 
The  descendants  of  the  former  inhabitants,  dispersed  at  Laus  and 
in  other  portions  of  the  territory,  were  not  strong  enough  to  establish 
any  new  city:  nor  did  it,  suit  the  views  of  the  Krotoniates  themselves 
to  do  so.  After  an  interval  of  more  than  sixty  years,  however,  dur- 
ing which  one  unsuccessful  attempt  at  occupation  had  been  made 
by  some  Thessalian  settlers,  these  Sybarites  at  length  prevailed  upon 
the  Athenians  to  undertake  and  protect  the  re-colonization;  the  prop- 
osition having  been  made  in  vain  to  the  Spartans.  Lampon  and 
Xenokritus,  the  former  a  prophet  and  interpreter  of  oracles,  were 
sent  by  Perikles  with  ten  ships  as  chiefs  of  the  new  colony  of  Thurii, 
founded  under  the  auspices  of  Athens.  The  settlers,  collected  from 
all  parts  of  Greece,  included  Dorians,  Ionians,  islanders,  Boeotians, 
as  well  as  Athenians.  But  the  descendants  of  the  ancient  Sybarites 
procured  themselves  to  he  treated  as  privileged  citizens,  monopoliz- 
ing for  themselves  the  possession  of  political  powers  as  well  as  the 
most  valuable  lands  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  walls;  while 
their  wives  also  assumed  an  offensive  pre-eminence  over  the  other 
women  of  the  city  in  the  public  religious  processions.  Such  spirit  of 
privilege  and  monopoly  appears  to  have  been  a  frequent  manifesta- 
tion among  the  ancient  colonies,  and  often  fatal  either  to  their  tran- 
quillity or  to  their  growth;  sometimes  to  both.  In  the  case  of  Thurii, 
founded  under  the  auspices  of  the  deniocratical  Athens,  it  was  not 
likely  to  have  any  lasting  success.  And  we  find  that  after  no  very 
long  period,  the  majority  of  the  colonists  rose  iu  insurrection  against 
the  privileged  Sybarites,  cither  slew  or  expelled  them,  and  divided 
the  entire  territory  of  the  city  upon  equal  principles  among  the  col- 
onists of  every  different  race.  This  revolution  enabled  them  to  make 
f>eace  with  the  Krontoniates,  who  had  probably  been  unfriendly  so 
ong  as  their  ancient  enemies,  the  Sybarites,  were  masters  of  the 
city,  and  likely  to  turn  its  powers  to  the  purpose  of  avenging  their 
conquered  ancestors.  And  the  city  from  this  time  forward,  demo- 
cratically governed,  appears  to  have  flourished  steadily  and  without 
internal  dissension  for  thirty  years,  until  the  ruinous  disasters  of  the 
Athenians  before  Syracuse  occasioned  the  overthrow  of  the  Athenian 
party  at  Thurii.     How  miscellaneous  the  population  of  Thurii  was, 


HEUODOTUS  AND  LYSIAS.  461 

we  may  judge  from  the  denominations  of  the  ten  tribes — such  was 
the  number  of  tribes  established,  after  the  model  of  Athens — Arkas, 
Achais,  Eleia,  Bceotia,  Amphiktyonis,  Doris,  las,  Athenais,  Eubois, 
Nesiotis.  From  this  mixture  of  race  they  could  not  agree  in  recog- 
nizing or  honoring  an  Athenian  (Ekist,  or  indeed  any  (Ekist  except 
Apollo.  The  Spartan  general  Kleandridas,  banished  a  few  years 
before  for  having  suffered  himself  to  be  bribed  by  Athens  along  with 
king  Pleistoanax,  removed  to  Thurii  and  was  appointed  general  of 
the  citizens  in  their  war  against  Tarentum.  That  war  was  ultimately 
adjusted  by  the  joint  foundation  of  the  new  city  of  Herakleia  half- 
way between  the  two — in  the  fertile  territory  called  Siritis. 

The  most  interesting  circumstance  respecting  Thurii  is,  that  the 
rhetor  Lysias,  and  the  historian  Horodotus,  were  both  domiciliated 
there  as  citizens.  The  city  was  connected  with  Athens,  yet  seemingly 
only  by  a  feeble  tie;  it  was  not  numbered  among  the  tributary  sub- 
ject allies.  From  the  circumstance  that  so  small  a  proportion  of  the 
settlers  at  Thurii  were  native  Athenians,  we  may  infer  that  not  many 
of  the  latter  at  that  time  wrere  willing  to  put  themselves  so  far  out  of 
connection  with  Athens — even  though  tempted  by  the  prospect  of 
lots  of  land  in  a  fertile  and  promising  territory.  And  Perikles  was 
probably  anxious  that  those  poor  citizens,  for  whom  emigration  was 
desirable,  should  rather  become  kleruchs  in  some  of  the  islands  or 
ports  of  the  ^Egean,  where  they  would  serve  (like  the  colonies  of 
Rome)  as  a  sort  of  garrison  for  the  maintenance  of  the  Athenian 
empire. 

The  fourteen  years  between  the  Thirty  years'  truce  and  the  break- 
ing out  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  are  a  period  of  full  maritime 
empire  on  the  part  of  Athens — partially  indeed  resisted,  but  never 
with  success.  They  are  a  period  of  peace  with  all  cities  extraneous 
to  her  own  empire;  and  of  splendid  decorations  to  the  city  itself, 
emanating  from  the  genius  of  Pheidias  and  others,  in  sculpture  as 
well  as  in  architecture. 

Since  the  death  of  Kimon,  Perikles  had  become,  gradually  but 
entirely,  the  first  citizen  in  the  commonwealth.  His  qualities  told 
far  more,  the  longer  they  were  known,  and  even  the  disastrous 
reverses  which  preceded  the  Thirty  years'  truce  had  not  overthrown 
him,  since  he  had  protested  against  that  expedition  of  Tolmides  into 
Eeeotia  out  of  which  they  first  arose.  But  if  the  personal  influence 
of  Perikles  had  increased,  the  party  opposed  to  him  seems  also  to 
have  become  stronger  and  better  organized  than  before ;  and  to  have 
acquired  a  leader  in  many  respects  more  effective  than  Kimon — 
Thucydides,  son  of  Melesias.  The  new  chief  was  a  near  relative  of 
Kimon,  but  of  a  character  and  talents  mere  analogous  to  that  of  Peri- 
kles; a  statesman  and  orator  rather  than  a  general,  though  competent 
to  both  functions  if  occasion  demanded,  as  every  leading  man  in 
those  days  was  required  to  be.  Under  Thucydides,  the  political  and 
parliamentary  opposition  against  Perikles  assumed  a  constant  char- 


462    ATHENS  BEFORE  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR 

acterand  organization,  such  as  Kimon  with  his  exclusively  military 
aptitudes  bad  never  bet  n  able  to  establish.  The  sristocratical  party 
in  the  commonwealth  the  "honorable  and  respectable"  citizens,  as 
we  find  them  Btyled,  adopting  their  own  nomenclature — now  imposed 
upon  themselves  the  obligation  of  undeviating  regularity  in  their 
attendance  on  the  public  assembly,  sitting  together  in  a  particular 
section  so  as  to  be  conspicuously  parted  from  the  Demos.  In  Hiis 
manner  their  applause  and  dissent,  their  mutual  encouragemenl  to 
each  nthcr,  then:  distribution  of  parts  to  different  speakers,  was  made 
more  conducive  to  the  party  purposes  than  it  bad  been  before  when 
these  distinguished  persons  were  intermingled  with  the  mass  (if  citi- 
zens. Thucydides  himself  was  eminent  as  a  speaker,  inferior  only 
to  Perikles — perhaps  hardly  inferior  even  to  him.  We  are  told  that 
in  reply  to  a  question  put  to  him  by  Archidamus,  whether  Perikles 
or  he  were  the  better  wrestler,  Thucydides  replied — "Even  when  I 
throw  him,  he  denies  that  be  has  fallen,  gains  his  point,  and  talks 
over  those  who  actually  saw  him  fall." 

Such  an  opposition,  made  to  Perikles  in  all  the  full  license  which 
a  democratic  constitution  permitted,  must  have  been  both  efficient 
and  embarrassing.  Bui  the  pointed  severance  of  the  aristocratic 
chiefs,  which  Thucydides  son  of  Milesias  introduced,  contributed 
probably  at  once  to  rally  the  democratic  majority  round  Perikles, 
and  to  exasperate  the  bitterness  of  party  conflict.  As  far  as  we  can 
make  out  the  grounds  of  the  opposition,  it  turned  partly  upon  the 
pacific  policy  of  Perikles  toward  the  Persians,  partly  upon  his 
expenditure  for  home  ornament.  Thucydides  contended  thai  Athens 
was  disgraced  in  the  eyes  of  the  Greeks  by  having  drawn  the  con- 
federate treasure  from  Delos  to  her  own  acropolis,  under  pretense  of 
greater  security — and  then  employing  it,  not  in  prosecuting  war 
against  the  Persians,  but  in  beautifying  Athens  by  new  temples  and 
costly  statues.  To  this  Perikles  replied  that  Athens  had  undertaken 
the  obligation,  in  consideration  <>f  the  tribute  money,  to  protect  her 
allies  and  keep  off  from  them  every  foreign  enemy — that  she  had 
accomplished  this  object  completely  at  the  present,  and  retained  a 
reserve  sufficient  to  guarantee  the  like  security  for  the  future — that 
under  such  circumstances,  she  owed  no  account  to  her  allies  of  the 
expenditure  of  the  surplus,  but  was  at  liberty  to  employ  it  for  pur- 
poses  useful  and  honorable  to  the  city.  In  this  point  of  view  it  was 
an  object  of  great  public  importance  to  render  Athens  imposing  in 
the  eyes  both  of  the  allies  and  of  Hellas  generally,  by  improved  forti- 
fications,— by  accumulated  embellishment,  sculptural  and  architectu- 
ral,— and  by  religious  festivals,  frequent,  splendid,  musical,  and 
poetical. 

Such  was  the  answer  made  by  Perikles  in  defense  of  his  policy 
against  the  opposition  headed  by  Thucydides.  And  considering  the 
grounds  of  the  debate  on  both  sides,  the  answer  was  perfectly  satis- 
factory.    For  when  we  look  at  the  very  large  sum  which  Perikles 


PAN-HELLENIC   SCHEMES.  463 

continually  kept  in  reserve  in  the  treasury,  no  one  could  reasonably 
complain  that  his  expenditure  for  ornamental  purposes  was  carried 
BO  far  as  to  encroach  upon  the  exigencies  of  defense.  What  Thucyd- 
ides  and  liis  partisans  appear  to  have  urged,  was  that  this  common 
fund  should  still  continue  to  be  spent  in  aggressive  warfare  against 
the  Persian  king,  in  Egypt  and  elsewhere — conformably  to  the  proj- 
ects pursued  by  Kimou  during  his  life.  But  Perikles  was  right  in 
contending  that  such  outlay  would  have  been  simply  wasteful;  of  no 
use  either  to  Athens  or  her  allies,  though  risking  all  the  chances  of 
distant  defeat,  such  as  had  been  experienced  a  few  years  before  in 
Egypt.  The  Persian  force  was  already  kept  away  both  from  the 
waters  of  the  iE^ean  and  the  coast  of  Asia,  either  by  the  stipulations 
of  the  treaty  of  Kallias,  or  (if  that  treaty  be  supposed  apocryphal)  by 
a  conduct  practically  the  same  as  those  stipulations  would  have 
enforced.  The  allies,  indeed,  might  have  had  some  ground  of  com- 
plaint against  Perikles,  either  for  not  reducing  the  amount  of  tribute 
required  from  them,  seeing  that  it  was  more  than  sufficient  for  the 
legitimate  purposes  of  the  confederacy, — or  for  not  having  collected 
their  positive  sentiment  as  to  the  disposal  of  it.  But  we  do  not  find 
that  this  was  the  argument  adopted  by  Thucydides  and  his  party; 
nor  was  it  calculated  to  find  favor  either  with  aristocrats  or  demo- 
crats in  the  Athenian  assembly. 

Admitting  the  injustice  of  Athens — an  injustice  common  to  both 
the  parties  in  that  city,  not  less  to  Kimou  than  to  Perikles — in  acting  as 
despot  instead  of  chief,  and  in  discontinuing  all  appeal  to  the  active 
and  heart}*  concurrence  of  her  numerous  allies;  we  shall  find  that  the 
schemes  of  Perikles  were  nevertheless  eminently  pan-Hellenic.  In 
strengthening  and  ornamenting  Athens,  in  developing  the  full  activity 
of  her  citizens,  in  providing  temples,  religious  offerings,  works  of 
art,  solemn  festivals,  all  of  surpassing  attraction, — he  intended  to 
exalt  her  into  something  greater  than  an  imperial  city  with  numerous 
dependent  allies.  He  wished  to  make  her  the  center  of  Grecian  feel- 
ing, the  stimulus  of  Grecian  intellect,  and  the  type  of  strong  demo- 
cratic patriotism  combined  with  full  liberty  of  individual  taste  and 
aspiration.  He  wished  not  merely  to  retain  the  adherence  of  the  sub- 
ject states,  but  to  attract  the  admiration  and  spontaneous  deference 
of  independent  neighbors,  so  as  to  procure  for  Athens  a  moral  ascend- 
ency much  beyond  the  range  of  her  direct  power.  And  he  succeeded 
in  elevating  the  city  to  a  visible  grandeur,  which  made  her  appear 
even  much  stronger  than  she  really  was — and  which  had  the  farther 
effect  of  softening  to  the  minds  of  her  subjects  the  humiliating  sense 
of  obedience;  while  it  served  as  a  normal  school,  open  to  strangers 
from  all  quarters,  of  energetic  action  even 'under  full  license  of 
criticism — of  elegant  pursuits  economically  followed — and  of  a  love 
for  knowledge  without  enervation  of  character.  Such  were  the  views 
of  Perikles  in  regard  to  his  country,  during  the  years  which  preceded 
the  Peloponnesian  war.     We  find  them  recorded  in  his  celebrated 


464    ATHENS  BEFORE  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR. 

Funeral  Oration  pronounced  in  the  first  year  of  that  war — an  i 

tiou  forever  memorable  of  the  sentiment  and  purpose  of  Athenian 

democracy,  as  conceived  by  its  ablest  president. 

Si)  bitter,  however,  was  the  opposition  made  by  Thucydides  and  his 
party  to  tliis  projected  expenditure — so  violenl  and  pointed  did  tin- 
scission  of  aristocrats  and  democrats  become — that  the  dispute  came 
after  no  long  time  to  that  ultimate  appeal  which  the  Athenian  con- 
stitution provided  for  the  case  of  two  opposite  and  nearly  equal 
party-leaders — a  vote  of  ostracism  Of  the  particular  details  which 
preceded  this  ostracism,  we  are  not  informed;  but  we  see  clearly  that 
the  general  position  was  such  as  the  ostracism  was  intended  to  meet. 
Probably  the  vote  was  proposed  by  the  party  of  Thucydides,  in  order 
to  procure  the  banishment  of  Penkles,  the  more  powerful  person  of 
the  two  and  the  most  likely  to  excite  popular  jealousy.  The  dial 
lenge  was  accepted  by  Perikles  and  his  friends,  and  the  result  of  the 
voting  was  such  that  an  adequate  legal  majority  condemned  Thucyd 
ides  to  ostracism.  And  it  seems  that  the  majority  must  have  been 
very  decisive,  for  the  party  of  Thucydides  was  completely  broken  by 
it.  We  hear  of  no  other  single  individual  equally  formidable,  as  a 
leader  of  opposition,  throughout  all  the  remaining  life  of  Perikles. 

The  ostracism  of  Thucydides  apparently  took  place  about  two 
years  after  the  conclusion  of  the  Thirty  years'  truce  (443-442  B.C.), 
and  it  is  to  the  period  immediately  following,  that  the  great  Peri- 
klean  works  belong.  The  southern  wall  of  the  acropolis  had  been 
built  out  of  the  spoils  brought  by  Kirnon  from  his  Persian  expedi- 
tions; but  the  third  of  the  long  walls  connecting  Athens  with  the 
harbor  was  the  proposition  of  Perikles,  at  what  precise  time  Ave  do 
not  know.  The  long  walls  originally  completed  (not  long  after  the 
battle  of  Tanagra,  as  has  already  been  stated)  were  two,  one  from 
Athens  to  Peirams,  another  from  Athens  to  Phalerum:  the  space 
between  them  was  broad,  and  if  in  the  bands  of  an  enemy,  the  com- 
munication with  PeiraeuS  would  be  interrupted.  Accordingly  Peri- 
kles now  induced  the  people  to  construct  a  third  or  intermediate  wall, 
running  parallel  with  the  first  wall  to  Peiraeus,  and  within  a  short 
distance  (seemingly  near  one  furlong)  from  it :  so  that  the  communi- 
cation between  the  city  and  the  port  was  placed  beyond  all  possible 
interruption,  even  assuming  an  enemy  to  have  got  within  the  Phaleric 
wall.  It  was  seemingly  about  this  time,  too,  thai  tlu  splendid  docks 
and  arsenal  in  Peiraeus,  alleged  by  Isokrates  to  have  cost  1000  talents, 
were  constructed;  while  the  town  itself  of  Peiraeus  was  laid  out  anew 
with  straight  streets  intersecting  at  right  angles.  Apparently  this  was 
something  new  in  Greece — the  towns  generally,  and  Athens  itself  in 
particular,  having  been  built  without  any  symmetry,  or  width,  or 
continuity  of  streets.  Hippodamus  the  Milesian,  a  man  of  consider- 
able attainments  in  the  physical  philosophy  of  the  age,  derived  much 
renown  as  the  earliest  town  architect,  for  having  laid  out  the  Peiraeus 
on  a  regular  plan.     The  market-place,  or  one  of  them  at  least,  per- 


TEMPLES  AND  STATUES,  465 

manently  bore  his  name— the  Hippodamian  agora.  At  a  time  when 
so  many  great  architects  were  displaying  their  genius  in  the  construc- 
tion of  temples,  we  are  not  surprised  to  hear  that  the  structure  of 
towns  began  to  be  regularized  also.  Moreover  we  are  told  that  the 
new  colonial  town  of  Tliurii,  to  which  Hippodamus  went  as  a  settler, 
was  also  constructed  in  the  same  systematic  form  as  to  straight  and 
wide  streets. 

The  new  scheme  upon  which  the  Peirteus  was  laid  out  was  not 
without  its  value  as  one  visible  proof  of  the  naval  grandeur  of  Athens. 
But  the  buildings  in  Athens  and  on  the  acropolis  formed  the  real 
glory  of  the  Periklean  age.  A  new  theater,  termed  the  Odeon,  was 
constructed  for  musical  and  poetical  representations  at  the  great  Pan- 
athenaic  solemnity.  Next,  the  splendid  temple  of  Athene,  called  the 
Parthenon,  with  all  its  masterpieces  of  decorative  sculpture,  friezes, 
and  reliefs:  lastly,  the  costly  portals  erected  to  adorn  the  entrance  of 
the  acropolis,  on  the  western  side  of  the  hill,  through  which  the  sol- 
emn processions  on  festival  days  were  conducted.  It  appears  that 
the  Odeon  and  the  Parthenon  were  both  finished  between  44o  and 
437  B.C.:  the  Propylsea  somewhat  later,  between  437  and  431  b.c.  \k 
Avhich  latter  year  the  Peloponuesian  war  began.  Progress  was  also 
made  in  restoring  or  reconstructing  the  Erechtheion,  or  ancient  tem- 
ple of  Athene  Polias,  the  patron  goddess  of  the  city — which  had  been 
burnt  in  the  invasion  of  Xerxes.  But  the  breaking  out  of  the  Pelo- 
ponnesian  war  seems  to  have  prevented  the  completion  of  this,  as 
well  as  of  the  great  temple  of  Demeter  at  Eleusis,  for  the  celebration 
of  the  Eleusinian  mysteries — that  of  Athene  at  Sunium — and  that 
of  Nemesis  at  Rhamnus.  Nor  was  the  sculpture  less  memorable 
than  the  architecture.  Three  statues  of  Athene,  all  by  the  hand  of 
Pheidias,  decorated  the  acropolis — one  colossal,  47  feet  high,  of  ivory, 
in  the  Parthenon — a  second  of  bronze,  called  the  Lemnian  Athene — a 
third  of  colossal  magnitude,  also  in  bronze,  called  Athene  Promachos, 
placed  between  the  Propylasa  and  the  Parthenon,  and  visible  from 
afar  off,  even  to  the  navigator  approaching  Peineus  by  sea. 

It  is  not  of  course  to  Perikles  that  the  renown  of  these  splendid 
productions  of  art  belongs.  But  the  great  sculptors  and  architects, 
by  whom  they  were  conceived  and  executed,  belonged  to  that  same 
period  of  expanding  and  stimulating  Athenian  democracy,  which 
likewise  called  forth  creative  genius  in  oratory,  in  dramatic  poeiry, 
and  in  philosophical  speculation.  One  man  especially,  of  immortal 
name, — Pheidias, — born  a  little  before  the  battle  of  Marathon,  was 
the  original  mind  in  whom  the  sublime  ideal  conceptions  of  genuine 
art  appear  to  have  disengaged  themselves  from  that  stiffness  of  exe- 
cution, and  adherence  to  a  consecratejd  type,  which  marked  the 
efforts  of  his  predecessors.  He  was  the  great  director  and  superin- 
tendent of  all  those  decorative  additions,  whereby  Perikles  imparted 
to  Athens  a  majesty  such  as  had  never  before  belonged  to  any  Gre- 
cian city.     The  architects  of  the  Parthenon  and  the  other  buildings — 


4GC  ATHENS  BEFORE  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR. 

Iktinus,  Kallikrates,  Korcebus,  Mnesikles,  and  others— worked  under 
his  instructions:  and  he  had  besides  a  Bchool  of  pupils  and  subordi- 
nates to  w  bom  the  mechanical  part  of  his  labors  was  confided.  With 
all  the  greal  contributions  which  Pheidias  made  to  the  grandeur  of 
Athens,  his  last  and  greatest  achievement  was  far  away  from  Athens 
—the colossal  statue  of  Zeus,  iu  the  great  temple  of  Olympia,  executed 
^11  the  years  immediately  preceding  the  Peloponnesian  war.  This 
stupendous  work  was  sixty  feet  high,  of  ivory  and  gold,  embodying 
in  vis:, iic  majesty  some  of  the  grandest  conceptions  of  Grecian  poetrj 
and  religion.  Its  effect  upon  the  minds  of  all  beholders,  for  oianj 
centurii  successively,  was  such  as  never  has  been,  and  probably 
never  will  be,  equalled  in  the  annals  of  art,  sacred  or  profane. 

Considering  these  prodigious  achievements  in  the  field  of  art  only 
as  they  hear  upon  Athenians  and  Grecian  history,  they  are  phenom 
ena  of  extraordinary  importance.  When  we  learn  the  profound 
impression  which  they  produced  upon  Grecian  spectators  of  a  later 
age.  we  may  judge  how  immense  was  the  effect  upon  that  generation 
which  saw  them  both  begun  and  finished.  In  the  year  480  B.C., 
Athens  had  been  ruined  by  the  occupation  of  Xerxes.  Since  that 
period,  the  Greeks  had  seen,  first  the  rebuilding  and  fortifying  of  the 
city  on  an  enlarged  scale — next,  the  addition  of  Peiraeus  with  its 
docks  and  magazines— thirdly,  the  junction  of  the  two  by  the  long 
walls,  thus  including  the  most  numerous  concentrated  population, 
wealth,  arms,  ships, "etc.,  in  Greece — lastly  the  rapid  creation  of  80 
many  new  miracles  of  art— the  sculptures  of  Pheidias  as  well  as  the 
paintings  of  the  Thasian  painter  Polygnotus,  in  the  temple  of  The- 
seus, and  in  the  portico  called  Pcekile.  Plutarch  observes  that  the 
celerity  with  which  the  works  were  completed  was  the  most  remark- 
able circumstance  connected  with  them;  and  so  it  probably  might  be, 
in  respect  to  the  effect  upon  the  contemporary  Greeks.  The  gigantic 
strides  by  which  Athens  had  reached  her  maritime  empire  were  now 
immediately  succeeded  by  a  scries  of  works  which  stamped  her  as  the 
imperial  city  of  Greece,  gave  to  her  an  appearance  of  power  even 
greater  than' the  reality,  and  especially  put  to  shame  the  old-fashioned 
simplicity  of  Sparta.  *  The  cost  was  doubtless  prodigious,  and  could 
only  have  been  borne  at  a  time  when  there  was  a  large  treasure  in  the 
acropolis,  as  well  as  a  considerable  tribute  annually  coming  in.  If 
we  may  trust  a  computation  which  seems  to  rest  on  plausible 
grounds,  it  cannot  have  been  much  less  than  3,000  talents  in  the 
ate  (about  £690,000).  The  expenditure  of  so  large  a  sum  was 
of  course  a  source  of  great  private  gain  to  contractors,  tradesmen, 
merchants,  artisans  of  various  descriptions,  etc.,  concerned  in  it.  In 
one  way  or  another,  it  distributed  itself  over  a  huge  portion  of  the 
whole  city.  And  it  appears  that  the  materials  employed  for  much 
of  the  work  were  designedly  of  the  most,  eOstly  description,  as  being 
most  consistent  with  the  reverence  due  to  the  gods.  Marble  was 
rejected  as  too  common  for  the  statue  of  Athene,  and  ivory  employed 


PALLAS-ATHENE. 


ATTEMPT  TO  CONVENE  A  CONGRESS.     467 

In  its  place.  Even  the  gold  with  which  it  was  surrounded  weighed 
not  less  than  forty  talents.  A  large  expenditure  for  such  purposes, 
considered  as  pious  toward  the  gods,  was  at  the  same  time  imposing 
in  reference  to  Grecian  feeling,  which  regarded  with  admiration 
every  variety  of  public  show  and  magnificence,  and  repaid  with 
grateful  defereuce  the  rich  men  who  indulged  in  it.  Perikles  knew 
well  that  the  visible  spleudor  of  the  city,  so  new  to  all  his  contempo- 
raries, would  cause  her  great  power  to  appear  greater  still,  and  would 
thus  procure  for  her  a  real,  though  unacknowledged  influence — per- 
haps even  an  aseeudeucy — over  all  cities  of  the  Grecian  name.  And 
it  is  certain  that  even  among  those  who  most  hated  and  feared  her, 
at  the  outbreak  of  the  Peloponuesian  war,  there  prevailed  a  powerful 
sentiment  of  involuntary  deference. 

A  step  taken  by  Perikles,  apparently  not  long  after  the  commence- 
ment of  the  thirty  years'  truce,  evinces  how  much  this  a£3eudency 
was  in  his  direct  aim,  and  how  much  he  connected  it  with  views 
both  of  harm  my  and  usefulness  for  Greece  generally.  He  prevailed 
upon  the  people  to  send  envoys  to  every  city  of  the  Greek  name, 
great  and  small,  inviting  each  to  appoint  deputies  for  a  congress  to 
Be  held  at  Athens.  Three  points  were  to  be  discussed  in  this 
intended  congress.  1.  The  restitution  of  those  temples  which  had 
been  burnt  by  the  Persian  iuvaders.  2.  The  fulfillment  of  such  vows, 
as  on  that  occasion  had  been  made  to  the  gods.  3.  The  safety  of  the 
sea  and  of  maritime  commerce  for  all. 

Twenty  elderly  Athenians  were  sent  round  to  obtain  the  convocation 
of  this  congress  at  Athens — a  pan-Hellenic  congress  for  pan-Hellenic 
purposes.  Bat  those  who  were  sent  to  Boeotia  and  Peloponnesus 
completely  failed  in  their  object,  from  the  jealousy,  noway  astonish- 
ing, of  Sparta  and  her  allies.  Of  the  rest  we  hear  nothing,  for  this 
refusal  was  quite  sufficient  to  frustrate  the  whole  scheme.  It  is  to 
be  remarked  that  the  dependent  allies  of  Athens  appear  to  have  been 
summoned  just  as  mach  as  the  cities  perfectly  autonomous;  so  that 
their  tributary  relation  to  Athens  was  not  understood  to  degrade 
them.  We  may  sincerely  regret  that  such  congress  did  not  take 
effect,  as  it  might  have  opened  some  new  possibilities  of  converg- 
ing tendency  and  alliance  for  the  dispersed  fractions  of  the  Greek 
n  ime— a  comprehensive  benefit  not  likely  to  be  entertained  at  Sparta 
even  as  a  project,  but  which  might  perhaps  have  been  realized  under 
Athens,  and  seems  in  this  case  to  have  been  sincerely  aimed  at  by 
Perikles.  The  events  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  however,  extin- 
tinguished  all  hopes  of  any  such  union. 

The  interval  of  fourteen  years,  between  the  beginning  of  the  thirty 
years'  truce  and  that  of  the  Peloponnesian  wstr,  was  by  no  means  one 
of  undisturbed  peace  to  Athens.  In  the  sixth  year  of  that  period 
occurred  the  formidable  revolt  of  Samos 

That  island  appears  to  have  been  the  most  powerful  of  all  the 
allies  of  Athens.     It  surpassed  even  Chios  or  Lesbos,  standing  on  the 


468     ATllKNS  BEFORE  THE  I'F.J.oPON'NKSIAN  WAR. 

same  footing  as  these  two:  that  is,  paying  do  tribute-money — a  privi- 
lege  when  compared  with  the  body  of  1 1 * « -  allies, — but  furnishing 

ships  ami  men  when  called  upon,  anil  retaining,  Bubject  to  this  con- 
dition,  its  complete  autonomy,  its  oligarchic  government,  its  forti- 
fications, and  its  military  force.  Like  most  of  the  oilier  islands  near 
the  coast,  Bamos  possessed  a  portion  of  territoryon  the  Asiatic  main- 
land, between  which  and  the  territory  of  Miletus  lay  the  small  town 
of  Priene,  one  of  the  twelve  original  members  contributing  to  the 
pan  Ionic  solemnity.  Respecting  the  possession  of  this  town  of 
Priene,  a  war  broke  out  between  the  Saiuians  and  Milesians,  in  the 
Sixth  year  of  the  thirty  years'  truce  (B.C.  440-439).  Whether  the 
town  had  before  been  independent,  we  do  not  know,  but  in  this  war 
the  Milesians  w ere  \\ orsted,  and  it  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Samians. 
The  defeated  Milesians,  enrolled  as  they  were  among  the  tributary 
allies  of  Athens,  complained  to  her  of  the  conduct  of  the  Samians, 
and  their  complaint  was  seconded  by  a  party  in  Sainos  itself,  opposed 
to  the  oligarchy  and  its  proceedings.  The  Athenians  required  the 
two  disputing  cities  to  bring  the  matter  before  discussion  and  award 
at  Allien-.  But  the  Samians  refused  to  comply:  whereupon  an 
armament  of  forty  ships  was  dispatched  from  Athens  to  the  island, 
and  established  in  it  a  democratic  government;  leaving  in  it  a  garri- 
son and  carrying  away  to  Lemnos  fifty  men  and  as  many  boys  from 
the  principal  oligarchic  families,  to  serve  as  hostages.  Of  these 
families,  however,  a  certain  number  retired  to  the  mainland,  where 
they  entered  into  negotiations  with  Pissutbnes  the  satrap  of  Bardes, 
to  procure  aid  and  restoration.  Obtaining  from  him  seven  hundred 
mercenary  troops,  and  passing  over  in  the  night  to  the  island,  by 
previous  concert  with  the  Oligarchic  party,  they  overcame  the 
Samian  democracy  as  well  as  the  Athenian  garrison,  who  were  sent 
over  as  prisoners  to  Pissutbnes.  They  were  farther  lucky  enough  to 
succeed  in  stealing  away  from  Lemnos  their  own  recently  deposited 
hostages,  and  they  then  proclaimed  open  revolt,  against  Athens,  in 
which  Byzantium  also  joined.  It  seems  remarkable,  that  though  by 
such  a  proceeding  they  would  of  course  draw  upon  themselves  the 
lull  strength  of  Athens,  yet  their  first  step  was  to  resume  aggressive 
hostilities  against  Miletus,  whither  they  sailed  with  a  powerful  force 
of  seventy  ships,  twenty  of  them  carrying  troops. 

Immediately  on  the  receipt  of  this  grave  intelligence,  a  fleet  of 
sixty  triremes — probably  all  that  were  in  complete  readiness — was 
dispatched  to  Bamos  under  ten  generals,  two  of  whom  were  Perikles 
himself  and  the  poet  Sophokles,  both  seemingly  included  among  the. 
ten  ordinary  Strategi  of  the  year.  But  it  was  necessary  to  employ 
sixteen  of  these  ships,  partly  in  summoning  contingents  from  Chios 
and  Lesbos,  to  which  islands  Sophokles  went  i.i  person;  partly  in 
keeping  watch  off  the  coast  of  Karia  for  the  arrival  of  the  Phoenician 
fleet ,  which  report  stated  to  be  approaching;  so  thai  Perikles  Lad  only 
forty-four  ships  remaining  in  his  squadron.     Yet  he  did  not  hesitate 


REVOLT  OP  THE  ALLIES.  469 

to  attaci  the  Saraian  fleet  of  seventy  ships  on  his  way  bnck  from 
Miletus,  near  the  island  of  Tragia,  and  was  victorious  in  the  action. 
Preseutly  lie  was  re-enforced  by  forty  ships  from  Athens  and  by 
twenty  five  from  Chios  and  Lesbos,  so  as  to  be  able  to  disembark  at 
Samoa,  where  he  overcame  the  Samian  land-force  and  blocked  up 
the  harbor  with  a  portion  of  his  fleet,  surrounding  the  city  on  the 
laud-side  with  a  triple  wall.  Meau while  the  Samianshad  sent  Stesag- 
oras  with  five  ships  to  press  the  coming  of  the  Phoenician  fleet,  and 
the  report  of  their  approach  became  again  so  prevalent  that  Periklcs 
felt  obliged  to  take  sixty  ships  (out  of  the  total  125)  to  watch  for  them 
off  the  coast  of  Kaunus  and  Karia,  where  he  cruised  for  about  four- 
teen days.  The  Phoenician  fleet  never  came  in  sight,  though  Diodorus 
affirms  that  it  was  actually  on  its  voyage.  Pissuthnes  certainly  seems 
to  have  promised,  and  the  Samians  to  have  expected  it.  Yet  I  incline 
to  believe  that,  though  willing  to  hold  out  hopes  and  encourage 
revolt  among  the  Athenian  allies,  the  satrap  did  not  choose  opeuly  to 
violate  the  convention  of  Kallias,  whereby  the  Persians  were  for- 
bidden to  send  a  fleet  westward  of  the  Chelidonian  promontory.  The 
departure  of  Perikles,  however,  so  much  weakened  the  Athenian 
fleet  off  Samos,  that  the  Samians,  suddenly  sailing  out  of  their  harbor 
in  an  opportune  moment,  at  the  instigation  and  under  the  command 
of  one  of  their  most  eminent  citizens,  the  philosopher  Melissus— 
surprised  and  disabled  the  blockading  squadron,  and  even  gained  a 
victory  over  the  remaining  fleet  before  the  ships  could  be  fairly  got 
clear  of  the  land.  For  fourteen  days  they  remained  masters  of  the 
sea,  carrying  in  and  out  all  that  they  thought  proper.  It  was  not 
until  the  return  of  Perikles  that  they  were  again  blockaded.  Re-en- 
forcements, however,  were  now  multiplied  to  the  investing  squadron 
— from  Athens,  forty  ships  under  Thucydides,  Agnon,  and  Phormion, 
and  twenty  under  Tlepolemus  and  Antikles,  besides  thirty  from 
Chios  and  Lesbos — making  altogether  near  two  hundred  sail. 
Against  this  overwhelming  force  Melissus  and  the  Samians  made  an 
unavailing  attempt  at  resistance,  but  were  presently  quite  blocked 
up,  and  remained  so  for  nearly  nine  months  until  they  could  hold 
out  no  longer.  They  then  capitulated,  being  compelled  to  raze  their 
fortifications,  to  surrender  all  their  ships  of  war,  to  give  hostages  for 
their  future  conduct,  and  to  make  good  by  stated  installments  the 
whole  expense  of  the  enterprise,  said  to  have  reached  1000  talents. 
The  Byzantines,  too,  made  their  submission  at  the  same  time. 

Two  or  three  circumstances  deserve  notice  respecting  this  revolt, 
as  illustrating  the  existing  condition  of  the  Athenian  empire.  First, 
that  the  whole  force  of  Athens,  together, with  the  contingents  from 
Chios  and  Lesbos,  was  necessary  in  order  to  crush  it,  so  that  Byzan- 
tium, which  joined  in  the  revolt,  seems  to  have  been  left  unassailed. 
Now  it  is  remarkable  that  none  of  the  dependent  allies  near  Byzan 
tium,  or  anvwhere  else,  availed  themselves  of  so  favorable  an  oppor- 
tunity to  revolt  also:  a  fact  which  seems  plainly  to  imply  tha4  there 


470    ATHENS  BEFORE  TITE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR. 

was  little  positive  discontent  then  prevalent  among  them.  ILid  tho 
revoll  spread  to  other  cities,  probably  Pissuthnes  might  have  realized 
his  promise  of  bringing  up  the  Phoenician  fleet,  which  would  have 
been  a  Berioua  calamity  for  tlie  JSgean  Greeks,  and  was  only  kepi  oft 
by  the  unbroken  maintenance  of  the  Athenian  empi 

Next,  the  r<  volted  Bamians  applied  for  aid,  not  only  to  Pissuthnes, 
but  also  to  Sparta  and  her  allies;  among  whom  at  a  special  me<  iinLr 
the  question  of  compliance  or  refusal  was  formally  debated.  Not- 
withstanding  the  thirty  years' truce  then  subsisting,  of  which  only 
six  rears  had  elapsed,  and  which  had  been  noway  violated  by  Alliens 
— many  of  the  allies  of  Sparta  voted  for  assisting  the  Bamians.  What 
part  Sparta  herself  took,  we  do  not  know — but  the  Corinthians  were 
the  main  and  decided  advocates  for  the  negative.  They  not  only 
contended  that  the  truce  distinctly  forbade  compliance  with  the 
Samian  request,  but  also  recognized  the  right  of  each  confederacy 
to  punish  its  own  recusant  members.  And  this  was  the  decision  ulti- 
mately adopted,  for  which  the  Corinthians  afterward  took  credit,  in 
the  eyes  of  Athens,  as  its  chief  authors.  Certainly,  if  the  contrary 
policy  had  been  pursued,  the  Athenian  empire  might  have  been  in 
great  danger — the  Phoenician  fleet  would  probably  have  been  brought 
in  also — and  the,  future  course  of  events  greatly  altered. 

A  \  ain,  after  the  reconquest  of  Samos,  we  should  assume  it  almost 
as  a  matter  of  certainty  that  the  Athenians  would  renew  the  demo- 
cratical  government  which  they  hail  set  up  just  before  the  revolt. 
Vet  if  they  did  so,  it  must  have  been  again  overthrown,  without  any 
attempt  to  uphold  it  on  the  part  of  Athens.  For  we  hardly  hear  of 
Samos  again,  until  twenty-seven  years  aftreward,  the  latter  division 
of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  in  412  B.C.,  and  it  then  appears  with  an 
established  oligarchical  government  of  Geomori  or  landed  proprietors, 
against  which  the  people  make  a  successful  rising  during  the  course 
of  that  year.  As  Samos  remained  during  the  interval  between  439 
B.C.  and  412  B.C.,  unfortifh  d,  deprived  of  its  fleet,  and  enrolled 
among  the  tribute-paying  allies  of  Athens — and  as  it  nevertheless 
either  retained,  or  acquired,  its  oligarchical  »r>vernment;  so  we  may 
conclude  that  Athens  cannot  have  systematically  interfered  to 
democratize  by  violence  the  subject-allies,  in  cases  where  the  natural 
tendency  of  parties  ran  toward  oligarchy.  The  condition  of  Lesbos 
at  the  time  of  its  revolt  (hereafter  to  be  related)  will  be  found  to  con- 
firm this  conclusion. 

On  returning  to  Athens  after  the  reconquest  of  Bamos.  Perikles  was 
chosen  to  pronounce  the  funeral  oration  over  the  citizens  slain  in  the 
war,  to  whom,  according  to  custom,  solemn  and  public 
were  celebrated  in  the  suburb  called  Kerameikus.  This  custom 
rs  tn  have  been  introduced  shortly  after  the  Persian  war.  and 
would  doubtless  contribute  to  stimulate  the  patriotism  of  the  citizens, 
especially  when  the  speaker  elected  to  deliver  it  was  possessed  of  the 
personal  dignity  as  well  as  the  oratorical  powers  of  Perikles.     He 


POSITION  OF  THE  ATHENIAN  EMPIRE.  471 

was  twice  public  funeral  orator  by  the  choice  of  the  citizens;  once 
after  the  Saurian  success,  and  a  second  time  in  the  first  year  of  the 
Peloponnesian  war.  His  discourse  on  the  first  occasion  has  not 
Cached  us  but  the  second  has  been  fortunately  preserved  (in  sub- 
stance ni  least)  by  Thucydides,  who  also  briefly  describes  the  funeral 
eeremony — doubtless  the  same  on  all  occasions.  The  bones  of  the 
deceased  warriors  were  exposed  in  tents  three  days  before  the  cere- 
mony, in  order  that  the  relatives  of  each  might  have  the  opportunity 
of  bringing  offerings.  They  were  then  placed  in  coffins  of  eypiess  and 
carriedforth  on  carts  to  the  public  burial-place  at  the  Kerameikus, 
one  coffin  for  each  of  the  ten  tribes,  and  one  empty  couch,  formally 
laid  out,  to  represeut  those  warriors  whose  benes  had  not  been  (lis 
covered  or  collected.  The  female  relatives  of  each  followed  the  carts, 
with  loud  wailings,  and  after  them  a  numerous  procession  both  of 
citizens  and  strangers.  So  soon  as  the  bones  had  been  consigned  to 
the  grave,  some  distinguished  citizen,  specially  chosen  for  the  pur- 
pose, mounted  on  an  elevated  stage  and  addressed  to  the  multitude 
an  appropriate  discourse.  Such  was  the  effect  produced  by  that  of 
Perikles  after  the  Samian  expedition,  that  when  he  had  concluded, 
the  audience  present  testified  their  emotion  in  the  liveliest  manner, 
and  the  women  especially  crowned  him  with  garlands  like  a  vic- 
torious athlete.  Only  Elpinike,  sister  of  the  deceased  Kimon, 
reminded  him  that  the  victories  of  her  brother  had  been  more  felici- 
tous, as  gained  over  Persians  and  Phoenicians,  and  not  over  Greeks 
and  kinsmen.  And  the  contemporary  poet  Ion,  the  friend  of  Kimon, 
reported  what  he  thought  an  unseemly  boast  of  Perikles — to  the 
effect  that  Agamemnon  had  spent  ten  years  in  taking  a  foreign  city, 
while  he  in  nine  months  had  reduced  the  first  and  most  powerful  of 
all  the  Ionic  communities.  But  if  we  possessed  the  actual  speech 
pronounced,  we  should  probably  find  that  he  assigned  all  the  honor 
of  the  exploit  to  Athens  and  her  citizens  generally,  placing  their 
achievement  in  favorable  comparison  with  that  of  Agamemnon  and 
his  host — not  himself  with  Agamemnon. 

Whatever  may  be  thought  of  this  boast,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
the  result  of  the  Samian  war  not  only  rescued  the  Athenian  empire 
from  great  peril,  but  rendered  it  stronger  than  ever:  while  the 
foundation  of  Amphipolis,  which  was  effected  two  years  afterward, 
strengthened  it  still  farther.  Nor  do  we  hear,  during  the  ensuing 
few  years,  of  any  farther  tendencies  to  disaffection  among  its  mem- 
bers," until  the  period  immediately  before  the  Peloponnesian  war. 
The  feeling  common  among  them  toward  Athens,  seems  to  have 
been  neither  attachment  nor  hatred,  but  simple  indifference  and 
acquiescence  in  her  supremacy.  Such  amount  of  positive  discontent 
as  really  existed  among  them,  arose,  not  from  actual  hardships 
suffered,  but  from  the  general  political  instinct  of  the  Greek  mind — 
desire  of  separate  autonomy;  which  manifested  itself  in  each  city, 
through  the  oligarchical  party,   whose  power  was  kept  down  by 


.)-._>    at  [EN8  BEFORE  THE  PELOPONNESIAM  WAR 

Athens— and  was  stimulated  by  the  Bentimeal  communicated  from 
the  Grecian  communities  without  the  Athenian  empire.  Aco 
to  thai  sentiment,  the  condition  of  a  Bubjeci  ally  of  Athens  was  treated 
idation  and  servitude.  In  proportion  as  fear  and 
hatred  of  Athens  became  predominant  among  the  allies  of  Bparta, 
these  lath  r  gave  utterance  to  the  sentiment  more  and  more  i  n  phati 
cally,  so  as  to  encourage  discontent  artificially  among  the  subjecl  allies 
nl"  the  Athenian  empire.    1'  complete  mastery  of  the  sea,  and 

every  sorl  of  superiority  requisite  for  holding  empire  over  islands, 
Athens  had  yel  no  Bentunenl  to  appeal  to  in  her  subjects,  calculated 
to  render  her  empire  popular,  excepl  thai  of  common  democracy, 
which  seems  al  firsl  to  have  acted  without  any  care  on  her  pari  to 
encourage  it,  until  the  progress  of  the  Peloponnesian  war  made  bu<  b 
encouragem<  nl  a  part  of  her  policy.  And  even  had  she  tried  to  keep 
up  in  the  allies  the  feeling  of  a  common  interesl  and  the  attachment 
to  a  permanent  con  federacy,  the  instinct  of  political  separation  would 
probably  have  baffled  all  berefforts.  Bui  she  took  no  such  pains. 
With  the  usual  morality  thai  grows  up  in  the  minds  of  the  actual 
i  ors  of  p<  e.'.  er,  she  conceived  herself  entitled  to  exacl  obedience 

as  her  right.  Borne  of  the  Athenian  speakers  in  Thucydides  go  so  far 
disdain  all  pretense  of  legitimate  power,  even  Mich  as  might 
fairly  be  sel  up;  resting  the  supremacy  of  Athens  on  the  naked  plea 
of  superior  force.  As  the  allied  cities  were  mostly  under  democ-l 
racies — through   the  indireel    influence  rather  than  the  systematic 

dictation  of  Athens — yet  each  having  its  own   internal  aristocracy  in 

a  state  of  opposition;  so  the  movements  for  revolt  against  Athens 
originated  with  the  aristocracy  or  with  some  few  citizens  apart; 
while  the  people,  though  sharing  more  or  less  in  the  desire  for  auton- 
omy, had  yel  either  a  fear  of  their  own  aristocracy  or  a  sympathy] 
with  Athens,  which  made  them  always  backward  in  revolting,  some- 
limes  decidedly  opposed  to  it.  Neither  Pcrikles  nor  Kleon,  indeed, 
lays  Btress  on  the  attachment  of  the  people  as  distinguished  from  that 
of  the  Few,  in  these  dependenl  cities.  Bui  the  argument  is  strongly 
insisted  on  by  Diodotua  in  the  discussion  respecting  Mitylene  after 
it-  surrender:  and  as  the  Avar  advanced,  the  question  of  alliance  with 
Athens  or  Sparta  became  more  and  more  identified  with  the  internal 
preponderance  of  democracy  or  oligarchy  ill  each. 

We  shall  find  thai  in  mosl  of  those  cases  of  actual  revolt  where  we 
are  informed  of  the  preceding  circumstances,  the  step  is  adopted  or 
contrived  by  a  small  number  of  oligarchical  malcontents,  without  con- 
sul tin  ir  the  general  voice;  while  in  those  lasts  where  the  general 
assembly  is  consulted  beforehand,  there  i-  manifested  indeed  a  pref- 
erence for  autonomy,  bul  nothing  like  a  hatred  of  Athens  or  decided 
inclination  to  break  with  her.  In  the  case  Of  .Mitylene,  in  the  fourth 
year  of  the  war.  it  was  the  aristocratical  government  which  revolt*  d, 
while  the  people,  as  soon  as  they  obtained  arms,  actually  declared  in 
favor  of  Athens.     And  the  secession  of  Chios,  the  greatest  of  all  the 


PARTICULAR  GRIEVANCES.  473 

allies,  in  the  twentieth  year  of  the  Peloponnesian  war — even  after  all 
the  hardships  Which  the  allies  had  been  called  upon  to  bear  in  that  war, 
and  after  the  ruinous  disasters  which  Athens  had  sustained  before 
Syracuse — was  both  prepared  beforehand  and  accomplished  by  secret 
negotiations  of  the  Chian  oligarchy,  not  only  without  the  concurrence 
but  against  the  inclination  of  their  own  people.  In  like  manner,  the 
revolt  of  Thas'os  would  not  have  occurred,  had  not  the  Thasian 
democracy  been  previously  subverted  by  the  Athenian  Peisander  and 
his  oligarchical  confederates.  So  in  Akanthus,  in  Amphipolis,  in 
Mende,  and  those  other  Athenian  dependencies  which  were  wrested 
from  Athens  by  Brasidas — we  find  the  latter  secretly  introduced  by  a 
fi'\v  conspirators.  The  bulk  of  the  citizens  do  not  hail  him  at  once 
as  a  deliverer,  like  men  sick  of  Athenian  supremacy:  they  acquiesce, 
not  without  debate,  when  Brasidas  is  already  in  the  town,  and  his 
demeanor,  just  as  well  as  conciliating,  soon  gains  their  esteem.  But 
neither  in  Akanthus  nor  in  Amphipolis  would  he  have  been  omitted 
by  the  free  decision  of  the  citizens,  if  they  had  not  been  alarmed  for 
the  safety  of  their  friends,  their  properties,  and  their  harvest,  still  ex- 
posed in  the  lands  without  the  walls.  These  particular  examples 
warrant  us  in  affirming  that  though  the  oligarchy  in  the  various  allied 
cities  desired  eagerly  to  shake  off  the  supremacy  of  Athens,  the  peo- 
ple were  always  backward  in  following  them,  sometimes  even 
opposed,  and  hardly  ever  willing  to  make  sacrifices  for  the  object. 
They  shared  the  universal  Grecian  desire  for  separate  autonomy,  and 
felt  the  Athenian  empire  as  an  extraneous  pressure  which  they  would 
have  been  glad  to  shake  off,  whenever  the  change  could  be  made  with 
safety.  But  their  condition  was  not  one  of  positive  hardship,  nor  did 
they  overlook  the  hazardous  side  of  such  a  change — partly  from  the 
coercive  hand  of  Athens — partly  from  new  enemies  against  whom 
Athens  had  hitherto  protected  them — and  not  least  from  their  own 
oligarchy.  Of  course  the  different  allied  cities  were  not  all  animated 
by  the  same  feelings,  some  being  more  averse  to  Athens  than  others. 

The  particular  modes  in  which  Athenian  supremacy  pressed  upon 
the  allies  and  excited  complaints,  appear  to  have  been  chiefly  three. 
1.  The  annual  tribute.  2.  The  encroachments  or  other  misdeeds 
committed  by  individual  Athenians,  taking  advantage  of  their  supe- 
rior position:  citizens  either  planted  out  by  the  city  as  Kleruchs  (out- 
settlers),  on  the  lands  of  those  allies  who  had  been  subdued — or  serv- 
ing in  the  naval  armaments — or  sent  round  as  inspectors — or  placed 
in  occasional  garrison — or  carrying  on  some  private  speculation.  3. 
The  obligation  under  which  the  allies  were  laid  of  bringing  a  large 
proportion  of  their  judicial  trials  to  be  settled  before  the  dikasteries 
at  Athens. 

As  to  the  tribute,  I  have  before  remarked  that  its  amount  had  been 
but  little  raised  from  its  first  settlement  down  to  the  beginning  of  the 
Peloponnesian  war,  at  which  time  it  was  600  talents  yearly.  It  ap- 
pears to  have  been  reviewed,  and  the  apportionment  corrected,  in 


474    ATHENS  BEFORE  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR. 

fifth  year,  at  which  period  the  collecting  officers  may  probably 
have  been  changed.  Afterward,  probably,  it  became  more  burden- 
some, though  when,  or  in  what  degree,  we  do  not  know:  but  the  al- 

duplication  of  il  (as  I  have  already  remarked)  is  both  uncertified 

and  improbable.    The  same  gradual  increase  may  probably  be  affirmed 

the  second  bead  of  inconvenience — vexation  caused  to  the 

by  individual  Athenians,  chiefly  officers  of  armaments  or  pow- 
erful citizei  b.     Doubtless  this  was  always  more  or  less  a  real  griev- 

1 1 c mi  the  moment  when  the  Athenians  became  despots  in  place 
of  chief s.  Bui  it  was  probably  not  very  serious  in  extent  until  after 
the  commencement  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  when  revolt  on  the 
part  of  the  allies  became  more  apprehended,  and  when  garrisons, 

tors,  and  tribute-gathering  ships  became  more  essential  in  the 
working  of  the  Athenian  empire. 

Bui  the  third  circumstance  above  noticed — the  subjection  of  the 
allied  cities  to  the  Athenian  dikasteries — has  been  more  dwelt  upon  as 
a  grievance  than  the  second,  and  seems  to  have  been  unduly  exagger- 
ated. We  can  hardly  doubt  that  the  beginning  of  this  jurisdiction 
exercised  by  the  Athenian  dikasteries  dates  with  the  synod  of  Delos, 
at  the  time  of  the  first  formation  of  the  confederacy.  It  was  an  in- 
dispensable element  of  that  confederacy,  thai  the  members  should 
forego  their  right  of  private  war  among  each  other,  and  submit  their 
differences  to  peaceable  arbitration — a  covenant  introduced  even  into 
alliances  much  less  intimate  than  this  was,  and  absolutely  essential  to 
the  efficient  maintenance  of  any  common  action  against  Persia.  Of 
course  many  causes  of  dispute,  public  as  well  as  private,  must  have 
arisen  among  these  wide  spread  islands  and  sea-ports  of  the  ^Egean, 
connected  with  each  other  bj-  relations  of  fellow -feeling,  of  trade,  and 
of  common  apprehensions.  The  synod  of  Delos,  composed  of  the 
deputies  of  all,  was  the  natural  board  of  arbitration  for  such  disputes. 
A  habit  must  thus  have  been  formed,  of  recognizing  a  sort  of  federal 
tribunal,  to  decide  peaceably  how  far  each  ally  had  faithfully  dis- 
charged its  duties,  both  toward  the  confederacy  collectively  and 
toward  other  allies  with  their  individual  citizens  separately,  as  well 
as  to  enforce  its  decisions  and  punish  refractory  members,  pursuant 
to  the  right  which  Sparta  ami  her  confederacy  also  claimed  and  exer- 
cised. Now  from  the  beginning  the  Athenians  were  the  guiding  and 
enforcing  presidents  of  this  synod.  When  it  gradually  died  awray, 
they  were  found  occupying  its  place  as  well  as  clothed  with  its  func- 
tions. Tt  was  in  this  manner  that  their  judicial  authority  over  the 
allies  appears  first  to  have  begun  as  the  confederacy  became  changed 
into  an  Athenian  empire,  the  judicial  functions  of  the  synod  being 
transferred  along  with  the  common  treasure  to  Athens,  and  doubtless 

much  extended.  And  on  the  whole,  these  functions  must  have  been 
productive  of  more  good  than  evil  to  the  allies  themselves,  especially 
to  the  weakest  and  most  defenseless  among  them. 

Among  the  thousand  towns  which  paid  tribute  to  Athens  (taking 


COMPARISON  OF  ATHENS  AND   SPARTA.        475 

this  numerical  statement  of  Aristophanes  not  in  its  exact  meaning, 
but  simply  as  a  great  number),  if  a  small  town,  or  one  of  its  citizens, 
had  cause  of  complaint  against  a  larger,  there  was  no  channel  except 
the  synod  of  Delos,  or  the  Athenian  tribunal,  through  which  it  could 
have  any  reasonable  assurance  of  fair  trial  or  justice.  It  is  not  to  be 
supposed  that  all  the  private  complaints  and  suits  between  citizen  and 
citizen,  in  each  respective  subject  town,  were  carried  up  for  trial  to 
Athens;  yet  we  do  not  know  distinctly  how  tbe  line  was  drawn, 
between  matters  carried  up  thither,  and  matters  tried  at  home.  The 
subject  cities  appear  to  have  been  interdicted  from  the  power  of  cap- 
ital punishment,  which  could  only  be  inflicted  after  previous  trial  and 
condemnation  at  Athens:  so  that  the  latter  reserved  to  herself  the 
cognizance  of  most  of  the  grave  crimes — or  what  may  be  called  "  the 
higher  justice"  generally.  And  the  political  accusations  preferred  by 
citizen  against  citizen,  in  any  subject  city,  for  alleged  treason,  cor- 
ruption, non-fulfillment  of  public  duty,  etc.,  were  doubtless  carried 
to  Athens  for  trial — perhaps  the  most  important  part  of  her  juris- 
diction. 

But  the  maintenance  of  this  judicial  supremacy  was  not  intended 
by  Athens  for  the  substantive  object  of  amending  the  administration 
of  justice  in  each  separate  allied  city.  It  went  rather  to  regulate  the 
relations  between  city  and  city — between  citizens  of  different  cities — ■ 
between  Athenian  citizens  or  officers,  and  any  of  these  allied  cities 
with  which  they  had  relations — between  each  city  itself,  as  a  depend- 
ent government  with  contending  political  parlies,  and  tbe  imperial 
head  Athens.  All  these  being  problems  which  imperial  Athens  was 
called  on  to  solve,  the  best  way  of  solving  them  would  have  been 
through  some  common  synod  emanating  from  all  the  allies.  Putting 
this  aside,  we  shall  find  that  the  solution  provided  by  Athens  was 
perhaps  the  next  best,  and  we  shall  be  the  more  induced  to  think  so 
when  we  compare  it  with  the  proceedings  afterward  adopted  by 
Sparta,  when  she  had  put  down  the  Athenian  empire.  Under  Sparta, 
the  general  rule  was,  to  place  each  of  the  dependent  cities  under  the 
government  of  a  Dekarchy  (or  oligarchical  council  of  ten)  among  its 
chief  citizens,  together  with  a  Spartan  harmost  or  governor  having  a 
small  garrison  under  his  orders.  It  will  be  found  when  we  come  to 
describe  the  Spartan  maritime  empire  that  the  arrangements  exposed 
each  dependent  city  to  very  great  violence  and  extortion,  while,  after 
all,  they  solved  only  a  part  of  the  problem.  They  served  only  to 
maintain  each  separate  city  under  the  dominion  of  Sparta  without 
contributing  to  regulate  the  dealings  between  the  citizens  of  one  and 
those  of  another,  or  to  bind  together  the  empire  as  a  whole.  Now 
the  Athenians  did  not,  as  a  system,  place»in  their  dependent  cities 
governors  analogous  to  the  harmosts,  though  they  did  so  occasionally 
under  special  need.  But  their  fleets  and  their  officers  were  in  fre- 
quent relation  with  these  cities;  and  as  the  principal  officers  were 
noways  indisposed  to  abuse  their  position,  bo  the  facility  of  com- 


4?G    ATHENS  BEFORE  THE  PELOPOXXESIAN  WAR 

plaint,  constantly  open,  to  the  Athenian  popular  dikastery,  served 
both  as  redress  and  guarantee  against  misrule  of  this  description.  It 
was  a  guarantee  which  the  allies  themselvc  sensibly  felt  and  valued. 
as  we  know  from  Thucydides.  The  chief  source  from  whence  they 
had  to  apprehend  evil  was,  the  misconduct  of  the  Athenian  officials 
and  principal  citizens,  who  could  misemploy  the  power  of  Athens  for 
(heir  own  private  purposes — but  they  looked  up  to  the  "Athenian 

-  as  a  chastener  of  such  evil-doers  and  as  a  harbor  of  refuge  to 
themselves."    It'  the  popular  dikasteries  at  Athens  had  not  been  thua 

the  allied  cities  would  have  Buffered  much  more  severely  from 
the  captains  and  officials  of  Athens  in  their  individual  capacity.  And 
the  maintenance  of  political  harmony,  between  the  imperial  city  and 
the  subject  ally,  was  ensured  by  Athens  through  the  jurisdiction  of 
her  dikasteries  with  much  less  cost  of  injustice  and  violence  than  by 
Sparta  For  though  oligarchical  leaders  in  these  allied  cities  mighl 
sometimes  be  unjustly  condemned  at  Athens,  yet  such  accidental 
wrong  was  immensely  overpassed  by  the  enormities  of  the  Spartan 
harmosts  and  Dekarchies,  who  put  numbers  to  death  without  any 
trial  at  all. 

So  again,  it  is  to  be  recollected  that  Athenian  private  citizens,  not 
officially  employed,  were  spread  over  the  whole  range  of  the  empire 
as  kleruchs,  proprietors,  or  traders.  Of  course,  therefore,  disputes 
would  arise  between  themand  the  natives  of  the  subject  cities,  as  wel. 
as  among  these  latter  themselves,  incases  where  both  parties  did  not 
belong  to  the  same  city.  Now  in  such  cases  the  Spartan  imperial 
authority  was  so  exercised  as  to  afford  little  or  no  remedy,  since  the 
action  of  the  harmostor  tin;  Dekarchy  was  confined  to  one  separate 
city;  while  the  Athenian  dikasteries,  with  universal  competence  and 
public  trial,  afforded  the  best  redress  which  the  contingency  admitted. 
If  a  Thasian  citizen  believed  himself  aggrieved  by  the  historian 
Thucydides,  either  as  commander  of  the  Athenian  fleet  on  that  sta- 
tion, or  as  proprietor  of  gold  mines  in  Thrace, — he  had  his  remedy 

i  the  latter  by  accusation  before  the  Athenian  dikasteries,  to 
which  the  most  powerful  Athenian  was  amenable  not  less  than  the 
meanest  Thasian.  To  a  citizen  of  any  allied  city  it  mighl  be  an 
occasional  hardship  to  be  sued  before  the  courts  at  Athens;  but  it 
was  also  often  a  valuable  privilege  to  him  to  be  able  to  sue,  before 
those  courts,  others  whom  else  he  could  not  have  reached.  He  had 
his  share  of  the  benefit  as  well  as  of  the  hardship.  Athens,  if  she 
robbed  her  subject-allies  of  their  independence,  at  least  gave  them  in 
exchange  the  advantage  ofa  central  and  common  judiciary  authority; 
thus  enabling  each  of  them  to  enforce  claims  of  justice  against  the 
rest,  in  a  way  which  would  not  have  been  practicable  (to  the  weaker 
at  least)  even  in  a  state  of  general  independence. 

Now  Sparta  seems  not  even  to  have  attempted  anything  of  the  kind 
with  regard  to  her  subject-allies,  being  content  to  keep  them  under 
the  rule  of  a  harmost  and  a  partisan  oligarchy.     And  we  read  anec- 


PROTECTION  AFFORDED  DIKASTERIES.         477 

dotes  which  show  that  no  justice  could  be  obtained  at  Sparta  even  for 
the  grossest  outrages  committed  by  the  harmost,  or  by  private  Spar- 
tans out  of  Laconia.  The  two  daughters  of  a  Boeotian  named  Ske- 
dasus  (of  Leuktra  in  Bceotia)  had  been  first  violated  and  then  mur- 
dered by  two  Spartan  citizens:  the  son  of  a  citizen  of  Oreus  in 
Eubcea  had  been  also  outraged  and  killed  by  the  harmost  Aristode- 
mus:  in  both  cases  the  fathers  went  to  Sparta  to  lay  the  euormity 
before  the  ephors  and  other  authorities,  and  in  both  cases  a  deaf  ear 
was  turned  to  their  complaints.  But  such  crimes,  if  committed  by 
Athenian  citizens  or  officers,  might  have  been  brought  to  a  formal 
exposure  before  the  public  sitting  of  the  dikastery,  and  there  can  be 
no  doubt  that  both  would  have  been  severely  punished.  We  shall 
see  hereafter  that  an  euormity  of  this  description,  committed  by  the 
Athenian  general  Baches  at  Mitylene,  cost  him  his  life  before  the 
Athenian  dikasts.  Xenophon,  in  the  dark  and  one-sided  representa- 
tion which  he  gives  of  the  Athenian  democracy,  remarks,  that  if  the 
subject-allies  had  not  been  made  amenable  to  justice  at  Athens,  they 
would  have  cared  little  for  the  people  of  Athens,  and  would  have 
paid  court  only  to  those  individual  Athenians,  generals,  trierarchs, 
or  envoys,  who  visited  the  islands  on  service;  but  under  the  existing 
system,  the  subjects  were  compelled  to  visit  Athens  either  as  plain- 
tiffs or  defendants,  and  were  thus  under  the  necessity  of  paying 
court  to  the  bulk  of  the  people  also — that  is,  to  those  humbler  citizens 
out  of  whom  the  dikasteries  were  formed;  they  supplicated  the 
dikasts  in  court  for  favor  or  lenient  dealing.  But  this  is  only  an 
invidious  manner  of  discrediting  what  was  really  a  protection  to  the 
allies,  both  in  purpose  and  in  reality.  For  it  was  a  lighter  lot  to  be 
brought  for  trial  before  the  dikastery,  than  to  be  condemned  without 
redress  by  the  general  on  service,  or  to  be  forced  to  buy  off  his  con- 
demnation by  a  bribe.  Moreover  the  dikastery  was  open  not  merely 
to  receive  accusations  against  citizens  of  the  allied  cities,  but  also  to 
entertain  complaints  which  they  preferred  against  others. 

Assuming  the  dikasteries  at  Athens  to  be  ever  so  defective  as 
tribunals  for  administering  justice,  we  must  recollect  that  they  were 
the  same  tribunals  under  which  every  Athenian  citizen  held  his  own 
fortune  or  reputation,  and  that  the  native  of  any  subject  city  was 
admitted  to  the  same  chance  of  justice  as  the  native  of  Athens. 
Accordingly  we  find  the  Athenian  envoy  at  Sparta,  immediately 
before  the  Peloponnesian  war,  taking  peculiar  credit  to  the  imperial 
city  on  this  ground,  for  equal  dealing  with  her  subject  allies.  "If 
our  power  (he  says)  were  to  pass  into  other  hands,  the  comparison 
would  presently  show  how  moderate  we  ai;e  in  the  use  of  it:  but  as 
regards  us,  our  very  moderation  is  unfairly  turned  to  our  disparage- 
ment rather  than  to  our  praise.  For  even  though  we  put  ourselves 
at  disadvantage  in  matters  litigated  with  our  allies,  and  though  we 
have  appointed  such  matters  to  be  judged  among  ourselves,  and 
under  laws  equal  to  both  parties,  we  are  represented  as  animated  by 


478    ATHENS  BEFORE  THE  PELOPONNESIAH  WAR 

nothing  better  than  a  love  of  litigation."  "Our  allies  (he  adds) 
would  complain  leas  if  we  made  op<  d  use  of  our  superior  force  with 
!  in  them;  but  we  discard  such  maxims,  and  deal  with  them 
upon  an  equal  rooting:  and  they  are  so  accustomed  to  this  that  they 
think  themselves  entitled  to  complain  at  every  trifling  disappoint- 
ment of  their  expectations.  They  suffered  worse  hardship  under 
the  Persians  before  our  empire  began,  and  they  would  suffer  worse 
\indcr  you  (the  Spartans)  if  you  were  to  succeed  in  conquering  us 
and  making  our  empire  yours." 

History  bears  out  the  boasl  of  the  Athenian  orator,  both  as  to 
the  time  preceding  and  following  the  empire  of  Athens.  And  an 
Athenian  citizen  indeed  mighl  well  regard  it  not  as  a  hardship,  but 
as  a  privilege  to  the  subject  allies,  that  they  should  be  allowed  tosue 
him  before  the  dikastery,  and  to  defend  themselves  before  the  same 
tribunal  either  in  case  of  wrong  done  to  him,  or  in  case  of  alleged 
in  to  the  imperial  authority  of  Athens:  they  were  thereby  put 
upon  a  level  with  himself.  Still  more  would  he  find  reason  to  eulo- 
gize the  universal  competence  of  these  dikasteries  in  providing  a 
common  legal  authority  for  all  disputes  of  the  numerous  distinct 
communities  of  the  empire  one  with  another,  and  for  the  safe  navi- 
gation and  general  commerce  of  the  JEgean.  That  complaints  were 
raised  againsl  it  among  the  subject-allies  is  noway  surprising.  For 
the  empire  of  Athens  generally  was  inconsistent  with  that  separate 
autonomy  to  which  every  town  thought  itself  entitled;  and  this 
central  judicature  was  one  of  its  prominent  and  constantly  operative 
institutions,  as  well  as  a  striking  mark  of  dependence  to  the  sub- 
ordinate communities.  Yet  we  may  safely  affirm  that  if  empire  was 
to  be  maintained  at  all,  no  way  of  maintaining  it  could  be  found  at 
once  less  oppressive  and  more  beneficial  than  the  superintending 
competence  of  the  dikasteries— a  system  not  taking  its  rise  in  the 
mere  "love  of  litigation"  (if,  indeed,  we  are  to  reckon  this  a  real 
feature  in  the  Athenian  character,  which  I  shall  take  another  oppor- 
tunity of  examining),  much  less  in  those  petty  collateral  interests 
indicated  by  Xenophon,  such  as  the  increased  customs  duty,  rent  of 
houses,  and  hire  of  slaves  at  Peiraeus,  and  the  larger  profits  of  the 
heralds,  arising  from  the  influx  of  suitors.  It  was  nothing  but  the 
power,  originally  inherent  in  the  confederacy  of  Delos,  of  arbitration 
between  members  and  enforcement  of  duties  toward  the  whole — a 
power  inherited  by  Athens  from  that  synod,  and  enlarged  to  meet  the 
political  want-  of  her  empire;  to  which  end  it  was  essential,  even  in 
theviewof  Xenophon  himself.  It  may  be  that  the  dikastery  was 
not  always  impartial  between  Athenian  citizens  privately,  or  the 
Athenian  commonwealth  collectively,  and  the  subject-allies — and 
in  so  far  the  latter  had  goo  dreason  to  complain.  But  on  the  other 
hand  we  have  no  ground  for  suspecting  it  of  deliberate  or  standing 
unfairness,  or  of  any  other  defects  than  such  as  were  inseparable 


SUBJECT-ALLIES  HAD  FEW  GRIEVANCES       479 

from  its  constitution  and  procedure,  whoever  might  be  the  parties 
under  trial. 

We  are  now  considering  the  Athenian  empire  as  it  stood  before  the 
Pelopounesian  war;  before  the  iucreased  exactions  and  the  multiplied 
revolts,  to  which  that  war  gave  rise  —  before  the  cruelties  which 
accompanied  the  suppression  of  those  revolts,  and  which  so  deeply 
stained  the  character  of  Athens — before  that  aggravated  fierceness, 
mistrust,  contempt  of  obligation,  and  rapacious  violence,  which 
Thucydides  so  emphatically  indicates  as  having  been  infused  into 
the  Greek  bosom  by  the  fever  of  an  all-pervading  contest.  There 
had  been  before  this  time  many  revolts  of  the  Athenian  dependen- 
cies, from  the  earliest  at  Naxos  down  to  the  latest  at  Samos.  All 
had  been  successfully  suppressed,  but  in  no  case  had  Athens  dis- 
played the  same  unrelenting  rigor  as  we  shall  find  hereafter  manifested 
toward  Mitylene,  Skione,  and  Melos.  The  policy  of  Perikles,  now 
in  the  plenitude  of  his  power  at  Athens,  was  cautious  and  conserva- 
tive, averse  to  forced  extension  of  empire  as  well  as  to  those  increased 
burdens  on  the  dependent  allies  which  such  schemes  would  have 
entailed,  and  tending  to  maintain  that  assured  commerce  in  the 
iEgean  by  which  all  of  them  must  have  been  gainers — not  without  a 
conviction  that  the  contest  must  arise  sooner  or  later  between  Athens 
and  Sparta,  and  that  the  resources  as  well  as  the  temper  of  the  allies 
must  be  husbanded  against  that  contingencjr.  If  we  read  in  Thucyd- 
ides the  speech  of  the  envoy  from  Mitylene  at  Olympia,  delivered 
to  the  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies  in  the  fourth  year  of  the 
Peloponnesian  war,  on  occasion  of  the  revolt  of  the  city  from  Athens 
— a  speech  imploring  aid  and  setting  forth  the  strongest  impeachment 
against  Athens  which  the  facts  could  be  made  to  furnish — we  shall 
be  surprised  how  weak  the  case  is  and  how  much  the  speaker  is  con- 
scious of  its  weakness.  He  has  nothing  like  practical  grievances  and 
oppressions  to  urge  against  the  imperial  city.  He  does  not  dwell 
upon  enormity  of  tribute,  unpunished  misconduct  of  Athenian 
officers,  hardship  of  bringing  causes  for  trial  to  Athens,  or  other 
sufferings  of  the  subjects  generally.  He  has  nothing  to  say  except 
that  they  were  defenseless  and  degraded  subjects,  and  that  Athens 
held  authority  over  them  without  and  against  their  own  consent:  and 
in  the  case  of  Mitylene,  not  so  much  as  this  could  be  said,  since  she 
was  on  the  footing  of  an  equal,  armed,  and  autonomous  ally.  Of 
course  this  state  of  forced  dependence  was  one  which  the  allies,  or 
such  of  them  as  could  stand  alone,  would  naturally  and  reasonably 
shake  off  whenever  they  had  an  opportunity.  But  the  negative 
evidence,  derived  from  the  speech  of  the  Mitylensean  orator,  goe3 
far  to  make  out  the  point  contended  for  by  the  Athenian  speaker  at 
Sparta  immediately  before  the  war — that,  beyond  the  fact  of  such 
forced  dependence,  the  allies  had  little  practically  to  complain  of. 
A  city  like  Mitylene  might  be  strong  enough  to  protect  itself  and  its 


480    ATHENS  BEFORE  THE  PELOPONNESIAM  WAR. 

own  C merce    without    the  help   of  Alliens.      Rut    to   the  weaker 

allies,  the  breaking  up  of  the  Athenian  empire  would  have  greatly 
lessened  the  Becunty  both  of  individuals  and  of  commerce,  in  the 
waters  of  the  £gean,  and  their  freedom  would  thus  have  been  pur- 
chased at  the  cosl  of  considerable  positive  disadvantages. 

rlj  the  whole  of  the  Grecian  world  (putting  aside  Italian, 
Sicilian."  and  African  Greek)  was  at  this  time  included  either  in  the 
alliance  of  Lacedsemon  or  in  thai  of  Athens,  so  thai  the  truce  of 
thirty  years  insured  a  suspension  of  hostilities  everywhere.  More- 
over! the  Lacedaemonian  confederates  had  determined  by  a  majority 

of  voles  to  refuse  the  request  of    Samos  for   aid  in  her  revolt  against 

Athens:  whereby  it  Beemed  established,  as  practical  international 
law,  that  neither  of  these  two  great  aggregate  bodies  should  inter- 
meddle with  the  other,  and  that  each  should  restrain  or  punish  its 
own  disobedient  lnetnliers. 

Of  this  refusal,  which  materially  affected  the  course  of  events,  the 
main  advisers  had  been  the  Corinthians,  in  spite  of  that  fear  and  dis- 
like of  Athens  which  prompted  many  of  the  allies  to  vote  for  war. 
The  position  of  the  Corinthians  was  peculiar;  for  while  Sparta  and 
her  other  allies  were  chiefly  land  powers,  Corinth  had  been  from  early 
times  maritime,  commercial,  and  colonizing.  She  had,  indeed,  once 
-ed  the  largest  navy  in  Greece,  along  with  iEgina;  but  either 
siie  had  not  increased  it  at  all  during  the  last  forty  years,  or,  if  she 
had,  her  comparative  naval  importance  had  been  sunk  by  the 
gigantic  expansion  of  Athens.  The  Corinthians  had  both  commerce 
and  colonies — Leukas,  Anaktorium,  Amhrakia,  Korkyra,  etc.,  along 
or  near  the  coast  of  Kpirus:  tiny  had  also  their  colony  Potidsea,  sit- 
uated on  the  isthmus  of  Pallene  in  Thrace,  and  intimately  connected 
with  them:  and  the  interest  of  their  commerce  made  them  averse 
to  collision  with  the  superior  navy  of  the  Athenians.  It  was  this 
illation  which  had  induced  them  to  resist  the  impulse  of  the 
Lacedaemonian  allies  toward  war  on  behalf  of  Samos.  For  though 
their  feelings  both  of  jealousy  and  hatn  d  against  Athens  were  even 
now  strong,  arising  greatly  out  of  the  struggle  a  few  years  before  the 
acquisition  of  Megara  to  the  Athenian  alliance— prudence  indicated 
that  in  a  war  against  the  first  naval  power  in  Greece,  they  were  sure 
to  be  the  greatest  losers. 

So  long  as  the  policy  of  Corinth  pointed  toward  peace,  there  was 
every  probability  that  war  would  be  avoided,  or  at  least  accepted 
only  in  a  case  of  grave  necessity,  by  the  Lacedaemonian  alliance. 
But  a  contingency,  distant  as  well  as  unexpected,  which  occurred 
about  five  years  after  the  revolt  of  Samos,  reversed  all  these  chances, 
ami  not  only  extinguished  the  dispositions  of  Corinth  toward  peace, 
but  even  transformed  her  into  the  forward  instigator  of  war. 

Amid  the  various  colonies  planted  from  Corinth  along  the  coast 
of  Epirus,  the  greater  number  acknowledged  on  her  part  an  hegem- 
ony or   supremacy.     "What  extent   of   real  power  and  interference 


•DISPUTE  BETWEEN   CORINTH   AND  KORKYRA.     481 

this  acknowledgment  implied,  in  addition  to  the  honorary  dignity, 

we  are  not  in  a  condition  to  say.  But  the  Corinthians  were  popular, 
and  had  not  carried  their  interference  beyond  the  point  which  the 
colonists  themselves  found  acceptable.  To  these  amicable  relations, 
however,  the  powerful  Korkyra  formed  a  glaring  exception — having 
been  generally  at  variance,  sometimes  in  the  most  aggravated  hos- 
tility, with  its  mother-city,  and  withholding  from  her  even  the  accus- 
tomed tributes  of  honorary  and  filial  respect.  It  was  amid  such 
relations  of  habitual  ill-will  between  Corinth  and  Korkyra  that  a 
dispute  grew  up  respecting  the  city  of  Epidamnus  (known  afterward 
in  the  Roman  times  aa  Dyrrhachium,  hard  by  the  modern  Durazzo) 
— a  colony  founded  by  the  Korkyneans  on  the  coast  of  Ulyria  in  the 
Ionic  Gulf,  considerably  to  the  north  of  their  own  island.  So  strong 
was  the  sanctity  of  Grecian  custom  in  respect  to  the  foundation  of 
colonies,  that  the  Korkyraeans,  in  spite  of  their  enmity  to  Corinth, 
had  been  obliged  to  select  the  GEkist  (or  Founder-in-Chief)  of  Epi- 
damnus from  that  city — a  citizen  of  Herakleid  descent  named  Pha- 
lius — along  with  whom  there  had  also  come  some  Corinthian  settlers. 
And  thus  Epidamnus,  though  a  Korkyrasan  colony,  was  nevertheless 
a  recognized  grand-daughter  (if  the  expression  may  be  allowed)  of 
Corinth,  the  recollection  of  which  was  perpetuated  by  the  solemnities 
periodically  celebrated  in  honor  of  the  GEkist. 

Founded  on  the  isthmus  of  an  outlying  peninsula  on  the  seacoast 
of  the  Illyrian  Taulantii,  Epidamnus  was  at  first  prosperous,  and 
acquired  a  considerable  territory  as  well  as  a  numerous  population. 
But  during  the  years  immediately  preceding  the  period  which  we. 
have  now  reached,  it  had  been  exposed  to  great  reverses.  Internal 
sedition  between  the  oligarchy  and  the  people,  aggravated  by  attacks 
from  the  neighboring  Illyrians,  had  crippled  its  power;  and  a  recent 
revolution,  in  which  the  people  put  down  the  oligarchy,  had  reduced 
it  still  farther— since  the  oligarchical  exiles,  collecting  a  force  and 
allying  themselves  with  the  Illyrians,  harassed  the  city  grievously 
both  by  sea  and  land.  The  Epidamnian  democracv  "was  in  such 
strairs  as  to  be  forced  to  send  to  Korkyra  for  aid.  Their  envoys  sat 
down  as  suppliants  at  the  temple  of '  Here,  cast  themselves  on  the 
mercy  of  the  Korkyraeans,  and  besought  them  to  act  both  as  medi- 
ators with  the  exiled  oligarchy,  and  as  auxiliaries  against  the  Illyrians. 
Though  the  Korkyraeans,  themselves  democratically  governed^  might 
have  been  expected  to  sympathize  with  these  suppliants  and  their 
prayers,  yet  their  feeling  was  decidedly  opposite.  For  it  was  the 
Epidamnian  oligarchy  who  were  principally  connected  with  Korkyra, 
from  whence  their  forefathers  had  emigrated,  and  where  their  family 
burial-places  as  well  as  their  kinsmen  were  still  to  be  found:  while 
the  Demos,  or  small  proprietors  and  tradesmen  of  Epidamnus.  may 
perhaps  have  been  of  miscellaneous  origin,  and  at  any  rate  had  no 
visible  memorials  of  ancient  lineage  in  the  mother-island.  Having 
been  refused  aid  from  Korkyra,  and  finding  their  distressed  con- 
H.  G.  II— 16 


485    ATHENS  BEFORE  Till;  PELOPONNESIAN  AVAR. 

dition  insupportable,  the  Epidamniane  next  thought  of  applying  to 
Corinth.     Bui  as  this  was  a  Btep  of  questionable  propriety,  their 
envoys  were  directed  firel  to  take  the  opinion  of  the  Delphian  god. 
Bis  oracle  having  given  an  unqualified  sanction,  they  proceeded  to 
Corinth  with  their  mission;  describing  their  distress  as  well  as  their 
unavailing  application  at  Korkyra— tendering  Epidamnus  to  tl 
inthians  as  to  its  (Ekists  and  chiefs.  w  ith  the  most  urgent  entreaties 
for  immediate  aid  to  preserve  it  from  rain— and  not  omitting  to  insist 
on  the  divine  sanction  just  obtained.     It  was  found  easy  to  persuade 
who,  looking  upon  Epidamnus  as  a  joint  colon}  from 
Corinth  and  Korkyra,  thought   themselves  no1  only  authorized,  but 
d,  to  undertake  its  defense — a  resolution  much  prompted  by 
-lit  feud  againsl   Korkyra.     Tbej   speedily  organized  an 
dition,  con  isting  partly  of  intended  new    settlers,  partly  ol  a 
military  force —  Corinthian,  Leukadian,  and  Ambrakiotic: 
which  combined  I  ody,  in  order  to  avoid  opposition  from  the  power- 
ful Korkyrsean  navy,  was  marched  l>y  land  as  far  asApolloma,  and 
transport*  d  from  th<  nee  by  sea  to  Epidamnus. 

The  arrival  of  such  a  re  enforcement  rescued  the  city  for  the 
moment,  but  drew-  upon  it  a  formidable  increase  of  peril  from  the 
Korkyraan-;  who  looked  upon  the  interference  of  Corinth  as  an 
infringement  of  their  rights,  and  resented  it  in  the  strongest  manner. 
Their  feelings  were  farther  inflamed  by  the  Epidamnian  oligarchical 
exiles,  who,  coming  to  the  island  with  petitions  for  succor  and 
appeals  to  the  tombs  of  their  Korkyraean  ancestors,  found  aready 
sympathy.  They  were  placed  on  board  a  fleet  of  twenty-five  tri- 
remes, afterward  strengthened  by  a  farther  re  enforcement,  which 
was  sent  to  Epidamnus  with  the  insulting  requisition  that  the\  should 
be  forthwith  restored  and  the  new-comers  from  Corinth  dismissed. 
No  attention  being  paid  to  such  demands,  the  Korkyrssans  com- 
menced the  blockade  of  the  city  with  forty  ships  and  with  an  auxil- 
iary land-force  of  Illyrians — making  proclamation  that  any  person 
within,  citizen  or  not,  might  depart  safely  if  he  chose,  but  would  be 
dealt  with  as  an  enemy  if  he  remained.  How  many  persons  profited 
by  this  permission  we  do  not  know;  but  at  least  enough  to  convey  to 
Corinth  the  news  thai  their  troops  in  Epidamnus  wen-  closely 
d.  The  Corinthians  immediately  hastened  the  equipment  of 
a  second  expedition — sufficient  not  only  for  the  rescue  of  the  place, 
but  to  surmount  that  resistance  which  the  Korkyraeans  were  sure  to 
offer.  In  addition  to  thirty  triremes,  and  3,000  hoplites,  of  their 
own,  they  solicited  aid  both  in  ships  and  money  from  many  of  their 
allies.  Eight  ships  fully  manned  were  furnished  bp  Megara,  four  by 
Tales  in  the  island  of  Kephallania,  five  by  Epidaurus,  two  by  Troezen, 
one  by  Hermione,  ten  by  Leukas,  and  eight  by  Ambrakia— together 
with  pecuniary  contributions  from  Thebes,  Phlius,  and  Elis.  TLey 
farther  proclaimed  a  public  invitation  for  new  settlers  to  Epidamnus, 
promising  equal  political  rights  to  all;  an  option  being  allowed  to  any 


REMONSTRANCE  OP  THE  KORKYR.EANS.       483 

one,  who  wished  to  hecome  a  settler  without  being  ready  to  depart  at 
ouce,  to  insure  future  admission  by  depositing  the  sum  of  fifty  Cor- 
inthian drachmas.  Though  it  might  seem  that  the  prospects  of  these 
new  settlers  were  full  of  doubt,  and  danger,  yet  such  was  the  con- 
fidence entertained  in  the  metropolitan  protection  of  Corinth,  that 
many  were  found  as  well  to  join  the  fleet,  as  to  pay  down  the  deposit 
for  liberty  of  future  junction. 

All  these  proceedings  on  the  part  of  Corinth,  though  undertaken 
with  intentional  hostility  towards  Korkyra,  had  not  been  preceded 
by  any  formal  proposition  such  as  was  customary  among  Grecian 
states— a  harshness  of  dealing  arising  not  merely  from  her  hatred 
toward  Korkyra,  but  also  from  the  peculiar  political  position  of  that 
island,  which  stood  alone  and  isolated,  not  enrolled  either  in  the 
Athenian  or  in  the  Lacedaemonian  alliance.  The  Korkyraeans,  wed 
aware  of  the  serious  preparation  now  going  on  at  Corinth  and  of  the 
union  among  so  many  cities  against  them,  felt  themselves  hardly  a 
match  for  it  alone,  in  spite  of  their  wealth  and  their  formidable  naval 
force  of  120  triremes,  inferior  only  to  that  of  Athens.  They  made  an 
effort  to  avert  the  storm  by  peaceable  means,  prevailing  upon  some 
mediators  from  Sparta  and  Sikyon  to  accompany  them  to  Corinth; 
where,  while  they  required  that 'the  forces  and  settlers  recently  dis- 
patched to  Epidamnus  should  be  withdrawn,  denying  all  right  on 
the  part  of  Corinth  to  interfere  in  that  colony — they  at  the  same  time 
offered,  if  the  point  were  disputed,  to  refer  it  for  arbitration  either 
to  some  impartial  Peloponnesian  city,  or  to  the  Delphian  oracle;  such 
arbiter  to  determine  to  which  of  the  two  cities  Epidamnus  as  a  colony 
really  belonged — and  the  decision  to  be  obeyed  by  both.  They 
solemnly  deprecated  recourse  to  arms,  which,  if  persisted  in,  would 
drive'  them  as  a  matter  of  necessity  to  seek  new  allies  such  as  they 
would  not  willingly  apply  to.  To  this  the  Corinthians  answered  that 
they  could  entertain  no  'proposition  until  the  Korkyroean  besieging 
force  was  withdrawn  from  Epidamnus.  Whereupon  the  Korkyraeans 
rejoined  that  they  would  withdraw  it  at  once,  provided  the  new  set- 
tlers and  the  troops  sent  by  Corinth  were  removed  at  the  same  time. 
Either  there  ought  to  be  this  reciprocal  retirement,  or  the  Korkyraeans 
would  acquiesce  in  the  statu  quo  on  both  sides,  until  the  arbiters 
should  have  decided. 

Although  the  Korkvrseans  had  been  unwarrantably  harsh  in  reject- 
ing the  first  supplication  from  Epidamnus,  yet  in  their  propositions 
made  at  Corinth,  right  and  equity  were  on  their*  side.  But  the  Cor- 
inthians had  gone  too  far,  and  assumed  an  attitude  too  decidedly 
aggressive,  to  admit  of  listening  to  arbitration.  Accordingly,  so  soon 
as  their  armament  was  equipped,  they  set,  sail  for  Epidamnus,  dis- 
patching a  herald  to  declare  war  formally  against  the  Korkyraeans. 
When  the  armament,  consisting  of  seventy-five  triremes  under  Aris 
teus,  Kallikrates,  and  Timanor,  with  2,000  hoplites  under  Archetimus 
and  Isarchidas,  had  reached  Cope  Aktium  at  the  mouth  of  the  Am- 


484    ATHENS  BEFORE  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR 

brakian  Gulf,  it  was  mel  bj  a  Korkyrsean  herald  in  a  little  boat  for- 
bidding  all  farther  advance  a  Bummons  of  course  unavailinj 
quickly  followed  bj  the  appearance  of  the  Korkyrsean  fleet.  Out  of 
the  120  triremes  which  constituted  the  naval  establishment  (if  the 
island,  forty  were  engaged  in  the  Biege  of  Epidamnus,  but  ;ill  the 
remaining  eight}  were  now  brought  into  service;  the  older  ships 
being  specially  repaired  for  the  occasion.  In  the  action  which 
ensued,  they  gained  a  complete  \  ictorj .  destroying  fifteen  ( lorinthian 
ships  and  taking  a  considerable  number  of  prisoners.  And  on  the 
very  day  of  the  victory,  Epidamnus  surrendered  to  their  besieging 
fleet,  under  covenant  thai  the  Corinthians  within  it  should  be  held  as 
prisoners,  and  that  the  other  new-comers  should  be  sold  as  slaves. 
The  <  lorinthians  and  their  allies  did  not  long  keep  the  sea  after  their 
defeat,  but  retired  home,  while  the  Korkyrseans  remained  undisputi  d 
masters  of  the  neighboring  sea.  Saving  erected  a  trophy  on  Leu- 
kimme,  the  adjoining  promontory  of  their  island,  they  proceeded, 
according  to  the  melancholy  practice  of  Grecian  warfare,  to  kill  all 
their  prisoners,  excepl  the  Corinthians,  who  were  carried  home  and 
detained  as  prizes  of  greal  value  for  purposes  of  negotiation.  They 
nexl  began  to  take  vengeance  on  those  allies  of  Corinth  who  had 
lent  assistance  to  the  recenl  expedition:  they  ravaged  the  territory  of 
Leukas,  burnt  Kyllene  the  seaport  of  Ehs,  and  inflicted  sp  n  h 
damage  thai  the  Corinthians  were  compelled  toward  the  end  o1  the 
summer  to  send  a  second  armament  to  Cape  Aktium,  for  the  d 
of  Leukas,  Anaktonum,  and  Ambrakia.  The  Korkyrsean  fleet  was 
again  assembled  near  Cape  Leukimme,  but  no  farther  action  took 
place,  and  at  the  approach  of  winter  both  armaments  were  dis- 
banded. 

Deeply  were  the  Corinthians  humiliated  by  their  defeat  at  sea, 
together  with  the  dispersion  of  the  settlers  whom  they  had  brought 
together:  and  though  their  original  project  was  frustrated  by  the  loss 
of  Epidamnus,  they  were  only  the  more  bent  on  complete  revenge 
againsl  their  old  enemy  Korkyra.  They  employed  themselves  for 
two  entire  years  after  the  battle  in  building  new  ships  and  providing 
an  armament  adequate  to  their  purposes:  and  in  particular,  they  senl 
round  not  only  to  the  Peloponnesian  seaports,  hut  also  to  the  islands 
under  the  empire  of  Athens,  in  order  to  take  into  their  pay  the  besl 
class  of  seamen.  By  such  prolonged  efforts,  ninety  well-manned 
Corinthian  ships  were  ready  to  set  sail  in  the  third  year  after  the 
battle.  The  entire  fleet,  when  re-enforced  by  the  allies,  amounted  to 
not  less  than  150  sail;  twenty-seven  tiremes  from  Ambrakia.  twelve 
from  Megara,  ten  from  Elias,  as  many  from  Leukas,  and  one  from 
Anaktorium.  Each  of  these  allied  squadrons  had  officers  of  its  own, 
while  the  Corinthian  Xenokleides  and  four  others  were  commanders- 
in-chief. 

But  the  elaborate  preparations  going  on  at  Corinth  were  no  secret 
to  the  Korkyrajaus,  wiio  well  knew,  besides,  the  numerous  allies 


APPLICATION  OF  THE  KORKYRiEANS.  485 

which  that  city  could  command,  and  her  extensive  influence  through- 
out Greece.  So  formidable  an  attack  was  more  than  they  could 
venture  to  brave,  alone  and  unaided.  They  had  never  yet  enrolled 
themselves  among  the  allies  either  of  Athens  or  of  Lacedaenion.  It 
had  been  their  pride  and  policy  to  maintain  a  separate  line  of  action, 
which,  by  means  of  their  wealth,  their  power,  and  their  very  peculiar 
position,*  they  had  hitherto  been  enabled  to  do  with  safety.  That 
they  had  been  able  so  to  proceed  with  safety,  however,  was  considered 
both  by  friends  and  enemies  as  a  peculiarity  belonging  to  their  island; 
from  whence  we  may  draw  an  inference  how  little  the  inlands  in  the 
Mgeaa,  now  under  the  Athenian  empire,  would  have  been  able  to 
maintain  any  real  independence  if  that  empire  had  been  broken  up. 
But  though  Korkyra  had  been  secure  in  this  policy  of  isolation  up  to 
the  present  moment,  such  had  been  the  increase  and  consolidation  of 
forces  elsewhere  throughout  Greece,  that  even  she  could  pursue  it  no 
longer.  To  appljr  for  admission  into  the  Lacedaemonian  confederacy, 
wherein  her  immediate  enemy  exercised  paramount  influence,  being 
out  of  the  question,  she  had  no  choice  except  to  seek  alliance  with 
Athens.  That  city  had  as  yet  no  dependencies  in  the  Ionic  Gulf; 
she  was  not  of  kindred  lineage,  nor  had  she  had  any  previous  amica- 
ble relations  with  the  Dorian  Korkyra.  But  if  there  was  thus  no  previ- 
ous fact  or  feeling  to  lay  the  foundation  of  alliance,  neither  was  there 
anything  to  forbid  it;  for  in  the  truce  bet-ween  Athens  and  Sparta,  it 
had  been  expressly  stipulated,  that  any  city,  not  actually  enrolled  in 
the  alliance  of  either,  might  join  the  one  or  the  other  at  pleasure. 
While  the  proposition  of  alliance  was  thus  formally  open  either  for 
acceptance  or  refusal,  the  time  and  circumstances  under  which  it  was 
to  be  made  rendered  it  full  of  grave  contingencies  to  all  parties. 
The  Korkyraean  envoys,  who  now  for  the  first  time  visited  Athens  for 
the  purpose  of  making  it,  came  thither  with  doubtful  hopes  of  suc- 
cess, though  to  their  island  the  question  was  one  of  life  or  death. 

According  to  the  modern  theories  of  government,  to  declare  war, 
to  make  peace,  and  to  contract  alliances,  are  functions  proper  to  be 
intrusted  to  the  executive  government  apart  from  the  representative 
assembly.  According  to  ancient  ideas,  these  were  precisely  the 
topics  most  essential  to  submit  for  the  decision  of  the  full  assembly 
of  the  people:  and  in  point  of  fact  they  were  so  submitted,  even 
under  governments  only  partially  democratical;  much  more,  of 
course,  under  the  complete  democracy  of  Athens.  The  Korkyraean 
envoys  on  reaching  that  city  would  first  open  their  business  to  the 
Strategi  or  generals  of  the  state,  who  would  appoint  a  day  for  them 
to  be  heard  before  the  public  assembly,  with  full  notice  beforehand  to 
the  citizens.  The  mission  was  no  secrete  for  the  Korkyraeans  had 
themselves  intimated  their  intention  at  Corinth,  at  the  time  when  they 
proposed  reference  of  the  quarrel  to  arbitration.  Even  without  such 
notice,  the  political  necessity  of  the  step  was  obvious  enough  to  make 
the  Corinthians  anticipate  it.     Lastly,  their  pro,ve-7ii  at  Athens  (Athe- 


480  ATHENS  BEFORE  THE  PELOPONNEBIAN  WAR 

nian  citizens  who  watched  ever  Corinthian  interests  public  and 
private,  in  confidential  correspondence  with  thai  goveramenl — and 
who,  sometimes  by  appointment,  sometimes  as  voluntei  re,  discharged 
partly  the  functions  of  ambassadors  in  mod*  in  times)  would  commu 
to  them  the  arrival  of  the  Korkyraean  envoys.  Bo  that,  on  the 
day  appointed  for  the  latter  to  be  heard  before  the  public  assembly, 
Corinthian  envoys  were  also  present  to  answer  them  and  to  oppose 
the  granting  of  their  prayer. 

Thucydides  has  given  in  his  history  the  speeches  of  both;  that  is, 
speeches  of  his  own  composition,  bul  representing  in  all  probability 
the  substance  of  what  was  actually  said,  and  of  what  he  perhaps 
himself  heard.  Though  pervaded  throughout  by  the  peculiar  style 
and  harsh  structure  of  the  historian,  these  speeches  are  yet  among 
the  plainest  and  most  business-like  in  his  whole  "work;  bringing 
before  us  thoroughly  the  existing  situation;  which  was  one  of  doubt 
and  difficulty,  presenting  reasons  of  considerable  force  on  each  of  the 
opposite  sides. 

The  Korkyrseans,  after  lamenting  their  previous  improvidence 
which  had  induced  them  to  defer  seeking  alliance  until  the  hour  of 
need  arrived,  presented  themselves  as  claimants  for  the  friendship  of 
Athens  on  the  strongest  grounds  of  common  interest  and  reciprocal 
usefulness.  Though  their  existing  danger  and  need  of  Athenian 
support  was  now  urgent,  it  had  not  been  brought  upon  them  in  an 
unjust  quarrel  or  by  disgraceful  conduct.  They  had  proposed  to 
Corinth  a  fair  arbitration  respecting  Epidamnus,  and  their  applica- 
tion had  been  refused— which  showed  where  the  rign.,  of  the  case 
lay:  moreover  they  were  now  exposed  single-banded,  not  to  Corinth 
alone,  whom  they  had  already  vanquished,  but  to  a  formidable  con- 
federacy organized  under  her  auspices,  including  choice  mariners 
hired  even  from  the  allies  of  Athens.  In  granting  their  prayer, 
Athens  would  in  the  first  place  neutralize  this  misemployment  of  her 
own  mariners,  and  would  at  the  same  time  confer  an  indelible  obli- 
gation, protect  the  cause  of  right,  and  secure  to  herself  an  important 
re-enforcement.  For  next  to  her  own,  the  Korkyrsean  naval  force 
was  the  most  powerful  in  Greece,  and  this  was  now  placed  within 
her  reach.  If  by  declining  the  present  offer,  she  permitted  Korkyra 
to  be  overcome,  that  naval  force  would  pass  to  the  side  of  her  ene- 
mies: for  such  were  Corinth  and  the  Peloponnesian  alliance — and 
such  they  would  soon  he  openly  declared.  In  the  existing  state  of 
Greece,  a  collision  between  that  alliance  and  Athens  could  not  long 
be  postponed.  It  was  with  a  view  to  this  contingency  that  the  Co- 
rinthians were  now  seeking  to  seize  Korkyra  along  with  her  naval 
force.  Tin'  policy  of  Athens  therefore  imperiously  called  upon  her 
to  frustrate  such  a  design,  by  now  assisting  the  Korkyneans.  She 
was  permitted  to  do  this  by  the  terms  of  the  Thirty  years'  truce. 
And  although  some  might  contend  that  in  the  present  critical  con- 
juncture acceptance  of  Korkyra  wad  tantamount  to  a  declaration  of 


REPLY  OF  CORINTHIAN  ENVOYS.  487 

war  with  Corinth,  yet  the  fact  would  falsify  such  predictions;  for 
Athens  would  so  strengthen  herself  that  her  enemies  would  be  more 
than  ever  unwilling  to  attack  her.  She  would  not  only  render  her 
naval  force  irresistibly  powerful,  but  would  become  mistress  of  tne 
communication  between  Sicily  and  Peloponnesus,  and  thus  prevent 
the  Sicilian  Dorians  from  sending  re-enforcements  to  the  Pelopon- 
nesians. 

To  these  representations  on  the  part  of  the  Korkyroeans,  the  Corin- 
thian speakers  made  reply.  They  denounced  the  selhsb  and  iniqui- 
tous policy  pursued  by  Korkyra,  not  less  in  the  matter  of  Epidamnua 
than  in  all  former  time — which  was  the  real  reason  why  she  had  ever 
been  ashamed  of  honest  allies.  Above  all  things,  she  had  always 
acted  undutifully  and  wickedly  toward  Corinth  her  mother  city,  to 
whom  she  was  bound  by  those  ties  of  colonial  allegiance  which  Gre- 
cian morality  recognized,  and  which  the  other  Corinthian  colonies 
cheerfully  obeyed.  Epidamnus  was  not  a  Korkyraau,  but  a  Corin- 
thian colony.  The  Korkymeans,  having  committed  wrong  in  besieg- 
ing it,  had  proposed  arbitration  without  being  willing  to  withdraw 
their  troops  while  arbitration  was  pending:  they  now  impudently 
came  to  ask  Athens  to  become  accessory  after  the  fact,  in  such  injus- 
tice. The  provision  of  the  Thirty  years'  truce  might  seem  indeed  to 
allow  Athens  to  receive  them  as  allies:  but  that  provision  was  not 
intended  to  permit  the  reception  of  cities  already  under  the  tie  of 
colonial  allegiance  elsewhere — still  less  the  reception  of  cities  engaged 
in  an  active  and  pending  quarrel,  where  any  countenance  to  one 
party  in  the  quarrel  was  necessarily  a  declaration  of  war  against  the 
opposite.  If  either  party  had  a  right  to  invoke  the  aid  of  Athens  on 
this  occasion,  Corinth  had  a  better  right  than  Korkyra.  For  the  latter 
had  never  had  any  transactions  with  the  Athenians,  while  Corinth 
was  not  only  still  under  covenant  of  amity  with  them,  through  the 
Thirty  years'  truce,  but  had  also  rendered  material  service  to  them 
by  dissuading  the  Peloponnesian  allies  from  assisting  the  revolted 
Samos.  By  such  dissuasion,  the  Corinthians  had  upheld  the  principle 
of  Grecian  international  law,  that  each  alliance  was  entitled  to  pun- 
ish its  own  refractory  members.  They  now  called  upon  Athens  to 
respect  this  principle  by  not  interfering  between  Corinth  and  her 
colonial  allies,  e-pecially  as  the  violation  of  it  would  recoil  incon- 
veniently upon  Athens  herself  with  her  numerous  dependencies.  As 
for  the  fear  of  an  impending  war  between  the  Peloponnesian  alliance 
and  Athens,  such  a  contingency  was  as  yet  uncertain — and  might 
possibly  never  occur  at  all,  if  Athens  dealt  justly,  and  consented  to 
conciliate  Corinth  on  this  critical  occasion.  But  it  would  assuredly 
occur  if  she  refused  such  conciliation,  and»the  dangers  thus  entailed 
upon  Athens  would  be  far  greater  than  the  promised  naval  co-opera- 
tion of  Korkyra  would  compensate. 

Such  was  the  substance  of  the  arguments  urged  by  the  contending 
envoys  before  the  Athenian  public  assembly,  in   this  momentous 


4SX    ATHENS  BEFORE  TIIK  PELOPO  fNESlAN  WAR. 

debate.  For  two  days  did  the  debate  continue,  the  assembly  being 
adjourned  over  to  the  morrow;  bo  considerable  was  the  number  of 
speakers,  and  probably  also  the  divergence  of  th<  ir  views.  Unluckily 
Thucydides  does  no1  give  us  any  of  these  Athenian  discourses — not 
!  \.mi  thai  of  Perikles,  who  determined  the  ultimate  result. 

lamnus  w  ith  its  disputed  question  of  metropolitan  righl  occu- 
pied little  the  attention  of  the  Athenian  assembly.     Butthe  Korky- 

naval  force  was  indeed  an  immense  it  m,  since  the  question  was 
whether  it  should  stand  on  their  side  in-  againsl  them — an  item  which 
nothing  could  counterbalance  excepl  the  dangers  of  a  Peloponnesian 
war.  "Let  us  avoid  this  last  calamity  (was  the  opinion  of  many) 
even  at  the  sacrifice  of  seeing  Korkyra  conquered,  and  all  her  ships 
and  seamen  in  the  sen  ice  of  the  Peloponnesian  league."  "  You  will 
nol  reallj  avoid  it.  even  by  thai  greal  sacrifice  (was  the  reply  of 
other-).  "The  generating  causes  of  war  are  at  work — and  it  will  infal- 
libly come  whatever  you  may  determine  respecting  Korkyra:  avail 
yourselves  of  the  present  opening,  instead  of  being  driven  ultimately 
to  undertake  the  war  at  great  comparative  disadvantage."  Of  these 
two  view-,  the  former  was  at  firsl  decidedly  preponderant  in  the 
assembly;  but  they  gradually  came  round  to  the  latter,  which  was 
conformably  to  the  steady  conviction  of  Perikles.  It  was  however 
resolved  to  take  a  sort  of  middle  course,  so  as  to  save  Korkyra,  and 
yet,  if  possible,  to  escape  \  iolation  of  the  existing  truce  and  the  con- 
sequent Peloponnesian  war.  To  comply  with  the  request  of  the 
Korkyraeans,  by  adopting  them  unreservedly  as  allies,  would  have 
laid  the  Athenians  under  the  necessity  of  accompanying  them  in  an 
attack  of  Corinth,  if  required— which  would  have  been  a  manifest 
nt  of  the  truce.  Accordingly  nothing  more  was  concluded 
than  an  alliance  for  purposes  strictly  defensive,  to  preserve  Korkyra 
and  her  possessions  in  ci  se  they  were  attacked:  nor  was  any  greater 
!  ce  i  quipped  to  back  this  resolve  than  a  squadron  of  ten  triremes, 
I.  cedaemonius  son  of  Kimon.  The  smallness  of  this  force 
would  satisfy  the  Corinthians  that  no  aggression  was  contemplated 

t  their  city,  while  it  would  save  Korkyra  from  ruin,  and  would 

'  iced   the  war   so  as  to  weaken   and  cripple  the  naval   force  of 

both  parties— -which  was  the  best  result  that  Athens  could  hope  for. 

The  instructions  to   Lacedaemonius  and  his  two  colleagues  were 

express:  not  to  engage  in  fight  with  the  Corinthians  unless  they  were 

actually  approaching  Korkyra  or  some  Korkyraean  possession  with  a 

iew  to  attack ;  but  in  that  case  to  do  his  b<  st  on  the  defensive. 

The  great  Corinthian  armament  of  150  sail  soon  took  its  departure 

from  the  Gulf,  and   reached  a   harbor  on  the  coast  of  Epirue  at  the 

(ape  called  Cheimerium,  nearly  opposite  to  the  southern  extremity 

i  f  Korkyra.     They  there  established  a  naval  station  and  camp,  sum- 

n. ening  to  their  aid  a  considerable  lone  from  the  friendly  Epirotic 

ribes  in  the  neighborhood.     The  Korkyraean  fleet  of  110  sail,  under 

Meikiadcs  and  two  others,  together  with  the  ten  Athenian  ships,  took 


NAVAL  COMBAT.  489 

station  at  one  of  the  adjoining  islands  called  Sybotha,  while  the  land 
force  and  1000  Zakynthian  hoplites  were  posted  on  the  Korkyrseaa 
Cape  Leukimme.  Both  sides  prepared  for  battle:  the  Corinthians, 
taking  on  board  three  days'  provisions,  sailed  by  night  from  Chei- 
merinm,  and  encountered  in  the  morning  the  Korkyraean  fleet  advanc- 
ing toward  them,  distributed  into  three  squadrons,  one  under  each 
of  the  three  generals,  and  having  the  ten  Athenian  ships  at  the 
extreme  right.  Opposed  to  them  were  ranged  the  choice  vessels  of 
the  Corinthians,  occupying  the  left  of  their  aggregate  fleet:  next 
came  the  various  allies,  with  Megarians  and  Ambrakiots  on  the 
extreme  right.  Never  before  had  two  such  numerous  fleets,  both 
Grecian,  engaged  in  battle.  But  the  tactics  and  maneuvering  were 
not  commensurate  to  the  numbers.  The  decks  were  crowded  with 
hoplites  and  bowmen,  while  the  rowers  below,  on  the  Korkyraean 
side  at  least,  were  in  great  part  slaves.  The  ships  on  both  sides, 
being  rowed  forward  so  as  to  drive  in  direct  impact  prow  against 
prow,  were  grappled  together,  and  a  fierce  hand-combat  was  then 
commenced  between  the  troops  on  board  of  each,  as  if  they  were  on 
land — or  rather,  like  boarding-parties:  all  upon  the  old-fashioned 
system  of  Grecian  sea-fight,  without  any  of  those  improvements  intro- 
duced into  the  Athenian  navy  during  the  last  generation.  In  Athe- 
nian naval  attack,  the  ship,  the  rowers,  and  the  steersman  were  of 
much  greater  importance  than  the  armed  soldiers  on  deck.  By 
strength  and  exactness  of  rowing,  by  rapid  and  sudden  change  of 
direction,  by  feints  calculated  to  deceive,  the  Athenian  captain  sought 
to  drive  the  sharp  beak  of  his  vessel,  not  against  the  prow,  but  against 
the  weaker  and  more  vulnerable  parts  of  his  enemy — side,  oars,  or 
stern.  The  ship  thus  became  in  the  hands  of  her  crew  the  real 
weapon  of  attack,  which  was  intended  first  to  disable  the  enemy  and 
leave  him  unmanageable  on  the  water;  and  not  until  this  was  done 
did  the  armed  men  on  deck  begin  their  operations.  Lacedaemonius 
with  his  ten  Athenian  ships,  though  forbidden  by  his  instructions  to 
share  in  the  battle,  lent  as  much  aid  as  he  could  by  taking  position 
at  the  extremity  of  the  line  and  by  making  motions  as  if  about  to 
attack;  while  his  seamen  had  full  leisure  to  contemplate  what  they 
would  despise  as  lubberly  handling  of  the  ships  on  both  sides.  All 
was  confusion  after  the  battle  had  been  joined.  The  ships  on  both 
sides  became  entangled,  the  oars  broken  and  unmanageable,  orders 
could  neither  be  heard  nor  obeyed,  and  the  individual  valor  of  the 
hoplites  and  bowmen  on  deck  became  the  decisive  point  on  which 
victory  turned. 

On  the  right  win?  of  the  Corinthians,  the  left  of  the  Korkyraean s 
was  victorious.  Their  twenty  ships  drove'back  the  Ambrakiot  allies 
of  Corinth,  and  not  only  pursued  them  to  the  shore,  but  also  landed 
and  plundered  the  tents.  Their  rashness  in  thus  keeping  so  long  out 
of  the  battle  proved  incalculably  mischievous,  the  rather  as  their  total 
number  was  inferior;  for  their  right  wing,  opposed  to  the  best  ships 


400    ATHENS  BEFORE  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR 

of  Corinth,  was  after  b  hard  struggle  thoroughly  beaten.  Many  of 
the  ships  were  disabled,  and  tin  real  obliged  to  retreat  as  they  could 
lc.ii  which  the  victorious  ships  on  the  other  wing  might  have 
.  ted,  had  there  been  any  effective  discipline  in  the  Sect,  but 
which  now  was  only  imperfectly  aided  by  the  ten  Athenian  ships 
under  Lacedsemonius.  Though  at  firsl  they  obeyed  the  instructions 
from  heme  in  abstaining  from  actual  blows,  yet — when  the  battle 
became  doubtful,  and  .-till  more,  when  the  Corinthians  were  pressing 
their  victory — the  Athenians  could  no  longer  keep  aloof,  but  attacked 
the  pursuers  in  good  earnest,  and  did  much  to  save  the  defeated 
Korkyrseans,  As  soon  as  the  latter  had  been  pursued  as  far  as  their 
own  island,  the  victorious  Corinthians  returned  to  the  scene  of  action, 
which  was  covered  with  crippled  and  water  Logged  ships,  of  their  own 
and  their  enemies,  as  well  as  with  seamen,  soldiers,  and  wounded 
men,  either  helpless  aboard  the  wrecks  or  keeping  above  water  as 
well  as  they  could — among  the  number,  many  of  their  own  citizens 
and  allies,  especially  on  their  defeated  right  wing.  Through  these 
disabled  vessels  they  sailed,  not  attempting  to  tow  them  off,  but 
looking  only  to  the  crews  aboard,  and  making  some  of  them  pris- 
oners, but  putting  the  greater  number  to  death.  Some  even  of  their 
own  allies  were  thus  slain,  not  being  easily  distinguishable.  The 
Corinthians,  having  picked  up  their  own  dead  bodies  as  well  as 
they  could,  transported  them  to  Bybota,  the  nearest  point  of  the  coast 
of  Bpirus;  after  which  they  again  mustered  their  fleet,  and  returned 
to  resume  the  attack  against  the  Korkyra?ans  on  their  own  coast. 
The  latter  got  together  as  many  of  their  ships  as  were  seaworthy, 
together  with  the  small  reserve  which  had  remained  in  harbor,  in 
order  to  prevent  at  any  rate  a  landing  on  the  coast:  and  the  Athe- 
nian ships,  now  within  the  strict  letter  of  their  instructions,  prepared 
to  co-operate  with  full  energy  in  the  defense.  It  was  already  late  in 
the  afternoon :  but  the  Corinthian  fleet,  though  their  paean  had  already 
been  shouted  for  attack,  were  suddenly  seen  to  back  water  instead  of 
advancing;  presently  they  pulled  round,  and  steered  direct  for  the 
Epirotic  coast.  The  Korkyrseans  did  not  comprehend  the  cause  of 
this  sudden  retreat,  until  at  length  it  was  proclaimed  that  an  unex- 
pected relief  of  twenty  fresh  Athenian  ships  was  approaching,  under 
Glaukon  and  Andokides;  which  the  Corinthians  had  been  the  firsl  to 
descry,  and  had  even  believed  to  be  the  forerunners  of  a  larger  Beet. 
It  was  already  dark  when  these  fresh  ships  reached  Cape  Leukimme, 
having  traversed  the  waters  covered  with  wrecks  and  dead  bodies. 
At  first  the  Korkyrseans  even  mistook  them  for  enemies.  The  re  en- 
forcement had  been  sent  from  Athens,  probably  after  more  accurate 
information  of  the  comparative  force  of  Corinth  and  Korkyra, 
under  the  impression  that  the  original  ten  ships  would  prove  inade- 
quate for  the  purpose  of  defense — an  impression  more  than  verified 
by  the  reality. 
Though  the  twenty  Athenian  ships  were  not,  as  the  Corinthians 


REINFORCEMENT  FROM  ATHENS.  491 

had  imagined,  the  precursors  of  a  larger  fleet,  they  were  found  suffi- 
cient to  change  completely  the  face  of  affairs.  In  the  preceding 
action  the  Korkyraeans  had  had  seventy  ships  sunk  or  disabled — the 
Corinthians  only  thirty — so  that  the  superiority  of  numbers  was  still 
on  the  side  of  the  latter,  who  were  however  encumbered  with  the 
care  of  1000  prisoners  (800  of  them  slaves)  captured,  not  easy  either 
to  lodge  or  to  guard  in  the  narrow  accommodations  of  an  ancient 
trireme.  Even  apart  from  this  embarrassment,  the  Corinthians  were 
in  no  temper  to  hazard  a  second  battle  against  thirty  Athenian  ships 
in  addition  to  the  remaining  Korkyraean.  And  when  their  enemies 
sai'ed  across  to  offer  them  battle  on  the  Epirotic  coast,  they  not  only 
refused  it,  but  thought  of  nothing  but  immediate  retreat — with  seri- 
ous alarm  lest  the  Athenians  should  now  act  aggressively,  treating  all 
amicable  relations  between  Athens  and  Corinth  as  practically  extin- 
guished by  the  events  of  the  day  before.  Having  ranged  their  fleet 
in  line  not  far  from  shore,  they  tested  the  dispositions  of  the  Athenian 
commanders  by  sending  forward  a  little  boat  with  a  few  men  to 
address  to  fLen"  the  following  remonstrance.  The  men  carried  no 
herald's  staff  (we  should  say,  no  flag  of  truce),  and  were  therefore 
completely  without  protection  against  an  enemy.  "  Ye  act  wrong- 
fully, Athenians  (they  exclaimed),  in  beginning  the  wTar  and  violating 
the  truce;  for  ye  are  using  arms  to  oppose  us  in  punishing  our 
enemies.  If  it  be  really  your  intention  to  hinder  us  from  sailing 
against  Korkyra  or  anywhere  else  that  we  choose,  in  breach  of  the 
truce,  take  first  of  all  us  who  nov?  address  you,  and  deal  with  us  as 
enemies."  It  was  not  the  fault  of  ths  Korkyraeans  that  this  last  idea 
was  not  instantly  realized:  for  such  of  them  as  wrere  near  enough  to 
hear,  instigated  the  Athenians  by  violsnt.  shouts  to  kill  the  men  in 
the  boat.  But  the  latter,  far  from  listening  to  such  an  appeal,  dis- 
missed them  with  the  answer:  "  We  neithe-  begic  the  war  nor  break 
the  truce,  Peloponnesians;  we  have  come  simply  to  aid  these  Korky- 
raeans our  allies.  If  ye  wish  to  sail  anywhere  else,  we  make  no  oppo- 
sition :  but  if  ye  are  about  to  sail  against  Korkyra  or  any  of  her  posses- 
sions, we  shall  use  our  best  means  to  prevent  you."  Both  the 
answer,  and  the  treatment  of  the  men  in  the  boat,  satisfied  the 
Corinthians  that  their  retreat  would  be  unopposed,  and  they  accord- 
ingly commenced  it  as  soon  as  they  could  get  ready,  staying  however 
to  erect  a  trophy  at  Sybota  on  the  Epirotic  coast,  in  commemoration 
of  their  advantage  on  the  preceding  day.  In  their  voyage  home- 
ward they  surprised  Auaktorium  at  the  mouth  of  the  Ambrakiotic 
Gulf,  which  they  had  hitherto  possessed  jointly  with  the  Korkyraeans, 
planting  in  it  a  re-enforcement  of  Corinthian  settlers  as  guarantee  foi 
future  fidelity.  On  reaching  Corinth,  the  armament  was  dismissed, 
and  the  great  majority  of  the  prisoners  taken,  800  slaves,  were  sold; 
but  the  remainder,  250  in  number,  were  detained,  and  treated  with 
peculiar  kindness.  Many  of  them  were  of  the  first  and  richest 
families  in  Korkyra,  and  the  Corinthians  designed  to  gain  them  over, 


402    ATHENS  BEFORE  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR 

■  i  make  them  instruments  for  effecting  b  revolution  in  the 
island.  The  calamitous  incidents  arising  from  their  subsequent 
return  will  appear  in  another  chapter. 

Relieved  now  from  all  danger,  the  Korkyraeans  picked  up  the  dead 

and  the  wrecks  which  had  Boated  during  the  nigbl  on  to  their 

island,  and  even  found  sufflcienl   pretense  to  erect  a  trophy,  chiefly 

in  consequence  of  their  partial  Buccess  on  the  left  wing.     In  truth, 

they  had  Inch  only  rescued  from  ruin  by  the  unexpected  coming  of 

the   lasl    Athenian    ships:   but    the   last    result   was    as  triumphant    to 

them,  as  it  was  disastrous  and  humiliating  to  the  Corinthians,  who 
had  incurred  an  immense  cost,  ami  taxed  all  their  v  illing  allies,  only 
to  leave  their  enemy  stronger  than  she  was  before.  From  this  time 
forward  they  considered  the  Thirty  year-'  truce  as  broken,  and  eon 
ceived  a  hatred,  alike  deadly  and  undisguised,  against  Athens;  BO 
that  the  latter  gained  nothing  by  the  moderation  of  ber  admiral-  in 
sparing  the  Corinthian  fleet  oil'  the  roast  of  Epirus.  An  opportunity 
was  not  long  wanting  for  the  Corinthians  to  strike  a  blow  at  their 
enemy  through  one  01  her  wide-spread  dependencies. 

On  the  isthmus  of  thai  lesser  peninsula  called  Pallene  (which  forms 
the  westernmost  of  the  three  prongs  of  the  greater  Thracian  peninsula 
called  Chalkidike,  between  the  Thermaic  and  the  StrymoniC  Gulfs), 
was  situated  the  Dorian  town  of  Potidaea,  one  of  the  tributary  allies 
of  Athens,  but  originally  colonized  from  Corinth  and  still  maintain- 
ing a  certain  metropolitan  allegiance  toward  the  latter:  insomuch 
that  every  year  certain  Corinthians  were  sent  thither  as  magis- 
trates under  the  title  of  Epidemiurgi.  On  various  points  of  thei 
boring  coast  also  there  were  several  small  towns  belonging  to  the 
Chalkidians  and  Bottiseans,  enrolled  in  like  manner  in  the  list  of 
Athenian  tributaries.  The  neighboring  inland  territory,  Mygdonia 
and  Chalkidike,  was  held  by  the  Macedonian  king  Perdikkas,  son  of 
that  Alexanderwho  had  taken  part  fifty  years  before  in  the  expedi- 
tion of  Xerxes.  These  two  princes  appear  gradually  to  have  ex- 
tended their  dominions,  after  the  ruin  of  Persian  power  in  Thrace  by 
the  exertions  of  Alliens,  until  at  length  they  acquired  all  the  territory 
between  the  rivers  Axius  and  Sirymon.  Now  IVrdikkas  had  been 
for  some  time  the  friend   and  ally  of  Athens;  but   there  W(  re  other 

Macedonian  princes,  his  brother  Philip,  and  Derdas,  holding  inde- 
pendent principalities  in  the  upper  country  (apparently  on  the  higher 

course  Of  the  Axius  near  the  I'.-eonian  tribes),  with  whom  he  was  in  a 
state  of  dispute.  These  princes  having  been  accepted  as  the  allies  of 
Athens,  Perdikkas  from  that  time  became  her  active  enemy;  and  it 
was  fro  ii  I  is  intrigues  that  all  the  difficulties  of  At  liens  on  that  coast 
took  their  first  origin.  The  Athenian  empire  was  much  les-  complete 
and  secure  over  the  sea-ports  on  the  mainland  than  over  the  islands. 
For  the  former  were  always  more  or  Irs-  dependent  on  any  powerful 
land  neighbor,  sometimes  more  dependent  on  him  than  upon  the  mis- 
tress of  the  sea;  and  we  shall  find  Athens  herself  cultivating  assidu- 


REVOLT  OF  POTID.EA.  493 

ously  the  favor  of  Sitalkes  and  other  strong  Thracian  potentates,  as 
an  aid  to  her  dominion  over  the  sea-ports.  Perdikkas  immediately 
began  to  ineite  and  aid  the  Chalkidians  and  Bottiseans  to  revolt  from 
Athens;  and  the  violent  enmity  against  the  latter,  kindled  in  the 
bosoms  of  the  Corinthians  by  the  recent  events  at  Korkyra,  enabled 
him  to  extend  the  same  projects  to  Potidaea.  Not  only  did  he  send 
envoys  to  Corinth  in  order  to  concert  measures  for  provoking  the 
revolt  of  Potidaea,  but  also  to  Sparta,  instigating  the  Peloponnesian 
league  to  a  general  declaration  of  war  against  Athens.  And  he  fur- 
ther prevailed  on  many  of  the  Chalkidian  inhabitants  to  abandon 
their  separate  small  towns  on  the  sea-coast,  for  the  purpose  of  joint 
residence  at  Olynthus,  which  was  several  stadia  from  the  sea.  Thus 
that  town,  as  well  as  the  Chalkidian  interest,  became  much  strength- 
ened, while  Perdikkas  further  assigned  some  territory  near  Lake 
Bolbe  to  contribute  to  the  temporary  maintenance  of  the  concen- 
trated population. 

The  Athenians  were  not  ignorant  both  of  his  hostile  preparations 
and  of  the  dangers  which  awaited  them  from  Corinth.  Immediately 
after  the  Korkyraean  sea-fight  they  sent  to  take  precautions  against 
the  revolt  of  Potidaea;  requiring  the  inhabitants  to  take  down  their 
wall  on  the  side  of  Pallene,  so  as  to  leave  the  town  open  on  the  side 
of  the  peninsula,  or  on  what  may  be  called  the  sea  side,  and  fortified 
only  toward  the  mainland — requiring  them  further  both  to  deliver 
hostages  and  to  dismiss  the  annual  magistrates  who  came  to  them 
from  Corinth.  An  Athenian  armament  of  thirty  triremes  and  1000 
hoplites,  under  Archestratus  and  ten  others,  dispatched  to  act  against 
Perdikkas  in  the  Thermaic  Gulf,  was  directed  at  the  same  time  to 
enforce  these  requisitions  against  Potidaea,  and  to  repress  any  dispo- 
sitions to  revolt  among  the  neighboring  Chalkidians.  Immediately 
»n  receiving  the  requisitions,  the  Potidaeans  sent  envoys  both  to  Ath- 
ens, for  the  purpose  of  evading  and  gaining  time,  and  to  Sparta,  in 
conjunction  with  Corinth,  in  order  to  determine  a  Lacedaemonian 
invasion  of  Attica,  in  the  event  of  Potidaea  being  attacked  by  Athens. 
From  the  Spartan  authorities  they  obtained  a  distinct  affirmative 
promise,  in  spite  of  the  Thirty  years'  truce  still  subsisting.  At  Ath- 
ens they  had  no  success,  and  they  accordingly  openly  revolted  (seem- 
ingly about  Midsummer  432  B.C.),  at  the  same  time  that  the  arma- 
ment under  Archestratus  sailed.  The  Chalkidians  and  Bottiaeans 
revolted  also,  at  the  express  instigation  of  Corinth,  accompanied  by 
solemn  oaths  and  promises  of  assistance.  Archestratus,  with  his  fleet, 
on  reaching  the  Thermaic  Gulf,  found  them  all  in  proclaimed  enmity  j 
but  was  obliged  to  confine  himself  to  the  attack  of  Perdikkas  in 
Macedonia,  not  having  numbers  enough  t'o  admit  of  a  division  of  his 
force.  He  accordingly  laid  siege  to  Therma,  in  co-operation  with  the 
Macedonian  troops  from  the  upper  country  under  Philip  and  the 
brothers  of  Derdas;  after  taking  that  place,  he  next  proceeded  to 
besiege  Pydna.     But  it  would  probably  have  been  wiser  had  he 


494    ATHENS  BEFORE  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR 

turned  ltis  whole  force  instantly  to  the  blockade  of  Potidaea;  for  dur- 
ing the  period  of  more  thaD  six  wi  eks  thai  he  spenl  in  the  operation! 
againsl  Therma,  the  Corinthians  conveyed  to  Potidaea  a  re-enforce- 
600  hoplites  and  ion  light-armed,  partly  their  own  citizens, 
partly  Peloponnesians  hired  for  the  occasion,  under  Aristeus  son  of 
Adeimantus,  a  man  of  Buch  eminenl  popularity,  both  al  Corinth  and 
:■  Potidaea,  thai  mosl  of  the  soldiers  volunteered  on  bis  personal 
i  ccount.  Potidaea  was  thus  pu1  in  a  state  of  complete  defense  shortly 
after  the  news  of  its  revolt  reached  Athens,  and  long  before  any  sec- 
ond armamenl  could  be  senl  to  attack  it.  A  second  armament,  how- 
ever, was  speedily  sent  forth — -10  triremes  ami  2,000  Athenian  hop- 
lites under  Knl1  ias,  son  of  Kalliades,  with  four  other  commanders — 
who,  on  reaching  the  Thermaic  Gulf,  joined  the  former  body  at  the 

■  f  Pydna,  After  prosecuting  the  siege  in  vain  for  a  short  time, 
they  found  themselves  obliged  to  patch  up  an  accommodation  <>n 
the*  best  terms  they  could  with  l'erdikkas,  from  the  necessity  of 
commencing  immediate  operations  against  Aristeus  and  Potidaea. 
i  l,i  y  then  quitted  Macedonia,  first  crossing  by  sea  from  Pydna  to  the 

o  coast  of  the  Thermaic  Gulf — next  attacking,  though  without 
effect,  the  town  of  Bcrcea — and  then  marching  by  land  along  the 
eastern  coasl  of  the  gulf,  in  the  direction  of  Potidaea.  On  the  third 
day  of  easy  march,  the  reached  the  sea-port  called  Gigonus,  near 
v.  hieh  they  encamped. 

In  spite  of  the  convention  concluded  at  Pydna,  Perdikkas,  whose 
character  for  faithlessness  we  shall  have  more  than  one  occasion  to 
notice,  was  now  again  on  the  side  of  the  Chalkidians,  and  sent  200 
horse  to  join  them  under  the  command  of  Iolaus.  Aristeus  posted 
hi-  Corinthians  and  Potidseans  on  the  isthmus  near  Potida-a,  provid- 
ing a  market  without  the  walls  in  order  thai  they  might  not  stray  in 
quest  of  provisions.  His  position  was  on  the  side  toward  Olynthus — 
which  was  about  seven  miles  off,  but  within  sight,  and  in  a  lofty  and 
Conspicuous  situation.  He  here  awaited  the  approach  of  the  Atheni- 
ans, calculating  that  the  Chalkidians  from  Olynthus  would,  upon  the 
hoisting  of  a  given  signal,  assail  them  in  the  rear  when  they  attacked 
him.  But  Kallias  was  strong  enough  to  place  in  reserve  his  Macedo- 
nian cavalry  and  other  allies  as  a  check  against  Olynthus;  while  with 
his  Athenians  and  the  main  force  he  marched  to  the  isthmus  and  took 
ion  in  front  of  Aristeus.  In  the  battle  which  ensued,  Aristeus 
and  the  chosen  band  of  Corinthians  immediately  about  him  were 
completely  successful,  breaking  the  troops  opposed  to  them,  and  pur- 
suing for  a  considerable  distance.  But  the  remaining  Potidseans  and 
Peloponnesians  were  routed  by  the  Athenians  and  driven  within  the 
On  returning  from  pursuit,  Aristeus  found  the  victorious 
Athenians  between  him  and  Potidaea,  and  was  reduced  to  the  alter 
native  either  of  cutting  his  way  through  them  into  the  latter  town,  or 
(if  making  a  retreating  march  to  Olynthus.  He  chose  the  former  as 
the  least  of  two  hazards,  and  forced  his  way  through  the  flank  of  the 


POTID^A  BLOCKADED  BY  ATHENIANS.         495 

Athenians,  wading  into  the  sea  in  order  to  turn  the  extremity  of  the 
Potidsean  wall,  which  reached  entirely  across  the  isthmus  with  a 
mole  running  out  at  each  end  into  the  water.  He  effected  this  daring 
enterprise  and  saved  his  detachment,  though  not  without  considerable 
difficulty  and  some  loss.  Meanwhile  the  auxiliaries  from  Olynthus, 
though  they  had  begun  their  inarch  on  seeing  the  concerted  signal, 
had  been  kept  in  check  by  the  Macedonian  horse,  so  that  the  Potid- 
aeans  had  been  beaten  and  the  signal  again  withdrawn,  before  they 
could  make  any  effective  diversion:  nor  did  the  cavalry  on  either 
side  come  into  action.  The  defeated  Potidseans  and  Corinthians, 
having  the  town  immediately  in  their  rear,  lost  only  300  men,  while 
the  Athenians  lost  150,  together  with  the  general  Kallias. 

The  victory  was  however  quite  complete,  and  the  Athenians,  after 
having  erected  their  trophy  and  given  up  the  enemy's  dead  for  burial, 
immediately  built  their  blockading  wall  across  the  isthmus  on  the 
side  of  the  mainland,  so  as  to  cut  off  Potidaea  from  all  communica- 
tion with  Olynthus  and  the  Chalkidians.  To  make  the  blockade 
complete,  a  second  wall  across  the  isthmus  was  necessary,  on  the 
other  side  toward  Pallene:  but  they  had  not  force  enough  to  detach 
a  completely  separate  body  for  this  purpose,  until  after  some  time 
they  were  joined  by  Phormio  with  1600  fresh  hoplites  from  Athens. 
That  general,  landing  at  Aphytis  in  the  peninsula  of  Pallene,  marched 
slowly  up  to  Potidaea,  ravaging  the  territory  in  order  to  draw  out  the 
citizens  to  battle.  But  the  challenge  not  being  accepted,  he  under- 
took and  finished  without  obstruction  the  blockading  wall  on  the  side 
of  Pallene,  so  that  the  town  was  now  completely  inclosed  and  the 
harbor  watched  by  the  Athenian  fleet.  The  wall  once  finished,  a 
portion  of  the  force  sufficed  to  guard  it,  leaving  Phormio  at  liberty 
to  undertake  aggressive  operations  against  the  Chalkidic  and  Botti- 
aean  townships.  The  capture  of  Potidaea  being  now  only  a  question 
of  more  or  less  time,  Aristeus,  in  order  that  the  provisions  might  last 
longer,  proposed  to  the  citizens  to  choose  a  favorable  wind,  get  on 
shipboard,  and  break  out  suddenly  from  the  harbor,  taking  their 
chance  of  eluding  the  Athenian  fleet,  and  leaving  only  500  defenders 
behind.  Though  he  offered  himself  to  be  among  those  left,  he  could 
not  determine  the  citizens  to  so  bold  an  enterprise,  and  therefore  sal- 
lied forth,  in  the  way  proposed,  with  a  small  detachment,  in  order  to 
try  and  procure  relief  from  without — especially  some  aid  or  diversion 
from  Peloponnesus.  But  he  was  able  to  accomplish  nothing  beyond 
some  partial  warlike  operations  among  the  Chalkidians,  and  a  suc- 
cessful ambuscade  against  the  citizens  of  Sermylus,  which  did  noth- 
ing for  the  relief  of  the  blockaded  town.  It  had  however  been  so 
well  provisioned  that  it  held  out  for  two  whole  years — a  period  full 
of  important  events  elsewhere. 

From  these  two  contests  between  Athens  and  Corinth,  first  indi- 
rectly at  Korkyra,  next  distinctly  and  avowedly  at  Potidaea,  sprang 
those  important  movements  in  the  Lacedaemonian  alliance  which  will 
be  recounted  in  the  next  chapter. 


496      BEGINNING  OF  THE  PELOPONNKSLAX  WAR 


CHAPTER  XLVIII. 

FROM  THE  BLOCKADE   OF  FOTID.KA    DOWN   TO   THE   END  OF  THE 
FIRST   YEAR  OF  THE   PELOPOXNEM  AN    WAR. 

Even  before  the  recent  hostilities  at  Korkyra  and  Potidaea,  it  had 
been  evident  to  reflecting  Greeks  that  prolonged  observance  <>('  the 
Thirty  years'  mice  was  becoming  uncertain,  and  Unit  the  mingled 
hatred,  fear,  and  admiration  which  Athens  inspired  throughout  Greece 
would  prompt  Sparta  and  the  Spartan  confederacy  to  seize  any 
favorable  opening  for  breaking  down  the  Athenian  power.  That 
such  was  the  disposition  of  Sparta  was  well  understood  among  the 
Athenian  allies,  however  considerations  of  prudence,  and  general 
slowness  in  resolving,  might  postpone  the  moment  of  carrying  it  into 
effect.  Accordingly  not  only  the  Samians  when  they  revolted  had 
applied  to  the  Spartan  confederacy  for  aid,  which  they  appear  to 
have  been  prevented  from  obtaining  chiefly  by  the  pacific  interests 
then  animating  the  Corinthians,  but  also  the  Lesbians  had  endeav- 
ored to  open  negotiations  with  Sparta  for  a  similar  purpose,  though 
the  authorities  to  whom  alone  the  proposition  could  have  been  com- 
municated, since  it  long  remained  secret  and  was  never  executed, 
had  given  them  no  encouragement. 

The  affairs  of  Athens  had" been  administered,  under  the  ascendency 
of  Perikles,  without  any  view  to  extension  of  empire  or  encroach- 
ment upon  others,  though  with  constant  reference  to  the  probabili- 
ties of  war,  and  with  anxiety  to  keep  the  city  in  a  condition  to  meet 
it.  But  even  the  splendid  internal  ornaments,  which  Athens  at  thai 
time  acquired,  were  probably  not  without  their  effect  in  provoking 
jealousy  on  the  part  of  other  Greeks  as  to  her  ultimate  views. 

The  only  known  incident,  wherein  Athens  had  been  brought  into 
collision  with  a  member  of  the  Spartan  confederacy  prior  to  the 
Korkyrsean  dispute,  was  her  decree  passed  in  regard  to  Megara— 
prohibiting  the  Magarians,  on  pain  of  death,  from  all  trade  or  inter- 
course as  well  with  Athens  as  with  all  ports  within  the  Athenian  em- 
pire. This  prohibition  was  grounded  on  the  alleged  fact  that  the 
Megarians  had  harbored  runaway  slaves  from  Athens,  and  had  ap- 
propriated and  cultivated  portions  of  land  upon  her  border;  partly 
land,  the  property  of  the  goddesses  of  Eleusis,  partly  a  strip  of  ter- 
ritory disputed  between  the  two  states,  and  therefore  left  by  mutual 
understanding  in  common  pasture  without  any  permanent  inclosure. 
In  reference  to  this  latter  point,  the  Athenian  herald  Anthemokritus 
had  been  sent  to  Megara  to  remonstrate,  but  had  been  so  rudely  dealt 
with,  that  his  death  shortly  afterward  was  imputed  to  the  Mega- 
rians.  We  may  reasonably  suppose  that  ever  since  the  revolt  of  Me- 
gara fourteen  years  before — which  caused  to  Athens  an  irreparable 


WARLIKE  SENTIMENTS  OF  THE  CORINTHIANS.     497 

mischief — the  feeling  prevalent  between  the  two  cities  had  been  one 
of  bitter  enmity,  manifesting  itself  in  many  ways,  but  so  much  exas- 
perated by  recent  events  as  to  provoke  Athens  to  a  signal  revenge. 
Exclusion  from  Athens  and  all  the  ports  in  her  empire,  comprising 
nearly  every  island  and  seaport  iu  the  ^Egean,  was  so  ruinous  to  the 
Megarians,  that  they  loudly  complained  of  it  at  Sparta,  representing 
it  as  an  infraction  of  the  Thirty  years'  truce;  though  it  was  undoubt- 
edly within  the  legitimate  right  of  Athens  to  enforce,  and  was  even 
less  harsh  than  the  systematic  expulsion  of  foreigners  by  Sparta,  with 
which  Perikles  compared  it. 

These  complaints  found  increased  attention  after  the  war  of  Kor- 
kyra  and  the  blockade  of  Potidsea  by  the  Athenians.  The  sentiments 
of  the  Corinthians  toward  Athens  had  now  become  angry  and  war- 
like in  the  highest  degree.  It  was  not  simply  resentment  for  the  past 
which  animated  them,  but  also  the  anxiety  further  to  bring  upon 
Athens  so  strong  a  hostile  pressure  as  should  preserve  Potidaea  and 
its  garrison  from  capture.  Accordingly  they  lost  no  time  in  endeav- 
oring to  rouse  the  feelings  of  the  Spartans  against  Athens,  and  in  in- 
ducing them  to  invite  to  Sparta  all  such  of  the  confederates  as  had 
any  grievances  against  that  city.  Not  merely  the  Megarians,  but 
several  other  confederates,  came  thither  as  accusers ;  while  the  fflg\. 
netans,  though  their  insular  position  made  it  perilous  for  them  to  ap- 
pear, made  themselves  vehemently  heard  through  the  mouths  of 
others,  complaining  that  Athens  withheld  from  them  the  autonomy 
to  which  they  were  entitled  under  the  truce. 

According  to  the  Lacedaemonian  practice,  it  was  necessary  first 
that  the  Spartans  themselves,  apart  from  their  allies,  should  decide 
whether  there  existed  a  sufficient  case  of  wrong  done  by  Athens 
against  themselves  or  against  Peloponnesus — either  in  violation  of 
the  Thirty  years'  truce,  or  in  any  other  way.  If  the  determination 
of  Sparta  herself  were  in  the  negative,  the  case  would  never  even  be 
submitted  to  the  vote  of  the  allies.  But  if  it  were  in  the  affirmative, 
then  the  latter  would  be  convoked  to  deliver  their  opinion  also:  and 
assuming  that  the  majority  of  votes  coincided  with  the  previous  de- 
cision of  Sparta,  the  entire  confederacy  stood  then  pledged  to  the 
given  line  of  policy — if  the  majority  was  contrary,  the  Spartans 
would  stand  alone,  or  with  such  only  of  the  confederates  as  con- 
curred. Each  allied  city,  great  or  small,  had  an  equal  right  of  suf- 
frage. It  thus  appears  that  Sparta  herself  did  not  vote  as  a  member 
of  the  confederacy,  but  separately  and  individually  as  leader,  anil 
that  the  only  question  ever  submitted  to  the  allies  was  whether  they 
would  or  would  not  go  along  with  her  previous  decision.  Such  was 
the  course  of  proceeding  now  followed.  The  Corinthians,  together 
witii  such  other  of  the  confederates  as  felt  either  aggrieved  or  alarmed 
by  Athens,  presented  themselves  before  the  public  assembly  of  Spar- 
tan citizens,  prepared  to  prove  that  the  Athenians  had  broken  the 
truce  and  were  going  on  in  a  course  of  wrong  toward  Peloponnesus. 


498     BEGINNING  OF  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR 

in  the  oligarchy  of  Sparta,  such  a  question  us  this  could  only 
In  ill  cided  by  a  g<  aeral  assembly  of  Spartan  ckiz<  ds,  qualified  both 
by  age,  by  regular  contribution  i<>  the  public  mess,  and  by  obedience 
Ipline.  To  the  assembly  so  constituted,  the  deputies 
of  the  various  allied  cities  addressed  themselves,  each  Betting  forth 
his  case  against  Athens.  The  Corinthians  chose  to  reserve  them- 
selves to  the  last,  after  the  assembly  hud  been  inflamed  by  the  pn  vi 
mi-  Bpeak 

Oi  this  importanl  assembly,  on  which  so  much  of  the  future  fate 
of  Greece  turned,  Thucydides  has  preserved  an  accounl  unusually 
copious.  First,  the  speech  delivered  by  the  Corinthian  envoys. 
Next,  thai  of  some  Athenian  envoys,  who  happening  to  be  at  the 
same  time  in  Sparta  on  some  other  matters,  and  bi  ing  present  in  the 
assembly  so  as  i<>  have  heard  the  9pe<  ches  both  of  the  Corinthians  and 
of  the  other  complainants,  obtained  permission  from  the-  magistrates 
to  address  the  assembly  in  their  turn.  Thirdly,  the  address  of  the 
Spartan  king  Archidamus,  on  the  course  of  policj  proper  to  he 
adopted  by  bparta.     Lastly,  the  brief,  bul  eminently  characteristic, 

s  of  the  Ephor  Sthenelaidas,  on  putting  the  question  for  decis- 
ion. These  speeches,  the  composition  of  Thucydides  himself,  con- 
tain substantially  the  sentiments  of  the  parties  to  whom  they  are 
ascribed.     Neither  of  them   is  distinctly  a  reply  to  that  which  has 

led,  but  each  presents  the  situation  of  affairs  from  a  different 

point  of  view. 

The  Corinthians  knew  well  that  the  audience  whom  they  were 
about  to  address  had  been  favorably  prepared  for  them — for  the 
Lacedaemonian  authorities  had  already  given  an  actual  promise,  to 
them  and  to  the  Potidaeans  ai  the  momenl  before  Potidaea  revolted, 

thai  they  would  invade  Attica.  Great  was  the  revululion  in  senti- 
ment of  the  Spartans,  since  they  had  declined  lending  aid  to  the  much 
more  powerful  island  of  Lesbos  when  it  proposed  to  revolt— a  revolu- 
tion occasioned  by  the  altered  interests  and  sentiments  of  Corinth. 
Nevertheless,  the  Corinthians  also  knew  that  their  positive  grounds 
of  complaint  against  Athens,  in  respect  of  wrong  or  violation  of  the 
existing  truce,  were  both  few  and  feeble.  Neither  in  the  dispute 
about  Potidaea  nor  about  Korkyra  had  Athens  infringed  the  truce 
or  wronged  the  Peloponnesian  alliance.  In  both  she  had  come  into 
collision  with  Corinth,  singly  and  apart  from  the  confederacy.  She 
had  a  right,  both  according  to  the  truce  and  according  to  the  received 
maxim  -  ol  international  law  .to  lend  defensive  aid  to  the  Korkyraeans, 
at  their  own  request :  she  had  a  righl  also,  according  to  the  principles 
laid  down  by  the  Corinthians  themselves,  on  occasion  of  therevoll  of 
Samos,  to  restrain  the  Potidaeans  from  revolting.  She  had  committed 
nothing  which  could  fairly  he  called  an  aggression.  Indeed  the 
aggression  both  in  the  >■■■*■■'■  of  Potidaea  and  that  of  Korkyra  was 
decidedly  on  the  side  of  the  Corinthians:  and  the  Peloponnesian  con- 
federacy could  only  be  so  fur  implicuted  as  it  was  understood  to  be 


ATHENS  IN   THE  RIGHT.  499 

bound  to  espouse  the  separate  quarrels,  right  or  wrong,  of  Corinth. 
All  this  was  well  known  to  the  Corinthian  envoys;  and  accordingly  we 
riud  that  in  their  speech  at  Sparta  they  touch  but  lightly  and  in  vague 
terms  on  positive  or  recent  wrongs.  Even  that  which  they  do  say 
completely  justifies  the  proceedings  of  Athens  about  the  affair  of 
Korkyra,  since  they  confess  without  hesitation  the  design  of  seizing 
the  large  Korkyraean  navy  for  the  use  of  the  Peloponuesian  alliance: 
while  in  respect  of  Potidaea,  if  we  had  only  the  speech  of  the  Corin- 
thian envoy  before  us  without  any  other  knowledge,  we  should  have 
supposed  it  to  be  an  independent  state,  not  connected  by  any  perma- 
nent bonds  with  Athens — we  should  have  supposed  that  the  siege  of 
Pot  Ldsea  by  Athens  was  an  unprovoked  aggression  upon  an  autono- 
mous ally  of  Corinth — we  should  never  have  imagined  that  Corinth 
had  deliberately  instigated  and  aided  the  revolt  of  the  Chalkidians  as 
well  as  of  the  Potidseans  against  Athens.  It  might  be  pretended  that 
she  had  a  right  to  do  this,  by  virtue  of  her  undefined  metropolitan 
relations  with  Potidaea.  But  at  any  rate  the  incident  was  not  such 
as  to  afford  any  decent  pretext  for  charge  against  the  Athenians 
either  of  outrage  toward  Corinth,  or  of  wrongful  aggression  against 
the  Peloponuesian  confederacy. 

To  dwrell  much  upon  specific  allegations  of  wrong,  wTould  not  have 
suited  the  purpose  of  the  Corinthian  envoy;  for  against  such  the 
Thirty  years'  truce  expressly  provided  that  recourse  should  be  had  to 
amicable  arbitration — to  which  recourse  he  never  once  alludes.  He 
knew  that  as  between  Corinth  and  Athens,  war  had  already  begun 
at  Potidaea;  and  his  business,  throughout  nearly  all  of  a  very  em- 
phatic speech  is  to  show  that  the  Peloponnesiau  confederacy,  and 
especially  Sparta,  is  bound  to  take  instant  part  in  it,  not  less  by 
prudence  than  by  duty.  He  employs  the  most  animated  language  to 
depict  the  ambition,  the  unwearied  activity,  the  personal  effort  abroad 
as  well  as  at  home,  the  quick  resolves,  the  sanguine  hopes  never 
dashed  by  failure — of  Athens:  as  contrasted  with  the  cautious,  home- 
keeping,  indolent,  scrupulous  routine  of  Sparta.  He  reproaches  the 
Spartans  with  their  backwardness  and  timidity,  in  not  having  repressed 
the  growth  of  Athens  before  she  readied  this  formidable  height: 
especially  in  having  allowed  her  to  fortify  her  city  after  the  retreat  of 
Xerxes  and  afterward  to  build  the  long  walls  from  the  city  to  the  sea. 
The  Spartans  (he  observes)  stood  alone  among  all  Greeks  in  the  nota- 
ble system  of  keeping  down  an  enemy  not  by  acting,  but  by  delaying 
to  act — not  arresting  his  growth,  but  putting  him  down  when  his 
force  was  doubled.  Falsely  indeed  had  they  acquired  the  reputation 
of  being  sure,  when  they  were  in  reality  merely  slow.  In  resisting 
Xerxes,  as  in  resisting  Athens,  they  had  always  been  behind-hand, 
disappointing  and  leaving  their  friends  to  ruin;  while  both  these 
enemies  had  only  failed  of  complete  success  through  their  own  mis- 
takes. 

After  half  apologizing  for  the  tartness  of  these  reproofs — which, 


500     BEGINNING  OF  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR. 

however,  as  the  Spartans  were  now  well-disposi  d  to  go  to  war  forth- 
with, would  be  well  timed  and  even  agreeable—  the  Corinthian  orator 
vindicates  the  necessity  of  plain  speaking  bj  the  urgent  peril  of  the 
encj  and  the  fornfidable  character  of  the  enemy  who  threat- 
ened them.  "  You  do  nol  refled  (he  says)  boM  thoroughly  different 
the  Athenians  are  from  yourselves.  ZT^yare  innovators  by  nature, 
sharp  both  mi  devising,  and  in  executing  what  they  have  determined: 
you  arc  sharp  only  in  keeping  what  you  have  got,  in  determining  on 
nothing  beyond,  and  in  doing  even  less  than  absolute  necessity 
requires.  They  again  dare  beyond  their  means,  run  risks  beyond 
their  own  judgment,  and  Keep  alive  their  hopes  iu  desperate  circum- 
stances: your  peculiarity  is  that  your  performance  comes  short  of 
your  power — you  have  no  faith  even  in  what  your  judgment  guar- 
-when  in  difficulties,  you  despair  of  all  escape.  They  n<  vex 
hang  back — you  are  habitual  laggards:  they  love  foreign  service — 
you  cannot  Stir  from  home:  for  they  are  always  under  the  belief  that 
their  movements  will  lead  to  some  farther  gain,  while  you  fancy  thai 
new  products  will  endanger  what,  you  already  have.  When  success 
fill,  tiny  make  the  greatest  forward  march;  when  defeated  they  fall 
back  the  least.  Moreover  they  task  their  bodies  on  behalf  of  their 
city  as  if  tiny  were  the  bodies  of  others — while  their  minds  are  mosl 
of  all  their  own,  for  exertion  in  her  services.  When  their  plans  for 
acquisition  do  not  come  successfully  out,  they  feel  like  men  robbed 
of  what  belongs  to  them:  yet  the  acquisitions  when  realized  appear 
like  trifles  compared  with  what  remains  to  be  acquired.  If  they 
sometimes  fail  in  an  attempt,  new  hopes  arise  in  some  other  direction 
to  supply  the  want  :  for  with  them  alone  the  possession  and  the  hope 
of  what  they  aim  al  is  almost  simultaneous,  from  t  heir  habit  of  quickly 
executing  all  thai  they  have  once  resolved.  And  in  this  manner  do 
they  toil  throughout  all  their  lives  amidst  hardship  and  peril,  disre- 
garding present  enjoyment  in  the  continual  thirst  for  increase — 
knowing  no  other  festival  recreation  except  the  performance  of 
active  duty — and  deeming  inactive  repose  a  worse  condition  than 
fatiguing  occupation.  To  speak  the  truth  in  two  words,  such  is 
their  inborn  temper,  that  they  will  neither  remain  at  rest  themselves, 
nor  allow  resl  to  others. 

"Such  is  the  city  which  stands  opposed  to  you,  Lacedaemonians — 

yel   ye  still  hang  back  from  action Tour  continual  scruples 

and  apathy  would  hardly  be  safe,  even  if  ye  had  neighbors  like 
yourselves  in  character:  but,  as  to  dealings  with  Athens,  your  system 
is  antiquated  and  out  of  date.  In  politics  as  in  art,  it  is  the  modern 
improvements  which  are  sure  to  come  out  victorious:  and  though 
unchanged  institutions  are  best,  if  a  city  be  not  called  upon  to  act — 
yel  multiplicity  of  active  obligations  requires  multiplicity  and 
uovelty  of  contrivance.  It  is  through  these  numerous  trials  that  the 
means  of  Athens  have  acquired  so  much  more  uew  development 
than  yours." 


REMARKABLE  PICTURE  OF  ATHENS.  501 

The  Corinthians  concluded  by  saying,  that  if,  after  so  many  pre- 
vious warnings,  now  repeated  for  the  last  time,  Sparta  still  refused 
to  protect  her  allies  against  Athens — if  she  delayed  to  perforin  her 
promise  made  to  the  Potidosans  of  immediately  invading  Attica — 
they  (the  Corinthians)  would  forthwith  look  for  safety  in  some  new 
alliance,  which  they  felt  themselves  fully  justified  in  doing.  They 
admonished  her  to  look  well  to  the  case,  and  to  carry  forward  Pelo- 
ponnesus, with  undiminished  dignity,  as  it  had  been  transmitted  to 
her  from  her  predecessors. 

Such  was  the  memorable  picture  of  Athens  and  her  citizens,  as 
exhibited  by  her  fiercest  enemy  before  the  public  assembly  at  Sparta. 
It  was  calculated  to  impress  the  assembly,  not  by  appeal  to  recent  or 
particular  misdeeds,  but  by  the  general  system  of  unprincipled  and 
endless  aggression  which  was  imputed  to  Athens  during  the  past — 
and  by  the  certainty  held  out  that  the  same  system,  unless  put  down 
by  measures  of  decisive  hostility,  would  be  pushed  still  farther  in 
future  to  the  utter  ruin  of  Peloponnesus.  And  to  this  point  did  the 
Athenian  envoy  (staying  in  Sparta  about  some  other  negotiation  and 
now  present  in  the  assembly)  address  himself  in  reply,  after  having 
asked  and  obtained  permission  from  the  magistrates.  The  empire  of 
Athens  was  now  of  such  standing  that  the  younger  men  present  had 
no  personal  knowledge  of  the  circumstances  under  which  it  had 
grown  up:  and  what  was  needed  as  information  for  them  would  be 
impressive  as  a  reminder  even  to  their  seniors. 

He  began  by  disclaiming  all  intention  of  defending  his  native  city 
against  the  charges  of  specific  wrong  or  alleged  infractions  of  the 
existing  truce.  This  was  no  part  of  his  mission;  nor  did  he  recog- 
nize Sparta  as  a  competent  judge  in  dispute  between  Athens  and 
Corinth.  But  he  nevertheless  thought  it  his  duty  to  vindicate 
Athens  against  the  general  character  of  injustice  and  aggression 
imputed  to  her,  as  well  as  to  offer  a  solemn  warning  to  the  Spartans 
against  the  policy  toward  which  they  were  obviously  tending.  He 
then  proceeded  to  show  that  the  empire  of  Athens  had  been  honora- 
bly earned  and  amply  deserved — that  it  had  been  voluntarily  ceded, 
and  even  pressed  upon  her — and  that  she  could  not  abdicate  it  with- 
out imperiling  her  own  separate  existence  and  security.  Far  from 
thinking  that  the  circumstances  under  which  it  was  acquired  needed 
apology,  he  appealed  to  them  with  pride,  as  a  testimony  of  the 
genuine  Hellenic  patriotism  of  that  city  which  the  Spartan  cougress 
now  seemed  disposed  to  run  down  as  an  enemy.  He  then  dwelt 
upon  the  circumstances  attending  the  Persian  invasion,  setting  forth 
the  superior  forwardness  and  the  unflinching  endurance  of  Athens, 
in  spite  of  ungenerous  neglect  from  the  Spartans  and  other  Greeks — 
the  preponderance  of  her  naval  force  in  the  entire  armament — the 
directing  genius  of  her  general  Themistokles,  complimented  even  by 
Sparta  herself — and  the  title  of  Athens  to  rank  on  that  memorable 
occasion  as  the  principal  saviour  of  Greece.  This  alone  ought  to  save 


602     BEGINNING  OF  TITE  PELOPOXNESIAN  WAR. 

her  empire  from  reproach;  bul  this  was  no1  all — for  that  empire  had 
been  tendered  to  her  bj  the  pressing  instance  of  the  allies  ai  a  time 
when  Sparta  had  proved  herself  both  incompetent  and  unwilling  to 
ate  the  war  against  Persia.  By  simple  exercise  of  the  con- 
straining force  inseparable  from  her  presidential  obligations,  and  by 
the  reduction  of  various  allies  who  revolted,  Alliens  had  gradually 
!  1 1  ome  unpopular,  while  Sparta  too  had  become  her  enemy  instead 
of  her  friend.  To  relax  her  hold  upon  her  allies  would  have  been 
to  make  them  the  allies  of  Sparta  againsl  her;  and  thus  the  motive 
of  tear  was  added  to  those  of  ambition  and  revenue,  in  inducing 
Athens  to  maintain  her  imperial  dominion  by  force.  In  her  position, 
no  Grecian  power  either  would  or  could  have  acted  otherwise: — no 
Grecian  power,  certainly  not  Sparta,  would  have  acted  with  so  much 
equity  and  moderation,  or  given  so  little  ground  of  complaint  to  her 
Is.  \\  orse  they  had  suffered,  while  under  Persia;  worse  they 
Buffer,  if  they  came  under  Sparta,  who  held  her  own  allies 
under  the  thraldom  of  an  oligarchical  party  in  each  city:  and  if  they 
hand  Athens,  i  his  was  only  because  subjects  always  hated  the  present 
dominion,  whatever  that  might  be. 

Having  justified  both  the  origin  and  the  working  of  the  Athenian 
empire,  the  envoy  concluded  by  warning  Sparta  to  consider  calmly, 
without  being  hurried  away  by  the  passions  and  Invectives  of  others, 
before  she  took  a  Step  from  which  there  was  no  retreat,  and  which 
exposed  the  future  to  chances  such  as  no  man  on  either  side  could 
foresee.  lie  called  on  her  not  to  break  the  truce  mutually  sworn  to, 
but  to  adjust  all  differences,  as  Athens  was  prepared  to  do,  by  the 
amicable  arbitration  which  that  truce  provided.  Should  she  begin 
war,  the  Athenians  would  follow  her  lead  and  resist  her,  calling 
to  witness  those  gods  under  whose  sanction  the  oaths  were  taken. 

The  facts  recounted  in  the  preceding  chapters  will  have  shown, 
that  the  account  given  by  the  Athenian  envoy  at  Sparta  of  the  origin 
and  character  of  tin' empire  exercised  by  his  city  (though  doubtless 
the  account  of  a  partisan)  is  in  substance  correct  and  equitable.  The 
envoys  of  Athens  had  not  yet  learned  to  take  the  tone  which  they 
assumed  in  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  years  of  the  coming  war, 
at  Melos  and  Kamarina.  At  any  time  previous  to  the  affair  of 
Korkyra,  the  topics  insisted  upon  by  the  Athenian  would  probably 
have  been  profoundly  listened  to  at  Sparta.  But  now  the  mind  of 
the  Spartans  was  made  up.  Having  cleared  the  assembly  of  all 
"strangers,"  and  even  all  allies,  they  proceeded  to  discuss  and 
determine  the  question  among  themselves.  3Iost  of  their  speakers 
held  but  one  language — expatiating  on  the  wrongs  already  done  by 
Athens,  and  urging  the  necessity  of  instant  war.  There  was  how- 
ever one  voice,  and  that  a  commanding  voice,  raised  against  this  con- 
clusion; the  ancient  and  respected  king  Archidamus  opposed  it. 

The  speech  of  Archidamus  is  that  of  a  deliberate  Spartan,  who, 
setting  aside  both  hatred  to  Athens  and  blind  partiality  to  allies,  looks 


SPARTAN  SPEAKERS  IN  FAVOR  OF  WAR.      503 

at  the  question  with  a  view  to  the  interests  and  honor  of  Sparta 
onlv — not,  however,  omitting  her  imperial  as  well  as  her  separate 
character.  The  preceding  native  speakers,  indignant  against  Athens, 
had  probably  appealed  to  Spartan  pride,  treating  it  as  an  intolerable 
disgrace  that  almost  the  entire  land -force  of  Dorian  Peloponnesus 
should  be  thus  bullied  by  one  single  Ionic  city,  and  should  hesitate 
to  commence  a  war  which  one  invasion  of  Attica  would  probably 
terminate.  As  the  Corinthians  had  tried  to  excite  the  Spartans  by 
well-timed  taunts  and  reproaches,  so  the  subsequent  speakers  had 
aimed  at  the  same  objects  by  panegyric  upon  the  well-known  valor 
and  discipline  of  the  city.  To  all  these  arguments  Archidamus  set 
himself  to  reply.  Invoking  the  experience  of  the  elders,  his  contem- 
poraries, around  him,  he  impressed  upon  the  assembly  the  grave 
responsibilit3r,  the  uncertainties,  difficulties,  and  perils  of  the  war  into 
which  they  were  hurrying  without  preparation.  He  reminded  them 
of  the  wealth,  the  population  (greater  than  that  of  any  other  Grecian 
city),  the  naval  force,  the  cavalry,  the  hoplites,  the  large  foreign 
dominion  of  Athens, — and  then  asked  by  what  means  they  proposed 
to  put  her  down  ?  Ships,  they  had  few;  trained  seamen,  yet  fewer; 
wealth,  next  to  none.  They  could,  indeed,  invade  and  ravage  Attica, 
by  their  superior  numbers  and  land-force.  But  the  Athenians  had 
possessions  abroad  sufficient  to  enable  them  to  dispense  with  the 
produce  of  Attica,  while  their  great  navy  would  retaliate  the  like 
ravages  upon  Peloponnesus.  To  suppose  that  one  or  two  devastat- 
ing expeditions  into  Attica  would  bring  the  war  to  an  end,  would  be 
a  deplorable  error:  such  proceedings  would  merely  enrage  the  Athe- 
nians, without  impairing  their  real  strength,  and  the  war  would  thus 
be  prolonged,  perhaps  for  a  whole  generation.  Before  they  deter- 
mined upon  war,  it  was  absolutely  necessary  to  provide  more  efficient 
means  for  carrying  it  on;  and  to  multiply  their  allies  not  merely 
among  the  Greeks,  but  among  foreigners  also.  While  this  was  in 
process,  envoys  ought  to  be  sent  to  Athens  to  remonstrate  and  obtain 
redress  for  the  grievances  of  the  allies.  If  the  Athenians  granted 
this — which  they  very  probably  would  do,  when  they  saw  the  prep- 
arations going  forward,  ami  when  the  ruin  of  the  highly  cultivated 
soil  of  Attica  was  held  over  them  in  terrorem  without  being  actually 
consummated — so  much  the  better:  if  they  refused,  in  the  course  of 
two  or  three  years  war  might  be  commenced  with  some  hopes  of  suc- 
cess. Archidamus  reminded  his  countrymen  that  their  allies  would 
hold  them  responsible  for  the  good  or  bad  issue  of  what  was  now 
determined;  admonishing  them,  in  the  true  spirit  of  a  conservative 
Spartan,  to  cling  to  that  cautious  policy  which  had  been  ever  the 
characteristic  of  the  state,  despising  both  taunts  on  their  tardiness 
and  panegyric  on  their  valor.  "  We  Spartans  owe  both  our  bravery 
and  our  prudence  to  our  admirable  public  discipline:  it  makes  us 
warlike,  because  the  sense  of  shame  is  most  closely  connected  with 
discipline,  as  valor  is  with  the  sense  of  shame :  it  makes  us  prudent. 


504     BEGINNING  OF  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR 

because  our  training  keeps  us  too  ignorant  to  set  ourselves  above  our 
o\\  n  institutions,  and  holds  us  under  Bbarp  restraint  so  as  not  to  dis 
obey  them.  And  i  lms,  in  it  being  overwise  in  unprofitable  accomplish- 
ments, we  Spartans  are  not  given  to  disparage  our  enemy's  strength 
in  clever  speech,  and  then  inert  him  with  shortcomings  in  reality. 
We  think  that  the  capacity  of  neighboring  states  is  much  on  a  par, 
.■iinl  that  the  chances  in  reserve  for  both  parties  are  too  uncertain  to 
be  discriminated  beforehand  by  speech.  We  always  make  real  prep 
arations  against  our  enemies,  as  if  they  were  proceeding  wisely  <>n 
their  side:  we  must  count  upon  security  through  our  own  precau- 
tions, not  upon  the  chance  oi  their  errors.  Indeed,  there  is  no  great 
superiority  in  one  man  as  compared  with  another:  he  is  the  stoutest 
who  is  trained  in  the  severest,  trials.  Let  us  for  our  parts  not 
renounce  this  discipline,  which  we  have  received  from  our  fathers  ami 
which  we  still  continue,  tOOUrvery  greal  profit:  let  us  not  hurry  on 
in  one  short  hour  a  resolution  upon  which  depend  so  many  lives,  so 
much  property.  SO  many  cities,  and  our  own  reputation  besides.  Let 
us  take  time  to  consider,  since  our  strength  puts  it  fully  in  our  power 
to  do  SO.  Send  envoys  to  the  Athenians  on  the  subject  of  I'otiihea  and 
of  the  other  grievances  alleged  by  our  allies— and  that,  too,  the  rather 
as  they  are  ready  to  give  us  satisfaction:  against  one  who  offers  .satis- 
faction, custom  forbids  you  to  proceed,  without  some  previous  appli- 
cation, as  if  lie  were  a  proclaimed  w  rong  doer.  But  at  the  same  time 
make  preparation  for  war;  such  will  be  the  course  of  policy  at  once 
the  best  for  your  own  power  and  the  most  terror  striking  to  your 
enemies." 

The  speech  of  Archidamus  was  not  only  in  itself  full  of  plain  rea- 
son and  good  sense,  hut  delivered  altogether  from  the  point  of  vl.  w 
of  a  Spartan;  appealing  greatly  to  Spartan  conservative  feeling  and 
even  prejudice.  But  in  spite  of  all  this,  and  in  spite  of  the  persona] 
esteem  entertained  for  the  speaker,  the  tide  of  feeling  in  the  opposite 
direction  was  at  that  moment  irresistible.  Sthcnclaidas — one  of  the 
five  Ephors,  to  whom  it  fell  to  put  the  question  for  voting — closed 
the  debate.  His  few  winds  mark  at  once  the  character  of  the  man — 
the  temper  of  the  assembly — and  the  simplicity  of  speech,  though 
without  the  wisdom  of  judgment,  for  which  Archidamus  had  taken 
credit  to  his  countrymen. 

"  1  don't  understand  (he  said)  these  long  speeches  of  the  Athenians. 
They  have  praised  themselves  abundantly,  but  they  have  never 
rebutted  what  is  laid  to  their  charge — that  they  are  guilty  of  wrong 
-i  our  allies  and  against  Peloponnesus.  Now  if  in  former  days 
they  were  good  men  against  the  Persians,  and  are  now  evil-doers 
againsl  us,  they  deserve  double  punishment  as  having  become  evil- 
doers instead  of  good.  I!ut  we  are  the  same  now  as  we  were  then: 
we  know  better  than  to  sit  still  while  our  allies  are  suffering  v. 
we  shall  not  adjourn  our  aid,  while  they  cannot  adjourn  their  suffer- 
ings.    Others  have  in  abundance  wealth,  ships,  and  horses — but  we 


VOTE  IN  FAVOR  OF  WAR  £05 

have  good  allies,  whom  we  are  not  to  abandon  to  the  mercy  of  the 
Athenians:  nor  are  we  to  trust  our  redress  to  arbitration  and  to  words, 
when  our  wrongs  are  not  confined  to  words.  We  must  help  them 
speedily  and  with  all  our  strength.  Let  no  one  tell  us  that  we  can 
with  honor  deliberate  when  we  are  actually  suffering  wrong:  it  is 
rather  for  those  who  intend  to  do  the  wrong,  to  deliberate  well  before- 
hand. Resolve  upon  war  then,  Lacedaemonians,  in  a  manner  worthy 
of  Sparta.  Suffer  not  the  Athenians  to  become  greater  than  they 
are :  let  us  not  betray  our  allies  to  ruin,  but  march  with  the  aid  of 
the  gods  against  the  wrong-doers." 

With  these  few  words,  so  well  calculated  to  defeat  the  prudential 
admonitions  of  Archidamus,  Sthenelaidas  put  the  question  for  the 
decision  of  the  assembly — which  at  Sparta  was  usually  taken  neither 
by  show  of  hands,  nor  by  deposit  of  balls  in  an  urn,  but  b}'  cries 
analogous  to  the  Ay  or  No  of  the  English  House  of  Commons — the 
presiding  Ephor  declaring  which  of  the  cries  predominated.  On  this 
occasion  the  cry  for  war  was  manifestly  the  stronger.  Yet  Sthene- 
laidas affected  inability  to  determine  which  of  the  two  was  the 
louder,  in  order  that  he  might  have  an  excuse  for  bringing  about  a 
more  impressive  manifestation  of  sentiment  and  a  stronger  apparent 
majority — since  a  portion  of  the  minority  would  probably  be  afraid 
to  show  their  real  opinions  as  individuals  openly.  He,  therefore, 
directed  a  division — like  the  Speaker  of  the  English  House  of  Com- 
mons when  his  decision  in  favor  of  Ay  or  No  is  questioned  by  any 
member — "  Such  of  you  as  think  that  the  truce  has  been  violated  and 
that  the  Athenians  are  doing  us  wrong,  go  to  that  side;  such  as  think 
the  contrary,  to  the  other  side."  The  assembly  accordingly  divided, 
and  the  majority  was  very  great  on  the  warlike  side  of  the  question. 

The  first  step  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  after  coming  to  this  impor- 
tant decision,  was  to  send  to  Delphi  and  inquire  of  the  oracle  whether 
it  would  be  beneficial  to  them  to  undertake  the  war.  The  answer 
brought  back  (Thucydides  seems  hardly  certain  that  it  was  really 
given)  was — that  if  they  did  their  best  they  would  be  victorious,  and 
that  the  god  would  help  them,  invoked  or  uninvoked.  They  at  the 
same  time  convened  a  general  congress  of  their  allies  to  Sparta,  for 
the  purpose  of  submitting  their  recent  resolution  to  the  vote  of  all. 

To  the  Corinthians,  in  their  anxiety  for  the  relief  of  Potidoea,  the 
decision  to  be  given  by  this  congress  was  not  less  important  than  that 
which  the  Spartans  had  just  taken  separately.  They  sent  round 
envoys  to  each  of  the  allies,  entreating  them  to  authorize  war  without 
reserve.  Through  such  instigations,  acting  upon  the  general  impulse 
then  prevalent,  the  congress  came  together  in  a  temper  decidedly 
warlike.  Most  of  the  speakers  were  full  of  invective  against  Athens 
and  impatient  for  action,  while  the  Corinthians,  waiting  as  before  to 
speak  the  last,  wound  up  the  discussion  by  a  speech  well  calculated 
to  insure  a  hearty  vote.  Their  former  speech  had  been  directed  to 
ehame,  exasperate,  and  alarm  the  Lacedaemonians;  this  point  havior 


§06    BEGINNING  <>f  the  peloponnesian  war. 

new  been  carried,  tiicy  had  to  enforce,  upon  tin-  allies,  generally,  th« 
dishonor  as  well  as  the  impolicy  of  receding  from  a  willing  Leader. 
The  cause  was  one  in  which  all  were  interested,  the  inland  Btatee  noi 
.in  the  maritime,  for  both  would  find  themselves  ultimately 
vici  in i-  di'  the  encroaching  despot  city.  \\  hatever  efforts  were  neces 
sary  for  the  war,  ought  cheerfully  to  be  made,  since  ii  was  only 
through  war  that  they  could  arrive  at  a  secure  and  honorable  peace. 
There  wen-  good  hopes  that  this  might  soon  lie  attained,  and  that  the 

war  would  not  last  long — 80  decided  was  the  superiority  of  the  con- 
federacy, in  numbers,  in  military  skill,  and  in  the  equal  heart  and 
Obedience  of  all  its  members.  The  naval  superiority  of  Athens 
depended  chiefly  upon  hired  seamen— so  that  the  confederacy,  by 
borrowing  from  the  treasuries  of  Delphi  and  Olytnpia,  would  BOOH  be 
able  to  overbid  her,  take  into  pay  her  best  mariners,  and  equal  her 
equipment  at  sea.  They  would  excite  revolt  among  her  alii' 
establi.-h  a  permanent  fortified  post  for  the  ruin  of  Attica.  To  make 
up  a  common  fund  for  this  pxirpose,  was  indispensably  necessary; 

for  Athens  was  far  more  than  a  match  for  each  of  them  .-ingle-handed. 
Nothing  less  than  hearty  union  could  save  them  all  from  successive 
enslavement— the  very  supposition  of  wind)  was  intolerable  to  Pelo- 
ponnesian freemen,  whose  lather-  had  liberated  Greece  from  the 
Persian.  Let  them  not  shrink  from  endurance  and  sacrifice  in  such 
a  caus( — it  was  their  hereditary  j  ride  to  purchase  success  by  labori- 
ous effort.  The  Delphian  god  had  promised  them  his  co-operation; 
and  the  whole  of  Greece  would  sympathize  in  the  cause,  either  from 
fear  of  the  despotism  of  Athens,  or  from  hopes  of  profit.  They 
would  not  be  the  first  to  break  the  truce,  for  the  Athenians  had 
already  broken  it,  as  the  declaration  of  the  Delphian  god  distinctly 
implied.  Let  them  lose  no  time  in  sending  aid  to  the  Potidaeans,  a 
Dorian  population  now7  besieged  by  Ionians,  as  well  a-  to  those  other 
Greeks  whom  Athens  had  enslaved.  Every  day  the  necessity  for 
effort  was  becoming  stronger,  and  the  longer  it  was  delayed,  tho 
more  painful  it  would  be  when  it  came.  "Be  ye  persuaded  then 
(concluded  the  orator),  that  this  city,  which  has  constituted  herself 
despot  of  Greece,  had  her  means  of  attack  prepared  against  all  of  us 
alike,  some  for  present  rule,  others  for  future  conquest.  Let  us  assail 
and  subdue  her,  that  we  may  dwell  securely  ourselves  hereafter,  and 
may  emancipate  those  Greeks  who  are  now  in  slavery." 

If  there  were  any  speeches  delivered  at  this  congress  in  opposition 
to  the  war.  they  were  not  likely  to  be  succes-ful  in  a  cause  wherein 
even  Archidamus  had  failed.  After  the  Corinthian  had  concluded, 
the  question  was  put  to  the  deputies  of  every  city,  great  and  small 
indiscriminately:  and  the  majority  decided  for  war.  This  important 
resolution  was  adopted  about  the  end  of  432  B.C.,  or  the  beginning  of 
January,  431  B.C.:  the  previous  decision  of  the  Spartans  separately 
may  have  been  taken  about  two  months  earlier,  in  the  preceding 
October  or  November,  432  b.c. 


MOTIVES   OF    THE   OPPOSING  POWERS.  507 

Reviewing  the  conduct  of  the  two  great  Grecian  parties  at  this 
momentous  juncture,  with  reference  to  existing  treaties  and  positive 
grounds  of  complaint,  it  seems  clear  that  Athens  was  in  the  right. 
She  had  done  nothing  which  could  fairly  be  called  a  violation  of  the 
Thirty  years'  truce:  while  for  such  of  her  acts  as  were  alleged  to  be 
such,  she  offered  to  submit  them  to  that  amicable  arbitration  which  the 
truce  itself  prescribed.  The  Peloponnesian  confederates  were  mani- 
festly the  aggressors  in  the  contest.  If  Sparta,  usually  so  backward, 
now  came  forward  in  a  spirit  so  decidedly  opposite,  we  are  to  ascribe 
it  partly  to  her  standing  fear  and  jealousy  of  Athens,  partly  to  the 
pressure  of  her  allies,  especially  of  the  Corinthians. 

Thucydides,  recognizing  these  two  as  the  grand  determining 
motives,  and  indicating  the  alleged  infractions  of  truce  as  simple 
occasions  or  pretexts,  seems  to  consider  the  fear  and  hatred  of  Athens 
as  having  contributed  more  to  determine  Sparta  than  the  urgency  of 
her  allies.  That  the  extraordinary  aggrandizement  of  Athens,  during 
the  period  immediately  succeeding  the  Persian  invasion,  was  well 
calculated  to  excite  alarm  and  jealousy  in  Peloponnesus,  is  indisput- 
able. But  if  we  take  Athens  as  she  stood  in  432  B.C.,  it  deserves 
notice  that  she  had  neither  made,  nor  (so  far  as  we  know)  tried  to 
make,  a  single  new  acquisition  during  the  whole  fourteen  years  which 
had  elapsed  since  the  conclusion  of  the  Thirty  years'  truce, — and 
moreover  that  that  truce  marked  an  epoch  of  signal  humiliation  and 
reduction  of  her  powrer.  The  triumph  which  Sparta  and  the  Pelo- 
ponnesians  then  gained,  though  not  sufficiently  complete  to  remove 
all  fear  of  Athens,  was  yet  great  enough  to  inspire  them  with  the 
hope  that  a  second  combined  effort  would  subdue  her.  This  mixture 
of  fear  and  hope  was  exactly  the  state  of  feeling  out  of  which  war 
was  likely  to  grow.  We  see  that  even  before  the  quarrel  between 
Corinth  and  Korkyra,  sagacious  Greeks  everywhere  anticipated  war 
as  not  far  distant.  It  was  near  breaking  out  even  on  occasion  of  the 
revolt  of  Samos ;  peace  being  then  preserved  partly  by  the  commercial 
and  nautical  interests  of  Corinth,  partly  by  the  quiescence  of  Athens. 
But  the  quarrel  of  Corinth  and  Korkyra,  which  Sparta  might  have 
appeased  beforehand  had  she  thought  it  her  interest  to  do  so, — and 
the  junction  of  Korkyra  with  Athens — exhibited  the  latter  as  again 
in  a  career  of  aggrandizement,  and  thus  again  brought  into  play  the 
warlike  feelings  of  Sparta;  while  they  converted  Corinth  from  the 
advocate  of  peace  into  a  clamorous  organ  of  war.  The  revolt  of 
Potkkea — fomented  by  Corinth  and  encouraged  by  Sparta  in  the  form 
of  a  positive  promise  to  invade  Attica — was,  in  point  of  fact,  the  first 
distinct  violation  of  the  truce,  and  the  initiatory  measure  of  the  Pelo- 
ponnesian war.  The  Spartan  meeting,  and*  the  subsequent  congress 
of  allies  at  Sparta,  served  no  other  purpose  than  to  provide  such 
formalities  as  were  requisite  to  insure  the  concurrent  and  hearty 
action  of  numbers,  and  to  clothe  with  imposing  sanction  a  state  of 
war  already  existing  in  reality,  though  yet  unproclaimed. 


508     BEGINNING  OF  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR 

The  Bentimenl  in  Peloponnesus  at  this  moment  was  not  the  fear 
of  Athens,  but  the  hatred  of  Alliens — and  the  Confident  hope  of  sub- 
duing her.  And  indeed  such  confidence  was  justified  by  plausible 
grounds.  Men  mighl  wed  think  that  the  Athenians  could  never 
endure  the  entire  devastation  of  their  highly  cultivated  soil — or  at 
least  thai  they  would  certainly  come  forth  to  tight  for  it  in  the  field, 
which  was  all  that  the  Peloponnesians  desired.  Nothing  except  the 
unparalleled  ascendency  and  unshaken  resolution  of  Perikles  induced 

the  Athenians  to  persevere  in  a  BCheme  of  patient  defense,  and  to 
trust  to  that  naval  superiority  Which  the  enemies  of  Alliens,  save  and 
except  the  judicious  Archidamus,  had  not  yet  learned  fully  to 
appreciate.  .Moreover  the  confident  hopes  of  the  Peloponnesians 
were  materially  strengthened  by  the  widespread  sympathy  in  favor 
of  their  cause,  proclaiming  as  it  did  the  intended  liberation  of  Greece 
from  a  despot  city. 

To  Athens,  on  the  other  hand,  the  coming  war  presented  itself  in 
a  very  different  aspect;  holding  out  nothing  less  than  the  certainty 
of  prodigious  loss  and  privation — even  granting  that  at  this  heavy 
cost,  her  independence  and  union  at  home,  and  her  empire  abroad, 
could  be  upheld.  By  Perikles,  and  by  the  more  long  sighted  Athe- 
nians, the  chance  of  unavoidable  war  was  foreseen  even  before 
the  Korkynean  dispute.  But  Perikles  was  only  the  first  citizen  in  a 
democracy,  esteemed,  trusted,  and  listened  to,  more  than  any  one 
else,  by  the  body  of  citizens,  but  warmly  opposed  in  most  of  his 
measures,  under  the  frea  speech  and  latitude  of  individual  action 
which  reigned  at  Athens — and  even  bitterly  baud  by  many  active 
political  opponents.  The  formal  determination  of  the  Laceda  mo- 
nians,  to  declare  war,  must  of  course  have  been  made  known  at 
Athens,  by  those  Athenian  envoys  who  had  entered  an  unavailing 
protest  against  it  in  the  Spartan  assembly.  No  steps  were  taken  by 
Sparta  to  carry  this  determination  into  effect  until  after  the  congress 
of  allies  and  their  pronounced  confirmator}-  vote.  Nor  did  the 
Spartans  even  then  send  any  herald,  or  make  any  formal  declaration. 
They  dispatched  various  propositions  to  Athens,  not  at  all  with  a 
view  of  trying  to  obtain  satisfaction,  or  of  providing  some  escape 
from  the  probability  of  war;  but  with  the  contrary  purpose — of 
multiplying  demands,  and  enlarging  the  grounds  of  quarrel.  Mean- 
while the  deputies,  retiring  home  from  the  congress  to  their  respec- 
tive cities,  carried  with  them  the  general  resolution  for  immediate 
warlike  preparations  to  be  made  with  as  little  delay  as  possible. 

The  first  requisition  addressed  by  the  Lacedaemonians  to  Athens 
was  a  political  maneuver  aimed  at  Perikles,  their  chief  opponent  in 
that  city.  His  mother  Agariste  belonged  to  the  great  family  of  the 
Alkm.'conids,  who  were  supposed  to  be  under  an  inexpiable  heredi- 
tary taint,  in  consequence  of  the  sacrilege  committed  by  their  ances- 
tor Megakles  nearly  two  centuries  before,  in  the  slaughter  of  the 
Kylouian   suppliants  near  tho  altar  of   the  Venerable   Goddesses. 


POSITION  OF  PERIKLES  AT  ATHENS.  509 

Ancient  as  this  transaction  was,  it  still  had  sufficient  hold  on  the 
mind  of  the  Athenians  to  serve  as  the  hasis  of  a  political  maneuver. 
About  seventy-seven  years  before,  shortly  after  the  expulsion  of 
Hippias  from  Athens,  it  had  been  so  employed  by  the  Spartan  king 
Kleomenes,  who  at  that  time  exacted  from  the  Atheniansa  clearance  of 
the  ancient  sacrilege,  to  be  effected  by  the  banishment  of  Kleisthenes 
(the  founder  of  the  democracy)  and  his  chief  partisans.  This  demand, 
addressed  by  Kleomenes  to  the  Athenians  at  the  instance  of  Isago- 
ras  the  rival  of  Kleisthenes,  had  been  then  obeyed,  and  had  served  well 
the  purposes  of  those  who  sent  it.  A  similar  blow  was  now  aimed 
bj'the  Lacedaemonians  at  Perikles  (the  grand-nephew  of  Kleisthenes), 
and  doubtless  at  the  instance  of  his  political  enemies.  Religion  re- 
quired, it  was  pretended,  that  "the  abomination  of  the  goddess 
should  be  driven  out."  If  the  Athenians  complied  with  this  demand, 
they  would  deprive  themselves,  at  this  critical  moment,  of  their 
ablest  leader.  But  the  Lacedaemonians,  not  expecting  compliance, 
reckoned  at  all  events  upon  discrediting  Perikles  with  the  people,  as 
being  partly  the  cause  of  the  war  through  family  taint  of  impiety — 
and  this  impression  would  doubtless  be  loudly  proclaimed  by  his 
political  opponents  in  the  assembly. 

The  influence  of  Perikles  with  the  Athenian  public  had  become 
greater  and  greater  as  their  political  experience  of  him  was  pro- 
longed. But  the  bitterness  of  his  enemies  appears  to  have  increased 
along  with  it.  Not  long  before  this  period,  he  had  been  indirectly 
assailed  through  the  medium  of  accusations  against  three  different 
persons,  all  more  or  less  intimate  with  him — his  mistress  Aspasia,  the 
philosopher  Anaxagoras,  and  the  sculptor  Pheidias. 

We  cannot  make  out  either  the  exact  date,  or  the  exact  facts  of 
either  of  these  accusations.  Aspasia,  daughter  of  Axiochus,  was  a 
native  of  Miletus,  beautiful,  well-educated,  and  aspiring.  She  re- 
sided at  Athens,  and  is  affirmed  (though  upon  very  doubtful  evi- 
dence) to  have  kept  slave-girls  to  be  let  out  as  courtezans.  Whatever 
may  be  the  case  with  this  report,  which  is  most  probably  one  of  the 
scandals  engendered  by  political  animosity  against  Perikles,  it  is  cer- 
tain that  so  remarkable  were  her  own  fascinations,  her  accomplish- 
ments, and  her  powers  not  merely  of  conversation,  but  even  of 
oratory  and  criticism — that  the  most  distinguished  Athenians  of  all 
ages  and  characters,  Sokrates  among  the  number,  visited  her,  and 
several  of  them  took  their  wives  along  with  them  to  hear  her  also. 
The  free  citizen  women  of  Athens  lived  in  strict  and  almost  oriental 
recluseness,  as  well  after  being  married  as  when  single.  Everything 
which  concerned  their  lives,  their  happiness,,  or  their  rights,  was  de- 
termined or  managed  for  them  by  male  relatives:  and  they  seem  to 
have  been  destitute  of  all  mental  culture  and  accomplishments. 
Their  society  presented  no  charm  nor  interest,  which  men  accord- 
ingly sought  for  in  the  company  of  a  class  of  women  called  Hetaerae 
or  Courtezans,  literally  Female  Companions,  who  lived  a  free  life, 


510     BEGINNING  OF  THE  PELOPONNEBIAN  WAR 

managed  their  own  affairs,  and  supported  themselves  by  their  powers 
of  pleasing.  These  women  were  numerous,  and  wen-  doubtless  of 
every  variety  of  personal  character  The  most  distinguished  and 
superior  among  them,  Buch  as  Aspasia  and  Theodote,  appear  to  have 
been  the  only  women  in  Greece,  except  the  Spartan,  who  either  in- 
spired strong  passion  or  exercised  mental  ascendency. 

IVrikles  had  been  determined  in  Id-  choice  of  a  wife  by  those 
family  considerations  which  were  held  almost  obligatory  at  Athens, 

and  had  married  a  woman  very  nearly  related  to  1dm.  by  whom  he 
had  two  sons,  Xanlhippus  and  Paral'us.  But  the  marriage  having 
never  been  com fortable,  was  afterward  dissolved   by  mutual  consent, 

according  to  that  full  liberty  of  divorce  which  the  Attic  law  permit- 
ted. IVrikles  concurred  With  his  wife's  male  relations  (who  formed 
her  legal  guardians)  in  giving  her  away  to  another  husband.  He  then 
took  Aspasia  to  live  with  him,  had  a  son  by  her  who  bore  his  name, 
and  continued  ever  afterward  on  terms  of  the  greatest  intimacy  and 
affection  with  her.  Without  adopting  those  exaggerations  which 
represent  Aspasia  as  having  communicated  to  Perikles  his  distin- 
guished eloquence,  or  even  as  having  herself  composed  oration-  for 
public  delivery,  we  may  reasonably  believe  her  to  have  b<  en  qualified 
to  take  interest  and  share  in  that  literary  and  philosophical  society 
which  frequented  the  house  of  Perikles,  and  which  his  unprincipled 
son  Xanthippus— disgusted  with  his  father's  regular  expenditure,  as 
withholding  from  him  the  means  of  supporting  an  extravagant  estab- 
lishment— reported  abroad  with  exaggerated  calumnies,  and  turned 
into  derision.  It  was  from  that  worthless  young  man,  who  died  of 
the  Athenian  epidemic  during  the  lifetime  of  Perikles,  thai  his  politi- 
cal enemies  and  the  comic  writers  of  the  day  obtained  the  pi<  tended 
revelations,  which  served  them  as  matter  for  scandalous  libel  on  the 
privacy  of  this  distinguished  man. 

While  the  comic  writers  attacked  Perikles  himself  for  alleged 
intrigues  with  different  women,  they  treated  the  name  of  Aspasia  as 
public  property  without  any  mercy  or  reserve:  she  was  the  Omphale, 
the  Deianeira,  or  the  Here,  to  this  great  Herakles  or  Zeus  of  Athens. 
At  length  one  of  these  comic  writers.  Hermippus,  not  contented  with 
scenic  attacks,  indicted  her  before  the  dikastery  for  impiety,  as  par- 
ticipant in  the  philosophical  discussions  held,  and  the  opinions 
professed,  among  the  society  Of  Perikles,  by  Anaxagoras  and  others. 
Against  Anaxagoras  himself,  too,  a  similar  indictment  is  said  to  have 
been  preferred,  either  by  Kleon  or  by  Thucydidcs  son  of  Melesias, 
under  a  general  resolution  recently  passed  in  the  public  assembly  at 
the  instance  of  Diopeithes.  And  such  was  the  sensitive  antipathy  of 
the  Athenian  public,  shown  afterward  fatally  in  the  case  of  Sokrab  S, 
and  imbittered  in  this  instance  by  all  the  artifices  of  political  faction, 
against  philosophers  whose  opinions  conflicted  with  the  received 
religious  dogmas — that  Perikles  did  not  dare  to  place  Anaxagoras  on 
his  trial.     The  latter  retired  from  Athens,  and  a  sentence  of  banish- 


PROSECUTION  OF  PHEIDIAS.  511 

ment  was  passed  against  him  in  his  absence.  But  Perikles  himself 
defended  Aspasia  before  the  dikastery.  In  fact,  the  indictment  was 
as  much  against  him  as  against  her:  one  thing  alleged  against  her 
(and  also  against  Pheidias)  was,  the  reception  of  free  women  to  facili- 
tate the  intrigues  of  Perikles.  He  defended  her  successfully  and 
procured  a  verdict  of  acquittal:  but  we  are  not  surprised  to  hear  that 
his  speech  was  marked  by  the  strongest  personal  emotions  and  even 
by  tears.  The  dikasts  were  accustomed  to  such  appeals  to  their 
sympathies,  sometimes  even  to  extravagant  excess,  from  ordinary 
accused  persons.  In  Perikles,  however,  so  manifest  an  outburst  of 
emotion  stands  out  as  something  quite  unparalleled;  for  constant 
self-mastery  was  one  of  the  most  prominent  features  in  his  character. 
And  we  shall  find  him,  near  the  close  of  his  political  life,  when  he 
had  become  for  the  moment  unpopular  writh  the  Athenian  people, 
distracted  as  they  were  at  the  moment  with  the  terrible  sufferings  of 
the  pestilence, — bearing  up  against  their  unmerited  anger  not  merely 
with  dignity,  but  with  a  pride  of  conscious  innocence  and  desert 
which  rises  almost  into  defiance;  insomuch  that  the  rhetor  Dionysius, 
who  criticises  the  speech  of  Perikles  as  if  it  were  simply  the  compo- 
sition of  Thucydides,  censures  that  historian  for  having  violated 
dramatic  propriety  by  a  display  of  insolence  where  humility  would 
have  been  becoming. 

It  appears  also,  as  far  as  we  can  judge  amid  very  imperfect  data, 
that  the  trial  of  the  great  sculptor  Pheidias,  for  alleged  embezzlement 
in  the  contract  for  his  celebrated  gold  and  ivory  statue  of  Athene, 
took  place  nearly  at  this  period.  That  statue  had  been  finished  and 
dedicated  in  the  Parthenon  in  437  B.C. ,  since  which  period  Pheidias 
had  been  engaged  at  Olympia  in  his  last  and  great  masterpiece,  the 
colossal  statue  of  the  Olympian  Zeus.  On  his  return  to  Athens  from 
the  execution  of  this  work,  about  433  or  432  B.C.,  the  accusation  of 
embezzlement  was  instituted  against  him  by  the  political  enemies  of 
Perikles.  A  slave  of  Pheidias,  named  Menon,  planted  himself  as  a 
suppliant  at  the  altar,  professing  to  be  cognizant  of  certain  facts 
which  proved  that  his  master  had  committed  peculation.  Motion 
was  made  to  receive  his  depositions  and  to  insure  to  his  person  the 
protection  of  the  people;  upon  which  he  revealed  various  statements 
so  greatly  impeaching  the  pecuniary  probity  of  Pheidias,  that  the 
latter  was  put  in  prison,  awaiting  the  day  for  his  trial  before  the 
dikastery.  The  gold  employed  and  charged  for  in  the  statue,  how- 
ever, was  all  capable  of  being  taken  off  and  weighed,  so  as  to  verify 
its  accuracy,  which  Perikles  dared  the  accusers  io  do.  Besides  the 
charge  of  embezzlement,  there  were  other  circumstances  which  ren- 
dered Pheidias  unpopular.  It  had  been  discovered  that,  in  the  reliefs 
on  the  frieze  of  the  Parthenon,  he  had  introduced  the  portraits  of 
himself  and  Perikles  in  conspicuous  positions.  It  seems  that  Pheid- 
ias died  in  prison  before  the  day  of  trial ;  and  some  even  said  that  ha 
had  been  poisoned  by  the  enemies  of  Perikles,  in  order  that  the  sua- 


512      BEGINNING  OF  TIIE  PELOPOXXKSI AX  WAR 

picions  against  the  latter,  who  was  the  real  objecl  of  attack,  might 
be  aggravated.  It  is  said  also  that  Drakontidee  proposed  and  carried 
a  decree  in  the  public  a  s<  mbly,  that  Perikles  should  be  <  n  1 1< •«  1  on  i<> 
give  an  account  of  the  money  which  lie  had  expended,  and  that  the 
dikasts,  before  whom  the  account  was  rendered,  should  give  their 
Buffrage  in  the  most  solemn  manner  from  the  altar.  This  latter  pro- 
vision was  modified  by  Agnon,  who,  while  proposing  thai  the  dikasts 
should  be  1500  in  number,  retained  the  vote  by  pebbles  in  the  ura 
according  to  ordinary  custom. 

If  Perikles  was  ever  tried  on  such  a  charge,  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  lie  was  honorably  acquitted:  for  the  language  of  Thucydides 
respecting  his  pecuniary  probity  is  such  as  could  not  bave  been 
employed  if  averdictof  guilty  on  charge  of  peculation  bad  been 
publicly  pronounced.  But  we  cannot  be  certain  that  he  ever  was 
tiied.  Indeed,  another  accusation  urged  by  bis  enemies,  and  even 
by  Aristophanes  in  the  sixth  year  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  implies 
thai  no  trial  took  place:  for  it  was  alleged  that  Perikles,  in  order  to 
escape  this  danger,  "  blew  up  the  Peloponnesian  war;"  and  involved 
his  country  in  .such  confusion  and  peril  as  made  his  own  aid  and 
guidance  indispensably  necessary  to  her;  especially,  that  he  passed 
the  degree  against  the  Megarians  by  which  the  war  was  really  brought 
on.  We  know  enough,  however,  to  lie  certain  that  such  a  supposi- 
tionis  altogether  inadmissible.  The  enemies  of  Perikles  were  far  too 
eager,  and  too  expert  in  Athenian  political  warfare,  to  have  let  him 
escape  by  such  a  stratagem.  Moreover,  we  learn  from  the  assurance 
of  Thucydides  that  the  war  depended  upon  far  deeper  causes— that 
the  Megarian  decree  was  in  no  way  the  real  cause  of  it, — that  it  was 
not  Perikles,  but  the  Peloponnesians,  who  brought  it  on,  by  the  blow 
struck  at  Potidaea. 

All  that  we  can  make  out,  amid  these  uncertified  allegations,  is, 
that  in  the  year  or  two  immediately  preceding  the  Peloponnesian 
war,  Perikles  was  hard-pressed  by  the  accusations  of  political  enemies 
— perhaps  even  in  his  own  person,  but  certainly  in  the  persons  of 
those  who  were  most  in  his  confidence  and  affection.  And  it  was  in 
this  turn  of  his  political  position,  that  the  Lacedemonians  sent  to 
Athens  the  above-mentioned  requisition  that  the  ancient  Kylonian 
sacrilege  might  heat  length  cleared  out;  in  other  words,  that  Peri- 
kles and  his  family  might  lie  banished.  Doubtless  his  enemies,  as 
well  as  the  partisans  of  Lacedsemon  at  Athens,  would  strenuously 
support  this  proposition.  And  the  party  of  Lacedsemon  at  Athens 
was  always  strong,  even  during  the  middle  of  the  war: — to  act  as 
proxenus  to  the  Lacedaemonians  was  accounted  an  honor  even  by 
the  greatest  Athenian  families.  On  this  occasion,  however,  the 
maneuver  did  not  succeed,  nor  did  the  Athenians  listen  to  the  requi- 
sition for  banishing  the  sacrilegious  Alknuconids.  On  the  contrary, 
they  replied  that  the  Spartans,  too,  had  an  account  of  sacrilege  to  clear 
off;  for  they  had  violated  the  sanctuary  of  Poseidon  at  Cape  Taenarus 


FRESH   REQUISITIONS  FROM  SPARTA.  513 

in  dragging  from  it  some  helot  suppliants  to  be  put  to  death — and 
the  sanctuary  of  Athene  Chalkioekus  at  Sparta,  in  blocking  up  and 
starving  to  death  the  guilty  regent  Pausanias.  To  require  that 
Laconia  might  be  cleared  of  these  two  acts  of  sacrilege — was  the 
only  answer  which  the  Athenians  made  to  the  demand  sent  for  the 
banishment  of  Perikles.  Probably  the  actual  effect  of  that  demand 
was,  to  strengthen  him  in  the  public  esteem:  very  different  from  the 
effect  of  the  same  maneuver  when  practiced  before  by  Kleomenes 
against  Klcisthencs. 

Other  Spartan  envoys  shortly  afterward  arrived  with  fresh  demands. 
The  Athenians  were  now  required — 1.  To  withdraw  their  troops  from 
Potidiea.  2.  To  replace  iEgina  in  its  autonomy.  3.  To  repeal  the 
decree  of  exclusion  against  the  Megarians. 

It  was  upon  the  latter  that  the  greatest  stress  was  laid;  an  intima- 
tion being  held  out  that  war  might  be  avoided  if  such  repeal  were 
granted.  We  see  plainly  from  this  proceeding  that  the  Lacedae- 
monians acted  in  concert  with  the  anti-Periklean  leaders  at  Athens. 
To  Sparta  and  her  confederacy  the  decree  against  the  Megarians  was  of 
less  importance  than  the  rescue  of  the  Corinthian  troops  now  blocked 
up  in  Potihea.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  party  opposed  to  Perikles 
would  have  a  much  better  chance  of  getting  a  vote  of  the  assembly 
against  him  on  the  subject  of  the  Megarians:  and  his  advantage,  if 
gained,  would  serve  to  enfeeble  his  influence  generally.  No  conces- 
sion was  obtained,  however,  on  either  of  the  three  points:  even  in 
respect  to  Mcgara  the  decree  of  exclusion  was  vindicated  and  upheld 
against  all  the  force  of  opposition.  At  length  the  Lacedaemonians — 
who  had  already  resolved  upon  war  and  had  sent  these  envoys  in 
mere  compliance  with  the  exigences  of  ordinary  practice,  not  with 
any  idea  of  bringing  about  an  accommodation — sent  a  third  batch  of 
envoys  with  a  proposition  which  at  least  had  the  merit  of  disclosing 
their  real  purpose  without  disguise.  Rhamphias  and  two  other  Spar- 
tans announced  to  the  Athenians  the  simple  injunction:  "  The  Lace- 
daemonians wish  the  peace  to  stand;,  and  it  may  stand,  if  you  will 
leave  the  Greeks  autonomous."  Upon  this  demand,  so  very  different 
from  the  preceding,  the  Athenians  resolved  to  hold  a  fresh  assembly 
on  the  subject  of  war  or  peace,  to  open  the  whole  question  anew  for 
discussion,  and  to  determine  once  for  all  on  a  peremptory  answer. 

The  last  demands  presented  on  the  part  of  Sparta,  which  went  to 
nothing  less  than  the  entire  extinction  of  the  Athenian  empire — com- 
bined with  the  character,  alike  wavering  and  insincere,  of  the  demands 
previously  made,  and  with  the  knowledge  that  the  Spartan  confed- 
eracy had  pronounced  peremptorily  in  favor  of  war — seemed  likely 
to  produce  unanimity  at  Athens,  and  to  bring  together  this  important 
assemby  under  the  universal  conviction  that  war  was  inevitable. 
Such,  however,  was  not  the  fact.  The  reluctance  to  go  to  war  was 
Bincere  amid  the  large  majority  of  the  assembly  ;  while  among  a 
considerable  portion  of  them  it  was  so  preponderant  that  they  even 
H.  G.  II.— 17 


514     BEGINNING  OF  THE  PELOPGNNESIAN  WAR. 

now  reverted  to  the  opening  which  the  Lacedsemonianshad  before  held 
<  mi  aboul  the  anti-Megarian  decree,  ae  if  they  were  the  chief  causeof 
war.  There  was  much  difference  of  opinion  among  the  speakers, 
several  of  whom  insisted  upon  the  repeal  of  this  decree,  treating  it  as 
a  matter  far  i""  insignificanl  to  go  to  war  ahout,  and  denouncing  the 
obstinacy  of  Perikles  for  refusing  to  concede  Buch  a  trifle,  Against 
this  opinion  Perikles  entered  bis  protest,  in  a  harangue  decisive  and 
encouraging,  w  hich  Dionysius  of  Halikarnassus  ranks  anion-  the  best 
speeches  in  Thucydides.  The  latter  historian  may  probably  himself 
have  heard  the  original  spei  ch. 

"I  continue,  Athenians,  to  adhere  to  the  same  conviction,  that  we 
must  not  yield  to  the  Pelopounesians — though  I  know  that  men  are 
in  one  mood,  when  they  sanction  the  resolution  to  go  to  war,  and  in 
another,  when  actually  in  the  contest — their  judgments  then  depend- 
ing upon  the  turn  of  events.  1  have  only  to  repeat  now  what  I  have 
said  on  former  occasion — and  I  adjure  you  who  follow  my  views  to 
adhere  to  whal  we  jointly  resolve,  though  the  result  should  be  par- 
tially unfavorable:  or  else  not  take  credit  for  wisdom  in  the  event  of 
success.  For  it  is  very  possible  thai  the  contingencies  of  events  may 
depart  more  from  all  reasonable  track  than  the  counsels  of  man:  such 
are  the  unexpected  turns  which  we  familiarly  impute  to  Fortune. 
The  Lacedaemonians  have  before  now  manifested  their  hostile  aims 
against  us,  but  on  this  last  occasion  more  than  ever.  "While  the  truce 
prescribes  that  we  are  to  give  and  receive  amicable  satisfaction  for 
our  differences,  and  each  to  retain  what  we  possess — they  not  only 
have  not  asked  for  such  satisfaction,  but  repudiate  it  when  tendered. 
They  choose  to  settle  complaints  by  war  and  not  by  discussion:  they 
have  got  beyond  the  tone  of  complaint,  and  are  here  already  with 
that  of  command.  For  they  enjoin  us  to  withdraw  from  Potida?a,  to 
leave  ^Egina  free,  and  to  rescind  the  decree  against  the  Megarians: 
nay,  t ;  nvoys  are  even  come  to  proclaim  to  us,  that  we  must 

leave  all  the  Greeks  free.  Now,  let  none  of  you  believe,  that  we  shall  be 
going  to  war  about  a  trifle,  if  we  refuse  to  rescind  the  Megarian  decree — 
which  they  chiefly  put  forward,  as  if  its  repeal  would  avert  the  war. 
Let  none  of  you  take  blame  to  yourselves  as  if  we  had  gone  to  war 
about  a  small  matter.  For  this  small  matter  contains  in  itself  the 
whole  test  and  trial  of  your  mettle:  if  ye  yield  it,  ye  will  presently 
have  some  other  greater  exaction  put  upon  you,  like  men  who  have 
already  truckled  on  one  point  from  fear  :  whereas  if  ye  hold  out 
stoutly,  ye  will  make  it  clear  to  them  that  they  must  deal  with  you 
more  upon  a  footing  of  equality." 

Perikles  then  examined  the  relative  strength  of  parties  and  the 
chances  of  war.  The  Peloponnesians  were  a  self-working  population, 
with  few  slaves,  and  without  wealth,  either  private  or  public:  they 
had  no  means  of  carrying  on  distant  or  long-continued  war.  They 
were  ready  to  expose  their  persons,  but  not  at  all  ready  to  contribute 
from  their  very  narrow  means.    In  a  border-war  or  a  single  land-battle, 


ORATION  OF  PERIKLES.  515 

they  were  invincible,  but  for  systematic  warfare  against  a  power  like 
Athens,  they  had  neither  competent  headship,  nor  habits  of  concert 
and  punctualit\-,  nor  money  to  profit  by  opportunities,  always  rare 
and  accidental,  for  successful  attack.  They  might  perhaps  establish 
a  fortified  post  in  Attica,  but  it  would  do  little  serious  mischief  ; 
while  at  sea,  their  inferiority  and  helplessness  would  be  complete, 
and  the  irresistible  Athenian  navy  would  take  care  to  keep  it  so. 
Nor  would  they  be  able  to  reckon  on  tempting  away  the  able  foreign 
seamen  from  Athenian  ships  by  means  of  funds  borrowed  from 
Olympia  or  Delphi.  For  besides  that  the  mariners  of  the  dependent 
islands  would  find  themselves  losers  even  by  accepting  a  higher  pay, 
with  the  certaiuty  of  Athenian  vengeance  afterward — Athens  herself 
would  suffice  to  man  her  fleet  in  case  of  need,  with  her  own  citizens 
and  metics:  she  had  within  her  own  walls  steersmen  and  mariners 
better,  as  well  as  more  numerous,  than  all  Greece  besides.  There 
was  but  one  side  on  which  Athens  was  vulnerable:  Attica  unfortun- 
ately was  not  an  island — it  was  exposed  to  invasion  and  ravage.  To 
this  the  Athenians  must  submit,  without  committing  the  imprudence 
of  engaging  a  land-battle  to  avert  it.  They  had  abundant  lands  out 
of  Attica,  insular  as  well  as  continental,  to  supply  their  wants,  while 
they  could  in  their  turn,  by  means  of  their  navy,  ravage  the  Pelo- 
ponnesian  territories,  whose  inhabitants  had  no  subsidiary  lands  to 
recur  to. 

' '  Mourn  not  for  the  loss  of  land  and  houses  (continued  the  orator). 
Reserve  j'our  mourning  for  men:  houses  and  land  acquire  not  men, 
but  men  acquire  them.  Nay,  if  I  thought  I  could  prevail  upon  you, 
I  would  exhort  you  to  march  out  and  ravage  them  yourselves,  and 
thus  show  to  the  Peloponnesians  that  for  them  at  least  ye  will  not 
truckle,  And  I  could  exhibit  many  further  grounds  for  confidently 
anticipating  success,  if  ye  will  only  be  willing  not  to  aim  at  increased 
dominion  when  we  are  in  the  midst  of  war,  and  not  to  take  upon 
yourselves  new  self-imposed  risks ;  for  I  have  ever  been  more  afraid 
of  our  own  blunders  than  of  the  plans  of  our  enemy.  But  these  are 
matters  for  future  discussion,  when  we  come  to  actual  operations: 
for  the  present,  let  us  dismiss  these  envoys  with  the  answer: — That 
we  will  permit  the  Megarians  to  use  our  markets  and  harbors,  if  the 
Lacedaemonians  on  their  side  will  discontinue  their  (xenelasy  or) 
summary  expulsions  of  ourselves  and  our  allies  from  their  own  ter« 
ritory — for  there  is  nothing  in  the  truce  to  prevent  either  one  or  the 
other:  That  we  will  leave  the  Grecian  cities  autonomous,  if  we  had 
them  as  autonomous  at  the  time  when  the  truce  was  made — and  as 
soon  as  the  Lacedaemonians  shall  grant  to  their  allied  cities  autonomy 
such  as  each  of  them  shall  freely  choose,  not, such  as  is  convenient  to 
Sparta:  That  while  we  are  ready  to  give  satisfaction  according  to  the 
truce,  we  will  not  begin  war,  but  will  repel  those  who  do  begin  it. 
Such  is  the  reply  at  once  just  and  suitable  to  the  dignity  of  this  city. 
We  ought  to  make  up  our  minds  that  war  is  inevitable:  the  mors 


516  I   •  PELOPOH  fESJAN  WAR. 

cepi  it,  the  less  vehemenl  shall  we  find  oui  enemies 
in  their  attack:  and  where  the  danger  i-  greatest,  there  also  is  1 1 1< - 
final  honor  greatest,  both  for  a  state  and  for  a  private  citizen.  As- 
suredly our  fathers,  when  they  bore  up  against  the  P<  rsians-  having 
no  such  means  as  we  o  start    from,  and  even  compelled  to 

abandon  all   that   they  did   possi both  repelled  the  invader  and 

brought  matters  forward  to  our  actual  pitch,  more  by  advised  opera 
tii in  than  bj  good  fortune,  and  by  a  daring  courage  greater  than  their 
real  power.     We  ought  not  to  fall  short  of  them:  we  must  keep  off 
our  enemies  in  every  way,  and  leave  an  unimpaired  power  to  our 
successors." 

These  animating  encouragi  ments  of  Perikles  carried  with  them  the 
majority  of  the  assembly,  so  thai  answer  was  made  to  the  envoys, 
Buch  as  lie  recommended,  on  each  of  the  particular  points  in  debate. 
It  was  announced  to  them,  moreover,  on  the  general  question  of 
peace  or  war,  thai  the  Athenians  were  prepan  -  uss  all  the 

grounds  of  complainl  against  them,  pursuant  to  the  truce,  by  equal 
and  amicable  arbitration — but  that  they  would  do  nothing  under 
authoritative  demand.  With  this  answer  the  envoys  returned  to 
Sparta,  and  an  end  was  pul  to  negotiation. 

It  seems  evident,  from  the  account  of  Thucydides,  thai  the  Athe- 
nian public  was  nol  brought  to  this  resolution  without  much  reluc- 
tance, and  greal  fear  of  the  consequences,  especially  destruction  of 
property  in  Attica;  and  that  a  considerable  minority  took  opposition 
on  the  Megarian  decree — the  ground  skillfully  laid  by  Sparta  for 
breaking  the  unanimity  of  her  enemy,  and  strengthening  the  party 
opposed  to  Perikles.     But   we  maj  idedly  infer  from  the 

same  historian— especially  from  the  proceedings  of  Corinth  and 
Sparta  as  he  set- them  forth— that  Athens  could  nol  have  avoided 
the  war  v,  ithout  such  an  abnegation  both  of  dignity  and  power  as  do 
nation  under  any  government  will  ever  submit  to,  and  as  would  even 
have  left  her  without  decenl  security  for  her  individual  rights.  To 
accept  the  war  tendered  to  her  was  a  matter  not  merely  of  prudence 
but  of  necessity:  the  tone  of  exaction  assumed  by  the  Spartan  envoys 
would  have  rendered  concession  a  mere  evidence  of  weakness  and 
fear.  As  the  account  of  Thucydidi  bears  out  the  judgment  of 
Perikles  on  this  important  point,  so  i  also  -how-  us  that  Athens  was 
not  less  in  the  right  upon  the  received  principles  of  international 
dealing.  It  was  not  Athi  ns  (as  the  Spartans  themselves  afterward 
came  to  feel  i,  liut  her  enemies,  who  broke  the  provisions  of  the  truce. 
by  encouraging  the  revolt  of  Potidsea,  and  by  promising  invasion  of 
Attica;  it  was  cot  Athens,  hut  hi  r  enemies,  who  after  thus  breaking 
the  truce,  made  a  string  of  exorbitant  demands,  in  order  to  gel  upas 
good  a  case  a-  possible  for  war.  The  case  made  out  by  Perikles, 
justifying  the  war  on  grounds  both  of  right  and  prudence,  is  iu 
all  its  main  points  borne  out  by  the  impartial  voice  of  Thucydides. 
And  though  it  is  perfectly  true  that  the  ambition  of  Athens  had  b«en 


EQUIVOCAL  PERIOD.  517 

great,  and  the  increase  of  her  power  marvelous,  during  the  thirty 
live  years  between  the  repulse  of  Xerxes  and  the  Thirty  years'  truce- 
it  is  not  less  true  that  by  that  truce  she  lost  very  largely,  and  that 
she  acquired  nothing  to  compensate  such  loss  during  the  fourteen 
years  between  the  truce  and  the  Korkyra'an  alliance.  The  policy  of 
Perikles  had  not  been  one  of  foreign  aggrandizement,  or  of  increas- 
ing vexation  and  encroachment  toward  other  Grecian  powers.  Even 
the  Korkyrsean  alliance  was  noway  courted  by  him,  and  was  in  truth 
accepted  with  paramount  regard  to  the  obligations  of  the  existing 
truce;  while  the  circumstances,  out  of  which  that  alliance  grew, 
testily  a  more  forward  ambition  on  the  part  of  Corinth  than  on  that 
of  Athens,  to  appropriate  to  herself  the  Korkj'raean  naval  force.  It 
is  common  to  ascribe  the  Peloponnesian  war  to  the  ambition  of 
Athens,  but  this  is  a  partial  view  of  the  case.  The  aggressive  sen- 
timent, partly  fear,  partly  hatred,  wTas  on  the  side  of  the  Peloponne- 
sians,  who  were  not  ignorant  that  Athens  desired  the  continuance  of 
peace,  but  were  resolved  not  to  let  her  stand  as  she  was  at  the  con- 
clusion of  the  Thirty  years'  truce.  It  was  their  purpose  to  attack  her 
and  break  down  her  empire,  as  daDgerous,  wrongful,  and  auti  Hel- 
lenic. The  war  was  thus  partly  a  contest  of  principle,  involving  the 
popular  proclamation  of  the  right  of  every  Grecian  state  to  autonomy, 
against  Athens:  partly  a  contest  of  power,  wherein  Spartan  and 
Corinthian  ambition  was  not  less  conspicuous,  and  far  more  aggress- 
ive in  the  beginning,  than  Athenian. 

Conformably  to  what  is  here  said,  the  first  blow  of  the  war  was 
struck,  not  by  Athens,  but  against  her.  After  the  decisive  answer 
given  to  the  Spartan  envoys,  taken  in  conjunction  with  the  previous 
proceedings,  and  the  preparations  actually  going  on,  among  the 
Peloponnesian  confederacy,  the  truce  could  hardly  be  said  to  be  still 
in  force,  though  there  was  no  formal  proclamation  of  rupture.  A 
few  weeks  passed  in  restricted  and  mistrustful  intercourse;  though 
individuals  who  passed  the  borders  did  not  yet  think  it  necessary  to 
take  a  herald  with  them,  as  in  time  of  actual  war.  Had  the  excess  of 
ambition  been  on  the  side  of  Athens  compared  with  her  enemies,  this 
was  the  time  for  her  to  strike  the  first  blow,  carrying  with  it  of  course 
great  probability  of  success,  before  their  preparations  were  com- 
pleted. But  she  remained  strictly  within  the  limits  of  the  truce, 
while  the  disastrous  series  of  mutual  aggressions,  destined  to  tear  in 
pieces  the  entrails  of  Hellas,  was  opened  by  her  enemy  and  her 
neighbor. 

The  little  town  of  Platsea,  still  hallowed  by  the  memorable  victory 
over  the  Persians  as  well  as  by  the  tutelary  consecration  received 
from  Pausanias,  was  the  scene  of  this  unforeseen  enterprise.  It 
stood  in  Bceotia,  immediately  north  of  Kithseron;  with  the  borders  of 
Attica  on  one  side,  and  the  Theban  territory  (from  which  it  was 
separated  by  the  river  Asopus)  on  the  other:  the  distance  between 
Platsea  and  Thebes  being  about  seventy  stadia,  or  eight  miles.  Thou£*j 


\  OF  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR 

:  ,n  by  descent,  the  Plateaus  were  completely  separated  from 
L'otiau  league,  and  in  hearty  alliance  (as  well  as  qualified  com- 
munion of  civil  rights)  with  the  Athenians,  who  had  protected  them 

■it  the  bitter  enmity  of  Tin  lies  lor  a  period  of  now  nearly  thn  i 

Bui  in  spite  of  this  long  proscription  the  Thebans,  as  chiefs 
nf  the  Boeotian  league,  still  fell  themselves  wronged  by  the  separa 

!  A.n  oligarchical  faction  of  wealthy  Jrlateans  espi 

their  cause  with  a  view  of  subverting  the  democratical  government 
of  the  town — of  destroying  iis  leaders,  their  political  rivals— and  of 
establishing  an  oligarchy  with  themselves  as  the  chiefs.  Naukleides, 
and  others  of  this  faction,  entered  into  a  seeret  conspiracy  with 
Eurymachus  and  the  oligarchy  of  Thebes.  To  both  ii  appeared  a 
tempting  prize,  since  war  was  close  at  hand,  to  take  advantage  of 
this  ambiguous  interval  before  watches  had  been  placed  and  tin  pre- 
cautions of  a  state  of  war  commenced.  They  resolved  to  surprise 
the  tow  n  of  Plataea  in  the  night,  during  a  period  of  religious  festival, 
in  order  thai  the  population  might  be  most  completely  off  their  guard. 
Accordingly,  on  a  rainy  nighi  towards  the  close  of  March  431  b.c, 
a  body  of  rather  more  than  300  Theban  hoplites,  commanded  by  two 
of  the  Boaotarchs,  Pythangelus  and  Diemporus,  and  including  Eury- 
machus in  the  ranks,  presented  themselves  at  the  gate  of  Platea 
during  the  first  sleep  of  the  citizens.  Naukleides  and  his  partisans 
opened  the  gate  and  conducted  them  to  the  agora,  which  they  reached 
and  occupied  in  military  order  without  the  least  resistance.  The 
best  pari  of  the  Theban  military  force  was  intended  to  arrive  at  Pla- 

.  break  of  day  in  order  to  support  them. 
Naukleides  and  his  friends,  following  the  instincts  of  political 
antipathy,  were  eager  to  conduct  the  Thebans  to  the  houses  of  their 
opponents,  the  deniocratical  leaders,  in  order  thai  the  latter  mighl  he 
seized  or  dispatched.  But  to  this  the  Thebans  would  not  consent. 
Believing  themselves  now  masters  of  the  town,  and  certain  of  a  large 
re  enforcement  at  daylight,  they  thought  they  could  overawe  the  citi- 
zens into  an  apparently  willing  acquiescence  in  their  terms,  without 
any  actual  violence.  They  wished,  moreover,  rather  to  soften  and 
justify  than  to  aggravate  the  gross  public  wrong  already  committed. 
Accordingly  their  herald  was  directed  to  invite  by  public  proclama- 
tion all  Plateans  who  were  willing  to  return  to  their  ancient  sym- 
pathies of  race  and  to  the  Boeotian  confederacy,  that  they  should 
come  forth  and  take  station  as  brethren  in  the  armed  ranks  of  the 
Thebans.  And  the  Plateans,  suddenly  roused' from  sleep  by  the 
astounding  news  that  their  great  enemy  was  master  of  the  town,  sup- 
posed  amidst  the  darkness  that  the  number  of  assailants  was  far 

r  than  the  reality:  so  that  in  spite  of  their  strong  attachment 
to  Athens,  they  thought  their  case  hopeless,  and  began  to  open  nego- 
tiations.    Bui  finding  out  soon,  in  spite  of  the  darkness,  as  the  di£ 
cussion  proceeded,  that  the  real  numbers  of  the  Thebans  were  not 
greater  than  could  be  dealt  with,  they  speedily  took  courage  and 


THE  ATTACK.  5U 

determined  to  attack  them;  establishing  communication  with  each 
other  by  breaking  through  the  walls  of  their  private  houses,  in  ordei 
that  they  might  not  be  detected  in  moving  about  in  the  streets  01 
ways,  and  forming  barricades  with  wagons  across  such  of  these  ways 
as  were  suitable. 

A  little  before  daybreak,  when  their  preparations  were  fully  com- 
pleted, they  sallied  forth  from  their  houses  to  the  attack,  and  imme- 
diately came  to  close  quarters  with  the  Thebans.  The  latter,  still 
fancying  themselves  masters  of  the  town  and  relying  upon  a  satisfac- 
tory close  to  the  discussions  when  daylight  should  arrive,  now  found 
themselves  surprised  in  their  turn,  and  under  great  disadvantages. 
Having  been  out  all  night  under  a  heavy  rain,  they  were  inclosed  in 
a  town  which  they  did  not  know,  with  narrow,  crooked,  and  muddy 
ways,  such  as  they  would  have  had  difficulty  in  tracking  out  even 
by  daylight.  Nevertheless,  on  finding  themselves  suddenly  assailed 
they  got  as  well  as  they  could  into  close  order,  and  repelled  the  Pla- 
taeans  two  or  three  times.  The  attack  was  repeated  with  loud  shouts, 
while  the  women  also  screamed,  howled,  and  threw  tiles  from  the 
flat-roofed  houses,  until  at  length  the  Thebans  became  dismayed  and 
broken.  But  flight  was  not  less  difficult  than  resistance;  for  they 
could  not  find  their  way  out  of  the  city,  and  even  the  gate  by  which 
they  entered,  the  only  one  open,  had  been  closed  by  a  Flalaean  citizen 
who  thrust  into  it  the  point  of  a  javelin  in  jilace  of  the  peg  whereby 
the  bar  was  commonly  held  fast.  Dispersed  about  the  city  and  pur- 
sued by  men  who  knew  every  inch  oi  the  ground,  some  ran  to  the 
top  of  the  wall  and  jumped  down  on  the  outside,  most  of  them  per- 
ishing in  the  attempt — a  few  others  escaped  through  an  unguarded 
gate  by  cutting  through  the  bar  with  a  hatchet  which  a  woman  gave 
to  them — while  the  greater  number  ran  into  the  open  doors  of  a  large 
barn  or  building  in  conjunction  with  the  wall,  mistaking  these  doors 
for  an  approach  to  the  town-gate.  They  were  here  blocked  up  with- 
out a  chance  to  escape,  and  the  Platseans  at  first  thought  of  setting 
fire  to  the  building.  But  at  length  a  convention  was  concluded, 
whereby  they,  as  well  as  the  other  Thebans  in  the  city,  agreed  to 
surrender  at  discretion. 

Had  the  re-enforcements  from  Thebes  arrived  at  the  expected  hour, 
this  disaster  would  have  been  averted.  But  the  heavy  rain  and  dark 
night  retarded  their  whole  march,  while  the  river  Asopus  was  so 
much  swollen  as  to  be  with  difficulty  fordable :  so  that  before  they 
reached  the  gates  of  Plata?a,  their  comrades  within  were  either  slain 
or  captured.  Which  fate  had  befallen  them,  the  Thebans  without 
could  not  tell:  but  they  immediately  resolved  to  seize  what  they 
could  find,  persons  as  well  as  property,  in  the  Platoean  territory  (no 
precautions  having  been  taken  as  yet  to  guard  against  the  perils  of 
war  by  keeping  within  the  Avails)  in  order  that  they  might  have 
something  to  exchange  for  such  Thebans  as  were  prisoners.  Before 
this  step  could  be  executed,  however,  a  herald  came  forth  from  the 


620     BEGINNING  OF  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR 

\i>\\  u  i"  remonstrate  with  them  upon  their  unholy  proceeding  in  hav 
flagranti}  violated  the  truce,  and  e  pecially  to  warn  them  not 
to  do  an}  wrong  without  the  walls.  It  they  retired  withoul  inflict- 
ing farther  mischief,  their  prisoners  within  should  be  riven  up  to 
them;  if  otherwise,  the  e  prisoners  would  be  slain  immediately.  A 
convention  having  been  concluded  and  swum  to  on  this  basis,  the 
Thebans  retired  withoul  any  active  measures. 

Swell  at  leasl  was  the  Theban  account  of  what  preceded  tin ir 
retirement.  Bui  the  Platseans  gave  a  different  statement;  denying 
that  they  had  made  any  categorical  promise  or  sworn  any  oath — and 
affirming  thai  they  had  engaged  for  nothing  except  to  suspend  any 
ep  with  regard  to  the  prisoners,  until  discussion  had  been 
entered  into  to  see  if  a  satisfactory  agreement  could  be  concluded. 

As  Thucydides  records  both  of  these  statements,  without  intimat- 
ing to  which  of  the  two  he  himself  gave  the  preference,  we  may 

presume  that  both  of  them  found  credence  with  respectable  persons. 

The  Theban  story  is  undoubtedly  the  most  probable:  but  the  Platse- 
ans appear  to  Lave  \  iolated  the  understanding,  even  upon  their  own 

construction  of  it.  For  no  sooner  had  the  Thebans  retired,  than  they 
(the  Platseans)  hastily  brought  in  their  citizens  and  the  best  of  their 
movable  property  within  (he  walls,  and  then  slew  all  their  prisoners 
forthwith,  without  even  entering  into  the  formalities  of  negotiation. 
The  prisoners  thus  put  to  death,  among  w  hem  was  Eurj  machushim- 

■  ere  ISO  in  number. 
On  the  firsl   entrance   of   the   Theban   assailants  at   night,  a  mes- 
senger had  started  from  Platsea  to  carry  the  news  to  Athens:  a  second 

Qger  followed  him  to  report  the  victory  and  capture  of  the 
prisoners,  as  soon  as  it  had  been  achieved.  The  Athenians  sent 
back  a  herald  without  delay,  enjoining  the  Platseans  to  take  no  step 

ding  the  prisoners  until  consultation  should  be  had  with 
Athens.  Perikles  doubtless  feared  what  turned  out  to  be  the  fact; 
for  the  prisoners  had  been  slain  before  his  messenger  could  arrive. 
Apart  from  the  terms  id'  the  convention,  and  looking  only  to  the 
received  practice  of  ancient  warfare,  their  destruction  could  not  be 
denounced  as  unusually  cruel,  though  the  Thebans  afterward, 
when  fortune  was  in  their  favor,  chose  to  designate  it  as  such.  But 
impartial  contemporaries  would  notice,  and  the  Athenians  in  par- 
ticular would  deeply  lament,  the  glaring  impolicy  of  the  act.  For 
Thebes,  the  best  thing  of  all  would  of  course  be  to  get  back  her  cap- 
tured citizens  forthwith :  but  next  to  that,  the  least  evil  would  be, 
to  hear  thai  thej  had  been  put  to  death.  In  the  hands  of  the  Athe- 
nians and  Platseans,  they  would  have  been  the  means  of  obtaining 
iron:  her  much  more  valuable  sacrifices  than  their  lives,  considered 
as  a  portion  of  Theban  power,  were  worth:  so  strong  was  the  feel- 
ing of  sympathy  for  imprisoned  citizens,  several  of  them  men  of 
rank  and  importance, — as  may  be  seen  by  the  pasl  conduct  of 
Athens  after  the  battle  of  Koroneia,  and  by  that  of  Sparta  (hereafter 


GRECIAN  FEELING.  521 

to  be  recounted)  after  the  taking  of  Sphakteria.  The  Plata?ans, 
obeying  the  simple  instinct  of  wrath  and  vengeance,  threw  away 
this  great  political  advantage,  which  the  more  long-sighted  Perikles 
would  gladly  have  turned  to  account. 

At  the  time  when  the  Athenians  sent  their  herald  to  Platrea,  they  also 
issued  orders  for  seizing  all  Boeotians  who  might  be  found  in  Attica; 
while  they  lost  no  time  in  sending  forces  to  provision  Plataea  and 
placing  it  on  the  footing  of  a  garrison  town,  removing  to  Athens  the 
old  men  and  sick,  with  the  women  and  children.  No  complaint  or 
discussion  respecting  the  recent  surprise,  was  thought  of  by  either 
party.  It  was  evident  to  both  that  the  war  was  now  actually  begun 
— that  nothing  was  to  be  thought  of  except  the  means  of  carrying  it 
on — and  that  there  could  be  no  farther  personal  intercourse  except 
under  the  protection  of  heralds.  The  incident  at  Plataea,  striking  in 
all  its  points,  wound  up  all  parties  to  the  full  pitch  of  warlike 
excitement.  A  spirit  of  resolution  and  enterpise  wTas  abroad  every- 
where, especially  among  those  younger  citizens,  yet  unacquainted 
with  the  actual  bitterness  of  war,  whom  the  long  truce  but  just 
broken  had  raised  up.  And  the  contagion  of  high-strung  feeling 
spread  from  the  leading  combatants  into  every  corner  of  Greece, 
manifesting  itself  partly  in  multiplied  oracles,  prophecies,  and  relig- 
ious legends  adapted  to  the  moment.  A  recent  earthquake  at  Delos, 
too,  as  well  as  various  other  extraordinary  physical  phenomena, 
were  construed  as  prognostics  of  the  awful  struggle  impending — a 
period  fatally  marked  not  less  by  eclipses,  earthquakes,  drought, 
famine,  and  pestilence,  than  by  the  direct  calamities  of  war. 

An  aggression  so  unwarrantable  as  the  assault  on  Plataea  tended 
doubtless  to  strengthen  the  unanimity  of  the  Athenian  assembly,  to 
silence  the  opponents  of  Perikles,  and  to  lend  additional  weight  to 
those  frequent  exhortations  whereby  the  great  statesman  was  wont 
to  sustain  the  courage  of  his  countrymen.  Intelligence  was  sent 
around  to  forewarn  and  hearten  up  the  numerous  allies  of  Athens, 
tributary  as  well  as  free.  The  latter,  with  the  exception  of  the 
Thessalians,  Akarnanians,  and  Messenians  at  Naupaktus,  were  all 
insular — Chians,  Lesbians,  Korkyroeans,  and  Zakynthians.  To  tho 
island  of  Kephallenia,  the  Athenians  sent  envoys,  but  it  was  nol 
actually  acquired  to  their  alliance  until  a  few  months  afterward. 
With  the  Akarnanians,  too,  their  connection  had  only  been  com- 
menced a  short  time  before,  seemingly  during  the  preceding  sum- 
mer, arising  out'  of  the  circumstances  of  the  town  of  Argos  in 
Amphilochia. 

That  town,  situated  on  the  southern  coast  of  the  Ambrakian  Gulf, 
was  originally  occupied  by  a  portion  of  the  Amphilochi,  a  non- 
Hellenic  tribe,  whose  lineage  apparently  was  something  intermediate 
between  Akarnanians  and  Epirots.  Some  colonists  from  Ambrakia, 
having  been  admitted  as  co-residents  with  the  Amphilochian  inhabi- 
tants of  this  town,  presently  expelled  them,  and  retained  the  town 


522     BEGINNING  OF  THE  PELOPON^ESIAN  WAR. 

with  its  territory  exclusively  for  themselves.  The  expelled  inhabi- 
tants, fraternizing  with  their  fellow-tribes  around  us  well  as  with  the 
Akarnanians,  looked  oul  for  the  means  of  restoration;  and  in  order 
tin  it,  invited  the  assistance  of  Athens.  Accordingly,  t lie 
Athenians  senl  an  expedition  of  thirty  triremes  under  rhormio, 
who,  joining  the  Amphilochians  and  Akarnanians,  attacked  and  car- 
ried Argos  reduced  the  Ambrakiots  to  slavery,  and  restored  the 
town  to  tli<'  Amphilochians  and  Akarnanians.  It  was  on  this  o<  ca- 
Bion  thai  the  alliance  of  the  Akarnanians  with  Athens  was  flrsl  con- 
cluded, and  thai  their  personal  attachment  to  the  Athenian  admiral 
Phormio  commenced. 

The  numerous  subjects  of  Athens,  whose  contributions  stood 
embodied  in  the  annual  tribute,  were  distributed  all  over  and  around 
the  .l'.iM'im,  including  all  the  island-  north  of  Krete,  with  the  excep- 
ij  Melos  and  Thera.  Moreover  the  elements  of  force  collected 
in  Athens  itself  were  fully  worthy  of  the  metropolis  of  so  ureal  an 
empire.  Perikles  could  make  a  report  to  his  countrymen  of  300  tri- 
remes lit  for  active  service;  1200  horsemen  and  horse  bowmen;  1600 

bowmen;  and  the  ureal  force  of  all,  not  less   than  29,000  hopliti 

mostly  citizen-,  bul  in  part  also  metics.  The  chosen  portion  of  these 
hopHtes,  both  as  to  age  and  as  to  equipment,  were  13,000  in  number; 
while  the  remaining  16,000.  including  the  elder  and  younger  citizens 
and  the  luetics,  did  garrison  dun  on  the  walls  of  Athens  and  Pei 
raeu  —  on  the  long  line  of  wall  which  connected  Athens  both  with 
Peirseus  and  Phalerum — and  in  the  various  fortified  posts  both  in 
and  out  of  Attica.  In  addition  to  these  large  military  and  naval 
forces,  the  city  possessed  in  the  acropolis  an  accumulated  treasure  of 
coined  silver  amounting  to  not  less  than  6,000  talents,  or  about 
£1,400,000,  derived  from  annual  laying  by  of  tribute  from  the  allies 
and  perhaps  of  other  revenues  besides.  The  treasure  had  at  one  time 
been  as  large  as  9,700  talents,  or  aboul  £2,230,000,  but  the  cost  of 
the  recent  religious  and  architectural  decorations  at  Athens,  as  well 
as  the  siege  of  Potidsea,  had  reduced  it  to  6,000.  Moreover  the  acro- 
polis and  the  temples  throughout  the  city  were  rich  in  votive  offer- 
ings, deposits,  sacred  plate,  and  silver  implements  for  the  proc< 
and  festivals,  etc.,  to  an  amount  estimated  at  more  than  500  talent-, 
while  the  greal  statue  of  the  goddess  recently  set  up  by  Pheidias  in 
the  Parthenon,  composed  of  ivory  and  gold,  included  a  quantity  of 
the  latter  metal  not  less  than  40  talents  in  weight — equal  in  value  to 
more  than  400  talents  of  silver — and  all  of  it  so  arranged  that  it  could 
be  taken  off  from  the  statue  at  pleasure.  In  alluding  to  th<  Be  sacri  d 
valuables  among  the  resources  of  the  state,  Perikles  spoke  of  them 
only  as  open  to  be  so  applied  in  case  of  need,  with  the  firm  resolution 
of  replacing  them  during  the  first  season  of  prosperity,  just  as  the 
Corinthians  had  proposed  to  borrow  from  Delphi  and  01; 
Besides  the  hoard  thus  actually  in  hand,  th  in  a  large  annual 

revenue,  amounting  under  the  single  head  of  tribute  from  the  sub- 


AMPLE  GROUNDS  FOR  CONFIDENCE.  ft2'.l 

ject  allies,  to  600  talents,  equal  to  about  £138,000;  besides  all  other 
items,  making  up  a  general  total  of  at  least  1000  talents,  or  about 
£230,000. 

To  this  formidable  catalogue  of  means  for  war,  were  to  be  added 
other  items  not  less  important,  but  which  did  not  admit  of  being 
weighed  and  numbered;  the  unrivalled  maritime  skill  and  discipline 
of  the  seamen — the  democratieal  sentiment,  alike  fervent  and  unani- 
mous, of  the  general  mass  of  citizens — and  the  superior  development 
of  directing  intelligence.  And  when  we  consider  that  the  enemy 
had  indeed  on  his  side  an  irresistible  land-force,  but  scarcely  any- 
thing else — few  ships,  no  trained  seamen,  no  funds,  no  powers  of 
combination  or  headship — we  may  be  satisfied  that  there  were  ample 
materials  for  an  orator  like  Perikles  to  draw  an  encouraging  picture 
of  the  future.  He  could  depict  Athens  as  holding  Peloponnesus 
under  siege  by  means  of  her  navy  and  a  chain  of  insular  posts,  and 
he  could  guarantee  success  as  the  sure  reward  of  persevering, 
orderly,  and  well-considered  exertion,  combined  with  firm  endurance 
under  a  period  of  temporary,  but  unavoidable  suffering;  and  com- 
bined too  with  another  condition  hardly  less  difficult  for  Athenian 
temper  to  comply  with — abstinence  from  seductive  speculations  of 
distant  enterprise' while  their  force  wTas  required  by  the  necessities  of 
war  near  home.  But  such  prospects  were  founded  upon  a  long- 
sighted calculation,  looking  beyond  immediate  loss  and  therefore 
ill-calculated  to  take  hold  of  the  mind  of  an  ordinary  citizen — or  at 
any  rate  likely  to  be  overwhelmed  for  the  moment  by  the  pressure  of 
actual  hardship.  Moreover  the  best  which  Perikles  could  promise 
was  a  successful  resistance — the  unimpaired  maintenance  of  that 
great  empire  to  which  Athens  had  become  accustomed;  a  policy 
purely  conservative,  wdtkout  any  stimulus  from  the  hope  of  positive 
acquisition — and  not  only  without  the  sympathy  of  other  states,  but 
with  feelings  of  simple  acquiescence  on  the  part  of  most  of  her  allies 
— of  strong  hostility  everywhere  else. 

On  all  these  latter  points  the  position  of  the  Peloponnesian  alliance 
was  far  more  encouraging.  So  powerful  a  body  of  confederates  had 
never  been  got  together — not  even  to  resist  Xerxes.  Not  only  the 
entire  strength  of  Peloponnesus  (except  Argeians  and  Achseans,  both 
of  whom  were  neutral  at  first,  though  the  Acha3an  town  of  Pellene 
joiued  even  at  the  beginning,  and  all  the  rest  subsequently)  was 
brought  together,  but  also  the  Megarians,  Boeotians,  Phokians,  Opun- 
tian  Lokrians,  Ambrakiots,  Leukadians,  and  Anaktorians.  Among 
these,  Corinth,  Megara,  Sikyon,  Pellene,  Elis,  Ambrakia,  and  Leu- 
kas  furuished  maritime  force,  while  the  Boeotians,  Phokians,  and 
Lokrians  supplied  cavalry.  Many  of  these  cities  however  supplied 
hoplites  besides;  but  the  remainder  of  the  confederates  furuished  hop- 
lites  only.  It  was  upon  this  latter  force,  not  omitting  the  powerful 
Boeotian  cavalry,  that  the  main  reliance  was  placed ;  especially  for 
the  first  and  most  important  operation  of  the  war — the  devastation 


524     BEGINNING  Of  THE  PELOPONNESUS  WAR. 

tica.  Bound  together  by  the  strongest  common  feeling  of 
active  antipathy  to  Athens,  the  whole  confederacy  was  full  of  hope 
and  confidence  for  this  immediate  forward  march — gratifying  al  once 
both  to  their  hatred  and  to  their  love  of  plunder,  by  the  hand  of 
destruction  laid  upon  the  richest  country  in  I  ireece—  and  presenting 
:i  chance  even  of  terminating  the  war  al  once,  it'  the  pnde  of  the 
A  then  ild  be  so  intolerably  Btung  as  to  provoke  them  to  come 

out  ;iik1  fight.  Certainty  of  immediate  success,  al  the  lirsi  outset — a 
common  purpose  to  be  accomplished  and  a  common  enemy  to  be  pul 
down,  with  favorable  sympathies  throughout  Greec< — all  these  cir- 
cumstances filled  the  Peloponnesians  with  Banguine  hopes  al  the 
of  the  war.  And  the  general  persuasion  was,  thai  Athens, 
even  if  not  reduced  to  submission  by  the  firsl  invasion,  could  not 
possibly  hold  oul  more  than  two  or  three  summers  against  the  repeti- 
tion of  this  destructive  process.  Strongly  did  this  confidence  con- 
trast with  the  proud  and  resolute  submission  to  necessity,  not  without 
desponding  anticipations  of  the  result,  which  reigned  among  the 
auditors  of  Perikles. 

But  though  the  Peloponnesians  entertained  confident  belief  of 
carrying  their  point  by  simple  land  campaign,  they  did  not  neglect 
auxiliary  preparations  for  naval  and  prolonged  war.  The  Lacedae- 
monians resolvi  d  to  make  up  the  naval  force  aln  ady  existing  among 
themselves  and  their  allies  to  an  aggregate  of  500  triremes;  chiefly 
by  the  aid  of  the  friendly  Dorian  cities  on  the  Italian  and  Sicilian 
Upon  each  of  them  a  specific  contribution  was  imposed, 

her  with  a  given  contingent;  order-  being  transmitted  to  them 
to  make  such  preparations  silently  without  any  immediate  declara- 
tion of  hostility  againsl  Athens,  and  even  without  refusing  for  the 

al  to  admil  any  single  Athenian  ship  into  their  harbors.  Besides 
this,  the  Lacedaemonians  laid  their  schemes  for  sending  envoys  to 
the  Persian  king  and  to  other  barbaric  powers — a  remarkable  evi- 
of  melancholy  revolution  in  Grecian  affairs,  when  that  poten- 
tate whom  the  common  arm  of  Greece  had  so  hardly  repulsed  a  few 
year-  before,  was  now  Invoked  to  bring  the  Phoenician  fleet  again 
into  the  .E^iiiii  for  the  purpose  of  crushing  Athens. 

The  invasion  of  Attica  however  without,  delay  was  the  primary 
object  to  he  accomplished;  and  for  that  the  Lacedaemonians  issued 
circular  orders  immediately  after  the  attempted  surprise  of  Platsea. 
:i  the  vote  of  the  allies  was  requisite  to  sanction  any  war.  yet 
when  that  vote  had  once  been  passed,  the  Lacedaemonians  look  upon 
themselves  to  direct  all  the  measures  of  execution.  Two  thirds  of 
the  hoplites  of  each  confederate  city — apparently  two  thirds  of  a  cer- 
tain assumed  rating  for  which  the  city  was  held  liable  in  the  books 
of  the  confederacy,  so  that  the  Boeotians  and  others  who  furnished 
cavalry,  were  not  constrained  to  send  two  thirds  of  their  entire  force 
of  hoplites— were  summoned  to  be  present  on  a  certain  day  at  the 
fethmus  of  Corinth,  with  provisions  and  equipment  for  an  expedition 


LAST  ENVOY  SENT  TO  ATHENS.  525 

of  some  length.  On  the  day  named,  the  entire  force  was  found  duly 
assembled.  The  Spartan  king  Archidamus,  on  taking  the  command, 
addressed  to  the  commanders  and  principal  officers  from  each  city  a 
discourse  of  solemn  warning  as  well  as  encouragement.  His  remarks 
Were  directed  chiefly  to  abate  the  tone  of  sanguine  over-confidence 
which  reigued  in  the  army.  After  adverting  to  the  magnitude  of  (he 
occasion,  the  mighty  impulse  agitating  all  Greece,  and  the  general 
good  wishes  which  accompanied  them  against  an  enemy  so  much 
hated — he  admonished  them  not  to  let  their  great  superiority  of  num- 
bers and  bravery  seduce  them  into  a  spirit  of  rash  disorder.  "We 
are  about  to  attack  (he  said)  an  enemy  admirably  equipped  in  every 
way,  so  that  we  may  expect  certainly  that  they  will  come  out  and 
fight,  even  if  they  be  not  now  actually  on  the  march  to  meet  us  at 
the  border,  at  least  when  they  see  us  in  their  territory  ravaging  and 
destroying  their  property.  All  men  exposed  to  any  unusual  indig- 
nity become  incensed,  and  act  more  under  passion  than  under  calcu- 
lation, when  it  is  actually  brought  under  their  eyes:  much  more  will 
the  Athenians  do  so,  accustomed  as  they  are  to  empire,  and  to  ravage 
the  territory  of  others  rather  than  to  see  their  own  so  treated." 

Immediately  on  the  army  being  assembled,  Archidamus  sent  Mele- 
sippus as  envoy  to  Athens  to  announce  the  coming  invasion,  being 
still  in  hopes  that  the  Athenians  would  yield.  But  a  resolution  had 
been  already  adopted,  at  the  instance  of  Perikles,  to  receive  neither 
herald  nor  envoy  from  the  Lacedaemonians  when  once  their  army 
was  on  its  march:  so  that  Melesippus  was  sent  back  without  even 
being  permitted  to  enter  the  city.  He  was  ordered  to  quit  the  terri- 
tory before  sunset,  with  guides  to  accompany  him  and  prevent  him 
from  addressing  a  word  to  any  one.  On  parting  from  his  guides  at 
the  border,  Melesippus  exclaimed,  with  a  solemnity  but  too  accu- 
rately justified  by  the  event — "This  day  will  be  the  beginning  of 
many  calamities  to  the  Greeks." 

Archidamus,  as  soon  as  the  reception  of  his  last  envoy  was  made 
known  to  him,  continued  his  march  from  the  isthmus  into  Attica— 
which  territory  he  entered  by  the  road  of  03noe,  the  frontier  Athe- 
nian fortress  of  Attica  toward  Bceotia.  His  march  was  slow,  and  he 
thought  it  necessary  to  make  a  regular  attack  on  the  fort  of  Gmoe, 
which  had  been  put  into  so  good  a  state  of  defense,  that  after  all  the 
various  modes  of  assault,  in  which  the  Lacedaemonians  were  not 
skillful,  had  been  tried  in  vain — and  after  a  delay  of  several  days 
before  the  place — he  was  compelled  to  renounce  the  attempt. 

The  want  of  enthusiasm  on  the  part  of  the  Spartan  king — his  mul- 
tiplied delays,  first  at  the  isthmus,  next  in*  the  march,  and  lastly 
before  GSnoe — were  all  offensive  to  the  fiery  impatience  of  the  army, 
who  were  loud  in  their  murmurs  against  him.  He  acted  upon  the 
calculation  already  laid  down  in  his  discourse  at  Sparta — that  the 
highly  cultivated  soil  of  Attica  was  to  be  looked  upon  as  a  hostage 
for  the  pacific  dispositions  of  the  Athenians,  who  would  be  more 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  PELOPOl  NESIAN  WAR. 

likely  to  yield  when  devastation,  though  not  yet  inflicted,  was  never- 
thelese  impending  and  al  their  doors.  In  this  point  of  view,  a  littlo 
delay  al  the  border  was  no  disadvantage;  and  perhaps  the  partisans 
of  peace  .-it  Athens  may  have  encouraged  him  to  hope  thai  it  would 
enable  them  to  prevail. 

Nor  can  we  doubl  that  it  was  a  moment  full  of  difficulty  to  Peri- 
K  1<  ~  at  Alliens,  lie  hail  to  proclaim  to  all  the  proprietors  in  Attica 
the  painful  truth,  that  they  must  prepare  to  see  their  lands  and 
overrun  and  ruined;  and  that  their  persons,  families,  and 
movable  property  inusi  lie  brought  in  for  safety  either  to  Athens,  or 
to  one  of  the  forts  in  the  territory — or  carried  across  to  one  of  the 
neighboring  islands.  It  would  indeed  make  a  Favorable  impression 
when  he  told  them  that  Arehidamus  was  his  own  family  friend,  yet 
only  within  such  limits  as  consisted  with  duty  to  the  city:  in  case 
therefore  the  invaders,  while  ravaging  Attica,  should  receive  in-truc- 
tion  to  spare  his  own  land-,  he  would  forthwith  make  them  over  to 
the  slate  a-  pulilic  property.  Such  a  case  was  likely  enough  to  arise, 
if  nol  from  the  personal  feeling  of  Arehidamus,  at  least  from  the 
d(  liberate  maneuver  of  the  Spartans,  who  would  seek  thus  to  set  the 
Athenian  public  againsl  Perikles,  as  they  had  tried  to  do  before  by 
demanding  the  banishment  of  the  sacrilegious  Alkmaeonid  race.  But 
though  this  declaration  from  Perikles  would  doubtless  provoke  a 
hearty  cheer,  yet  the  lesson  which  he  had  to  inculcate — not  simply 
for  admission  as  prudent  policy,  but  for  actual  practice— was  one 
revolting  alike  to  the  immediate  interest,  the  dignity,  and  the  sym- 
pathies of  his  countrymen.  To  see  their  lands  all  ravaged,  without 
l  an  arm  to  defend  them — to  earry  away  their  wives  and  fami- 
lies, and  to  desert  and  dismantle  their  country  residences,  as  they  had 
done  during  the  Persian  invasion — all  in  the  confidence  of  compensa- 
tion in  other  ways  and  of  remote  ultimate  success — were  recommen- 
dations which  probably  no  one  but  Perikles  could  have  hoped  to 
enforce.  They  were,'  moreover,  the  more  painful  to  execute, 
inasmuch  as  the  Athenian  citizens  had  very  generally  retained  the 
habits  of  residing  permanently,  not  in  Athens,  but  in  the  various 
denies  of  Attica;  many  of  which  still  preserved  their  temples,  their 
festivals,  their  local  customs,  and  their  limited  municipal  autonomy, 
handed  down  from  the  day  when  they  had  once  been  independent  of 
Athens.  It  was  but  recently  that  the  farming,  the  comforts,  and  the 
ornaments,  thus  distributed  over  Attica,  had  been  restored  from  the 
ruin  of  the  Persian  invasion,  and  brought  to  a  higher  pitch  of 
improvement  than  ever.  Yet  the  fruits  of  this  labor,  and  the  scenes 
of  these  local  affections,  were  now  to  be  again  deliberately  abandoned 
to  a  new  aggressor,  and  exchanged  for  the  utmost  privation  and  dis- 
comfort. Arehidamus  might  well  doubt  whether  the  Athenians 
would  nerve  themselves  up  to  the  pitch  of  resolution  necessary  for 
'his  distressing  step,  when  it  came  to  the  actual  crisis;  and  whether 
they  would  not  constrain  Perikles  against  his  will  to  make  proposi- 


ATTICA  DESERTED.  527 

tions  for  peace.  His  delay  on  the  border,  and  postponement  of 
actual  devastation,  gave  the  best  chance  for  such  propositions  to  be 
made;  though,  as  this  calculation  was  not  realised,  the  army  raised 
plausible  complaints  against  him  for  having  allowed  the  Athenians 
time  to  save  so  much  of  their  property. 

From  all  parts  of  Attica  the  residents  flocked  within  the  spacious 
walls  of  Athens,  which  now  served  as  shelter  for  the  houseless,  like 
Salaniis  forty-nine  years  before — entire  families  with  all  their  mova- 
ble property,  and  even  with  the  woodwork  of  their  houses.  The 
sheep  and  cattle  were  conveyed  to  Euboea  and  the  other  adjoining 
islands.  Though  a  few  among  the  fugitives  obtained  dwellings  or 
reception  from  friends,  the  greater  number  were  compelled  to  encamp 
in  the  vacant  spaces  of  the  city  and  Peiraeus,  or  in  and  around  the 
numerous  temples  of  the  city — always  excepting  the  acropolis  and 
the  Eleusinion,  which  were  at  all  times  strictly  closed  to  profane 
occupants.  But  even  the  ground  called  the  Peiasgikon  immediately 
under  the  acropolis,  which  by  an  ancient  and  ominous  tradition  was 
interdicted  to  human  abode  was  made  use  of  under  the  present 
necessity.  Many  too  placed  their  families  in  the  towers  and  recesses 
of  the  city  walls,  or  in  sheds,  cabins,  tents,  or  even  tubs,  disposed 
along  the  course  of  the  long  walls  to  Peiraeus.  In  spite  of  so  serious 
an  accumulation  of  losses  and  hardships,  the  glorious  endurance  of 
their  fathers  in  the  time  of  Xerxes  was  faithfully  copied,  and  copied 
too  under  more  honorable  circumstances,  since  at  that  time  there 
had  been  no  option  possible;  whereas  the  march  of  Archidamus 
might  perhaps  now  have  been  arrested  by  submissions,  ruinous 
indeed  to  Athenian  dignity,  yet  not  inconsistent  with  the  security  of 
Athens,  divested  of  her  rank  and  power.  Such  submissions,  if  sug- 
gested as  they  probably  may  have  been  by  the  party  opposed  to  Peri- 
kles,  found  no  echo  among  the  suffering  population. 

After  having  spent  several  dajrs  before  (Enoe  without  either  taking 
the  fort  or  receiving  any  message  from  the  Atheuians,  Archidamus 
marched  onward  to  Eleusis  and  the  Thriasian  plain — about  the 
middle  of  June,  eighty  days  after  the  surprise  of  Plataea.  His  army 
was  of  irresistible  force,  not  less  than  60,000  hoplites,  according  to 
the  statement  of  Plutarch,  or  of  100,000  according  to  others.  Con- 
sidering the  number  of  constituent  allies,  the  strong  feeling  by  which 
they  were  prompted,  and  the  shortness  of  the  expedition  combined 
with  the  chance  of  plunder — even  the  largest  of  these  two  numbers 
is  not  incredibly  great,  if  wre  take  it  to  include  not  hoplites  only,  but 
cavalry  and  light-armed  also.  But  since  Thucydides,  though  com- 
paratively full  in  his  account  of  this  march,  has  stated  no  general 
total,  we  may  presume  that  he  had  heard  none  upon  which  he  could 
rely. 

As  the  Athenians  had  made  no  movement  toward  peace,  Archida- 
mus anticipated  that  they  would  come  forth  to  meet  him  in  the  fertile 
plain  of  Eleusis  and  Thria,  which  was  the  first  portion  of  territory 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR. 

thai  he  -.-it  down  to  ravage.  Ye\  do  Athenian  force  appeared  to 
oppose  In".,  i  scepl  a  detachment  of  cavalry,  ^\ In >  were  repulsed  in  a 
skirmish  near  the  small  lakes  called  Rheiti.  Saving  laid  waste  this 
plain  without  any  serious  opposition,  Archidamus  did  Dot  think  fit 
to  pursue  the  straight  road  which  from  Thria  conducted  directly  to 
Athens  across  the  ridge  of  Mount  ,;  bul  turned  off  to  the 

eastward,  leaving  thai  mountain  on  his  righl  hand  until  he  came  to 
Cropeia,  where  he  crossed  a  portion  of  the  line  of2Egaleos  over  to 
Acharnse.  He  was  bere  about  seven  miles  from  Alliens,  on  a 
declivity  sloping  down  into  the  plain  which  stretches  westerly  and 
nortb-westerly  from  Athens,  and  visible  from  the  city  walls.  Here 
he  encamped,  keeping  his  army  in  perfect  order  for  battle,  bul  at  the 
same  time  intending  to  damage  and  ruin  the  place  and  its  neighbor- 
hood.  Acharnse  was  the  largesl  and  mosl  populous  of  all  the  denies 
in  Attica,  furnishing  no  less  than  3,000  hoplites  to  the  national  line, 
and  flourishing  as  well  by  its  corn,  vines,  and  olives,  as  by  its  pecu- 
liar abundance  of  charcoal-burning  from  the  forests  of  ilex  on  the 
neighboring  hills.  Moreover,  if  we  are  to  believe  Aristophanes,  the 
Acharnian  proprietors  were  not  merely  sturdy  "hearts  of  oak,"  but 
peculiarly  vehemenl  and  irritable.  It  illustrates  the  condition  of  a 
Grecian  territory  under  invasion,  when  we  find  this  greal  deme — 
which  could  not  have  contained  lees  than  12,000  free  inhabitants  of 
both  sexes  and  all  ages,  with  at  least  an  equal  number  of  slave — 
completely  deserted.  Archidamus  calculated  that  when  the  Athe- 
nians actually  saw  his  troops  so  close  to  their  city,  carrying  fire  and 
sword  over  their  -wealthiest  canton,  their  indignation  would  become 
uncontrollable  and  they  would  march  oul  forthwith  to  battle.  The 
Acharnian  proprietors  especially  (he  thought)  would  be  foremost  in 
inflaming  this  temper  and  insisting  upon  protection  to  their  own 
properties — or  if  the  remaining  citizens  refused  to  march  out  along 
with  them,  they  would,  after  having  been  thus  left  undefended  to 
ruin,  become  discontented  and  indifferent  to  the  general  weal. 

Though  his  calculation  was  not  realized,  it  was  nevertheless 
founded  upon  most  rational  grounds.  What  Archidamus  anticipated 
was  on  the  poinl  of  happening,  and  nothing  prevented  it  except  the 
personal  ascendency  of  Perikles,  strained  to  its  very  utmost.  So 
long  as  the  invading  army  was  engaged  in  the  Thriasian  plain,  the 
Athenians  had  some  faint  hope  that  it  might  (like  Pleistoanax  four- 
teen years  before)  advance  no  farther  into  the  interior.  But  when  it 
came  to  Acharnse,  within  sighl  of  the  city  walls — when  the  ravagers 
were  actually  seen  destroying  buildings,  fruit-trees,  and  crops  in  the 
plain  of  Athens,  a  sighl  strange  to  every  Athenian  eye.  except  to 
those  very  old  men  who  recollected  the  Persian  invasion — the  exas- 
p<  ration  Of  the  general  body  of  citizens  rose  to  a  pitch  never  before 
known.  The  Acharnians  first  of  all — next  the  youthful  citizens  gen- 
erally— became  madly  clamorous  for  arming  and  going  forth  to  fight. 
Knowing  well  their  own  great" strength,  hut   l<  -  correctly  info 


TRYING  POSITION  OF  PERIKLES.  £29 

of  the  superior  strength  of  the  enemy,  they  felt  confident  that  victory- 
was  within  their  reach.  Groups  of  citizens  were  everywhere  gath- 
ered together,  angrily  debating  the  critical  question  of  the  moment; 
while  the  usual  concomitants  of  excited  feeling — oracles  and  prophe- 
cies of  diverse  tenor,  many  of  them  doubtless  promising  success 
against  the  enemy  at  Acharnse — were  eagerly  caught  up  and  circu- 
lated. 

In  this  inflamed  temper  of  the  Athenian  mind,  Perikles  was  natu- 
rally the  great  object  of  complaint  and  wTrath.  He  was  denounced 
as  the  cause  of  all  the  existing  suffering.  He  was  reviled  as  a  cow- 
ard for  not  leading  out  the  citizens  to  fight,  in  his  capacity  of  general. 
The  rational  convictions  as  to  the  necessity  of  the  war  and  the  only 
practicable  means  of  carrying  it  on,  wmich  his  repeated  speeches  had 
implanted,  seemed  to  be  altogether  forgotten.  This  burst  of  spon- 
taneous discontent  was,  of  course,  fomented  by  the  numerous  politi- 
cal enemies  of  Perikles,  and  particularly  by  Kleon,  now  rising  into 
importance  as  an  opposition  speaker;  whose  talent  for  invective  wa3 
thus  first  exercised  under  the  auspices  of  the  high  aristocratical  party, 
as  well  as  of  an  excited  public.  But  no  manifestations,  however  vio- 
lent, could  disturb  either  the  judgment  or  the  firmness  of  Perikles. 
He  listened  unmoved  to  all  the  declarations  made  against  him,  reso- 
lutely refusing  to  convene  any  public  assembly,  or  any  meeting 
invested  with  an  authorized  character,  under  the  present  irritated 
temper  of  the  citizens.  It  appears  that  he  as  general,  or  rather  Ihe 
Board  of  the  Generals  among  whom  he  was  one,  must  have  been 
invested  constitutionally  with  the  power  not  only  of  calling  the 
Ekklesia  when  they  thought  fit,  but  also  of  preventing  it  from  meet- 
ing, and  of  postponing  even  those  regular  meetings  which  commonly 
took  place  at  fixed  times,  four  times  in  the  prytany.  No  assembly 
accordingly  took  place,  and  the  violent  exasperation  of  the  people 
was  thus  prevented  from  realizing  itself  in  any  rash  public  resolution. 
That  Perikles  should  have  held  firm  against  this  raging  force,  is  but 
one  among  the  many  honorable  points  in  his  political  character:  but 
it  is  far  less  wonderful  than  the  fact  that  his  refusal  to  call  the  Ekkle- 
sia was  efficacious  to  prevent  the  Ekklesia  from  being  held.  The 
entire  body  of  Athenians  were  now  assembled  within  the  walls,  and 
if  he  refused  to  convoke  the  Ekklesia,  they  might  easily  have  met  in 
the  Pynx  without  him;  for  which  it  would  not  have  been  difficult  at 
such  a  juncture  to  provide  plausible  justification.  The  inviolable 
respect  which  the  Athenian  people  manifested  on  this  occasion  for 
the  forms  of  their  democratical  constitution — assisted  doubtless  by 
their  long-established  esteem  for  Perikles,  yet  opposed  to  an  excite- 
ment alike  intense  and  pervading,  and  to  a  demand  apparently  rea- 
sonable, in  so  far  as  regained  the  calling  of  an  assembly  for  discussion 
— is  one  of  the  most  memorable  incidents  in  their  history. 

While  Perikles  thus  decidedly  foi'bade  any  general  march  out  for 
battle,  he  sought  to  provide  as  much  employment  as  possible  for  the 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  PELOPONNE8IAN  AVAR. 

compn  361  '1  i  a  rerness  of  the  citizens.  The  cavalry  were  sent  forth, 
together  with  the  Thessalian  cavalry,  their  allies,  for  the  purpose  of 
restraining  the  excursions  of  the  enemy's  lighl  troops,  and  protect- 
ing the  lands  near  the  city  from  plunder.  At  the  same  time  he  fitted 
out  a  pow  'it'ul  expedition, which  sailed  forth  to  ravage  Peloponne- 
bub,  even  while  the  invaders  were  yet  in  Atiiea.  Archidamus,  after 
having  remained  engaged  in  the  devastation  of  Acharnse  long  enough 
to  satisfy  himself  that  the  Athenians  would  nol  hazard  a  battle, 
tinned  away  from  Athens  in  a  north-westerly  direction  toward  the 
demes  between  .Mount  Brilessus  and  Mount  Parnes,  on  the  road  pass- 
ing through  Dekeleia.  The  army  continued  ravaging  the  e  districts 
until  their  provisions  were  exhausted,  and  then  quitted  Attica  by  the 
north-western  road  near  Oropus,  which  brought  them  intoBceotia. 
As  the  Oropians,  though  not  Athenians,  were  ye1  dependent  upon 
Athens— the  district  ofGr8ea,a  portion  of  their  territory,  was  laid 
waste;  after  which  the  army  dispersed  and  retired  hack  to  their 
respective  homes.  It  would  seem  that  they  (nutted  Attica  toward 
the  end  of  July,  having  remained  in  the  country  between  thirty  aud 
forty  days. 

Meanwhile  the  Athenian  expedition,  under  Karkinus,  Proteas.  and 
Sokrates,  joined  by  fifty  Korkyraean  ships  and  by  some  other  allies, 
Bailed  round  Peloponnesus,  landing  in  various  parts  to  inflicl  dam- 
age, and  among  other  places  at  Methonc  (Modem),  on  the  south-west- 
ern peninsula  of  the  Lacedaemonian  territory.  The  place,  neither 
strong  nor  well-garrisoned,  would  have  been  carried  with  little  diffi- 
culty, had  not  Brasidas,  the  sou  of  Tellis—  a  gallant  Spartan  now 
mentioned  for  the  Qrst  time,  hut  destined  to  great  celebrity  after- 
ward—who happened  to  he  on  guard  al  a  neighboring  post,  thrown 
himself  into  it  with  100  men  by  a  rapid  movement,  before  the  dis- 
persed Athenian  troops  could  he  broughl  together  to  prevent  him. 
Be  infused  such  courage  into  the  defenders  of  the  place  that  every 
attack  was  repelled,  and  the  Athenians  were  forced  to  re-embark — an 
act  of  prowess  which  procured  for  him  the  first  public  honors 
bestowed  hy  the  Spartans  during  this  war.  Sailing  northward  along 
the  western  coasl  of  Peloponnesus,  the  Athenians  landed  again  on  the 
coasl  of  Elis,  a  little  south  of  the  promontory  called  Cape  Ichthys: 
tbey  ravaged  the  territory  for  two  days,  defeating  both  the  troops  in 
the  neighb  >rhood  and  300  chosen  mi  a  from  the  central  Eleian  terri- 
tory. Strong  winds  on  a  harborless  coast  now  induced  the  captains 
to  -ail  with  most  of  the  troops  round  Cape  Ichthys.  in  order  to  reach 
the  harbor  of  Pheia  on  tin-  northern  side  of  it;  while  the  Messcnian 
hoplites,  marching  hy  land  across  the  promontory,  attacked  Pheia  and 
d  it  by  assault.  When  the  fleet  arrived,  all  were  re  embarked 
—  the  full  force  of  Elis  being  under  inarch  to  attack  them.  They 
then  sailed  northward,  landing  on  various  other  spots  to  commit 
devastation,  until  they  reached  Sollium,  a  Corinthian  settlement  on 
the  coast  of  Akarnania.     They  captured  this  place,  which   they 


ATHENIANS  EXPEL  THE  ^EGINETANS.  531 

handed  over  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  neighboring  Akarnanian  town 
of  Paherus — as  well  as  Astakus,  from  whence  they  expelled  the  des- 
pot Euarchus,  and  enrolled  the  town  as  a  member  of  the  Athenian 
alliance.  From  hence  they  passed  over  to  Kephallenia,  which  they 
were  fortunate  enough  also  to  acquire  as  an  ally  of  Athens  without 
any  compulsion — with  its  four  distinct  towns  or  districts,  Pales, 
Krauii,  Same,  and  Prone.  These  various  operations  took  up  near 
three  months  from  about  the  beginning  of  July,  so  that  they  returned 
to  Athens  toward  the  close  of  SepFember — the  beginning  of  the 
winter  half  of  the  year,  according  to  the  distribution  of  Thucydides. 

This  was  not  the  only  maritime  expedition  of  the  summer.  Thirty 
more  triremes,  under  Kleopompus,  were  sent  through  the  Euripus  to 
the  Lokrian  coast  opposite  to  the  northern  part  of  Eubcea.  Some 
disembarkations  were  made,  whereby  the  Lokrian  towns  of  Thro- 
nium  and  Alope  were  sacked,  and  farther  devastation  inflicted; 
while  a  permanent  garrison  was  planted,  and  a  fortified  post  erected, 
in  the  uninhabited  island  of  Atalanta  opposite  to  the  Lokrian  coast, 
in  order  to  restrain  privateers  from  Opus  and  the  other  Lokrian 
towns  in  their  excursions  against  Euboea.  It  was  farther  determined 
to  expel  the  ^.Eginetan  inhabitants  from  iEgina,  and  to  occupy  the 
island  with  Athenian  colonists.  This  step  was  partly  rendered  pru- 
dent by  the  important  position  of  the  island  midway  between  Attica 
and  Peloponnesus.  But  a  concurrent  motive,  and  probably  the 
stronger  motive,  was  the  gratification  of  ancient  antipathy,  and 
revenge  against  a  people  who  had  been  among  the  foremost  in  pro- 
voking the  war  and  in  inflicting  upon  Athens  so  much  suffering. 
The  iEginetans  with  their  wives  and  children  were  all  put  ou  ship- 
board and  landed  in  Peloponnesus — where  the  Spartans  permitted 
them  to  occupy  the  maritime  district  and  town  of  Thyrea,  their  last 
frontier  towards  Argos:  some  of  them,  however,  found  shelter  in 
other  parts  of  Greece.  The  island  was  made  over  to  a  detachment 
of  Athenian  kleruchs,  or  citizen  proprietors  sent  thither  by  lot. 

To  the  sufferings  of  the  ^Eginetans,  which  we  shall  hereafter  find  still 
more  deplorably  aggravated,  we  have  to  add  those  of  the  Megarians. 
Both  had  been  most  zealous  in  kindling  the  war,  but  upon  none  did 
the  distress  of  war  fall  so  heavily.  Both  probably  shared  the  prema- 
ture confidence  felt  among  the  Peloponnesian  confederacy,  that 
Athens  could  never  hold  out  more  than  a  year  or  two — and  wTere 
thus  induced  to  overlook  their  own  undefended  position  against  her. 
Toward  the  close  of  September,  the  full  force  of  Athens,  citizens 
and  metics,  marched  into  the  Megarid,  under  Perikles,  and  laid  waste 
the  greater  part  of  the  territory:  while  they  were  in  it,  the  hundred 
ships  which  had  been  circumnavigating  Peloponnesus,  having  arrived 
at  xEgina  on  their  return,  went  and  joined  their  fellow-citizens  in  the 
Megara,  instead  of  going  straight  home.  The  junction  of  the  two 
formed  the  largest  Athenian  force  that  had  ever  yet  been  seen 
together:  there  were  10,000  citizen  hoplites,  (independent  of  3,000 


532     BEGINNING  OF  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR 

others  who  were  engaged  in  the  siege  of  Potidaea),  and  8,000  metic 
hoplites  —besides  a  large  number  of  light  troops.  large 

a  force  the  Megarians  could  of  course  make  no  bead,  so  thai  their 
territory  was  all  laid  waste,  even  to  the  city  walls.  For  several  years 
of  the  war,  the  Athenians  inflicted  this  destruction  once,  and  often 
twice  in  the  ame  year.  A  decree  was  proposed  in  the  Athenian 
Ekklesia  by  Charinus,  though  perhaps  uo1  carried,  to  the  effect  that 
the  Strategi  every  year  should  swear,  as  a  portion  of  their  oath  of 
office,  that  they  would  twice  invade  and  ravage  the  Megarid.  As  the 
Athenians  at  the  same  time  kept  the  port  of  Nisaea  blocked  up,  by 
means  of  their  superior  naval  force  and  of  the  neighboring  coast  of 
Salamis,  the  privations  imposed  on  the  Megarians  became  extreme 
and  intolerable.  Not  merely  their  corn  and  fruits,  but  even  their 
garden  vegetables  near  the  city,  were  rooted  up  and  destroyed  and 
their  situation  seems  often  to  have  been  that  of  a  Ik  sieged  city  hard 
pre  sed    by  famine.      liven    in    the   time   of   I'ausanias.  five   centuries 

afterward,  the  miseries  of  the  town  during  these  years  were  remem- 
bered and  communicated  to  him,  being  assigned  as  the  reason  why 

one  of  their  most  memorable  statues  had  never  been  completed. 

To  the  various  military  operations  of  Athens  (luring  the  course  of 
this  summer,  some  other  measures  of  moment  are  to  he  added.  More- 
over Thucydides  notices  an  eclipse  of  the  sun,  w  Inch  modern  astro- 
nomical   calculations   refer   to    the    third   of  August:   had   this  eclipse 

happened  three  months  earlier,  immediately  before  the  entrance  of 
the   Peloponnesians  into  Attica,  it  mighl   probably  have  been  con 
strued  as  an  unfavorable  omen,  and  caused  the  postponement  of  the 
scheme. 

Expecting  a  prolonged  struggle,  the  Athenians  now  made  arrange- 
ments for  placing  Attica  in  a  permanent  state  of  defense,  both  by  sea 
and  land.  What  these  arrangements  were,  we  arc  not  told  in  detail, 
but  one  of  them  was  sufficiently  remarkable  to  be  named  particularly. 
They  set  apart  one  thousand  talents  out  of  the  treasure  in  the  acro- 
polis as  an  inviolable  reserve,  not  to  be  touched  except  on  the  single 
contingency — of  a  hostile  naval  force  about  to  assail  the  city,  with  no 
other  means  at  hand  to  defend  it.  They  further  enacted  that  if  any 
citizen  should  propose,  or  any  magistrate  put  the  question,  in  the 
public  assembly,  to  make  a  different  application  of  this  reserve,  he 
should  be  punishable  with  death.  Moreover  they  resolved  every 
year  to  keep  back  one  hundred  of  their  best  triremes,  and  trierarchs 
to  command  and  equip  them,  for  the  same  special  necessity.     It  may 

be  doubled  whether  this  latter  provision  was  placed  under  the  same 
stringent  sanction,  or  observed  with  the  same  rigor,  as  that  con- 
cerning the  money;  which  latter  was  not  departed  from  until  the 
twentieth  \  ear  of  the  war.  after  all  the  disasters  of  the  Sicilian  expe- 
dition, and  on  the  terrible  news  of  the  revolt  of  Chios.  It  was  on 
thai  occasion  that  the  Athenians,  having  fust  repealed  the  sentence 
of  capital  punishment  against  any  proposer  of  the  forbidden  change. 


REMARKS  ON  THE  DECREE.  533 

appropriated  the  money  to  meet  the  then  imminent  peril  of  the  com- 
monwealth. 

The  resolution  here  taken  about  this  sacred  reserve,  and  the  rigorous 
sentence  interdicting  contrary  propositions,  is  pronounced  by  Mr. 
Mitford  to  be  an  evidence  of  the  indelible  barbarism  of  the  demo- 
crat ical  government.  But  we  must  recollect,  first,  that  the  sentence 
of  capital  punishment  was  one  which  could  hardly  by  possibility 
come  into  execution;  for  no  citizen  would  be  so  mad  as  to  make  the 
forbidden  proposition,  while  this  law  was  in  force.  Whoever  desired 
to  make  it,  would  first  begin  by  proposing  to  repeal  the  prohibitory 
law,  whereby  he  would  incur  no  danger,  whether  the  assembly 
decided  in  the  affirmative  or  negative.  If  he  obtained  an  affirmative 
decision,  he  would  then,  and  then  only,  proceed  to  move  the  re-appro- 
priation of  the  fund.  To  speak  the  language  of  English  parliamen- 
tary procedure,  he  would  first  move  the  suspension  or  abrogation  of 
the  standing  order  whereby  the  proposition  was  forbidden — next,  he 
would  move  the  proposition  itself.  In  fact  such  was  the  mode 
actually  pursued,  when  the  thing  at  last  came  to  be  done.  But 
though  the  capital  sentence  could  hardly  come  into  effect,  the  proc- 
lamation of  it  in  t&rrorem  had  a  very  distinct  meaning.  It  expressed 
the  deep  and  solemn  conviction  which  the  people  entertained  of  the 
importance  of  their  own  resolution  about  the  reserve — it  forewarned 
all  assemblies  and  all  citizens  to  come,  of  the  danger  of  diverting  it 
to  any  other  purpose — it  surrounded  the  reserve  with  an  artificial 
sanctity,  which  forced  every  man  who  aimed  at  the  re-appropriation 
to  begin  with  a  preliminary  proposition  formidable  on  the  very  face 
of  it,  as  removing  a  guarantee  which  previous  assemblies  had  deemed 
of  immense  value,  and  opening  the  door  to  a  contingency  which 
they  had  looked  upon  as  treasonable.  The  proclamation  of  a  lighter 
punishment,  or  a  simple  prohibition  without  any  definite  sanction 
whatever,  would  neither  have  announced  the  same  emphatic  convic- 
tion, nor  produced  the  same  deterring  effect.  The  assembly  of  431 
B.C.  could  not  in  any  way  enact  laws  which  subsequent  assemblies 
could  not  reverse;  but  it  could  so  frame  its  enactments,  in  cases  of 
peculiar  solemnity,  as  to  make  its  authority  strongly  felt  upon  the 
judgment  of  its  successors,  and  to  prevent  them  from  entertaining 
motions  for  repeal  except  under  necessity  at  once  urgent  and  obvious. 

Far  from  thinking  that  the  law  now  passed  at  Athens  displayed 
barbarism,  either  in  the  end  or  in  the  means,  I  consider  it  princi- 
pally remarkable  for  its  cautious  and  long-sighted  view  of  the  future 
— qualities  the  exact  reverse  of  barbarism — and  worthy  of  the  gen- 
eral character  of  Perikles,  who  probably  suggested  it.  Athens  was 
just  entering  into  a  war  which  threatened  t<5  be  of  indefinite  length, 
and  was  certun  to  be  very  costly.  To  prevent  the  people  from 
exhausting  all  their  accumulated  fund,  and  to  place  them  under  a 
necessity  of  reserving  something  against  extreme  casualties,  was  an 
object  of  immense  importance.     Now  the  particular  casualty,  which 


534      BEGINNING  OF  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR. 

Perikles  (assuming  him  to  be  the  proposer)  named  as  the  sole  condi 
i  ■ .  .11  of  touching  this  1000  talents,  mighl  be  considered  as  of  all 
others  the  mosl  improbable,  in  the  year  481  B.C.  So  immense  was 
then  the  superiority  of  the  Athenian  naval  force,  thai  to  suppose  it 
defeated,  and  a  Peloponnesian  fled  in  full  sail  for  Peiraeus,  was  a 
possibility  which  it  required  a  statesman  of  extraordinary  caution  to 
look  forward  to,  and  which  it  is  wonderful  that  the  people  generally 
could  have  been  induced  to  contemplate.  Once  tied  up  to  this  pur- 
however,  the  fund  lay  ready  for  any  other  terrible  emergency. 
We  shall  find  the  actual  employmentof  it  incalculably  beneficial  to 
Athens,  at  a  momenl  of  the  gravest  peril,  when  she  could  hardly 
have  protected  herself  without  some  such  special  resource.  The 
people  would  scarcely  have  sanctioned  so  rigorous  an  economy,  had 
ii  nol  been  proposed  to  them  at  a  period  so  early  in  the  war  that 
their  available  reserve  was  still  much  larger.  But  it  will  be  forever 
to  the  credit  of  their  foresighl  as  well  as  constancy,  that  they  should 
first  have  adopted  such  a  precautionary  measure,  and  afterward 
adhered  to  it  for  nineteen  years,  under  severe  pressure  for  money, 
until  at  length  a  case  arose  which  rendered  farther  abstinence  really, 
and  not  constructively,  impossible. 

To  display  their  force  and  take  revenge  by  disembarking  and  rav- 
aging parts  of  Peloponnesus,  was  doubtless  of  much  importance  to 
Athens  during  this  first  summer  of  the  war:  though  it  might  seem 
that  the  force  so  employed  was  quite  as  much  needed  in  the  conquest 
of  Potidsea,  which  still  remained  under  blockade — and  of  the  neigh- 
boring Chalkidians  in  Thrace,  still  in  revolt.  It  was  during  the 
course  of  this  summer  that  a  prospect  opened  to  Athens  of  subduing 
these  towns,  through  the  assistance  of  Sitalkes  king  of  the  Odrysian 
Thracians.  That  prince  had  married  the  sisterof  Nymphodorus.a  citi- 
zen of  Abdera,who  engaged  to  render  him  and  his  son  Sadokus  allies 
of  Athens.  Sent  for  to  Aihens  and  appointed  proxenus  of  Athens  at 
Abdera,  which  was  one  of  the  Athenian  subject  allies,  Nymphodorus 
made  this  alliance,  and  promised  in  the  name  of  Sitalkes  that  a  suffi- 
cient Thracian  force  should  be  sent  to  aid  Athens  in  the  re-conquest 
of  her  revolted  towns:  the  honor  of  Athenian  citizenship  was  at  the 
same  time  conferred  upon  Sadokus.  Nymphodorus  farther  estab- 
lished a  good  understanding  between  Perdikkas  of  Macedonia  and 
the  Athenians,  who  were  persuaded  to  restore  to  him  Thesma,  which 
they  had  before  taken  from  him.  The  Athenians  had  thus  the  prom- 
ise of  powerful  aid  against  the  Chalkidians  and  Potidaeans:  yet  the 
latter  still  held  out,  with  little  prospect  of  immediate  surrender. 
Moreover  the  town  of  Astakus  in  Akarnania,  which  the  Athenians 
had  captured  during  the  summer  in  the  course  of  their  expei 
round  Peloponnesus,  was  recovered  during  the  autumn  by  the 
deposed  de-pot  Euarchus,  assisted  by  forty  Corinthian  triremes  and 
1000  hoplites.  This  Corinthian  armament,  after  restoring  Euarchus, 
made  some  unsuccessful  descents  both  upon  other  parts  of  Akarnania 


PERIKLES  IS  CHOSEN  ORATOR.  535 

and  upon  the  island  of  Kcphallenia.  In  the  latter  they  were  entrap- 
ped i^tcr  an  ambuscade  and  obliged  to  return  home  with  considerable 
loss. 

It  was  toward  the  close  of  autumn  also  that  Perikles,  chosen  by 
the  people  for  the  purpose,  delivered  the  funeral  oration  at  the  pub- 
lic interment  of  those  warriors  who  had  fallen  during  the  campaign. 
The  ceremonies  of  this  public  token  of  respect  have  already  been 
described  in  a  former  chapter,  on  occasion  of  the  conquest  of  Samos. 
But  that  which  imparted  to  the  present  scene  an  imperishable  inter- 
est, was  the  discourse  of  the  chosen  statesman  and  senator;  probably 
heard  by  Thocydides  himself,  and  in  substance  reproduced.  A  huge 
crowd  of  citizens  and  foreigners,  of  both  sexes  and  all  ages,  accom- 
panied the  funeral  possession  from  Athens  to  the  suburb  called  the 
outer  Kerameikus,  where  Perikles,  mounted  upon  a  lofty  stage  pre- 
pared for  the  occasion,  closed  the  ceremony  with  his  address.  The 
law  of  Athens  not  only  provided  this  public  funeral  and  commemor- 
ative discourse,  but  also  assigned  maintenance  at  the  public  expense 
to  the  children  of  the  slain  warriors  until  they  attained  military  age: 
a  practice  which  was  acted  on  throughout  the  whole  war,  though  we 
have  only  the  description  and  discourse  belonging  to  this  single  occa- 
sion. 

The  eleven  chapters  of  Thucydides  which  comprise  this  funeral 
speech  are  among  the  most  memorable  relics  of  antiquity;  consider- 
ing that  under  the  language  and  arrangement  of  the  historian — 
always  impressive,  though  sometimes  harsh  and  peculiar,  like  the 
workmanship  of  a  powerful  mind  misled  by  a  bad  or  unattainable 
model — we  possess  the  substance  and  thoughts  of  the  illustrious 
statesman.  A  portion  of  it,  of  course,  is  and  must  be  commonplace, 
belonging  to  all  discourses  composed  for  a  similar  occasion.  Yet 
this  is  true  only  of  a  comparatively  small  portion.  Much  of  it  is  pecu- 
liar, and  every  way  worthy  of  Perikles — comprehensive,  rational, 
and  full  not  less  of  sense  and  substance  than  of  earnest  patriotism. 
It  thus  forms  a  strong  contrast  with  the  jejune,  though  elegant, 
rhetoric  of  other  harangues,  mostly  not  composed  for  actual  delivery. 
And  it  deserves,  in  comparison  with  the  funeral  discourses  remain- 
ing to  us  from  Plato,  and  the  pseudo-Demosthenes,  and  even  Lysias, 
the  honorable  distinction  which  Thucydides  claims  for  his  own  his- 
tory— an  ever-living  possession,  not  a  mere  show-piece  for  the 
moment. 

In  the  outset  of  his  speech  Perikles  distinguishes  himself  from 
those  who  had  preceded  him  in  the  same  function  of  public  orator, 
by  dissenting  from  the  encomiums  which  if  had  been  customary  to 
bestow  on  the  law  enjoining  these  funeral  harangues.  He  thinks 
that  the  publicity  of  the  funeral  itself,  and  the  general  demonstra- 
tions of  respect  and  grief  by  the  great  body  of  citizens,  tell  more 
emphatically  in  token  of  gratitude  to  the  brave  dead,  when  the  scene 
passes  in  silence — than  when  it  is  translated  into  the  words  of  a 


536     BEGINNING  OF  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR. 

speaker,  who  may  easily  offend  either  by  incompetency  or  by  appar- 
ent feebleness,  or  perhaps  even  by  unseasonable  exaggeration. 
Nevertheless,  the  custom  having  been  embodied  in  law,  and  elected 
as  he  has  been  by  the  citizens,  he  comes  forward  to  discharge  the 
duly  imposed  upon  him  in  the  best  manner  he  can. 

One  of  the  remarkable  features  in  this  discourse  is,  its  business- 
like, impersonal  character.  It  is  Athens  herself  who  undertakes  to 
commend  and  decorate  her  departed  sons,  as  well  as  to  hearten  up 
and  admonish  the  living. 

After  a  few  words  on  the  the  magnitude  of  the  empire  and  on  the 
glorious  efforts  as  well  as  endurance  whereby  their  forefathers  and 
they  had  acquired  it — Perikles  proceeds  to  sketch  the  plan  of  life, 
the  constitution,  and  the  manners,  under  -which  such  achievements 
were  brought  about. 

"  We  live  under  a  constitution  such  as  noway  to  envy  the  laws  of 
our  neighbors — ourselves  an  example  to  others,  rather  than  mere  imi- 
tators. It  is  called  a  demoi  racy,  since  its  permanent  aim  tends  to- 
ward the  Many  and  not  toward  the  Few.  As  to  private  matters  and 
disputes,  the  laws  deal  equally  with  every  man:  while  in  regard  to 
public  affairs  and  to  claims  of  individual  influence,  every  man's 
chance  of  advancement  is  determined  not  by  party  favor  but  by  real 
worth,  according  as  his  reputation  stands  in  his  own  particular  de- 
partment. Neither  poverty,  nor  obscure  station,  keep  him  back,  if 
h  K  ally  has  the  means  of  benefiting  the  city.  Moreover  our  social 
march  is  free,  not  merely  in  regard  to  public  affairs,  but  also  in  regard 
to  intolerance  of  each  other's  diversity  of  daily  pursuits.  For  we 
are  not  angry  with  our  neighbor  for  what  he  may  do  to  please  him- 
self, nor  do  we  ever  put  on  those  sour  looks,  wmich,  though  they  do 
no  positive  damage,  are  not  the  less  sure  to  offend.  Thus  conduct- 
ing our  private  social  intercourse  with  reciprocal  indulgence,  we  are 
restrained  from  wrong  on  public  matters  by  fear  and  reverence  of 
our  magistrates  for  the  time  being  and  of  our  laws — especially  such 
laws  as  are  instituted  for  the  protection  of  wrongful  sufferers,  and 
even  such  others  as,  though  not  written,  are  enforced  by  a  common 
sense  of  shame.  Besides  this,  we  have  provided  for  our  minds 
numerous  recreations  from  toil,  partly  by  our  customary  solemnities 
of  sacrifice  and  festival  throughout  the  year,  partly  by  the  elegance  of 
our  private  establishments — the  daily  charm  of  which  banishes  the 
sense  of  discomfort.  From  the  magnitude  of  our  city,  the  products 
of  the  whole  earth  are  brought  to  us,  so  that  our  enjoyment  of  for- 
eign luxuries  is  as  much  our  own  and  assured  as  those  which  we  grow 
at  home.  In  respect  to  training  for  war,  we  differ  from  our  oppo- 
nents (the  Lacedaemonians)  on  several  material  points.  First,  we  lay 
open  our  city  as  a  common  resell:  we  apply  no  xenelasy  to  exclude 
even  an  enemy  either  from  any  lesson  or  any  spectacle, the  full  view  of 
which  he  may  think  advantageous  to  him.  For  military  efficiency, 
we  trust  less  to  maneuvers  and  quackery  than  to  our  own  native 


EULOGY  UPON  ATHENS.  537 

bravery.  Next,  in  regard  to  education,  while  the  Lacedaemonians 
even  from  their  earliest  youth  subject  themselves  to  an  irksome  exer- 
cise for  the  attainment  of  courage,  we  with  our  easy  habits  of  life 
are  not  less  prepared  than  they,  to  encounter  all  perils  within  the 
measure  of  our  strength.  The  proof  of  this  is,  that  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  confederates  do  not  attack  us  one  by  one,  but  with  their  whole 
united  force;  while  we,  when  we  attack  them  at  home,  overpower 
for  the  most  part  all  of  them  who  try  to  defend  their  own  territory. 
None  of  our  enemies  lias  ever  met  and  contended  with  our  entire 
force ;  partly  in  consequence  of  our  large  navy — partly  from  our  dis- 
persion in  different  simultaneous  land-expeditions.  But  when  they 
chance  to  be  engaged  with  any  part  of  it,  if  victorious,  they  pretend 
to  have  vanquished  us  all — if  defeated,  they  pretend  to  have  been 
vanquished  by  all. 

"Now,  if  we  are  willing  to  brave  danger,  just  as  much  under  an 
indulgent  system  as  under  constant  toil,  and  by  spontaneous  courage 
as  much  as  under  force  of  law — we  are  gainers  in  the  end  by  not 
vexing  ourselves  beforehand  with  sufferings  to  come,  yet  still  appear- 
ing in  the  hour  of  trial  not  less  daring  than  those  who  toil  without 
ceasing. 

"  In  other  matters,  too,  as  well  as  in  these,  our  city  deserves  admir- 
ation. For  we  combine  elegance  of  taste  with  simplicity  of  life,  and 
we  pursue  knowledge  without  being  enervated:  we  employ  wealth 
not  for  talking  and  ostentation,  but  as  a  real  help  in  the  proper  sea- 
son :  nor  is  it  disgraceful  to  any  one  who  is  poor  to  confess  his  pov- 
erty, though  he  may  rather  incur  reproach  for  not  actually  keeping 
himself  out  of  poverty.  The  magistrates  who  discharge  public  trusts 
fulfil  their  domestic  duties  also — the  private  citizen,  while  engaged 
in  professional  business,  has  competent  knowledge  on  public  affairs: 
for  we  stand  alone  in  regarding  the  man  who  keeps  aloof  from  these 
latter  not  as  harmless,  but  as  useless.  Moreover,  we  always  hear 
and  pronounce  on  public  matters,  when  discussed  by  our  leaders — or 
perhaps  strike  out  for  ourselves  correct  reasoning  about  them:  far 
from  accounting  discussion  an  impediment  to  action,  we  complain 
only  if  we  are  not  told  what  is  to  be  done  before  it  becomes  our  duty 
to  do  it.  For  in  truth  we  combine  in  the  most  remarkable  manner 
these  two  qualities — extreme  boldness  in  execution  with  full  debate 
beforehand  on  that  which  we  are  going  about:  whereas  with  others, 
ignorance  alone  imparts  boldness — debate  introduces  hesitation. 
Assuredly  those  men  are  properly  to  be  regarded  as  the  stoutest  of 
heart,  who,  knowing  most  precisely  both  the  terrors  of  war  and  the 
sweets  of  peace,  are  still  not  the  less  willing'to  encounter  peril. 

"In  fine,  I  affirm  that  cur  city,  considered  as  a  whole,  is  the 
schoolmistress  of  Greece;  while  viewed  individually,  we  enable  the 
same  man  to  furnish  himself  out  and  suffice  to  himself  in  the  great- 
est variety  of  ways  and  with  the  most  complete  grace  and  refine- 
ment.    This  is  no  empty  boast  of  the  moment,  but  genuine  reality 


538     BEG  I N  N I N  Ci  0  F  T  HE  PELOPON  X  E81 A  N  WAR 

and  the  power  of  the  city,  acquired  through  the  dispositions  jusi  indi- 
cated, exists  to  prove  it.  Athens  alone  of  all  cities  stands  forth  in 
actual  trial  greater  than  her  reputation :  ber  enemy  when  he  attacks 
her  will  not  nave  his  pride  wounded  by  suffering defeal  from  feehle 
hands— her  subjects  will  nol  ihink  themselves  degraded  as  it'  their 
obedience  were  paid  to  an  unworthy  superior.  Having  thus  pul 
forth  our  power,  nol  uncertified,  but  backed  by  the  mosl  evident 
proofs,  we  shall  be  admired  not  less  by  posterity  than  by  our  con- 
temporaries. Nor  do  we  stand  in  need  either  of  Homer  or  of  any 
other  panegyrist,  whose  winds  may  for  the  momenl  please,  though 
the  truth  it'  known  would  confute  their  intended  meaning.  We  have 
compelled  all  land  and  sea  to  become  accessible  to  our  courage,  and 
have  planted  everywhere  imperishable  monuments  of  our  kin  dm 
as  well  as  of  i  in'  hostility. 

"Such  is  the  city  on  behalf  of  which  these  citizens,  resolved  thai 
it  should  nol  be  "wrested  from  them,  have  noblj  fought  and  died — 
and  on  behalf  of  which  all  of  us  here  left  b<  hind  must  willingly  toil. 
It  is  for  this  reason  that  1  have  spoken  at  length  concerning  the  citj', 
at  once  to  draw  from  it  the  lesson  thai  the  conflict  is  not  for  equal 
motives  between  us  and  enemies  who  possess  nothing  of  the  like 
excellence — and  to  demonstrate  by  proofs  the  truth  of  my  enc<  - 
pronounced  upon  her," 

Perikles  pursues,  al  considerable  additional  length,  the  same  tenor 
of  mixed  exhortation  to  the  living  and  eulogy  of  the  dead;  with 
many  special  and  emphatic  observations  addressed  to  the  relatives 
of  the  latter,  who  wire  assembled  around  and  doubtless  very  near 
him.  But  the  extract  winch  I  have  already  made  is  so  long,  that 
no  further  addition  would  be  admissible:  yet  it  was  impossible  to 
pass  over  lightly  the  picture  of  the  Athenian  commonwealth  in  its 
glory,  as  delivered  by  the  ablest  citizen  of  the  age.  The  effect  of  the 
democratical  constitution,  with  its  diffused  and  equal  citizenship,  in 
calling  forth  not  merely  strong  attachment,  hut  painful  self-sacrifice, 
on  the  part  of  all  Athenians — is  nowhere  more  forcibly  insisted  upon 
than  in  the  words  above  cited  of  Perikles,  as  well  as  in  others  after 
ward — "  Contemplating  as  you  do  daily  before  you  the  actual  power 
of  the  state,  and  becoming  passionately  attached  to  it,  when  you  con- 
ceive its  full  greatness,  reflect  thai  it  was  all  acquin  d  by  men  daring, 
acquainted  with  their  duty,  and  full  of  an  honorable  sense  of  shame 
in  their  actions" — such  is  the  association  which  he  presents  between 
the  greatness  of  the  state  as  an  object  of  common  passion,  and  the 
courage,  intelligence,  and  mutual  esteem,  of  individual  citizens,  as 
its  creating  and  preserving  causes;  poor  as  well  as  rich  being  alike 
interested  in  the  partnership. 

But  the  claims  of  patriotism,  though  pul  forward  as  essentially  and 

deservedly  paramount,  are  by  no   means  understood    to  reign  CXi  lus 
ively,  or  to  absorb  the  whole  of  the  democratwal  activity.     Subject 
to  these,  and  to  those  law  ms  which  protect  both  the 


INDIVIDUAL  LIBERTY  IN  GREECE.  539 

j  iblic  and  individuals  against  wrong,  it  is  the  pride  of  Athens  to 
exhibit  a  rich  and  varied  fund  of  human  impulse — an  unrestrained 
play  of  fancy  and  diversity  of  private  pursuit,  coupled  with  a  reci- 
procity of  cheerful  indulgence  between  one  individual  and  another — 
and  an  absence  even  of  those  "black  looks"  which  so  much  imhitter 
life,  even  if  they  never  pass  into  enmity  of  fact.  This  portion  of  the 
speech  of  Perikles  deserves  peculiar  attention,  because  it  serves  to 
correct  an  assertion,  often  far  too  indiscriminately  made,  respecting 
antiquity  as  contrasted  with  modern  societies — an  assertion  that  the 
ancient  societies  sacrificed  the  individual  to  the  state,  and  that  only 
in  modern  times  has  individual  agency  been  left  free  to  the  proper 
extent.  This  is  pre-eminently  true  of  Sparta: — it  is  also  true  in  a 
great  degree  of  the  ideal  societies  depicted  by  Plato  and  Aristotle: 
but  it  is  pointedly  untrue  of  the  Athenian  democracy,  nor  can  Ave 
with  any  confidence  predicate  it  of  the  major  part  of  the  Grecian 
cities. 

I  shall  hereafter  return  to  this  point  when  I  reach  the  times  of  tin 
great  speculative  philosophers:  at  present,  I  merely  bespeak  attention 
to  the  speech  of  Perikles  as  negativing  the  supposition,  that  exor- 
bitant interference  of  the  state  with  individual  liberty  was  universal 
among  the  ancient  Greek  republics.  There  is  no  doubt  that  he  has 
present  to  his  mind  a  comparison  with  the  extreme  narrowness  and 
rigor  of  Sparta,  and  that  therefore  his  assertions  of  the  extent  of 
positive  liberty  at  Athens  must  be  understood  as  partially  qualified 
by  such  contrast.  But  even  making  allowance  for  this,  the  stress 
which  he  lays  upon  the  liberty  of  thought  and  action  at  Athens,  not 
merely  from  excessive  restraint  of  law,  but  also  from  practical  intoler- 
ance between  man  and  man,  and  tyranny  of  the  majority  over  indi- 
vidual dissenters  in  taste  and  pursuit — deserves  serious  notice,  and 
brings  out  one  of  those  points  in  the  national  character  upon  which 
the  intellectual  development  of  the  time  mainly  depended.  The 
national  temper  was  indulgeut  in  a  high  degree  to  all  the  varieties  of 
positive  impulse.  The  peculiar  promptings  in  every  individual  bosom 
Avere  allowed  to  manifest  themselves  and  bear  fruit,  without  being 
suppressed  by  external  opinion  or  trained  into  forced  conformity  with 
some  assumed  standard:  antipathies  against  any  of  them  formed  no 
part  of  the  habitual  morality  of  the  citizen.  While  much  of  the  gen- 
erating causes  of  human  hatred  was  thus  rendered  inoperative,  and 
while  society  was  rendered  more  comfortable,  more  instructive,  and 
more  stimulating— all  its  germs  of  productive  fruitful  genius,  so  rare 
everywhere,  found  in  such  an  atmosphere  the  maximum  of  encour- 
agement. Within  the  limits  of  the  law,  assuredly  as  faithfully 
observed  in  Athens  as  anywhere  in  Greece,»individual  impulse,  taste, 
and  even  eccentricity,  were  accepted  with  indulgence,  instead  of 
being  a  mark  as  elsewhere  for  the  intolerance  of  neighbors  or  of  the 
public.  This  remarkable  feature  in  Athenian  life  will  help  us  in  a 
future  chapter  to  explain  the  striking  career  of  Sokrates,  and  it  far- 


i:i;«;i\NI.Y<;  OF  THE  PELOPONNE8IAN  WAR. 

tier  presents  to  us,  under  another  I  al  part  oftlial  which 

the  censors  of  Athens  denounced  under  the  name  of  "  democratical 
The  liberty  and  diversity  of  individual  life  in  that  city 
wire  offensive  to  Xenophon,  Plato,  and  Aristotle — attached  either  to 
the  monotonous  drill  of  Sparta,  or  to  Bome  other  ideal  standard, 
which,  though  much  better  than  the  Spartan  in  it>elf,  they  were  dis- 
posed to  impress  upon  society  with  a  heavy-handed  uniformity. 
That  liberty  of  individual  action,  uol  merely  from  the  over-restraints 
of  law,  but  from  the  tyranny  of  jealous  opinion,  such  as  Perikles 
depicts  in  Athens,  belongs  more  naturally  to  a  democracy,  av lien- 
there  i  t  (  me  or  !•'<  w  to  receive  worship  and  Bet  the  fashion, 
than  t<>  any  other  form  of  government.  But.  it  is  very  rare  even  in 
democracies.  None  of  the  governments  of  modern  times,  demo- 
cratical, aristocratical,  or  monarchical,  presents  anything  like  the 
picture  of  generous  tolerance  towards  social  dissent,  and  sponlam  ity 
of  individual  taste,  which  we  read  in  the  speech  of  the  Athenian 
man.  In  all  of  them,  the  tolerance  of  the  national  opinion  cuts 
down  individual  character  to  one  out  of  a  few  set  types,  to  which 
every  person,  or  every  family,  is  constrained  to  adjust  itself,  and 
beyond  which  all  exceptions  meet  either  with  hatred  or  with  derision. 
To  impose  upon  men  such  restraints  either  of  law  or  of  opinion  as  are 
requisite  for  the  security  and  comfort  of  society,  bul  to  encourage 
rather  than  repress  the  free  play  of  individual  impulse  subject  to 
those  limits — is  an  ideal,  which,  if  it  was  ever  approached  al  Athens, 
has  certainly  never  been  attained,  and  has  indeed  comparatively  been 
little  studied  or  cared  for,  in  any  modern  society. 

Connected  with  this  reciprocal  indulgence  of  individual  diversity, 
was  not  only  the  hospitable  reception  of  all  Btrangers  at  Athens, 
which  Perikles  contrasts  with  the  xenelasy  or  jealous  expulsion 
practiced  al  Sparta — but  also  the  many-sided  activity,  bodily  and 
mental,  visible  in  the  former,  so  opposite,  to  that  narrow  range  of 
thought,  exclusive  discipline  of  the  body,  and  never-ending  prepara- 
tion for  war,  which  formed  the  system  of  the  latter.  His  assertion 
Jhat  Athens  was  equal  to  Sparta  even  in  her  own  solitary  excellence 
—efficiency  on  the  field  of  battle — is  doubtless  untenable.  Bui  not 
the  les-;  impressive  is  his  sketch  of  that  multitude  of  concurrent 
impulses  which  at  this  same  time  agitated  and  impelled  the  Athenian 
mind — the  strength  of  one  not  implying  the  weakness  of  the  remainder: 
tic-  relish  for  all  pleasures  of  art  and  elegance,  and  the  appetite  Ei  r 
intellectual  expansion,  coinciding  in  the  same  bosom  with  energetic 
promptitude  a-  well  as  endurance:  abundance  of  recreative  spectacle-, 
yet  no  way  abating  the  cheerfulness  of  obedience  even  to  the  hardest 
callsof  patriotic  duty:  that  combination  of  reason  and  courage  which 
encountered  danger  the  more  willingly  from  having  discussed  and 
calculated  it  beforehand:  lastly,  tin  anxious  interest,  as  well  as  a  com- 
petence of  judgment,  in  public  discussion  and  public  action,  commi  in 
to  every  citizen  rich  and  poor,  and  combined  with  every  man's  own 


ATHENS  AT  THE  MAXIMUM  OF  HER  POWER.     541 

private  industry.  So  comprehensive  an  ideal  of  many  sided  social 
development,  bringing  out  the  capacities  for  action  and  endurance, 
as  well  as  those  for  enjoyment,  would  be  sufficiently  remarkable, 
even  if  we  supposed  it  only  existing  in  the  imagination  of  a  philo- 
sopher: but  it  becomes  still  more  so  when  we  recollect  that  the  main 
features  of  it  at  least  were  drawn  from  the  fellow-citizens  of  the 
speaker.  It  must  be  taken,  however,  as  belonging  peculiarly  to  the 
Athens  of  Periklea  and  his  contemporaries.  It  would  not  have  suited 
either  the  period  of  the  Persian  war  fifty  years  before,  or  that  of 
Demosthenes  seventy  years  afterward.  At  the  former  period,  the 
art,  the  letters,  and  the  philosophy,  adverted  to  with  pride  by 
Perikles,  were  as  yet  backward,  while  even  the  active  energy  and 
democratical  stimulus,  though  very  powerful,  had  not  been  worked 
up  to  the  pitch  which  they  afterward  reached:  at  the  latter  period, 
although  the  intellectual  manifestations  of  Athens  subsist  in  full  or 
even  increased  vigor,  we  shall  find  the  personal  enterprise  and 
energetic  spirit  of  her  citizens  materially  abated.  As  the  circum- 
stances, which  I  have  already  recounted,  go  far  to  explain  the  previ- 
ous upward  movement,  so  those  which  fill  the  coming  chapters,  con- 
taining the  disasters  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  will  be  found  to 
explain  still  more  completely  the  declining  tendency  shortly  about 
to  commence.  Athens  was  brought  to  the  brink  of  entire  ruin,  from 
which  it  is  surprising  that  she  recovered  at  all — but  no  way  surpris- 
ing that  she  recovered  at  the  expeuse  of  a  considerable  loss  of  per- 
sonal energy  in  the  character  of  her  citizens. 

And  thus  the  season  at  which  Perikles  delivered  his  discourse  lends 
to  it  an  additional  and  peculiar  pathos.  It  was  at  a  time  when  Athens 
was  as  yet  erect  and  at  her  maximum.  For  though  her  real  power 
was  doubtless  much  diminished  compared  with  the  period  before  the 
Thirty  years'  truce,  yet  the  great  edifices  and  works  of  art,  achieved 
since  then,  tended  to  compensate  that  loss,  in  so  far  as  the  sense  of 
greatness  was  concerned;  and  no  one,  either  citizen  or  enemy,  con- 
sidered Athens  as  having  at  all  declined.  It  was  at  the  commence- 
ment of  the  great  struggle  with  the  Peloponnesian  confederacy,  the 
coming  hardships  of  which  Perikles  never  disguised  either  to  himself 
or  to  his  fellow-citizens,  though  he  fully  counted  upon  eventual  suc- 
cess. Attica  had  been  already  invaded ;  it  was  no  longer  "  the un wasted 
territory,"  as  Euripides  had  designated  it  in  his  tragedy  "Medea," 
represented  three  or  four  months  before  the  march  of  Archidamus. 
A  picture  of  Athens  in  her  social  glory  was  well  calculated  both  to 
rouse  the  pride  and  nerve  the  courage  of  those  individual  citizens, 
who  had  been  compelled  once,  and  would  be  compelled  again  and 
again,  to  abandon  their  country  residence  and  fields  for  a  thin  tent  or 
confined  hole  in  the  city.  Such  calamities  might  indeed  be  foreseen; 
but  there  was  one  still  greater  calamity,  which,  though  actually  then 
impending,  could  not  be  foreseen — the  terrific  pestilence  which  wdl 
be  recounted  in  the  coming  chapter.     The  bright  colors  and  tone  of 


SECOND  AND  THIRD  YEARS  OF  THE  WAR. 

cheerful  confidence,  which  pervade  ti  i  eof  Perikles,  appeaT 

the  more  striking  from  being  in  immediate  antecedence  to  the  awful 
description  of  this  distemper:  a  contrast,  to  which  Thucydidi 
doubtless  nol  insensible,  and  which  is  another  circumstance  enhancing 
the  interest  of  the  composition. 


CHAPTER  XLIX. 

FROM  THE    BEGINNING    of    THE    SECOND    TEAR    DOWN   TO    THE    END 
OF   THE   THIRD  YEAR  OE   THE   PELOPONNESIAN    WAK. 

At  the  close  of  one  year  after  the  attempted  surprise  of  Plata?a  by 
the  Thebans,  the  belligerenl  parties  in  Greece  remained  in  an  unal- 
tered position  as  to  relative  strength.  Nothing  decisive  had  been 
accomplished  on  either  side,  either  by  the  invasion  of  Attica,  or  by 
the  flying  descents  round  tb'e  coast  of  Peloponnesus.  In  spite  of 
mutual  damage  inflicted— douhtless  in  the  greatest  measure  upon 
Attica — no  progress  was  yet  made  toward  ihe  fulfillment  of  those 
objects  which  had  induced  the  Pelop esians  to  go  to  war.  Espe- 
cially the  most  pressing  among  all  their  wishes — the  relief  of  Pptidaea 
— was  no  way  advanced;  for  the  Athenians  had  not  found  it  neces- 
sary, to  relax  the  blockade  of  that  city.  The  result  of  the  first  year's 
operations  had  thus  been  to  disappoint  the  hopes  of  the  Corinthians 
and  the  other  ardent  instigators  of  war,  while  it  justified  the  antici- 
pations both  of  Perikles  and  of  Archidamus. 

A  second  devastation  of  Attica  was  resolved  upon  for  the  com- 
mencement of  spring;  and  measures  were  taken  for  canying  it  all 
over  that  territory,  since  the  settled  policy  of  Athens  not  to  hazard  a 
battle  with  the  invaders  was  now  ascertained.  About  the  end  of 
March  or  beginning  of  April,  the  entire  Peloponnesian  force  (two- 
thirds  from  each  confederate  city  as  before)  was  assembled  under  the 
command  of  Archidamus  and  marched  into  Attica.  This  lime  they 
carried  the  work  of  systematic  destruction  not  merely  over  the  Thri- 
asian  plain  and  the  plain  immediately  near  to  Athens,  as  before;  but 
also  to  the  more  southerly  portions  of  Attica,  down  even  as  far  as  the 
mines  of  Laurium.  They  traversed  and  ravaged  both  the  eastern  and 
the  western  coast,  remaining  n<>i  less  than  forty  days  in  the  country. 
They  found  the  territory  deserted  ashefore,  all  the  population  having 
retired  within  the  walls. 

In  regard  to  this  second  invasion.  Perikles  recommended  the  same 
defensive  policy  as  he  had  applied  to  the  first;  and  apparently  the 
citizens  had  now  come  to  acquiesce  in  it,  if  not  willingly,  at  least 
with  a  full  conviction  of  its  necessity.  But  a  new  visitation  had  now 
occurred,  diverting  their  attention  from  the  invader,  though  enor- 


COMMENCEMENT  OP  THE  PESTILENCE.         543 

mously  aggravating  their  sufferings.  A  few  days  after  Archidamus 
entered  Attica,  a  pestilence  or  epidemic  sickness  broke  out  unex- 
pectedly at  Athens. 

It  appears  that  this  terrific  disorder  had  been  raging  for  some  time 
throughout  the  regions  round  the  Mediterranean ;  having  begun,  as 
was  believed,  in  Ethiopia — thence  passing  into  Egypt  and  Libya,  and 
overrunning  a  considerable  portion  of  Asia  under  the  Persian  govern- 
ment. About  sixteen  years  before,  too,  there  had  been  a  similar 
calamity  in  Rome  and  in  various  parts  of  Itaby.  Recently,  it  had 
been  felt  in  Lemnos  and  some  other  islands  of  the  ^Egean,  yet  seem- 
ingly not  with  such  intensity  as  to  excite  much  notice  generally  in  the 
Grecian  world:  at  length  it  passed  to  Athens,  and  first  showed  itself 
in  the  Peiryeus.  The  progress  of  the  disease  was  as  rapid  and  destruc- 
tive as  its  appearance  had  been  sudden;  while  the  extraordinary 
accumulation  of  people  within  the  city  and  long  walls,  in  consequence 
of  the  presence  of  the  invaders  in  the  country,  was  but  too  favorable 
to  every  form  of  contagion.  Families  crowded  together  in  close  cabins 
and  places  of  temporary  shelter — throughout  a  city  constructed  (like 
most  of  those  in  Greece)  with  little  regard  to  the  conditions  of  salu- 
brity— and  in  a  state  of  mental  chagrin  from  the  forced  abandonment 
and  sacrifice  of  their  properties  in  the  country,  transmitted  the  dis- 
order with  fatal  facility  from  one  to  the  other  Beginning  as  it  did 
about  the  middle  of  April,  the  increasing  heat  of  summer  farther 
aided  the  disorder,  the  symptoms  of  which,  alike  violent  and  sudden, 
made  themselves  the  more  remarked  because  the  year  was  particularly 
exempt  from  maladies  of  every  other  description. 

Of  this  plague — or  (more  properly)  eruptive  typhoid  fever,  distinct 
from,  yet  analogous  to,  the  small-pox — a  description  no  less  clear 
than  impressive  has  been  left  by  the  historian  Thucydides,  himself 
not  only  a  spectator  but  a  sufferer.  It  is  not  one  of  the  least  of  his 
merits,  that  his  notice  of  the  symptoms,  given  at  so  early  a  stage  of 
medical  science  and  observation,  is  such  as  to  instruct  the  medical 
reader  of  the  present  age,  and  to  enable  the  malady  to  be  understood 
and  identified.  The  observations  with  which  that  notice  is  ushered 
in,  deserve  particular  attention.  ' '  In  respect  to  this  distemper  (he 
says),  let  every  man,  physician  or  not,  say  what  he  thinks  respecting 
the  source  from  whence  it  may  probably  have  arisen,  and  respecting 
the  causes  which  he  deems  sufficiently  powerful  to  have  produced  so 
great  a  revolution.  But  I,  having  myself  had  the  distemper,  and 
having  seen  others  suffering  under  it,  will  state  what  it  actually  was, 
and  will  indicate  in  addition  such  other  matters  as  will  furnish  any 
man,  who  lays  them  to  heart,  with  knowledge  and  the  means  of  cal- 
culation beforehand,  in  case  the  same  misfortune  should  ever  again 
occur."  To  record  past  facts,  as  a  basis  for  rational  prevision  in 
regard  to  the  future — the  same  sentiment  which  Thucydides  mentions 
in  his  preface,  as  having  animated  him  to  the  composition  of  his 
history — was  at  that  time  a  duty  so  little  understood,  that  we  have 


544      SECOND  AND  THIRD  YEARS  OF  THE  WAR. 

reason  to  admire  not  less  the  manner  in  which  he  performs  it  in 
practice,  than  the  distinctness  wiih  which  lie  conceives  it  in 
theory.  We  infer  from  Iris  language  thai  specula  ion  in  bis  day  was 
active  respecting  the  causes  of  this  plague,  according  to  the  vague 
ami  fanciful  physics,  and  .-canty  stock  of  ascertained  facts,  which 
was  all  that  could  then  be  consulted.  By  resisting  the  itch  of 
theorizing  from  one  of  those  loose  hypotheses  which  then  appeared 
plausibly  to  explain  everything,  he  probably  renounced  the  point  of 
view  from  which  most  credit  and  interesl  would  he  derivable  at  the 
time.  I5ut  his  simple  and  precise  summary  of  observed  facts  carries 
with  it  an  imperishable  value,  and  even  affords  grounds  for  imagin- 
ing that  lie  was  no  stranger  to  the  habits  and  training  of  his  con- 
temporary Hippokrates,  and  the  other  A.sklepiads  of  Kos. 

It  is  hardly  within  the  province  of  an  historian  of  Greece  to  repeat 
after  Thucydides  the  painful  enumeration  of  symptoms,  violent  in 
the  extreme  and  pervading  every  portion  Of  the  bodily  system, 
which  marked  this  fearful  disorder.  Beginning  in  Peiraeus,  it 
quickly  passed  into  the  city,  and  both  the  one  and  the  other  was 
speedily  filled  with  Bickness  and  suffering,  the  like  of  which  had 
never  before  been  known.  The  seizures  were  sudden,  and  a  large 
proportion  of  the  sufferers  perished  after  deplorable  agonies  on  the 
seventh  or  on  the  ninth  day.  Others,  whose  strength  of  constitution 
carried  them  over  this  period,  found  th<  mselves  the  victims  of 
exhausting  and  incurable  diarrhea  afterward:  with  others  again, 
after  traversing  both  these  stages,  the  distemper  fixed  itself  in  some 
particular  member,  the  eyes,  the  genitals,  the  hands,  or  the  feet, 
which  were  rendered  permanently  useless,  or  in  some  cases  ampu- 
tated, even  where  the  patient  himself  recovered.  There  were  also 
some  whose  recovery  was  attended  with  a  total  loss  of  memory,  so 
that  they  no  more  knew  Ihemsclves  or  recognized  their  friends.  No 
treatment  or  remedy  appearing,  except  in  accidental  cases,  to  pro- 
duce any  beneficial  effect,  the  physicians  or  surgeons  whose  aid  was 
invoked  became  completely  at  fault.  While  trying  their  accustomed 
means  without  avail,  they  soon  ended  by  catching  the  malady  tliem- 
selves  and  perishing.  The  charms  and  incantations,  to  which  the 
unhappy  patient  resorted,  were  not  likely  to  be  more  efficacious. 
While  some  asserted  that  the  Peloponnesians  had  poisoned  the 
cisterns  of  water,  others  referred  the  visitation  to  the  wrath  of  the 
Gods,  and  especially  to  Apollo,  known  by  hearers  of  the  Iliad  as 
author  of  pestilence  in  the  Greek  host  before  Troy.  It  was  renum- 
bered that  this  Delphian  god  had  promised  the  Lacedaemonians,  in 
reply  to  their  application  immediately  before  the  war,  that  he  would 
assist  them  whether  invoked  or  uniuvoked— and  the  disorder  now- 
raging  wras  ascribed  to  the  intervention  of  their  irresistible  ally; 
while  the  elderly  men  farther  called  to  mind  an  oracular  verse  sung 
in  the  time  of  their  youth — "The  Dorian  war  will  come,  and  pesti- 
lence along  with  it."     Under  the  distress  which  suggested,  and  was 


INEFFICACY  OF  REMEDIES.  545 

reciprocally  aggravated  by,  these  gloomy  ideas,  prophets  "were  con. 
suited,  ami  supplications  with  solemn  procession  were  held  at  t lie 
'temples,  to  appease  the  divine  wrath. 

When  it  was  found  that  neither  the  priest  nor  the  physician, 
could  retard  the  spread,  or  mitigate  the  intensity,  of  the  disorder 
the  Athenians  abandoned  themselves  to  despair,  and  the  space 
within  the  walls  became  a  scene  of  desolating  misery.  Every  man 
attacked  with  the  malady  at  once  lost  his  courage — a  state  of  depres- 
sion itself  among  the  worst  features  of  the  case,  which  made  him  lie 
down  and  die,  without  any  attempt  to  seek  for  preservatives.  And 
though  at  first  friends  and  relatives  lent  their  aid  to  tend  the  sick 
with  the  usual  family  sympathies,  yet  so  terrible  was  the  number  of 
these  attendants  who  perished,  "like  sheep,"  from  sucli  contact,  that 
at  length  no  man  would  those  expose  himself;  while  the  most  gen- 
erous spirits,  who  persisted  longest  in  the  discharge  of  their  duty, 
were  carried  off  in  the  greatest  numbers.  The  patient  was  thus  left 
to  die  alone  and  unheeded.  Sometimes  all  the  inmates  of  a  house 
were  swept  away  one  after  the  other,  no  man  being  willing  to  go 
near  it:  desertion  on  the  one  hand,  attendance  on  the  other,  both 
tended  to  aggravate  the  calamity.  There  remained  only  those  who, 
having  had  the  disorder  and  recovered,  were  willing  to  tend  the 
sufferers.  These  men  formed  the  single  exception  to  the  all-pervad- 
ing misery  of  the  time — for  the  disorder  seldom  attacked  any  one 
twice,  and  when  it  did,  the  second  attack  was  never  fatal.  Elate 
with  their  own  escape,  they  deemed  themselves  out  of  the  reach  of 
all  disease,  and  were  full  of  compassionate  kindness  for  others  whose 
sufferings  were  just  beginning.  It  was  from  them  too  that  the  prin- 
cipal attention  to  the  bodies  of  deceased  victims  proceeded :  for  such 
was  the  state  of  dismay  and  sorrow,  that  even  the  nearest  relatives 
neglected  the  sepulchral  duties,  sacred  beyond  all  others  in  the  eyes 
of  a  Greek.  Nor  is  there  any  circumstance  which  conveys  to  us  so 
vivid  an  idea  of  the  prevalent  agony  and  despair,  as  when  we  read, 
in  the  words  of  an  eye-witness,  that  the  deaths  took  place  among  this 
close-packed  crowd  without  the  smallest  decencies  of  attention — 
that  the  dead  and  the  dying  lay  piled  one  upon  another  not  merely  in 
the  public  roads,  but  even  in  the  temples,  in  spite  of  the  understood 
defilement  of  the  sacred  building — that  half-dead  sufferers  were  seen 
lying  round  all  the  springs,  from  insupportable  thirst — that  the 
numerous  corpses  thus  unburied  and  exposed  were  in  such  a  condi- 
tion, that  the  dogs  which  meddled  with  them  died  in  consequence, 
while  no  vultures  or  other  birds  of  the  like  habits  ever  came  near. 
Those  bodies  which  escaped  entire  neglect  were  burnt  or  buried 
without  the  customary  mourning,  and  with  unseemly  carelessness. 
In  some  cases,  the  bearers  of  a  body,  passhig  by  a  funeral  pile  on 
which  another  body  was  burning,  would  put  their  own  there  to  be 
burnt  also;  or  perhaps,  if  the  pile  was  prepared  ready  for  a  body  not 
yet  arrived,  would  deposit  their  own  upon  it,  set  fire  to  the  pile,  and 
H.  G.  II.— 18 


5  16      SECOND  AND  THIRD  YEARS  OF  THE  WAR 

then  depart.  Such  indecent  contusion  would  have  been  intolerable 
to  the  feelings  of  the  Athenians,  in  any  ordinary  times. 

To  all  these  scenes  of  physical  suffering,  death,  and  reckless 
despair  was  superadded  another  evil,  which  affected  those  who 
were  fortunate  enough  to  escape  the  rest.  The  bonds  both  of  law 
and  morality  became  relaxed,  amid  such  total  uncertainty  of  every 
man  both  for  his  own  life  and  thai  of  others.  Men  cared  not  to 
ali-tain  from  wrong,  under  circumstances  in  which  punishment  was 
not  likel]  t"  overtake  them — nor  to  put  a  check  upon  their  passions, 
and  endure  privations,  in  obedience  even  to  their  Btrongesl  convic- 
tion, when  the  chance  was  so  small  of  their  living  to  reap  reward  or 
enjoy  any  future  esteem.      An  interval,  short  and  sweet,  before  their 

doom  was  realized — before  they  became  plunged  in  the  wide-spread 
misery  which  they  witnessed  around,  and  which  affected  indiscrimi- 
nately the  virtuous  and  the  profligate— was  all  that  they  looked  to 
enjoy;  embracing  with  avidity  the  immediate  pleasures  of  sense,  as 

well  as  such  positive  gains,  however  ill-gotten,  as  could  lie  made  the 
means  of  procuring  them,  .•mil  throwing  aside  all  thoughl  both  of 
honor  or  of  long-sighted  advantage.  Life  and  property  being  alike 
ephemeral,  there  was  no  hope  left  hut  lo  snatch  a  moment  of  enjoy- 
ment, before  the  outstretched  hand  of  destiny  should  fall  upon  its 
victims. 

The  picture  of  society  under  the  pressure  of  a  murderous  epidemic, 
with  its  train  of  physical  torments,  wretchedness,  and  demoraliza- 
tion, has  been  drawn  by  more  than  one  eminent  author,  but  by  none 
with  more  impressive  fidelity  and  conciseness  than  by  Thucydides, 
who  had  no  predecessor,  nor  anything  but  the  reality,  to  copy  from. 
We  may  remark  that  amidst  all  the  melancholy  accompaniments  of 
the  time",  there  are  no  human  sacrifices,  such  as  those  offered  up  at 
Carthage  during  pestilence  to  appease  the  anger  of  the  gods — there 
are  no  cruel  persecutions  against  imaginary  authors  of  the  disease, 
such  as  those  against  the  Untori  (anointers  of  doors)  in  the  plague  of 
Milan  in  1630. 

Three  years  altogether  did  this  calamity  desolate  Athens:  continu- 
ously, during  the  entire  second  and  third  years  of  the  war — after 
which  followed  a  period  of  marked  abatement  for  a  year  and  a  half: 
hut  it  then  revived  again,  and  lasted  for  another  year,  with  the  same 
fury  as  at  first.  The  public  loss,  over  and  above  the  private  misery, 
which  this  unexpected  enemy  inflicted  upon  Athens,  was  incalcula- 
ble. Out  of  1200  horsemen,  all  among  the  rich  men  of  the  state,  300 
died  of  the  epidemic;  besides  4,400  hoplites  out  of  the  roll  formally 
kept,  and  a  number  of  the  poorer  population,  so  great  as  to  defy 
computation.  No  efforts  of  the  Peloponnesians  could  have  done  so 
much  to  ruin  Athens,  or  to  bring  the  war  to  a  termination  such  as 
they  desired:  and  the  distemper  told  the  more  in  their  favor,  as  it 
never  spread  at  all  into  Peloponnesus,  though  it  passed  from  Athens 
to  some  of  the  more  populous  islands.    The  Lacedaemonian  army 


ATHENIAN  ARMAMENT   RUINED.  547 

was  withdrawn  from  Attica  somewhat  earlier  than  it  would  other- 
wise have  been,  for  fear  of  taking  the  contagion. 

But  it  was  while  the  Lacedaemonians  were  yet  in  Attica,  and  dur- 
ing the  first  freshness  of  the  terrible  malady,  that  Penklcs  equipped 
and  conducted  from  Peiraeus  an  armament  of  100  triremes  and  4,000 
hoplites  to  attack  the  coasts  of  Peloponnesus.  300  horsemen  were 
also  carried  in  some  horse-transports,  prepared  for  the  occasion  out 
of  old  triremes.  To  diminish  the  crowd  accumulated  in  the  city 
was  doubtless  of  beneficial  tendency,  and  perhaps  those  who  went 
aboard  might  consider  it  as  a  chance  of  escape  to  quit  an  infected 
home.  But  unhappily  they  carried  the  infection  along  with  them, 
which  desolated  the  fleet  net  less  than  the  city,  and  crippled  all  its 
efforts.  Re-enforced  by  fifty  ships  of  war  from  Chios  and  Lesbos, 
the  Athenians  first  landed  near  Epidaurus  in  Peloponnesus,  ravaging 
the  territory  and  making  an  unavailing  attempt  upon  the  city,  next 
they  made  like  incursions  on  the  more  southerly  portions  of  the 
Argolic  peninsula — Trcezen,  Halieis,  and  Hermione;  and  lastly  at- 
tacked and  captured  PrasioB,  on  the  eastern  coast  of  Laconia.  On 
returning  to  Atuens,  the  same  armament  was  immediately  conducted 
under  Agnon  and  Kleopompus,  to  press  the  siege  of  Potidaea,  the 
blockade  of  which  still  continued  without  any  visible  progress.  On 
arriving  there,  an  attack  was  made  on  the  walls  by  battering  engines 
and  by  the  other  aggressive  methods  then  practiced;  but  nothing 
whatever  was  achieved  In  fact,  the  armament  became  incompetent 
for  all  serious  effort,  from  the  aggravated  character  which  the  dis- 
temper here  assumed,  communicated  by  the  soldiers  fresh  from 
Athens  even  to  those  who  had  before  been  free  from  it  at  Potidaea. 
So  frightful  was  the  mortality,  that  out  of  the  4,000  hoplites  under 
Agnon,  no  less  than  1050  died  in  the  short  space  of  forty  days.  The 
armament  was  brought  back  in  this  distressed  condition  to  Athens, 
while  the  reduction  of  Potidaea  was  left  as  before  to  the  slow  course 
of  blockade. 

On  returning  from  the  expedition  against  Peloponnesus,  PerikTes 
found  his  countrymen  almost  distracted  with  their  manifold  suffer- 
ings. Over  and  above  the  raging  epidemic,  they  had  just  gone  over 
Attica  and  ascertained  the  devastations  committed  by  the  invaders 
throughout  all  the  territory  (except  the  Marathonian  Tetrapolis  and 
Dekeleia — districts  spared,  as  we  are  told,  through  indulgence 
founded  on  an  ancient  legendary  sympathy)  during  their  long  stay  of 
forty  days.  The  rich  had  found  their  comfortable  mansions  and 
farms,  the  poor  their  modest  cottages,  in  the  various  denies,  torn 
down  and  ruined.  Death,  sickness,  loss  of  property,  and  despair  of 
the  future,  now  rendered  the  Athenians  angvy  and  intractable  to  the 
last  degree.  They  vented  their  feelings  against  Perikles  as  the 
cause  not  merely  of  the  war,  but  also  of  all  that  they  were  now 
enduring.  Either  with  or  without  his  consent,  they  sent  envoys  to 
Sparta  to  open  negotiations  for  peace,  but  the  Spartans  turned  a  deaf 


i)  AM)  THIRD  YKAKS  OF  TIIE  WAR 

ear  to  the  proposition.  This  new  disappointment  rendered  them 
still  more  furious  againsl  Perikles,  whose  long-standing  political  ene< 
liiirs  dow  doubtless  found  strong  s\  mpathy  in  their  denunciatii 
bis  character  and  policy.  That  unshaken  ami  majestic  firmness, 
wbicli  ranked  firsl  among  his  manj  eminenl  qualities,  was  never 
more  imperiously  required  and  never  inure  effectively  manifest*  d. 

In  his  capacity  of  Strategus  or  General,  Perikles  convoked  a  for- 
mal assembly  ol  the  people,  for  the  purpose  of  vindicating  himself 
publicly  against  the  prevailing  sentiment,  and  recommending  perse- 
verance in  his  line  of  poUcj .  The  speei  ties  made  by  his  opponents, 
dly  very  bitter,  are  not  given  by  Thucydidesj  but  thai  01 
Perikles  himself  is  set  down  at  considerable  length,  and  a  memorable 
discourse  it  is.  It  strikingly  brings  into  relief  both  the  character  of 
the  man  and  the  impress  of  actual  circumstances — an  impregnable 
mind  conscious  not  only  of  right  purposes  but  of  just  and  reasonable 
anticipations,  and  bearing  up  with  manliness,  or  even  defiance, 
against  the  natural  difficulty  of  the  case,  heightened  by  an  extreme 
of  incalculable  misfortune.  He  had  foresi  en,  while  advising  the  war 
originally,  the  probable  impatience  of  his  countrymen  under  its  first 
hardships,  but  he  could  not  foresee  the  epidemic  by  which  that  im- 
patience had  been  exasperated  into  madness:  and  he  now  addressed 
them  not  merely  with  unabated  adherence  to  his  own  deliberate 
convictions,  hut  also  in  a  tone  of  reproachful  remonstrance  against 
their  unmerited  change  of  sentiment  toward  him — seeking  at  the 
same  time  to  combat  that  uncontrolled  despair  which  for  the  moment 
overlaid  both  their  pride  and  their  patriotism.  Far  from  humbling 
himself  before  the  present  sentiment,  it  is  at  this  time  that  he  sets 
forth  bis  titles  to  their  esteem  in  the  most  direct  and  unqualified 
manner,  and  claims  the  continuance  of  that  which  they  had  so  long 
accorded,  as  something  belonging  to  him  by  acquired  right. 

His  main  object,  through  this  discourse,  is  to  fill  the  minds  of  his 
audience  with  patriotic  sympathy  for  the  weal  of  the  entire  city,  so 
as  to  counterbalance  the  absorbing  sense  of  private  woe.  If  the  col- 
lective city  flourishes  (he  argues),  private  misfortunes  may  at  least 
be  borne:  but  no  amount  of  private  prosperity  will  avail,  if  the  col- 
lective city  falls  (a  proposition  literally  true  in  ancient  times  and 
under  the  circumstances  of  ancient  warfare — though  less  true  at  pres- 
ent). "  Distracted  by  domestic  calamity,  ye  are  now  angry  both  with 
me  who  advised  you  to  go  to  war,  and  with  yourselves  who  followed 
the  advice.  Ye  listened  to  me,  considering  me  superior  to  others  in 
judgment,  in  Bpeech,  in  patriotism,  and  in  incorruptible  probity — ■ 
nor  ought  I  now  to  be  treated  as  culpable  forgiving  such  advice, 
when  in  point  of  fact  the  war  was  unavoidable  and  there  would  have 
been  Btill  greater  danger  in  shrinking  from  it.  I  am  the  same  man, 
still  unchanged — but  ye  in  your  misfortunes  cannot  stand  to  the  con- 
victions which  ye  adopted  when  yel  unhurt.  Extreme  and  unfore- 
seen, indeed,   are  the  sorrows  which  have  fallen  upon  you:  yet 


EFFECT  OF  PERIKLES'S  ADDRESS.  £49 

inhabiting  as  ye  do  a  great  city,  and  brought  up  in  dispositions  suit- 
able to  it,  yc  ihust  also  resolve  to  bear  up  against  the  utmost  pressure 
of  adversity,  and  never  to  surrender  your  dignity.  I  have  often 
explained  to  you  that  ye  have  no  reason  to  doubt  of  eventual  success 
in  the  war,  but  I  will  now  remind  you,  more  emphatically  than  before, 
and  even  with  a  degree  of  ostentation  suitable  as  a  stimulus  to  your 
present  unnatural  depression — that  your  naval  force  makes  you  mas- 
ters not  only  of  your  allies,  but  of  the  entire  sea — one-half  of  the 
visible  field  for  action  and  employment.  Compared  with  so  vast  a 
power  as  this,  the  temporary  use  of  your  houses  and  territory  is  a  mere 
trifle — an  ornamental  accessory  not  worth  considering:  and  this  too, 
if  ye  preserve  your  freedom,  ye  will  quickly  recover.  It  was  your 
fathers  who  first  gained  this  empire,  without  any  of  the  advantages 
which  ye  now  enjoy;  ye  must  not  disgrace  yourselves  by  losing  what 
they  acquired.  Delighting  as  ye  all  do  in  the  honor  and  empire 
enjoyed  by  the  city,  ye  must  not  shrink  from  the  toils  whereby  alone 
that  honor  is  sustained:  moreover  ye  now  fight,  not  merely  for  free- 
dom instead  of  slavery,  but  for  empire  against  loss  of  empire,  with 
all  the  perils  arising  out  of  imperial  unpopularity.  It  is  not  safe  for 
you  now  to  abdicate,  even  if  ye  chose  to  do  so;  for  ye  hold  your 
empire  like  a  despotism — unjust  perhaps  in  the  original  acquisition, 
but  ruinous  to  part  with  when  once  acquired.  Be  not  angry  with 
me,  whose  advice  ye  followed  in  going  to  war,  because  the  enemy 
have  done  such  damage  as  might  be  expected  from  them :  still  less 
on  account  of  this  unforeseen  distemper:  I  know  that  this  makes  me 
an  object  of  your  special  present  hatred,  though  very  unjustly,  unless 
ye  will  consent  to  give  me  credit  also  for  any  unexpected  good  luck 
which  may  occur.  Our  city  derives  its  particular  glory  from  un- 
shaken bearing  up  against  misfortune:  her  power,  her  name,  her 
empire  of  Greeks  over  Greeks,  are  such  as  have  never  before  been 
seen-  and  if  we  choose  to  be  great,  we  must  take  the  consequence  of 
that  temporary  envy  and  hatred  which  is  the  necessary  price  of  per- 
manent renown.  Behave  ye  now  in  a  manner  worthy  of  that  glory; 
display  that  courage  which  is  essential  to  protect  you  against  disgrace 
at  present,  as  well  as  to  guarantee  your  honor  for  the  future.  Send 
no  further  embassy  to  Sparta,  and  bear  your  misfortunes  without 
showing  symptoms  of  distress." 

The  irresistible  reason,  as  well  as  the  proud  and  resolute  bearing 
of  this  discourse,  set  forth  with  an  eloquence  which  it  was  not  possi- 
ble for  Thucydides  to  reproduce — together  with  the  age  and  charac- 
ter of  Perikles — carried  the  assent  of  the  assembled  people ;  who  when 
in  the  Pnyx  and  engaged  according  to  habit  on  public  matters,  would 
for  a  moment  forget  their  private  sufferings  in  considerations  of  the 
safety  and  grandeur  of  Athens.  Possibly,  indeed,  those  sufferings, 
though  still  continuing,  might  become  somewhat  alleviated  when  the 
invaders  quitted  Attica,  and  when  it  was  no  longer  indispensable  for 
all  the  population  to  confine  itself  within  the  walls.     Accordingly, 


BECOND  AND  THIRD  YEARS  OF  THE  WAR. 

the  assembly  resolved  that  no  further  propositions  should  be  made 
for  peace,  and  thai  the  war  should  be  prosecuted  with  vigor- 
Bui  though  the  public  resolution  thus  adopted  showed  the  ancient 
ice  to  the  authority  of  Penkles,  the  sentiments  of 
individ  tarately  were  still  those  of  anger  against  him  as 

tli,.  aul  tern  which  had  brought  them  into  so  much  dis- 

His  political  opponents — Eicon,  Bimmias,  or  Lakratidas,  per- 
haps all  three  in  conjunction — took  can  to  provide  an  opportunity 
for  this  prevalent  irritation  to  manifest  itself  in  act,  by  bringing  an 
ion  against  him  before  the  dikastery.  The  accusation  is  said 
to  have  been  preferred  on  the  ground  of  pecuniary  malversation,  and 
ended  by  his  being  sentenced  to  pay  a  considerable  fine,  the  amount 
of  which  is  differently  reported — fifteen,  fifty,  or  eighty  talents,  by 
different  authors.  The  accusing  party  thus  appeared  to  have  carried 
their  point,  and  to  have  disgraced,  as  well  as  excluded  from  re-elec- 
tion, the  veteran  statesman.  The  event,  however,  disappointed  their 
expectations,  The  imposition  of  the  fine  not  only  satiated  all  the 
irritation  of  the  people  against  him,  but  even  occasioned  a  serious 
reaction  in  his  favor,  and  brought  back  as  strongly  as  ever  the 
ancient  sentiment  of  esteem  and  admiration.  It  was  quickly  found 
that  those  who  had  succeeded  Perikles  as  generals  neither  possessed 
served  in  an  equal  degree  the  public  confidence.  He  was 
accordingly  soon  re-elected,  with  as  much  power  and  influence  as  he 
had  ever  iii  his  life  enjoyed. 

But  that  life,  long,  honorable,  and  useful,  had  already  been  pro- 
1 « . 1 1  _- .  d  considerably  beyond  the  sixtieth  year,  and  there  were  but  too 
many  circumstances,  besides  the  recent  flue,  which  tended  to  hasten 
as  well  as  to  embitter  its  close.  At  the  very  moment  when  Perikles 
(reaching  to  his  countrymen,  in  a  tone  almost  reproachful,  the 
necessity  of  manful  and  unabated  devotion  to  the  common  country 
in  the  midst  of  private  suffering,  he  was  himself  among  the  greatest 
of  su  fferers,  and  most  hardly  pressed  to  set  the  example  of  observing  his 
own  precepts.  The  epidemic  carried  off  notmerely  his  two  sons  (the 
only  two  legitimate,  Xanthippus  and  Paralus),  but  also  his  sister, 
several  other  relatives,  and  his  best  and  most  useful  political  friends. 
Amid  this  train  of  domestic  calamities,  and  in  the  funeral  obsequies 
of  so  many  of  his  dearest  friends,  he  remained  master  of  his  grief, 
and  maintained  his  habitual  self-command,  until  the  last  misfortune 
— the  death  of  his  favorite  son  Paralus,  which  left  his  house  without 
any  legitimate  representative  to  maintain  the  family  and  the  heredi- 
tary sacred  rites.  On  this  final  blow,  though  he  strove  to  command 
himself  as  before,  yet  at  the  obsequies  of  the  young  man,  when  it 
became  his  duty  to  place  a  wreath  on  the  dead  body,  his  grief  became 
uncontrollable,  and  he  burst  out,  for  the  first  time  in  his  life,  into 
profuse  tears  and  sobbing. 

In  the  midst  of  these  several  personal  trials  be  received  the  intima- 
tion, through  Alkibiades  ami  some  other  friends,  of  the  restored  con- 


DEATH  OF  PERIKLES.  551 

fidence  of  the  people  toward  him,  and  of  his  re-election  to  the  office 
of  Strategus.  But  it  was  not  without  difficulty  that  he  was  persuad- 
ed to  present  himself  again  at  the  puhlic  assembly,  and  resume  the 
direction  of  affairs.  The  regret  of  the  people  was  formally  expressed 
to  him  for  the  recent  sentence — perhaps,  indeed,  the  tine  may  have 
been  repaid  to  him,  or  some  evasion  of  it  permitted,  saving  the  forms 
of  law — in  the  present  temper  of  the  city;  which  was  farther  dis- 
played toward  him  by  the  grant  of  a  remarkable  exemption  from  a 
law  of  his  own  original  proposition.  He  had  himself,  some  years 
before,  been  the  author  of  that  law,  whereby  the  citizenship  of 
Athens  was  restricted  to  persons  born  both  of  Athenian  fathers  and 
Athenian  mothers,  under  which  restriction  several  thousand  persons, 
illegitimate  on  the  mother's  side,  are  said  to  have  been  deprived  of 
the  citizenship,  on  occasion  of  a  public  distribution  of  corn.  Invid- 
ious as  it  appeared  to  grant,  to  Perikles  singly,  an  exemption  from  a 
law  which  had  been  strictly  enforced  against  so  many  others,  the 
people  were  now  moved  not  less  by  compassion  than  by  anxiety  to 
redress  their  own  previous  severity.  Without  a  legitimate  heir,  the 
house  of  Perikles,  one  branch  of  the  great  Alkrnaeonid  Gens  by  his 
mother's  side,  would  be  left  deserted,  and  the  continuity  of  the  fam- 
ily sacred  rites  would  be  broken — a  misfortune  painfully  felt  by 
every  Athenian  family,  as  calculated  to  wrong  all  the  deceased  mem- 
bers, and  provoke  their  posthumous  displeasure  toward  the  city. 
Accordingly,  permission  was  granted  to  Perikles  to  legitimize,  and 
to  inscribe  in  his  own  gens  and  phratry,  his  natural  son  by  Aspasia, 
who  bore  his  own  name. 

It  was  thus  that  Perikles  was  reinstated  in  his  post  of  Strategus  as 
well  as  in  his  ascendency  over  the  public  counsels — seemingly  about 
August  or  September — 430  b.c.  He  lived  about  one  year  longer,  and 
seems  to  have  maintained  his  influence  as  long  as  his  health  per- 
mitted. Yet  we  hear  nothing  of  him  after  this  moment,  and  he  fell 
a  victim,  not  to  the  violent  symptoms  of  the  epidemic,  but  to  a  slow 
and  wearing  fever,  which  undermined  his  strength  as  well  as  his 
capacity.  To  a  friend  who  came  to  ask  after  him  when  in  this 
disease,  Perikles  replied  by  showing  a  charm  or  amulet  which  his 
female  relations  had  hung  about  his  neck — a  proof  how  low  he  was 
reduced,  and  how  completely  he  had  become  a  passive  subject  in  the 
bands  of  others.  And  according  to  another  anecdote  which  wTe  read, 
yet  more  interesting  and  equally  illustrative  of  his  character — it  was 
during  his  last  moments,  when  he  was  lying  apparently  unconscious 
and  insensible,  that  the  friends  around  his  bed  were  passing  in  review 
the  acts  of  his  life,  and  the  nine  trophies  which  he  had  erected  at 
different  times  for  so  many  victories.  He  Jieard  wffiat  they  said, 
though  they  fancied  that  he  was  past  hearing,  and  interrupted  them  by 
remarking — "What  you  praise  in  my  life,  belongs  partly  to  good 
fortune — and  is,  at  best,  common  to  me  with  many  other  generals. 
But  the  peculiarity  of  which  I  am  most  proud,  you  have  not  noticed 


552      SECOND  AND  THIRD  YEARS  OF  THE  WAR. 

. — no  Athenian  lias  ever  put  on  mourning  through  any  action  of 
mine." 

Such  a  cause  of  self-gratulation,  doubtless  more  satisfactory  to 
at  such  a  moment  than  any  other,  illustrates  that  long-sighted 
calculation,  aversion  to  distanl  or  hazardous  enterprise,  and  economy 
of  the  public  force,  which  marked  hi.  entire  political  career;  a  career 
,  beyond  all  parallel  in  the  history  of  Athens — since  he  main- 
tained a  great  influence,  gradually  swelling  into  a  decisive  personal 
ascendency,  for  between  thirty  and  forty  years.  I  lis  character  has 
been  presented  in  very  different  lights  by  different  authors  both 
ancient  and  modern,  and  our  materials  for  striking  the  balance  are 
not  so  good  as  we  could  wish.  But  his  immense  and  long-continued 
supremacy,  as  well  as  his  unparalleled  eloquence,  are  facts  attested 
not  i(  ss  by  his  enemies  than  by  his  friends — nay,  even  more  forcibly 
by  the  former  than  by  the  latter.  The  comic  writers,  who  hated 
him,  and  whose  trade  it  was  to  deride  and  hunt  down  every  leading 
political  character,  exhaust  their  powers  of  illustration  in  setting 
forth  both  the  one  and  the  other:  Telekleides,  Kratmus,  Eupolis, 
Aristophanes,  all  hearers  and  all  enemies,  speak  of  him  like  Olym- 
pian Zeus  hulling  thunder  and  lightning — like  Heraklcs  and  Achilles 
— as  the  only  speaker  on  whose  lips  persuasion  sat  and  who  left  his 
sting  in  the  minds  of  his  audience:  while  Plato  the  philosopher,  who 
disapproved  of  his  political  working  and  of  the  moral  effects  which 
lie  produced  upon  Athens,  nevertheless  extols  his  intellectual  and 
oratorical  ascendency — "his  majestic  intelligence" — in  language  not 
less  decisive  than  Thucydides.  There  is  another  point  of  eulogy, 
not  Less  valuable,  on  which  the  testimony  appears  uncontradicted: 
throughout  his  long  career,  amid  the  hottest  political  animosities, 
the  conduct  of  Perikles  toward  opponents  was  always  mild  and  lib- 
eral. The  conscious  self-esteem  and  arrogance  of  manner,  with 
which  the  contemporary  poet  Ion  reproached  him,  contrasting  it 
with  the  unpretending  simplicity  of  his  own  patron  Kimon — though 
probably  invidiously  exaggerated,  is  doubtless  in  substance  well- 
founded,  and  those  who  read  the  last  speech  given  above  out  of 
Thucydides  will  at  once  recognize  in  it  this  attribute.  His  natural 
taste,  his  love  of  philosophical  research,  and  his  unwearied  applica- 
tion to  public  affairs,  all  contributed  1o  alienate  him  from  ordinary 
familiarity,  and  to  make  him  careless,  perhaps  improperly  careless, 
of  the  lesser  means  of  conciliating  public  favor. 

But  admitting  this  latter  reproach  to  be  well-founded,  as  it  seems 
to  be,  it  helps  to  negative  that  greater  and  graver  political  crime 
which  has  been  imputed  to  him,  of  sacrificing  the  permanent  well- 
being  and  morality  of  the  state  to  the  maintenance  of  his  own  politi- 
cal power — of  corrupt  in.;-  the  people  by  distributions  of  the  public 
money.  "He  gave  the  reins  to  the  people  (in  Plutarch's  words) 
and  shaped  his  administration  for  their  immediate  favor,  by  always 
providing  at  home  some  public  spectacle  or  festival  or  procession, 


POLITICAL  LIFE  OF  PERIKLES.  55  fj 

thus  nursing  up  the  city  m  elegant  pleasures — and  by  sending  o'lt 
every  year  sixty  triremes  manned  by  citizen-seamen  on  full  pay,  who 
were  thus  kept  in  practice  and  acquired  nautical  skill." 

Now,  the  charge  here  made  against  Perikles,  and  supported  by 
allegations  in  themselves  honorable  rather  than  otherwise — of  a 
vicious  appetite  for  immediate  popularity,  and  of  improper  conces- 
sions to  the  immediate  feelings  of  the  people  against  their  permanent 
interests — is  precisely  that  which  Thucydides  in  the  most  pointed 
manner  denies;  and  not  merely  denies,  but  contrasts  Perikles  with 
his  successors  in  the  express  circumstance  that  they  did  so,  while  hs 
did  not.  The  language  of  the  contemporary  historian  well  deserves 
to  be  cited — "Perikles,  powerful  from  dignity  of  character  as  well 
as  from  wisdom,  and  conspicuously  above  the  least  tinge  of  corrup- 
tion, held  back  the  people  with  a  free  hand,  and  was  their  real 
leader  instead  of  being  led  by  them.  For  not  being  a  seeker  of 
power  from  unworthy  sources,  he  did  not  speak  with  any  view  to 
present  favor,  but  had  sufficient  sense  of  dignity  to  contradict  them 
on  occasion,  even  braving  their  displeasure.  Thus,  whenever  ho 
perceived  them  insolently  and  unseasonably  confident,  he  shaped  his 
speeches  in  such  manner  as  to  alarm  and  beat  them  down:  when 
again  he  saw  them  unduly  frightened,  he  tried  to  counteract  it  and 
restore  their  confidence:  so  that  the  government  was  in  name  a 
democracy,  but  in  reality  an  empire  exercised  by  the  first  citizen  in 
the  state.  But  those  who  succeeded  after  his  death,  being  more 
equal  one  with  another,  and  each  of  them  desiring  pre-eminence  over 
the  rest,  adopted  the  different  course  of  courting  the  favor  of  the 
people  and  sacrificing  to  that  object  even  important  state-interests. 
From  whence  arose  many  other  bad  measures,  as  might  be  expec- 
ted in  a  great  and  imperial  city,  and  especially  the  Sicilian  expedi- 
tion," etc. 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  judgment  here  quoted  from  Thucydides 
contradicts,  in  an  unqualified  manner,  the  reproaches  commonly 
.  made  against  Perikles  of  having  corrupted  the  Athenian  people — by 
distributions  of  the  public  money,  and  by  giving  way  to  their  unwise 
caprices — for  the  purpose  of  acquiring  and  maintaining  his  own 
political  power.  Nay,  the  historian  particularly  notes  the  opposite 
qualities — self-judgment,  conscious  dignity,  indifference  to  imme- 
diate popular  applause  or  wrath  when  set  against  what  was  perma- 
nently right  and  useful — as  the  special  characteristic  of  that  great 
statesman.  A  distinction  might  indeed  be  possible,  and  Plutarch 
professes  to  note  such  distinction,  between  the  earlier  and  the  later 
part  of  his  political  career.  Perikles  began  (so  that  biographer  says) 
by  corrupting  the  people  in  order  to  acquire  power;  but  having 
acquired  it,  he  employed  it  in  an  independent  and  patriotic  manner, 
so  that  the  judgment  of  Thucydides,  true  respecting  the  later  part 
of  his  life,  would  not  be  applicable  to  the  earlier.  This  distinction 
may  be  to  a  certain  degree  well  founded,  inasmuch  as  the  power  of 


55  l      BECI  >ND  AND  THIRD  YEARS  OF  TnE  WAR. 

ing  a  bold  and  successful  resistance  to  temporary  aberrations  of 
the  public  mind  necessarily  implies  an  established  influence,  and  can 
hardly  ever  be  exercised  even  by  the  firmest  politician  during  liis 
years  of  commencement,     lie  is  at  that  time  necessarily  the  adjunct 

me  party  or  tendency  which  he  finds  already  in  operation,  and 
has  to  stand  forward  actively  and  assiduously  before  he  can  create 
for  himself  a  separate  personal  influence.  But  while  we  admit  the 
distinction  to  this  extent,  there  is  nothing  to  warrant  us  in  restrict- 

the  encomium  of  Thucydides  exclusively  to  the  later  life  of 
Perikles,  or  in  representing  the  earlier  life  as  something  in  pointed 
contrast  with  that  encomium.  Construing  fairly  what  the  historian 
says,  he  evidently  did  not  so  conceive  the  earlier  life  of  Perikles. 
Either  those  political  changes  which  are  held  by  Plato,  Aristotle, 
Plutarch,  and  others,  to  demonstrate  the  corrupting  effect  of  Perikles 
and  his  political  ascendency — such  as  the  limitation  of  the  functions 
of  the   Areopagus,  as  well  as  of  the  power  of  the  magistrates,  the 

lishmenl  of  the  numerous  and  frequent  popular  dikasteries  with 

'  i' pay,  and  perhaps  also  the  assignment  of  pay  to  those  who 
attended  the  Ekklesia,  the  expenditure  for  public  works,  religious 
edifices  and  ornaments,  the  Diobely  (or  distribution  of  two  oboli  per 
head  to  the  poorer  citizens  at  various  festivals,  in  order  that  they 
mighl  be  able  to  pay  for  their  places  in  the  theater),  taking  it  as  it 
then  stood,  etc. — did  not  appear  to  Thucydides  mischievous  and  cor- 
rupting, as  these  other  writers  thought  them;  or  else  he  did  not  par- 
ticularly refer  them  to  Perikles. 

Both  are  true,  probably,  to  some  extent.  The  internal  political 
changes  at  Athens,  respecting  the  Areopagus  and  the  dikasteries,  took 
place  when  Perikles  was  a  young  man.  and  when  he  cannot  be  sup- 
posed to  have  yet  acquired  the  immense  personal  weight  which  after- 
ward belonged'  to  him  (Ephialtes  in  fact  seems  in  those  early  days  to 
have  been  a  greater  man  than  Perikles,  if  we  may  judge  by  the  fact 
that  he  was  selected  by  his  political  adversaries  for  assassination) — 
so  that  they  might  with  greater  propriety  be  ascribed  to  the  party 
with  winch  Perikles  was  connected,  rather  than  to  that  statesman 
himself.  But  next,  we  have  no  reason  to  presume  that  Thucydides 
considered  these  changes  as  injurious,  or  as  having  deteriorated  the 
Athenian  character.  All  that  he  docs  say  as  to  the  working  of  Peri- 
kles on  the  sentiment  and  actions  of  his  countrymen  is  eminently 
favorable.  He  represents  Hie  presidency  of  that  statesman  as  mod- 
erate, cautious,  conservative,  and  successful;  he  describes  him  as 
uniformly  keeping  back  the  people  from  rash  enterprises,  and  from 
attempts  to  extend  their  empire — as  looking  forward  to  the  necessity 
of  a  war,  and  maintaining  the  naval,  military,  and  financial  ; 
of  the  state  in  constanl  condition  to  stand  it— as  calculating,  with 
long-sighted  wisdom,  the  conditions  on  which  ultimate  succe 
pended.  If  wc  follow  the  elaborate  funeral  harangue  of  Perikles 
(which  Thucydides,  since  he  produces  it  at  length,  probably  con-id- 


IMPROVEMENT  UNDER  PERIKLES.  555 

eretl  as  faithfully  illustrating  the  political  point  of  view  of  that  states- 
man), we  shall  discover  a  conception  of  democratical  equality  no  less 
rational  than  generous;  an  anxious  care  for  the  recreation  and  com- 
fort of  the  citizens,  hut  no  disposition  to  emancipate  them  from 
active  obligation,  either  public  or  private — and  least  of  all,  any  idea 
of  dispensing  with  such  activity  by  abusive  largesses  out  of  the  gen- 
eral revenue.  The  whole  picture,  drawn  byPerikles,  of  Athens  "as 
the  schoolmistress  of  Greece,"  implies  a  prominent  development  of 
private  industry  and  commerce  not  less  than  of  public  citizenship 
and  soldiership — of  letters,  arts,  and  recreative  varieties  of  taste. 

Though  Thucydides  does  not  directly  canvass  the  constitutional 
changes  effected  in  Athens  under  Perikles,  yet  everything  which  he 
does  say  leads  us  to  believe  that  he  accounted  the  working  of  that 
statesman,  upon  the  whole,  on  Athenian  power  as  well  as  on  Athe- 
nian character,  eminently  valuable,  and  his  death  as  an  irreparable 
loss.  And  we  may  thus  appeal  to  the  judgment  of  an  historian  who 
is  our  best  witness  in  every  conceivable  respect,  as  a  valid  reply  to 
the  charge  against  Perikles  of  having  corrupted  the  Athenian  habits, 
character,  and  government.  If  he  spent  a  large  amount  of  the  public 
treasure  upon  religious  edifices  and  ornaments,  and  upon  stately 
works  for  the  city,  yet  the  sum  which  he  left  untouched,  ready  for 
use  at  the  beginning  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  was  such  as  to  appear 
more  than  sufficient  for  all  purposes  of  defense,  or  public  safety,  or 
military  honor.  It  cannot  be  shown  of  Perikles  that  he  ever  sacri- 
ficed the  greater  object  to  the  less — the  permanent  and  substantially 
valuable  to  the  transitory  and  showy — assured  present  possessions  to 
the  lust  of  new,  distant,  or  uncertain  conquests.  If  his  advice  had 
been  listened  to,  the  rashness  which  brought  on  the  defeat  of  the 
Athenian  Tolmides  at  Koroneia  in  Bceotia  would  have  been  avoided, 
and  Athens  might  probably  have  maintained  her  ascendency  over 
Megara  and  Bueotia,  which  would  have  protected  her  territory  from 
invasion,  and  given  a  new  turn  to  the  subsequent  history.  Perikles 
is  not  to  be  treated  as  the  author»of  the  Athenian  character.  he«f  ound 
it  with  its  very  marked  positive  characteristics  and  susceptibilities, 
among  which  those  which  he  chiefly  brought  out  and  improved  were 
the  best.  The  lust  of  expeditions  against  the  Persians,  which  Kimon 
would  have  pushed  into  Egypt  and  Cyprus,  he  repressed,  after'it  had 
accomplished  all  which  could  be  usefully  aimed  at.  The  ambition 
of  Athens  he  moderated  rather  than  encouraged:  the  democratical 
movement  of  Athens  he  regularized,  and  worked  out  ir>to  judicial 
institutions  which  ranked  among  the  prominent  features  of  Athenian 
life,  and  worked,  in  my  judgment,  with  a'  very  large  balance  of 
benefit  to  the  national  mind  as  well  as  to  individual  security,  in  spite 
of  the  many  defects  in  their  direct  character  as  tribunals.     But  that 

goiut  in  which  there  was  the  greatest  difference  between  Athens,  as 
'erikles  found  it  and  as  he  left  it,  is  unquestionably  the  pacific  and 
intellectual  development — rhetoric,    poetry,    arts,    philosophical  re- 


566      SECOKD  AND  THIRD  YEARS  OF  TnE  WAR. 

search,  and  recreative  variety.  To  which  if  we  add  greal  improve- 
ment in  the  cultivation  of  the  Attic  soil— extension  of  Athenian 
iniiU — attainment  and  laborious  maintenance  of  the  maximum  of 
maritime  skill  (attested  by  the  battles  of  Phormio) — enlargement  of 
the  area  of  complete  security  by  construction  of  the  Long  Walls — 
lastly,  the  clothing  of  Athens  in  her  imperial  mantle,  by  ornaments 
architectural  and  sculptural — we  shall  make  out  a  case  of  genuine 
progress  realized  during  the  political  rife  of  Perikles,  Mich  as  the 
evils  imputed  t<>  him,  far  more  imaginary  than  real,  will  go  but  a 
little  way  to  alloy.  How  little,  comparatively  Bpeaking,  of  the  pic- 
ture drawn  by  Perikles  in  his  funeral  harangue  of  481  b. a  would 
bave  been  correct,  if  the  harangue  had  been  delivered  over  those  war- 

llorS  who  tell  at  Tanaura  twenty-seven  years  before! 

It  has  been  remarked  by  M.  Boeckh,  thai  Perikles  sacrificed  the 
landed  proprietors  of  Attica  to  the  maritime  interests  and  empire  of 
Athens.  This  is  of  course  founded  on  the  destructive  invasions  of 
the  country  during  the  Peldponnesian  war;  for  down  to  the  com- 
mencement of  that  war  the  position  of  Attic  cultivators  and  propri- 
etors was  particularly  enviable:  and  the  censure  of  M.  Boeckh  there- 
lore  depends  upon  the  question,  how  far  l'eriklcs  contributed  to 
produce,  or  had  it  in  his  power  to  avert,  this  melancholy  war,  in  its 
results  so  fatal  not  merely  to  Athens,  but  to  the  entire  Grecian  race. 
Now  here  again,  if  we  follow  attentively  the  narrative  of  Thucy- 
dides,  we  shall  see  that,  in  the  judgment  of  that  historian,  not  only 
l'eriklcs  did  not  bring  on  the  war,  but  he  could  not  have  averted 
it  without  such  concessions  as  Athenian  prudence  as  well  as  Athe- 
nian patriotism  peremptorily  forbade.  Moreover  we  shall  see.  that 
the  calculations  on  which  Perikles  grounded  his  hopes  of  succos  if 
driven  to  war,  were  (in  the  opinion  of  the  historian)  perfectly  sound 
and  sate.  We  may  even  go  farther,  and  affirm,  that  the  administra- 
tion of  Perikles  during  the  fourteen  years  preceding  the  war.  exhibits 
a  "  moderation  "  (to  u.-e  the  words  of  Thucydidi  si  dictated  chiefly 
by  anxiety  to  avoid  raising  causes  of  war.  If  in  the  month?  imme- 
diately preceding  the  breaking  out  of  the  war,  after  the  conduct  of 
the  Corinthians  at  Potid®,  and  the  resolutions  of  the  Congress  at 
Sparta,  he  resisted  strenuously  all  compliance  with  special  demands 
from  Sparta — we  musl  recollect  that  these  were  demands  essentially 
insincere,  in  which  partial  compliance  would  have  lowered  the  dig- 
nity of  Athens  without  insuring  peace.  The  stories  about  Pheidias, 
Aspasia,  and  the  Megarians,  even  if  we  should  grant  thai  there  is 
some  truth  at  the  bottom  of  them,  must,  according  to  Thucydides,  be 
looked  upon  at  worst  as  concomitants  and  pretexts,  rather  than  as 
real  eausi  S,  of  the  war:  though  modern  authors  in  speaking  of  Peri- 
kles are    but    too  apt    to  use  expressions  which  tacitly  assume   these 

Btories  to  be  well  founded. 

Seeing  then  that  Perikles  did  not  bring  on,  and  could  not  have 
averted,  the  Peloponnesian  war— that  he  steered  his  course  in  refer- 


GREAT  MORTALITY  AND   SICKNESS.  557 

ence  to  that  event  with  the  long-sighted  prudence  of  one  who  knew 
that  the  safety  and  the  dignity  of  imperial  Athens  were  essentially 
interwoven — we  have  no  right  to  throw  upon  him  the  blame  of  sacri- 
ficing the  landed  proprietors  of  Attica.  These  proprietors  might, 
indeed,  be  excused  for  complaining,  where  they  suffered  so  ruinously. 
But  the  impartial  historian,  looking  at  the  whole  of  the  case,  cannot 
admit  their  complaints  as  a  ground  for  censuring  the  Athenian 
statesman. 

The  relation  of  Athens  to  her  allies,  the  weak  point  of  her  position, 
it  was  beyond  the  power  of  Perikles  seriously  to  amend ;  probably 
also  beyond  his  will,  since  the  idea  of  political  incorporation,  as  well 
as  that  of  providing  a  common  and  equal  confederate  bond  sustained 
by  effective  federal  authority,  between  different  cities,  was  rarely 
entertained  even  by  the  best  Greek  minds.  We  hear  that  he  tried  to 
summon  at  Athens  a  congress  of  deputies  from  all  cities  of  Greece, 
the  allies  of  Athens  included;  but  the  scheme  could  not  be  brought  to 
bear,  in  consequence  of  the  reluctance,  no  way  surprising,  of  the 
Peloponnesians.  Practically,  the  allies  were  not  badly  treated  during 
his  administration :  and  if  among  the  other  bad  consequences  of  the 
prolonged  war,  they  as  well  as  Athens  and  all  other  Greeks  come  to 
suffer  more  and  more,  this  depends  upon  causes  with  which  he  is 
not  chargeable,  and  upon  proceedings  which  departed  altogether 
from  his  wise  and  sober  calculations.  Taking  him  altogether,  with 
his  powers  of  thought,  speech,  and  action — his  competence  civil  and 
military,  in  the  council  as  well  as  in  the  field — his  vigorous  and  cul- 
tivated intellect,  and  his  comprehensive  ideas  of  a  community  in 
pacific  and  many-sided  development — his  incorruptible  public 
morality,  caution,  and  firmness,  in  a  country  where  all  those  quali- 
ties were  rare,  and  the  union  of  them  in  the  same  individual  of 
course  much  rarer — we  shall  find  him  without  a  parallel  throughout 
the  whole  course  of  Grecian  history. 

Under  the  great  mortality  and  pressure  of  sickness  at  Athens, 
operations  of  war  naturally  languished;  while  the  enemies  also, 
though  more  active,  had  but  little  success.  A  fleet  of  100  triremes 
with  1000  hoplites  on  board,  was  sent  by  the  Lacedaemonians  under 
Knemus  to  attack  Zakynthus,  but  accomplished  nothing  beyond 
devastation  of  the  open  parts  of  the  island ;  and  then  returned  home. 
And  it  was  shortly  after  this,  toward  the  month  of  September,  that 
the  Ambrakiots  made  an  attack  upon  the  Amphilochian  town  called 
Argos,  situated  on  the  southern  coast  of  the  Gulf  of  Ambrakia; 
which  town,  as  has  been  recounted  in  the  preceding  chapter,  had 
been  wrested  from  them  two  years  before 'by  the  Athenians  under 
Phormio  and  restored  to  the  Amphilochians  and  Akarnanians.  Tin; 
Ambrakiots,  as  colonists  and  allies  of  Corinth,  were  at  the  same  time 
animated  by  active  enmity  to  the  Athenian  influence  in  Akarnania, 
and  by  desire  to  regain  the  lost  town  of  Argos.  Procuring  aid  from 
the  Chaonians  and  some  other  Epirotic  tribes,  they  marched  against 


558      BECOND  AND  THIRD  YEARS  of  THE  WAR. 

.  and  after  laying  waste  the  territory,  endeavored  to  take  the 
iiiwn  by  assault,  bul  were  repulsed  and  obliged  to  retire.  This  ezpe 
iliiion  appears  to  have  impressed  the  Athenians  with  the  m  cessity  of 
a  standing  force  to  protect  their  interest  in  those  parts;  bo  that  in  the 
autumn  Phormio  was  senl  with  a  squadron  of  twenty  triremes  to 

y  Naupaktus  (now  inhabited  by  the  Messenians)  as  a  permanenl 
naval  Btation,  and  to  watch  the  entrance  of  the  Corinthian  Gulf. 
We  shall  find  in  the  events  of  the  succeeding  year  ample  confirmation 
of  this  necessity. 

Though  the  Peloponnesians  were  too  inferior  in  maritime  force  to 
undertake  formal  war  at  sea  againsl  Athens,  their  single  privateers, 
especially  the  Megarian  privateers  from  the  harbor  of  Nissea,  were 
active  in  injuring  her  commerce — and  not  merely  the  commerce  of 
Athens,  bul  also  that  of  other  neutral  Greeks,  without  scruple  or 
discrimination.    Several  merchantmen  and  fishing-vessels,  with   a 

derable  number  of  prisoners,  were  thus  captured.  Such  pris- 
oners as  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Lacedsemonians — even  neutral 

-  as  well  as  Athenians — were  all  put  to  death,  and  their  bodies 
cast  into  clefts  of  the  mountains.  In  regard  to  the  neutrals,  this 
capture  was  piratical,  and  the  slaughter  unwarrantably  cruel,  judged 
even  by  the  received  practice  of  the  Greeks,  deficient  as  that  was  mi 
the  score  of  humanity.  But  to  dismiss  these  neutral  prisoners,  or  to 
sell  them  as  slaves,  would  have  given  publicity  to  a  piratical  capture 
and  provoked  the  neutral  towns;  so  that  the  prisoners  were  probably 
slain  as  the  best  way  of  getting  rid  of  them  and  thus  suppressing 

evidence. 

Some  of  these  Peloponnesian  privateers  ranged  as  far  as  the  south- 
western coast  of  Asia  Minor,  where  they  found  temporary  shelter, 
and  interrupted  the  trading-vessels  from  Phaselis  and  Phenicia  i<> 
Athens;  to  protect  which  the  Athenians  dispatched  in  the  course  of 
the  autumn  a  squadron  of  six  triremes  under  Melesander.  lie  was 
farther  directed  to  insure  the  collection  of  the  ordinary  tribute  from 
Athenian  subject-allies,  and  probably  to  raise  such  contributions  as 
he  could  elsewhere.  In  the  prosecution  of  this  latter  duty,  he  under- 
took an  expedition  from  the  sea-coast  against  one  of  the  Lykian 
towns  in  the  interior,  but  his  attack  was  repelled  with  loss,  and  lie 
himself  slain. 

An  opportunity  soon  afforded  itself  to  the  Athenians  of  retaliating 
on  Sparta  for  this  cruel  treatment  of  the  maritime  prisoners.  In 
i  ion  of  the  idea  projected  at  the  commencement  of  the  war,  the 
Lacedsemonians  sent  Aneristus  and  two  others  as  envoys  to  Persia, 
for  the  purpose  of  soliciting  from  the  Great  King  aids  of  money  and 
troops  against  Athens;  the  dissensions  among  the  Greeks  thusgradu- 
ally  paving  the  way  for  him  to  regain  his  ascendency  in  the  .Egean. 
Timagoraa  of  Tegea,  together  with  an  Argeian  named  Pollis  without 
any  formal  mission  from  his  city,  and  the  Corinthian  Aristeus,  accom- 


SURRENDER  OF  POTID.EA.  559 

panied  them.  As  the  sea  was  in  the  power  of  Athens,  they  traveled 
overland  through  Thrace  to  the  Hellespont.  Aristeus,  eager  to  leave 
nothing  untried  for  the  relief  of  Potidoea,  prevailed  upon  them  to 
make  application  to  Sitalkes,  king  of  the  Odrysian  Thracians.  That 
prince  was  then  in  alliance  with  Athens,  and  his  son  Sadokus  had 
even  received  the  grant  of  Athenian  citizenship.  Yet  the  envoys 
thought  it  possible  not  only  to  detach  him  from  the  Athenian  alli- 
ance, but  even  to  obtain  from  him  an  army  to  act  against  the  Athe- 
nians and  raise  the  blockade  of  Potidsea.  On  being  refused,  they 
lastly  applied  to  him  for  a  safe  escort  to  the  banks  of  the  Helles- 
pont, in  their  way  toward  Persia.  But  Learchus  and  Ameiniades, 
then  Athenian  residents  near  the  person  of  Sitalkes,  had  influence 
enough  not  only  to  cause  rejection  of  these  requests,  but  also  to 
induce  Sadokus,  as  a  testimony  of  zeal  in  his  new  character  of  Athe- 
nian citizen,  to  assist  them  in  seizing  the  persons  of  Aristeus  and  his 
companions  in  their  journey  through  Thrace.  Accordingly,  the  whole 
party  were  seized  and  conducted  as  prisoners  to  Athens,  where  they 
were  forthwith  put  to  death,  without  trial  or  permission  to  speak — and 
their  bodies  cast  into  rocky  chasms,  as  a  reprisal  for  the  captured 
seamen  slain  by  the  Lacedaemonians. 

Such  revenge  against  Aristeus,  the  instigator  of  the  revolt  of  Poti- 
daea,  relieved  the  Athenians  from  a  dangerous  enemy;  and  that 
blockaded  city  was  now  left  to  its  fate.  About  midwinter  it  capitu- 
lated, after  a  blockade  of  two  years,  and  after  going  through  the 
extreme  of  suffering  from  famine  to  such  a  degree,  that  some  of 
those  who  died  were  even  eaten  by  the  survivors.  In  spite  of  such 
intolerable  distress,  the  Athenian  generals,  Xenophon,  son  of  Eurip- 
ides, and  his  two  colleagues,  admitted  them  to  favorable  terms  of 
capitulation — allowing  the  whole  population  and  the  Corinthian 
allies  to  retire  freely,  with  a  specified  sum  of  money  per  head,  as 
well  as  with  one  garment  for  each  man  and  two  for  each  woman — so 
that  they  found  shelter  among  the  Chalkidic  townships  in  the  neigh- 
borhood. These  terms  were  singularly  favorable,  considering  the 
desperate  state  of  the  city,  which  must  very  soon  have  surrendered 
at  discretion.  But  the  hardships,  even  of  the  army  without,  in  the 
cold  of  winter,  were  very  severe,  and  they  had  become  thoroughly 
tired  both  of  the  duration  and  the  expense  of  the  siege.  The  cost  to 
Athens  had  been  not  less  than  2,000  talents;  since  the  assailant  force 
had  never  been  lower  than  3,000  hoplites,  during  the  entire  tw<i 
years  of  the  siege,  and  for  a  portion  of  the  time  considerably  greater 
— each  hoplite  receiving  two  drachmas  per  diem.  The  Athenians 
at  home,  when  they  learnt  the  terms  of  the  capitulation,  were  dis- 
pleased with  the  generals  for  the  indulgence  shown, — since  a  little 
additional  patience  would  have  constrained  the  city  to  surrender  at 
discretion;  in  which  case  the  expense  would  have  been  partly  made 
good  by  selling  the  prisoners  as  slaves — and  Athenian  vengeance 


500      SECOND  AND  THIRD  YEARS  OF  THE  WAR. 

probably  gratified  by  putting  the  warriors  to  death.  A  body  of  1000 
colonist"--  were  senl  from  Athena  i"  occupy  Potidaea  and  its  vacant 
territorj . 

Two  full  years  had  now  elapsed  since  the  actual  commencement  of 
war  by  the  attack  of  the  Thebane  <<n  Plataea.  Fet  the  Peloponne 
sians  hid  accomplished  ao  part  of  whal  they  expected.  They  bad  nut. 
rescind  Potidaea,  nor  had  their  twice-repeated  invasion,  although 
assisted  by  the  unexpected  disasters  arising  from  the  epidemic,  as 
vet  brought  Alliens  to  any  sufficient  humiliation — though  perhaps 
the  envoys  which  she  had  sent,  during  the  foregoing  summer  with 
propositions  lor  peace  (contrary  to  the  advice  of  Perikles)  may  have 
produced  an  impression  that  she  could  not.  hold  out  long.  At  the 
same  time  the  Peloponnesian  allies  had  on  their  side  suffered  little 
damage,  since  the  ravages  inflicted  by  the  Athenian  licet  on  their 
coast  may  have  been  nearly  compensated  by  the  booty  which  their 
invading  troops  gained  in  Attica.  Probably  by  this  time  the  public 
opinion  in  Greece  had  contracted  an  unhappy  familiarity  with  the  state 
of  war.  so  that  nothing  but  some  decisive  loss  and  humiliation  on  one 
side  at  least,  if  not  on  both,  would  suffice  to  terminate  it.  In  this 
third  spring,  the  Peloponnesians  did  not  repeat  their  annual  march 
into  Attica — deterred,  partly,  we  may  suppose,  by  fear  of  the  epi- 
demic yet  raging  there — but  still  more,  by  the  strong  desire  of  the 
Thebans  to  take  their  revenge  on  Platsea. 

To  this  ill-fated  city,  Archidamus  marched  forthwith  at  the  head  of 
the  confederate  army.  No  sooner  had  he  entered  and  begun  to  lay 
waste  the  territory  than  the  Plataean  heralds  came  forth  to  arrest  his 
hand,  and  accosted  him  in  the  following  terms:  "  Archidamus,  and 
ye  men  of  Lacedsemon,  ye  act  wrong  and  in  a  manner  neither 
worthy  of  yourselves  nor  of  your  fathers,  in  thus  invading  the  terri- 
tory of  Platsea.  For  the  Lacedaemonian  Pausanias,  son  of  Kleom- 
brotus,  after  he  had  liberated  Greece  from  the  Persians,  in  conjunc- 
tion with  those  Greeks  who  stood  forward  to  bear  their  share  of  the 
danger,  offered  sacrifice  to  Zeus  Eleutherius  in  the  market-place  of 
Plataea;  and  there,  in  presence  of  all  the  allies,  assigned  to  the 
Platieans  their  own  city  and  territory  to  hold  in  full  autonomy,  so 
that  none  should  invade  them  wrongfully  or  with  a  view  to  enslave 
them:  should  such  invasion  occur,  the  allies  present  pledged  them- 
selves to  stand  forward  with  all  their  force  as  protectors.  While 
your  fathers  made  to  us  this  grant  in  consideration  of  our  valor  and 
forwardness  in  that  perilous  emergency,  ye  are  now  doing  the  pre 
cise  contrary:  ye  are  come  along  with  our  worst  enemies,  the  The- 
bans, to  enslave  us.  And  we  on  our  side  now  adjure  you,  calling  to 
witness  the  gods  who  sanctioned  that  oath,  as  well  as  your  paternal 
and  our  local  gods,  not  to  violate  the  oath  by  doing  wrong  to  the 
Plataean  territory,  but  to  let  us  live  on  in  that  autonomy  which  Pau- 
sanias  guaranteed." 

Whereunto    Archidamus   replied — "  Ye    speak    fairly,    men  of 


THE  REPLY  OF  ARCHIDAMUS.  561 

Platsea,  if  your  conduct  shall  be  in  harmony  with  your  words. 
Remain  autonomous  yourselves,  as  Pausanias  granted,  and  help  us  to 
lil>erate  those  other  Greeks,  who,  after  having  shared  in  the  same 
dangers  and  sworn  the  same  oath  along  with  you,  have  now  been 
enslaved  by  the  Athenians.  It  is  for  their  liberation  and  that  of  the 
other  Greeks  that  this  formidable  outfit  of  war  has  been  brought 
forth.  Pursuant  to  your  oaths,  ye  ought  by  rights,  and  we  now 
invite  you,  to  take  active  part  in  this  object.  But  if  ye  cannot  act 
thus,  at  least  remain  epiiet,  conformably  to  the  summons  which  we 
have  already  sent  to  you.  Enjoy  your  own  territory,  and  remain 
neutral — receiving  both  parlies  as  friends,  but  neither  party  for  war- 
like purposes.     With  this  we  shall  be  satisfied." 

The  reply  of  Archidamus  discloses  by  allusion  a  circumstance 
which  the  historian  had  not  before  directly  mentioned;  that  the 
Lacedaemonians  had  sent  a  formal  summons  to  the  Platseaus  to 
renounce  their  alliance  with  Athens  and  remain  neutral.  At  what 
time  this  took  place,  we  know  not,  but  it  marks  the  peculiar  senti- 
ment attaching  to  the  town.  But  the  Platreans  did  not  comply  with 
the  invitation  thus  repeated.  The  heralds,  having  returned  for 
instructions  into  the  cit}r,  brought  back  for  answer,  that  compliance 
was  impossible,  without  the  consent  of  the  Athenians,  since  their 
wives  and  families  were  now  harbored  at  Athens :  besides,  if  they 
should  profess  neutrality,  and  admit  both  parties  as  friends,  the 
Thebans  might  again  make  an  attempt  to  surprise  their  city.  In 
reply  to  their  scruples,  Archidamus  again  addressed  them — "Well 
then,  hand  over  your  city  and  houses  to  us,  Lacedaemonians:  mark 
out  the  boundaries  of  your  territory:  specify  the  number  of  your 
fruit-trees,  and  all  your  other  property  which  admits  of  being  num- 
bered; and  then  retire  whithersoever  ye  choose,  as  long  as  the  war 
continues.  As  soon  as  it  is  over,  we  will  restore  to  you  all  that  we 
have  received — in  the  interim  we  will  hold  it  in  trust,  and  keep  it  in 
cultivation,  and  pay  you  such  an  allowance  as  shall  suffice  for  your 
wants." 

The  proposition  now  made  was  so  fair  and  tempting,  that  the  gen- 
eral body  of  the  Plataeans  were  at  first  inclined  to  accept  it,  provided 
the  Athenians  would  acquiesce.  They  obtained  from  Archidamus  a 
truce  long  enough  to  enable  them  to  send  envoys  to  Athens.  After 
communication  with  the  Athenian  assembly,  the  envoys  returned  to 
Platrca  bearing  the  following  answer — "  Men  of  Plataea,  the  Athe- 
nians say  they  have  never  yet  permitted  you  to  be  wronged  since  the 
alliance  first  began, — nor  will  they  now  betray  you,  but  will  help  you 
to  the  best  of  their  power.  And  they  adjuije  you,  by  the  oaths  which 
your  fathers  swore  to  them,  not  to  depart  in  any  way  from  the 
alliance." 

This  message  awakened  in  the  bosoms  of  the  Plataeans  the  full 
force  of  ancient  and  tenacious  sentiment.  They  resolved  to  main- 
tain, at  all  cost,  and  even  to  the  extreme  of  ruin,  if  necessity  should 


562      SECOND  AND  THIRD  YEARS  OF  THE  WAR. 

require  it,  their  union  with  Athens.  Ii  was,  indeed,  impossible  that 
they  could  do  otherwise  (considering  the  position  of  their  wives  and 
families)  without  the  consent  of  the  Athenians.  Though  we  cannot 
wonder  that  the  latter  refused  consent,  we  may  yel  remark,  that,  in 
their  situation,  a  perfectly  generous  ally  might  well  have  granted  it. 
For  the  forces  of  Platsea  counted  for  little  as  a  portion  of  the  aggre- 
gate strength  of  Athens;  nor  could  the  Athenians  possibly  protect  it 
against  the  superior  land  force  of  enemies.  In  fact,  so  hopeless  was 
the  attempt,  that  they  never  even  tried,  throughout  the  whole  course 
of  the  long  subsequent  blockade. 

The  final  refusal  of  the  Platseans  was  proclaimed  to  Archidamus 
by  word  of  mouth  from  the  walls,  since  it  was  not  thought  safe  to 
send  out  any  messenger.  As  soon  as  the  Spartan  prince  heard  the 
answer,  he  prepared  for  hostile  operations, — apparently  with  very 
sincere  reluctance,  attested  in  the  following  invocation  emphatically 
pronounced : 

"  Ye  <b>ds  and  Heroes,  who  hold  the  Platsean  territory,  be  ye  my 
witnesses,  that  we  have  not  in  the  first  instance  wrongfully — not 
until  these  Platseans  have  lirst  renounced  the  oath-  binding  on  all  of 
us — invaded  this  territory,  in  which  our  fathers  defeated  the  Per- 
sian- after  prayers  to  you,  and  which  ye  granted  as  propitious  for 
Creek-  to  tight  in:  nor  shall  we  commit  wrong  in  what  we  may  do 
fait  her,  for  we  have  taken  pains  to  tender  reasonable  terms,  but 
without  success.  Be  ye  now  consenting  parties:  may  those  who  are 
beginning  the  wrong  receive  punishment  for  it — mayr  those  who  are 
aiming  to  inflict  penalty  righteously,  obtain  their  object." 

It  was  thus  that  Archidamus,  in  language  delivered  probably  under 
the  walls,  and  within  hearing  of  the  citizens  who  manned  them, 
endeavored  to  conciliate  the  gods  and  heroes  of  that  town  which  he  was 
about  to  ruin  and  depopulate.  The  whole  of  this  preliminary  debate, 
so  strikingly  and  dramatically  set  forth  by  Thueydides,  illustrates  the 
respectful  reluctance  with  which  the  Lacedemonians  first  brought 
themselves  to  assail  this  scene  of  the  glories  of  their  fathers.  What 
deserves  remark  is.  their  direct  sentiment  attaches  itself,  not  at  all  to 
the  Platsean  people,  but  only  to  the  Platsean  territory.  It  is  purely 
local,  though  it  becomes  partially  transferred  to  the  people,  as  tenants 
of  this  spot,  by  secondary  association.  We  see.  indeed,  that  nothing 
but  the  long-standing  antipathy  of  the  Thebans  induced  Archidamus 
to  undertake  the  enterprise;  for  the  conquest  of  Plat  sea  was  of  no 
avail  toward  the  main  objects  of  the  war,  though  the  exposed  situa- 
tion of  the  town  caused  it  to  be  crushed  between  the  two  great  con- 
tending forces  in  Greece. 

Archidamus  now  commenced  the  siege  forthwith,  in  full  hopes 
that  his  numerous  army,  the  entire  strength  of  the  Peloponnesian 
confederacy,  would  soon  capture  a  place,  of  no  great  size,  and  proba- 
bly not  very  well  fortified — yet  defended  by  a  resolute  garrison  of  400 
native  citizens,  with  eighty  Athenians.     There  was  no  one  else  in 


SIEGE  OP  PLAT^A.  563 

the  town,  except  110  female  slaves  for  cooking.  The  fruit  trees,  cut 
down  in  laying  waste  the  cultivated  land,  sufficed  to  form  a  strong 
palisade  all  round  the  town,  so  as  completely  to  inclose  the  inhabi- 
tants. Next,  Archidamus,  having  abundance  of  timber  near  at  hand 
,in  the  forests  of  Kithaaron,  began  to  erect  a  mound  against  a  portion 
of  the  town  wall,  so  as  to  be  able  to  scale  it  by  an  inclined  plane,  and 
thus  take  the  place  by  assault.  Wood,  stones,  and  earth  were  piled 
up  in  a  vast  heap — cross  palings  of  wood  being  carried  on  each  side 
of  it,  in  parallel  lines  at  right  angles  to  the  town  wall,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  keeping  the  loose  mass  of  materials  between  them  together. 
For  seventy  days  and  as  many  nights  did  the  army  labor  at  this 
work,  without  any  intermission,  taking  turns  for  food  and  repose; 
and  through  such  unremitting  assiduity,  the  mound  approached  near 
to  the  height  of  the  town  wall.  But  as  it  gradually  mounted  up,  the 
Platseans  were  not  idle  on  their  side :  they  constructed  an  additional 
wall  of  wood,  which  they  planted  on  the  top  of  their  own  town  wall 
so  as  to  heighten  the  part  in  contact  with  the  enemy's  mound;  sus- 
taining it  by  brickwork  behind,  for  which  the  neighboring  houses 
furnished  materials.  Hides,  raw  as  well  as  dressed,  were  suspended 
in  front  of  it,  in  order  to  protect  the  workmen  against  missiles,  and 
the  wood-work  against  fire-carrying  arrows.  And  as  the  besiegers 
still  continued  heaping  up  materials,  to  raise  their  mound  to  the 
height  even  of  this  recent  addition,  the  Platseans  met  them  by  break- 
ing a  hole  in  the  lower  part  of  their  town  wall,  and  pulling  in  the 
earth  from  the  lower  portion  of  the  mound;  which  then  fell  in  at  the 
top,  and  left  a  vacant  space  near  the  wall.  This  the  besiegers  filled  up 
by  letting  down  quantities  of  stiff  clay  rolled  up  in  wattled  reeds,  which 
could  not  be  pulled  away  in  the  same  manner.  Again,  the  Plataeans 
dug  a  subterranean  passage  from  the  interior  of  their  town  to  the 
ground  immediately  under  the  mound,  and  thus  carried  away  unseen 
its  earthy  foundation ;  so  that  the  besiegers  saw  their  mound  con- 
tinually sinking  down,  in  spite  of  fresh  additions  at  the  top — yet 
without  knowing  the  reason.  Nevertheless  it  was  plain  that  these 
stratagems  would  be  in  the  end  ineffectual,  and  the  Platseans  accord- 
ingly built  a  new  portion  of  town  wall  in  the  interior,  in  the  shape 
of  a  crescent,  taking  its  start  from  the  old  town  wall  on  each  side  of 
the  mound.  The  besiegers  were  thus  deprived  of  all  benefit  from 
the  mound,  assuming  it  to  be  successfully  completed;  since  when 
they  had  marched  over  it,  there  stood  in  front  of  them  a  new  town 
wall  requiring  to  be  carried  in  like  manner. 

Nor  was  this  the  only  method  of  attack  employed.  Archidamus 
farther  brought  up  battering  engines,  one  of  which  greatly  shook 
and  endangered  the  additional  height  of  wall  built  by  the  Platseans 
against  the  mound;  while  others  were  brought  to  bear  on  different 
portions  of  the  circuit  of  the  town  wall.  Against  these  new  assail- 
ants, various  means  of  defense  were  used.  The  defenders  on  the 
walls  let  down  ropes,  got  hold  of  the  head  of  the  approaching  engine, 


564      SECOND  AND  THIRD  YEARS  OP  THE  WAR 

and  pulled  il  by  main  force  oul  of  therighl  line,  cither  upwards  or 

sideways;  or  they  prepared  heavy  wooden  beams  on  the  wall,  each 

attached  al  both  ends  by  long  iron  chains  to  two  poles  projecting  at 

righl  angles  from   tin'  wall,  by  means  of  which  pules  it  was  raised 

and  held  aloft:   so  thai  al  the  proper  moment  when  the  battering 

machine  approached  the  wall,  the  chain  was  suddenly  lei  go,  and  the 

beam  fell  down  withgreal  violence  directly  upon  the  engine,  break 

iii-  off  its  projecting  beak.     However  rude  these  defensive  process! 

eem,  they  were  found  effective  againsl  the  besiegers,  who  saw 

.1  the  close  of  three  months' unavailing  efforts,  obliged 

to  renounce  the  idea  of  taking  the  town  in  any  other  way  than  by 

irocess  of  blockade  and  famine — a   process  alike  tedious  and 

costly. 

Before  they  would  incur  so  much  inconvenience,  however,  they 
had  recourse  to  one  farther  stratagem — that  of  trying  to  set  the  town 
on  lire.  From  the  height  of  their  mound,  they  threw  down  large 
quantities  of  fagots,  partly  into  the  space  between  the  mound  and  the 
newly  built  crescent  wall — partly,  as  far  as  they  could  reach,  into 
Other  parts  of  the  city:  pitch  and  oilier  combustibles  were  next 
added,  and  the  whole  mass  set  on  tire.  The  conflagration  was  tre- 
mendous, such  as  had  never  been  before  seen:  a  large  portion  of  the 
town  became  unapproachable,  and  the  whole  of  it  narrowly  escaped 
destruction.  Nothing  could  have  preserved  it,  had  the  wind  been 
rather  more  favorable.  There  was,  indeed,  a  further  story  of  an 
opportune  thunder-storm  coming  to  extinguish  the  flames,  which 
Thucydides  does  not  seem  to  credit.  In  spite  of  much  partial  dam- 
age, the  town  remained  still  defensible  and  the  spirit  of  the  inhabit- 
ants unsubdued. 

There  now  remained  no  other  resource  except  to  build  a  wall  of 
circumvallation  round  Platsea,  and  trust  to  the  slow  process  of 
famine.  The  task  was  distributed  in  suitable  fractions  among  the 
various  confederate  cities,  and  completed  about  the  middle  of  Sep- 
tember,  a  little  before  the  autumnal  equinox.  Two  distinct  walls 
were  constructed,  with  sixteen  feet  of  intermediate  space  all  covered 
in,  so  as  to  look  like  one  very  thick  wall.  There  were,  moreover,  two 
ditches,  out  of  which  the  bricks  for  the  wall  had  been  taken — one  on 
the  inside  toward  Plataea,  and  the  other  on  the  outside  againsl  any 
foreign  relieving  force.  The  interior  covered  space  between  the  walls 
wa's  intended  to  serve  as  permanent  quarters  fpr  the  troops  left  on 
guard,  consisting  half  of  Boeotians  and  half  of  Peloponnesians. 

At  the  same  time  that  Archidamus  began  the  siege  of  Plataea,  the 
Athenians  on  their  side  dispatched  a  force  of  2,000  hoplites  and  L'OO 
horsemen  to  the  Chalkidic  peninsula,  under  Xenophon  son  of  Eurip- 
ides (with  two  colleague-),  the  same  who  had  granted  so  recently 
the  capitulation  of  Potid;ea.  It  was  necessary  doubtless  to  convoy 
and  establish  the  new  colonists  who  were  about  to  occupy  the  deserted 
site  of  Potidsea.     Moreover,  the  general  had  acquired  some  knowl- 


ATTACK  UPON  AKARNANIA.  565 

edge  of  the  position  and  parties  of  the  Chalkidic  towns,  and  hoped 
to  be  able  to  act  against  them  with  effect.  He  first  invaded  the 
territory  belonging  to  the  Bottaeian  town  of  Spartolus,  not  without 
hopes  that  the  city  itself  would  be  betrayed  to  him  by  intelligences 
within.  But  this  was  prevented  by  the  arrival  of  an  additional  force 
from  Olynthus,  partly  hoplites,  partly  peltasts.  Such  peltasts,  a 
species  of  troops  between  heavy-armed  and  light-armed,  furnished 
with  a  pelta  (or  light  shield)  and  short  spear  or  javelin,  appear  to 
have  taken  their  rise  among  these  Chalkidic  Greeks,  being  equipped 
in  a  manner  half  Greek  and  half  Thracian :  we  shall  find  them  hereafter 
much  improved  and  turned  to  account  by  some  of  the  ablest  Grecian 
generals.  The  Chalkidic  hoplites  are  generally  of  inferior  merit:  on 
the  other  hand,  their  cavalry  and  their  peltasts  are  very  good.  In 
the  action  which  now  took  place  under  the  walls  of  Spartolus,  the 
Athenian  hoplites  defeated  those  of  the  enemy,  but  their  cavalry  and 
their  light  troops  were  completely  worsted  by  the  Chalkidic.  These 
latter,  still  further  strengthened  by  the  arrival  of  fresh  peltasts  from 
Olynthus,  ventured  even  to  attack  the  Athenian  hoplites,  who 
thought  it  prudent  to  fall  back  upon  the  two  companies  left  in 
reserve  to  guard  the  baggage.  During  this  retreat  they  were 
harassed  by  the  Chalkidic  horse  and  light-armed,  who  retired  when 
the  Athenians  turned  upon  them,  but  attacked  them  on  all  sides 
when  on  their  march,  and  employed  missiles  so  effectively  that  the 
retreating  hoplites  could  no  longer  maintain  a  steady  order,  but  took 
to  flight  and  sought  refuge  at  Potidsea.  Four  hundred  and  thirty 
hoplites,  near  one-fourth  of  the  whole  force,  together  with  all  three 
generals,  perished  in  this  defeat,  while  the  expedition  returned  in 
dishonor  to  Athens. 

In  the  western  parts  of  Greece,  the  arms  of  Athens  and  her  allies 
were  more  successful.  The  Ambrakiots,  exasperated  by  their  repulse 
from  the  Amphilochian  Argos,  during  the  preceding  year,  had  been 
induced  to  conceive  new  and  larger  plans  of  aggression  against 
both  the  Akarnanians  and  Athenians.  In  concert  with  their  mother- 
city  Corinth,  where  they  obtained  warm  support,  they  prevailed  upon 
the  Lacedaemonians  to  take  part  in  a  simultaneous  attack  of  Akarna- 
nia,  by  land  as  well  as  by  sea,  which  would  prevent  the  Akarnanians 
from  concentrating  their  forces  in  any  one  point,  and  would  put  each 
of  their  townships  upon  an  isolated  self-defense :  so  that  all  of  them 
might  be  overpowered  in  succession,  and  detached,  together  with 
Kephallenia  and  Zakynthus  (Zacte),  from  the  Athenian  alliance.  The 
fleet  of  Phormio  at  Kaupaktus,  consisting  only  of  twenty  triremes, 
was  accounted  incompetent  to  cope  with  aPeloponnesian  fleet  such 
as  might  be  fitted  out  at  Corinth.  There  was  even  some  hope  that 
the  important  station  at  Naupaktus  might  itself  be  taken,  so  as  to 
expel  the  Athenians  completely  from  those  parts. 

The  scheme  of  operations  now  projected  was  far  more  comprehen- 
sive than  anything  which  the  war  had  yet  afforded.     The  land-force 


566      SECOND  AND  THIRD  YEARS  OF  TnE  WAR. 

of  the  Ambrakiota,  together  with  their  neighbors  and  fellow-colonists 
the  Leukadians  and  Anaktorians,  assembled  near  their  own  city; 
while  their  maritime  force  was  collected  at  Leukas,  on  the  Akarnanian 
coast.  The  force  al  Ambrakia  was  joined,  not  only  by  Knenms.  the 
i  acedsBmonian  admiral,  with  1000  Peloponnesian  hoplites,  who 
found  means  to  cross  over  from  Peloponnesus,  eluding  the  vigilance 
Df  Phormio  but  also  by  a  numerous  body  of  Epirotic  and  Macedo- 
nian auxiliaries,  collected  even  from  the  distant  and  northernmost 
tribes.    A  thousand  Chaonians  were  present,  under  the  command  of 

PhotVUS  and  Nikanor.  two  animal  chiefs  chosen  from  the  regal  ,Lrens. 
Neither  this  tribe,  nor  the  Thesprotians  who  came  along  with  them, 
acknowledged  any  hereditary  king.  The  Molossiana  and  Atintanes, 
who  also  joined  the  force,  were  under  Sabylinthus,  regent  on  behalf 
of  the  young  prince  Tharypas.  There  came,  besides,  the  Parauai. 
from  the  hanks  of  the  river  Amis,  under  t heir  king  Orcedus,  together 
with  1000  Orestse,  a  tribe  rather  Macedonian  than  Epirot,  sent  by 
their  king  Antiochus.  Even  king  Perdikkas,  though  then  nominally 
in  alliance  with  Athens,  sent  1000  of  his  Macedonian  subjects,  who 
however  arrived  too  late  to  be  of  any  use.  This  large  and  diverse 
body  of  Epirotic  invaders,  a  new  phenomenon  in  Grecian  history, 
and  got  together  doubtless  by  the  hopes  of  plunder,  proves  the 
extensive  relations  of  the  tribes  of  the  interior  with  the  city  of 
Ambrakia— a  city  destined  to  become  in  later  days  the  capital  of  the 
Epirotic  king  Pyrrhus. 

It  had  been  concerted  that  the  Peloponnesian  fleet  from  Corinth 
should  join  thai  already  assembled  at  Leukas,  and  act  upon  the  coast 
of  Akarnania  at  the  same  time  that  the  land-force  marched  into  that 
territory.  But  Knenms,  finding  the  land-force  united  and  ready 
near  Ambrakia,  deemed  it  unnecessary  to  await  the  fleet  from 
Corinth,  and  marched  straight  into  Akarnania,  through  Limna?a,  a 
frontier  village  territory  belonging  to  the  Amphilochian  Argos.  He 
directed  his  march  upon  Stratus — an  interior  town,  the  chief  place  in 
Akarnania — the  capture  of  which  would  be  likely  to  carry  with  it  the 
surrender  of  the  rest;  especially  as  the  Akarnanians,  distracted  by  the 
presence  of  the  ships  at  Leukas,  and  alarmed  by  the  large  body  of 
invaders  on  their  frontier,  did  not  dare  to  leave  their  own  separate 
homes,  so  that  Stratus  was  left  altogether  to  its  own  citizens.  Nor 
was  Phormio,  though  they  sent  an  urgent  message  to  him,  in  any  con- 
dition to  help  them;  since  he  could  not  leave  Naupaktus  unguarded, 
when  the  large  fleet  from  Corinth  was  known  to  be  approaching. 
Under  such  circumstances,  Knemus  and  his  army  indulged  confident 
hopes  of  overpowering  Stratus  without  difficulty.  They  inarched  in 
three  divisions:  the  Epirots  in  the  center — the  Leukadians  and  Anak- 
torians on  the  right — the  Peloponnesians  and  Ambrakiots,  together 
with  Knemus  himself,  on  the  left.  So  little  expectation  was  enter- 
tained of  resistance,  that  these  three  divisions  took  no  pains  to  keep 
near,  or  eren  in  sight  of  each  other.     Both  the  Greek  divisions, 


REPULSE  OF  THE  ARMY.  567 

indeed,  maintained  a  good  order  of  march,  and  kept  proper  scouts  on 
the  lookout;  but  the  Epirota  advanced  without  any  care  or  order; 
especially  the  Chaonians,  who  formed  the  van.  These  men,  ac- 
counted the  most  warlike  of  all  the  Epirotic  tribes,  were  so  full  of 
conceit  and  rashness,  that  when  they  approached  near  to  Strains, 
they  would  not  halt  to  encamp  and  assail  the  place  conjointly  with 
the  Greeks;  but  marched  along  with  the  other  Epirota  right  forward 
to  the  town,  intending  to  attack  it  single-handed,  and  confident  that, 
they  should  carry  it  at  the  first  assault  before  the'Greeks  came  up,  so 
that  the  entire  glory  would  be  theirs.  The  Stratians  watched  and 
profited  by  this  imprudence.  Planting  ambuscades  in  convenient 
places,  and  suffering  the  Epirots  to  approach  without  suspicion  near 
to  the  gates,  they  then  suddenly  sallied  out  and  attacked  them,  while 
the  troops  in  amhuscade  rose  up  and  assailed  them  at  the  same  time. 
The  Chaonians  who  formed  the  van,  thus  completely  surprised,  were 
routed  with  great  slaughter;  while  the  other  Epirots  fled,  after  but 
little  resistance.  So  much  had  they  hurried  forward  in  advance  of 
their  Greek  allies,  that  neither  the  right  nor  the  left  division  were 
aware  of  the  battle,  until  the  flying  barbarians,  hotly  pursued  by  the 
Akarnanians,  made  it  known  to  them.  The  two  divisions  then 
joined,  protected  the  fugitives,  and  restrained  further  pursuit — the 
Slratians  declining  to  come  to  hand-combat  with  them  until  the  other 
Akarnanians  should  arrive.  They  seriously  aunoyed  the  forces  of 
Knemus,  however,  by  distant  slinging,  in  which  the  Akarnanians 
were  pre-eminently  skillful.  Knemus  did  not  choose  to  persist  in  his 
attack  under  such  discouraging  circumstances.  As  soon  as  night 
arrived,  so  that  there  was  no  longer  any  fear  of  slingers,  he  retreated 
to  the  river  Anapus,  a  distance  of  between  nine  and  ten  miles.  Well 
aware  that  the  news  of  the  victory  would  attract  other  Akarnanian 
forces  immediately  to  the  aid  of  Stratus,  he  took  advantage  of  the 
arrival  of  his  own  Akarnanian  allies  from  ffiniadre  (the  only  town  in 
the  country  which  was  attached  to  the  Lacedaemonian  interest)  and 
sought  shelter  near  their  city.  From  thence  his  troops  dispersed,  and 
returned  to  their  respective  homes 

Meanwhile  the  Peloponnesian  fleet  from  Corinth,  which  had  been 
destined  to  co-operate  with  Knemus  off  the  coast  of  Akarnania,  had 
found  difficulties  in  its  passage  alike  unexpected  and  insuperable. 
Mustering  forty-seven  triremes  of  Corinth,  Sikyon,  and  other  places, 
with  a  body  of  soldiers  on  board  and  with  accompanying  store  ves- 
sels, it  departed  from  the  harbor  of  Corinth  and  made  its  way  along 
the  north eru  coast  of  Achaia.  Its  commanders,  not  intending  to 
meddle  with  Phormio  and  his  twenty  ships  at  Naupaktus,  never 
imagined  that  he  would  venture  to  attack  a  number  so  greatly  supe- 
rior. The  triremes  were  accordingly  fitted  out  more  as  transports  for 
numerous  soldiers  than  with  any  view  to  naval  combat,  and  with 
little  attention  to  the  choice  of  skillful  rowers. 

Except  in  the  combat  near  Korkyra,  and  there  only  partially,  the 


568      SECOND  AND  THIRD  YEARS  OF  TUE  WAR. 

Peloponnesians  had  never  yd  made  actual  trial  of  Athenian  maritime 
efficiency  al  the  poinl  of  excellence  which  it  had  now  reached. 
Themselves  retaining  the  old  unimproved  mode  of  fighting  and 
of  working  -hips  at  sea,  they  had  no  practical  idea  of  the  degree 
to  which  ii  had  been  superseded  by  Athenian  training.  Among  the 
Athenians,  on  the  contrary,  not  only  the  seamen  generally  had  a  con- 
firmed feeling  of  their  own  superiority,  but  Phormio  especially,  the 
ablest  of  all  their  captains,  always  familiarized  Ins  men  with  the 
conviction,  thai  no  Peloponnesian  fleet,  be  its  number  ever  so  great, 
could  possibly  contend  against  them  with  success.  Accordingly  the 
Corinthian  admirals,  Machaon  and  his  two  colleagues,  were  sur- 
prised  to  observe  thai  Phormio  with  Ins  small  Athenian  squadron, 
instead  of  keeping  safe  in  Naupaktus,  was  moving  in  parallel  line 
with  them  and  watching  their  progress  until  they  should  get  out  of 
the  Corinthian  Gulf  into  the  more  open  sea.  Having  advanced 
along  the  northern  coast  of  Peloponnesus  as  far  as  Patnc  in  Achaia, 
they  then  altered  their  com  se,  and  bore  to  the  north-west  in  order  to 
cross  over  toward  the  iEtolian  coast  in  their  way  to  Akarnania.  In 
doing  tins,  however,  they  perceived  that  Phormio  was  hearing  down 
upon  them  from  Chalkis  and  the  mouth  of  the  river  Euenus;  and 
they  now  discovered  for  the  fust  time  that  he  was  going  to  attack 
them.  Disconcerted  by  the  incident,  and  not  inclined  for  a  naval 
comhat  in  the  wide  and  open  sea,  they  altered  their  plan  of  passage, 
returned  to  the  coast  of  Peloponnesus,  and  brought  to  for  the  night  at 
some  point  near  to  Rhium,  the  narrowest  breadth  of  the  strait.  Their 
bringing  to  was  a  mere  feint  intended  to  deceive  Phormio  and  induce 
him  to  go  back  for  the  night  to  his  own  coast:  for  during  the  course 
of  the  night,  they  left  their  station,  and  tried  to  get  across  the 
breadth  of  the  Gulf,  where  it  was  near  the  strait  and  comparatively 
narrow,  before  Phormio  could  come  down  upon  them.  And  if  the 
Athenian  captain  had  really  gone  hack  to  take  night-station  on  his 
own  coast,  they  would  probably  have  got  across  to  the  iEtolian  or 
northern  coast  without  any  molestation  in  the  wide  sea.  But  he 
watched  their  movements  closely,  kept  the  sea  all  night,  and  was 
thus  enabled  to  attack  them  in  midchannel,  even  during  the  shorter 
passage  near  the  strait,  at  the  first  dawn  of  morning.  On  seeing  his 
approach,  the  Corinthian  admirals  ranged  their  triremes  in  a  circle 
with  the  prows  outward — like  the  spokes  of  a  wheel.  The  circle 
was  made  as  large  as  it  could  he  without  leaving  opportunity  to  the 
Athenian  assailing  ships  to  practice  the  maneuver  of  the  diekplus, 
and  the  interior  space  was  sufficient  not  merely  for  the  Store-Vessels, 
but  also  for  five  chosen  triremes,  which  were  kept  as  a  reserve  to 
dart  out  when  required  through  the  intervals  between  the  outer  tri- 
remes. 

In  this  position  they  were  found  and  attacked  shortly  after  day 
break  by  Phormio,  who  bore  down  upon  them  with  his  ships  in  sin- 
gle file,  all  admirable  sailers,  and  his  own  ship  leading;  all  being 


COMPLETE  VICTORY  OF  PHORMIO.  560 

strictly  forbidden  to  attack  until  he  should  give  the  signal.  He 
rowed  swiftly  round  the  Peloponnesian  circle,  nearing  the  prows  of 
their  ships  as  closely  as  he  could,  and  making  constant  semblance  of 
being  about  to  come  to  blows.  Partly  from  the  intimidating  effect 
of  this  maneuver,  altogether  novel  to  the  Peloponnesians — partly 
from  the  natural  difficulty,  well  known  to  Phormio,  of  keeping  every 
ship  in  its  exact  stationary  position — the  order  of  the  circle,  both 
within  and  without,  presently  became  disturbed.  It  was  not  long 
before  a  new  ally  came  to  his  aid,  on  which  he  calculated,  postpon- 
ing his  actual  attack  until  this  favorable  incident  occurred.  The 
strong  land-breeze  out  of  the  Gulf  of  Corinth,  always  wont  to  begin 
shortly  after  daybreak,  came  down  upon  the  Peloponnesian  fleet  with 
its  usual  vehemence,  at  a  moment  when  the  steadiness  of  their  order 
was  already  somewhat  giving  way,  and  forced  their  ships  more  than 
ever  out  of  proper  relation  one  to  the  other.  The  triremes  began  to  run 
foul  of  each  other,  or  become  entangled  with  the  store- vessels :  so  that 
in  every  ship  the  men  on  board  were  obliged-to  keep  pushing  off  their 
neighbors  on  each  side  with  poles — not  without  loud  clamor  and 
mutual  reproaches,  which  prevented  both  the  orders  of  the  captain, 
and  the  cheering  sound  or  song  whereby  the  keleustes  animated  the 
rowers  and  kept  them  to  time,  from  being  audible.  Moreover,  the 
fresh  breeze  had  occasioned  such  a  swell,  that  these  rowers,  unskillful 
und«r  all  circumstances,  could  not  get  their  oars  clear  of  the  water, 
and  the  pilots  thus  lost  command  over  their  vessels.  The  critical 
moment  was  now  come,  and  Phormio  gave  the  signal  for  attack. 
He  first  drove  against  and  disabled  one  of  the  admiral's  ships — his 
comrades  next  assailed  others  with  equal  success — so  that  the 
Peloponnesians,  confounded  and  terrified,  attempted  hardly  any 
resistance,  but  broke  their  order  and  sought  safety  in  flight.  They 
fled  partly  to  Patrae,  partly  to  Dyme,  in  Achaia,  pursued  by  the 
Athenians;  who,  with  scarcely  the  loss  of  a  man,  captured  twelve 
triremes,  carried  away  almost  the  entire  crews,  and  sailed  off  with  them 
to  Molykreium  or  Antirrhium,  the  northern  cape  at  the  narrow  mouth 
of  the  Corinthian  Gulf,  opposite  to  the  corresponding  cape  called 
Rhium  in  Achaia.  Having  erected  at  Antirrhium  a  trophy  for  the 
victory,  dedicating  one  of  the  captured  triremes  to  Poseidon,  they 
returned  to  Naupaktus;  while  the  Peloponnesian  ships  sailed  along 
the  shore  from  Patrae  to  Kyllene,  the  principal  port  in  the  territory 
of  Elis.  They  were  here  soon  afterward  joined  by  Knemus,  who 
passed  over  with  his  squadron  from  Leukas. 

These  two  incidents,  just  recounted,  with  their  details — the  repulse 
of  Knemus  and  his  army  from  Stratus,  and  the  defeat  of  the  Pelo- 
ponnesian fleet  by  Phormio — afford  ground  for  some  interesting  re- 
marks. The  first  of  the  two  displays  the  great  inferiority  of  the  Epi- 
rots  to  the  Greeks — and  even  to  the  less  advanced  portion  of  the 
Greeks — in  the  qualities  of  order,  discipline,  steadiness,  and  power 
of  co-operation  for  a  joint  purpose.     Confidence  of  success  with  them 


570      SECOND  AND  THIRD  YEARS  OF  THE  WAR. 

is  exaggerated  into  childish  rashness,  bo  thai  they  despise  even  the 
commonest  precautions  either  in  march  or  attack;  while  the  Greek 
di\  isions  on  their  right  and  on  their  1*  El  are  never  so  elate  as  to  omil 
either.  If",  on  land,  we  thus  discover  the  inherent  superiority  of 
Greeks  over  Epirots  involuntarily  breaking  oul — bo  in  ihe  sea  fighl 
we  are  mi  less  impressed  with  the  astonishing  superiority  of  the 
Athenians  over  their  opponents;  a  superiority,  indeed,  no  way  in- 
herent, such  as  that  of  Greeks  over  Epirots,  bul  depending  in  ibis 
case  on  previous  toil,  training,  and  inventive  talent,  on  the  one  side, 
compared  with  neglect  and  old-fashioned  routine  on  the  other.  No 
where  dues  the  extraordinary  value  of  that  seamanship,  which  the 
Athenians  had  been  gaining  by  years  of  improved  practice,  stand  so 
clearly  marked  as  in  these  first  battles  of  Phormio.  It  gradually  be- 
comes less  conspicuous  as  we  advance  in  the  war,  since  the  Pelopon 
nesians  improve,  learning  seamanship  ;;-  the  Russians  under  Peter 
the  Great  learnt  the  art  of  war  from  the  Swedes  under  Charles  XII. 
— while  the  Athenian  triremes  anil  their  crews  seem  to  become  1'  -s 
choice  and  effective,  eveTi  before  the  terrible  disaster  at  Syracuse, 
and  are  irreparably  deteriorated  after  that  misfortune. 

To  none  did  the  circumstances  of  this  memorable  sea  fight  seem  so 
incomprehensible  as  to  the  Lacedaemonians.  They  had  beard  indeed 
of  the  seamanship  of  Athens,  but  had  never  felt  it,  and  could  not 
understand  what  it  meant;  so  that  they  imputed  the  defeat  to  noth- 
ing but  disgraceful  cowardice,  and  sent*  indignant  orders  to  Knemus 
at  Kylene,  to  take  the  command,  equip  a  larger  and  better  fleet,  and 
repair  the  dishonor.  Three  Spartan  commissioners — Brasidas,  Titn- 
okrates,  and  Lykophron — were  sent  down  to  assist  him  with  their 
advice  and  exertions  in  calling  together  naval  contingents  from  the 
different  allied  cities.  By  this  means,  under  the  general  resentment 
occasioned  by  the  recent  defeat,  a  large  fleet  of  seventy-seven  tri- 
remes was  speedily  mustered  at  Panormus,  a  harbor  of  Achaia  near 
to  the  promontory  of  Rhium  and  immediately  within  the  interior 
gulf.  A  land-force  was  also  collected  at  the  same  place  ashore,  to 
aid  the  operations  of  the  fleet. 

Such  preparations  did  not  escape  the  vigilance  of  Phormio,  who 
transmitted  to  Athens  news  of  his  victory,  at  the  same  time  urgently 
soliciting  re-enforcements  to  contend  with  the  increasing  strength  of 
the  enemy.  The  Athenians  immediately  sent  twenty  fresh  ships  to 
join  him."  Yet  they  were  induced  by  the  instances  of  a  Kretan  named 
Nikias,  their  proxenus  at  Gortyn,  to  allow  him  to  take  the  ships  first 
to  Krete,  on  the  faith  of  his  promise  to  reduce  the  hostile  town  of 
Kydonia.  He  bad  made  this  promise  as  a  private  favor  to  the  inhab- 
itants of  Polichna,  border  enemies  of  Kydonia;  but  when  the  fleet 
arrived  he  was  unable  to  fulfill  it:  nothing  was  effected  except  ravage 
of  the  Kydonian  lands,  and  the  fleet  was  long  prevented  by  adverse 
winds  and  weather  from  getting  away.  This  ill-advised  diversion  of 
the  fleet  from  its  straight  course  to  join  Phormio  is  a  proof  how  much 


INFERIOR  NUMBERS  OF  PHORMIO.  571 

the  counsels  of  Athens  -were  beginning  to  suffer  from  the  loss  of 
Perikles,  who  was  just  now  in  his  last  illness  and  died  shortly  after- 
ward. That  liability  to  be  seduced  by  novel  enterprises  and  projects 
of  acquisition,  against  which  he  so  emphatically  warned  his  coun- 
trymen, was  even  now  beginning  to  manifest  its  disastrous  conse- 
quences. 

Through  the  loss  of  this  precious  interval,  Phormio  found  himself, 
with  no  more  than  his  original  twenty  triremes,  opposed  to  the  vastly 
increased  forces  of  the  enemy— seventy-seven  triremes  with  a  large 
force  on  land  to  back  them:  the  latter  no  mean  help  in  ancient  war- 
fare. He  took  up  his  station  near  the  Cape  Antirrhium,  or  the  Mo- 
lykric  Rhium  as  it  was  called — the  northern  headland,  opposite  to 
the  other  headland  also  called  Rhium,  on  the  coast  of  Achaia.  _  The 
line  between  these  two  capes,  seemingly  about  an  English  mile  in 
breadth,  forms  the  entrance  of  the  Corinthian  Gulf.  The  Messeaian 
force  from  Naupaktus  attended  him,  and  served  on  land.  But  he 
kept  on  the  outside  of  the  Gulf,  anxious  to  right  in  a  large  and  open 
breadth  of  sea,  which  was  essential  to  Athenian  maneuvering;  while 
his  adversaries  on  their  side  remained  on  the  inside  of  the  Achaic 
cape,  from  the  corresponding  reason— feeling  that  to  them  the  narrow 
sea  was  advantageous,  as  making  the  naval  battle  like  to  a  land  bat- 
tle, effacing  all  superiority  of  nautical  skill.  If  we  revert  back  to  the 
occasion  of  the  battle  of  Salamis,  we  find  that  narrowness  of  space 
was  at  that  time  accounted  the  best  of  all  protection  for  a  smaller 
fleet  against  a  larger.  But  such  had  been  the  complete  change  of 
feeling,  occasioned  by  the  system  of  maneuvering  introduced  since 
that  period  in  the  Athenian  navy,  that  amplitude  of  sea-room  is  now 
not  less  coveted  by  Phormio  than  dreaded  by  his  enemies.  The  im- 
proved practice  of  Athens  had  introduced  a  revolution  in  naval  war- 
fare. 

For  six  or  seven  days  successively  the  two  fleets  were  drawn  out 
against  each  other — Phormio  trying  to  entice  the  Peloponnesians  to 
the  outside  of  the  Gulf,  while  they  on  their  side  did  what  they  could 
to  bring  him  within  it.  To  him  every  day's  postponement  was  gain, 
since  it  gave  him  a  new  chance  of  his  re-enforcements  arriving:  for 
that  very  reason,  the  Peloponnesian  commanders  were  eager  to  ac- 
celerate an  action,  and  at  length  resorted  to  a  well-laid  plan  for  forc- 
ing it  on.  But  in  spite  of  immense  numerical  superiority,  such  was 
the  discouragement  and  reluctance  prevailing  among  their  seamen — 
many  of  whom  had  been  actual  sufferers  in  the  recent  defeat — that 
Knemus  and  Brasidas  had  to  employ  emphatic  exhortations.  They 
insisted  on  the  favorable  prospect  before  them — pointing  out  that  the 
late  battle  had  been  lost  only  by  mismanagement  and  imprudence, 
which  would  be  for  the  future  corrected — and  appealing  to  the  in- 
herent bravery  of  the  Peloponnesian  warrior.  They  concluded  by  a 
hint  that  while  those  who  behaved  well  in  the  coming  battle  would 
receive  due  honor,  the  laggards  would  assuredly  be  punished :  a  topic 


572      SECOND  AND  THIRD  YEARS  OF  THE  WAR. 

rarely  touched  upon  by  ancient  generals  in  their  harangues  on  the 
eve  of  battle,  and  demonstrating  conspicuously  the  reluctance  of 
many  of  the  Peloponnesian  seamen,  who  bad  been  brought  to  this 
second  engagement  chiefly  by  the  ascendency  and  Btrenuous  com 
mands  of  Spuria.  To  such  reluctance  Phormio  pointedly  alluded,  in 
the  encouraging  exhortations  which  be  on  bis  side  addressed  to  his 
men  :  for  thej  too,  in  Bpite  of  their  habitual  confidence  al  sea, 
strengthened  by  the  recent  victory,  were  dispirited  by  the  smallnest 
of  their  cumbers.  lie  reminded  them  of  their  long  practice  and  ra 
tional  conviction  of  superiority  at  sea.  such  as  do  augmentation  of 
numbers,  especially  with  an  enemy  conscious  of  his  own  \veakin  -  . 
could  overbalance.  lie  called  upon  them  to  show  their  habitual  dis- 
cipline ami  quick  apprehension  of  orders,  and  above  all  to  perform 
their  regular  movements  in  perfect  silence  during  the  actual  battle — 
useful  in  all  matters  of  war,  and  essential  to  the  proper  conduct  of  a 
sea-fight.  The  idea  of  entire  silence  on  board  the  Athenian  .-hips 
while  a  sea-fight  was  going  on,  is  not  only  striking  as  a  feature  in  the 
picture,  but  is  also  one  of  the  most  powerful  evidences  of  the  force 
of  self-control  and  military  habits  among  these  citizen-seamen. 

The  habitual  position  of  the  Peloponnesian  tieet  off  Panormus  was 
within  the  strait,  but  nearly  fronting  the  breadth  of  it — opposite  to 
Phormio,  who  lay  on  the  outer  side  of  the  strait,  as  well  as  oil'  the 
opposite  cape:  in  the  Peloponnesian  line,  therefore,  the  right  wiug 
occupied  the  north  or  north-east  side  toward  Naupaktus.  Knemus 
and  Brasidas  now  resolved  to  make  a  forward  movement  up  the  Gulf, 
as  if  against  that  town,  which  was  the  main  Athenian  station. 
Knowing  that  Phormio  would  be  under  the  necessity  of  coming  to 
the  defense  of  the  place,  they  hoped  to  pin  him  up  and  force  him  to 
action  close  under  the  land,  where  Athenian  maneuvering  would  be 
unavailing.  Accordingly  they  commenced  this  movement  early  in 
the  morning,  sailing  in  line  of  four  abreast  toward  the  northern  coast 
of  the  Inner  Gulf.  The  right  squadron,  under  the  Lacedaemonian 
Timokrates,  was  in  the  van,  according  to  its  natural  position,  and 
care  had  been  taken  to  place  in  it  twenty  of  the  best-sailing  ships, 
since  the  success  of  the  plan  of  action  was  known  beforehand  to 
depend  upon  their  celerity.  As  they  had  foreseen,  Phormio,  the 
moment  he  saw  their  movement,  put  his  men  on  shipboard,  and 
rowed  into  the  interior  of  the  strait,  though  with  the  greatest  reluc- 
tance; for  the  Messenians  were  on  land  alongside  of  him,  and  he 
knew  that  Naupaktus.  with  their  wives  and  families,  and  a  long  cir- 
cuit of  wall,  was  utterly  undefended.  He  ranged  his  ships  in  line  of 
battle  ahead,  probably  Ins  own  the  leading  ship;  and  sailed  close 
along  the  land  toward  Naupaktus,  while  the  .Messenians  marching 
ashore  kept  near  to  him. 

Both  fleets  were  thus  moving  in  the  same  direction,  and  toward  the 
same  point — the  Athenian  close  along  shore — the  Peloponnesian  some- 
what farther  off.     The  latter  had  now  got  Phormio  into  the  position 


PELOPONNESIAN  FLEET  AT  FIRST  SUCCESSFUL.  573 

which  they  wished,  pinned  up  against  the  land,  with  no  room  for  tac- 
tics. On  a  sudden  the  signal  was  given,  and  the  whole  Peloponnesian 
fleet,  facing  to  the  left,  changed  from  column  into  line,  and  instead 
of  continuing  to  move  along  the  coast,  rowed  rapidly  with  their  prows 
shoreward  to  come  to  close  quarters  with  the  Athenians.  The  right 
squadron  of  the  Peloponnesiaus,  occupying  the  side  toward  Naupak- 
tus,  was  especially  charged  with  the  duty  of  cutting  off  the  Atheniaus 
from  all  possibility  of  escaping  thither;  the  best  ships  having  been 
placed  on  the  right  for  that  important  object.  As  far  as  the  com- 
manders were  concerned,  the  plan  of  action  completely  succeeded: 
the  Athenians  were  caught  in  a  situation  where  resistance  was  impos- 
sible, and  had  no  chance  of  escape  except  in  flight.  But  so  superior 
were  they  in  rapid  movement  even  to  the  best  Peloponnesians,  that 
eleven  ships,  the  headmost  out  of  the  twenty,  just  found  means  to 
run  by,  before  the  right  wing  of  the  enemy  closed  in  upon  the  shore; 
and  made  the  best  of  their  way  to  Naupaktus.  The  remaining  nine 
ships  were  caught  and  driven  ashore  with  serious  damage — their 
crews  being  partly  slain,  partly  escaping  by  swimming.  The  Pelo- 
ponnesians towed  off  one  trireme  with  its  entire  crew,  and  some  others 
empty.  But  more  than  one  of  them  was  rescued  by  the  bravery  of 
the  Athenian  hoplitcs,  who,  in  spite  of  their  heavy  panoply,  rushed 
into  the  water  and  got  aboard  them,  fighting  from  the  decks  and 
driving  off  the  enemy  even  after  the  rope  had  been  actually  made 
fast,  and  the  process  of  towing  off  had  begun. 

The  victory  of  the  Peloponnesians  seemed  assured.  While  their 
left  and  center  were  thus  occupied,  the  twenty  ships  of  their  right 
wing  parted  company  with  the  rest,  in  order  to  pursue  the  eleven 
fugitive  Athenian  ships  which  they  had  failed  in  cutting  off.  Ten  of 
these  got  clear  away  into  the  harbor  of  Naupaktus,  and  there  posted 
themselves  in  an  attitude  of  defense  near  the  temple  of  Apollo,  before 
any  of  the  pursuers  could  come  near;  while  the  eleventh,  somewhat 
less  swift,  was  neared  by  the  Lacedaemonian  admiral,  who,  on  board 
a  Leukadian  trireme,  pushed  greatly  ahead  of  his  comrades,  in  hopes 
of  overtaking  at  least  this  one  prey.  There  happened  to  lie  moored 
a  merchant-vessel  at  the  entrance  of  the  harbor  of  Naupaktus.  The 
Athenian  captain  in  his  flight  observing  that  the  Leukadian  pursuer 
was  for  the  moment  alone,  seized  the  opportunity  for  a  bold  and 
rapid  maneuver.  He  pulled  swiftly  round  the  trader-vessel,  directed 
his  trireme  so  as  to  meet  the  advancing  Leukadian,  and  drove  his 
beak  against  her,  amidships,  with  an  impact  so  violent  as  to  disable 
her  an  once.  Her  commander,  the  Lacedaemonian  admiral  Timokra- 
tes,  was  so  stung  with  anguish  at  this  unexpected  catastrophe,  that 
he  slew  himself  forthwith,  and  fell  overboard  into  the  harbor.  The 
pursuing  vessels  coming  up  behind,  too,  were  so  astounded  and  dis- 
mayed by  it,  that  the  men,  dropping  their  oars,  held  water,  and  ceased 
to  advance;  while  some  even  found  themselves  half  aground,  from 
ignorance  of  the  coast    On  the  other  hand,  the  ten  Athenian  triremes 


,-,74      SECOND  AND  THIRD  YEARS  OF  THE  WAR. 

in  the  harbor  were  beyond  measure  elated  by  Ihe  incident,  so  thai  a 
single  word  from  Phormio  sufficed  to  pul  them  in  active  forward 
motion,  and  to  make  them  strenuously  a  Hack  the  embarrassed  enemy, 
whose  ships,  disordered  by  the  heal  of  pursuit,  and  having  be<  d  just 
suddenly  stopped,  could  not  be  speedily  got  again  under  weigh,  and 
expected  nothing  less  than  renewed  attack.  First,  the  Athenians 
broke  the  twenty  pursuing  ship**  on  the  right  wing,  next  they  pui  ued 
their  advantage  againsl  the  left  and  center,  who  had  probablj  neari  d 
to  the  righl :  so  that  after  a  short   resistance,  Hie  whole  were  coin- 

gletely  routed,  and  fled  across  the  Oulf  to  their  original  station  at 
'anormus.  Not  only  did  the  eleven  Athenian  ships  thus  break, 
terrify,  and  drive  away  the  entire  licet  of  the  enemy,  witli  the  cap- 
ture of  six  of  the  nearest  IVloponnesian  triremes — but  they  also  res- 
cued those  ships  of  their  own  which  had  been  driven  ashore  and  taken 

in  the  early  pari  of  the  action.     Moreover  the  Peloponneaian  crews 

sustained  a  considerable  loss  both  in  killed  and  in  prisoners. 

Thus  in  spite  not  only  of  the  prodigious  disparity  of  numbers,  but 
also  of  the  disastrous  blow  which  the  Athenians  had  sustained  at  first, 
Phormio  ended  by  gaining  a  complete  victory;  a  victory  to  which 
even  the  Lacedaemonians  were  forced  to  bear  testimony,  since  they 
were  obliged  to  ask  a  truce  for  burying  and  collecting  Hair  dead, 
while  the  Athenians  on  their  part  picked  up  the  bodies  of  their  own 
warriors.  The  defeated  party,  however,  still  thought  themselves 
entitled,  in  token  of  their  success  in  the  early  part  of  the  action,  to 
erect  a  trophy  on  the  Rhium  of  Achaia,  where  they  also  dedicated 
the  single  Athenian  trireme  which  they  had  been  able  to  carry  off. 
Yet  they  were  so  completely  discomfited — and  further  so  much  in  fear 
of  the  expected  re-enforcement  from  Athens — that  they  took  advan- 
tage of  the  night  to  retire,  and  sail  into  Ihe  Gulf  to  Corinth  ;  all  except 
the  Leukadians,  who  returned  to  their  own  home. 

Presently  the  re-enforcement  arrived,  after  that  untoward  detention 
which  had  well  nigh  exposed  Phormio  and  his  whole  fleet  to  ruin.  It 
confirmed  his  mastery  of  the  entrance  of  the  Gulf  and  of  the  coast  of 
Akarnania,  where  the  Peloponnesiahs  had  now  no  naval  force  at  all. 
To  establish  more  fully  the  Athenian  influence  in  Akarnania,  he 
undertook  during  the  course  of  the  autumn  an  expedition,  landing  at 
Astakus,  and  marching  into  the  Akarnanian  inland  country  with  400 
Athenian  boplites  and  400  Mcssenians.  Some  of  the  leading  men  of 
Stratus  and  Koronta,  who  were  attached  to  the  Peloponnesian  inter- 
est, he  caused  to  be  sent  into  exile,  while  a  chief  named  Kynes,  of 
Koronta,  who  seems  to  have  been  hitherto  in  exile,  was  re-established 
in  his  native  town.  The  great  object  was,  to  besiege  and  take  the 
powerful  town  of  (Eniadse,  near  the  mouth  of  the  Achelous;  a  town 
at  variance  with  the  other  Akarnanians,  and  attached  to  the  Pelo- 
ponnesians.  But  as  the  great  spread  of  the  waters  of  the  Achelous 
rendered  this  siege  impracticable  during  the  winter,  Phormio  returned 
to  the  station  at  Naupaktus.     From  hence  he  departed  to  Athens 


ATTEMPT  TO   SURPRISE  PEIRAEUS.  575 

toward  the  end  of  the  winter,  carrying  home  both  his  prize-ships  and 
such  of  his  prisoners  as  were  freemen.  The  latter  were  exchanged 
man  for  man  against  Athenian  prisoners  in  the  hands  of  Sparta. 

After  abandoning  the  naval  contest  at  Rhium,  and  reriring  to  Cor- 
inth, Kncmus  and  Brasidas  were  prevailed  upon  by  the  Megarians, 
before  the  fleet  dispersed,  to  try  the  bold  experiment  of  a  sudden  in- 
road upon  Peiraeus.  Such  was  the  confessed  superiority  of  the  Athe- 
nians at  sea,  that  while  they  guarded  amply  the  coasts  of  Attica 
against  privateers,  they  never  imagined  the  possibility  of  an  attack, 
upon  their  own  main  harbor.  Accordingly,  Peiraeus  was  not  only 
unprotected  by  any  chain  across  the  entrance,  but  destitute  even  of 
any  regular  guard-ships  manned  and  ready.  The  seamen  of  the 
retiring  Peloponnesian  armament,  on  reaching  Corinth,  were  imme- 
diately disembarked  and  marched,  first  across  the  isthmus,  next  to 
Megara — each  man  carrying  his  seat-cloth,  and  his  oar,  together  with 
the  loop  whereby  the  oar  was  fastened  to  the  oar-hole  in  the  side  and 
thus  prevented  from  slipping. 

There  lay  forty  triremes  in  Nisaea,  the  harbor  of  Megara,  which, 
though  old  and  out  of  condition,  were  sufficient  for  so  short  a  trip) 
and  the  seamen,  immediately  on  arriving,  launched  these  and  got 
aboard.  Yet  such  was  the  awe  entertained  of  Athens  and  her  power, 
that  when  the  scheme  came  really  to  be  executed,  the  courage  of  the 
Peloponnesians  failed,  though  there  was  nothing  to  hinder  them  from 
actually  reaching  Peiraeus.  Pretending  that  the  wind  was  adverse, 
they  contented  themselves  with  passing  across  to  the  station  of 
Budorum,  in  the  opposite  Athenian  island  of  Salamis,  where  they 
surprised  and  seized  the  three  guard-ships  which  habitually  blockaded 
the  harbor  of  Megara,  and  then  landed  upon  the  island.  They  spread 
themselves  over  a  large  part  of  Salamis,  ravaged  the  properties,  and 
seized  men  as  well  as  goods.  Fire-signals  immediately  made  known 
this  unforeseen  aggression  both  at  Peiraeus  and  at  Athens,  occasioning 
in  both  the  extreme  of  astonishment  and  alarm ;  for  the  citizens  in 
Athens,  not  conceiving  distinctly  the  meaning  of  the  signals,  fancied 
that  Peiraeus  itself  had  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  The 
whole  population  rushed  down  to  the  Peiraeus  at  break  of  day,  and 
put  to  sea  with  all  the  triremes  that  were  ready.  But  the  Pelopon- 
nesians, aware  of  the  danger  which  menaced  them,  made  haste  to  quit 
Salamis  with  their  booty  and  the  three  captured  guard-ships.  The 
lesson  was  salutary  to  the  Athenians:  from  henceforward  Peiraeus 
was  furnished  with  a  chain  across  the  mouth,  and  a  regular  guard, 
down  to  the  end  of  the  war.  Forty  years  afterward,  however,  we 
shall  find  it  just  as  negligently  watched,  and  surprised  with  much 
more  boldness  and  dexterity  by  the  Lacedaemonian  captain  Teleutias. 

As,  during  the  summer  of  this  year,  the  Ambrakiots  had  brought 
down  a  numerous  host  of  Epirotic  tribes  to  the  invasion  of  Akarua- 
nia,  in  conjunction  with  the  Peloponnesians — so  during  the  autumn 
the  Athenians  obtained  aid  against  the  Chalkidians  of  Thrace  from 


576      SECOND  AND  THIRD  YEARS  OF  THE  WAR 

the  powerful  barbaric  prince  before  mentioned,  Sitalke9  king  of  the 
Odrysian  Thracians. 

Amidst  the  numerous  tribes,  between  the  Danube  and  the  JSgean 
sea — who  all  bore  the  generic  name  of  Thracians,  though  each  had  a 
Bpi  cial  name  besides — the  Odrysians  were  at  this  time  the  most  war- 
likeand  powerful.  The  Odrysian  king  Teres,  father  of  Sitalkes,  had 
made  use  of  this  power  to  subdue  and  render  tributary  a  great  num- 
ber of  these  different  tribes,  especially  those  whose  residence  was  in. 
the  plain  rather  than  in  the  mountains.  Hi.s  dominion,  the  largest 
existing  between  the  Ionian  sea  and  the  Euxine,  extended  from 
Abdera  or  the  mouth  of  the  Nestus  in  the  ZEgean  sea,  to  the  mouth 
of  the  Danube  in  the  Euxine;  though  it  seems  that  this  must  be  un- 
derstood with  deductions,  since  many  intervening  tribes,  especially 
mountain  tribes,  did  not  acknowledge  his  authority.  Sitalkes  himself 
had  invaded  and  conquered  some  of  the  Pseonian  tribes  who  joined 
the  Thracians  on  the  west,  between  the  Axius  and  the  Strymon. 
Dominion,  in  the  sense  of  the  Odrysian  king,  meant  tribute,  presents, 
and  military  force  when  required.  With  the  two  former,  at  least,  we 
may  conclude  that  he  was  amply  supplied,  since  bis  nephew  and  suc- 
cessor Seuthes  (under  wdiom  the  revenue  increased  and  attained  its 
maximum)  received  400  talents  annually  in  gold  and  silver  as  tribute, 
and  the  like  sum  in  various  presents,  over  and  above  many  other 
presents  of  manufactured  articles  and  ornaments.  These  latter  came 
from  the  Grecian  colonies  on  the  coast,  which  contributed  moreover 
largely  to  the  tribute,  though  in  what  proportions  we  are  not  in- 
formed. Even  Grecian  cities,  not  in  Thrace,  sent  presents  to  forward 
their  trading  objects,  as  purchasers  for  the  produce,  the  plunder,  and 
the  slaves,  acquired  by  Tbracian  chiefs  or  tribes.  The  residence  of 
the  Odrysians  properly  so  called,  and  of  the  princes  of  that  tribe  now 
ruling  over  so  many  of  the  remaining  tribes,  appears  to  have  been 
about  twelve  days'  journey  inland  from  Byzantium,  in  the  upper 
regions  of  the  Hebrus  and  Strymon,  south  of  Mount  Hsemus,  and 
north-east  of  Rhodope.  The  Odrysian  chiefs  were  connected  by 
relationship  more  or  less  distant  with  those  of  the  subordinate  tribes, 
and  by  marriage  even  with  the  Scythian  princes  north  of  the  Danube: 
the  Scythian  prince  Ariapeithes  had  married  the  daughter  of  the 
Odiysian  Teres,  the  first  who  extended  the  dominion  of  his  tribe  over 
any  considerable  portion  of  Thrace. 

The  natural  state  of  the  Thracian  tribes — in  the  judgment  of  He- 
rodotus, permanent  and  incorrigible — was  that  of  disunion  and  in- 
capacity of  political  association;  were  such  association  possible  (he 
says),  they  would  be  strong  enough  to  vanquish  every  other  nation — 
though  Thucydides  considers  them  as  far  inferior  to  the  Scythians. 
The  Odrysian  dominion  had  probably  not  reached,  at  the  period  when 
Herodotus  made  his  inquiries,  the  same  development  winch  Thucy- 
dides describes  in  the  third  year  of  the  Peloponnesiau  war,  and  which 
imparted  to  these  tribes  a  union,  partial  indeed,  and  temporary,  but 


FORCES  OF   SITALKES.  577 

such  as  tliey  never  reached  either  before  or  afterward.  It  has  been 
already  mentioned  that  the  Odrysian  prince  Sitalkes  had  taken  for 
his  wife  (or  rather  for  one  of  his  wives)  the  sister  of  Nymphodorus,  a 
Greek  of  Abdera;  by  whose  mediation  he  had  been  made  the  ally, 
and  his  son  Sadokus  even  a  citizen,  of  Athens.  He  had  further  been 
induced  to  promise  that  he  would  reconquer  the  Chalkidians  of 
Thrace  for  the  benefit  of  the  Athenians — his  ancient  kinsmen, 
according  to  the  myth  of  Tereus  as  interpreted  by  both  parties.  At 
the  same  time,  Perdikkas  king  of  Macedonia  had  offended  him  by 
refusing  to  perform  a  promise  made  of  giving  him  his  sister  in  mar- 
riage— a  promise  made  as  consideration  for  the  interference  of  Sital- 
kes and  Nymphodorus  in  procuring  for  Perdikkas  peace  with  Athens, 
at  a  moment  when  lie  was  much  embarrassed  by  civil  dissensions 
with  his  brother  Philip.  The  latter  prince,  ruling  in  his  own  name 
(and  seemingly  independent  of  Perdikkas)  over  a  portion  of  the 
Macedonians  along  the  upper  course  of  the  Axius,  had  been  expelled 
by  his  more  powerful  brother,  and  taken  refuge  with  Sitalkes.  He 
was  now  apparently  dead,  but  his  son  Amyntas  received  from  the 
Odrysian  prince  the"  promise  of  restoration.  The  Athenians,  though 
they  had  ambassadors  resident  with  Sitalkes,  nevertheless  sent  Agnon 
as  special  envoy  to  concert  arrangements  for  his  march  against  the 
Chalkidians,  with  which  an  Athenian  armament  was  destined  to  co- 
operate. In  treating  with  Sitalkes,  it  was  necessary  to  be  liberal  in 
presents  both  to  himself  and  to  the  subordinate  chieftains  who  held 
power  dependent  upon  him.  Nothing  could  be  accomplished  among 
the  Thracians  except  by  the  aid  of  bribes,  and  the  Atheuians  were 
more  competent  to  supply  this  exigency  than  any  other  people  in 
Greece.  The  joint  expedition  against  the  Chalkidians  was  finally 
resolved. 

But  the  forces  of  Sitalkes,  collected  from  many  different  portions 
of  Thrace,  were  tardy  in  coming  together.  He  summoned  all  the 
tribes  under  his  dominion  between  Haemus,  Rhodope,  and  the  two 
seas:  the  Getae  between  Mount  Haemus  and  the  Danube,  equipped 
like  the  Scythians  (their  neighbors  on  the  other  side  of  the  river)  with 
bow  and  arrow  on  horseback,  also  joined  him,  as  well  as  the  Agrianes, 
the  Laeaei,  and  the  other  Paeonian  tribes  subject  to  his  dominion. 
Lastly,  several  of  the  Thracian  tribes  called  Dii,  distinguished  by 
their  peculiar  short  swords,  and  maintaining  a  fierce  independence  on 
the  heights  of  Rhodope,  were  tempted  by  the  chance  of  plunder,  or 
the  offer  of  pay,  to  flock  to  his  standard.  Altogether  his  army 
amounted,  or  was  supposed  to  amount,  to  150,000  men — one-third  of 
it  cavalry,  wdio  were  for  the  most  part  Getae  and  Odrysians  proper. 
The  most  formidable  warriors  in  his  camp  were  the  independent 
tribes  of  Rhodope.  The  whole  host,  alike  rfumerous,  warlike,  pred- 
atory, and  cruel,  spread  terror  amidst  all  those  who  were  within 
even  the  remote  possibilities  of  its  march. 

Starting  from  the  central  Odrysian  territory,  and  bringing  with  him 

H.  G.  II.— 19 


578      SECOND  AND  THIRD  YEARS  OF  THE  WAR. 

Agnon  ami  the  other  Athenian  envoys,  he  first  crossed  the  uninhabi- 
ted mountain  called  Kerkine,  which  divided  the  Pseonians  on  the 
weal  from  the  Thracian  tribes  called  Sinti  and  Maedi  on  t lie  east, 
until  he  reached  the  Pseonian  tew  d  or  districl  called  Doberus;  it  w  as 

that  many  troops  and  additional  volunteers  reached  him,  mak- 
ing up  his  full  total.  Ft  im  1  toberus,  probably  marching  down  along 
one  of  the  tributary  streams  of  the  Axius,  he  entered  into  that  por- 

ij  l  pper  Macedonia  which  lies  along  the  higher  Axius,  aud 
w  hieh  had  constituted  the  separate  principality  of  Philip.  The  pres- 
ence in  his  army  of  Amyntas,  son  of  Philip,  induced  some  of  the 
fortified  placi  -.  Gortynia,  Atalante,  and  others,  to  open  their  rates 
without  resistance,  while  Eidomenewas  taken  by  storm,  and  Europus 

in  vain  attacked.      From  hence  he  passed  still  further  southward  into 

Lower  Macedonia,  the  kingdom  of  Perdikkas,  ravaging  the  territory 
on  both  sides  of  the  Axius  even  to  the  neighborhood  of  the  towns 
Pella  and  KyrrhtlS,  and  apparently  down  as  far  south  as  the  mouth 
of  the  river  and  the  head  of  the  Thermaie  Gulf.      Further  south  than 

this  lie  did  not  go.  but  spread  his  force  ov<  r  the  districts  between  the 
left  bank  of  the  Axius  and  the  head  of  the  Strymonic  Gulf — Myg- 
donia,  Kxestonia,  and  Anthemus — while  a  portion  of  his  army  was 
detached  to  overrun  the  territory  of  the  Chalkidians  and  Bottiaeans. 
The  Macedonians  under  Perdikkas,  renouncing  all  idea  of  contend- 
ing on  foot  againsl  so  overwhelming  a  host,  cither  fled  or  shut  them- 
selves up  in  the  small  number  of  fortified  places  which  the  country 
presented.  The  cavalry  from  Upper  Macedonia,  indeed,  well-armed 
and  excellent,  made  some  orderly  and  successful  charges  against  the 
Thracians,  lightly  armed  with  javelins,  short  swords,  and  the  pelta 
or  small  shield — but  it  was  presently  shut  in,  harassed  on  all  sides 
by  superior  numbers,  and  compelled  to  think  only  of  retreat  and 
extrication. 

Luckily  for  the  enemies  of  the  Odrysian  king,  his  march  was  not 
made  until  the  beginning  of  winter — seemingly  about  November  or 
December.  We  may  be  sure  that  the  Athenians,  when  they  con- 
certed with  him  the  joint  attack  upon  the  Chalkidians,  intended  that 
it  should  be  in  a  better  time  of  the  year.  Having  probably  waited  to 
hear  that  his  army  was  in  motion,  and  waited  long  in  vain,  they 
began  to  despair  of  his  coming  at  all.  and  thought  it  not  worth  while 
to  dispatch  any  force  of  their  own  to  the  spot.  Some  envoys  and 
presents  only  were  sent  as  compliments,  instead  of  the  co-operating 
armament.  And  this  disappointment,  coupled  with  the  severity  of 
the  weather,  the  nakedness  of  the  country,  and  the  privations  of  his 
army  at  that  season,  induced  Sitalkes  soon  to  enter  into  negotiations 
with  Perdikkas;  who,  moreover,  trained  over  Seuthes,  nephew  of  the 
Odrysian  prince,  by  promising  his  sister  Stratonike  in  marriage, 
together  with  a  sum  of  money,  on  condition  that  the  Thracian  host 
should  be  speedily  withdrawn.  This  was  accordingly  done,  after  it 
had  been  distributed  for  thirty  days  over  Macedonia,  during  eight  of 


APPENDIX.  579 

which  days  bis  detachment  had  ravaged  the  Chalkidic  lands.  But 
the  interval  had  been  quite  long  enough  to  diffuse  terror  all  around. 
Such  a  host  of  fierce  barbarians  had  never  before  been  brought 
together,  and  no  one  knew  in  what  direction  they  might  be  disposed 
to  carry  their  incursions.  The  independent  Thracian  tribes  (Panaei, 
Odomantes,  Droi,  and  Dersaei)  in  the  plains  on  the  north-east  of  the 
Strymon,  and  near  Mount  Paugserus,  not  far  from  Amphipolis,  were 
the  first  to  feel  alarm  lest,  Sitalkes  should  take  the  opportunity  of  try- 
ing to  conquer  them.  On  the  other  side,  the  Thessalians,  Magnetes, 
and  other  Greeks  north  of  Thermopylae,  apprehensive  that  he  would 
carry  his  invasion  further  south,  began  to  organize  means  for  resist- 
ing him.  Even  the  general  Peloponnesiau  confederacy  heard  wilh 
uneasiness  of  this  new  ally  whom  Athens  was  bringing  into  the  field, 
perhaps  against  them.  All  such  alarms  were  dissipated  when  Si- 
talkes, after  remaining  thirty  days,  returned  by  the  way  he  came, 
and  the  formidable  avalanche  was  thus  seen  to  melt  away.  The  faith- 
less Perdikkas,  on  this  occasion,  performed  his  promise  to  Seuthes, 
having  drawn  upon  himself  much  mischief  by  violating  his  previous 
similar  promise  to  Sitalkes. 


APPENDIX. 

Thucyd.  ii.  90.  Oi  Se  IleAoTroi'fTJo'icx.,  eireiSr)  clvtoTs  01  'A8r)valot.  ovk  intnKeov  i£ 
tw  koXttov  Kai  tq  (TTeva,  /3oi)A6uei/<n  atcovTas  eo"u>  irpoayayeLV  auTous,  aeayd/xei'oi  ajaa 
€a>  err  Aeoy,  errl  Teaaapwv  Ta£a/xei'Oi  Tas  va-vs,  erri  tt)v  eavruiv  yr\v  ea"a>  erri  tov 
KoArrov,  6e£ta>  Kepa  rjyovp-evut,  uiairep  kcll  oipp.ow  eiri  6'  avrw  ei/co<ri  yijas  eTa£ai>  Tas 
apt<rTa  TrAeoua"as,  brrtos,  et  apa  foui'cras  erri  Trif  HavTraKTOi*  TrXelv  6  <$>op[XLu>v  Kai  auros 
e7ri/3oi)#wi'  Tavrfl  rraparrAeoi,  p.rj  Sia^/vXocev  nXtovra  tqv  errirrAoui>  <x\p(i)v  ot  'A0i)vatoi 
€^to    tov    eavrwv    /ce'pws,  aAA'    aurat    at    vr/es    rrepiKAr/creiai'. 

The  above  passage  forms  the  main  authority  for  niy  description  (given  above) 
of  the  movement  of  the  Peloponnesian  fleet,  previous  to  the  second  battle 
against  Phormio.  The  annexed  plan  will  enable  my  reasoning  to  be  under- 
stood. 

The  main  question  for  consideration  here  is,  What  is  the  meaning  of  tt\v 
cauTw  yi\v'i  Does  it  mean  the  land  of  the  Peloponnesians,  south  of  the  Gulf — or 
the  land  of  the  Athenians,  north  of  the  Gulf?  The  commentators  affirm  that  it 
must  mean  the  former.  I  thought  that  it  might  mean  the  latter:  and  in  my 
previous  editions,  I  adduced  several  examples  of  the  use  of  the  pronoun  eai/ToO, 
tending  to  justify  that  opinion. 

Finding  that  on  this  question  of  criticism,  my  opinion  is  opposed  to  the  best 
authorities,  I  no  longer  insist  upon  it,  nor  do  I  now  reprint  the  illustrative  pas- 
sages. As  to  the  facts,  however,  my  conviction  remains  unchanged.  The 
land  here  designated  by  Thucydides  must  be  "  the  land  of  the  Athenians  north 
of  the  Strait:"  it  cannot  be  ''the  land  of  the  Peloponnesians  south  of  the 
Strait."  The  pronoun  koMiuv  must  therefore  be  wrong,  and  ought  to  be  altered 
into  axiToiv,  as  Mr.  Bloomfleld  proposes,  or  eiceivtw- 

The  Scholiast  says  that  erri  ti^  yrjv  is  here  equivalent  to  Trapa  tt)v  yyv.  Dr.  Arnold 
thoroughly  approving  the  description  of  Mitford,  who  states  that  the  Pelopon- 
nesian fleet  were  "  moving  eastward  along  the  Achate  coast"  says:  "The  Scho- 
liast says  that  erri  is  here  used  for  Trapa.  It  would  be  better  to  say  that  it  has  a 
mixed  signification  of  motion  toward  a  place  and  neighborhood  to  it:  express- 


580      BEI  OND  AND  THIKD  YEARS  OF  THE  WAR. 

Ing  thai  the  Peloponnesians  Bailed  toward  their  <>\\n  land  (i.e.,  toward  Corinth, 
Sicyon,  and  Pellene,  to  which  place  the  greater  number  of  the  ships  belonged), 
instead  of  standing  over  to  the  oppo  >  longing  to  their  enemies;  and 

at  the  same  time  ki  land,  in  the  sense  of  eiri  with  a  dative 

To  discuss  this  interpri  i    ace  to  the  verbal  construction. 

Surely  the  m  Scholiasl  puts  upon  «r«  rrjr  yrjv  is  one  which  can- 

ifj  it.     No  two  propositions  ran  be 

more    distinct    than    the    twO,irAeil'  >  and  ir\flv    irapa    TJji'  yr)V '!      The 

an  Beet,  before  it  made  any  movement,  was  already  moored  close 

upon  its  own  lam!    at  the  headland  Rhium  nearPanormus  where  its  land-force 

stood  (Thucyd.  ii.  86).    In  this  position,  if  ii  moved  at  all,  it  must  either  sail 

from  the  Peloponnesian  coast,  or  along  the  Peloponnesian  coast:  and 

neither  of  these  movements  would  be  expressed  byThucydid.es  undea  the  words 

n  i  tt)v  iavjCiv  yr\v- 

To  obviate  this  difficulty,  while  the  Scholiast  changes  the  meaning  of  in\,  Dr. 
Arnold  changes  thai  of  r'vv  iavriov  yijv;  \\  hich  words,  according  to  him,  denote, 

Pelo] n-sian  roasi  as  opposed  to  the  northern  shore  occupied  by  Phor- 

mio,  but  Corinth,  sicyon.  and  Pellene;  to  which  places  (he  says)  the  greater 
number  of  the  ships  belonged.  But  I  submit  that  this  is  a  sense  altogether 
unnatural.  Corinl  a  and  Sicyon  are  so  far  off  that  anj  allusion  to  them  Eere  is 
most  improbable.  Thucydid.es  is  describing  the  operations  of  two  hostile  fleets, 
one  occupj  ing  the  coast  northward,  the  other  the  const  southward,  of  the  Strait. 
The  "a -,t  kind  of  the  Peloponnesians  was  thai  southern  line  of  coast  which  they 
occupied  and  on  which  their  land-force  was  encamped:  it  is  distinguished  from 
i  mies'  land,  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  Strait.  If  Thucydides  had  wished 
to  intimate  thai  the  Peloponnesian  fleel  sailed  in  the  direction  of  Corinth  and 

Sicyon.  he  would  hardly  have  used  SUCh  words  as  UnKtov  eVi  t't)v  iavTuiv  yjji'. 

Profes  or  Dunbar  (in  an  article  among  the  Critical  Remarks  annexed  to  the 
third  edition" of  bis  Greek  and  English  Lexicon  i  has  contested  my  interpretation 
of  this  passage  of  Thucydides.    He  says:  "The  Peloponnesian  fleet  must  have 

/.  1/  along  tl  OSt—hri  TT)f  tavrap  ■yij'i  a<ju>  inX  toO  koKttov-     In  this 

passage  we  find  eiri.  with  two  cases:  the  lirst  with  the  accusative,  the  other  with 
the  genitive.  The  first  appears  to  me  to  indicate  the.  locality  i<>  which  they  were 
sailing:  and  that  evidently  was  the  headland  on  the  Achaean  coast,  nearly  oppo 
site  Naupactus." 

The  headland,  to  which  Mr.  Dunbar  alludes,  will  be  seen  on  the  annexed  plan, 
marked  Drepanum.  It  is  sufficiently  near  not  to  be  open  to  the  objection  which 
I  have  urged  against  Dr.  Arnold's  hypothesis  of  Corinth  and  Sicyon.  But  still 
Icontend  thai  ll  cannot  be  indicated  by  the  words  as  they  stand  "in  Thucydides. 
On  Mr.  Dunbar's  interpretation,  the  Peloponnesians  must  have  moved  from  one 

Eoint  of  their  own  land  to  another  point  of  their  own  land.    Now  if  Thucydides 
ad  meant  to  affirm  this,  he  surely  would  not  have  used  such  words  as  en\eov 
eiri  tt)v  iavrCiv  yyv.    He  would  either  have  specified  by  name  the  particular  point 

Of  land  (as  in  C.  86  TrnpeVAeucrev  eVt  to  'Viov) — or  of  lie  bad  desired  to  bring  to  our 

view  that  "they  proceeded  along  their  own  coast,"  be  would  have  said  irapa 
instead  of  erri. 

Thus  far  I  have  been  discussing  simply  the  verbal  interpretation  of  enl  ttji» 
iavTu>v  yrji',  for  the  purpose  of  showing  that  though  these  words  be  admitted  to 
I  he  land  of  the  Peloponnesians — stall,  in  order  to  reconcile  such  meaning 
with  the  facts,  the  commentators  are  obliged  to  advance  suppositions  highly 
Improbable,  and  even  to  identify  «r«  with  napa.  I  nowturn  from  the  verbal  con- 
struction to  the  facts,  in  older  to  show  that  the  real  movement  of  the  Pelopon- 
nesian fleet  must  havt  be<  n  toward  the  Athenian  coast  and  toward  Naupaktus. 
Therefore,  since  eouTaii/ cannot  have  that  meaning,  eavriav  must  be  an  error  of 

the   text. 

The  purpose  of  the  Peloponnesians  in  effecting  the  movement  was  to  make 
1'hoimio  believe  that  they  were  going  to  attack  Naupaktus;  to  constrain  him 
to  come  within  the  Gulf  with  a  view  of  protecting  that  place;  and  at  the  same 
time,  if  Phormiodid  come  within  the  Gulf,  to  attack  him  in  a  narrow  space 
where  his  ships  would  have  no  room  for  maneuvering.  This  was  what  the  Pelo- 
ponnesians not  only  intended,  but  actually  accomplished. 


APPENDIX.  581 

Now  I  ask  how  this  purpose  could  be  accomplished  by  a  movement  along 
the  coast  of  Peloponnesus  from  the  headland  of  Rhium  to  the  headland  of  Dre- 
panum— which  last  point  the  reader  will  see  on  the  plan  annexed?  How  could 
such  movement  induce  Phormio  to  think  that  the  Peloponnesians  were  going  to 
attack  Naupaktus,  or  throw  him  into  alarm  for  the  safety  of  that  place?  "When 
arrived  at  Drepanum,  they  would  hardly  be  nearer  to  Naupaktus  than  they  were 
at  Rhium:  thev  would  still  have  the  whole  breadth  of  the  Gulf  to  cross.  Let 
us,  however,  suppose  that  their  movement  toward  Drepanum  did  really  induce  , 
Phormio  to  come  into  the  Gulf  for  the  protection  of  Naupaktus.  If  they 
attempted  to  cross  the  breadth  of  the  Gulf  from  Drepanum  toward  Naupaktus, 
they  woidd  expose  themselves  to  be  attacked  by  Phormio  midway  in  the  open 
sea;  the  very  contingency  which  he  desired,  and  which  they  were  maneuvering 
to  avoid. 

Again,  let  us  approach  the  question  from  another  point  of  view.  It  is  certain, 
from  the  description  of  Thucydides,  that  the  actual  attack  of  the  Peloponne- 
sians  upon  Phormio,  in  which  they  cut  off  nine  out  of  his  twenty  ships,  took 
place  on  the  northern  coast  of  the  Gulf,  at  some  spot  between  the  headland 
Antirrhium  and  Naupaktus;  somewhere  near  the  spot  which  I  have  indicated 
on  the  annexed  plan.  The  presence  of  the  Messenian  soldiers  (who  had  come 
out  from  Naupaktus  to  assist  Phormio,  and  who  waded  into  the  water  to  save 
the  captured  ships)  would  of  itself  place  this  beyond  a  doubt— if  indeed  any 
doubt  could  arise.  It  is  farther  certain  that  when  the  Peloponnesian  fleet 
wheeled  from  column  into  line  to  attack  Phormio,  they  were  so  near  to  this 
northern  land  that  Phormio  was  in  the  greatest  danger  of  having  his  whole 
squadron  driven  ashore:  only  eleven  out  of  his  twenty  ships  could  escape.  The 
plan  will  illustrate  what  is  here  said. 

Now  I  ask  how  these  facts  are  to  be  reconciled  with  the  supposition  that  the 
Peloponnesian  fleet,  on  quitting  their  moorings  at  Rhium,  coasted  along  their 
own  land  toward  Drepanum?  If  they  did  so,  how  did  they  afterward  get  across 
the  Gulf  to  the  place  where  the  battle  was  fought?  Every  yard  that  they 
moved  in  the  direction  of  Drepanum  only  tended  to  widen  the  breadth  of  open 
gulf  to  be  crossed  afterward.  With  the  purpose  which  they  had  in  view,  to 
move  from  Rhium  along  their  own  coast  in  the  direction  of  Drepanum  would 
have  been  absurd.  Supposing,  however,  that  they  did  so,  it  could  only  have 
been  preliminary  to  a  second  movement,  in  another  direction  across  the  Gulf. 
But  of  this  second  movement,  Thucydides  says  not  one  word.  All  that  he  tells 
us  about  the  course  of  the  Pelopounesians  is  contained  in  this  phrase — en\eov 

€JTt  Triv  eauTwy  y-qi'  ecra>  e7ri  rov  koXttov,   6e£ta>   Ke'pa  rjyovfj.ei'to,  OMTirep  /cat  lopnovv*      If 

these  words  really  designate  a  movement  along  the  southern  coast,  we  must 
assume,  first,  that  the  historian  has  left  unnoticed  the  second  movement  across 
the  Gulf,  which,  nevertheless,  must  have  followed — next,  that  the  Peloponne- 
sians  made  a  first  move  for  no  purpose  except  to  increase  the  distance  and  dif- 
ficulty of  the  second. 

Considering  therefore  the  facts  of  the  case,  the  localities  and  the  purpose  of 
the  Peloponnesians,  all  of  which  are  here  clear — I  contend  that  en-A.eoi'  em.  t^v 
iavruiv  7fji>  ecroi  enl  too)  K0A770U  must  denote  a  movement  of  the  Peloponnesian 
fleet  toward  the  land  of  the  Atheniaus.  or  the  northern  shore  of  the  Gulf;  and 
that  as  eavTwi'  wdl  not  bear  that  sense,  it  must  be  altered  to  avrai>  or  eKeivuv. 

It  remains  to  explain  ecrw  eni  tou>  koAttou,  which  bear  a  very  distinct  and  impor- 
tant meaning.  The  land  of  the  Athenians,  on  the  northern  side  of  the  Strait, 
comprises  the  headland  of  Antirrhium  with  both  the  lines  of  coast  which  there 
terminate  and  make  an  angle;  that  is,  one  line  of  coast  fronting  inside  toward 
the  Corinthian  Gulf—  the  other,  front ing  outside  toioard  the  Gulf  of  Pat r as. 
The  reader  who  looks  at  the  annexed  plan  will  see  this  at  a  glance.  Now  when 
Thucydides  says  that  the  Peloponnesians  sailed  "  upon  the  land  of  the  Athe- 
nians inward  fronting  the  Gulf,"  these  last  words  «are  essential  to  make  us 
understand  toward  which  of  the  two  Athenian  lines  of  coast  the  movement 
was  turned.  We  learn  from  the  words  that  the  Peloponnes>ans  did  not  sail 
toward  that  outer  side  of  the  headland  where  Phormio  was  moored,  but  toward 
the  inner  side  of  it,  on  the  line  which  conducted  to  Naupaktus. 


582  FOLRTII   YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 


CHAPTER  L. 

FROM  THE  COMMENI  l.MKVf  OP   THE    F01  BTH   YKAK  OF  TIITC  TELOPON- 
NESIAH       WAIL      DOWN      TU    TUK      REVOLT.  Tl  OH  A  B  V     COMMOTIONS     AT 

KOKKYKA. 

The  second  and  third  years  of  the  war  had  both  been  years  of  great 
Buffering  with  the  Athenians,  from  the  continuance  of  the  epidemic, 
which  did  nol  materially  relax  until  the  winter  of  the  third  year  (B.C. 
429  428).  It  is  no  wonder  that  under  the  pressure  of  such  a  calamity 
their  military  efforts  were  enfeebled,  although  the  victories  of  Phor- 
mio  had  placed  their  maritime  reputation  at  a  higher  point  than  ever. 
To  their  enemies,  the  destructive  effects  of  this  epidemic — effects  still 
felt,  althougb  the  disorder  itself  was  suspended  during  the  fourth 
yeai-  of  the  war — afforded  material  assistance  as  well  as  encourage- 
ment to  persevere.  The  Peloponnesians,  under  Archidamus,  again 
repeated  during  this  year  their  invasion  and  ravage  of  Attica,  which 
had  been  intermitted  during  the  year  preceding.  As  before,  they 
met  with  no  serious  resistance.  Entering  the  country  about  the 
beginning  of  May,  they  continued  the  process  of  devastation  until 
their  provisions  were  exhausted.  To  this  damage  the  Athenians  had 
probably  now  accustomed  themselves:  but  they  speedily  received 
even  while  the  invaders  were  in  their  country,  intelligence  of  an  event 
far  more  embarrassing  and  formidable — the  revolt  of  Mityleneand  of 
the  greater  part  of  Lesbos. 

This  revolt,  indeed,  did  not  come  even  upon  the  Athenians  wholly 
unawares.  Yet  the  idea  of  it  was  of  longer  standing  than  they  BUS- 
pected,  for  the  Mitylensean  oligarchy  had  projected  it  before  the  war 
and  had  made  secret  application  to  Sparta  for  aid,  but  without  suc- 
cess. Some  time  after  hostilities  broke  out,  they  resumed  the  design, 
which  was  warmly  promoted  by  the  Boeotians,  kinsmen  of  the  Les- 
bians in  iEolic  lineage  and  dialect.  The  Mitylcna?an  leaders  appear 
to  have  finally  determined  on  revolt  during  the  preceding  autumn  or 
winter.  Hut"  they  thought  it  prudent  to  make  ample  preparations 
before  they  declared  themselves  openly;  and  moreover  they  took 
measures  for  constraining  three  other  towns  in  Lesbos — Antissa, 
Eresus,  and  Pyrrha — to  share  their  fortunes,  to  merge  their  own 
separate  governments,  ami  to  become  incorporated  with  Mitylene. 
Methymna,  the  second  town  in  Lesbos,  situated  on  the  north  of  the 
island,  was  decidedly  opposed  to  them  and  attached  to  Athens.  The 
Mitylenseans  built  new  slnps — put  their  walls  in  an  improved  state  of 
defense — carried  out  a  mole  in  order  to  narrow  the  entrance  of  their 
harbor  and  render  it  capable  of  being  closed  with  a  chain — dispatched 
emissaries  to  hire  Scythian  bowmen  and  purchase  corn  in  the  Eu.xine 
— and  took  such  other  measures  as  were  necessary  for  an  effective 
resistance. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  ATHENS.  £>83 

Though  the  oligarchical  character  of  their  government  gave  them 
much  means  of  secrecy,  and,  above  all,  dispensed  with  the  necessity 
of  consulting  the  people  beforehand, — still,  measures  of  such  impor- 
tance could  not  be  taken  without  provoking  attention.     Intimation 

was  sent  to  the  Athenians  by  various  Mitylenaean  citizens,  partly 
from  private  feeling,  partly  in  their  capacity  of  yroxeni  (or  consuls, 
to  use  a  modern  word  which  approaches  to  the  meaning)  for  Alliens 
— especially  by  a  Mitylenaean  named  Doxander,  incensed  with  the 
government  for  having  disappointed  his  two  sons  of  marriage  with 
two  orphan  heiresses.  Not  less  communicative  were  the  islanders  of 
Tencdos,  animated  by  ancient  neighborly  jealousy  toward  Mitylene; 
so  that  the  Athenians  were  thus  forewarned  both  of  the  intrigues 
between  Mitylene  and  the  Spartans,  and  of  her  certain  impending 
revolt  unless  they  immediately  interfered. 

This  news  seems  to  have  become  certain  about  February  or  March 
428  B.C.  But  such  was  then  the  dispirited  condition  of  the  Athenians 
■ — arising  from  two  years'  suffering  under  the  epidemic,  and  no  longer 
counteracted  by  the  wholesome  remonstrances  of  Perikles — that  they 
could  not  at  first  bring  themselves  to  believe  what  they  were  so  much 
afraid  to  find  true.  Lesbos,  like  Chios,  was  their  ally  upon  an  equal 
footing,  still  remaining  under  those  conditions  which  had  been  at 
first  common  to  all  the  members  of  the  confederacy  of  Delos.  Mity- 
lene paid  no  tribute  to  Athens:  it  retained  its  walls,  its  large  naval 
force,  and  its  extensive  lauded  possessions  on  the  opposite  Asiatic 
continent:  its  government  was  oligarchical,  administering  all  internal 
affairs  without  reference  to  Athens.  Its  obligations  as  an  ally  were, 
that  in  case  of  war,  it  was  held  bound  to  furnish  armed  ships,  whether 
in  determinate  number  or  not,  we  do  not  know.  It  would  undoubt- 
edl}-  be  restrained  from  making  war  upon  Tenedos,  or  any  other 
subject-ally  of  Athens:  and  its  government  or  its  citizens  would 
probably  be  held  liable  to  answer  before  the  Athenian  dikasteries,  in 
case  of  any  complaint  of  injury  from  the  government  or  citizens  of 
Tenedos  or  of  any  other  ally  of  Athens — these  latter  being  themselves 
also  accountable  before  the  same  tribunals  under  like  complaints 
from  Mitylene.  That  city  was  thus  in  practice  all  but  independent, 
and  so  extremely  powerful  that  the  Athenians,  fearful  of  coping 
with  it  in  their  actual  state  of  depression,  were  loath  to  believe  the 
alarming  intelligence  which  reached  them.  They  sent  envoys  with 
a  friendly  message  to  persuade  the  Mitylenoeans  to  suspend  their 
proceedings,  and  it  was  only  when  these  envoys  returned  without 
success  that  they  saw  the  necessity  of  stronger  measures.  Ten  Mity- 
lenrean  triremes,  serving  as  contingent  in  the  Athenian  fleet,  were 
seized,  and  their  crews  placed  under  guard;  While  Kleippides,  then 
on  the  point  of  starting  (along  with  two  colleagues)  to  conduct  a  fleet 
of  forty  triremes  round  Peloponnesus,  was  directed  to  alter  his  des- 
tination and  to  proceed  forthwith  to  Mitylene.  It  was  expected  that 
he  would  reach  that  town  about  the  time  of  the  approaching  festival 


584  FOURTH  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 

:  Apollo  Maloeis,  celebrated  in  its  neighborhood — on  which  occasion 
the  whole  Mitylenaean  population  was  in  the  babil  of  going  forth  to 
the  temple:  so  thai  the  town,  while  thus  deserted,  might  easily  be 
surprised  and  seized  by  the  fleet.  In  ease  this  calculation  should  be 
disappointed,  Kleippidcs  was  instructed  to  require  thai  the  Mityle- 
should  surrender  their  ships  of  war  and  raze  their  fortifications, 
and  in  the  event  of  refusal  to  attack  them  immediately. 

But  the  publicity  of  debate  at  Athens  was  tar  too  great  to  allow 
such  a  scheme  to  succeed.  The  Mitylenseans  had  their  spies  in  the 
city,  and  the  moment  the  resolution  was  taken,  one  of  them  set  off 
to  communicate  it  at  Mitylene.  Crossing  over  to  Gereestus  in  Eubcra, 
and  getting  aboard  a  merchantman  on  the  point  of  departure,  he 
reached  Mitylene  with  a  favorable  wind  on  the  third  day  from 
Athens:  so  that  when  Kleippidcs  arrived  shortly  afterward,  he  found 
the  festival  adjourned  and  the  government  prepared  for  him.  The 
requisition  which  he  sent  in  was  refused,  and  the  Mitylenaean  fleet 
even  came  forth  from  the  harbor  to  assail  him,  but  was  beaten  back 
with  little  difficulty:  upon  which,  the  Mitylenaean  leaders,  finding 
themselves  attacked  before  their  preparations  were  completed,  and 
desiring  still  to  gain  time,  opened  negotiations  with  Kleippidcs,  and 
prevailed  on  him  to  suspend  hostilities  until  ambassadors  could  be 
sent  to  Athens— protesting  that  they  had  no  serious  intention  of 
revolting.  This  appears  to  have  been  about  the  middle  of  May,  soon 
after  the  Laccd;emonian  invasion  of  Attica. 

Kleippidcs  was  induced,  not  very  prudently,  to  admit  this  propo- 
sition, under  the  impression  that  his  armament  was  not  sufficient  to 
cope  with  a  city  and  island  so  powerful.  He  remained  moored  off 
the  harbor  at  the  north  of  Mitylene  until  the  envoys  (among  wThom 
was  included  one  of  the  very  citizens  of  Mitylene  who  had  sent  to 
betray  the  intended  revolt,  but  who  had  since  changed  his  opinion) 
should  return  from  Athens.  Meanwhile  the  Mitylena?an  government, 
unknown  to  Kleippides,  and  well  aware  that  the  embassy  would 
prove  fruitless,  took  advantage  of  the  truce  to  send  secret  envoys  to 
Sparta  imploring  immediate  aid.  And  on  the  arrival  of  the  Lace- 
daemonian Meleas  and  the  Theban  Herma?ondas  (who  had  been  dis- 
patched to  Mitylene  earlier,  but  had  only  come  in  by  stealth  since 
the  arrival  of  Kleippides),  a  second  trireme  was  sent  alongwith  tin  m, 
carrying  additional  envoys  to  reiterate  the  solicitation.  These  arriv- 
als and  dispatches  "were  carried  on  without  the  knowledge  of  the 
Athenian  admiral;  chiefly  in  consequence  of  the  peculiar  site  of  the 
town,  which  had  originally  been  placed  upon  a  little  islet  divided 
from  Lesbos  by  a  narrow  channel  or  euripus,  and  had  subsequently 
extended  across  into  the  main  island — like  Syracuse  and  so 
many  other  Grecian  settlements.  It  had  consequently  two  harbors, 
one  north,  the  other  south  of  the  town:  Kleippides  was  anchored  off 
the  former,  hut.  the  latter  remained  unguarded. 

During  the  absence  of  the  Mitylcnaan  envoys  at  Athens,  re-enforce- 


BLOCKADE   OF  MITYLENE.  585 

mcnts  reached  the  Athenian  admiral  fromLernnos,  Imbros,  and  some 
other  allies,  as  well  as  from  the  Lesbian  town  of  Methynma:  so  that 
when  the  envoys  returned,  as  they  presently  did  with  an  unfavorable 
reply,  war  was  resumed  with  increased  vigor.  The  Mitylenaeaus, 
having  made  a  general  sally  with  their  full  military  force,  gained 
some  advantage  in  the  battle;  yet  not  feeling  bold  enough  to  main- 
tain the  field,  they  retreated  back  behind  their  walls.  The  news  of 
their  revolt,  when  first  spread  abroad,  had  created  an  impression  un- 
favorable to  the  stability  of  the  Athenian  empire.  But  when  it  was 
seen  that  their  conduct  was  irresolute  and  their  achievements  dispro- 
portionate to  their  supposed  power,  a  reaction  of  feeling  took  place. 
The  Chians  and  other  allies  came  in  with  increased  zeal,  in  obedience 
to  the  summons  of  Athens  for  re-enforcements.  Kleippides  soon 
found  his  armament  large  enough  to  establish  two  separate  camps, 
markets  for  provision,  and  naval  stations,  north  and  south  of  the 
town,  so  as  to  watch  and  block  up  both  the  harbors  at  once.  But  he 
commanded  little  beyond  the  area  of  his  camp,  and  was  unable  to 
invest  the  city  by  laud;  especially  as  the  Mitylenaeans  had  received 
reenforcements  from  Antissa,  Pyrrha,  and  Eresus,  the  other  towns  of 
Lesbos  which  acted  with  them.  They  were  even  sufficiently  strong 
to  march  against  Methymna,  in  hopes  that  it  would  be  betrayed  to 
them  by  a  party  within.  But  this  expectation  was  not  realized,  nor 
could  they  do  more  than  strengthen  the  fortifications,  and  confirm  the 
Mitylenaean  supremacy,  in  the  other  three  subordinate  towns;  in  such 
manner  that  the  Methymnaeans,  who  soon  afterward  attacked  Antissa, 
were  repulsed  with  considerable  loss.  In  this  undecided  condition, 
the  island  continued,  until  (somewhere  about  the  month  of  August 
B.C.  428)  the  Athenians  sent  Paches  to  take  the  command,  with  a 
reenforcement  of  1000  hoplites,  who  rowed  themselves  thither  in 
triremes.  The  Athenians  were  now  in  force  enough  not  only  to  keep 
the  Mitylenaeans  within  their  walls,  but  also  to  surround  the  city 
with  a  single  wall  of  circumvallation  strengthened  by  separate  forts 
in  suitable  positions.  By  the  beginning  of  October,  Mitylene  was 
thus  completely  blockaded,  by  land  as  well  as  by  sea. 

Meanwhile  the  Mitylenaean  envoys,  after  a  troublesome  voyage, 
had  reached  Sparta  a  little  before  the  Olympic  festival,  about  the 
middle  of  June.  The  Spartans  directed  them  to  come  to  Olympia 
at  the  festival,  where  all  the  members  of  the  Peloponnesian  con- 
federacy would  naturally  be  present — and  there  to  set  forth  their 
requests,  after  the  festival  was  concluded,  in  presence  of  all. 

Thucydides  has  given  us,  at  some  length,  his  version  of  the  speech 
wherein  this  was  done — a  speech  not  a  little  remarkable.  Pro- 
nounced, as  it  was,  by  men  who  had  just  revolted  from  Athens, 
having  the  strongest  interest  to  raise  indignation  against  her  as  well 
as  sympathy  for  themselves — and  before  an  audience  exclusively 
composed  of  the  enemies  of  Athens,  all  willing  to  hear,  and  none 
present  to  refute,  the  bitterest  calumnies  against  her — we  should  have 


586  FOURTH  YEAR  OF  THE  "WAR. 

1  a  confident  sense  of  righteous  and  well-grounded,  though 
at.  on  the  part  of  the  Mitylenaeans,  and  a  plaurible  col- 

0  of  wrongs  and  oppressions  alleged  againsl  ihe  common  enemy. 

Instead  of  which  the  speech  is  apologetic  and  embarrassed.  The 
r  net  only  docs  not  allege  any  extortion  or  severe  dealing  from 
Alliens  toward  the  Mitylenaeans,  but  even  admits  the  fact  that  tiny 
had  been  treated  by  her  with  marked  honor;  and  that  too,  through- 
out a  long  period  of  peace,  during  which  she  stood  less  in  awe  of  her 

generally,  and  would  have  had  much  more  facility  in  realizing 
any  harsh  purposes  toward  them,  than  she  could  possibly  enjoy  n<  v. 
that  the  war  had  broken  out,  when  their  discontents  would  be  lik<  ly 
to  find  powerful  protectors.  According  to  his  own  showing,  the 
Mitylenaeans,  while  they  had  been  perfectly  well  treated  by  Athens 

■    the  past,  had  now  acquired,   by  the  mere  fact  of  war,   in- 

1  security  for  continuance  of  the  like  treatment  during  the 
future.  It  is  upon  the  necessity  of  acquiring  security  for  the  future, 
nevertheless,  that  he  rests  the  justification  of  the  revolt,  not  pre- 
tending to  have  any   subject    of   positive   complaint.     The  Mity- 

is  (he  contends)  could  have  no  prospective  security  against 
Athens:  for  she  had  successively  and  systematically  brought!  into 
all  her  allies,  except  Lesbos  and  Chios,  though  all  had  origin- 
ally^ been  upon  an  equal  footing:  and  there  was  every  reason  for 
fearing  that  she  would  take  the  first  convenimt  opportunity  of 
reducing  the  two  last  remaining  to  the  same  level — ihe  rather  as  their 
position  was  now  one  of  privilege  and  exception,  offensive  to  her  im- 
perial pride  and  exaggerated  ascendency.  It  had  hitherto  suited  the 
of  Athens  to  leave  these  two  exceptions  as  a  proof  that  the 
other  allies  had  justly  incurred  their  fate,  since  otherwise  Lesbos  and 
Chios,  having  equal  Votes,  would  not  have  joined  forces  in  reducing 
them.  But  this  policy  was  now  no  longer  necessary,  and  the  Mity- 
lenaeans, feeling  themselves  free  only  in  name,  were  imperatively 
called  upon  by  regard  for  their  own  safety  to  seize  the  earliest  oppor- 
tunity for  emancipating  Ihemselves  in  reality.      Nor  was  it  merely 

1  for  their  own  safety,  but  a  farther  impulse  of  Pan  hellenic 
patriotism;  a  desire  to  take  rank  among  the  opponents,  and  not 
among  the  auxiliaries,  of  Athens,   in  her  usurpation  of  sovereignty 

so  many  free  Grecian  states.      The  Mitylenaeans  had  however 
been  compelled  to  revolt  with  preparations  only  half  complete 
had  therefore  a  double  claim  upon  the  succor  of  Sparta — th< 
and  protectress  of  Grecian   autonomy.     And  Spartan  ai 
i   it  immediately  and  heartily,  in   a   renewed  attack   - 
this  same  year,  by  sea  as  well  as  by  land — could  not   I 
pill  down  the  common  enemy,  exhausted  as  she  was  bj  pestili  I 
as  well  as  by  the  cost  of  three  years'  war,  and   occupying  her  whole 
maritime   force  either  in   the  siege  of  Mitylene   or  round  Pelopon- 
nesus.    The  orator  concluded  by  appealing  not   merely  to  the  I  It  1 
ienic  patriotism  and  sympathies  of  the  Peloponnesians,  but  also  to  the 


INTERIOR   OF  THE  TEMPLE  OF  JUPITER  AT  OLYMPIA. 

•  Reconstruction). 


PRACTICAL  GROUNDS  OF  COMPLAINT.  587 

sacred  name  of  the  Olympic  Zeus,  in  whose  precinct  the  meeting  was 
he'd,  that  his  pressing  entreaty  might  not  be  disregarded. 

In  following  the  speech  of  the  orator,  we  see  the  plain  confession 
that  the  Mitylemcans  had  no  reason  whatever  to  complain  of  the  con- 
duct of  Athens  toward  themselves.  She  had  respected  alike  their 
dignity,  their  public  force,  and  their  private  security.  This  impor- 
tant fact  helps  us  to  explain,  first,  the  indifference  which  the  Mity- 
lemcan  people  will  be  found  to  manifest  in  the  revolt;  next,  the 
barbarous  resolution  taken  by  the  Athenians  after  its  suppression. 

The  reasons  given  for  the  revolt  are  mainly  two.  1.  The  Mityle- 
nseans  had  uo  security  that  Athens  would  not  degrade  them  into  the 
condition  of  subject-allies  like  the  rest.  2.  They  did  not  choose  to 
second  the  ambition  of  Athens,  and  to  become  parties  to  a  war  for 
the  sake  of  maintaining  an  empire  essentially  offensive  to  Grecian 
political  instincts. 

In  both  these  two  reasons  there  is  force;  and  both  touch  the  sore 
point  of  the  Athenian  empire.  That  empire  undoubtedly  contra- 
dicted one  of  the  fundamental  instincts  of  the  Greek  mind — the  right 
of  every  separate  town  to  administer  its  own  political  affairs  apart 
from  external  control.  The  Peloponnesian  alliance  recognized  this 
autonomy  in  theory,  by  the  general  synod  and  equal  voting  of  all  the 
members  at  Sparta,  on  important  occasions;  though  it  was  quite  true 
(as  Perikles  urged  at  Athens)  that  in  practice  nothing  more  was 
enjoyed  than  an  autonomy  confined  by  Spartan  leading-strings — and 
though  Sparta  held  in  permanent  custody  hostages  for  the  fidelity  of 
her  Arcadian  allies,  summoning  their  military  contingents  without 
acquainting  them  whither  they  were  destined  to  march.  But  Athens 
proclaimed  herself  a  despot,  effacing  the  autonomy  of  her  allies  not 
less  in  theory  than  in  practice.  Far  from  being  disposed  to  cultivate 
in  them  any  sense  of  a  real  common  interest  with  herself,  she  did  not 
even  cheat  them  with  those  forms  and  fictions  which  so  often  appease 
discontent  in  the  absence  of  realities.  Doubtless  the  nature  of  her 
empire,  at  once  widely  extended,  maritime,  and  unconnected  (or  only 
partially  connected)  with  kindred  of  race,  rendered  the  forms  of  peri- 
odical deliberation  difficult  to  keep  up ;  at  the  same  time  that  it  gave 
to  her  as  naval  chief  an  ascendency  much  more  despotic  than  could 
have  been  exercised  by  any  chief  on  land.  It  is  doubtful  whether 
she  could  have  overcome — it  is  certain  that  she  did  not  try  to  over- 
come— these  political  difficulties;  so  that  her  empire  stood  confessed 
as  a  despotism,  opposed  to  the  political  instinct  of  the  Greek  mind; 
and  the  revolts  against  it,  like  this  of  Mitylene — in  so  far  as  they  rep- 
resented a  genuine  feeling  and  were  not  merely  movements  of  an 
oligarchical  party  against  their  own  democracy — were  revolts  of  this 
offended  instinct,  much  more  than  consequences  of  actual  oppression. 
The  Mitylenasans  might  certainly  affirm  that  they  had  no  security 
against  being  one  day  reduced  to  the  common  condition  of  subject- 
allies  like  the  rest.     Yet  an  Athenian  speaker,  had  he  been  here  pros- 


588  FOURTH   YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 

i  iii,  might  have  made  no  mean  reply  to  this  portion  of  their  reason- 
ing. Be  would  have  urged  thai  bad  Athens  fell  any  dispositions 
toward  such  a  scheme,  she  would  have  taken  advantage  of  the 
Fourteen  years' truce  to  execute  it;  and  he  would  have  shown  Lhal 
Ihe  degradation  of  the  allies  by  Athens,  and  the  change  inherpu 
tion  from  presidenl  to  despot,  had  been  far  less  intentional  and.  sys- 
tematic than  the  Mitylensean  orator  affirmed. 

To  the  Peloponnesian  auditors,  however,  the  speech  of  the  latter 
proved  completely  satisfactory.  The  Lesbians  were  declared  mem 
bers  of  the  Peloponnesian  alliance,  and  a  second  attack  upon  Attica 
was  decreed.  The  Lacedaemonians,  foremost  in  the  movement,  sum* 
moned  contingents  Iron:  their  various  allies,  and  were  early  in  arriving 
with  their  own  at  the  Isthmus.  They  there  began  to  prepare  car- 
riages or  trucks,  for  dragging  across  the  Isthmus  the  triremes  which 
had  foughl  againsl  Phormio,  from  the  harbor  of  Lechamni  into  the 
Saronic  Gulf,  in  order  to  employ  them  against  Athons.  But  the 
remaining  allies  did  not  answer  to  the  summons,  remaining  at  home 
occupied  with  their  harvest;  while  the  Lacedaemonians,  sufficiently 
disappointed  with  this  languor  and  disobedience,  were  still  farther 
confounded  by  the  unexpected  presence  of  100  Athenian  triremes  off 
the  const  of  the  Isthmus. 

The  Athenians,  though  their  own  presence  at  the  Olympic  festival 
was  forbidden  by  the  war,  had  doubtless  learned  more  or  less  thor- 
oughly the  proceedings  which  had  taken  place  there  respecting 
Alityleue.  Perceiving  thegeueral  belief  entertained  of  their  depressed 
and  helpless  condition,  they  determined  to  contradict  this  by  a  great 
and  instant  effort.  They  accordingly  manned  forthwith  100  triremes, 
requiring  the  personal  service  of  all  men,  citizens  as  well  as  metics, 
and  excepting  onlyr  the  two  richest  classes  of  the  Solonian  census,  i.e., 
the  Pentakosiomedimni,  and  the  Hippeis  or  Horsemen.  With  this 
prodigious  fleet  they  made  a  demonstration  along  the  Isthmus  in  view 
of  the  Lacedaemonians,  and  landed  in  various  parts  of  the  Pelopon- 
nesian coast  to  inflict  damage.  At  the  same  time  thirty  other  Athe- 
nian triremes,  dispatched  sometime  previously  to  Akarnania  under 
Asopius,  son  of  Phormio,  landed  at  different  openings  in  Laconia  for 
the  same  purpose.  This  news  reached  the  Lacedemonians  at  the 
Isthmus,  Avhile  the  other  great  Athenian  fleet  was  parading  before 
their  eyes.  Amazed  at  so  unexpected  a  demonstration  of  3trength, 
they  began  to  feel  how  much  they  had  been  misled  respecting  Ihe 
exhaustion  of  Athens,  and  how  incompetent  they  were,  especially 
without  the  presence  of  their  allies,  to  undertake  any  joint  effective 
movement  by  sea  and  land  against  Attica.  They  therefore  returned 
home,  resolving  to  send  an  expedition  of  forty  triremes  under  Alkidas 
to  the  relief  of  Mitylene  itself;  at  ihe  same  time  transmitting  requisi- 
tions to  their  various  allies,  in  order  that  these  triremes  might  be  fur- 
nished. 

Meanwhile  Asopius  with  his  thirty  triremes  had  arrived  in  Akar- 


ASOPIUS  IN  AKARNANIA.  589 

nania,  from  whence  all  the  ships  except  twelve  were  sent  home.  He 
had  been  nominated  commander  as  the  son  of  Phormio,  who  appears 
either  to  have  died,  or  to  have  become  unfit  for  service,  since  his  vic- 
tories of  the  preceding  year.  The  Akarnanians  had  preferred  a 
special  request  that  a  son,  or  at  least  some  relative,  of  Phormio  should 
be  invested  with  the  command  of  the  squadron;  so  beloved  was  Ids 
name  and  character  among  them.  Asopius,  however,  accomplished 
nothing  of  importance,  though  he  again  undertook  conjointly  with 
the  Akarnanians  a  fruitless  march  against  (Eniadse.  Ultimately  he 
was  defeated  and  slain,  in  attempting  a  disembarkation  on  the  terri- 
tory of  Leukas. 

The  sanguine  announcement  made  by  the  Mitylena?ans  at  Olympia, 
that  Athens  was  rendered  helpless  by  the  epidemic,  had  indeed  been 
strikingly  contradicted  by  her  recent  display;  since,  taking  numbers 
and  equipment  together,  the  maritime  force  which  she  had  put  forth 
this  summer,  manned  as  it  was  by  a  higher  class  of  seamen,  surpassed 
all  former  years;  although,  in  point  of  number  only,  it  was  inferior 
to  the  250  triremes  which  she  had  sent  out  during  the  first  summer  of 
the  war.  But  the  assertion  that  Athens  was  impoverished  in  finances 
was  not  so  destitute  of  foundation:  for  the  whole  treasure  in  the 
acropolis,  6,000  talents  at  the  commencement  of  the  war,  was  now 
consumed,  with  the  exception  of  that  reserve  of  1000  talents  which 
had  been  solemnly  set  aside  against  the  last  exigences  of  defensive 
resistance.  This  is  not  surprising  when  we  learn  that  every  hoplite 
engaged  for  near  two  years  and  a  half  in  the  blockade  of  Potidoea 
received  two  drachmas  per  day,  one  for  himself  and  a  second  for  an 
attendant.  There  were  during  the  whole  time  of  the  blockade  3,000 
hoplites  engaged  there, — and  for  a  considerable  portion  of  the  time, 
4,600;  besides  the  fleet,  all  the  seamen  of  which  received  one  drachma 
per  day  per  man.  Accordingly,  the  Athenians  were  now  for  the  first 
time  obliged  to  raise  a  direct  contribution  among  themselves,  to  the 
amount  of  200  talents,  for  the  purpose  of  prosecuting  the  siege  of 
Mitylene:  and  they  at  the  same  time  dispatched  Lysikles  (with"  four 
colleagues)  in  command  of  twelve  triremes  to  collect  money.  What 
relation  these  money-gathering  ships  bore  to  the  regular  tribute  paid 
by  the  subject  allies,  or  whether  they  were  allowed  to  visit  these  lat- 
ter, we  do  not  know.  In  the  present  case,  Lysikles  landed  at  Myus, 
near  the  mouth  of  the  Mseander,  and  marched  up  the  country  to  levy 
contributions  on  the  Karian  villages  in  the  plain  of  that  river:  but  he 
was  surprised  by  the  Karians,  perhaps  aided  by  the  active  Samian 
exiles  at  Ansea  in  the  neighborhood,  and  slain  with  a  considerable 
number  of  his  men. 

While  the  Athenians  thus  held  Mitylene  under  siege,  their  faithful 
friends  the  Platseans  had  remained  closely  blockaded  by  the  Pelopon- 
nesians  and  Boeotians  for  more  than  a  year,  without  any  possibility 
of  relief.  At  length  provisions  began  to  fail,  and  the  general  Eupom- 
pides,  backed  by  the  prophet  Thesenetus  (these  prophets  were  oftea 


590  FOURTH  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 

among  the  bravesl  soldiers  in  the  army),  persuaded  the  garrison  to 
adopt  the  daring,  bu1  Beemingly  desperate,  resolution  of  breaking 
mil  over  tb  ding  wall  and  in  spile  of  its  guards.     Bodes 

.  indeed,  did  the  projed  seem,  that  at  the  moment  of  execution, 
one  balf  of  the  rani  sun  shrank  from  it  as  equivalent  to  certain  death : 
the  other  half,  about  212  in  number,  persisted  and  escaped.  Happy 
would  ii  bave  been  for  the  remainder  had  they  even  perished  in  the 

:it,  and  thus  forestalled  the  more  melancholy  late  in  store  foi 
them! 

It  has  been  already  stated  that  the  circumvallation  of  Platsea  \\a 
accomplished  by  a  double  wall  and  a  double  ditch,  one  ditch  withoul 
the  encircling  walls,  another  between  them  and  the  town;  the  two 
walls  being  sixteen  feet  apart,  joined  together,  and  roofed  all  round, 
so  as  to  look  like  one  thick  wall,  and  to  afford  covered  quarters  for 
the  besiegers.  Both  Hie  outer  and  inner  circumference  were  furnished 
with  batlements,  and  after  every  ten  battlements  came  a  roofed  tower, 
covering  the  whole  breadth  of  the  double  wall — allowing  a  free 
inside,   but  none  outside.     In   general,  the  entire  circuit  of 

0  fed  wall  was  kept  under  watch  night  and  day;  but  on  wet 
nights  the  besiegers  had  so  far  relaxed  their  vigilance  as  to  retire 

.  cover  of  the  towers,  leaving  the  intermediate  spaces  unguarded; 
and  it  was  upon  this  omission  that  the  plan  of  escape  was  founded. 
The  Platseans  prepared  ladders  of  a  proper  height  to  scale  the 
blockading  double  wall,  ascertaining  its  height  by  repeatedly' count- 
ing the  ranges  of  bricks,  which  were  near  enough  for  them  to  discern, 
and  not  effectually  covered  with  whitewash.  On  a  cold  and  dark 
December  night,  amidst  rain,  sleet,  and  a  roaring  wind,  they  marched 
forth  from  the  gates,  lightly  armed,  some  few  with  sliields  and 
spears,  but  most  of  them  with  breastplates,  javelins,  and  bows  and 
arrows.  The  right  foot  was  naked,  but  the  left  foot  shod,  so  as  to 
give  to  it  a  more  assured  footing  on  the  muddy  ground.  Taking  care 
to  sally  out  with  the  wind  in  their  faces  and  at  such  a  distance  from 
each  other  as  to  prevent  any  clattering  of  arms,  they  crossed  the  inner 
ditch  and  reached  the  foot  of  the  wall  without  being  discovered.  The 
ladders,  borne  in  the  van,  were  immediately  planted,  and  Ammeas 
son  of  Korcebus,  followed  by  eleven  others  armed  only  with  a  short 
sword  and  breastplate,  mounted  the  wall:  others  armed  with  speari 
followed  him,  their  shields  being  carried  and  handed  to  them  when 
on  the  top  byr  comrades  behind.  It  was  the  duty  of  this  first  com- 
pany to  master  and  maintain  the  two  towers  right  and  left,  so  as  to 
keep  the  intermediate  space  free  for  passing  over.  This  was  success- 
fully done,  the  guards  in  both  towers  being  surprised  and  slain,  with- 
out alarming  the  remaining  besiegers.  Many  of  the  PlaUeans  had 
already  reached  the  top  of  the  wall,  when  the  noise  of  a  tile  acci- 
dentally knocked  down  by  one  of  them  betrayed  what  was  passing. 
Immediately  a  general  clamor  was  raised,  alarm  was  given,  and  the 
awakened  garrison  rushed  up  from  beneath  to  the  top  of  the  wall, 


HALF  OF  THE  GARRISON  ESCAPE.  591 

yet  not  knowing  where  the  enemy  was  to  be  found,  a  perplexity 
further  increased  by  the  Plataeans  in  the  town,  who  took  this  oppor- 
tunity of  making  a  false  attack  on  the  opposite  side.  Amid  such 
confusion  and  darkness,  the  blockading  detachment  could  not  tell 
where  to  direct  their  blows,  and  all  remained  at  their  posts,  except  a 
reserve  of  300  men,  kept  constantly  in  readiness  for  special  emer- 
gencies, who  marched  out  and  patrolled  the  outside  of  the  ditch  to 
intercept  any  fugitives  from  within.  At  the  same  time,  fire-signals 
were  raised  to  warn  their  allies  at  Thebes.  But  here,  again,  the 
Plataeans  in  the  town  had  foreseen  and  prepared  fire-signals  on  their 
part,  which  they  hoisted  forthwith  in  order  to  deprive  this  telegraphic 
communication  of  all  special  meaning. 

Meanwhile  the  escaping  Plataeans,  masters  of  the  two  adjoining 
towers — on  the  top  of  which  some  of  them  mounted,  while  others  held 
the  doorway  through,  so  as  to  repel  with  spears  and  darts  all  approach 
of  the  blockaders — prosecuted  their  flight  without  interruption  over 
the  space  between,  shoving  down  the  battlements  in  order  to  make  it 
more  level  and  plant  a  greater  number  of  ladders.  In  this  manner 
they  all  successively  got  over  and  crossed  the  outer  ditch.  Every 
man,  immediately  after  crossing,  stood  ready  on  the  outer  bank  with 
bow  and  javelin  to  repel  assailants  and  maintain  safe  passages  for  his 
comrades  in  the  rear.  At  length,  when  all  had  descended,  there 
remained  the  last  and  greatest  difficulty — the  escape  of  those  who 
occupied  the  two  towers  and  kept  the  intermediate  portion  of  wall 
free :  yet  even  this  was  accomplished  successfully  and  without  loss. 
The  outer  ditch  was  found  embarrassing — so  full  of  water  from  the 
rain  as  to  be  hardly  fordable,  yet  with  thin  ice  on  it  also,  from  a 
previous  frost :  for  the  storm,  which  in  other  respects  was  the  main 
help  to  their  escape,  here  retarded  their  passage  of  the  ditch  by  an 
unusual  accumulation  of  water.  It  was  not,  however,  until  all  had 
crossed  except  the  defenders  of  the  towers — who  were  yet  descending 
and  scrambling  through — that  the  Peloponnesian  reserve  of  300  were 
seen  approaching  the  spot  with  torches.  Their  unshielded  right  side 
being  turned  toward  the  ditch,  the  Plata?ans,  already  across  and 
standing  on  the  bank,  immediately  assailed  them  with  arrows  and 
javelins — in  which  the  torches  enabled  them  to  take  tolerable  aim, 
while  the  Peloponnesians  on  their  side  could  not  distinguish  their 
enemies  in  the  dark,  and  had  no  pi'evious  knowledge  of  their  position. 
They  were  thus  held  in  check  until  the  rearmost  Plataeans  had  sur- 
mounted the  difficulties  of  the  passage :  after  which  the  whole  body  stole 
off  as  speedily  as  they  could,  taking  at  first  the  road  toward  Thebes, 
while  their  pursuers  were  seen  with  their  torch-lights  following  the 
opposite  direction,  on  the  road  which  led  by  the  heights  called  Dryos- 
Kephalse  to  Athens.  After  having  marched  about  three-quarters  of 
a  mile  on  the  road  to  Thebes  (leaving  the  chapel  of  the  Hero  Androk- 
rates  on  their  right  hand),  the  fugitives  quitted  it,  and  striking  to  the 
eastward  toward  Erythrae  and  Hysiae,  soon  found  themselves  in  safety 


502  FOURTH   YEAR   OF   THE   WAR. 

among  iho  mountains  which  separate  Boeotia  from  Attica  at  that 
point,  from  whence  they  passed  into  the  glad  harbor  and  refuge  of 
Athens. 

Two  hundred  and  twelve  brave  nun  thus  emerged  to  life  and 
liberty,  breaking  loose  from  thai  impending  fate  which  too  Boon 
overtook  the  remainder,  and  preserving  for  future  times  the  genuine 

breed  and  honorable  traditions  of  IMaln-a.     One  man  alone  was  taken 

prisoner  at  the"  brink  of  the  outer  ditch,  while  a  few,  who  had 
enrolled  themselves  originally  for  the  enterprise,  lost  courage  and 
returned  in  despair  even  from  the  fool  of  the  inner  wall,  telling  their 

comrades  within  that  the  whole  hand  had  perished.  Accordingly, 
ai  day  break,  the  Platseans  within  si  nl  out  a  herald  to  solicil  a  truce 

for  burial  of  the  dead  bodies,  and  it  was  only  by  the  answer  made  to 
this  request,  that  they  learnt  the  actual  truth.  The  description  of 
this  memorable  outbreak  exhibits  not  less  daring  in  the  execution  than 
skill  and  foresight  in  the  design,  and  is  the  more  interesting  inasmuch 
as  the  men  who  thus  worked  out  their  salvation  were  precisely  the 
bravest  men  who  best  deserved  it. 

Meanwhile  Paches  and  the  Athenians  kept  Mitylene  closely  blocked 
up,  the  provisions  were  nearly  exhausted,  and  the  besieged  were 
already  beginning  to  think  of  capitulation,  when  their  spirits  were 
raised  by  the  arrival  of  the  Lacedaemonian  envoy  Salsethus,  who  had 
landed  atPyrrha  on  the  west  of  Lesbos,  and  contrived  to  steal  in 
through  a  ravine  which  obstructed  the  continuity  of  the  blockading 
wall  (about  February,  427  b.c).  He  encouraged  the  Mitylenaeans  to 
hold  out,  assuring  th<  m  that  a  Peloponnesian  licet  under  Alkidas  was 
on  the  point  of  setting  oul  in  assist  them,  and  dial  Attica  would  be 
forthwith  invaded  by  the  general  1'cloponnesian  army.  His  own 
arrival,  also,  and  Ids  stay  in  the  town,  was  in  itself  qo small  encourage- 
ment :  we  shall  see  hereafter,  when  we  come  to  the  siege  of  Syracuse 
by  the  Athenians,  howmuch  might  depend  upon  the  presence  of  one 
single  Spartan.  All  thought  of  surrender  was  accordingly  aban- 
doned, and  the  Mitylenaeans  availed  with  impatience  the  arrived  of 
Alkidas.  who  started  from  Peloponnesus  at  the  beginning  of  April, 
with  forty-two  triremes;  while  the  Lacedaemonian  army  at  the  same 
lime  invaded  Attica,  in  order  to  keep  the  attention  of  Athens  fully- 
employed.  Their  ravages  on  this  occasion  were  more  diligent, 
searching,  and  destructive  to  the  country  than  before,  and  were  con- 
tinued the  longer  because  they  awaited  the  arrival  of  news  from 
Lesbos.  But  no  news  reached  them,  their  stock  of  provisions  was 
exhausted,  and  the  army  was  obliged  to  break  up. 

The  tidings  which  at  length  arrived  proved  very  unsatisfactory. 

Salsethus  and  the  Mitylenaeans  had  laid  out  until  their  provisions 
were  completely  exhausted,  but  neither  relief  nor  encouragemenl 
reached  them  from  Peloponnesus.  At  Length  even  Salsethus  became 
convinced  that  no  relief  would  come;  he  projected,  therefore,  as  a 
Last   hope,  a  desperate  attack  upon  the  Athenians  and  their  wall  of 


SURRENDER  OP  MITYLENE.         593 

blockade.  For  this  purpose  he  distributed  full  panoplies  among  the 
mass  of  the  people  or  commons,  who  had  hitherto  been  without  them 
having  at  best  nothing  more  than  bows  or  javelins. 

But  he  had  not  sufficiently  calculated  the  consequences  of  this 
important  step.  The  Mitylenaean  multitude,  living  under  an  oligarch- 
ical government,  had  no  interest  in  the  present  contest,  which  hail 
been  undertaken  without  any  appeal  to  their  opinion.  They  had  no 
reason  for  aversion  to  Athens,  seeing  that  they  suffered  no  practical 
grievance  from  the  Athenian  alliance:  and  (to  repeat  what  has  been 
remarked  in  the  early  portion  of  this  volume)  we  find  that  even  among 
the  subject-allies  (to  say  nothing  of  a  privileged  ally  like  Mitylene), 
the  bulk  of  the  citizens  were  never  forward,  sometimes  positive  reluc- 
tant, to  revolt.  The  Mitylenaean  oligarchy  had  revolted,  in  spite  of 
the  absence  of  practical  wrongs,  because  they  desired  an  uncontrolled 
town-autonomy  as  well  as  security  for  its  continuance.  But  this  was 
a  feeling  to  which  the  people  were  naturally  strangers,  having  no 
share  in  the  government  of  their  own  town,  and  being  kept  dead  and 
passive,  as  it  was  the  interest  of  the  oligarchy  that  they  should  be,  in 
respect  to  political  sentiment.  A  Grecian  oligarchy  might  obtain 
from  its  people  quiet  submission  under  ordinary  circumstances;  but 
if  ever  it  required  energetic  effort,  the  genuine  devotion  under  which 
alone  such  effort  could  be  given  was  found  wanting.  The  Mity- 
lenaean Demos,  so  soon  as  they  found  themselves  strengthened  and 
ennobled  by  the  possession  of  heavy  armor,  refused  obedience  to  the 
orders  of  Salaethus  for  marching  out  and  imperiling  their  lives  in  a 
desperate  struggle.  They  were  under  the  belief — not  unnatural  under 
the  secrecy  of  public  affairs  habitually  practiced  by  an  oligarchy,  but 
which  assuredly  the  Athenian  Demos  would  have  been  too  well 
informed  to  entertain — that  their  governors  were  starving  them  and 
had  concealed  stores  of  provision  for  themselves.  Accordingly,  the 
first  use  which  they  made  of  their  arms  was  to  demand  that  these 
concealed  stores  should  be  brought  out  and  f airly  apportioned  to  all ; 
threatening  unless  their  demand  was  complied  with  at  once,  to  enter 
into  negotiations  with  the  Athenians  and  surrender  the  city.  The 
ruling  Mitylenaeans,  unable  to  prevent  this,  but  foreseeing  that  it 
would  be  their  irretrievable  ruin,  preferred  the  chance  of  negotiating 
themselves  for  a  capitulation.  It  was  agreed  with  Paches  that  the 
Athenian  armament  should  enter  into  possession  of  Mitylene;  that 
the  fate  of  its  people  and  city  should  be  left  to  the  Athenian  assem- 
bly, and  that  the  Mitylenaeans  should  send  envoys  to  Athens  to 
plead  their  cause:  until  the  return  of  these  envoys,  Paches  engaged 
that  no  one  should  be  either  killed,  or  put  in  chains,  or  sold  in  slavery. 
Nothing  wa-s  said  about  Salaethus,  who  hid  himself  as  well  as  he 
could  in  the  city.  In  spite  of  the  guarantee  received  from  Paches, 
so  great  was  the  alarm  of  those  Mitylenaeans  who  had  chiefly  insti- 
gated the  revolt,  that  when  he  actually  took  possession  of  the  city, 
they  threw  themselves  as  suppliants  upon  the  altars  for  protection. 


594  FOURTH   YEAR  OF  TEE  WAR. 

But  being  induced  by  bis  assurances  to  quit  tbeir  sanctuary,  Ibcy 
were  placed  in  the  island  of  Tenedos  until  answer  sbould  be  received 
from  Athens. 

Having  tbus  secured  possession  of  Mitylene,  Paches  sent  round 
some  triremes  to  the  other  side  of  the  island,  and  easily  captured 
Antissa.  But  before  be  bad  time  to  reduce  the  two  remaining  towns 
of  Pyrrha  and  Eresus,  he  received  news  which  forced  bim  to  turn 
bis  attention  elsewhere. 

To  the  astonishment  of  every  one,  the  Peloponnesian  fleet  of 
Alkidas  was  seen  on  the  coast  of  Ionia.  It  ought  to  have  been  there 
much  earlier,  and  had  Alkidas  been  a  man  of  energy,  it  would  have 
reached  Mitylene  even  before  the  surrender  of  the  city.  But  the 
Peloponnesians,  when  about  to  advance  iuto  the  Athenian  waters  and 
brave  the  Athenian  fleet,  were  under  the  same  impression  of  con- 
scious weakness  and  timidity  (especially  since  the  victories  of  Phor- 
mio  in  the  preceding  year)  as  that  which  inset  land  troops  when 
marching  up  to  attack  the  Lacedaemonian  heavy-armed.  Alkidas, 
though  unobstructed  by  the  Athenians,  who  were  not  aware  of  his 
departure — though  pressed  to  hasten  forward  by  Lesbian  and  Ionian 
exiles  on  board,  and  aided  by  expert  pilots  from  those  Bamian  exiles 
who  had  established  themselves  at  Amea  on  the  Asiatic  continent, 
and  acted  as  zealous  enemies  of  Athens — nevertheless,  instead  of  sail- 
ing straight  to  Lesbos,  lingered  first  near  Peloponnesus,  next  at  the 
island  of  Delos,  making  capture  of  private  vessels  with  their  crews, 
until  at  length,  on  reaching  the  islands  of  Ikarns  and  Mykonus,  he 
heard  the  unwelcome  tidings  that  the  besieged  town  had  capitulated. 
Not  at  first  crediting  the  report,  he  sailed  onward  to  Embaton,  in  the 
Erythraean  territory  on  the  coast  of  Asia  Minor,  where  he  found  the 
news  confirmed.  As  only  seven  days  had  elapsed  since  the  capitula- 
tion had  been  concluded,  Teutiaplus,  an  Eleian  captain  in  the  fleet, 
strenuously  urged  the  daring  project  of  sailing  on  forthwith,  and 
surprising  Mitylene  by  night  in  its  existing  unsettled  condition :  no 
preparation  would  have  been  made  for  receiving  them,  and  there  was 
good  chance  that  the  Athenians  might  be  suddenly  overpowered, 
the  Mityleuaeans  again  armed,  and  the  town  recovered. 

Such  a  proposition,  which  was  indeed  something  more  than  darinij, 
did  not  suit  the  temper  of  Alkidas.  Nor  could  be  be  induced  by  the 
solicitation  of  the  exiles  to  fix  and  fortify  himself  either  in  any  port 
of  Ionia,  or  in  the  iEolic  town  of  Kyme,  so  as  to  afford  support  and 
countenance  to  such  subjects  of  the  Athenian  empire  as  were  disposed 
to  revolt ;  though  he  was  confidently  assured  that  many  of  them  would 
revolt  on  his  proclamation,  and  that  the  satrap  Pissuthnes  of  Sardis 
would  help  him  to  defray  1  he  expense.  Having  been  sent  for  the 
express  purpose  of  relieving  Mitylene,  Alkidas  believed  himself  inter- 
dicted from  any  other  project.  He  determined  to  return  to  Pelopon- 
nesus at  once,  dreading  nothing  so  much  as  the  pursuit  of  Paches 
and  the  Athenian  fleet.     From  Embaton  accordingly  by  started  on 


PACHES  PURSUES  THE  FLEET.  595 

his  return,  coasting  southward  along  Asia  Minor  as  far  as  Ephesus. 
But  the  prisoners  taken  in  his  voyage  were  now  an  incumbrance  to 
his  flight;  and  their  number  was  not  inconsiderable,  since  all  the 
merchant-vessels  in  his  route  had  approached  the  fleet  without  sus- 
picion, believing  it  to  be  Athenian:  a  Peloponnesian  fleet  near  the 
coast  of  Ionia  was  as  yet  something  unheard  of  and  incredible.  To 
get  rid  of  his  prisoners,  Alkidas  stopped  at  Myonnesus  near  Teos, 
and  there  put  to  death  the  greater  number  of  them — a  barbarous  pro- 
ceeding which  excited  lively  indignation  among  the  neighboring 
Ionic  cities  to  which  they  belonged;  insomuch  that  when  he  reached 
Ephesus,  the  Samian  exiles  dwelling  at  Amea,  who  had  come  forward 
so  actively  to  help  him,  sent  him  a  spirited  remonstrance,  remind- 
ing him  that  the  slaughter  of  men  neither  engaged  in  war,  nor  ene- 
mies, nor  even  connected  with  Athens  except  by  constraint,  was 
disgraceful  to  one  who  came  forth  as  the  liberator  of  Greece — and 
that  if  he  persisted,  he  would  convert  his  friends  into  enemies,  not 
his  enemies  into  friends.  So  keenly  did  Alkidas  feel  this  animadver- 
sion, that  he  at  once  liberated  the  remainder  of  his  prisoners,  several 
of  them  Chians,  and  then  departed  from  Ephesus,  taking  his  course 
across  sea  toward  Krete  and  Peloponnesus.  After  much  delay  off 
the  coast  of  Krete  from  stormy  weather,  which  harassed  and  dispersed 
his  fleet,  he  at  length  reached  in  safety  the  harbor  of  Kyllene  in  Elis, 
where  his  scattered  ships  were  ultimately  reunited. 

Thus  inglorious  was  the  voyage  of  the  first  Peloponnesian  admiral 
who  dared  to  enter  that  Mare  clausum  which  passed  for  a  portion  of 
the  territory  of  Athens.  But  though  he  achieved  little,  his  mere 
presence  excited  everywhere  not  less  dismay  than  astonishment:  for 
the  Ionic  towns  were  all  unfortified,  and  Alkidas  might  take  and 
sack  any  one  of  them  by  sudden  assault,  even  though  unable  to  hold 
it  permanently.  Pressing  messages  reached  Paches  from  Erythra? 
and  from  several  other  places,  while  the  Athenian  triremes  called 
Paralus  and  Salaminia  (the  privileged  vessels  which  usually  carried 
public  and  sacred  deputations)  had  themselves  seen  the  Peloponnesian 
fleet  anchored  at  Ikarus,  and  brought  him  the  same  intelligence. 
Paches,  having  his  hands  now  free  by  the  capture  of  Mitylene,  set 
forth  immediately  in  pursuit  of  the  intruder,  whom  he  chased  as  far 
as  the  island  of  Patmos.  It  was  there  ascertained  that  Alkidas  had 
finally  disappeared  from  the  eastern  waters,  and  the  Athenian  admi- 
ral, though  he  would  have  rejoiced  to  meet  the  Peloponnesian  fleet 
in  the  open  sea,  accounted  it  fortunate  that  they  had  not  taken  up  a 
position  in  some  Asiatic  harbor — in  which  case  it  would  have  been 
necessary  for  him  to  undertake  a  troublesome  and  tedious  blockade, 
besides  all  the  chances  of  revolt  among  the  Athenian  dependencies. 
We  shall  see  how  much,  in  this  respect,  depended  upon  the  personal 
character  of  the  Lacedaemonian  commander,  when  we  come  hereafter 
to  the  expedition  of  Brasidas. 

On  his  return  from  Patmos  to  Mitylene  Paches  was  induced  to 


596  FOURTH    YEAR   OF  THE   WAR. 

stop  at  Notium  by  the  solicitations  of  some  exiles.     Notium  was  the 
porl  of  Colophon,  from  which  it  was  al  sonic  little  distance,  as  Peir- 

83US  was  Erom  Alliens. 

About  three  years  before,  a  violent  internal  dissension  had  taken 
place  in  Colophon,  and  one  of  the  parties,  invoking  the  aid  of  the  Per- 
sian Itamancs  (seemingly  one-  of  the  generals  of  the  satrap  Pissuthnes), 
had  placed  him  in  possession  of  the  town;  whereupon  the  opposite 
party,  forced  to  retire,  had  established  itself  separately  and  indepen- 
dently al  Notium.  Hut  the  Kolophonians  who  remained  in  the  town 
soon  contrived  to  procure  a  party  in  Notium,  whereby  they  were 
enabled  to  regain  possession  of  it,  through  the  aid  of  a  body  of  Arca- 
dian mercenaries  in  the  service  of  Pissuthnes.  These  Arcadians 
formed  a  standing  garrison  at  Notium,  in  which  they  occupied  a 
separate  citadel  or  fortified  space,  while  the  town  became  again  at- 
tached as  harbor  to  Kolophon.  A  considerable  body  of  exiles,  how- 
ever, expelled  on  that  occasion,  now  invoked  the  aid  of  Paches  to 
reinstate  them,  and  to  expel  the  Arcadians.  On  reaching  the  place 
the  Athenian  general  prevailed  upon  Hippias,  the  Arcadian  captain, 
to  come  forth  to  a  parley,  under  the  promise  that  if  nothing  mutually 
satisfactory  could  be  settled,  he  would  again  replace  him  "safe  and 
sound  "  in  the  fortification.  But  no  sooner  had  the  Arcadian  come 
forth  to  this  parley  than  Paches,  causing  him  to  be  detained  under 
guard  but  without  letters  or  ill-usage,  immediately  attacked  the  for- 
tification while  the  garrison  were  relying  on  the  armistice,  carried  it 
by  storm,  and  put  to  death  both  the  Arcadians  and  the  Persians  who 
Avere  found  within.  Having  got  possession  of  the  fortification,  he 
next  brought  Hippias  again  into  it — "  safe  and  sound,"  according  to 
the  terms  of  the  convention,  which  was  thus  literally  performed — 
and  then  immediately  afterwards  caused  him  to  be  shot  with  arrows 
and  javelins.  Of  this  species  of  fraud,  founded  on  literal  perform- 
ance and  real  violation  of  an  agreement,  there  are  various  examples 
in  Grecian  history;  but  nowhere  do  we  read  of  a  more  flagitious 
combination  of  deceit  and  cruelty  than  the  behavior  of  the  Paches 
at  Notium.  How  it  was  noticed  at  Athens  we  do  not  know:  yet  we 
remark,  not  without  surprise,  that  Thucydides  recounts  it  plainly 
and  calmly,  without  a  single  word  of  comment. 

Notium  was  now  separated  from  Kolophon  and  placed  in  posses- 
sion of  those  Kolophonians  who  were  opposed  to  the  Persian  suprem- 
acy in  the  upper  town.  But  as  it  had  been,  down  to  this  time,  a 
mere  appendage  of  Kolophon  and  not  a  separate  town,  the  Athenians 
soon  afterwards  sent  OZkists  and  performed  for  it  the  ceremonies  of 
colonization  according  to  their  own  laws  and  customs,  inviting  from 
every  quarter  the  remaining  exiles  of  Kolophon.  Whether  any  new 
settlers  went  from  Athens  itself,  does  not  appear.  But  the  step  was 
intended  to  confer  a  sort  of  Hellenic  citizenship  and  recognized  col- 
lective personality  on  the  new-born  town  of  Notium;  without  which 
neither  its  theory  or  solemn  deputation  would  have  been  admitted  to 


SAL.ETHUS   SENT  TO  ATHENS.  597 

offer  public  sacrifice,  nor  its  private  citizens  to  contend  for  the  prize 
at  Olympic  and  other  great  festivals. 

Having  cleared  the  Asiatic  waters  from  the  enemies  of  Athens, 
Paches  returned  to  Lesbos,  reduced  the  towns  of  Pyrrha  and  Eresus, 
and  soon  found  himself  so  completely  master  both  of  Mitylene  and 
the  whole  island  as  to  be  able  to  send  home  the  larger  part  of  his 
force;  carrying  with  them  as  prisoners  those  Mityleutvaus  who  had 
been  deposited  in  Tenedos,  as  well  as  others  prominently  implicated 
in  the  late  revolt,  to  the  number  altogether  of  rather  more  than  a 
thousand.  The  Lacedaemonian  Salasthus,  being  recently  detected  in 
his  place  of  concealment,  was  included  among  the  prisoners  trans- 
mitted. 

Upon  the  fate  of  these  prisoners  the  Athenians  had  now  to  pro- 
nounce. They  entered  upon  the  discussion  in  a  temper  of  extreme 
wrath  and  vengeance.  As  to  Salasthus,  their  resolution  to  put  him 
to  death  was  unanimous  and  immediate.  They  turned  a  deaf  ear  to 
his  promises,  assuredly  delusive,  of  terminating  the  blockade  of  Pla- 
tsea  in  case  his  life  was  spared.  What  to  do  with  Mitylene  and  its 
inhabitants  was  a  point  more  doubtful,  and  was  submitted  to  formal 
debate  in  the  public  assembly. 

It  is  in  this  debate  that  Thucydides  first  takes  notice  of  Kleon,  who 
is,  however,  mentioned  by  Plutarch  as  rising  into  importance  some 
few  years  earlier,  during  the  lifetime  of  Perikles.  Under  the  great 
increase  of  trade  and  population  in  Athens  and  Peirceus  during  the 
last  forty  years,  a  new  class  of  politicians  seems  to  have  grown  up; 
men  engaged  in  various  descriptions  of  trade  and  manufacture,  who 
began  to  rival  more  or  less  in  importance  the  ancient  families  of  Attic 
proprietors.  This  change  was  substantially  analogous  to  that  which 
took  place  in  the  cities  of  Mediaeval  Europe,  when  the  merchants  and 
traders  of  the  various  guilds  gradually  came  to  compete  with,  and 
ultimately  supplanted,  the  patrician  families  in  whom  the  supremacy 
had  originally  resided.  In  Athens,  persons  of  ancient  family  and 
station  enjoyed  at  this  time  no  political  privilege — since  through  the 
reforms  of  Ephialtes  and  Perikles,  the  political  constitution  had  be- 
come thoroughly  democratical.  But  they  still  continued  to  form  the 
two  highest  classes  in  the  Solonian  census  founded  on  property — the 
Pentakosiomedimni,  and  the  Hippeis  or  Knights.  New  men  enriched 
by  trade  doubtless  got  into  these  classes,  but  probably  only  in  mi- 
nority, and  imbibed  the  feeling  of  the  class  as  they  found  it,  instead 
of  bringing  into  it  any  new  spirit.  Now  an  individual  Athenian  of 
this  class,  though  without  any  legal  title  to  preference,  yet  when  he 
Btood  forward  as  candidate  for  political  influence,  continued  to  be 
decidedly  preferred  and  welcomed  by  the  social  sentiment  at  Athens, 
which  preserved  in  its  spontaneous  sympathies  distinctions  effaced 
from  the  political  code.  Besides  this  place  ready  prepared  for  him  in 
the  public  sympathy,  especially  advantageous  at  the  outset  of  politi 
cal  life — he  found  himself  farther  borne  up  by  the  family  connec- 


ft«j8  FOURTH  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 

tions,  associations,  and  political  clubs,  etc.,  which  exercised  very 
great  influence  both  on  the  politi<  a  and  the  judicature  of  Alliens,  and 
of  which  he  became  a  member  as  a  matter  of  course.  Such  advan- 
tages were  doubtless  only  auxiliary,  carrying  a  man  up  to  a  certain 
poinl  of  influence,  bul  Leaving  him  to  achieve  the  resl  by  his  own 
personal  qualities  and  capacity.  Bui  their  effect  was  nevertheless 
very  real,  and  those  who.  without  possessing  them,  met  and  buffeted 
him  in  the  public  assembly,  contended  against  great  disadvantages. 
A  person  of  such  low  or  middling  station  obtained  no  favorable  pre- 
sumptions or  indulgence  on  the  part  of  the  public  to  meet  him  half- 
way; nor  did  he  possess  established  connections  to  encourage  first 
successes,  or  help  him  out  of  early  scrapes.  He  found  others  already 
in  possession  of  ascendency,  and  well-disposed  to  keep  down  new 
competitors;  so  that  he  had  to  win  his  own  way  unaided,  from  the  first 
step  to  the  last,  by  qualities  personal  to  himself;  by  assiduity  of 
attendance — by  acquaintance  with  business — by  powers  of  striking 
speech — and  withal  by  unflinching  audacity,  indispensable  to  enable 
him  to  bear  up  against  that  opposition  and  enmity  which  he  would 
incur  from  the  high-born  politicians  and  organized  party-clubs,  as 
soon  as  he  appeared  to  be  rising  into  importance. 

The  free  march  of  political  and  judicial  affairs  raised  up  several 
such  men,  during  the  years  beginning  and  immediately  preceding  the 
Peloponnesian  war.  Even  during  the  lifetime  of  Perikles,  they 
appear  to  have  risen  in  greater  or  less  numbers.  But  the  personal 
ascendency  of  that  great  man — who  combined  an  aristocratical  posi- 
tion with  a  strong  and  genuine  democratical  sentiment,  and  an 
enlarged  intellect  rarely  found  attached  to  either — impressed  a  pecul- 
iar character  on  Athenian  politics.  The  Athenian  world  was  divided 
into  his  partisans  and  his  opponents,  among  each  of  whom  there 
were  individuals  high-born  and  low-born — though  the  aristocratical 
party  properly  so  called,  the  majority  of  wealthy  and  high-born 
Athenians,  either  opposed  or  disliked  him.  It  is  about  two  years 
after  bis  death  that  we  begin  to  hear  of  a  new  class  of  politicians — 
Eukrates,  the  rope-seller — Kleon,  the  leather-seller — Lysikles,  the 
sheep-seller — Hyberbolus,  the  lamp-maker;  the  two  first,  of  whom 
must,  however,  have  been  already  well  known  as  speakers  in  the 
Ekklesia  even  during  the  lifetime  of  Perikles.  Among  them  all, 
the  most  distinguished  was  Kleon,  son  of  Kleaenetus. 

Kleon  acquired  his  first  importance  among  the  speakers  against 
Perikles,  so  that  he  would  thus  obtain  for  himself,  during  his  early 
political  career,  the  countenance  of  the  numerous  and  aristocratical 
anti-Perikleans.  He  is  described  by  Thucydides  in  general  terms  as 
a  person  of  the  most  violent  temper  and  character  in  Athens — as 
being  dishonest  in  his  calumnies,  and  virulent  in  his  invective  and 
accusation.  Aristophanes,  in  his  comedy  of  the  Knights,  reproduces 
these  features  with  others  new  and  distinct,  as  well  as  with  exaggera 
ted  details,  comic,  satirical,  and  contemptuous.    His  comedy  depicts 


CHARACTER  OF  KLEON.  599 

Kleon  in  the  point  of  view  in  which  he  would  appear  to  the  knights 
of  Athens — a  leather-dresser,  smelling  of  the  tan-yard — a  low-born 
brawler,  terrifying  opponents  by  the  violence  of  his  criminations,  the 
loudness  of  his  voice,  the  impudence  of  his  gestures — moreover  as 
venal  in  his  politics — threatening  men  with  accusations  and  then 
receiving  money  to  withdraw  them — a  robber  of  the  public  treasury 
—persecuting  merit  as  well  as  rank — and  courting  the  favor  of  the 
assembly  by  the  basest  and  most  guilty  cajolery.  The  general  attri- 
butes set  forth  by  Thucydides  (apart  from  Aristophanes,  who  does 
not  profess  to  write  history),  we  may  reasonably  accept — the  power- 
ful and  violent  invective  of  Kleon,  often  dishonest — together  with  his 
self-confidence  and  audacity  in  the  public  assembly  Men  of  the 
middling  class,  like  Kleon  and  Hyperbolus,  who  persevered  in  ad- 
dressing the  public  assembly  and  trying  to  take  a  leading  part  in  it, 
against  persons  of  greater  family  pretension  than  themselves,  were 
pretty  sure  to  be  men  of  more  than  usual  audacity.  Without  this 
quality,  they  would  never  have  surmounted  the  opposition  made  to 
them.  Tt  is  probable  enough  that  they  had  it  to  a  displeasing  excess 
— and  even  if  they  had  not,  the  same  measure  of  self-assumption 
which  in  AMdbiades  would  be  tolerated  from  his  rank  and  station, 
would  in  them  pass  for  insupportable  impudence.  Unhappily  we 
have  no  specimens  to  enable  us  to  appreciate  the  invective  of  Kleon. 
We  cannot  dete^Tnine  whether  it  was  more  virulent  than  that  of 
Demosthenes  and  JEschines,  seventy  years  afterward;  each  of  those 
eminent  orators  imputing  to  the  other  the  grossest  impudence,  cal- 
umny, perjury,  corruption,  loud  voice,  and  revolting  audacity  of 
manner  in  language  which  Kleon  can  hardly  have  surpassed  in  inten- 
sity of  vituperation,  though  he  doubtless  fell  immeasurably  short  of 
it  in  classical  finish.  Nor  can  we  even  tell  in  what  degree  Kleon's 
denunciations  of  the  veteran  Perikles  were  fiercer  than  those  memo- 
rable invectives  against  the  dd  age  of  Sir  Robert  Walpole,  with 
which  Lord  Chatham's  political  career  opened.  The  talent  for  invec- 
tive possessed  by  Kleon,  employed  first  against  Perikles,  would  be 
counted  as  great  impudence  by  the  partisans  of  that  illustrious  states- 
man, as  well  as  by  impartial  and  judicious  citizens.  But  among  the 
numerous  enemies  of  Perikles,  it  wo«jld  be  applauded  as  a  burst  of 
patriotic  indignation,  and  would  procure  for  the  orator  that  extrane- 
ous support  at  first,  which  would  sustaiu  jnm  until  he  acquired  his 
personal  hold  on  the  public  assembly. 

By  what  degrees  or  through  what  causes  that  hold  was  gradually 
increased,  we  do  not  know.  At  the  time  ■when  the  question  of  Mily- 
lene  came  on  for  discussion,  it  had  grown  into  a  sort  of  ascendency 
Which  Thucydides  describes  by  saying  that  Kleon  was  "at  that  time 
by  far  the  most  persuasive  speaker  in  the  eye=s  of  the  people."  The 
fact  of  Kleon's  great  power  of  speech  and  his  capacity  of  handling 
public  business  in  a  popular  manner,  is  better  attested  than  anything 
else  respecting  him,  because  it  depends  upon  two  witnesses  both  hos- 


600  FOURTH   TEAR  OF  THE  WAR 

tile  to  him — Thucydidee  and  Aristophanes.  The  assembly  and  (sue 
dikastery  were  Kleon's  theater  and  holding-ground:  for  the  Athenian 
people  taken  collectively  in  their  place  of  meeting— and  the  Athenian 

people  taken  individually — were  nol  always  the  same  person  and  had 
not  the  same  mode  of  judgment:  Demos  sitting  in  the  Pnyi  was  ;i 
different  man  from  Demos  sitting  at  home.  The  Lofty  combination 
of  qualities  possessed  by  Perikles  exercised  influence  over  both  one 

and  the  other,  but  Kleon  swayed  considerably  the  former,  without 
standing  high  in  the  esteem  of  the  latter. 

When  the  fate  of  Mitylene  and  Its  inhabitants  was  submitted  to  the 
Athenian  assembly,  Kleon  took  the  lead  in  the  discussion.  There 
never  was  a  theme  more  perfectly  suited  to  his  violent  temperament 
and  power  of  fierce  invective.  Taken  collectively,  the  case  of  Mity- 
lene presented  a  revolt  as  Inexcusable  and  aggravated  as  any  revolt 
could  lie.  Indeed  we  have  only  to  read  the  grounds  of  it,  as  set  forth 
by  the  Mitylensean  speakers  themselves  before  the  Peloponnesians  at, 
Olympia,  to  be  satisfied  that  such  a  proceeding,  when  looked  at  from 
tin-  Athenian  point  of  view,  would  he  supposed  to  justify,  and  even 
to  require,  the  very  highest  pitch  of  indignation.  The  Mitylenseans 
admit  not  only  that  they  have  no  ground  of  complaint  against  Athens, 
hut  that  they  have  been  well  and  honorably  treated  by  her,  with 
special  privilege.  But  they  fear  that  she  may  oppress  them  in  future: 
they  hate  the  very  principle  of  her  empire,  and  eagerly  instigate,  as 
well  as  aid,  her  enemies  to  subdue  her:  they  select  the  precise  mo- 
ment in  which  she  has  been  worn  down  by  a  fearful  pestilence,  inva- 
sion, and  cost  of  war.  Nothing  more  than  this  would  be  required  to 
kindle  the  most  intense  wrath  in  the  bosom  of  an  Athenian  patriot. 
But  there  was  yet  another  point  which  weighed  as  much  as  the  rest, 
if  not  more.  The  revolters  had  been  the  first  to  invite  a  Peloponne- 
sian  fleet  across  the  .<Egean,  and  the  first  to  proclaim,  both  to  Athens 
and  her  allies,  the  precarious  tenure  of  her  empire.  The  violent 
Kleon  would  on  this  occasion  find  in  the  assembly  an  audience  hardly 
less  violent  than  himself,  and  would  easily  be  able  to  satisfy  them 
that  anything  like  mercy  to  the  Mitylenseans  was  treason  to  Athens, 
He  proposed  to  apply  to  the  captive  city  the  penalties  tolerated  by 
the  custom  of  war,  in  their  harshest  and  fullest  measure:  to  kill  the 
whole  Mitylensean  male  population  of  military  age,  probably  about 
6,000  persons — and  to  sell  as  slaves  all  the  women  and  children. 
The  proposition,  though  strongly  opposed  by  Diodotus  and  others, 
was  sanctioned  and  passed  by  the  assembly,  and  a  trireme  was  forth- 
with dispatched  to  3Iitylene,  enjoining  Paches  to  put  it  in  execu- 
tion. 

Such  a  sentence  was,  in  principle,  nothing  more  than  a  very  rigor- 
ous application  of  received  laws  of  war.  Not  merely  the  reconquered 
rebel,  but  even  the  prisoner  of  war  (apart  from  any  special  conven 
tion)  was  at  the  mercy  of  his  conqueror  to  be  slain,  6old,  or  admitted 
to  ransom.     We  shall  find  the    Lacedaemonians  carrying  out   the 


THE  SECOND  ASSEMBLY.  601 

■. 

maxim  without  the  smallest  abatement  toward  the  Platsean  prisoners 
in  the  course  of  a  very  short  time.  And  doubtless  the  Athenian 
people — so  long  as  they  remained  in  assembly,  under  that  absorbing 
temporary  intensification  of  the  common  and  predominant  sentiment 
which  springs  from  the  mere  fact  of  multitude — and  so  long  as 
they  were  discussing  the  principle  of  the  case, — What  had  Mitylene 
deserved? — thought  only  of  this  view.  Less  than  the  most  rigorous 
measure  of  war  (they  would  conceive)  would  be  inadequate  to  the 
wrong  done  by  the  Mitylena?ans. 

But  when  the  assembly  broke  up — when  the  citizen,  no  longer 
wound  up  by  sympathizing  companions  and  animated  speakers  in 
the  Pnyx,  subsided  into  the  comparative  quiescence  of  individual 
life — when  the  talk  came  to  be,  not  about  the  propriety  of  passing 
such  a  resolution,  but  about  the  details  of  executing  it — a  sensible 
change,  and  marked  repentance  became  presently  visible.  We  must 
also  recollect — and  it  is  a  principle  of  no  small  moment  in  human 
affairs,  especially  among  a  democratical  people  like  the  Athenians, 
who  stand  charged  with  so  many  resolutions  passed  and  afterward 
unexecuted — that  the  sentiment  of  wrath  against  the  Mitylenaeans 
had  been  really  in  part  discharged  by  the  mere  passing  of  the  sen* 
tence,  quite  apart  from  its  execution;  just  as  a  furious  man  relieves 
himself  from  overboiling  anger  by  imprecations  against  others,  which 
he  would  himself  shrink  from  afterward  realizing.  The  Athenians, 
on  the  whole  the  most  humane  people  in  Greece  (though  humanity, 
according  to  our  ideas,  cannot  be  predicated  of  any  Greeks),  became 
sensible  that  they  had  sanctioned  a  cruel  and  frightful  decree.  Even 
the  captain  and  seamen  to  whom  it  was  given  to  carry,  set  forth  on 
their  voyage  with  mournful  repugnance.  The  Mitylenaean  envoys 
present  in  Athens  (who  had  probably  been  allowed  to  speak  in  the 
assembly  and  plead  their  own  cause),  together  with  those  Athenians 
who  had  been  proxeni  and  friends  of  Mitylene ;  and  the  minority 
generally  of  the  previous  assembly — soon  discerned,  and  did  their 
best  to  foster,  this  repentance ;  which  became  during  the  course  of 
the  same  evening  so  powerful  as  well  as  so  wide-spread,  that  the 
Strategi  acceded  to  the  prayer  of  the  envoys,  and  convoked  a  fresh 
assembly  for  the  morrow  to  reconsider  the  proceeding.  By  so  doing, 
they  committed  an  illegality,  and  exposed  themselves  to  the  chance 
of  impeachment.  But  the  change  of  feeling  among  the  people  was 
so  manifest  as  to  overbear  any  such  scruples. 

Though  Thucydides  has  given  us  only  a  short  summary  without 
any  speeches,  of  what  passed  in  the  first  assembly — yet  as  to  this 
second  assembly,  he  gives  us  at  length  the  speeches  both  of  Kleon 
and  Diodotus — the  two  principal  orators  of  'the  first  also.  We  may 
be  sure  that  this  second  assembly  was  in  all  points  one  of  the  most 
interesting  and  anxious  of  the  whole  war;  and  though  we  cannot 
certainly  determine  what  were  the  circumstances  which  determined 
Thucydides  in  his  selection  of  speeches,  yet  this  cause,  as  well  as  the 


602       FOURTH  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR 

signal  defeat  of  Kleon.  whom  he  disliked,  may  probably  be  presumed 
to  have  influenced  him  here. 

That  orator  coming  forward  to  defend  his  prosposition  passed  on 
the  preceding  day,  denounced  in  terms  of  indignation  the  unwise 
tenderness  and  scruples  of  the  people,  who  could  not  bear  in  in  at 

their  subject-allies,  according  to  the  plain  reality,  as  men  held  only 
by  naked  fear.  He  dwelt  upon  the  mischief  and  folly  of  reversing 
on  one  day  what  had  been  decided  on  the  day  preceding;  also  upon 
the  guilty  ambition  of  orators,  who  sacrificed   the   most    valuable 

interests  of  the  commonwealth,  either  to  pecuniary  gains,  or  to  the 
personal  credit  of  speaking  with  effect,  triumphing  over  rivals,  and 
setting  up  their  own  fancies  in  place  of  fact  and  reality.  He  depre- 
cated the  mistaken  encouragement  given  to  such  delusions  by  a 
public  "wise  beyond  what  was  written,"  who  came  to  the  assembly. 
not  to  apply  their  good  sense  in  judging  of  public  matters,  but  men  ly 
for  the  delight  of  hearing  speeches,  lie  restated  the  heinous  and 
unprovoked  wrong  committed  by  the  Mitylenseans — and  the  grounds 
for  inflicting  upon  them  that  maximum  of  punishment  which  "jus- 
tice "  enjoined.  He  called  for  "justice"  against  them,  nothing  less, 
but  nothing  more;  warning  the  assembly  that  the  imperial  necessities 
of  Athens  essentially  required  the  constant  maintenance  of  a  sinii- 
ment  of  fear  in  the  minds  of  unwilling  subjects,  and  that  they  must 
prepare  to  see  their  empire  pass  away  if  they  suffered  themselves  to 
be  guided  either  by  compassion  for  those  who,  if  victors,  would 
have  no  compassion  on  them — or  by  unseasonable  moderation  toward 
those  who  would  neither  feel  nor  requite  it — or  by  the  mere  impres- 
sion of  seductive  discourses.  Justice  against  the  Mitylenseans,  not 
less  than  the  strong  political  interests  of  Athens,  required  the  inflic- 
tion of  the  sentence  decreed  on  the  day  preceding. 

The  harangue  of  Kleon  is  in  many  respects  remarkable.  If  we  are 
surprised  to  find  a  man,  whose  whole  importance  resided  in  his 
tongue,  denouncing  so  severely  the  license  and  the  undue  influence 
of  speech  in  the  public  assembly,  we  must  recollect  that  Kleon  had 
the  advantage  of  addressing  himself  to  the  intense  prevalent  senti- 
ment of  the  moment:  that  he  could  therefore  pass  oil'  the  dictates  of 
this  sentiment  as  plain,  downright,  honest  sense  and  patriotism — 
while  the  opponents,  speaking  against  the  reigning  sentiment  and 
therefore  driven  to  collateral  argument,  circumlocution,  and  more  or 
less  of  maneuver,  might  be  represented  as  mere  clever  sophists, 
showing  their  talents  in  making  the  worse  appear  the  better  reason 
— if  not  actually  bribed,  at  least  unprincipled  and  without  any  sin 
cere  moral  conviction.  As  this  is  a  mode  of  dealing  with  questions, 
both  of  public  concern  and  of  private  morality,  not  Less  common  at 
present  than  it  was  in  the  time  of  the  Peloponnesian  war — to  seize 
upon  some  strong  and  tolerably  wide-spread  sentiment  among  the 
public,  to  treat  the  dictates  of  that  sentiment  as  plain  common  sense 
and  obvious  right,  and  then   to  shut  out  all  rational  estimate  of 


SPEECH  OF  DIODOTUS  603 

coming  good  and  evil  as  if  it  were  unholy  or  immoral,  or  at  best 
mere  uncanciid  subtlety — we  may  well  notice  a  case  in  which  Kleon 
employs  it  to  support  a  proposition  now  justly  regarded  as  barbarous. 

Applying  our  modern  views  to  this  proposition,  indeed,  the  prev- 
alent sentiment  would  not  only  not  be  in  favor  of  Kleon,  but  would 
be  irresistibly  in  favor  of  his  opponents.  To  put  to  death  in  cold 
blood  some  6,000  persons,  would  so  revolt  modern  feelings,  as  to 
overbalance  all  considerations  of  past  misconduct  in  the  persons  to  be 
condemned.  Nevertheless  the  speech  of  Diodotus,  who  followed  and 
opposed  Kleon,  not  only  contains  no  appeal  to  any  such  merciful 
predispositions,  but  even  positively  disclaims  appealing  to  them :  the 
orator  deprecates,  not  less  than  Kleon,  the  influence  of  compassionate 
sentiment,  or  of  a  spirit  of  mere  compromise  and  moderation.  He 
further  discards  considerations  of  justice  or  the  analogies  of  criminal 
judicature — and  rests  his  opposition  altogether  upon  reasons  of 
public  prudence,  bearing  upon  the  future  welfare  and  security  of 
Athens. 

He  begins  by  vindicating  the  necessity  of  reconsidering  the  resolu- 
tion just  passed,  and  insists  on  the  mischief  of  deciding  so  important 
a  question  in  haste  or  under  strong  passion.  He  enters  a  protest 
against  the  unwarrantable  insinuations  of  corruption  or  self-conceit 
by  which  Kleon  had  sought  to  silence  or  discredit  his  opponents;  and 
then,  taking  up  the  question  on  the  ground  of  public  wisdom  and 
prudence,  he  proceeds  to  show  that  the  rigorous  sentence  decreed  on 
the  preceding  day  was  not  to  be  defended.  That  sentence  would  not 
prevent  any  other  among  the  subject-allies  from  revolting,  if  they 
saw,  or  fancied  that  they  saw,  a  fair  chance  of  success:  but  it  might 
perhaps  drive  them,  if  once  embarked  in  revolt,  to  persist  even  to 
desperation,  and  bury  themselves  under  the  ruins  of  their  city. 
While  every  means  ought  to  be  employed  to  prevent  them  from 
revolting,  by  precautions  beforehand,  it  was  a  mistaken  reckoning 
to  try  to  deter  them  by  enormity  of  punishment,  inflicted  afterward 
upon  such  as  were  reconquered.  In  developing  this  argument,  the 
speaker  gives  some  remarkable  views  on  the  theory  of  punishment 
generally,  and  on  the  small  addition  obtained  in  the  way  of  prevent- 
ive effect,  even  by  the  greatest  aggravation  of  the  suffering  inflicted 
upon  the  condemned  criminal — views  which  might  have  passed  as 
rare  and  profound  even  down  to  the  last  century.  And  he  further 
supports  his  argument  by  emphatically  setting  forth  the  impolicy  of 
confounding  the  Mitylenoean  Demos  in  the  same  punishment  with 
their  oligarchy:  the  revolt  had  been  the  act  exclusively  of  the  latter, 
and  the  former  had  not  only  taken  no  part  in  it,  but  as  soon  as  they 
obtained  possession  of  arms,  had  surrendered  the  city  spontaneously. 
In  all  the  allied  cities,  it  was  the  commons  who  were  well-affected  to 
Athens,  and  upon  whom  her  hold  chiefly  depended  against  the 
doubtful  fidelity  of  the  oligarchies:  but  this  feeling  could  not  possibly 
contiuue,  if  it  were  now  seen  that  all  the  Mitylenaeans  indiscrim- 


604  FOURTH  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 

inately  were  confounded  in  one  common  destruction.  Diodotus  con- 
cludes by  recommending  thai  those  Mitylenseans  whom  Paches  had 

sent  to  Alliens  as  chiefs  of  the  revolt  should  he  put  upon  their  trii  1 
separately,  but  that  the  remaining  population  should  be  spared. 

This  speech  is  that  of  a  man  who  feels  that  he  has  the  reigning  and 
avowed  sentiment  of  the  audience  against,  hitn,  and  that  he  must 
therefore  win  his  way  by  appeals  to  their  reason.  The  same  appeals 
however  might  have  been  made,  and  perhaps  had  been  made,  during 
the  preceding  discussion,  without  success.  But  Diodotus  knew  Ilia! 
the  reigning  sentiment,  though  still  ostensibly  predominant,  had  been 
silently  undermined  during  the  last  few  hours,  and  that  the  reaction 
toward  pity  and  moderation,  which  had  been  growing  up  under  it, 
would  work  in  favor  of  his  arguments,  though  he  might  disclaim  all 
intention  of  invoking  its  aid.  After  several  other  discourses,  both  for 
and  against,  the  assembly  came  to  a  vote,  and  the  proposition  of 
Diodotus  was  adopted;  but  adopted  by  so  small  a  majority,  that  the 
decision  seemed  at  first  doubtful. 

The  trireme  carrying  the  first  vote  had  started  the  day  before,  and 
was  already  twenty-four  hours  on  its  way  to  IVIitylene.  A  second 
trireme  was  immediately  put  to  sea  bearing  the  new  decree;  yet  noth- 
ing short  of  superhuman  exertions  could  enable  it  to  reach  the  con- 
demned city  before  the  terrific  sentence  now  on  its  way  might  be 
actually  in  course  of  execution.  The  Mitylensean  envoys  stored  the 
vessel  well  with  provisions,  promising  large  rewards  to  the  crew  if 
they  arrived  in  time.  An  intensity  of  effort  was  manifested,  without 
parallel  in  the  history  of  Athenian  seamanship.  The  oar  was  never 
once  relaxed  between  Athens  and  Mitylene — the  rowers  merely  taking 
turns  for  short  intervals  of  rest,  with  refreshment,  of  barley-meal 
steeped  in  wine  and  oil,  swallowed  on  their  seats.  Luckily  there  was 
no  unfavorable  wind  to  retard  them:  but  the  object  would  have  been 
defeated  if  it  had  not  happened  that  the  crew  of  the  first  trireme 
were  as  slow  and  averse  in  the  transmission  of  their  rigorous  man- 
date as  those  of  the  second  were  eager  for  the  delivery  of  the  reprieve 
in  time.  And  after  all,  it  came  only  just  in  time.  The  first  trireme 
had  arrived,  the  order  for  execution  was  actually  in  the  hands  of 
Paches,  and  his  measures  were  already  preparing.  So  near  was  the 
Mitylena?an  population  to  this  wholesale  destruction:  so  near  was 
Athens  to  the  actual  perpetration  of  an  enormity  which  would  have 
raised  against  her  throughout  Greece  a  sentiment  of  exasperation 
more  deadly  than  that  which  she  afterward  incurred  even  from  the 
proceedings  at  Melos,  Skione,  and  elsewhere.  Had  the  execution 
been  realized,  the  person  who  would  have  suffered  most  by  it,  and 
most  deservedly,  would  have  been  the  proposer  Kleon.  For  if  the 
reaction  in  Athenian  sentiment  was  so  immediate  and  sensible  after 
the  mere  passing  of  the  sentence,  far  more  violent  would  it  have  been 
when  they  learnt  that  the  deed  had  been  irrevocably  done,  and  when 
all  its  painful  details  wore  presented  to  their  imaginations :  and  Kleon 


DEATH   OF  PACIIES.  005 

would  have  been  held  responsible  as  the  author  of  that  which  had  so 
disgraced  them  in  their  own  eyes.  As  the  case  turned  out,  he  was 
fortunate  enough  to  escape  this  danger;  and  his  proposition,  to  put 
to  death  those  Mitylenseaus  whom  Paches  had  sent  home  as  the  active 
revolting  party,  was  afterward  adopted  and  executed.  It  doubtless 
appeared  so  moderate,  after  the  previous  decree  passed  but  rescinded, 
as  to  be  adopted  with  little  resistance,  and  to  provoke  no  after- 
repentance:  yet  the  men  so  slain  were  rather  more  than  1000  in 
number. 

Besides  this  sentence  of  execution,  the  Athenians  razed  the  fortifi- 
cations of  Mitylene,  and  took  possession  of  all  her  ships  of  war.  In 
lieu  of  tribute,  they  further  established  a  new  permanent  distribution 
of  the  land  of  the  island ;  all  except  Methymna,  which  had  remained 
faithful  to  them.  They  distributed  it  into  3,000  lots,  of  which  300 
were  reserved  for  consecration  to  the  gods,  and  the  remainder  as- 
signed to  Athenian  kleruchs,  or  proprietary  settlers,  chosen  by  lot 
among  the  citizens;  the  Lesbian  proprietors  still  remaining  on  the 
land  as  cultivating  tenants,  and  paying  to  the  Athenian  kleruch  an 
annual  rent  of  two  minse  (about  seven  pounds  sixteen  shillings  ster- 
ling) for  each  lot.  We  should  have  been  glad  to  learn  more  about 
this  new  land-settlement  than  the  few  words  of  the  historian  suffice 
to  explain.  It  would  seem  that  2,700  Athenian  citizens  with  their 
families  must  have  gone  to  reside,  for  the  time  at  least,  in  Lesbos — as 
kleruchs :  that  is,  without  abnegating  their  rights  as  Athenian  citizens, 
and  without  being  exonerated  either  from  Athenian  taxation  or  from 
personal  military  service.  But  it  seems  certain  that  these  men  did 
not  continue  long  to  reside  in  Lesbos.  We  may  even  suspect  that  the 
kleruchic  allotment  of  the  island  must  have  been  subsequently  abro- 
gated. There  was  a  strip  on  the  opposite  mainland  of  Asia,  which 
had  hitherto  belonged  to  Mitylene;  this  was  now  separated  from  that 
town,  and  henceforward  enrolled  among  the  tributary  subjects  of 
Athens. 

To  the  misfortunes  of  Mitylene  belongs,  as  a  suitable  appendix, 
the  fate  of  Paches,  the  Athenian  commander,  whose  perfidy  at 
Notium  has  been  recently  recounted.  It  appears  that,  having  con- 
tracted a  passion  for  two  beautiful  free  women  at  Mitylene,  Hellanis 
and  Lamaxis,  he  slew  their  husbands,  and  got  possession  of  them  by 
force.  Possibly  they  may  have  had  private  friends  at  Athens,  which 
must,  of  course,  have  been  the  case  with  many  Mitylenaean  families. 
At  all  events  they  repaired  thither,  bent  on  obtaining  redress  for  this 
outrage,  and  brought  their  complaint  against  Paches  before  the 
Athenian  dikastery,  in  that  trial  of  accountability  to  which  every 
officer  was  liable  at  the  close  of  his  command*.  So  profound  was  the 
.sentiment  which  their  case  excited,  in  this  open  and  numerous  assem- 
bly of  Athenian  citizens,  that  the  guilty  commander,  not  waiting  for 
sentence,  slew  himself  with  his  sword  in  open  court. 

The  surrender  of  Platsea  to  the  Lacedaemonians  took  place  not 


606  FOURTH  YEAR  OF  TIIE  WAR. 

long  after  Unit  of  Mitylene  to  the  Athenians — somewhat  Inter  in  the 
same  summer.  Though  the  e  cape  i  E  one  half  of  the  garrison  had 
made  the  provisions  last  longer  for  the  rest,  still  their  "whole  stock 
had  now  ciinic  to  be  cxhausti  (I,  so  that  the  remaining  defenders  were 
enfeebled,  and  on  the  point  of  perithing  by  starvation.  The  Lace- 
deemonian  commander  of  the  blockading  force,  knowing  their 
defenseless  condition,  could  easily  Lave  taken  the  town  by  Btorm, 
had  he  not  been  forbidden  by  <  \  press  orders  from  Sparta.  For  the 
Spartan  government,  calculating  that  peace  mighl  one  day  be  c<  d 
eluded  with  Athens  on  terms  of  mutual  cession  of  places  acquired  by 
war,  wished  to  acquire  Platsea,  not  by  force,  hut  by  capitulate  a  and 
voluntary  surrender,  which  would  serve  as  an  excuse  for  not  giving 
it  up:  though  such  a  distinction,  between  capture  by  force  and  by 
capitulation,  not  admissible  in  modern  diplomacy,  was  afterward 
found  to  tell  against  the  Lacedaemonians  quite  as  much  as  in  their 
favor.  Acting  upon  these  orders,  the  Lacedaemonian  commander 
sent  in  a  herald,  summoning  the  Platseans  to  surrender  voluntarily, 
and  submit  themselves  to  the  Lacedaemonians  as  judges— with  a 
stipulation  "that  the  wrong-doers  should  be  punished,  but  thai  none 
should  be  punished  unjustly."  To  the  besieged,  in  their  state  of 
hopeless  starvation,  all  terms  were  nearly  alike,  and  they  accordingly 
surrendered  the  city.  After  a  few  days'  interval,  during  which  they 
received  nourishment  from  the  blockading  army,  five  persons  arriv<  d 
from  Sparta  to  sit  in  judgment  upon  their  fate — one  Aristomenidas,  a 
Herakleid  of  the  regal  family. 

The  five  Spartans  having  taken  their  seat  as  judges,  doubtless  in 
full  presence  of  the  blockading  army,  and  especially  with  the  The- 
bans,  the  great  enemies  of  Plata?a,  by  their  side — the  prisoners  taken, 
200  Platseans  and  twenty-five  Athenians,  were  brought  up  for  trial 
or  sentence.  No  accusation  was  preferred  againsl  them  by  any  one: 
but  the  simple  question  was  put  to  them  by  the  judges — "Have  you, 
during  the  present  war,  rendered  any  service  to  the  Lacedaemonians, 
or  to  their  allies?"  The  Platseans  "were  confounded  at  a  question 
alike  unexpected  and  preposterous.  It  admitted  but  of  one  answer 
— but  before  returning  any  categorical  answer  at  all,  they  entreated 
permission  to  plead  their  cause  at  length.  In  spite  of  the  opposition 
of  the  Thebans,  their  request  was  granted.  Astymachus  and  Lakon 
(the  latter,  proxenus  of  Sparta  at  Platsea)  were  appointed  to  speak  on 
behalf  of  the  body.  Possibly  both  these  delegates  may  have  spoken : 
if  so,  Thucydides  has  blended  the  two  speeches  iuto  one. 

A  more  desperate  position  cannot  be  imagined.  The  interrogatory 
was  expressly  so  framed  as  to  exclude  allusion  to  any  facts  preceding 
the  Peloponnesian  war.  But  the  speakers,  though  fully  conscious 
how  slight  was  their  chance  of  success,  disregarded  the  limits  of  the 
question  itself,  and  while  upholding  with  unshaken  courage  the  dig- 
nity of  their  little  city,  neglected  no  topic  which  could  touch  the 
gvmpathies  of  their  judges.     After  remonstrating  against  the  mere 


REPLY   OF  THE  THEBANS.  607 

mockery  of  trial  and  judgment  to  which  they  were  submitted,  they 
appealed  to  the  Hellenic  sympathies,  and  lofty  reputation  for  com- 
manding virtue,  of  the  Lacedaemonians.  Tliey  adverted  to  the  first 
alliance  of  Plataea  with  Athens,  concluded  at  the  recommendation  of 
the  Lacedaemonians  themselves,  who  had  then  declined,  though  for- 
mally solicited,  to  undertake  the  protection  of  the  town  against 
Theban  oppression.  They  next  turned  tp  the  Persian  war,  wherein 
Platsean  patriotism  toward  Greece  was  not  less  conspicuous  than 
Theban  treason — to  the  victory  gained  over  the  Persians  on  their  soil, 
whereby  it  had  become  hallowed  under  the  promises  of  Pausanias, 
and  by  solemn  appeals  to  the  local  gods.  From  the  Persian  war  they 
passed  on  to  the  flagitious  attack  made  by  the  Thebans  on  Plataea,  in 
the  midst  of  the  truce.  They  did  not  omit  to  remind  the  judges  of 
an  obligation  personal  to  Sparta — the  aid  which  they  had  rendered, 
along  with  the  Athenians,  to  Sparta,  when  pressed  by  the  revolt  of 
the  Helots  at  Ithome.  This  speech  is  as  touching  as  any  which  we 
find  in  Thucydides;  the  skill  of  it  consisting  in  the  frequency  with 
which  the  hearers  are  brought  back,  time  after  time,  and  by  well- 
managed  transitions,  to  these  same  topics.  And  such  was  the 
impression  which  it  seemed  to  make  on  the  five  Lacedaemonian 
judges,  that  the  Thebans  near  at  hand  found  themselves  under  the 
necessity  of  making  a  reply  to  it:  although  we  see  plainly  that  the 
whole  scheme  of  proceeding — the  formal  and  insulting  question,  as 
well  as  the  sentence  destined  to  follow  upon  answer  given — had  been 
settled  beforehand  between  them  and  the  Lacedaemonians. 

The  Theban  speakers  contended  that  the  Plataeans  had  deserved, 
and  brought  upon  themselves  by  their  own  fault,  the  enmity  of 
Thebes — that  they  had  stood  forward  earnestly  against  the  Persians, 
only  because  Athens  had  done  so  too — and  that  the  merit,  whatever 
it  might  be,  which  they  had  thereby  acquired,  was  counterbalanced 
and  canceled  by  their  having  allied  themselves  with  Athens  after- 
ward for  the  oppression  and  enslavement  of  the  ^Eginetans,  and  of 
other  Greeks  equally  conspicuous  for  zeal  against  Xerxes,  and  equally 
entitled  to  protection  under  the  promises  of  Pausanias.  The  Thebans 
went  on  to  vindicate  their  nocturnal  surprise  of  Plataea,  by  maintain- 
ing that  they  had  been  invited  by  the  most  respectable  citizens  of  the 
town,  who  were  anxious  only  to  bring  back  Plataea  from  its  alliance 
with  a  stranger  to  its  natural  Boeotian  home — and  that  they  had 
abstained  from  anything  like  injurious  treatment  of  the  inhabitants, 
until  constrained  to  use  force  in  their  own  defense.  They  then 
reproached  the  Plataeans,  in  their  turn,  with  that  breach  of  faith 
whereby,  ultimately,  the  Theban  prisoners  in  the  town  had  been  put 
to  death.  And  while  they  excused  their  alliance  with  Xerxes,  at  the 
time  of  the  Persian  invasion,  by  affirming  that  Thebes  was  then 
under  a  dishonest  party- oligarchy,  who  took  this  side  for  their  own 
factious  purposes,  and  carried  the  people  with  them  by  force — they 
at  the  same  time  charged  the  Plataeans  with  permanent   treason 


608  FOURTH   YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 

against  the  Boeotian  customs  and  brotherhood.  All  this  was  farther 
enforced  by  setting  forth  the  claims  of  Thebes  to  the  gratitude  of 
Lacedsemon,  both  for  having  brought  Boeotia  into  the  Lacedaemonian 

alliance  at  the  time  of  the  battle  of  Koroneia,  and  having  furnished 
so  large  a  portion  of  the  common  force  in  the  war  then  going  on. 

The  discourse  of  the  Thebans,  inspired  by  bitter,  and,  as  yet, 
unsatisfied  hatred  against  Plataea,  proved  effectual:  or,  rather,  it  was 

superfluous — the  minds  of  the  Lacedaemonians  having  before  been 

made  up.  After  the  proposition,  twice  made  by  Arehidamus  to  the 
Platseans,  inviting  them  to  remain  neutral,  and  even  offering  to 
guarantee  their  neutrality — after  the  solemn  apologetic  protest  ten- 
dered by  him,  upon  their  refusal,  to  the  gods,  before  he  began  the 
siege — the  Lacedemonians  conceived  themselves  exonerated  from  a./ 
obligation  to  respect  the  sanctity  of  the  place;  looking  upon  the 
inhabitants  as  having  voluntarily  renounced  their  inviolability,  and 
sealed  their  own  ruin.  Hence  the  importance  attached  to  that  pro- 
test, and  the  emphatic  detail  with  which  it  is  set  forth  in  Thucydides. 
The  five  judges,  as  their  only  reply  to  the  two  harangues,  again 
called  the  Platseans  before  them,  and  repeated  to  every  one  of  them, 
individually,  the  same  question  which  had  before  been  put.  Each 
of  them,  as  he  successively  replied  in  the  negative,  was  taken  away 
and  killed,  together  with  the  twenty-five  Athenian  prisoners.  The 
women  captured  were  sold  as  slaves:  and  the  town  and  territory  of 
Plataea  were  handed  over  to  the  Thebans,  who  at  first  established  in 
them  a  few  oligarchical  Plataean  exiles,  together  with  some  Megarian 
exiles — but  after  a  few  months,  recalled  this  step,  and  blotted  out 
Plataea,  as  a  separate  town  and  territory,  from  the  muster-roll  of 
Hellas.  Having  pulled  down  all  the  private  buildings,  they  employed 
the  materials  to  build  a  vast  barrack  all  round  the  Herseum,  or  temple 
of  Here,  200  feet  iu  every  direction,  with  apartments  of  two  stories 
above  and  below;  partly  as  accommodation  for  visitors  to  the  temple, 
partly  as  an  abode  for  the  tenant-farmers,  or  graziers  who  were  to 
occupy  the  land.  A  new  temple,  of  100  feet  in  length,  was  also 
built  in  honor  of  Here,  and  ornamented  with  couches  prepared  from 
the  brass  and  iron  furniture  found  in  the  private  houses  of  the 
Plataeans.  The  Plataean  territory  was  let  out  for  ten  years,  as  public 
property  belonging  to  Thebes,  and  was  hired  by  private  Theban  cul- 
tivators. 

Such  was  the  melancholy  fate  of  Plataea,  after  sustaining  a  blockade 
of  about  two  years.  Its  identity  and  local  traditions  were  extin- 
guished, and  the  sacrifices,  in  honor  of  the  deceased  victors  who  had 
fought  under  Pausanias,  suspended — which  the  Plataean  speakers  had 
urged  upon  the  Lacedsemoniaus  as  an  impiety  not  to  be  tolerated,  and 
which,  perhaps,  the  latter  would  hardly  have  consented  to  under  any 
other  circumstances,  except  from  an  anxious  desire  of  conciliating  tne 
Thebans  in  their  prominent  antipathy.  It  is  in  this  way  that  Thucyd- 
ides explains  the  conduct  of  Sparta,  which  he  pronounces  to  have 


CIRCUMSTANCES  OF  KORKYRA.  609 

been  rigorous  in  the  extreme.  And  in  truth  it  was  more  rigorous, 
considering  only  the  principle  of  the  case,  and  apart  from  the  number 
of  victims,  than  even  the  first  unexecuted  sentence  of  Athens  against 
the  Mitylenaeans.  For  neither  Sparta,  nor  even  Thebes,  had  any  fair 
pretense  for  considering  Platsea  as  a  revolted  town,  whereas  Mitylene. 
was  a  city  which  had  revolted  under  circumstances  peculiarly  offen- 
sive to  Athens.  Moreover,  Sparta  promised  trial  and  justice  to  the 
Platseans  on  their  surrender:  Paches  promised  nothing  to  the  Mity- 
lenaeans except  that  their  fate  should  be  reserved  for  the  decision  of 
the  Athenian  people.  This  little  city — interesting  from  its  Hellenic 
patriotism,  its  grateful  and  tenacious  attachments,  and  its  unmerited 
suffering — now  existed  only  in  the  persons  of  its  citizens  harbored  at 
Athens.  We  shall  find  it  hereafter  restored,  destroyed  again,  and 
finally  again  restored:  so  checkered  was  the  fate  of  a  little  Grecian 
state  swept  away  by  the  contending  politics  of  greater  neighbors.  The 
slaughter  of  the  twenty-five  Athenian  prisoners,  like  that  of  Salaethus 
by  the  Athenians,  was  not  beyond  the  rigor  admitted  and  tolerated," 
though  not  always  practiced  on  both  sides — toward  prisoners  of 
war. 

We  have  now  gone  through  the  circumstances,  painfully  illustrat- 
ing the  manners  of  the  age,  which  followed  on  the  surrender  of  Mity- 
lene  and  Plataea.  We  next  pass  to  the  west  of  Greece — the  island  of 
Korkyra — where  we  shall  find  scenes  not  less  bloody,  and  even  more 
revolting. 

It  has  been  already  mentioned  that  in  the  naval  combats  between 
the  Corinthians  and  Korkyraeans  during  the  year  before  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  war,  the  former  had  captured  250  Korkyraean  prisoners,  men 
of  the  first  rank  and  consequence  in  the  island.  Instead  of  following 
the  impulse  of  blind  hatred  in  slaughtering  their  prisoners,  the  Cor- 
inthians displayed,  if  not  greater  humanity,  at  least  a  more  long- 
sighted calculation.  They  had  treated  the  prisoners  well,  and  made 
every  effort  to  gain  them  over,  with  a  view  of  employing  them  on 
the  first  opportunity  to  effect  a  revolution  in  the  island — to  bring  it 
into  alliance  with  Corinth,  and  disconnect  it  from  Athens.  Such  an 
opportunity  appears  first  to  have  occurred  during  the  winter  or  spring 
of  the  present  year,  while  both  Mitylene  and  Plataea  were  under 
blockade;  probably  about  the  time  when  Alkidas  departed  for  Ionia, 
and  when  it  was  hoped  that  not  only  Mitylene  would  be  relieved,  but 
the  neighboring  dependencies  of  Athens  excited  to  revolt,  and  her 
whole  attention  thus  occupied  in  that  quarter.  Accordingly,  the 
Korkyraean  prisoners  were  then  sent  home  from  Corinth,  nominally 
under  a  heavy  ransom  of  800  talents,  for  which  those  Korkyraean 
citizens  who  acted  as  proxeni  to  Corinth  made  themselves  respon- 
sible. The  proxeni,  lending  themselves  thus  to  the  deception,  were 
doubtless  participant  in  the  entire  design. 

But  it  was  soon  seen  in  what  form  the  ransom  was  really  to  be 
paid.     The  new-comers,  probably  at  first  heartily  welcomed  after  so 
H.  G.  II.— 20 


610  FOURTH   YEAR  OP  THE  WAR. 

long  a  detention,  employed  all  their  influence,  combined  with  the 
most  active  personal  canvass,  to  brine:  about  a  complete  rupture  of 
alliance  with  Athens.  Intimation  being  sent  to  Athens  of  what  was 
going  on,  an  Athenian  trireme  arrived  with  envoys  to  try  and  defeat 
these  maneuvers;  while  a  Corinthian  trireme  also  brought  envoys 
from  Corinth  to  aid  the  views  of  the  opposite  party.  The  mere  pres- 
ence of  Corinthian  envoys  indicated  a  change  in  the  political  feeling 
of  the  island.  But  still  more  conspicuous  did  this  change  become 
when  a  formal  public  assembly,  alter  hearing  both  envoys,  decided 
that  Korkyra  would  maintain  her  alliance  with  Athens  according  to 
the  limited  terms  of  simple  mutual  defense  originally  stipulated;  but 
would  at  the  same  time  be  in  relations  of  friendship  with  the  Pelo- 
ponnesians,  as  she  had  been  before  the  Epidamnian  quarrel.  Since 
that  event,  however,  the  alliance  between  Athens  and  Korkyra  had 
become  practically  more  intimate,  and  the  Korkyraean  fleet  had  aided 
the  Athenians  in  the  invasion  of  Peloponnesus.  Accordingly,  the 
resolution  now  adopted  abandoned  the  present  to  go  back  to  the  past 
— and  to  a  past  which  could  not  be  restored. 

Looking  to  the  war  then  raging  between  Athens  and  the  Pelopon- 
nesians,  such  a  declaration  was  self-contradictory.  It  was  intended 
by  the  oligarchical  party  only  as  a  step  to  a  more  complete  revolu- 
tion, both  foreign  and  domestic.  They  followed  it  up  by  a  political 
prosecution  against  Peithias,  the  citizen  of  greatest  personal  influence 
among  the  people,  who  acted  by  his  own  choice  as  proxenus  to  the 
Athenians.  They  accused  him  of  practicing  to  bring  Korkyra  into 
slavery  to  Athens.  What  were  the  judicial  institutions  of  the  island, 
under  which  he  was  tried,  we  do  not  know:  but  he  was  acquitted  of 
the  charge.  He  then  revenged  himself  by  accusing  in  his  turn  five 
of  the  richest  among  his  oligarchical  prosecutors,  of  the  crime  of 
sacrilege — of  having  violated  the  sanctity  of  the  sacred  grove  of  Zeus 
and  Aikinous,  by  causing  stakes,  for  their  vine-props,  to  be  cut  in  it. 
This  was  an  act  distinctly  forbidden  by  law,  under  a  penalty  of  a 
stater  or  four  drachmas  for  every  stake  so  cut.  But  it  is  no  uncommon 
phenomenon,  even  in  societies  politically  better  organized  than  Kor- 
kyra, to  find  laws  existing  and  unrepealed,  yet  habitually  violated, 
sometimes  even  by  everyone,  but  still  oftener  by  men  of  wealth  and 
power,  whom  most  people  would  be  afraid  to  prosecute.  Moreover, 
in  this  case,  no  individual  was  injured  by  the  act,  so  that  any  one 
who  came  forward  to  prosecute  would  incur  the  odium  of  an 
informer — which  probably  Peithias  might  not  have  chosen  to  brave 
under  ordinary  circumstances,  though  he  thought  himself  justified  in 
adopting  this  mode  of  retaliation  against  those  who  had  prosecuted 
him.  The  language  of  Thucydides  implies  that  the  fact  was  not 
denied :  nor  is  there  any  difficulty  in  conceiving  that  these  rich  men 
may  have  habitually  resorted  to  the  sacred  property  for  vine-stakes. 
On  being  found  guilty  and  condemned,  they  cast  themselves  as  sup- 
pliants at  the  temples,  and  entreated  the  indulgence  of  being  allowed 


ASSASSINATION  OF  PEITHIAS.  611 

to  pay  the  fine  by  installments.  But  Peithias,  then  a  member  of  the 
(annual)  senate,  to  whom  the  petition  was  referred,  opposed  It,  and 
caused  its  rejection,  leaving  the  law  to  take  its  course.  It  was,  more- 
over, understood  that  he  was  about  to  avail  himself  of  his  character 
of  senator — and  of  his  increased  favor,  probably  arising  from  the 
recent  judicial  acquittal — to  propose  in  the  public  assembly  a  reversal 
of  the  resolution  recently  passed;  together  with  a  new  resolution,  to 
jecognize  only  the  same  friends  and  the  same  enemies  as  Athens. 

Pressed  by  the  ruinous  fine  upon  the  five  persons  condemned,  as 
well  as  by  the  fear  that  Peithias  might  carry  his  point  and  thus  com- 
pletely defeat  their  project  of  Corinthian  alliance,  the  oligarchical 
party  resolved  to  carry  their  point  by  violence  and  murder.  They 
collected  a  party  armed  witli  daggers,  burst  suddenly  into  the  senate- 
house  during  full  sitting,  and  there  slew  Peithias  with  sixty  other 
persons,  partly  senators,  partly  private  individuals.  Some  others  of 
his  friends  escaped  the  same  late  by  getting  aboard  the  Attic  trireme 
which  had  brought  the  envoys,  and  which  was  still  in  the  harbor,  but 
now  departed  forthwith  to  Athens.  These  assassins,  under  the  fresh 
terror  arising  from  their  recent  act,  convoked  an  assembly,  affirmed 
that  what  they  had  done  was  unavoidable  to  guard  Korkyra  against 
being  made  the  slave  of  Athens,  and  proposed  a  resolution  of  full 
neutrality  both  toward  Athens  and  toward  the  Peloponnesians — per- 
mitting no  visit  from  either  of  the  belligerents,  except  of  a  pacific 
character  and  with  one  single  ship  at  a  time.  And  this  resolution  the 
assembly  was  constrained  to  pass — it  probably  was  not  very  numer- 
ous, and  the  oligarchical  partisans  were  at  hand  in  arms.  At  the 
same  time  they  sent  envoys  to  Athens,  to  communicate  the  recent 
events  with  such  coloring  as  suited  their  views,  and  to  dissuade 
the  fugitive  partisans  of  Peithias  from  provoking  any  armed  Athe- 
nian intervention,  such  as  might  occasion  a  counter-revolution  in  the 
island.  With  some  of  the  fugitives,  representations  of  this  sort,  or 
perhaps  the  fear  of  compromising  their  own  families  left  behind, 
prevailed.  But  most  of  them,  and  the  Athenians  along  with  them, 
appreciated  better  both  what  had  been  done  and  what  was  likely  to 
follow.  The  oligarchical  envoys,  together  with  such  of  the  fugitives 
as  had  been  induced  to  adopt  their  views,  were  seized  by  the  Athe- 
nians as  conspirators,  and  placed  in  detention  at  ^gina;  while  a 
fleet  of  sixty  Athenian  triremes  under  Eurymedon  was  immediately 
fitted  out  to  sail  for  Korkyra — for  which  there  was  the  greater  neces- 
sity, as  the  Lacedaemonian  fleet  under  Alkidas,  lately  mustered  at 
Kyllene  after  its  return  from  Ionia,  was  understood  to  be  on  the 
point  of  sailing  thither. 

But  the  oligarchical  leaders  at  Korkyra  having  little  faith  in  the 
chances  of  this  mission  to  Athens,  proceeded  in  the  execution  of 
their  conspiracy  with  that  rapidity  which  was  best  calculated  to 
insure  its  success.  On  the  arrival  of  a  Corinthian  trireme — which 
brought  ambassadors  from  Sparta,  and  probably  also  brought  news 


612  FOURTH   TEAK   OF   THE  WAR 

that  the  fleel  of  Alkidas  would  shortly  appear — they  organized  their 
force,  and  attacked  thepeopleand  the  democratic  authorities.  The 
Korkv  rsean  Demos  were  al    first  vat  and  dispersed.    But 

during  the  nighl  they  collected  t<  md  fortified  themselves  in 

the  upper  part  of  the  town  near  the  acropolis,  and  from  thence  down 
to  Hyllaic  harbor— one  of  the  two  harbors  which  the  town  possessed; 
while  the  other  harbor  and  the  chief  arsenal,  facing  the  mainland  of 
Epirus,  washeld  by  the  oligarchical  party,  together  with  the  market- 
place near  to  it,  in  and  around  which  the  wealthier  Korkyncans 
chiefly  resided.  In  this  divided  state  the  town  remained  throughout 
the  ensuing  day,  during  which  the  Demos  sent  emissaries  around  the 
territory  soliciting  aid  from  the  working  slaves,  and  promising  to 
them  emancipation  as  a  reward,  while  the  oligarchy  also  lured  and 
procured  8U0  Epirotic  mercenaries  from  the  mainland  lie-enforced 
by  the  slaves,  who  Hocked  in  at  the  call  received,  the  Demos  renewed 
the  struggle  on  the  morrow  more  furiously  than  before.  Both  in 
position  and  numbers  they  had  the  advantage  over  the  oligarchy,  and 
the  intense  resolution  with  which  they  fought  communicated  itself 
even  to  the  women,  who,  braving  danger  and  tumult,  took  active 
part  in  the  combat,  especially  by  flinging  tiles  from  the  housetops. 
Toward  the  afternoon  the  people  became  decidedly  victorious,  and 
were  even  on  the  point  of  carrying  by  assault  the  lower  town,  to- 
gether with  the  neighboring  arsenal.  The  oligarchy  had  no  other 
chance  of  safety  except  the  desperate  resource  of  setting  fire  to  that 
part  of  the  town,  with  the  market-place,  houses,  and  buildings  all 
around  it,  their  own  among  the  rest.  This  proceeding  drove  back 
the  assailants,  but  destroyed  much  property  belonging  to  the  merch- 
ants in  the  warehouses,  together  with  a  large  part  of  the  town: 
indeed  had  the  wind  been  favorable,  the  entire  town  would  have 
been  consumed.  The  people  being  thus  victorious,  the  Corinthian 
trireme,  together  with  most  of  the  Epirotic  mercenaries,  thought  it 
safer  to  leave  the  island;  while  the  victors  were  still  further  strength- 
ened on  the  ensuing  morning  by  the  arrival  of  the  Athenian  admiral 
Nikostratus,  with  twTelve  triremes  from  Naupaktus,  and  500  Messe- 
nian  hoplites. 

Nikostratus  did  his  best  to  allay  the  furious  excitement  prevailing, 
and  to  persuade  the  people  to  use  their  victory  with  moderation. 
Under  his  auspices  a  convention  of  amnesty  and  peace  was  concluded 
between  the  contending  parties,  save  only  ten  proclaimed  individuals, 
the  most  violent  oligarchs,  who  were  to  be  tried  as  ringleaders. 
These  men  of  course  soon  disappeared,  so  that  there  would  have 
been  no  trial  at  all,  wdiich  seems  to  have  been  what  Nikostratus 
desired.  At  the  same  time  an  alliance  offensive  and  defensive  was 
established  between  Korkyra  and  Athens,  and  the  Athenian  admiral 
was  then  on  the  point  of  departing,  when  the  Korkyra?an  leaders 
entreated  him  to  leave  with  them,  for  greater  safety,  five  ships  out 
of  his  little  fleet  of  twelve — offering  him  five  of  their  own  triremes 


ARRIVAL  OF  ADMIRAL  ALEIDAS.  613 

instead.  Notwithstanding  the  peril  of  this  proposition  to  himself, 
Nikostratus  acceded  to  it ;  and  the  Korkyraeans,  preparing  the  live 
ships  to  he  sent  along  with  him,  began  to  enroll  among  the  crews  the 
names  of  their  principal  enemies.  To  the  latter  this  presented  the 
appearance  of  sending  them  to  Athens,  which  they  accounted  a  sen- 
tence of  death.  Under  such  impression  they  took  refuge  as  suppli- 
ants in  the  temple  of  Dioskuri,  where  Nikostratus  went  to  visit  them, 
and  tried  to  reassure  them  by  the  promise  that  nothing  was  intended 
against  their  personal  safety.  But  he  found  it  impossible  to  satisfy 
them,  and  as  they  persisted  in  refusing  to  serve,  the  Korkyrsean 
Demos  began  to  suspect  treachery.  They  took  arms  again,  searched 
the  houses  of  the  recusants  for  arms,  and  were  bent  on  putting  some 
of  tliem  to  death,  if  Nikostratus  had  not  taken  them  under  his  pro- 
tection. The  principal  men  of  the  defeated  party,  to  the  number  of 
about  400,  now  took  sanctuary  in  the  temple  and  sacred  ground  of 
Here;  upon  which  the  leaders  of  the  people,  afraid  that  in  this 
inviolable  position  they  might  still  cause  further  insurrection  in  the 
city,  opened  a  negotiation  and  prevailed  upon  them  to  be  ferried 
across  to  the  little  island  iinrnediatety  opposite  to  the  Heraeum ;  where 
they  were  kept  under  watch,  with  provisions  regularly  transmitted 
across  to  them  for  four  days. 

At  the  end  of  these  four  days,  while  the  uneasiness  of  the  popular 
leaders  still  continued,  and  Nikostratus  still  adjourned  his  departure, 
a  new  phase  opened  in  this  melancholy  drama.  The  Peloponnesian 
fleet  under  Alkidas  arrived  at  the  road  of  Sybota  on  the  opposite 
mainland — fifty-three  triremes  in  number,  since  the  forty  triremes 
brought  back  from  Ionia  had  been  re-enforced  by  thirteen  more  from 
Leukas  and  Ambrakia.  Moreover,  the  Lacedaemonians  had  sent 
down  Brasidas  as  advising  companion — himself  worth  more  than  the 
new  thirteen  triremes,  if  he  had  been  sent  to  supersede  Alkidas, 
instead  of  bringing  nothing  but  authority  to  advise.  Despising  the 
small  squadron  of  Nikostratus,  then  at  Naupaktus,  the  Spartans 
were  only  anxious  to  deal  with  Korkyra  before  re-enforcements  should 
arrive  from  Athens;  but  the  repairs  necessary  for  the  ships  of  Alkidas, 
after  their  disastrous  voyage  home,  occasioned  an  unfortunate  delay. 
When  the  Peloponnesian  fleet  was  seen  approaching  from  Sybota  at 
break  of  day,  the  confusion  at  Korkyra  was  unspeakable.  The 
Demos  and  the  newly  emancipated  slaves  were  agitated  alike  by  the 
late  terrrible  combat  and  by  fear  of  the  invaders — the  oligarchical 
party  though  defeated  was  still  present,  forming  a  considerable 
minority — and  the  town  was  half -burnt.  Amidst  such  elements  of 
trouble,  there  was  little  authority  to  command,  and  still  less  confi- 
dence or  willingness  to  obey.  Plenty  of  triremes  were  indeed  at 
hand,  and  orders  were  given  to  man  sixty  of  them  forthwith — while 
Nikostratus,  the  only  man  who  preserved  the  cool  courage  necessary 
for  effective  resistance,  entreated  the  Korkyraean  leaders  to  proceed 
with  regularity,  and  to  wait  till  all  were  manned,  so  as  to  sail  forth 


614  FOURTH   YEAR  OF  THE   WAR. 

from  the  harbor  in  a  body.  He  offered  himself  with  his  twelve 
Athenian  treremes  to  go  forth  firsl  alone,  and  occupy  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  fleet,  until  the  llorkyraean  sixty  triremes  could  all  come  out  in 
full  array  to  support  him.  lie  accordingly  went  forth  with  his 
squadron,  bul  the  Korkyraans  instead  of  following  his  advice,  sent 

their  ships  OUl  one  by  one  and  without  any  selection  of  crews.  Two 
of  th  in  de  erted  forthwith  to  the  enemy,  while  others  presented  the 
.special  le  of  crews  fighting  among  themselves:  even  those  who 
actually  joined  battle  came  up  by  single  ships,  without  the  least 
order  or  concert. 

The  Peloponnesians  soon  seeing  that  they  bad  little  to  fear  from 
such  enemies,  thought  it  sufficient  to  set  twenty  of  their  ships  against 
the  Korkyraeans,  while  with  the  remaining  thirty-three  they  moved 
to  contend  with  the  twelve  Athenians.  Nikostratus,  having  plenty 
of  sea-room,  was  not  afraid  of  this  numerical  superiority;  the  more  so 
as  two  of  his  twelve  triremes  were  the  picked  vessels  of  the  Athenian 
navy — the  Salaminia  and  the  Paralus.  He  took  care  to  avoid  entang- 
ling himself  with  the  center  of  the  enemy,  and  to  keep  rowing  about 
their  flanks;  and  as  be  presently  contrived  to  disable  one  of  their 
ships  by  a  fortunate  blow  with  the  beak  of  one  of  his  vessels,  the 
Peloponnesians.  instead  of  attacking  him  with  their  superior  numbers, 
formed  themselves  into  a  circle  and  stood  on  the  defensive,  as  they 
had  done  in  the  first  combat  with  Phormio  in  the  middle  of  the  Gulf 
at  Rhium.  Nikostratus  (like  Phormio)  rowed  round  this  circle,  trying 
to  cause  confusion  by  feigned  approach,  and  waiting  to  see  some  of 
the  ships  lose  their  places  or  run  foul  of  each  other,  so  as  to  afford 
him  an  opening  for  attack.  And  be  might  perhaps  have  succeeded, 
if  the  remaining  twenty  Peloponnesian  ships,  seeing  the  proceeding 
and  recollecting  with  dismay  the  success  of  a  similar  maneuver  in  the 
former  battle,  bad  not  quitted  the  Korkyra'an  ships,  whose  disorderly 
condition  they  despised,  and  hastened  to  join  their  comrades.  The 
whole  fleet  of  fifty-three  triremes  now  again  took  the  aggressive,  and 
advanced  to  attack  Nikostratus,  who  retreated  before  them,  but  back- 
ing astern  and  keeping  the  head  of  his  ships  toward  the  enemy.  In  this 
manner  he  succeeded  in  drawing  them  away  from  the  town,  so  as  to 
leave  the  most  of  the  Korkyrsean  ships  opportunity  for  getting  back 
to  the  harbor;  while  such  was  the  superior  maneuvering  of  the  Athe- 
nian triremes,  that  the  Peloponnesians  were  never  able  to  come  up 
with  him  or  force  him  to  action.  They  returned  back  in  the  evening 
to  Sybota,  with  no  greater  triumph  than  their  success  against  the 
Korkyraeans,  thirteen  of  whose  triremes  they  carried  away  as  prizes. 

It  was  the  expectation  in  Korkyra  that  they  would  on  the  morrow- 
make  a  direct  attack  (which  coidd  hardly  have  failed  of  success)  on 
the  town  and  harbor.  We  may  easily  believe  (what  report  afterward 
stated)  that  Brasidas  advised  Alkidas  to  this  decisive  proceeding. 
The  Korkyreean  leaders,  more  terrified  than  ever,  first  removed  their 
prisoners  from  the  little  island  to  the  Herseum,  and  then  tried  to  come 


VENGEANCE  OP  THE  VICTORIOUS  DEMOS.      615 

to  a  compromise  with  the  oligarchical  party  generally,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  organizing  some  effective  and  united  defense.  Thirty  tri- 
remes were  made  ready  and  manned,  wherein  some  even  of  the  oli- 
garchical Korkyraeans  were  persuaded  to  form  part  of  the  crews. 

But  the  slackness  of  Alkidas  proved  their  best  defense.  Instead  of 
coming  straight  to  the  town,  he  contented  himself  with  landing  in  the 
island  at  some  distance  from  it,  on  the  promontory  of  Leukimne :  after 
ravaging  the  neighboring  lands  for  some  hours,  he  returned  to  his  sta- 
tion at  Sybota.  He  had  lost  an  opportunity  which  never  again  returns  1 : 
for  on  the  very  same  night  the  fire-signals  of  Leukas  telegraphed  to 
him  the  approach  of  the  fleet  under  Eurymedon  from  Athens — sixty 
triremes.  His  only  thought  was  now  for  the  escape  of  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  fleet,  which  was  in  fact  saved  by  this  telegraphic  notice. 
Advantage  was  taken  of  the  darkness  to  retire  close  along  the  land 
as  far  as  the  isthmus  which  separates  Leukas  from  the  mainland — 
across  which  isthmus  the  ships  were  dragged  by  hand  or  machinery, 
so  that  they  might  not  fall  in  with,  or  be  descried  by,  the  Athenian 
fleet  in  sailing  round  the  Leukadian  promontory.  From  hence  Alki- 
das made  the  best  of  his  way  home  to  Peloponnesus,  leaving  the  Kor- 
kyrasau  oligarchs  to  their  fate. 

That  fate  was  deplorable  in  the  extreme.  The  arrival  of  Euryme- 
don opens  a  third  unexpected  transition  in  this  checkered  narrative — 
the  Korkyroean  Demos  passing,  abruptly  and  unexpectedly,  from 
intense  alarm  and  helplessness  to  elate  and  irresistible  mastery.  In 
the  bosom  of  Greeks,  and  in  a  population  seemingly  amongst  the  least 
refined  of  all  Greeks — including  too  a  great  many  slaves  just  emanci- 
pated against  the  will  of  their  masters,  and  of  course  the  fiercest  and 
most  discontented  of  all  the  slaves  in  the  island — such  a  change  was 
but  too  sure  to  kindle  a  thirst  for  revenge  almost  ungovernable,  as 
the  only  compensation  for  foregone  terror  and  suffering. 

As  soon  as  the  Peloponnesiau  fleet  was  known  to  have  fled  and 
that  of  Eurymedon  was  seen  approaching,  the  Korkyra?an  leaders 
brought  into  the  town  the  500  Messenian  hoplites  who  had  hitherto 
been  encamped  without;  thus  providing  a  resource  against  any  last 
Effort  of  despair  on  the  part  of  their  interior  enemies.  Next,  the 
thirty  ships  recently  manned — and  held  ready  in  the  harbor  facing 
the  continent,  to  go  out  against  the  Peloponnesian  fleet,  but  now  no 
longer  needed — were  ordered  to  sail  round  to  the  other  or  Hyllaic 
harbor.  Even  while  they  were  thus  sailing  round,  some  obnoxious 
men  of  the  defeated  party,  being  seen  in  public,  were  slain.  But  when 
the  ships  arrived  at  the  Hyllaic  harbor,  and  the  crews  were  disem- 
barked, a  more  wholesale  massacre  was  perpetrated,  by  putting  to 
deatli  those  individuals  of  the  oligarchical  faction  who  had  been  per- 
suaded on  the  day  before  to  go  aboard  as  part  of  the  crews.  Then 
came  the  fate  of  those  suppliants,  about  400  in  number,  who  had  been 
brought  back  from  the  islet  opposite,  and  were  still  under  sanctuary, 
in  the  sacred  precinct  of  the  Herseum.     It  was  proposed  to  them  to 


CI 6  FOURTn  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 

quit  sanctuary  and  stand  their  trial  Fifty  of  them  accepted  the 
pr  position,  were  pul  on  their  trial  all  condemned,  and  all  executed. 
Their  execution  took  place,  as  it  seems,  immediately  mi  th<  spot, 
and  within  actual  view  of  the  unhappy  men  still  remaining  in  the 
sacred  ground;  who,  Beeing  that  their  lot  was  desperate, preferred 
d\  ing  by  their  own  hands  to  starvation  or  the  sword  of  theirenemies. 
Some  hung  themselves  on  branches  of  the  trees  surrounding  the  tem- 
ple, others  helped  their  friends  in  the  work  of  suicide,  and  in  one  way 
or  another  the  entire  hand  thus  perished.  It  was  probably  a  conso 
lation  to  them  to  believe  thai  this  desecration  of  the  precinct  would 
bring  down  the  anger  of  the  gods  upon  their  surviving  enemies. 

Eurymedon  remained  with  Ins  licet  for  seven  days,  during  all  which 
time  the  victorious  Korkyrseans  carried  on  a  sanguinary  persecution 
against  the  party  who  had  been  concerned  in  the  late  oligarchical 
revolution.  Five  hundred  of  this  party  contrived  to  escape  by  flight 
to  the  mainland;  while  those  who  (lid  not  or  could  not  lice  were  slain 
wherever  they  could  be  found.  Some  received  their  death-wounds 
even  on  the  altar  itself — others  shared  the  same  fate  after  having  been 
dragged  away  from  it  by  violence.  In  one  case  a  party  of  murderers 
having  pursued  their  victims  to  the  temple  of  Dionysus,  refrained 
From  shedding  their  blood,  but  built  up  the  doorway  and  left  them  to 
starve,  as  the  Laced;emonians  had  done  on  a  former  occasion  respect- 
ing Pausanias.  Such  was  the  ferocity  of  the  time,  that  in  one  case  a 
father  slew  his  own  son.  It  was  not  merely  the  oligarchical  party 
who  thus  suffered:  the  flood-gates  of  private  feud  were  also  opened, 
and  various  individuals,  under  false  charges  of  having  been  concerned 
in  the  oligarchical  movements,  were  slain  by  personal  enemies  or 
debtors.  This  deplorable  suspension  of  legal  as  well  as  moral  re- 
straints continued  during  the  week  of  Eurymedon's  stay — a  period 
long  enough  to  satiate  the  fierce  sentiment  out  of  which  it  arose;  yet 
without  any  apparent  effort  on  his  part  to  soften  the  victors  or  pro- 
tect the  vanquished.  We  shall  see  further  reason  hereafter  to  appre- 
ciate the  baseness  and  want  of  humanity  in  his  character.  Had  Nik- 
ostratus  remained  in  command,  we  may  fairly  presume,  judging  by 
wdiat  he  had  done  in  the  earlier  part  of  the  sedition  with  very  inferior 
force,  that  he  would  have  set  much  earlier  limits  to  the  Korkyr.ean 
butchery;  unfortunately,  Thucydides  tells  us  nothing  at  all  about 
Nikostratus,  after  the  naval  battle  of  (he  preceding  day. 

We  should  have  been  glad  to  hear  something  about  "the  steps  taken 
in  the  way  of  restoration  or  healing,  after  this  burst  of  murderous 
fury,  in  which  doubtless  the  newly  emancipated  slaves  were  not  the 
mosl  backward — and  after  the  departure  of  Eurymedon.  But  here 
again  Thucydides  disappoints  our  curiosity.  We  only  hear  from 
him  that  the  oligarchical  exiles  who  had  escaped  to  the  mainland 
were  strong  enough  to  gel  possession  of  the  forts  and  most  part  of 
the  territory  there  belonging  to  Korkyra;  just  as  the  exiles  from 
Sarnos  and  Mitylene  became  more  or  less  completely  masters  of  the 


THE  KORKTR^EAN  MASSACRE.  617 

Peraea  or  mainland  possessions  belonging  to  those  islands.  They 
even  sent  envoys  to  Corinth  and  Sparta,  in  hopes  of  procuring  aid  to 
accomplish  their  restoration  by  force;  but  their  request  found  no 
favor,  and  they  were  reduced  to  their  own  resources.  After  harass- 
ing for  some  time  the  Korkyraeans  in  the  island  by  predatory  incur- 
sions, so  as  to  produce  considerable  dearth  and  distress,  they  at 
length  collected  a  band  of  Epirotic  mercenaries,  passed  over  to  the 
island,  and  there  established  a  fortified  position  on  the  mountain 
called  Istone,  not  far  from  the  city.  Having  burnt  their  vessels  in 
order  to  cut  off  all  hopes  of  retreat,  thej^  maintained  themselves  for 
near  two  years  by  a  system  of  ravage  and  plunder  which  inflicted 
great  misery  on  the  island.  This  was  a  frequent  way  whereby,  of 
old,  invaders  wore  out  and  mastered  a  city,  the  walls  of  which  they 
found  impregnable.  The  ultimate  fate  of  these  occupants  of  Istone, 
which  belongs  to  a  future  chapter,  will  be  found  to  constitute  a  close 
suitable  to  the  bloody  drama  jret  unfinished  in  Korkyra. 

Such  a  drama  could  not  be  acted  in  an  important  city  belonging  to 
the  Greek  name,  without  producing  a  deep  and  extensive  impression 
throughout  all  the  other  cities.  And  Thucydides  has  taken  advan- 
tage of  it  to  give  a  sort  of  general  sketch  of  Grecian  politics  during 
the  Peloponnesian  war;  violence  of  civil  discord  in  each  city,  aggra- 
vated by  foreign  war,  and  by  the  contending  efforts  of  Athens  and 
Sparta — the  former  espousing  the  democratical  party  everywhere; 
the  latter,  the  oligarchical.  The  Korkyraean  sedition  was  the  first 
case  in  which  these  two  causes  of  political  antipathy  and  exaspera- 
tion were  seen  acting  with  full  united  force,  and  where  the  malignity 
of  sentiment  and  demoralization  flowing  from  such  a  union  was  seen 
without  disguise.  The  picture  drawn  by  Thucydides  of  moral  and 
political  feeling  under  these  influences,  will  ever  remain  memorable 
as  the  work  of  an  analyst  and  a  philosopher.  He  has  conceived  and 
described  the  perverting  causes  with  a  spirit  of  generalization  which 
renders  these  two  chapters  hardly  less  applicable  to  other  political 
societies  far  distant  both  in  time  and  place  (especially,  under  many 
points  of  view,  to  France  between  1789  and  1799)  than  to  Greece  in 
the  fifth  century  before  the  Christian  era.  The  deadly  bitterness 
infused  into  intestine  party  contests  by  the  accompanying  dangers  of 
foreign  war  and  intervention  of  foreign  enemies — the  mutual  fears 
between  political  rivals,  where  each  thinks  that  the  other  will  forestall 
him  In  striking  a  mortal  blow,  and  where  constitutional  maxims  have 
ceased  to  carry  authority  either  as  restraint  or  as  protection — the 
superior  popularity  of  the  man  who  is  most  forward  with  the  sword, 
or  who  runs  down  his  enemies  in  the  most  unmeasured  language, 
coupled  with  the  disposition  to  treat  both  prudence  in  action  and 
candor  in  speech  as  if  it  were  nothing  but  treachery  or  cowardice — 
the  exclusive  regard  to  party  ends,  with  the  reckless  adoption,  and 
even  admiring  preference,  of  fraud  or  violence  as  the  most  effectual 
means — the  loss  of  respect  for  legal  authority  as  well  as  of  confidence 


618  FOURTH   YEAR   OF  THE  WAR. 

in  private  agreement,  and  the  surrender  even  of  blood  and  friendship 
to  the  overruling  ascendency  of  part;  ties  the  perversion  of  ordinary 
morality,  bringing  with  it  altered  signification  of  all  the  common 
words  importing  blame  or  approbation — the  unnatural  predominance 
of  the  ambitious  and  contentious  passions,  overpowering  in  men's 
minds  all  real  public  objects,  and  equalizing  for  the  time  the  better 
and  the  worse  cause,  l>\  taking  hold  of  democracy  on  one  side,  and 
aristocracy  on  the  other,  as  mere  pretenses  to  sanctify  personal 
triumph— all  these  gloomy  social  phenomena,  here  indicated  by  the 
historian,  have  their  causes  deeply  seated  in  the  human  mind,  and 
are  likely,  unless  the  bases  of  constitutional  morality  shall  come  to 
be  laid  more  surely  and  firmly  than  they  have  hitherto  been,  to  recur 
from  time  to  time,  under  diverse  modifications,  "so  long  as  human 
nature  shall  be  the  same  as  it  is  now,"  to  use  the  language  of  Thu- 
cydides himself .  He  has  described,  with  fidelity  not  inferior  to  his 
sketch  of  the  pestilence  at  Athens,  the  symptoms  of  a  certain  morbid 
political  condition,  wherein  the  vehemence  of  intestine  conflict, 
instead  of  being  kept  within  such  limits  as  consists  with  the  main- 
tenance of  one  society  among  the  contending  parties,  becomes  for  the 
time  inflamed  and  poisoned  with  all  the  unscrupulous  hostility  of 
foreign  war,  chiefly  from  actual  alliance  between  parties  within  the 
state  and  foreigners  without.  In  following  the  impressive  descrip- 
tion of  the  historian,  Ave  have  to  keep  in  mind  the  general  state  of 
manners  in  his  time,  especially  the  cruelties  tolerated  by  the  laws  of 
war,  as  compared  with  that  greater  humanity  and  respect  for  life 
which  has  grown  up  during  the  last  two  centuries  in  modern  Europe. 
And  we  have  further  so  recollect  that  if  he  had  been  describing  the 
effects  of  political  fury  among  Carthaginians  and  Jews,  instead  of 
among  his  contemporary  Greeks,  he  would  have  added  to  his  list  of 
horrors  mutilation,  crucifixion,  and  other  refinements  on  simple 
murder. 

The  language  of  Thucydides  is  to  be  taken  rather  as  a  generalization 
and  concentration  of  phenomena  which  he  had  observed  among 
different  communities,  than  as  belonging  to  any  one  of  them.  I  do 
not  believe — what  a  superficial  reading  of  his  opening  words  might 
at  first  suggest — that  the  bloodshed  in  Korkyra  was  only  the  earliest, 
but  by  no  means  the  worst,  of  a  series  of  similar  horrors  spread  over 
the  Grecian  world.  The  facts  stated  in  his  own  history  suffice  to 
show  that  though  the  same  causes  which  worked  upon  this  unfor- 
tunate island  became  disseminated  and  produced  analogous  mischiefs 
throughout  many  other  communities,  yet  the  case  of  Korkyra,  as  it 
was  the  first,  so  it  was  also  the  worst  and  most  aggravated  in  point 
of  intensity.  Fortunately  the  account  of  Thucydides  enables  us  to 
understand  it  from  beginning  to  end,  and  to  appreciate  the  degree  of 
guilt  of  the  various  parties  implicated,  which  we  can  seldom  do  with 
certainty;  because  when  once  the  interchange  of  violence  has  begun, 
the  feelings  arising  out  of  the  contest  itself  presently  overpower  in  the 


CONDUCT  OF  THE  OPPOSING  PARTIES.         619 

minds  of  both  parties  the  original  cause  of  dispute,  as  well  as  all 
scruples  as  to  fitness  of  means.  Unjustifiable  acts  in  abundance  are 
committed  by  both,  and  in  comparing  the  two,  we  are  often  obliged 
to  employ  the  emphatic  language  which  Tacitus  uses  respecting  Otho 
and  Vitellius — "deteriorem  fore,  cpiisquis  vicisset" — of  two  bad  men 
all  that  the  Roman  world  could  foresee  was,  that  the  victor,  which- 
soever he  was,  would  prove  the  worst. 

But  in  regard  to  the  Korkyraean  revolution,  we  can  arrive  at  a 
more  discriminating  criticism.  We  see  that  it  is  from  the  beginning 
the  work  of  a  selfish  oligarchical  party,  playing  the  game  of  a  foreign 
enemy;  and  the  worst  and  most  ancient  enemy,  of  the  island — aim- 
ing to  subvert  the  existing  democracy  and  acquire  power  for  them- 
selves, and  ready  to  employ  any  measure  of  fraud  or  violence  for 
the  attainment  of  these  objects.  While  the  democracy  which  they 
attack  is  purely  defensive  and  conservative,  the  oligarchical  movers, 
having  tried  fair  means  in  vain,  are  the  first  to  employ  foul  means, 
which  latter  they  find  retorted  with  greater  effect  against  themselves. 
They  set  the  example  of  judicial  prosecution  against  Peithias,  for 
the  destruction  of  a  political  antagonist;  in  the  use  of  this  same 
weapon,  he  proves  more  than  a  match  for  them,  and  employs  it  to 
their  ruin.  Next,  they  pass  to  the  use  of  the  dagger  in  the  senate- 
house  against  him  and  his  immediate  fellow-leaders,  and  to  the  whole- 
sale application  of  the  sword  against  the  democracy  generally.  The 
Korkyraean  Demos  are  thus  thrown  upon  the  defensive.  Instead  of  the 
affections  of  ordinary  life,  all  the  most  intense  anti-social  sentiments 

-fear,  pugnacity,  hatred,  vengeance — obtain  unqualified  possession 
of  their  bosoms;  exaggerated  too  through  the  fluctuations  of  victory 
and  defeat,  successively  brought  by  Nikostratus,  Alkidas,  and  Eurym- 
edon.  Their  conduct  as  victors  is  such  as  we  should  expect  under 
such  maddening  circumstances,  from  coarse  men  mingled  with  liber- 
ated slaves.  It  is  vindictive  and  murderous  in  the  extreme,  not 
without  faithless  breach  of  assurances  given.  But  we  must  remem- 
ber that  they  are  driven  to  stand  upon  their  defense,  and  that  all 
their  energies  are  indispensable  to  make  that  defense  successful. 
They  are  provoked  by  an  aggression  no  less  guilty  in  the  end  than  in 
the  means — an  aggression,  too,  the  more  gratuitous,  because,  if  we 
look  at  the  state  of  the  island  at  the  time  when  the  oligarchical  cap- 
tives were  restored  from  Corinth,  there  was  no  pretense  for  affirming 
that  it  had  suffered,  or  was  suffering,  any  loss,  hardship,  or  disgrace, 
from  its  alliance  with  Athens.  These  oligarchical  insurgents  find 
the  island  in  a  state  of  security  and  tranquillity,  since  the  war 
imposed  upon  it  little  necessity  for  effort.  They  plunge  it  into  a  sea 
of  blood,  with  enormities  as  well  as  suffering'on  both  sides,  which 
end  at  length  in  their  own  complete  extermination.  Our  compassion 
for  their  final  misery  must  not  hinder  us  from  appreciating  the 
behavior  whereby  it  was  earned. 

In  the  course  of  a  few  years  from  this  time,  we  shall  have  occasion 


620  FOURTH   YEAR   OF  THE   WAR. 

to  recount  two  political  movements  in  Athens  similar  in  principle 
and  general  result  to  this  Korkyraean  revolution;  exhibiting  oligar- 
chical conspirators  against  an  existing  and  conservative  democracy — 
with  this  conspiracy  at  firsl  successful,  but  afterwards  put  down, 
and  the  Demos  again  restored.  The  contrast  between  Alliens  and 
Korkyra  under  such  circumstances  will  be  found  highly  instructive, 
especially  in  regard  to  the  Demos  both  in  the  hours  of  defeat  and  in 
those  of  victory.  It  will  then  he  seen  how  much  the  habit  of  active 
participation  in  political  and  judicial  affairs — of  open,  conflicting 
discussion,  discharging  the  malignant  passions  by  way  of  speech, 

and  followed  by  appeal  to  the  vote — of  having  constantly  present,  to 
the  mind  of  every  citizen  in  his  character  of  Dikast  or  Ekklesia'st, 
the  conditions  of  a  pacific  society,  and  the  paramount  authority  of  a 
constitutional  majority — how  much  all  these  circumstances,  brought 
home  as  they  were  at  Athens  more  than  iu  any  other  democracy  to 
the  feelings  of  individuals,  contributed  to  soften  the  instincts  of 
intestine  violence  and  revenge,  even  under  very  great  provocation. 

But  the  case  of  Korkyra,  as  well  as  that  of  Athens,  different  in  so 
many  respects,  conspire  to  illustrate  another  truth  of  much  impor- 
tance in  Grecian  history.  Rotli  of  them  show  how  false  and  impu- 
dent were  the  pretentions  set  up  by  the  rich  and  great  men  of  the 
various  Grecian  cities,  to  superior  morality,  superior  intelligence, 
and  greater  fitness  for  using  honorably  and  beneficially  the  powers 
of  government,  as  compared  with  the  mass  of  citizens.  Though  the 
Grecian  oligarchies,  exercising  powerful  sway  over  fashion,  and 
more  especially  over  the  meaning  of  words,  bestowed  upon  them- 
selves the  appellation  of  "the  best  men,  the  honorable  and  good,  the 
elegant,  the  superior,"  etc.,  and  attached  to  those  without  their  own 
circle  epithets  of  a  contrary  tenor,  implying  low  moral  attributes — no 
such  difference  will  be  found  borne  out  by  the  facts  of  Grecian  his- 
tory. Abundance  of  infirmity,  with  occasional  bad  passions,  was 
doubtless  liable  to  work  upon  the  people  generally,  often  corrupting 
and  misguiding  even  the  Athenian  democracy,  the  best  apparently  of 
all  the  democracies  in  Greece.  But  after  all,  the  rich  and  great  men 
were  only  a  part  of  the  people,  and  taking  them  as  a  class  (apart 
from  honorable  individual  exceptions)  by  no  means  the  besl  part.  If 
exempted  by  their  position  from  some  of  the  vices  which  beset  smal 
ler  and  poorer  men,  they  imbibed  from  that  same  position  an 
unmeasured  self-importance — and  an  excess  of  personal  ambition  a£ 
well  as  of  personal  appetite — peculiar  to  themselves,  not  less  anti- 
social in  tendency,  and  operating  upon  a  much  grander  scale.  To  the 
prejudices  and  superstitions  belonging  to  the  age,  they  were  no  waj 
superior,  considering  them  as  a  class;  while  their  animosities  among 
one  another,  virulent  and  unscrupulous,  were  among  the  foremos 
causes  of  misfortune  in  Grecian  commonwealths.  Indeed  many  o: 
the  most  exceptionable  acts  committed  by  the  democracies,  consisted 
in  their  allowing  themselves  to  be  made  the  tools  of  one  aristocra 


CAPTURE  OF  MINOA.  021 

for  the  ruin  of  another.  Of  the  intense  party-selfishness  which  char- 
acterized them  as  a  body,  sometimes  exaggerated  into  the  strongest 
anti-popular  antipathy,  as  we  see  in  the  famous  oligarchical  oath 
cited  by  Aristotle — we  shall  find  many  illustrations  as  we  advance  in 
the  history,  but  none  more  striking  than  this  Korkyraean  revolution. 


CHAPTER  LI. 

FROM   THE    TROUBLES  TN    KORKYRA,    EST    THE    FIFTH  TEAR    OF   THE 
FELOPONNESIAN   WAR,  DOWN  TO  THE   END   OF   THE   SIXTH  YEAR. 

About  the  same  time  as  the  troubles  of  Korkyra  occurred,  Nikias 
the  Athenian  general  conducted  an  armament  against  the  rocky 
island  of  Minoa,  which  lay  at  the  mouth  of  the  harbor  of  Megara, 
and  was  occupied  by  a  Megarian  fort  and  garrison.  The  narrow 
channel,  which  separated  it  from  the  Megarian  port  of  Nissea  and 
formed  the  entrance  of  the  harbor,  was  defended  by  two  towers  pro- 
jecting  out  from  Nissea,  which  Nikias  attacked  and  destroyed  by 
means  of  battering  machines  from  his  ships.  He  thus  cut  off  Minoa 
from  communication  on  that  side  with  the  Megarians,  and  fortified 
it  on  the  other  side,  where  it  communicated  with  the  mainland  by  a 
lagoon  bridged  over  with  a  causway.  Minoa,  thus  becoming  thor- 
oughly insulated,  was  more  completely  fortified  and  made  an  Athe- 
nian possession;  since  it  was  eminently  convenient  to  keep  up  an 
effective  blockade  against  the  Megarian  harbor,  which  the  Athenians 
had  hitherto  done  only  from  the  opposite  shore  of  Salamis. 

Though  Nikias,  son  of  Nickeratus,  had  been  for  some  time  con- 
spicuous in  public  life,  and  is  said  to  have  been  more  than  once 
Strategus  along  with  Perikles,  this  is  the  first  occasion  on  which 
Thucydides  introduces  him  to  our  notice.  He  was  now  one  of  the 
Strategi  or  generals  of  the  commonwealth,  and  appears  to  have 
enjoyed  on  the  whole,  a  greater  and  more  constant  personal  esteem 
than  any  citizen  of  Athens,  from  the  present  time  down  to  his  death. 
In  wealth  and  in  family,  he  ranked  among  the  first  class  of  Atheni- 
ans; in  political  character,  Aristotle  placed  him,  together  with  Thu- 
cydides son  of  Melesias  and  Theramenes,  above  all  other  names  in 
Athenian  history — seemingly  even  above  Perikles. 

Such  a  criticism,  from  Aristotle,  deserves  respectful  attention, 
though  the  facts  before  us  completely  belie  so  lofty  an  estimate.  It 
marks,  however,  the  position  occupied  by  Nikias  "in  Athenian  poli- 
tics, as  the  principal  person  of  what  may  be  called  the  oligarchical 
party,  succeeding  Kimon  and  Thucydides,  and  preceding  Thera- 
menes. In  looking  to  the  conditions  under  which  this  party  contin- 
ued to  subsist,  we  shall  see  that  during  the  interval  between  Thucy- 


622        FIFTH  AM)  BIXTH  YEARS  OF  THE  WAR 

diilcs  (sod  of  Melesias)  and  Hildas,  the  democratic^]  forms  had 
acquired  such  confirmed  ascendency  thai  it  would  do!  have  Buited 
the  purpose  of  any  politician  to  betray  evid<  ace  of  positive  hostility 
id  them,  prior  in  The  Bilician  expedition  and  the  great  embarrassment 
in  the  foreign  relations  <>!'  Alliens  which  arose  ou1  of  thai  disaster. 
After  thai  change,  the  Athenian  oligarchs  became  emboldened  and 
aggressive,  so  thai  we  shall  find  Theramenes  among  the  chief  con- 
spirators in  the  revolution  of  the  Four  Hundred.  Bui  Nikias  repre- 
sents the  oligarchical  parly  in  its  previous  stale  of  quiescence  and 
torpidity,  accommodating  itself  to  a  sovereign  demoi  racy,  ai  d  exst- 
ing  in  the  form  of  common  sentimenl  rather  than  of  common  pur- 
poses. And  it  is  a  remarkable  illustration  of  the  real  temper  of  thu 
Athenian  people,  thai  a  man  of  tins  character,  known  as  an  oligarch 
but  not  feared  as  such,  and  doing  his  duty  sincerely  to  the  democracy, 
should  have  remained  until  his  death  the  mosl  esteemed  and  influen- 
tial man  in  the  city. 

Nikias  was  a  man  of  even  mediocrity,  in  intellect,  i it-  education,  and 
'moratory:  forward  in  his  military  duties,  and  not  only  personally 
courageous  iii  the  field,  but  hitherto  found  competent  as  a  genera] 
under  ordinary  circumstances:  assiduous,  too,  in  the  discharge  of  all 
political  duties  at  home,  especially  in  the  posl  of  Btrategus  or  one  of 

the  ten  generals  of  the  slate,  to  which  he  was  frequentbj  chosen  and 
rechosen.  Of  the  many  valuable  qualities  combined  in  his  predeces- 
sor Perikles,  the  recollection  of  whom  was  ye1  fresh  in  the  Athenian 
mind,  Nikias  possessed  two,  on  which,  mosl  of  all,  his  influence 
rested— though,  properly  speaking,  that  influence  belongsto  the  sum 
total  of  his  character,  and  not  to  any  special  attributes  in  it:  First, 
he  was  thoroughly  incorruptible  as  to  pecuniary  gaini — a  quality  so 
rare  in  Grecian  public  men  of  all  the  cities,  that  when  a  man  once 
became  notorious  for  possessing  it,  he  acquired  a  greater  degree  of 
trust  than  any  superiority  of  intellect  could  have  bestowed  upon 
him:  next,  be  adopted  the  Periklean  view  as  to  the  necessity  of  a 
conservative  or  stationary  foreign  policy  for  Athens,  avoiding  new 
acquisitions  at  a  distance,  adventurous  risks,  or  provocation  to  fresh 
enemies.  With  this  important  point  of  analogy  there  were  at  the 
same  time  material  differences  between  them  even  in  regard  to  for- 
ign  policy.  Perikles  was  a  conservative,  resolute  against  submitting 
0  loss  or  abstraction  of  empire,  but  at  the  same  time  refraining  from 
ggrandizement:  Nikias  was  in  policy  faint-hearted,  averse  to  ener- 
getic effort  for  any  purpose  whatever,  and  disposed  not  only  to  main- 
tain peace,  but  even  to  purchase  it  by  considerable  sacrifices. 
Nevertheless,  he  was  the  leading  champion  of  the  conservative 
party  of  his  day,  always  powerful  at  Athens:  and  as  he  was  con- 
stantly familiar  with  the  details  and  actual  course  of  public  affairs, 
capable  of  giving  full  effect  to  the  cautious  and  prudential  point  of 
■view,  and  enjoying  unqualified  credit  for  Honest  purposes — his  value 


CARE  OP  NIKIAS  TO  MAINTAIN  HIS  POPULARITY.    623 

as  a  permanent  counselor  was  steadily  recognized,  even  though  in 
particular  cases  his  counsel  might  not  be  followed. 

Besides  these  two  main  points,  which  Nikias  had  in  common  with 
Perikles,  he  was  perfect  in  the  use  of  minor  and  collateral  modes  of 
standing  well  with  the  people,  which  that  great  man  had  taken  but 
little  pains  to  practice.      While  Perikles  attached  himself  to  Aspasia, 
wdiose  splendid  qualities  did  not  redeem,  in  the  eyes  of  the  public, 
either  her  foreign  origin  or  her  unchastity,  the  domestic  habits  of 
Nikias  appear  to  have  been  strictly  conformable  to  the  rules  of  Athe- 
nian decorum.     Perikles  was  surrounded  by  philosophers,  Nikias  by 
prophets — whose  advice  was  necessary  both  as  a  consolation  to  his 
temperament  and asa  guide  to  his  intelligence  under  difficulties.   One 
of  them  was  constantly  in  his  service   and  confidence,  and  his  con- 
duct appears  to  have  been  sensibly  affected   by  the  difference  of 
character  between  one  prophet  and  another,  just  as  the  government 
of  Louis  XIV.  and  other  Catholic  princes  has  been  modified  by  the 
change  of  confessors.     To  a  life  thus    rigidly  decorous  and  ultra- 
religious — both  emineutly  acceptable  to  the  Athenians — Nikias  added 
the  judicious  employment  of  a  large  fortune  with  a  view  to  popular- 
ity.    Those  liturgies  (or  expensive  public  duties  undertaken  by  rich 
men,  each  in  his  turn,  throughout  other  cities  of  Greece  as  well  as  in 
Athens)  which  fell  to  his  lot  were  performed  with  such  splendor, 
munificence,  and  good  taste,  as  to  procure  for  him  universal  enco- 
miums; and  so  much  above  his  predecessors  as  to  be  long  remem- 
bered and  extolled.     Most  of  these  liturgies  were  connected  with  the 
religious  service  of  the  state,  so  that  Nikias,  by  his  manner  of  per- 
forming them,  displayed  his  zeal  for  the  honor  of  the  gods  at  the 
same  time  that  he  laid  up  for  himself  a  store  of  popularity.     More- 
over, the  remarkable  caution  and  timidity — not  before  an  enemy, 
but  in  reference  to  his  own  fellow- citizens — which  marked  his  char- 
acter, rendered  him  pre-eminently  scrupulous  as  to  giving  offense  or 
making  personal  enemies.     While  his  demeanor  toward  the  poorer 
citizens  generally  was  equal  and  conciliating,  the  presents  which  he 
made  were  numerous,  both  to  gain  friends  and  to  silence  assailants. 
We  are  not  surprised  to  hear  that  various  bullies,  whom  the  comic 
writers  turn  to  scorn,  made  their  profit  out  of  this  susceptibility.   But 
most  assuredly  Nikias  as  a  public  man,  though  he  might  occasion- 
ally be  cheated  out  of  money,  profited  greatly  by  reputation  thus 
acquired. 

The  expenses  unavoidable  in  such  a  career,  combined  with  strict 
personal  honesty,  could  not  have  been  defrayed  except  by  another 
quality,  which  ought  not  to  count  as  discreditable  to  Nikias,  though 
in  this,  too,  he  stood  distinguished  from  Pefikles.  He  was  a  careful 
and  diligent  money-getter;  a  speculator  in  the  silver-mines  of  Lau- 
rium,  and  proprietor  of  one  thousand  slaves,  whom  he  let  out  for 
work  in  them,  receiving  a  fixed  sum  per  head  for  each.     The  super- 


024        FIFTII  AND  SIXTH  YEARS  OF  TnE  WAR 

intending  slaves  who  managed  the  details  of  this  business  were  men 
of  great  ability  and  high  pecuniary  value.  Mosl  of  the  wealth  of 
Nikiaa  was  held  in  this  Form,  and  not  in  landed  property.  Judging 
by  whai  remains  to  us  of  the  comic  authors,  this  musl  have  been 
considered  as  a  perfectly  gentlemanlike  way  of  making  money:  for 
while  they  abound  with  derision  of  the  leather-dresser  Kleon,  the 
lamp-maker  Hyperbolus,  and  the  vegetable-selling  mother  to  whom 
Euripides  owes  his  birth,  we  hear  nothing  from  them  in  disparage- 
ment of  the  slave-letter  Nikias. 

The  degree  to  which  the  latter  was  thus  occupied  with  the  care  of 
his  private  fortune,  together  with  the  general  moderation  of  his  tem- 
per, made  him  often  wish  to  abstract  himself  from  public  duty.  But. 
such  unambitious  reluctance,  rare  among  the  public  men  of  the  day. 
rather  made  I  lie  Athenians  more  anxious  to  put  him  forward  and 
retain  his  services.  In  the  eye- of  the  Pentakosiomedimni  and  the 
Bippeis,  the  two  richesl  classes  in  Athens,  he  was  one  of  themselves 
— and,  on  the  whole,  the  best  man,  as  being  so  little  open  to  reproach 
or  calumny, whom  they  could  oppose  to  the  leather-dressers  and  lamp 
makers,  who  often  out  talked  them  iu  the  public  assembly.  The 
hoplites.who  despised  Kleon — and  did  not  much  regard  even  the 
brave,  hardy,  and  soldierlike  Lamachus,  because  he  happened  to  be 
poor — respected  in  Nikias  the  union  of  wealth  and  family  with  hon- 
esty, courage,  and  carefulness  in  command.  The  maritime  and 
trading  multitude  esteemed  him  as  a  decorous,  honest,  religious  gen- 
tleman, who  gave  splendid  choragies,  treated  the  poorest  men  with 
consideration,  and  never  turned  the  public  service  into  a  job  for  his 
own  profit — who,  moreover,  if  he  possessed  no  commanding  quali- 
ties, so  as  to  give  to  his  advice  imperative  and  irresistible  authority, 
was  yet  always  worthy  of  being  consulted,  and  a  steady  safeguard 
against  public  mischief.  Before  the  fatal  Sicilian  expedition,  be  had 
never  commanded  on  any  very  serious  or  difficult  enterprise;  but 
what  be  had  done  had  been  accomplished  successfully;  so  that  he 
enjoyed  the  reputation  of  a  fortunate  as  well  as  a  prudent  com- 
mander. He  appears  to  have  acted  as  proxenus  to  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians at  Athens;  probably  by  bis  own  choice,  and  among  several 
others. 

The  first  half  of  the  political  life  of  Nikias — after  the  time  when 
he  rose  to  enjoy  full  consideration  in  Athens,  being  already  of 
mature  ag< — was  in  opposition  to  Kleon;  the  last  half,  in  opposition 
to  Alkibiades.  To  employ  terms  which  are  not  suitable  to  the  Athe- 
nian democracy,  but  which  yet  bring  to  view  the  difference  intended 
to  be  noted  better  than  -any  other.-,  Nikias  was  a  minister  or  minis- 
terial man,  often  actually  exercising,  and  always  likely  to  exercise, 
official  functions — Kleon  was  a  man  of  the  opposition,  whose  pro- 
vince it  was  to  supervise  and  censure  official  men  for  their  public 
conduct.  We  must  divest  these  words  of  that  accompaniment  which 
they  are  understood  to  carry  in   English  political  life — a  standing 


NIKIAS  AND  KLEON.  625 

parliamentary  majority  in  favor  of  one  party:  Klcon  would  often 
carry  in  the  public  assembly  resolutions,  which  bis  opponents  Nikias 
and  others  of  like  rank  and  position — who  served  in  the  posts  of 
Strategus,  ambassador,  and  other  important  offices  designated  by  the 
general  vote — were  obliged  against  their  will  to  execute. 

In  attaining  such  offices  they  were  assisted  by  the  political  clubs, 
or  established  conspiracies  (to  translate  the  original  literally)  among 
tbe  leading  Athenians  to  stand  by  each  other  both  for  acquisition  of 
offl  •  ■  and  for  mutual  insurance  under  judicial  trial.  These  clubs,  or 
Heueries,  must  have  played  an  important  part  in  the  practical  work- 
ing of  Athenian  politics,  and  it  is  much  to  be  regretted  that  we  an; 
sed  of  no  details  respecting  them.  We  know  that  in  Athens 
they  were  thoroughly  oligarchical  in  disposition — while  equality,  or 
something  near  to  it,  in  rank  and  position,  must  have  been  essential 
to  the  social  harmony  of  the  members.  In  some  towns,  it  appears 
that  such  political  associations  existed  under  the  form  of  gymnasia 
for  the  mutual  exercise  of  the  members,  or  of  syssitia  for  joint  ban- 
quets. At  Athens  they  were  numerous,  and  doubtless  not  habitually 
in  friendship  with  each  other;  since  the  antipathies  among  different 
oligarchical  men  were  exceedingly  strong,  and  the  union  brought 
about  between  them  at  the  time  of  the  Four  Hundred,  arising  only 
out  of  common  desire  to  put  down  the  democracy,  lasted  but  a  little 
while..  But  the  designation  of  persons  to  serve  in  the  capacity  of 
Strategus  and  other  principal  offices  greatly  depended  upon  them — 
as  well  as  the  facility  of  passing  through  that  trial  of  accountability 
to  which  every  man  was  liable  after  his  year  of  office.  Nikias,  and 
men  generally  of  his  rank  and  fortune,  helped  by  these  clubs  and 
lending  help  in  their  turn,  composed  what  may  be  called  the  minis- 
ters, or  executive  individual  functionaries  of  Athens:  the  men  who 
acted,  gave  orders  as  to  specific  acts,  and  saw  to  the  execution  of 
that  which  the  senate  and  the  public  assembly  resolved.  Especially 
in  regard  to  the  military  and  naval  force  of  the  city,  so  large  and  so 
actively  employed  at  this  time,  the  powers  of  detail  possessed  by  the 
Strategi  must  have  been  very  great,  and  essential  to  the  safety  of  the 
state. 

While  Nikias  was  thus  in  what  may  be  called  ministerial  function, 
Kleon  was  not  of  sufficient  importance  to  attain  the  same,  but  was 
confined  to  the  inferior  function  of  opposition.  We  shall  see  in  the 
coming  chapter  how  he  became  as  it  were  promoted,  partly  by  his 
own  superior  penetration,  partly  by  the  dishonest  artifice  and  mis- 
judgment  of  Nikias  and  other  opponents,  in  the  affair  of  Sphakteria. 
But  his  vocation  was  now  to  find  fault,  to  censure,  to  denounce;  his 
theater  of  action  was  the  senate,  the  public,  assembly,  the  dikasteries; 
his  principal  talent  was  that  of  speech,  in  which  he  must  unquestion- 
ably have  surpassed  all  his  contemporaries.  The  two  gifts  which 
had  been  united  in  Perikles— superior  capacity  for  speech,  as  well  as 
for  action — were  now  severed,  and  had  fallen,  though  both  in  greatly 


626         FIFTH  AND  SIXTH  YEARS  OF  THE  WAR. 

inferior  degree,  the  one  to  Nikias,  the  other  to  Kleon.  As  an  opposi- 
tion  man,  fierce  and  violent  in  temper,  Kleon  was  extremely  formida- 
ble to  all  acting  functionaries;  and  from  his  influence  in  the  public 
assembly,  be  was  doubtless  the  author  of  many  important  positive 
measures,  thus  going  beyond  the  functions  belonging  to  what  is 
called  opposition.  But  though  the  most  effective  speaker  in  the 
public  assembly,  he  "was  not  for  that  reason  the  most  influential 
person  in  the  democracy.  His  powers  of  speech  in  fact  stood  out 
the  more  prominently,  because  they  were  found  apart  from  that 
station  and  those  qualities  which  were  considered,  even  at  Athens, 
all  hut  essential  to  make  a  man  a  leader  in  political  life. 

To  understand  the  political  condition  of  Athens  at  this  time,  it  has 
been  nccessar}'  to  take  this  comparison  between  Nikias  and  Kleon, 
and  to  remark,  that  though  the  latter  might  be  a  more  victorious 
speaker,  the  former  was  the  more  guiding  and  influential  leader. 
The  points  gained  by  Kleon  were  all  noisy  and  palpable,  sometimes, 
however,  without  doubt,  of  considerable  moment— but  the  course  of 
affairs  was  much  more  under  the  direction  of  Nikias. 

It  was  during  the  summer  of  this  year  (the  fifth  of  the  war — B.C. 
427)  that  the  Athenians  began  operations  on  a  small  scale  in  Sicily; 
probably  contrary  to  the  advice  both  of  Nikias  and  Kleon,  neither  of 
them  seemingly  favorable  to  these  distant  undertakings.  I  reserve, 
however,  the  series  of  Athenian  measures  in  Sicily — which  afterward 
became  the  turning-point  of  the  fortunes  of  the  state — for  a  depart- 
ment by  themselves.  I  shall  take  them  up  separately,  and  bring 
them  down  to  the  Athenian  expedition  against  Syracuse,  when  I 
reach  the  date  of  that  important  event. 

During  the  autumn  of  the  same  year,  the  epidemic  disorder,  after 
having  intermitted  for  some  time,  resumed  its  ravages  at  Athens,  and 
continued  for  one  whole  year  longer,  to  the  sad  ruin  both  of  the 
strength  and  the  comfort  of  the  city.  And  it  seems  that  this  autumn, 
as  well  as  the  ensuing  summer,  were  distinguished  by  violent  atmo- 
spheric and  terrestrial  disturbance.  Numerous  earthquakes  were 
experienced  at  Athens,  inEubcea,  inBceotia,  especially  near  Orchome- 
nus.  Sudden  waves  of  the  sea  and  unexampled  tides  were  also  felt 
on  the  coast  of  Eubcea  and  Lokris,  and  the  islands  of  Atalante  and 
Peparethus:  the  Athenian  fort  and  one  of  the  two  guard-ships  at 
Atalante  were  partially  destroyed.  The  earthquakes  produced  one 
effect  favorable  to  Athens.  They  deterred  the  Lacedaemonians  from 
invading  Attica.  Agis,  king  of  Sparta,  had  already  reached  the 
Isthmus  for  that  purpose;  but  repeated  earthquakes  were  looked 
iiponas  an  unfavorable  portent,  and  the  scheme  was  abandoned. 

These  earthquakes,  however,  were  not  considered  sufficient  to 
deter  the  Lacedaemonians  from  the  foundation  of  Herakleia,  a  new 
colony  near  the  strait  of  Thermopylae.  On  this  occasion,  we  hear  of 
a  branch  of  the  Greek  population  not  before  mentioned  during  the 
war-     The  coast  north-west  of  the  strait  of  Thermopylae  was  occu- 


FOUNDATION  OF  HERAKLEIA.  627 

pied  by  the  three  subdivisions  of  the  Malians — Paralii,  Hieres,  and 
Trachinians.  These  latter,  immediately  adjoining  Mount  GSta  on  its 
north  side — as  well  as  the  Dorians  (the  little  tribe  properly  so  called, 
which  was  accounted  the  primitive  hearth  of  the  Dorians  generally) 
who  joined  the  same  mountain  range  on  the  south — were  both  of 
them  harassed  and  plundered  by  the  predatory  mountaineers,  proba- 
bly .Etolians,  on  the  high  lands  between  them.  At  first  the  Tra- 
chinians  were  disposed  to  throw  themselves  on  the  protection  of 
Athens.  But  not  feeling  sufficiently  assured  as  to  the  way  in  which 
Bhe  would  deal  with  them,  they  joined  with  the  Dorians  in  claiming 
aid  from  Sparta:  in  fact,  it  does  not  appear  that  Athens,  .possessing 
naval  superiority  only  and  being  inferior  on  land,  could  have  .given 
them  effective  aid. 

The  Lacedaemonians,  eagerly  embracing  the  opportunity,  deter- 
mined to  plant  a  strong  colony  in  this  tempting  situation.  There 
was  wood  in  the  neighboring  regions  for  ship-building,  so  that  they 
might  hope  to  acquire  a  naval  position  for  attacking  the  neighboring 
island  of  Euboea,  while  the  passage  of  troops  against  the  subject- 
allies  of  Athens  in  Thrace  would  also  be  facilitated;  the  impractica- 
bility of  such  passage  had  forced  them,  three  years  before,  to  leave 
Potidsea  to  its  fate.  A  considerable  body  of  colonists,  Spartans  and 
Lacedaemonian  Periceki,  was  assembled  under  the  conduct  of  three 
Spartan  CEkists — Leon,  Damagon,  and  Alkidas;  the  latter  (we  are  to 
presume,  though  Thucydides  does  not  say  so)  the  same  admiral  who  had 
met  with  such  little  success  in  Ionia  and  at  Korkyra.  Proclamation 
was  further  made  to  invite  the  junction  of  all  other  Greeks  as  colo- 
nists, excepting  by  name  Ionians,  Achaeans,  and  oome  other  tribes 
not  here  specified.  Probably  the  distinct  exclusion  of  the  Achaeans 
must  have  been  rather  the  continuance  of  ancient  sentiment  than  dic- 
tated by  any  present  reasons;  since  the  Achaeans  were  not  now  pro- 
nounced enemies  of  Sparta.  A  number  of  colonists,  stated  as  not 
les-<  than  10,000,  flocked  to  the  place,  having  confidence  in  the  sta- 
bility of  the  colony  under  the  powerful  protection  of  Sparta.  The 
new  town,  of  large  circuit,  was  built  and  fortified  under  the  name  of 
Herakleia;  not  far  from  the  site  of  Trachis,  about  two  miles  and  a 
quarter  from  the  nearest  point  of  the  Maliac  Gulf,  and  about  double 
that  distance  from  the  strait  of  Thermopylae.  Near  to  the  latter,  and 
for  the  purpose  of  keeping  effective  possession  of  it,  a  port  with  dock 
and  accommodation  for  shipping  was  constructed. 

A  populous  city,  established  under  Lacedaemonian  protection  in 
this  important  post,  alarmed  the  Athenians,  and  created  much  expec- 
tation in  every  part  of  Greece.  But  the  Lacedaemonian  G^kists  were 
harsh  and  unskillful  in  their  management;  wliile  the  Thessalains,  to 
whom  the  Trachinia*  territory  was  tributary,  considered  the  colony 
as  an  encroachment  upon  their  soil.  Anxious  to  prevent  its  increase, 
they  harassed  it  with  hostilities  from  the  first  moment.  The  G5taean 
assailants  were  also  active  enemies;  so  that  Herakleia,  thus  pressed 


H28       FrFTii  AND  sixth  years  of  ttie  war. 

from  without  and  misgoverned  within,  dwindled  down  from  Li 
inal  aiimbers  and  promise,  barely  maintaining  its  existence.     We 
shall  And  it  in  later  times,  however,  revived,  and  becoming  a  place 
of  considerable  importance. 

The  main  Athenian  armament  of  this  summer,  consisting  of 
sixty  triremes  under  Nikias,  undertook  an  expedition  againsl  the 
island  of  Melos.  Melos  and  There,  both  inhabited  by  ancient 
colonists  from  Lacedaemon,  had  never  been  from  the  beginning, 
and  still  refused  to  be,  members  of  the  Athenian  alliance  or  sub- 
jects of  the  Athenian  empire.  They  thus  stood  out  as  exceptions 
to  all  the  other  islands  in  the  ^Egean,  and  the  Athenians  thought 
themselves  authorized  to  resort  to  constraint  and  conquest;  believing 
themselves  entitled  to  command  over  all  the  islands.  They  mighl 
indeed  urge,  and  with  considerable  plausibility,  that  the  Meliansnow 
enjoyed  their  share  of  the  protection  of  the  ^Egean  from  piracy, 
without  contributing  to  the  cost  of  it:  but  considering  the  obstinate 
reluctance  and  strong  philo-Laconian  prepossessions  of  the  Medians, 
who  had  taken  no  part  in  the  war  and  given  no  ground  of  offen-i  to 
Athens,  the  attempt  to  conquer  them  by  force  could  hardly  be  justi- 
fied even  as  a  calculation  of  gain  and  loss,  nnd  was  a  mere  gratifica- 
tion to  the  pride  of  power  in  carrying  out  what,  in  modern  days,  we 
should  call  the  principle  of  maritime  empire.  Melos  and  Thera 
formed  awkward  corners,  which  defaced  the  symmetry  of  a  great 
proprietor's  field;  and  the  former  ultimately  entailed  upon  Athens 
the  heaviest  of  all  losses— a  dc<'<\  of  blood  which  deeply  dishonored  her 
annals.  On  this  occasion,  Nikias  visited  the  island  with  his  fleet, 
and  after  vainly  summoning  the  inhabitants,  ravaged  the  lands,  but 
retired  without  undivilaking  a  siege.  Me  then  sailed  away,  and  came 
to  <  >ropus,  on  the  north  easl  frontier  of  Attica  bordei  ing  on  Ba-otia. 
The  hoplites  on  board  his  ships.  landing  in  the  night,  marched  into 
the  interior  of  Boeotia  to  the  vicinity  of  Tanagre.  They  were  here 
met,  according  to  signal  raised,  by  a  military  force  from  Athens 
which  marched  thither  by  land;  and  the  joint  Athenian  army  ravaged 
the  Tanagrsean  territory,  gaining  an  insignificant  advantage  over  its 
defenders.  On  retiring,  Nikias  re-assembled  his  armament,  sailed 
northward  along  the  coast  of  Lokris  with  the  usual  ravages,  and 
returned  home  without  effecting  anything  further. 

About  the  same  time  thai  he  started,  thirty  other  Athenian  triremes, 
under  Demosthenes  and  Prokles,  had  been  sent  round  Peloponnesus 
to  act  upon  the  coast  of  Akarnania.  In  conjunction  with  the  whole 
Akarnanian  force,  except  the  men  of  CEniadae — with  fifteen  triremes 
from  Korkyra  and  some  troops  from  Kephallenia  and  Zakynthus — 
they  ravaged  the  whole  territory  of  Leukas,  both  within  ami  without 
the  isthmus,  and  confined  the  inhabitants  to  their  town,  which  was 
toe  strong  to  be  taken  by  anything  but  a  wall  of  circumvallation  and 
a  tedious  blockade.  And  the  Akarnanians,  to  whom  the  city  was 
especially  hostile,  were  urgent  with  Demosthenes  to  undertake  this 


EXPEDITION  AGAINST  .ETOLIA.  629 

measure  forthwith,  since  the  opportunity  might  not  again  recur,  and 
success  was  nearly  certain. 

But  this  enterprising  officer  committed  the  gtave  imprudence  of 
offending  them  on  a  matter  of  great  importance,  in  order  to  attack  a 
country  of  all  others  the  most  impracticable — the  interior  of  iEtolia. 
The  Messenians  of  Naupaktus,  who  suffered  from  the  depredations 
of  the  neighboring  xEtolian  tribes,  inflamed  his  imagination  by  sug- 
gesting to  him  a  grand  scheme  of  operations,  more  worthy  of  the 
large  force  which  he  commanded  than  the  mere  reduction  of  Leukas. 
The  various  tribes  of  ^Etoliaus — rude,  brave,  active,  predatory,  and 
unrivaled  in  the  use  of  the  javelin,  which  they  rarely  laid  out  of 
their  hands — stretched  across  the  country  from  between  Parnassus 
and  (Eta  to  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Achelous.  The  scheme  suggested 
by  the  Messenians  was  that  Demosthenes  should  attack  the  great  cen- 
tral xEtolian  tribes — the  Apodoti,  Ophioneis,  and  Eurytanes: — if  they 
were  conquered,  all  the  remaining  continental  tribes  between  the 
Ambrakian  Gulf  and  Mount  Parnassus  might  be  invited  or  forced 
into  the  alliance  of  Athens — the  Akarnanians  being  already  included 
in  it.  Having  thus  got  the  command  of  a  large  continental  force, 
Demosthenes  contemplated  the  ulterior  scheme  of  marching  at  the 
head  of  it  on  the  west  of  Parnassus  through  the  territory  of  the  Ozo- 
lian  Lokrians — inhabiting  the  north  of  the  Corinthian  Gulf,  friendly 
to  Athens,  and  enemies  to  the  ^Etolians,  whom  they  resembled  bofh 
in  their  habits  and  in  their  fighting — until  he  arrived  at  Kitynium  in 
Doris,  in  the  upper  portion  of  the  valley  of  the  river  Kephisus.  He 
would  then  easily  descend  that  valley  into  the  territory  of  the  Pho- 
kians,  who  were  likely  to  join  the  Athenians  if  a  favorable  opportu- 
nity occurred,  but  who  might  at  any  rate  be  constrained  to  do  so. 
From  Phokis  the  scheme  was  to  invade  from  the  northward  the  con- 
terminous territory  of  Bceotia,  the  great  enemy  of  Athens;  which 
might  thus  perhaps  be  completely  subdued,  if  assailed  at  the  same 
time  from  Attiea.  Any  Athenian  general  who  could  have  executed 
this  comprehensive  scheme  would  have  acquired  at  home  a  high  and 
well-merited  celebrity.  But  Demosthenes  had  been  ill  informed  both 
as  to  the  invincible  barbarians  and  the  pathless  country  compre- 
hended under  the  name  of  JEtolia.  Some  of  the  tribes  spoke  a  lan- 
guage scarcely  intelligible  to  Greeks,  and  even  ate  their  meat  raw ; 
while  the  country  has  even  down  to  the  present  time  remained  not 
only  unconquered,  but  untraversed  by  an  enemy  in  arms. 

Demosthenes  accordingly  retired  from  Leukas,  in  spite  of  the 
remonstrance  of  the  Akarnanians,  who  not  only  could  not  be  induced 
to  accompany  him,  but  went  home  in  visible  disgust.  He  then  sailed 
with  his  other  forces — Messenians,  Kephallenians,  and  Zakynthians 
— to  OEneon  in  the  territory  of  the  Ozolian  Lokrians.  a  maritime 
township  on  the  Corinthian  Gulf,  not  far  eastward  of  Naupaktus — 
where  his  army  was  disembarked,  together  with  300  epibatre  (or 
marines)  from  the  triremes — including  on  this  occasion,  what  was  not 


6C0         FIFTH  AND  SIXTH  YEARS  OF  THE  WAR. 

commonly  the  case  on  shipboard,  some  of  the  choice  boplites,  selected 
all  from  young  men  of  the  same  age,  on  the  Athenian  muster-roll. 
Having  passed  the  nighl  in  the  sacred  precinct  of  Zeus  Nemeut  at 
CEneon,  memorable  as  the  spot  where  the  poel  Hesiod  was  said  to 
have  been  slain,  he  marched  early  in  the  morning,  under  thi 
ance  of  the  Messenian  Chromon,  into  /Ktoiia.  On  tin-  first  day  he 
took  Potidania,  on  the  second  Krokyleium,  cm  the  third  Teichium — 
all  of  them  villages  unfortified  and  undefended,  for  the  inhabitants 
abandoned  them  and  fled  to  the  mountains  above.  1!<'  was  here 
inclined  to  halt  and  await  the  junction  of  the  Ozolian  Lokrians,  who 
had  engaged  to  invade  iEtoba  at  the  same  time,  and  were  almost 
indispensable  to  his  success,  from  their  familiarity  with  .Ktolian 
warfare,  and  their  similarity  of  weapons.  Bui  the  },\<  ssenians  again 
persuaded  hini  to  advance  without  delay  into  the  interior,  in  order 
that  the  villages  might  he  separately  attacked  and  taken  before  any 

collective  force  corld  he  gathered  together:  ami  Demosthenes  was  so 
encouraged  by  having  as  yet,  encountered  no  resistance,  that  he 
advanced  to  jEgitium,  which  he  also  found  deserted,  and  captured 
without  opposition. 

Here,  however,  was  the  term  of  his  good  fortune.  The  mountains 
round  JEgitium  were  occupied  not  only  by  the  inhabitants  of  that 
village,  but  also  by  the  entire  force  of  JEtolia,  collected  even  from 
the  distant  tribes  Bomies  and  Rallies,  who  bordered  on  the  Maliac 
Gulf.  The  invasion  of  Demosthenes  had  become  known  beforehand 
to  the  ^Etolians,  who  not  only  forewarned  all  their  own  tribes  of  the 
approaching  enemy,  but  also  sent  ambassadors  to  Sparta  and  Corinth 
to  ask  for  aid.  However,  they  showed  themselves  fully  capable  of 
defending  their  owu  territory  without  foreign  aid.  Demosthenes 
found  himself  assailed  in  his  position  at  iEgitium,  on  all  sides  at 
once  by  these  active  highlanders  armed  with  javelins,  pouring  down 
from  the  neighboring  hills.  Not  engaging  in  any  close  combat,  they 
retreated  when  the  Athenians  advanced  forward  to  charge  them — 
resuming  their  aggression  the  moment  that  the  pursuers,  who  could 
never  advance  far  in  consequence  of  the  ruggedness  of  the  ground, 
began  to  return  to  the  main  body.  The  small  number  of  bowmen 
along  with  Demosthenes  for  some  time  kept  their  unshielded  assail- 
ants at  bay.  But  the  officer  commanding  the  bowmen  was  presently 
slain:  the  stock  of  arrows  became  nearly  exhausted;  and  "what  was 
still  worse,  Chromon  the  Messenian,  the  only  man  who  knew  the 
country  and  could  serve  as  guide,  was  slain  also.  The  bowmen 
became  thus  either  ineffective  or  dispersed;  while  the  boplites 
exhausted  themselves  in  vain  attempts  to  pursue  and  beat  off  an 
active  enemy,  who  always  returned  upon  them  and  in  every  succes- 
sive onset  thinned  and  distressed  them  more  and  more.  At  length 
the  force  of  Demosthenes  was  completely  broken  and  compelled  to 
take  flight;  without  beaten  roads,  without  guides,  and  in  a  country 
not  only  strange  to  them,  but  impervious,  from  continual  mountain, 


ATTACK  UPON  NAUPAKTUS.        631 

rock,  and  forest.  Many  of  them  were  slain  in  the  flight  by  pursuers, 
superior  not  less  in  rapidity  of  movement  than  in  knowledge  of  the 
country:  some  even  lost  themselves  in  the  forest,  and  perished  miser- 
ably in  Sanies  kindled  around  them  by  the  ^Etolians.  The  fugitives 
were  at  length  reassembled  at  OEneon  near  the  sea,  with  the  loss  of 
Perikles,  the  colleague  of  Demosthenes  in  command,  as  well  asof  130 
hoplites,  among  the  best-armed  and  most  vigorous  in  the  Athenian 
muster-roll.  The  remaining  force  was  soon  transported  back  from 
Naupaktus  to  Athens,  but  Demosthenes  remained  behind,  being  too 
much  afraid  of  the  displeasure  of.  his  countrymen  to  return  at  such  a 
moment.  It  is  certain  that  his  conduct  was  such  as  justly  to  incur 
their  displeasure;  and  that  the  expedition  against  /Etolia,  alienating 
an  established  ally  and  provoking  a  new  enemy,  had  been  conceived 
with  a  degree  of  rashness  which  nothing  but  the  unexpected  favor  of 
fortune  could  have  counterbalanced. 

The  force  of  the  new  enemy,  whom  his  unsuccessful  attack  had 
raised  into  activity,  soon  made  itself  felt.  The  iEtoliau  envoys,  who 
had  been  dispatched  to  Sparta  and  Corinth,  found  it  easy  to  obtain 
the  promise  of  a  considerable  force  to  join  them  in  an  expedition 
against  Naupaktus.  About  the  month  of  September,  a  body  of  3,000 
Pcloponuesian  hoplites,  including  500  from  the  newly  founded  colony 
(A  Herakleia,  was  assembled  at  Delphi,  under  the  command  of 
Eurylochus,  Makarius,  and  Meuedemus.  Their  road  of  march  to 
Naupaktus  lay  through  the  territory  of  the  Ozolian  Lokrians,  whom 
they  proposed  either  to  gain  over  or  to  subdue.  With  Amphissa,  the 
largest  Lokrian  township  and  in  the  immediate  neighborhood  of 
Delphi,  they  had  little  difficulty — for  the  Amphissians  were  in  a  state 
of  feud  with  their  neighbors  on  the  other  side  of  Parnassus,  and  were 
afraid  that  the  new  armament  might  become  the  instrument  of 
Phokian  antipathy  against  them.  On  the  first  application  they 
joined  the  Spartan  alliance,  and  gave  hostages  for  their  fidelity  to  it: 
moreover,  they  persuaded  many  other  Lokrian  petty  villages — among 
others  the  Myoueis,  who  were  masters  of  the  most  difficult  pass  on 
the  road — to  do  the  same.  Eurylochus  received  from  these  various 
townships  re-enforcements  for  his  army,  as  well  as  hostages  for  their 
fidelity,  whom  he  deposited  at  Kytinium  in  Doris:  and  he  was  thus 
enabled  to  march  through  all  the  territory  of  the  Ozolian  Lokrians 
without  resistance;  except  from  03 neon  and  Eupalion,  both  which 
places  he  took  by  force.  Having  arrived  in  the  territory  of  Naupak- 
tus, he  was  there  joined  by  the  full  force  of  the  iEtolians.  Their 
joint  efforts,  after  laying  waste  all  the  neighborhood,  captured  the 
Corinthian  colony  of  Molykreiou,  which  had  become  subject  to  the 
Athenian  empire.  » 

Naupaktus,  with  a  large  circuit  of  wall  and  thinly  defended,  was 
in  the  greatest  danger,  and  would  certainly  have  been  taken,  had  it 
not  been  saved  by  the  efforts  of  the  Athenian  Demosthenes,  who  had 
remained    ihoiri    ever    since   the    unfortunate  iEtolian  expedition. 


633         FIFTH  AND  SIXTH  YEARS  OF  THE  WAR 

Apprised  of  the  coming  march  of  Eurylochus,  lie  went  personally  to 
the  Akamaniana,  and  persuaded  them  to  send  a  force  to  aid  in  the 
defense  of  Naupaktus.  For  a  long  time  they  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  his 
solicitations  in  consequence  of  tha  refusal  to  blockade  Leukas— but 
they  were  al  length  induced  to  consent.  At  the  head  of  1000  Akar- 
nanian  hoplites,  Demosthenes  threw  himself  into  Naupaktus,  and 
Eurylochus,  seeing  that  the  town  had  been  thus  placed  out  of  the 
reach  of  attack,  abandoned  all  his  designs  upon  it — marching  farther 
westward  to  the  neighboring  territories  of  ^Etolia — Kalydon,  Pleuron, 
and  Proschium,  near  the  Achelous  and  the  borders  of  Akarnania. 

The  /Etolians,  who  had  come  down  to  join  him  for  the  common 
purpose  of  attacking  Naupaktus,  here  abandoned  him  and  retired  to 
their  respective  homes.  But  the  Ambrakiots,  rejoiced  to  lind  so 
considerable  a  Pelopounesian  force  in  their  neighborhood,  prevailed 
upon  him  to  assist  them  in  attacking  the  Auiphilochian  Argos  as 
well  as  Akarnania;  assuring  him  that  there  was  now  a  fail-  prospecl 
of  bringing  the  whole  of  the  population  of  the  mainland,  between 
the  Ambrakian  and  Corinthian  Gulfs,  under  the  supremacy  of  Lace- 
daemon.  Having  persuaded  Eurylochus  thus  to  keep  his  forces 
together  and  ready,  they  themselves,  with  3,000  Ambrakiot  hoplites, 
invaded  the  territory  of  the  Auiphilochian  Argos,  and  captured  the 
fortified  hill  of  Olpoe,  immediately  bordering  on  the  Ambrakian  Gulf, 
about  three  miles  from  Argos  itself;  a  hill  employed  in  former  days 
by  tin- Akarnanians  as  a  place  for  public  judicial  congress  of  the 
\\  hole  nation. 

This  enterprise,  communicated  forthwith  to  Eurylochus,  was  the 
signal  for  movement  on  both  sides.  The  Akarnanians,  inarching 
with  their  whole  force  to  the  protection  of  Argos,  occupied  a  post 
called  Krena3  in  the  Amphilochian  territory,  to  prevent  Eurylochus 
from  effecting  his  junction  with  the  Ambrakiots  at  Olpa?.  They  at 
the  same  time  sent  urgent  messages  to  Demosthenes  at  Naupaktus, 
and  to  the  Athenian  guard-squadron  of  twenty  triremes  under  Aristot- 
cles  and  Ilierophon,  entreating  their  aid  in  the  present  need,  and 
inviting  Demosthenes  to  act  as  their  commander.  They  had  for- 
gotten their  displeasure  against  him,  arising  out  of  his  recent  refusal 
to  blockade  at  Leukas — for  which  they  probably  thought  that  he  had 
been  sufficiently  punished  by  his  disgrace  at  ./Elolia;  while  they  knew 
and  esteemed  Ins  military  capacity.  In  fact,  the  accident  whereby 
he  had  been  detained  at  Naupaktus  now  worked  fortunately  for  them 
as  well  as  for  him.  It  secured  to  them  a  commander  whom  all  of 
them  respected,  obviating  the  jealousies  among  their  own  numerous 
petty  townships — it  procured  for  him  the  means  of  retrieving  bis  own 
reputation  at  Athens.  Demosthenes,  not  backward  in  seizing  this 
-olden  opportunity,  came  speedily  into  the  Ambrakian  Gulf  with  the 
twenty  triremes,  conducting  200  Messenian  hoplites  and  sixty  Athe- 
nian bowmen.  Finding  the  whole  Akarnanian  force  concentrated  at 
the  Amphilochian  Argos,  he  was  named  general,  nominally  along 


MARCH  OF  EURYLOCHUS.  633 

with  the  Akarnanian  generals,  but  in  reality  enjoying  the  whole 
direction  of  operations. 

He  found  also  the  whole  of  the  enemy's  force,  both  the  3,000 
Ambrakiot  hoplites  and  the  Peloponnesian  division  under  Euryiochus, 
already  united  and  in  position  at  Olpae,  about  three  miles  off.  For 
Euryiochus,  as  soon  as  he  was  apprised  that  the  Ambrakiots  had 
reached  Olpae,  broke  up  forthwith  his  camp  at  Proschium  in  ^Etolia, 
knowing  that  his  best  chance  of  traversing  the  hostile  territory  of 
Akarnania  consisted  in  celerity:  the  whole  Akarnanian  force,  how- 
ever, had  already  gone  to  Argos,  so  that  his  march  was  unopposed 
through  that  country.  He  crossed  the  Achelous,  marched  westward 
of  Stratus,  through  the  Akarnanian  townships  of  Phytia,  Med  eon, 
and  Lirnnaea,  then  quitting  both  Akarnania  and  the  direct  road  from 
Akarnania  to  Argos,  he  struck  rather  eastward  into  the  mountainous 
district  of  Thyamus  in  the  territory  of  the  Agrseans,  who  were  ene- 
mies of  the  Akarnanians.  From  hence  he  descended  at  night  into 
the  territory  of  Argos,  and  passed  unobserved,  under  cover  of  the 
darkness,  between  Argos  itself  and  the  Akarnanian  force  at  Krenge, 
so  as  to  join  in  safety  the  3,000  Ambrakiots  at  Olpoe,  to  their  great 
joy.  They  had  feared  that  the  enemy  at  Argos  and  Krenae  would 
have  arrested  his  passage;  and  believing  their  force  inadequate  to 
contend  alone,  they  had  sent  pressing  messages  home  to  demand  large 
re-enforcements  for  themselves  and  their  own  protection. 

Demosthenes,  thus  finding  a  united  and  formidable  enemy,  superior 
in  number  to  himself,  at  Olpae,  conducted  his  troops  from  Argos  and 
Krenae  to  attack  them.  The  ground  was  rugged  and  mountainous, 
and  between  the  two  armies  lay  a  steep  ravine,  which  neither  liked 
to  be  the  first  to  pass;  so  that  they  lay  for  five  days  inactive.  If 
Herodotus  had  been  our  historian,  he  would  probably  have  ascribed 
this  delay  to  unfavorable  sacrifices  (which  may  indeed  have  been  the 
case),  and  would  have  given  us  interesting  anecdotes  respecting  the 
prophets  on  both  sides,-  but  the  more  positive  practical  genius  of 
Thucydides  merely  acquaints  us,  that  on  the  sixth  day  both  armies 
put  themselves  in  order  of  battle — both  probably  tired  of  waiting. 
The  ground  being  favorable  for  ambuscade,  Demosthenes  hid  in  a 
bushy  dell  400  hoplites  and  light-armed,  so  that  they  might  spring  up 
suddenly  in  the  midst  of  the  action  upon  the  Peloponnesian  left, 
which  outflanked  his  right.  He  was  himself  on  the  right  with  the 
Messenians  and  some  Athenians,  opposed  to  Euryiochus  on  the  left 
of  the  enemy:  the  Akarnanians  with  the  Amphilochian  akontists,  or 
darters,  occupied  his  left,  opposed  to  the  Ambrakiot  hoplites:  Ambra- 
kiots and  Peloponnesiaus  were,  however,  intermixed  in  the  line  of 
Euryiochus,  and  it  was  only  the  Mantfneans  who  maintained  a 
separate  station  of  their  own  toward  the  left  center.  The  battle 
accordingly  began,  and  Euryiochus,  with  his  superior  numbers,  was 
proceeding  to  surround  Demosthenes,  when  on  a  sudden  the  men  in 
ambush  rose  up  and  set  upon  his  rear.     A  panic  seized  his  men,  who 


634        FIFTH  AND  SIXTH  YEARS  OF  the  war. 

made  no  resistance  worthy  of  their  Peloponnesian  reputation:  they 
broke  and  fled,  while  Eurylochus,  <j  xposing  himself  with 

peculiar  bravery  in  order  to  restore  the  battle,  was  early  slain.  Demos 
thenes,  having  near  him  his  besl  ti  ed  them  vigorously, 

ami  their  panic  communicated  itself  to  the  troops  in  the  center,  so 
that  all  were  pul  to  flight  and  pursued  to  Olpae.  On  the  righl  of  the 
line  of  Eurylochus,  the  Ambrakiots,  the  mosl  warlike  Greeks  in  the 
Epirotic  regions,  completely  defeated  the  Akarnaniane  opposed  to 
them,  and  carried  their  pursuit  even  as  far  as  Argos.  So  complete, 
however,  was  the  victory  gained  by  Demosthenes  over  the  remaining 
troops,  thai  these  Ambrakiots  had  great  difficulty  in  fighting  their 
way  back  to  Olpse,  which  was  nol  accomplished  without  severe  loss, 
and  late  in  the  evening.  Among  all  the  beaten  troops,  the  Manti- 
neans  were  those  who  besl  maintained  their  retreating  order.  The 
loss  in  the  army  of  Demosthenes  was  about  300;  thai  of  the  opponents 
much  greater,  hut  the  Dumber  is  not  specified. 

Of  the  three  Spartan  commanders,  two,  Eurylochus  and  Makarius, 
had  been  slam:  the  third,  Meneihrus,  found  himself  beleaguered 
both  by  sea  and  land — the  Athenian  squadron  being  on  guard  along 
the  coast.  It  would  seem,  indeed,  thai  lie  mighl  have  fought  his  way 
to  Ambrakia,  especially  as  lie  would  have  met  the  Amhrakiot  rein- 
forcement coming  from  the  city.  But  whether  this  were  possible  or 
not,  the  commander,  too  much  dispirited  to  attempt  it,  look  advan- 
i  the  customary  truce  granted  for  burying  the  dead,  to  open 
negotiations  with  Demosth<  nes  and  the  Akamanian  gi  nerals,  for  the; 
purpose  of  obtaining  an  unmolested  retreat.  This  was  peremptorily 
refit  ed:  hut  Demosthenes  (with  the  consent  of  the  Akamanian 
leaders)  secretly  intimated  to  the  Spartan  commander  and  those 
immediately  around  him,  together  with  the  Mantineans  and  other 
Peloponnesian  troops — that  if  they  chose  to  make  a  separate  and  sur- 
reptitious retreat,  abandoning  their  comrades,  no  opposition  would 
he  offered.  He  designed  by  this  means  not  merely  to  isolate  the 
Ambrakiots,  the  great  enemies  of  Argos  and  Akarnania.  along  with 
the  body  of  miscellaneous  mercenaries  who  bad  come  under  Euryl- 
ochus— but  also  to  obtain  the  more  permanent  advantage  of  disgracing 
the  Spartans  and  Peloponnesians  in  the  eyes  of  the  Epirotic  Greeks, 
as  cowards  and  traitors  to  military  fellowship.  The  very  reason 
which  prompted  Demosthenes  to  granl  a  separate  facility  of  escape, 
ought  to  have  been  imperative  with  Menedaeus  and  the  Peloponne- 
sians around  him,  to  make  them  spurn  it  with  indignation.  Yet  such 
was  their  anxiety  for  personal  safely,  that  this  disgraceful  convention 
was  accepted,  ratified,  and  carried   into  effect    forthwith.      It  stands 

alone  in  Grecian  history  as  an  example  of  separate  treason  in  officers 
to  purchase  safety  for  themselves  and  their  immediate  comrades,  by 
abandoning  the  genera]  body  under  their  command.  Hud  the  officers 
been  Athenian,  it  would  have  been  doubtless  quoted  as  evidence  of 
the  pretended  faithlessness  of  democracy.     But  as  it  was  the  act  of  a 


RETKEAT  AND  LOSS  OF  THE   AMBRAKIOTS.     635 

Spartan  commander  in  conjunction  with  many  leading  Peloponne- 

siaus,  we  will  only  venture  to  remark  upon  it  as  a  further  manifesl  ation 
of  that  intra-Peloponnesian  selfishness,  and  carelessness  of  obligation 
toward  extra-Peloponnesian  Greeks,  which  we  found  so  lamentably 
prevalent  during  the  invasion  of  Xerxes;  in  this  case,  indeed,  height- 
ened by  the  fact,  that  the  men  deserted  were  fellow-Dorians  and  fel 
low-soldiers  who  had  just  fought  in  the  same  ranks. 

As  soon  as  the  ceremony  of  burying  the  dead  had  been  completed, 
Menedseus,  and  the  Peloponnesians  who  were  protected  bjT  this  secret 
convention,  stole  away  slyly  and  in  small  bands  under  pretense  of 
collecting  wood  and  vegetables.  On  getting  to  a  little  distance,  they 
quickened  their  pace  and  made  off — much  to  the  dismay  of  the 
Ambrakiots,  who  ran  after  them  trying  to  overtake  them.  The 
Akarnanians  pursued,  and  their  leaders  had  much  difficulty  in 
explaining  to  them  the  secret  convention  just  concluded.  It  was  not 
without  some  suspicions  of  treachery,  and  even  personal  hazard  from 
their  own  troops,  that  they  at  length  caused  the  fugitive  Peloponne- 
sians to  be  respected;  while  the  Ambrakiots,  the  most  obnoxious  of 
the  two  to  Akarnanian  feeling,  were  pursued  without  any  reserve, 
and  200  of  them  were  slain  before  they  could  escape  into  the  friendly 
territory  of  the  Agrseans.  To  distinguish  Ambrakiots  from  Pelopon- 
nesians, similar  in  race  and  dialect,  was  however  no  easy  task.  Much 
dispute  arose  in  individual  cases. 

Unfairly  as  this  loss  fell  upon  Ambrakia,  a  far  more  severe  calamity 
was  yet  in  store  for  her.  The  large  re-enforcement  from  the  city, 
which  had  been  urgently  invoked  by  the  detachment  at  Olpae,  started 
in  due  course  as  soon  as  they  could  be  got  ready,  and  entered  the  ter- 
ritory of  Amphilochia  about  the  time  when  the  battle  of  Olpse  was 
fought;  but  ignorant  of  that  misfortune,  and  hoping  to  arrive  soon 
enough  to  stand  by  their  friends.  Their  march  was  made  known  to 
Demosthenes,  on  the  day  after  the  battle,  by  the  Amphilochians, 
who  at  the  same  time  indicated  to  him  the  best  way  of  surprising 
them  in  the  rugged  and  mountainous  road  along  which  they  had  to 
march,  at  the  two  conspicuous  peaks  called  Idomene,  immediately 
above  a  narrow  pass  leading  farther  on  to  Olpae.  It  was  known 
beforehand,  by  the  line  of  march  of  the  Ambrakiots,  that  they  would 
rest  for  the  night  at  the  lower  of  these  two  peaks,  ready  to  march 
through  the  pass  on  the  next  morning.  On  that  same  night  a  detach- 
ment of  Amphilochiaus,  under  direction  from  Demosthenes,  seized 
the  higher  of  the  two  peaks;  while  that  commander  himself,  dividing 
his  forces  into  two  divisions,  started  from  his  position  at  Olpae  in 
the  evening  after  supper.  One  of  these  divisions,  having  the  advan- 
tage of  Amphilochian  guides  in  their  own, country,  marched  by  an 
unfrequented  mountain  road  to  Idomene;  the  other,  under  Demos- 
thenes himself,  went  directly  through  the  pass  leading  from  Idomene 
to  Olpae.  After  marching  all  night  they  reached  the  camp  of  the 
Ambrakiots  a  little  before  daybreak — Demosthenes  himself  with  his 


636         FIFTH  AND  SIXTH  YEARS  <>F  THE  WAR. 

Messenians  in  the  van.  Tim  surprise  was  complete.  The  Ambra- 
kiots  were  found  still  lying  down  and  asleep,  while  even  the  sentinels, 
uninformed  of  the  recenl  battle — hearingthemselvea  accosted  in  the 
Doric  dialect  by  the  Messenians,  whom  Demosthenes  had  placed  in 
front  for  thai  express  purpose— and  nol  seeing  very  clearly  in  the 
morning  twilight — mistook  them  for  some  of  their  own  fellow-citizens 
coming  bach  from  the  other  camp.  The  Akarnanians  and  Messe- 
nians thus  fell  among  the  Ambrakiots  sleeping  and  unarmed,  and 
without  any  possibility  of  resistance.  Large  numbers  of  them  were 
destroyed  on  the  spot,  and  the  remainder  fled  in  all  directions  among 
the  neighboring  mountains,  none  knowing  the  roads  and  the  country. 
It  was  the  country  of  the  Amphilochians — subjects  of  Ambrakia,  but 
subjects  averse  to  their  condition,  and  now  making  use  of  their  per- 
fect local  knowledge  and  light-armed  equipment,  to  inflict  a  terrible 
revenge  on  their  masters.  Some  of  the  Ambrakiots  beeame  entangled 
in  ravines — others  fell  into  ambuscades  laid  by  the  Amphilochians. 
Others  again,  dreading  most  of  all  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  the 
Amphilochians — barbaric  in  race  as  well  as  intensely  hostile  in  feeling 
— and  seeing  no  other  possibility  of  escaping  them,  swam  off  to  the 
Athenian  ships  cruising  along  the  shore.  There  were  but  a  small 
proportion  of  them  who  survived  to  return  to  Ambrakia. 

The  complete  victory  of  Idomene,  admirably  prepared  by  Demos- 
thenes, was  achieved  with  scarce  any  loss.  The  Akarnanians,  after 
erecting  their  trophy  and  despoiling  the  enemy's  dead,  prepared  to 
carry  off  the  arms  t]1Us  taken  to  Argos. 

On  the  morrow,  however,  before  this  was  done,  they  were  visited 
by  a  herald,  coming  from  those  Ambrakiots  who  had  fled  into  the 
Agraean  territory  after  the  battle  of  Olpa?  and  the  subsequent  pursuit. 
He  came  with  the  customary  request  from  defeated  soldiers,  for  per- 
mission to  bury  their  dead  who  bad  fallen  in  that  pursuit.  Neither 
he,  nor  those  from  whom  he  came  knew  anything  of  the  destruction 
of  their  brethren  at  Idomene — just  as  these  latter  had  been  ignorant 
of  the  defeat  at  01pa3;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Akarnanians  in 
the  camp, whose  minds  were  full  of  the  more  recent  and  capital  advan- 
tage at  Idomene,  supposed  that  the  message  referred  to  the  men  slain 
in  that  engagement.  The  numerous  panoplies  just  acquired  at 
Idomene  lay  piled  up  in  the  camp,  and  the  herald,  on  seeing  them, 
was  struck  with  amazement  at  the  size  of  the  heap,  so  much  execed- 
ing  the  number  of  those  who  were  missing  in  his  own  detachment. 
,\  n  Afcarnanian  present  asked  the  reason  of  his  surprise,  and  inquin  d 
how  many  of  his  comrades  had  been  slain — meaning  to  refer  to  the 
slain  at  Idomene.  "Aboul  two  hundred,"  the  herald  replied.  "Yet 
these  arms  here  show,  not  that  number,  but  more  than  a  thousand 
men." — "Then  they  are  not  the  arms  of  those  who  fought  with  us." 
— "  Nay — but  they  are — if  ye  were  the  persons  who  fought  yesterday 
at  Idomene." — "We  fought  with  no  one  yesterday:  it  was  the  day 
before  yesterday,  in  the  retreat." — "  O,  then — ye  have  to  learn,  that 


FEEBLE  CONDITION  OP  AMBRAKIA.  637 

we  were  engaged  yesterday  -with  these  others,  who  were  on  their 
march  as  re-enforcement  from  the  city  of  Ambrakia." 

The  unfortunate  herald  now  learnt  for  the  first  time  that  the  large 
re-enforcement  from  his  city  had  been  cut  to  pieces.  So  acute  was 
his  feeling  of  mingled  anguish  and  surprise  that  he  raised  a  loud  cry 
of  woe,  and  hurried  away  at  once,  without  saying  another  word;  not 
even  prosecuting  his  request  about  the  burial  of  the  dead  bodies^ 
which  appears  on  this  fatal  occasion  to  have  been  neglected. 

His  grief  was  justified  by  the  prodigious  magnitude  of  the  calamity, 
which  Thucydides  considers  to  have  been  the  greatest  that  afflicted 
any  Greciancity  during  the  whole  war  prior  to  the  peace  of  Nikias; 
so  incredibly  great,  indeed,  that  though  he  had  learnt  the  number 
slain,  he  declines  to  set  it  down,  from  fear  of  not  being  believed — a 
scruple  which  we  his  readers  have  much  reason  to  regret.  It  appears 
that  nearly  the  whole  adult  military  population  of  Ambrakia  was 
destroyed,  and  Demosthenes  was  urgent  with  the  Akarnanians  to 
march  thither  at  once.  Had  they  consented,  Thucydides  tells  us  posi- 
tively that  the  city  would  have  surrendered  without  a  blow.  But 
they  refused  to  undertake  the  enterprise,  fearing  (according  to  the 
historian)  that  the  Athenians  at  Ambrakia  would  be  more  trouble- 
some neighbors  to  them  than  the  Ambrakiots.  That  this  reason  was 
operative  we  need  not  doubt .  but  it  can  hardly  have  been  either  the 
single,  or  even  the  chief  reason ;  for  had  it  been  so,  they  would  have 
been  equally  afraid  of  Athenian  co-operation  in  the  blockade  of 
Leukas,  which  they  had  strenuously  solicited  from  Demosthenes, 
and  had  quarreled  with  him  for  refusing.  Ambrakia  was  less  near 
to  them  than  Leukas — and  in  its  present  exhausted  state,  inspired 
less  fear:  but  the  displeasure  arising  from  the  former  refusal  of 
Demosthenes  had  prodably  never  been  altogether  appeased,  nor  were 
they  sorry  to  find  an  opportunity  of  mortifying  him  in  a  similar 
mauner. 

In  the  distribution  of  the  spoil,  300  panoplies  were  first  set  apart  as 
the  perquisite  of  Demosthenes:  the  remainder  were  then  distributed, 
one-third  for  the  Athenians,  the  other  two-thirds  among  the  Akarna- 
nian  townships.  The  immense  reserve  personally  appropriated  to 
Demosthenes  enables  us  to  make  some  vague  conjecture  as  to  the 
total  loss  of  Ambrakiots.  The  fraction  of  one-third,  assigned  to 
the  Athenian  people,  must  have  been,  we  may  imagine,  six  times  as 
great,  and  perhaps  even  in  larger  proportion,  than  the  reserve  of  the 
general.  For  the  latter  was  at  that  time  under  the  displeasure  of 
the  people,  and  anxious  above  all  things  to  regain  their  favor — an 
object  which  would  be  frustrated  rather  than  promoted,  if  his 
personal  share  of  the  arms  were  not  greatly  disproportionate  to  tho 
collective  claim  of  the  city.  Reasoning  up"on  this  supposition,  the 
panoplies  assigned  to  Athens  would  be  1800,  and  the  total  of  Ambra- 
kiot  slain  whose  arms  became  public  property  would  be  5,400.  To 
which  must  be  added  some  Ambrakiots  killed  in  their  flight  from 


638         FIFTH  AND  SIXTH  FEARS  OF  THE  WAR. 

[domene  by  the  Amphilochians,  in  dells,  ravines,  and  by-places: 
probably  those  Amphilochians,  wllo  slew  them,  would  appropriate 
privately,  withoul  bringing  them  into  the  general  stock. 
Upon  this  calculation,  the  total  number  of  Ambrakiots  slain  in  both 
battles  and  both  pursuits,  would  be  about  6,000;  a  number  suitable 
to  the  grave  expressions  of  Thucydides,  as  well  as  to  bis  statements, 
the  firsl  detachment  which  marched  to  Olpae  was  8,000  strong — 
and  thai  the  message  sent  home  invoked  as  re-enforcemenl  the  total 

of   the   city.      How  totally   helpless    Ambrakia    ii.nl    become,  i 

still  more  conclusively  proved  by  the   fact  that  the  Corinthians  w<  re 

obliged  shortly  afterward  to  send  by  land  a  detachment  of  300  hop- 

ense. 

The  Athenian  triremes  soon  returned  to  their  station  at  Naupaktus. 

after  whieh  a  convention  was  concluded  between  the  Akarnanians 

and  Amphilot  bians  on  the  one  side,  and  the  Ambrakiots   and    lYlo- 

ponnesians  (who  had  fled  alter  the  battle  of  Olpaa  into  the  territory  of 
Balynthius  and  the  Agrsei)  on  the  other — insuring  a  safe  and  unmo 
tested  egress  to  both  of  the  latter.  With  the  Ambrakiots  a  more 
permanent  pacification  was  effected:  the  Akarnanians  and  Amphilo- 
chians concluded  with  them  a  peace  and  alliance  for  100  years,  on 
condition  that  they  should  surrender  all  the  Amphilochian  territory 
and  hostages  in  their  possession,  and  should  bind  themselves  to  fur- 
nish no  aid  to  Anaktorium,  then  in  hostility  to  the  Akarnanians. 
Each  party,  however,  maintained  its  separate  alliance — the  Ambra- 
kiots with  the  Peloponnesian  confederacy,  the  Akarnanians  with 
Athens.  It  was  stipulated  that  the  Akarnanians  should  not  be 
required  to  assisl  the  Ambrakiots  againsl  Athens,  nor  the  Ambra- 
kiots to  assist  the  Akarnanians  against  the  Peloponnesian  league; 
but  against  all  other  enemies,  each  engaged  to  lend  aid  to  the  other. 

To  Demosthenes  personally,  the  events  on  the  coast  of  the  Ambra- 
kian  G-ulf  proved  a  signal  good  fortune,  well-earned  indeed  by  the 
skill  which  he  had  displayed.  He  was  enabled  to  atone  for  his 
imprudence  in  the  JStolian  expedition,  and  to  re-establish  himself  in 
the  favor  of  the  Athenian  people.  He  sailed  home  in  triumph  to 
Athens,  during  the  course  of  the  winter,  with  his  reserved  present 
of  300  panoplies,  which  acquired  additional  value  from  the  accident, 
that  the  larger  number  of  panoplies,  reserved  out  of  the  spoil  for  the 
Athenian  people,  were  captured  at  sea  and  never  reached  Athens. 
Accordingly,  those  brought  by  Demosthenes  were  the  only  trophy  of 
the  victory,  and  as  such  were  deposited  in  the  Athenian  temples, 
where  Thucydides  mentions  them  as  still  existing  at  the  time  when 
lie  wrote. 

It  was  in  this  same  autumn  that  the  Athenians  were  induced  by  an 
oracle  to  undertake  the  more  complete  purification  of  the  sacred 
island  of  Delos.  This  step  was  probably  taken  to  propitiate  Apollo, 
since  they  were  under  the  persuasion  that  the  terrible  visitation  of 
the  epidemic  was  owing  to  his   wrath.     And  as  it  was  about  this 


INVASION  OF  ATTICA.  (Ytf) 

period  that  the  second  attack  of  the  epidemic,  after  having  lasted  a 
year,  disappeared — many  of  them  probably  ascribed  this  relief  to  the 
effect  of  their  pious  cares  at  Delos.  All  the  tombs  in  the  island  wen; 
opeued;  the  dead  bodies  were  then  exhumed  and  re-interred  in  the 
neighboring  island  of  Rheneia:  and  orders  were  given  that  for  the 
future  neither  deaths  nor  births  should  lake  place  in  the  sacred 
island.  Moreover,  the  ancient  Delian  festival— once  the  common 
point  of  meeting  and  solemnity  for  the  whole  Ionic  race,  and  cele- 
brated for  its  musical  contests,  before  the  Lydian  and  Persian  con- 
quests had  subverted  the  freedom  and  prosperity  of  Ionia — was  now 
renewed.  The  Athenians  celebrated  the  festival  with  its  accompany- 
ing matches,  even  the  chariot  race,  in  a  manner  more  splendid  than 
had  ever  been  known  in  former  times.  They  appointed  a  similar 
festival  to  be  celebrated  every  fourth  year.  At  this  period  they  were 
excluded  both  from  the  Olympic  and  the  Pythian  games,  which 
probably  made  the  revival  of  the  Delian  festival  more  gratifying 
to  them.  The  religious  zeal  and  munificence  of  Nikias  were  strik- 
ingly displayed  at  Delos. 


CHAPTER  LII. 

SEVENTH  TEAK  OP  THE  WAB. — CAPTURE  OP  SPHAKTERIA. 

The  invasion  of  Attica  by  the  Lacedaemonians  had  now  become  an 
ordinary  enterprise,  undertaken  in  every  year  of  the  war  except  the 
third  and  sixth,  and  then  omitted  only  from  accidental  causes: 
though  the  same  hopes  were  no  longer  entertained  from  it  as  at  the 
commencement  of  the  war.  During  the  present  spring  Agis  king  of 
Sparta  conducted  the  Peloponnesian  army  into  the  territory,  seem- 
ingly about  the  end  of  April,  and  repeated  the  usual  ravages. 

It  seemed,  however,  as  if  Korkyra  were  about  to  become  the  prin- 
cipal scene  of  the  year's  military  operations.  For  the  exiles  of  the 
oligarchical  party,  having  come  back  to  the  island  and  fortified  them- 
selves on  Mount  Istone,  carried  on  war  with  so  much  activity  against 
the  Korkyraeans  in  the  city,  that  distress  and  even  famine  reigned 
there.  Sixty  Peloponnesian  triremes  were  sent  thither  to  assist  the 
aggressors.  As  soon  as  it  became  known  at  Athens  how  hardly 
the  Korkyraeans  in  the  city  were  pressed,  orders  were  given  to  an 
Athenian  fleet  of  forty  triremes,  about  to  sail  for  Sicily  under  Eury- 
medon  and  Sophokles,  to  halt  in  their  voyage  at  Korkyra,  and  to 
lend  whatever  aid  might  be  needed.  But  during  the  course  of  this 
voyage  an  incident  occurred  elsewhere,  neither  foreseen  nor  imagined 
by  any  one,  which  gave  a  new  character  and  promise  to  the  whole 
war— illustrating  forcibly  the  observations  of  Perikles  and  Archida- 


640  SEVENTH  YEAR   <>F   THE   WAR. 

mus  before  its  commencement,  on  the  impossibility  of  calculating 
what  turn  events  might  take. 

So  high  did  Demosthenes  stand  in  the  favor  of  liis  countrymen 
after  his  brilliant  successes  in  the  Ambrakian  (Julf,  that  they  granted 
him  permission  at  his  own  request  to  go  aboard  and  to  employ  the 
fleet  in  any  descent  which  he  might  think  expedient  on  the  coast  of 
Peloponnesus.  The  attachment  of  this  active  officer  to  the  MesBeni 
ans  a1  Naupaktus  inspired  him  with  the  idea  of  planting  a  detachment 
of  them  on  some  well-chosen  maritime  post  in  the  ancient  Messenian 
territory,  from  whence  they  would  be  able  permanently  to  harass  the 
Lacedsemonians  and  provoke  revolt  among  the  Helots — the  more  so 
from  their  analogy  of  race  and  dialect.  The  Messenians,  active  in 
privateering,  and  doubtless  well  acquainted  with  the  points  of  this 
coast,  all  of  which  had  formerly  belonged  to  their  ancestors,  had 
probably  indicated  to  turn  Pylus  on  the  southwestern  shore. 

That  ancient  and  Homeric  name  was  applied  specially  and  prop- 
erly to  denote  the  promontory  which  forms  the  northern  termination 
of  the  modern  bay  of  Navarino  opposite  to  the  island  of  Sphagia  or 
Bphakteria;  though  in  vague  language  the  whole  neighboring  district 
seems  also  to  have  been  called  Pylus.  Accordingly,  in  circumnavi- 
gating Laconia,  Demosthenes  requested  that  the  fleet  might  be 
detained  at  this  spot  long  enough  to  enable  him  to  fortify  it,  engag- 
ing himself  to  stay  afterward  and  maintain  it  with  a  garrison.  It 
was  an  uninhabited  promontory — about  forty-five  miles  from 
Sparta,  that  is,  as  far  distant  as  any  portion  of  her  territory — pre- 
senting rugged  cliffs,  and  easy  of  defense  both  by  sea  and  land.  But 
its  great  additional  recommendation,  with  reference  to  the  maritime 
power  of  Athens,  consisted  in  its  overhanging  the  spacious  and 
secure  basin  now  called  the  bay  of  Navarino.  That  basin  was 
fronted  and  protected  by  the  islet  called  Sphakteria  or  Bphagia, 
untrodden,  untenanted,  and  full  of  wood:  which  stretched  along  the 
coast  for  about  a  mile  and  three-quarters,  leaving  only  two  narrow 
entrances;  one  at  its  northern  end,  opposite  to  the  position  fixed  on 
by  Demosthenes,  so  confined  as  to  admit  only  two  triremes  abreast 
— the  other  at  the  southern  end  about  four  fimes  as  broad;  while  the 
inner  water  approached  by  these  two  channels  was  both  roomy  and 
protected.  It  was  on  the  coast  of  Peloponnesus,  a  little  within  the 
northern  or  narrowest  of  the  two  channels,  that  Demosthenes  pro- 
posed to  plant  his  little  fort — the  ground  being  itself  eminently 
favorable;  with  a  spring  of  fresh  water  in  the  center  of  the  promon- 
tory. 

But  Eurymedon  and  Sophokles  decidedly  rejected  all  proposition 
of  delay;  and  with  much  reason,  since  "they  had  been  informed 
(though  seemingly  without  truth)  that  the  Peloponnesian  fleet  had 
actually  reached  Korkyra.  They  might  well  have  remembered  the 
mischief  which  had  ensued  three  years  before,  from  the  delay  of  the 
re-enforcement  sent  to  Phormio  in  some  desultory  operations  on  the 


THE  FLEET  DRIVEN  INTO  PYLUS.  64l 

coast  of  Krete.  The  fleet  accordingly  passed  by  Pylus  without  stop- 
ping: but  a  terrible  storm  drove  them  back  and  forced  them  to  seek 
shelter  in  the  very  harbor  which  Demosthenes  had  fixed  upon — the 
only  harbor  anywhere  near.  That  officer  took  advantage  of  this 
accident  to  renew  his  proposition,  which  however  appeared  to  the 
commanders  chimerical.  There  were  plenty  of  desert  capes  round 
Peloponnesus  (they  said),  if  he  chose  to  waste  the  resources  of  the 
city  in  occupying  them.  They  remained  unmoved  by  his  reasons  in 
reply.  Finding  himself  thus  unsuccessful,  Demosthenes  presumed 
upon  the  undefined  permission  granted  to  him  by  the  Athenian 
people,  to  address  himself  first  to  the  soldiers,  last  of  all  to  the  taxi- 
archs  or  inferior  officers — and  to  persuade  them  to  second  his  project, 
even  against  the  will  of  the  commanders.  Much  inconvenieuco 
might  well  have  arisen  from  such  clashing  of  authority:  but  it  hap- 
pened that  both  the  soldiers  and  the  taxiarchs  took  the  same  view  of 
the  case  as  their  commanders,  and  refused  compliance.  Nor  can  we 
be  surprised  at  such  reluctance,  when  we  reflect  upon  the  seeming 
improbability  of  being  able  to  maintain  such  a  post  against  the 
great  real,  and  still  greater  supposed,  superiority  of  Lacedaemonian 
land-force.  It  happened  however  that  the  fleet  was  detained  there 
for  some  days  by  stormy  weather;  so  that  the  soldiers,  having  noth- 
ing to  do,  were  seized  with  the  spontaneous  impulse  of  occupying 
themselves  with  the  fortification,  and  crowded  around  to  execute  it 
with  all  the  emulation  of  eager  volunteers.  Having  contemplated 
nothing  of  the  kind  on  starting  from  Athens,  they  had  neither  tools 
for  cutting  stone,  nor  hods  for  carrying  mortar.  Accordingly,  they 
were  compelled  to  build  their  wall  by  collecting  such  pieces  of  rock 
or  stones  as  they  found,  and  putting  them  together  as  each  happened 
to  fit  in :  whenever  mortar  was  needed,  they  brought  it  up  on  their 
bended  backs,  with  hands  joined  behind  them  to  prevent  it  from 
slipping  away.  Such  deficiencies  were  made  up,  however,  partly  by 
the  unbounded  ardor  of  the  soldiers,  partly  by  the  natural  difficulties 
of  the  ground,  which  hardly  required  fortification  except  at  particu- 
lar points;  the  work  was  completed  in  a  rough  way  in  six  days,  and 
Demosthenes  was  left  in  garrison  with  five  ships,  while  Eurymedon 
with  the  main  fleet  sailed  away  to  Korkyra.  The  crews  of  the  five 
ships  (two  of  which,  however,  were  sent  away  to  warn  Eurymedon 
afterward)  would  amount  to  about  1000  men  in  all.  But  there 
presently  arrived  two  armed  Messenian  privateers,  from  which 
Demosthenes  obtained  a  re-enforcement  of  forty  Messenian  hoplites, 
together  with  a  supply  of  wicker  shields,  though  more  fit  for  show 
than  for  use,  wherewith  to  arm  his  rowers.  Altogether,  it  appears 
that  he  must  have  had  about  200  hoplites,  besides  the  half-armed 
seamen.  * 

Intelligence   of  this  attempt  to   plant,   even   upon  the  Lacedae- 
monian territory,  the  annoyance  and  insult  of  a  hostile  post,  was 
eoon  transmitted  to  Sparta.     Yet  no  immediate  measures  were  taken 
H.  G.  II.—  21 


643  SEVENTH  YEAR  OF  THE  TVAR. 

in  march  to  the  spol ;  ae  well  from  the  natural  slowness  of  the  Spar* 
lan  character,  strengthened  l>\  a  festival  which  happened  to  lie  then 
going  on,  as  from  the  confidence  entertained  that,  when<  rer  attacked, 
the  expulsion  of  the  enemy  was  certain.     A   Btronger  impression 

however  was  made  by  the  news  upon  i  lie  Lacedaemonian  army  invad- 
ing Atliea.  who  were  al  the  same  lime  Buffering  from  want  of  pro- 
visions (the  com  noi  being  yel  ripe),  and  from  an  unusually  cold 
spring:  accordingly,  Agis  marched  them  back  )■>  Sparta,  and  the 
fortification  of  Pylus  thus  produced  the  effect  of  abridging  the 
invasion  to  the  unusually  shorl  period  of  fifteen  days,  it  opi 
in  like  manner  to  the  protection  of  Korkyra:  for  the  Peloponnesian 
Heel,  recently  arrived  thither  or  ^ i ill  on  its  "way,  received  orders 
immediately  to  return  for  the  attach  of  Pylus.  Having  avoided  the 
Athenian  fleet  by  transporting  the  ships  across  the  isthmus  of  Leu- 
kas,  it  reached  Pylus  aboul  the  Ban  e  time  as  the  Lacedaemonian 
land  force  from  Sparta,  composed  of  the  Spartans  themselves  and 
the  neighboring  Perioeki.  For  the  more  distant  Perioeki,  as  well 
as  the  Peloponnesian  allies,  being  jusl  returned  from  Attica,  though 
summoned  to  come  as  sooh  as  they  could,  did  not  accompany  this 
first  march. 

At  flu-  hist  moment  before  the  Peloponnesian  fleet  came  in  and 
occupied  the  harbor,  Demosthenes  detached  two  out  of  his  live  tri- 
remes to  warn  Eurymedon  and  the  main  licet,  and  to  entreat  immedi- 
ate succor;  the  remaining  ships  lie  bauled  ashore  under  the  fortifi- 
cation, protecting  them  by  palisades  planted  in  front,  and  prepared 

to  defend  himself  in  the  hot    manner'  lie  could.      Having  posted  the 

larger  portion  of  his  force — some  of  tin  m  mere  seamen  without 
arms,  and  many  only  half-armed — round  the  assailable  points  of  the 
fortification,  to  resisi  attacks  from  the  land-force,  lie  himself,  with 
sixty  chosen  hoplites  and  a  lew  how  men,  march i  d  out  of  the  fortifi- 
cation down  to  the  sea-shore.  It  was  on  that  side  that  the  wall  was 
weakest,  for  the  Athenians,  confidi  nl  in  their  naval  superiority,  had 
given  themselves  little  trouble  to  provide  againsl  an  assailant  fleet. 
Accordingly,  Demosthenes  foresaw  that  the  great  stress  of  the  attack 
would  lie  on  the  sea-side.  His  only  safety  consisted  in  preventing 
the  enemy  from  landing;  a  purpose  seconded  by  the  rocky  ami 
perilous  shore,  which  left  no  possibility  of  approach  for  ships  except 
on  ;i  narrow  space  immediately  under  the  fortification.  It  was  here 
that  he  took  po^t.  on  the  water's  edge,  addressing  a  few  words  of 
encouragement  to  his  men,  and  warning  them  that  it  was  useless 
now  to  display  acuteness  in  summing  up  perils  which  were  but  too 
obvious — and  that  the  only  chance  of  escape  lay  in  boldly  encounter- 
ing the  enemy  before  tiny  could  set  foot  ashore;  the  difficulty  of 
effecting  a  Landing  from  ships  in  the  face  of  resistance  being  better 
known  to  Athenian  mariners  than  to  an\   one  else. 

With  a  Heel  of  forty-three  triremes  under  Thrasymelidas,  and  a 
powerful  land-force,  simultaneously  attacking,  the  Lacedamionians 


GALLANT  CONDUCT  OF  BRASIDAS.  643 

bad  good  hopes  of  storming  at  once  a  rock  so  hastily  converted 
into  a  military  post.  But  as  they  foresaw  thai  the  lirst  attack  might 
possibly  fail,  and  that  the  fleet  of  Eurymedon  would  probably 
return,  they  resolved  to  occupy  forthwith  the  island  of  Sphakteria, 
the  natural  place  where  the  Athenian  fleet  would  take  station  for  the 
purpose  of  assisting  the  garrison  ashore.  The  neighboring  coast  on 
the  mainland  of  Peloponnesus  was  both  harborless  and  hostile,  so 
that  there  was  no  oilier  spot  near,  where  they  could  take  station. 
And  the  Lacedaemonian  commanders  reckoned  upon  being  able  to 
stop  up,  as  it  were  mechanically,  both  the  two  entrances  into  the 
harbor,  by  triremes  lashed  together  from  the  island  to  the  main  land, 
with  their  prows  pointing  outward:  so  that  they  would  be  able  at 
at  any  rate,  occupying  the  island  as  well  as  the  two  channels,  to  keep 
off  the  Athenian  fleet,  and  to  hold  Demosthenes  closely  blocked  up 
on  the  rock  of  Pylus;  where  his  provisions  would  quickly  fail  him. 
With  these  views  they  drafted  off  by  lot  some  hoplites  from  each 
of  the  Spartan  lochi,  accompanied  as  usual  by  Helots,  and  sent 
them  across  to  Sphakteria;  while  their  land-force  and  their  fleet 
approached  at  once  to  attack  the  fortification. 

Of  the  assault  on  the  land-side  we  hear  little.  The  Lacedaemonians 
were  proverbially  unskillful  in  the  attack  of  anything  like  a  fortified 
place,  and  they  appear  now  to  have  made  little  impression.  But  the 
chief  stress  and  vigor  of  the  attack  came  on  the  sea-side,  as  Demos- 
thenes had  foreseen.  The  landing-place,  even  where  practicable,  was 
still  rocky  and  difficult — and  so  narrow  in  dimensions,  that  the  Lace- 
daemonian ships  could  only  approach  by  small  squadrons  at  a  time; 
while  the  Athenians  maintained  their  ground  firmly  to  prevent  a  sin- 
gle man  from  setting  foot  on  land.  The  assailing  triremes  rowed  up 
with  loud  shouts  and  exhortations  to  each  other,  striving  to  get  so 
placed  as  that  the  hoplites  in  the  bow  could  effect  a  lauding:  but 
such  were  the  difficulties  arising  partly  from  the  rocks  and  partly 
from  the  defense,  that  squadron  after  squadron  tried  this  in  vain. 
Nor  did  even  the  gallant  example  of  Brasidas  procure  for  them  any 
better  success.  That  officer,  commanding  a  trireme,  and  observing 
that  some  of  the  pilots  near  him  were  cautious  in  driving  their  ships 
close  in  shore  for  fear  of  staving  them  against  the  rocks,  indignantly 
called  to  them  not  to  spare  the  planks  of  their  vessels  when  the  enemy 
had  insulted  them  by  erecting  a  fort  in  the  country:  Lacedaemonians 
(he  exclaimed)  ought  to  carry  the  landing  by  force,  even  though  their 
ships  should  be  dashed  to  pieces:  the  Peloponnesian  allies  ought  to 
be  forward  in  sacrificing  their  ships  for  Sparta,  in  return  for  the 
many  services  which  she  had  rendered  to  them.  Foremost  in  per- 
formance as  well  as  in  exhortation,  Brasidas  constrained  his  own 
pilot  to  drive  his  ship  close  in,  and  advanced  in  person  even  on  to  the 
landing-steps,  for  the  purpose  of  leaping  first  ashore.  But  here  he 
stood  exposed  to  all  the  weapons  of  the  Athenian  defenders,  who 
beat  him  back  and  pierced  him  with  so  many  wounds,  that  he  fainted 


G44  SEVENTH   YEAR   OP  TI1E   WAR. 

away  and  fell  back  in  to  the  bowa  (or  foremost  pari  of  1  lie  trireme, 
beyond  the  rowers);  while  his  shield,  slipping  away  from  the  arm, 
dropped  down  and  rolled  overboard  into  the  sea.  His  ship  was 
obliged  to  retire,  like  the  rest,  without  having  effected  any  landing. 

All  these  successive  attacks  from  the  sea,  repeated  for  one  whole  day 

and  a  part  of  the  next,  were  repulsed  by  Demosthenes  and  his  little 

hand  with  victorious  bravery.  To  both  sides  it  seemed  a  strange  re- 
versal of  ordinary  relations,  that  the  Athenians,  essentially  maritime, 
should  be  fighting  on  land — and  that  too  Lacedaemonian  laud — against 
the  Lacedaemonians,  the  select  land-warriors  of  Greece  now  on  ship- 
board, and  striving  in  vain  to  compass  a  landing  on  their  own  shore. 
The  Athenians,  in  honor  of  their  success,  erected  a  trophy,  the  chief 
ornament  of  which  was  the  shield  of  Brasidas,  cast  ashore  by  the 
waves. 

On  the  third  day,  the  Lacedaemonians  did  not  repeat  their  attack, 
but  sent  some  of  their  vessels  round  to  Asine  in  the  Messenian  Cull' 
for  timber  to  construct  battering  machines;  which  they  intended  to 
employ  against  the  wall  of  Demosthenes  on  the  side  toward  the  har- 
bor, where  it  was  higher,  and  could  nol  be  assailed  withoul  machines, 
but  where  at  the  same  time  there  was  greal  facility  in  landing — for 
their  previous  attack  had  been  made  on  the  side  fronting  the  sea, 
where  the  wall  was  lower,  but  the  difficulties  of  landing  insuper- 
able. 

But  before  these  ships  came  back,  the  face  of  affairs  was  seriously 
changed  by  the  unwelcome  return  of  the  Athenian  fleet  from  Zakyn- 
thus  under  Eurymedon,  re-enforced  by  four  Chian  ships  and  some  of 
the  guard-ships  at  Naupaktus,  so  as  now  to  muster  fifty  sail.  The 
Athenian  admiral,  finding  the  enemy's  fleet  in  possession  of  the  har- 
bor, and  seeing  both  the  island  of  Sphakteria  occupied,  and  the  op- 
posite shore  covered  with  Lacedaemonian  hoplites — for  the  allies  from 
all  parts  of  Peloponnesus  bad  now  arrived — looked  around  in  vain 
for  a  place  to  land.  lie  could  find  no  other  night-station  except  the 
uninhabited  island  of  Prote,  not  very  far  distant.  From  hence  he 
sailed  forth  in  the  morning  to  Pylus,  prepared  lor  a  naval  engage- 
ment— hoping  that  perhaps  the  Lacedaemonians  might  come  out  to 
fight  him  in  the  open  sea,  but  resolved,  if  this  did  not  happen,  to 
force  his  way  in  and  attack  the  fleet  in  the  harbor;  the'  breadth  of 
sea  between  Sphakteria  ami  the  mainland  being  sufficient  to  admit  of 
nautical  maneuver.  The  Lacedaemonian  admirals,  seemingly  con- 
founded by  the  speed  of  the  Athenian  fleet  in  coming  back,  never 
thought  of  sailing  out  of  the  harbor  to  fight,  nor  did  they  even  realize 
their  scheme  of  blocking  up  the  two  entrances  of  the  harbor  with 
triremes  closely  lashed  together.  Leaving  both  entrances  open,  they 
determined  to  defend  themselves  within  but  even  here,  so  defective 
were  their  precautions  that  several  id'  their  triremes  were  yet  moored, 
and  the  rowers  not  fully  aboard,  when  the  Athenian  admirals  sailed 
in  by  both  entrances  at  once,  to  attack  them.     Most  of  the  Lac  da- 


DEFEAT  OF  THE  LACEDAEMONIAN  FLEET.      Q4£ 

monian  triremes,  afloat  and  in  fighting  trim,  resisted  the  attack  ror  a 
certain  time,  but  were  at  length  vanquished  and  driven  back  to  the 
shore,  many  of  them  with  serious  injury.  Five  of  them  were  cap- 
tured and  towed  off,  one  with  all  her  crew  aboard.  The  Athenians, 
vigorously  pursuing  their  success,  drove  against  such  as  took  refuge 
on  the  shore,  as  well  as  those  which  were  not  manned  at  the  moment  . 
when  the  attack  began,  and  had  not  been  able  to  get  afloat  or  into  ' 
action.  Some  of  the  vanquished  triremes  being  deserted  by  their 
crews,  -who  jumped  out  upon  the  land,  the  Athenians  were  proceed- 
ing to  tow  them  off,  when  the  Lacedaemonian  hoplites  on  the  shore 
opposed  a  new  and  strenuous  resistance.  Excited  to  the  utmost 
pitch  by  witnessing  the  disgraceful  defeat  of  their  fleet,  and  aware 
of  the  cruel  consequences  which  turned  upon  it — they  marched  all 
armed  into  the  water,  seized  the  ships  to  prevent  them  from  being 
dragged  off,  and  engaged  iu  a  desperate  conflict  to  baffle  the  assail- 
ants. We  have  already  seen  a  similar  act  of  bravery,  two  years  be- 
fore, on  the  part  of  the  Messenian  hoplites  accompanying  the  fleet  of 
Phormio  near  Naupaktus.  Extraordinary  daring  and  valor  was  here 
displayed  on  both  sides,  in  the  attack  as  well  as  in  the  defense,  and 
such  was  the  clamor  and  confusion,  that  neither  the  land-skill  of  the 
Lacedaemonians,  nor  the  sea-skill  of  the  Athenians,  were  of  much 
avail:  the  contest  was  one  of  personal  valor,  and  considerable  suffer- 
ing, on  both  sides.  At  length  the  Lacedaemonians  carried  their  point 
and  saved  all  the  ships  ashore;  none  being  carried  away  except  those 
at  tirst  captured.  Both  parties  thus  separated:  the  Athenians  retired 
to  the  fortress  at  Pylus,  where  they  were  doubtless  hailed  with  over- 
flowing joy  by  their  comrades,  and  where  they  erected  a  trophy  for 
their  victory — giving  up  the  enemy's  dead  for  burial,  and  picking  up 
the  floating  wrecks  and  pieces. 

But  the  great  prize  of  the  victory  was  neither  in  the  five  ships  cap- 
tured, nor  in  the  relief  afforded  to  the  besieged  at  Pylus.  It  lay  in 
the  hoplites  occupying  the  island  of  Sphakteria,  who  were  now  cut 
off  from  the  mainland,  as  well  as  from  all  supplies.  The  xlthenians, 
sailing  round  it  in  triumph,  already  looked  upon  them  as  their  pris- 
oners; while  the  Lacedaemonians  on  the  opposite  mainland,  deeply 
distressed  but  not  knowing  what  to  do,  sent  to  Sparta  for  advice. 
So  grave  was  the  emergency,  that  the  Ephors  came  in  person  to  the 
spot  forthwith.  Since  they  could  still  muster  sixty  triremes,  a  greater 
number  than  the  Athenians — besides  a  large  force  on  land,  and  the 
whole  command  of  the  resources  of  the  country — while  the  Athe- 
nians had  no  footing  on  shore  except  the  contracted  promontory  of 
Pylus,  we  might  have  imagined  that  a  strenuous  effort  to  carry  off 
the  imprisoned  detachment  across  the  narrow  strait  to  the  mainland 
would  have  had  a  fair  chance  of  success.  And  probably,  if  either 
Demosthenes  or  Brasidas  had  been  in  command,  such  an  effort  would 
have  been  made.  But  Lacedaemonian  courage  was  rather  steadfast 
and  unyielding  than  adventurous.     Moreover  the  Athenian  superior- 


G46  SEVENTH    YEA  It   OF   THE    WAR 

liy  at  si  a  exercised  a  sorl  of  fascination  over  men's  minds  analogous 

to  thai  of  the  Spartans  themselves  on  land;  bo  that  the  Ephors,  on 

[j  Pylus,  took  a  d<  sponding  view  of  their  ]•< >-ii ion.  and  Ben1  a 

herald  to  the  Athenian  generals  to  propose  an  armistice,  in  order  to 

time  for  envoys  to  go  to  Athens  and  treat  for  peace. 

To  this  Eruymedon  and  Demosthenes  assented,  and  an  armistice 

was  concluded  on  the  following  term-.     The  Lacedaemonians  agr<  i  d 

to  surrender  nol  only  all  their  triremes  now  in  the  harbor,  bul  also 

all  the  rest  in  their  ports,  altogether  to  the  number  of  sixty;  also  to 

abstain  from  all  attack  upon  the  fortress  at  Pylus  either  by  land  or 

sea.  for  such  time  as  should  be  necessary  for  the  mission  of  envoys 

to  Athens  as  well  as  for  their   return,  both  to   be  effected  in  an 

Athenian  trireme  provided  for  the  purpose.      The  Athenians  on  their 

side  engaged  to  desist  from  all  hostility  s  during  the  like  interval,  but 
it  was  agreed  that  they  should  keep  strict  and  unremitting  watch 
over  the  island,  yet  without  landing  upon  it.  For  the  subsistence  of 
the  detachment  in  the  island,  the  Lacedaemonians  were  permitted  to 
send  over  every  day  two  choenikes  of  barley-meal  in  cakes  ready 
baked,  two    kolyla-    of  wine,  and    some    meat,  for   each    hoplite — to 

gether  with  half  that  quantity  for  each  of  the  attendant  Helots;  but 

this  was  all  to  be  done  under  the  supervision  of  the  Ath<  mans,  with 
peremptory  obligations  to  send  no  secret  additional  supplies.  It  was 
moreover  expressly  stipulated  that  if  any  one  provision  of  the 
armistice,  small  or  great,  were  violated,  the  whole  should  lie  con- 
sidered as  null  and  void.  Lastly,  the  Athenians  engaged,  en  the 
return  of  the  envoys  from  Athens,  to  restore  the  triremes  in  tla  D  • 
condition  as  they  received  them 

Such  terms  sufficiently  attest  the  humiliation  and  anxiety  of  the 
Lacedaemonians;  while  the  surrender  of  their  entire  naval  force, 
to  the  number  of  sixty  triremes,  which  was  forthwith  carried  into 
effect,  demonstrates  at  the  same  time  that  they  sincerely  believed  in 
the  possibility  of  Obtaining  peace.  "Well-aware  that  they  were  them- 
the  original  beginners  of  the  war.  at  a  time  when  the  Athen 
iang  desired  peao — and  that  the  latter  had  besides  made  fruitless 
overtures  while  under  the  pressure  of  the  epidemic — they  pr<  sumed 
that  the  same  disposition  still  prevailed  at  Athens,  and  that  their 
presenl  pacific  wishes  would  be  so  gladly  welcomed  as  to  procure 
without  difficulty  the  relinquishment  of  the  prisoners  in  Sphakteria. 

The  Lacedaemonian  envoys,  conveyed  to  Athens  in  an  Athenian 
trireme,  appeared  before  the  public  assembly  to  set  forth  their 
mission,  according  to  custom,  prefacing  their  address  with  some 
apologies  for  that  brevity  of  speech  which  belonged  to  their  country. 
Their  proposition  was  in  substance  a  very  simple  one — "Give  Qp  to 
us  the  men  in  the  island,  and  accept,  in  exchange  for  this  favor, 
peace,  with  the  :illianee  of  Sparta."  They  enforced  their  cause  by 
-.  well  turned  and  conciliatory,  partly  indeed  to  the  generosity, 
but   still   more   to   the  prudential  calculation  of  Athens;  explicitly 


MISSION  OF  LACEDAEMONIAN  ENVOYS.  647 

admitting  the  high  and  glorious  vantage-ground  on  •which  she  was 
now  placed,  as  well  as  their  own  humbled  dignity  and  inferior  posi- 
tion. They,  the  Lacedaemonians,  the  first  and  greatest  power  in 
Greece,  were  smitten  by  adverse  fortune  of  war — and  that  too  with- 
out misconduct  of  their  own,  so  that  they  were  for  the  first  time 
obliged  to  solicit  an  enemy  for  peace;  which  Athens  had  the  precious 
opportunity  of  granting,  not  merely  with  honor  to  herself,  but  also 
in  such  manner  as  to  create  in  their  minds  an  ineffaceable  friendship. 
And  it  became  Athens  to  make  use  of  her  present  good  fortune  while  she 
had  it — not  to  rely  upon  its  permanence  nor  to  abuse  it  by  extrava- 
gant demands.  Her  own  imperial  prudence,  as  well  as  the  present 
circumstances  of  the  Spartans,  might  teach  her  how  unexpectedly  the 
most  disastrous  casualties  occurred.  By  granting  what  was  now 
asked,  she  might  make  a  peace  which  would  be  far  more  durable 
than  if  it  were  founded  on  the  extorted  compliances  of  a  weakened 
enemy,  because  it  would  rest  on  Spartan  honor  and  gratitude;  the 
greater  the  previous  enmity,  the  stronger  would  be  such  reactionary 
sentiment.  But  if  Athens  should  now  refuse,  and  if,  in  the  farther 
prosecution  of  the  war,  the  men  in  Sphakteria  should  perish — a  new 
and  inexpiable  ground  of  quarrel,  peculiar  to  Sparta  herself,  would 
be  added  to  those  already  subsisting,  which  rather  concerned  Sparta 
as  the  chief  of  the  Peloponnesian  confederacy.  Nor  was  it  only  the 
goodwill  and  gratitude  of  the  Spartans  which  Athens  would  earn  by 
accepting  the  proposition  tendered  to  her;  she  would  farther  acquire 
the  grace  and  glory  of  conferring  peace  on  Greece,  which  all  the 
Greeks  would  recognize  as  her  act.  And  when  once  the  two  pre- 
eminent powers,  Athens  and  Sparta,  were  established  in  cordial 
amity,  the  remaining  Grecian  states  would  be  too  weak  to  resist 
what  they  two  might  prescribe. 

Such  was  the  language  held  by  the  Lacedaemonians  in  the  assembly 
at  Athens.  It  was  discreetly  calculated  for  their  purpose,  though 
when  we  turn  back  to  the  commencement  of  the  war,  and  read  the 
lofty  declarations  of  the  Spartan  Ephors  and  assembly  respecting  the 
wrongs  of  their  allies  and  the  necessity  of  extorting  full  indemnity 
for  them  from  Athens — the  contrast  is  indeed  striking.  On  this 
occasion,  the  Lacedaemonians  acted  entirely  for  themselves  and  from 
consideration  of  their  own  necessities;  severing  themselves  from 
their  allies,  and  soliciting  a  special  peace  for  themselves,  with  as 
little  scruple  as  the  Spartan  general  Menedaeus  during  the  preceding 
year,  when  he  abandoned  his  Ambrakiot  confederates  after  the 
battle  of  Olpae,  to  conclude  a  separate  capitulation  with  Demos- 
thenes. 

The  course  proper  to  be  adopted  by  Athens  in  reference  to  the  propo- 
sition, however,  was  by  no  means  obvious.  ,  In  all  probability,  the 
trireme  which  brought  the  Lacedaemonian  envoys  also  brought  the 
first  news  of  that  unforeseen  and  instantaneous  turn  of  events, 
which  had  rendered  the  Spartans  in  Sphakteria  certain  prisoners  (so 


648  SEVENTH  YEAH  OF   THE   WAR. 

it  was  thru  conceived),  and  placed  the  whole  Lacedeemonian  fleet  in 
their  power:  thus  giving  a  totally  new  character  to  the  war,  The 
Budden  arrival  of  such  prodigious  intelligenci  the  astounding  pres 
ence  of  Lacedaemonian  envoys,  bearing  the  olive-hranch  and  in  an 
attitude  iif  humiliation— must  have  produced  in  the  susceptible 
public  of  Athens  emotions  of  the  utmost  intensity;  an  elation  and 
confidence  such  as  had  prohably  never  been  Celt  since  the  reconquest 
of  Samos.  It  was  difficult  at  firsl  to  measure  the  full  hearings  of  the 
new  situation,  and  even  l'erikles  himself  mighl  have  hesitated  what 
to  recommend.  Bui  the  immediate  and  dominant  impression  with 
the  genera]  public  was,  that  Athens  might  now  ask  her  own  terms, 
as  consideration  for  the  prisoners  in  the  island. 

Of  this  reigning  tendency  Kleon  made  himself  the  emphatic  organ, 
as  he  had  done  three  years  before  in  the  sentence  passed  on  the 
Mitylenseans ;  a  man  who — like  leading  journals  in  modern  limes — 
often  appeared  to  guide  the  public  because  lie  gave  vehement  utter- 
ance to  that  which  tiny  were  already  feeling,  and  carried  it  out  in  its 
collateral  bearings  ami  consequences.  On  the  present  occasion  he 
doubless  spoke  with  the  most  genuine  conviction,  for  lie  was  full  of 
the  sentiment  of  Athenian  force  and  Athenian  imperial  dignity,  as 
well  as  disposed  to  a  sanguine  view  of  future  chances.  Moreover,  in 
a  discussion  like  that  now  opened,  where  there  was  much  room  for 
doubt,  he  came  forward  with  a  proposition  at  once  plain  and 
decisive.  Reminding  the  Athenians  of  the  dishonorable  truce  of 
Thirty  years  to  which  they  had  been  compelled  by  the  misfortunes 
of  the  times  to  accede,  fourteen  years  before  the  PeloponncMan  war 
— Kleon  insisted  that  now  was  the  time  for  Athens  to  recover  what 
she  had  then  lost — Nisaea,  Pega?,  Trcezen,  and  Achaia.  He  proposed 
that  Sparta  should  he  required  to  restore  these  to  Athens,  in  exchange 
for  the  soldiers  now  blocked  up  in  Sphakteria;  after  which  a  truce 
might  be  concluded  for  as  long  a  time  as  might  be  deemed  expedient. 

This  decree,  adopted  by  the  assembly,  was  communicated  as  the 
answer  of  Athens  to  the  Lacedaemonian  envoys,  who  had  probably 
retired  after  their  firsl  address,  and  were  now  sent  for  again  into  the 
assembly  to  hear  it.  On  being  informed  of  the  resolution,  they  made 
no  comment  on  its  substance,  but  invited  the  Athenians  to  name 
commissioners,  who  might  discuss  with  them  freely  and  deliberately 
suitable  terms  for  a  pacification.  Here,  however,  Kleon  burst  upon 
them  with  an  indignant  rebuke.  He  had  thought  from  the  hist  (he 
said)  that  they  came  with  dishonest  purposes,  but  now  the  thing  was 
clear — nothing  else  could  be  meant  by  this  di  die  to  treat  with  some 
few  men  apart  from  the  general  public.  If  they  had  really  any  fair 
proposition  to  make,  lie  called  upon  them  to  proclaim  it  openly  to  all. 
But  this  the  envoys  could  not  bring  themselves  to  do.  They  had 
probably  come  with  authority  to  make  certain  concessions;  hut  to 
announce  these  concessions  forthwith  would  have  rendered  negotia- 
tion impossible,  besides  dishonoring  them  in  the  face  of  their  allies. 


CONDUCT  OF   ATHENS.  649 

Such  dishonor  would  be  incurred,  too,  without  any  advantage,  if  the 
Athenians  bhould  after  all  reject  the  terms,  which  the  temper  of  the 
assembly  before  them  rendered  but  too  probable.  Moreover,  they 
were  totally  unpracticed  in  the  talents  for  dealing  witli  a  public  assem- 
bly, such  discussions  being  so  rare  as  to  be  practically  unknown 
in  the  Lacedaemonian  system.  To  reply  to  the  denunciation  of  a 
vehement  speaker  like  Kleou,  required  readiness  of  elocution,  dexter- 
ity, and  self-command,  which  they  had  had  no  opportunity  of  acquir- 
ing. They  remained  silent — abashed  by  the  speaker  and  intimidated 
by  the  temper  of  the  assembly.  Their  mission  was  thus  terminated, 
and  they  were  reconvened  in  the  trireme  to  Pylus. 

It  is  probable  that  if  these  envoys  had  been  able  to  make  an  effect- 
ive reply  to  Kleon,  and  to  defend  their  proposition  against  his 
charge  of  fraudulent  purpose,  they  would  have  been  sustained  by 
Nikias  and  a  certain  number  of  leading  Athenians,  so  that  the  assem- 
bly might  have  been  brought  at  least  to  try  the  issue  of  a  private 
discussion  between  diplomatic  agents  on  both  sides.  But  the  case 
was  one  in  which  it  was  absolutely  necessary  that  the  envoys  should 
stand  forward  with  some  defense  for  themselves;  which  Nikias 
might  effectively  second,  but  could  not  originate:  and  as  they  were 
incompetent  to  this  task,  the  whole  affair  broke  down.  We  shall 
hereafter  find  other  examples  in  which  the  incapacity  of  Lacedae- 
monian envoys  to  meet  the  open  debate  of  Athenian  political  life  is 
productive  of  mischievous  results.  In  this  case,  the  proposition 
of  the  envoys  to  enter  into  treaty  with  select  commissioners 
was  not  only  quite  reasonable,  but  afforded  the  only  possibility 
(though  doubtless  not  a  certainty)  of  some  ultimate  pacification :  ana 
the  maneuver  whereby  Kleon  discredited  it  was  a  grave  abuse  of 
publicity — not  unknown  in  modern,  though  more  frequent  in  ancient, 
political  life.  Kleon  probably  thought  that  if  commissioners  were 
named,  Nikias,  Laches,  and  other  politicians  of  the  same  rank  and 
color,  would  be  the  persons  selected ;  persons  whose  anxiety  for 
peace  and  alliance  with  Sparta  would  make  them  over-indulgent  and 
careless  in  securing  the  interests  of  Athens.  It  will  be  seen,  when  wre 
come  to  describe  the  conduct  of  Nikias  four  years  afterward,  that 
this  suspicion  was  not  ill-grounded. 

Unfortunately  Thucydides,  in  describing  the  proceedings  of  this 
assembly,  so  important  in  its  consequences  because  it  intercepted  a 
promising  opening  for  peace,  is  brief  as  usual — telling  us  only  what 
was  said  by  Kleon  and  what  wTas  decided  by  the  assembly.  But 
though  nothing  is  positively  stated  respecting  Nikias  and  his  parti- 
sans, we  learn  from  other  sources,  and  we  may  infer  from  what  after- 
ward occurred,  that  they  vehemently  opposed  Kleon,  and  that  they 
looked  coldly  on  the  subsequent  enterprise  against  Sphakteria  as  upon 
his  peculiar  measure. 

It  has  been  common  to  treat  the  dismissal  of  the  Lacedsemouiaq 
envoys  on  this  occasion  as  a  peculiar  specimen  <->f  democratical  folly. 


650  SEVENTH  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 

Yet  over-estimation  of  the  prospective  chances  arising  col  of  success, 
to  a  decree  more  extravaganl  than  that  of  which  Athens  was  now 
guilty,  is  by  no  means  peculiar  to  democracy.  Other  governments, 
opposed  to  democracy  do1  less  in  temper  than  in  form — an  able  des- 
pot like  the  Emperor  Napoleon,  and  a  powerful  aristocracy  like  that 
of  England — have  found  success  to  the  full  as  misleading.  Tliat 
Athens  should  de-ire  to  profit  by  this  unexpected  piece  of  good  for- 
tune, was  perfectly  reasonable:  that  she  should  make  use  of  it  to 
regain  advantages  which  former  misfortunes  had  compelled  herself 
to  surrender,  was  a  feeling  not  unnatural.  And  whether  the  demand 
was  excessive,  or  by  how  much — is  a  question  always  among  the  most 
embarrassing  for  any  government — kingly,  oligarchical,  or  democrat- 
ical — to  determine. 

We  may.  however,  remark  that  Kleon  gave  an  impolitic  turn  to 
Athenian  feeling,  by  directing  it  toward  the  entire  and  literal  reac- 
quisition  of  what  had  been  lost  twenty  years  before.  Unless  we  are 
to  consider  his  quadruple  demand  as  a  nourish,  to  be  nioditied  by 
subsequent  negotiation,  it  seems  to  present  some  plausibility,  but 
little  of  long-sighted  wisdom.  For  while  on  the  one  hand,  it  called 
upon  Sparta  to  give  up  much  which  was  not  in  her  possession,  and 
must  have  been  extorted  by  force  from  allies— on  the  other  hand,  the 
situation  of  Athens  was  not  the  same  as  it  had  been  when  she  con- 
cluded the  Thirty  years'  truce;  nor  does  it  seem  that  the  restoration 
of  Achaia  and  Treezen  would  have  been  of  any  material  value  to  her. 
Nisaea  and  Pegae — winch  would  have  been  tantamount  to  the  entire 
Megarid,  inasmuch  as  Megara  itself  could  hardly  have  been  held  with 
both  its  ports  in  the  possession  of  an  enemy — would  inched  have  been 
highly  valuable,  since  she  could  then  have  protected  her  territory 
against  invasion  from  Peloponnesus,  besides  possessing  a  port  in  the 
Corinthian  gulf.  And  it  would  seem  that  if  able  commissioners 
had  now  been  named  for  private  discussion  with  the  Lacedaemonian 
envoys,  under  the  present  urgent  desire  of  Sparta  coupled  with  her 
disposition  to  abandon  her  allies — this  important  point  might  possibly 
have  been  pressed  and  carried,  in  exchange  for  Sphakteria.  Nay, 
even  if  such  acquisition  had  been  found  impracticable,  still  the 
Athenians  would  have  been  able  to  effect  some  arrangement  which 
would  have  widened  the  breach  and  destroyed  the  confidence  between 
Sparta  and  her  allies;  a  point  of  great  moment  for  them  to  accom- 
plish. There  was  therefore  every  reason  for  trying  what  could  he 
done  by  negotiation,  under  the  present  temper  of  Sparta;  and  the 
step,  by  which  Kleon  abruptly  broke  off  such  hopes  was  decidedly 
mischievous. 

On  the  return  of  the  envoys  without  success  to  Pylus,  twenty  days 
after  their  departure  from  that  place,  the  armistice  immediately 
terminated;  and  the  Lacedaemonians  redemanded  the  triremes  which 
they  had  surrendered.  But  Eurymedon  refused  compliance  with 
this  demand,  alleging  that  the  Lacedaemonians  had  during  the  truce 


THE  WAR  RESUMED  AT  PYLU3.  651 

made  a  fraudulent  attempt  to  surprise  the  rock  of  Pylus,  and  had 
violated  the  stipulations  in  othe,r  ways  besides;  while  it  stood 
expressly  stipulated  in  the  truce,  that  the  violation  by  either  side 
even  of  the  least  among  its  conditions  should  cancel  all  c-bligation  on 
both  sides.  Thucydides,  without  distinctly  giving  his  opinion,  seems 
rather  to  imply  that  there  was  no  just  ground  for  the  refusal"  though 
if  any  accidental  want  of  vigilance  had  presented  to  the  Lacedae- 
monians an  opportunity  for  surprising  Pylus,  they  would  be  likely 
enough  to  avail  themselves  of  it,  seeing  that  they  would  thereby 
drive  off  the  Athenian  fleet  from  its  only  landing-place,  and  render 
the  continued  blockade  of  Spahkteria  impracticable.  However  the 
truth  may  be,  Eurymedon  persisted  in  his  refusal,  in  spite  of  loud 
protests  of  the  Laceda?monians  against  his  perfidy.  Hostilities  were 
energetically  resumed:  the  Lacedaemonian  army  on  land  began  again 
to  attack  the  fortifications  of  Pylus,  while  the  Athenian  fleet  became 
doubly  watchful  in  the  blockade  of  Sphakteria,  in  which  they  were 
re-enforced  by  twenty  fresh  ships  from  Athens,  making  a  fleet  of 
seventy  triremes  in  all.  Two  ships  were  perpetually  rowing  round 
the  island,  in  opposite  directions,  throughout  the  whole  day;  while  at 
night  the  whole  fleet  were  kept  on  watch,  except  on  the  sea  side  of 
the  island  in  stormy  weather. 

The  blockade,  however,  was  soon  found  to  be  more  full  of  priva- 
tion in  reference  to  the  besiegers  themselves,  and  more  difficult  of 
enforcement  in  respect  to  the  island  and  its  occupants,  than  had 
been  originally  contemplated.  The  Athenians  were  much  distressed 
for  want  of  water.  They  had  only  one  really  good  spring  in  the 
fortification  of  Pylus  itself,  quite  insufficient  for  the  supply  of  a 
large  fleet:  many  of  then?  were  obliged  to  scrape  the  shingle  and 
drink  such  brackish  water  as  they  could  find;  while  ships  as  well  as 
men  were  perpetually  afloat,  since  they  could  take  rest  and  refresh- 
ment only  by  relays  successively  landing  on  the  rock  of  Pylus,  or 
even  on  the  edge  of  Sphakteria  itself,  with  all  the  chance  of  being 
interrupted  by  the  enemy — there  being  no  other  landing-place,  and 
the  ancient  trireme  affording  no  accommodation  either  for  eating  or 
sleeping. 

At  first,  all  this  was  patiently  borne,  in  the  hopes  that  Sphakteria 
would  speedily  be  starved  out,  and  the  Spartans  forced  to  renew  the 
request  for  capitulation.  But  no  such  request  came,  and  the  Athe- 
nians in  the  fleet  gradually  became  sick  in  body  as  well  as  impatient 
and  angry  in  mind.  In  spite  of  all  their  vigilance,  clandestine  sup- 
plies of  provisions  continually  reached  the  island,  under  the  tempta- 
tion of  large  rewards  offered  by  the  Spartan  government.  Able 
swimmers  contrived  to  cross  the  strait,  dragging  after  them  by  ropes 
skins  full  of  linseed  and  poppy-seed  mixed  with  honey;  while  mer- 
chant-vessels, chiefly  manned  by  Helots,  started  from  various  parts 
of  the  Laconian  coast,  selecting  by  preference  the  stormy  nights,  and 
encountering  every  risk  in  order  to  run  their  vessel  with  its  cargo 


652  SEVENTH   TEAR  OF  Till-:  WAR. 

ashore  on  the  sea  aide  of  the  island,  at  a  tune  when  the  Athenian 
guard-ships  could  nol  be  on  the  lookout.  They  cared  little  aboul 
damage  to  their  vessel  in  landing,  provided  they  could  gel  the  cargo 
on  shore;  for  ample  compensation  was  insured  them,  together  with 
emancipation  to  every  Helm  who  succeeded  in  reaching  the  island 
with  a  supply.  Though  the  Athenians  redoubled  their  vigilance, 
and  intercepted  many  of  these  daring  smugglers,  still  t  lie  re  were  others 
who  eluded  them.  Moreover  the  rations  supplied  to  the  island  by 
stipulation  during  the  absence  of  the  envoys  in  their  journey  to 
Allien--  had  been  so  ample,  that  Epitadas  the  commander  had  been 

able    to   economize,   and   thus   to   make    the  stock    hold    out    longer. 

\\  ii  k  after  week  passed  without  any  symptoms  of  surrender.  The 
Athenians  not  only  felt  the  present  sufferings  of  their  own  position, 
but  also  became  apprehensive  for  their  own  supplies,  all  brought  by 
sea  round  Peloponnesus  to  this  djstant  and  naked  shore.  They  began 
even  to  mistrust  the  possibility  of  thus  indefinitely  continuing  the 
blockade,  against  the  contingencies  of  Buch  violent  weather  as  would 
probably  ensue  at  the  close  of  summer.  In  this  state  of  weariness 
and  uncertainty,  the  active  Demosthenes  began  to  organize  a  descent 
upon  the  island,  with  the  view  of  carrying  it  by  force.  Be  not  only 
sent  for  forces  from  the  neighboring  allies.  Zakyntbus  and  Naupak- 
tus,  but  also  transmitted  an  urgent  request  to  Alliens  that  re  enforce- 
ments might  be  furnished  to  him  for  the  purpose — making  known 
explicitly  both  the  uncomfortable  condition  of  the  armament  and  the 
unpromising  chances  of  simple  blockade. 

The  arrival  of  these  envoys  caused  infinite  mortification  to  the 
Athenians  at  home.  J  laving  expected  to  hear  long  before  that  Sphakte- 
ria  had  surrendered,  they  were  now  taught  to  consider  even  the  ulti- 
mate  conquest  as  a  matter  of  doubt.  They  were  surprised  that  the 
Lacedaemonians  sent  no  fresh  envoys  to  solicit  peace,  and  began  to 
suspect  that  such  silence  was  founded  upon  well  grounded  hopes  of 
being  able  to  hold  out.  But  the  person  most  of  all  discomposed 
was  Kleon,  who  observed  that  the  people  now  regretted  their  insult- 
ing repudiation  of  the  Lacedaemonian  message,  and  were  displeased 
with  him  as  the  author  of  it:  while,  on  the  contrary,  his  numerous 
political  enemies  were  rejoiced  at  the  turn  events  had  taken,  as  it 
opened  a  means  of  effecting  his  ruin.  At  lirst,  Kleon  contended  that 
the  envoys  had  misrepresented  the  state  of  facts.  To  which  the 
latter  replied  by  entreating,  that  if  their  accuracy  were  mistrusted, 
commissioners  of  inspection  might  be  sent  to  verify  it;  and  Kleon 
himself,  along  with  Theogenes,  was  forthwith  named  for  this  func- 
tion. 

But  it  did  not  suit  Kleon's  purpose  to  go  as  commissioner  to  Pylus. 
His  mistrust  of  the  statement  was  a  mere  general  suspicion,  nol  rest- 
ing on  any  positive 'evidence.  Mori  over  he  saw  that  the  dispositions 
of  the  assembly  tended  to  compley  with  the  request  of  Demosthenes, 
and  to  dispatch  a  re-enforcing  armament,     lie  accordingly  altered 


PROPOSITION  OF  KLEON.  653 

his  tone  at  once:  "If  ye  really  believe  the  story  (lie  said),  do  not 
waste  time  in  sending  commissioners,  but  sail  at  once  to  capture  the 
men.  It  would  be  easy  with  a  proper  force,  if  our  generals  were 
men  (here  he  pointed  reproachfully  to  his  enemy  Nikias,  than  Stra- 
tegus),  to  sail  and  take  the  soldiers  in  the  island.  That  is  what  1 
at  least  would  do  if  /were  general."  His  words  instantly  provoked 
a  hostile  murmur  from  a  portion  of  the  assembly:  "Why  do  you 
not  sail  then  at  once,  if  you  think  the  matter  so  easy?"  Nikias,  tak- 
ing up  this  murmur,  and  delighted  to  have  caught  his  political  enemy 
in  a  trap,  stood  forward  in  person  and  pressed  him  to  set  about  the 
enterprise  without  delay;  intimating  the  willingness  of  himself  and 
his  colleagues  to  grant  him  any  portion  of  the  military  force  of  the 
city  which  he  chose  to  ask  for. 

Kleon  at  first  closed  with  this  proposition,  believing  it  to  be  a 
mere  stratagem  of  debate  and  not  seriously  intended.  But  so  soon  as 
he  saw  that  what  was  said  was  really  meant,  he  tried  to  back  out, 
and  observed  to  Nikias — "  It  is  your  place  to  sail:  you  are  general, 
not  I."  Nikias  only  replied  by  repeating  his  exhortation,  renouncing 
formally  the  command  against  Sphakteria,  and  calling  upon  the 
Athenians  to  recollect  what  Kleon  had  said,  as  well  as  to  hold  him 
to  his  engagement.  The  more  Kleon  tried  to  evade  the  duty,  the 
louder  and  more  unanimous  did  the  cry  of  the  assembly  become  that 
Nikias  should  surrender  it  to  him,  and  that  he  should  undertake  it. 
At  last,  seeing  that  there  was  no  possibility  of  receding,  Kleon  reluc- 
tantly accepted  the  charge,  and  came  forward  to  announce  his  inten- 
tion in  a  resolute  address — "  I  am  not  at  all  afraid  of  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians (he  said):  I  shall  sail  without  even  taking  with  me  any  of  the 
hoplites  from  the  regular  Athenian  muster-roll,  but  only  the  Lemnian 
and  Imbriau  hoplites  who  are  now  here  (that  is,  Athenian  kleruchs 
or  out-citizens  who  had  properties  in  Lemnos  and  Imbros,  and  habit- 
ually resided  there),  together  with  some  peltasts  brought  from  iEnos 
in  Thrace,  and  400  bowmen.  With  this  force,  added  to  what  is 
already  at  Pylus,  I  engage  in  the  space  of  twenty  days  either  to 
bring  the  Lacedaemonians  in  Sphakteria  hither  as  prisoners,  or  to  kill 
them  in  the  island."  The  Athenians  (observes  Thucydides)  laughed 
somewhat  at  Kleon's  looseness  of  tongue;  but  prudent  men  had 
pleasure  in  reflecting  that  one  or  other  of  the  two  advantages  was 
now  certain:  either  they  would  get  rid  of  Kleon,  which  they  antici- 
pated as  the  issue  at  once  most  probable  and  most  desirable — or 
if  mistaken  on  this  point,  the  Lacedaemonians  in  the  island  would  be 
killed  or  taken.  The  vote  was  ascordingly  passed  for  the  immediate 
departure  of  Kleon.  who  caused  Demosthenes  to  be  named  as  his 
colleague  in  command,  and  sent  intelligence  \o  Pylas  at  once  that  he 
was  about  to  start  with  the  re-enforcement  solicited. 

This  curious  scene,  interesting  as  laying  open  the  interior  feeling  of 
the  Athenian  assembly,  suggests,  when  properly  considered,  reflec- 
tions very  different  from  those  which  have  been  usually  connected 


654  SEVENTH   YEAB  OF  THE  WAR. 

with  it.  It  Beems  to  be  conceived  by  mosl  historians  as  a  mere  piece 
of  levity  or  folly  in  the  Athenian  people,  who  are  supposed  to  have 
enjoyed  the  excellent  joke  of  putting  an  incompetent  man  againsl 
his  own  will  at  the  head  of  this  enterprise,  in  order  thai  they  might 
amuse  themselves  with  his  blunders:  Kieon  is  thus  contemptible, 
and  the  Athenian  people  ridiculous.  Certainly,  if  thai  people  bad 
been  disposed  to  conducl  then:  public  business  upon  such  childish 
fancies  as  arc  here  implied,  they  would  have  made  a  very  different 
figure  Erom  that  which  history  actually  presents  to  us,  The  truth 
is,  that  in  regard  to  Kleon's  alleged  looseness  of  tongue,  which 
excited  more  or  less  of  laughter  among  tlie  persons  present,  there 
was  do  one  really  ridiculous  except  the  laughers  themselves.  For 
the  announcement  which  he  made  was  so  far  from  being  extrava- 
gant, that  it  was  realized  to  the  letter — and  realized  loo,  let  us  add, 
without  any  peculiar  aid  from  unforeseen  favorable  accident.  To 
illustrate  further  what  is  here  said,  we  have  only  to  contrast  the 
jesters  before  the  fact  with  the  jesters  after  it.  While  the  former 
deride  Kleon  as  a  promiser  of  extravagant  and  impossible  results,  we 
find  Aristophanes  (in  his  comedy  of  the  Enights  about  six  months 
afterward)  laughing  at  him  as  having  achieved  nothing  at  all — as 
having  cunningly  put  himself  into  the  shoes  of  Demosthenes,  and 
stolen  away  from  that  general  the  glory  of  taking  Sphr.kteria,  after 
all  the  difficulties  of  the  enterprise  had  been  already  got  over,  and 
"the  cake  ready  baked" — to  use  the  phrase  <»f  the  comic  poet. 
Both  of  the  jests  are  exaggerations  in  opposite  directions;  but  the 
last  in  order  of  time,  if  it  be  good  at  all  against  Kleon,  is  a  galling 
sarcasm  against  those  who  derided  Kleon  as  an  extravagant  boaster. 

If  we  intend  fairly  to  compare  the  behavior  of  Kleon  with  that  of 
bis  political  adversaries,  we  must  distinguish  between  the  two  occa- 
sions: first,  that  in  which  he  had  frustrated  the  pacific  mission  of  the 
Lacedemonian  envoys;  next,  the  subsequent  delay  and  dilemma 
which  has  been  recently  described.  On  the  first  occasion,  hie  advice 
appears  to  have  been  mistaken  in  policy,  as  well  as  offensive  in  man- 
ner: his  opponents,  proposing  a  discussion  by  special  commissioners 
as  a  fair  change  for  honorable  terms  of  peace,  took  a  justcr  view  of 
the  public  interests.  Hut  the  case  was  entirely  altered  when  the 
mission  for  peace  (wisely  or  unwisely)  had  been  broken  up,  and 
when  the  fate  of  Sphakteria  had  been  committed  to  the  chances 
of  war.  There  were  then  imperative  reasons  for  prosecuting  the  war 
vigorously,  and  for  employing  all  the  force  requisite  to  insure  the 
capture  of  that  island.  And  looking  to  this  end,  we  shall  find  that 
there  was  nothing  i'n  tin;  conduct  of  Kleon  either  to  blame  or  to 
deride;  while  his  political  adversaries  (Nikias  among  them)  are 
deplorably  timid,  ignorant,  and  reckless  of  the  public  interest  ;  seek- 
ing only  to  turn  the  existing  disappointment  and  dilemma  into  a 
party-opportunity  for  ruining  him. 

To  grant  the  re-enforcement  asfcd  for  by  Demosthenes  was  obviously 


CONDUCT  OF  NIKIAS  AND  HIS  SUPPORTERS.     655 

the  proper  measure,  and  Kleon  saw  that  the  people  would  go  along 
with  him  in  proposing  it.  But  lie  had  at  the  same  time  good  grounds 
for  reproaching  Nikias  and  the  other  Strategi,  whose  duty  it  was  to 
originate  that  proposition,  with  their  backwardness  in  remaining 
silent,  and  in  leaving  the  matter  to  go  by  default,  as  if  it  were 
Kleon's  affair  and  not  theirs.  His  taunt — "This  is  what  /  would 
have  done,  if  i"  were  general " — was  a  mere  phrase  of  the  heat  of 
debate,  such  as  must  have  been  very  often  used  without  auy  idea 
on  the  part  of  the  hearers  of  coustruing  it  as  a  pledge  which  the 
speaker  was  bound  to  realize.  It  was  no  disgrace  to  Kleon  to  decline 
a  charge  which  he  had  never  sought,  and  to  confess  his  incompetence 
to  command.  The  reason  wThy  he  was  forced  into  the  post,  in  spite 
of  his  own  unaffected  reluctance,  was  not  (as  some  historians  would 
have  us  believe)  because  the  Athenian  people  loved  a  joke,  but  from 
two  feelings,  both  perfectly  serious,  which  divided  the  assembly — 
feelings  opposite  in  their  nature,  but  coinciding  on  this  occasion 
to  the  same  result.  His  enemies  loudly  urged  him  forward,  antici- 
pating that  the  enterprise  under  him  would  miscarry  and  that  he 
would  thus  be  ruined:  his  friends,  perceiving  this  maneuver,  but 
not  sharing  in  such  anticipations,  and  ascribing  his  reluctance  to 
modesty,  pronounced  themselves  so  much  the  more  vehemently 
on  behalf  of  their  leader,  and  repaid  the  scornful  cheer  by  cheers 
of  sincere  encouragement.  "  Why  do  not  you  try  your  hand  at  this 
enterprise,  Kleon,  if  you  think  it  so  easy?  you  will  soon  find  that  it 
is  too  much  for  you" — was  the  cry  of  his  enemies:  to  which  his 
friends  wrould  reply — "Yes,  to  be  sure,  try,  Kleon:  by  all  means, 
try:  do  not  be  backward;  we  warrant  that  you  will  come  honorably 
out  of  it,  and  we  will  stand  by  you."  Such  cheer  and  counter-cheer 
is  precisely  in  the  temper  of  an  animated  multitude  (as  Thucydides 
states  it)  divided  in  feeling.  Friends  as  well  as  enemies  thus  con- 
curred to  impose  upon  Kleon  a  compulsion  not  to  be  eluded.  Of  all 
the  parties  here  concerned,  those  whose  conduct  is  the  most  unpar- 
douably  disgraceful  are  Nikias  and  his  oligarchical  supporters,  who 
force  a  political  enemy  into  the  supreme  command  against  his  own 
strenuous  protest,  persuaded  that  he  will  fail  so  as  to  compromise  the 
lives  of  many  soldiers  and  the  destinies  of  the  state  on  an  important 
emergency — but  satisfying  themselves  with  the  idea  that  they  shall 
bring  him  to  disgrace  and  ruin. 

It  is  to  be  remarked  that  Nikias  and  his  fellow  Strategi  were  back- 
ward on  this  occasion,  partly  because  they  were  really  afraid  of  the 
duty.  They  anticipated  a  resistance  to  the  death  at  Sphakteria  such 
as  that  at  Thermopylae:  in  which  case,  though  victory  might  perhaps 
be  won  by  a  superior  assailant  force,  it  would  not  be  won  without 
much  bloodshed  and  peril,  besides  an  inexpiable  quarrel  with  Sparta. 
If  Kleon  took  a  more  correct  measure  of  the  chances,  he  ought  to 
have  credit  for  it  as  one  "bene  ausus  vana  conternnere."  And 
it  seems  probable  that  if  he  had  not  been  thus  forward  in  support- 


656  SEVENTH    YKAH   OF   THE  WAR. 

ing  the  request  of  Demosthenes  for  re  enforcement— or  rather,  if  lie 
had  doI  been  so  placid  thai  he  was  coin]). -lied  to  be  forward — Nikias 
and  his  friends  would  have  laid  aside  the  enterprise,  and  reopened 
negotiations  for  peace  under  circumstances  neither  honorable  nor 
advantageous  to  Athens.  Kleon  was  iu  this  matter  one  main  author 
of  the  most  important  success  which  Athens  obtained  throughout  the 
whole  war. 

On  joining  Demosthenes  with  his  re-enforcement,  Eleon  found 
every  preparation  for  attack  made  by  thai  general,  and  the  soldiers 
at  Pyms  eager  to  commence  such  aggressive  measures  as  would 
relieve  them  from  the  tedium  of  a  blockade.  Sphakteria  had  be<  ome 
recently  more  open  to  assault  in  consequence  clan  accidental  con-. 
flagration  of  the  wood,  arising  from  a  lire  kindled  by  the  Athenian 
seamen,  while  landing  at  the  skirt  of  the  island  and  cooking  their 
food.  Under  the  influence  of  a  strong  wind,  most  of  the  wood  in  the 
inland  had  thus  caught  fire  and  been  destroyed.  To  Demosth-nes 
this  was  an  accident  especially  welcome:  for  the  painful  experience 
of  his  defeat  in  the  forest-covered  hills  of  JEtolia  had  taught  him 
how  difficult  it  was  for  assailants  to  cope  with  an  enemy  whom  they 
could  not  see,  and  who  knew  all  the  good  points  of  defense  in  the 
country.  The  island  being  thus  stripped  of  its  wood,  he  was  enabled 
to  survey  the  garrison,  to  count  their  number,  and  to  lay  his  plan  of 
attack  on  certain  data.  He  now,  too,  for  the  first  time  discovered 
that  he  had  underrated  their  real  number,  having  before  suspected 
that  the  Lacedaemonians  had  sent  in  rations  for  a  greater  total  than 
was  actually  there.  The  island  was  occupied  altogether  by  420 
Lacedaemonian  hoplites,  out  of  whom  more  than  120  were  native 
Spartans,  belonging  to  the  first  families  in  the  city.  The  commander 
Epitadas,  with  the  main  body,  occupied  the  center  of  the  island,  near 
the  only  spring  of  water  which  it  afforded:  an  advanced  guard  of 
thirty  hoplites  was  posted  not  far  from  the  seashore  in  the  end  of 
the  island  farthest  from  Pylus;  while  the  end  immediately  fronting 
Pylus,  peculiarly  steep  and  rugged,  and  containing  even  a  rude  cir- 
cuit of  stones,  of  unknown  origin,  which  served  as  a  sort  of  defense 
— was  held  as  a  post  of  reserve. 

Such  was  the  prey  which  Kleou  and  Demosthenes  were  anxious  to 
grasp.  On  the  very  daj  of  the  arrival  of  the  former,  they  sent  a 
herald  to  the  Lacedaemonian  generals  on  the  mainland,  inviting  the 
surrender  of  the  hoplites  on  the  island  on  condition  of  being  simply 
detained  under  guard  without  any  hardship,  until  a  final  pacification 
should  take  place.  Of  course  the  summons  was  refused;  after  which. 
leaving  only  one  day  for  repose,  the  two  generals  took  advantage  of 
the  night  to  put  all  their  hoplites  aboard  a  few  triremes,  making  show- 
as  if  they  were  merely  commencing  the  ordinary  nocturnal  circum- 
navigation, so  as  to  excite  no  suspicion  in  the  occupants  of  the  island. 
The  entire  body  of  the  Athenian  hoplites,  800  in  number,  were  thus 
disembarked  in  two  divisions,  one  on  each  tide  of  the  island,  a  littlo 


ATTACK  UPON  SPHAKTERIA.        657 

before  daybreak:  the  outposts,  consisting  of  thirty  Lacedaemonians, 
completely  unprepared,  were  surprised  even  in  I  heir  sleep,  and  all 
slain.  At  the  point  of  day,  the  entire  remaining  force  from  the 
seventy-two  triremes  was  also  disembarked,  leaving  on  hoard  none 
but  the  thalamii  or  lowest  tier  of  rowers,  and  reserving  only  a  suffi- 
cient Dumber  to  man  the  walls  of  Pylus.  Altogether  there  could  not 
have  been  less  (ban  10.000  troops  employed  in  the  attack  on  the 
island — men  of  all  arms:  800  hqplitcs,  800  peltasts,  800  bowmen;  the 
rest  armed  with  javelins,  slinks,  and  stones.  Demosthenes  kept  his 
hoplites  in  one  compact  body,  but  distributed  the  light-armed  into 
separate  companies  of  about  200  men  each,  with  orders  to  occupy  the 
rising  grounds  all  round,  and  harass  the  flanks  and  rear  of  the  Lace- 
daemonians. 

To  resist  this  large  force,  the  Lacedamionian  commander  Epitadas 
bad  only  360  hoplites  around  him ;  for  his  outlying  company  of  thirty 
men  had  been  slain,  and  as  many  more  must  hvae  been  held  in 
reserve  to  guard  the  rocky  station  in  his  rear.  Of  the  Helots  who 
were  with  him,  Thucydides  says  nothing  during  the  whole  course  of 
the  action.  As  soon  as  he  saw  the  numbers  and  disposition  of  his 
enemies,  Epitadas  placed  his  men  in  battle  array,  and  advanced  to 
encounter  the  main  body  of  hoplites  whom  he  saw  before  him.  But 
the  Spartan  march  was  habitually  slow:  moreover,  the  ground  was 
rough  and  uneven,  obstructed  with  stumps,  and  overlaid  with  dust 
and  ashes,  from  the  recently  burnt  wood,  so  that  a  march  at  once 
rapid  and  orderly  was  hardly  possihle.  He  had  to  traverse  the  whole 
intermediate  space,  since  the  Athenian  hoplites  remained  immovable 
in  their  opposition.  No  sooner  had  his  march  commenced,  than  he 
found  himself  assailed  both  in  rear  and  flanks,  especially  in  the  right 
or  unshielded  flanks,  by  the  numerous  companies  of  light-armed. 
Notwithstanding  their  extraordinary  superiority  of  number,  these 
men  were  at  first  awe-stricken  at  finding  themselves  in  actual  contest 
with  Lacedaemonian  hoplites.  Still  they  began  the  fight,  poured  in 
their  missile  weapons,  and  so  annoyed  the  march  that  the  hoplites 
were  obliged  to  halt,  while  Epitadas  ordered  the  most  active  among 
them  to  spring  out  of  their  ranks  and  repel  the  assailants.  But  pur- 
suers with  spear  and  shield  had  little  chance  of  overtaking  men 
lightly  clad  and  armed,  who  always  retired,  in  whatever  direction 
the  pursuit  was  commenced — had  the  advantage  of  difficult  ground- 
redoubled  their  annoyance  against  the  rear  of  the  pursuers,  as  soon 
as  the  latter  retreated  to  resume  their  place  in  the  ranks — and  always 
took  care  to  get  ground  to  the  rear  of  the  hoplites. 

After  some  experience  of  the  inetficacy  of  Lacedaemonian  pursuit, 
the  light-armed,  becoming  far  bolder  than  at  first,  closed  upon  them 
nearer  and  more,  universally,  with  arrows,  javelins,  and  stones — rais- 
ing shouts  and  clamors  that  rent  the  air,  rendering  the  word  of  com- 
mand inaudible  by  the  Lacedaemonian  soldiers — who  at  the  same 
time  were  almost  blinded  by  the  thick  clouds  of  dust,  kicked  up  from 


658  SEVENTH   YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 

the  recently  Bpread  wood  ashes.  Such  method  of  fighting  was  one 
for  which  Lykurgean  drill  made  no  provision.  r J '  1 1 < •  longer  ii  con- 
tinned,  the  more  painful  did  the  embarrassment  of  the  exposed 
hoplites  become;  Their  repeated  efforts,  to  destroy,  or  even  to 
reach  nimble  and  ever  retormng  em  mies,  all  proved  abortive,  \s  1 1 i  1  ^ t 
their  own  numbers  were  incessautly  diminishing  by  wounds  which 
thej  could  not  return.  Their  only  offensive  arms  consisted  of  thq 
spear  and  short  sword  usual  to  the  Grecian  boplite,  without  any 
missile  weapons  whatever;  nor  could  they  even  pick  up  and  throw 
back  the  javelins  of  their  enemies,  Bince  the  points  of  these  javelins, 
commonly  broke  off  and  Btuck  in  the  shields,  or  sometimes  even  in 
the  body  which  they  bad  wounded.  Moreover,  the  bows  of  the 
archers,  doubtless  carefully  selected  before  shilling  from  Alliens, 
were  powerfully  drawn,  so  thai  their  arrows  may  Bometimes  have 
pierced  and  inflicted  wounds  even  through  the  shield  or  the  helmet — 
but  at  any  raic,  the  stuffed  doublet,  which  formed  the  only  defense 
of  the  boplite  on  his  unshielded  side,  was  a  very  inadequate  protec- 
tion against  them'.  Under  this  trying  dis  less  did  the  Lacedaemonians 
continue  for  a  long  inne,  rjoorlj  provided  for  defense,  and  in  this 
particular  case  altogether  helpless  for  aggression— without  being  able 
to  approach  at  all  nearer  to  the  Athenian  hoplites.  At  length  the 
Lacedaemonian  commander,  seeing  that  his  position  grew  worse  and 
worse,  gave  orders  to  close  the  ranks  and  retreat  to  the  last  redoubt 
in  the  rear.  But  this  movement  was  not  accomplished  without  diffi- 
culty, for  the  light-armed  assailants  became  bo  clamorous  and  for- 
ward, thai  many  wounded  men,  unable  to  move,  or  at  least  to  keep 
in  rank,  were  overtaken  and  slain. 

A  diminished  remnant,  however,  reached  Ihe  last  post  in  safety. 
Here  they  were  in  comparative  protection,  since  the  ground  was  so 
rocky  and  impracticable  that  their  enemies  could  attack  them  neither 
in  flank  nor  rear;  though  the  position  at  any  rate  could  not  have 
been  long  tenable  separately,  inasmuch  as  the  only  spring  of  water  in 
the  island  was  in  the  center,  which  they  had  just    been  compelled   to 

abandon.  The  light-armed  being  now  less  available,  Demosthenes 
and  Kleon  brought  up  their  800  Athenian  hoplites,  who  had  not 
before  been  engaged.  But  the  Lacedaemonians  were  here  at  home 
with  their  weapons,  and  enabled  to  display  their  well-known  superi- 
ority againsl  opposing  hoplites,  especially  as  they  had  the  vantage 
ground  againsl  enemies  charging  from  beneath.  Although  the  Athe- 
nians were  double  in  numbers,  and  withal  yet  unexhausted,  they 
were  repulsed  in  many  successive  attacks.  The  besieged  maintained 
their  ground  in  spite  of  all  previous  fatigue  and  suffering,  harder  to 
lie  borne  from  the  scanty  diet  on  which  they  had  recently  subsisted. 
The  struggle  lasted  so  long  that  heat  and  thirst  began  to  tell  even 

upon  the  assailants,  when  the  commander  of  the  Messenians  came  to 
Kleon  anil  Demosthenes,  and  intimated  that  they  were  now  laboring 
in  vain;  promising  at   the  same  time   that   if  they  would  confide  to 


SURRENDER  OF  THE  LACEDEMONIANS.         659 

him  a  detachment  of  light  troops  and  bowmen,  he  would  find  his  way- 
round  to  the  higher  cliffs  in  the  rear  of  the  assailants.  He  accord- 
ingly stole  away  unobserved  from  the  rear,  scrambling  round  over 
pathless  crags,  and  by  an  almost  impracticable  footing  on  the  brink 
of  the  sea,  through  approaches  which  the  Lacedaemoniaus  had  left 
unguarded,  never  imagining  that  they  could  be  molested  in  that  direc- 
tion. He  suddenly  appeared  with  his  detachment  on  the  higher 
peak  above  them,  so  that  their  position  was  thus  commanded,  and 
they  found  themselves,  as  at  Thermopylae,  between  two  fires,  with- 
out any  hope  of  escape.  Their  enemies  in  front,  encouraged  by  the 
success  of  the  Messeuians,  pressed  forward  with  increased  ardor, 
uutil  at  length  the  courage  of  the  Lacedaemonians  gave  way,  and  the 
position  was  carried. 

A  few  moments  more,  and  they  would  have  been  all  overpowered 
and  slain — when  Kleon  and  Demosthenes,  anxious  to  carry  them  as 
prisoners  to  Athens,' constrained  their  men  to  halt,  and  proclaimed  by 
herald  an  invitation  to  surrender,  on  condition  of  delivering  up  their 
arms,  and  being  held  at  the  disposal  of  the  Athenians.  Most  of  them, 
incapable  of  farther  effort,  closed  with  the  proposition  forthwith, 
signifying  compliance  by  dropping  their  shields  and  waving  their 
hands*  above  their  heads.  The  battle  being  thus  ended,  Styphon  the 
commander — originally  only  third  in  command,  but  now  chief;  since 
Epitadas  had  been  slain,  and  the  second  in  command,  Hippagretes, 
was  lying  disabled  by  wounds  on  the  field — entered  into  conference 
with  Kleon  and  Demosthenes,  and  entreated  permission  to  send  across 
for  orders  to  the  Lacedaemonians  on  the  mainland.  The  Athenian 
commanders,  though  refusing  this  request,  sent  a  messenger  of  their 
own.  inviting  Lacedaemonian  heralds  over  from  the  mainland,  through 
whom  communications  were  exchanged  twice  or  three  times  between 
Styphon  and  the  chief  Lacedaemonian  authorities.  At  length  the 
final  message  came — "  The  Lacedaemonians  direct  you  to  take  coun- 
sel for  yourselves,  but  to  do  nothing  disgraceful."  Their  counsel 
was  speedily  taken;  they  surrendered  themselves  and  delivered  up 
their  arms;  *292  iu  number,  the  survivors  of  the  original  total  of  420. 
And  out  of  these  no  less  than  120  were  native  Spartans,  some  of  them 
belonging  to  the  first  families  in  the  city.  They  were  kept  under 
guard  during  that  night,  and  distributed  on  the  morrow  among  the 
Athenian  trierarchs  to  be  conveyed  as  prisoners  to  Athens;  while  a 
truce  was  granted  to  the  Lacedaemonians  on  shore,  in  order  that  they 
might  carry  across  the  dead  bodies  for  burial.  So  careful  had  Epi- 
tadas been  in  husbanding  the  provisions,  that  some  food  was  yet 
found  in  the  island;  though  the  garrison  had  subsisted  for  fifty-two 
days  upon  casual  supplies,  aided  by  such  economies  as  had  been  laid 
by  during  the  twenty  days  of  the  armistice,  when  food  of  a  stipulated 
quantity"  was  regularly  furnished.  Seventy-two  days  had  thus 
elapsed,  from  the  first  imprisonment  in  the  island  to  the  hour  of  their 
surrender. 


060  SEVENTH    YEA  It   OF   THE   WAR 

The  best  troops  in  modern  times  would  neither  incur  reproach,  nor 
occasion  surprise,  by  surrendering,  under  circumstances  in  all 
respects  similar  to  this  gallanl  remnant  in  Sphakteria.  Vet  in  (in  ece 
the  astonishment  was  prodigious  and  universal,  when  it  was  learnt 
that  the  Lacedaemonians  bad  con  ented  to  become  prisoners.  For 
the  terror  inspired  by  their  name,  and  the  deepstruck  impression  of 
Thermopylae  had  created  a  belief  that  they  would  endure  an]  extrem- 
ity of  famine,  and  perish  in  the  midst  of  any  superiority  of  hostile 

force,  rather  than  dream  of  giving   Up    their   arms   ami   surviving  as 

captives.  The  events  of  Bphakteria,  shocking  as  they  did  this  pre- 
conceived idea,  discredited  the  military  prowess  of  Sparta  in  the  eyes 
ui'  all  Greece,  and  especially  in  those  oi  her  own  allies.  Even  in 
Sparta  itself,  too,  the  same  feeling  prevailed — partially  revealed  in 
the  answer  transmitted  to  Styphon  from  the  generals  on  shore,  who 
ilid  not  venture  to  forbid  surrender,  yet  discountenanced  it  by  impli- 
cation. It  is  certain  that  the  Spartans  would  have  losl  less  by  their 
death  than  by  their  surrender,  lint  we  read  with  disgust  the  spiteful 
taunt  of  one  of  the  allies  of  Athens  (not  an  Athenian)  engaged  in  the 
affair,  addressed  in  the  form  of  a  question  to  one  of  the  prisoners — 
"Have  your  best  men  then  been  all  slain?'  The  reply  conveyed  an 
intimation  of  the  standing  contempt  entertained  hy  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians for  the  bow  and  its  chance  strokes  in  the  line — "Thai  would 
be  a  capital  arrow  which  could  single  out  the  best  man."  The  langu- 
age which  Herodotus  puts  into  the  mouth  of  Demaratus,  composed 
in  the  early  years  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  attests  this  same  belief 
in  Spartan  valor — "  The  Lacedaemonians  die,  but  never  surrender." 
Such  impression  was  from  henceforward,  not  indeed  effaced,  but 
sensibly  enfeebled,  nor  was  it  ever  again  restored  to  its  full  former 
pitch. 

But  the  general  judgment  of  the  Greeks  respecting  the  capture  of 
Sphakteria,  remarkable  as  it  is  to  commemorate,  is  far  less  surprising 
than  that  pronounced  by  Thucydides  himself.  Kleon  and  Demos- 
thenes  returning  with  a  part  of  the  squadron  and  carrying  all  the 
prisoners,  started  from  Sphakteria  on  the  next  day  but  one  after  the 
action,  and  reached  Athens  within  twenty  days  after  Kleon  had  left 
it.  Thus  "the  promise  of  Kleon,  insane  as  it  teas,  came  true" — 
observes  the  historian. 

.Men  vi  ith  arms  in  their  hands  have  always  the  option  between  death 
and  imprisonment,  and  Grecian  opinion  was  only  mistaken  in  assum- 
ing as  a  certainty  that  the  Lacedaemonians  would  choose  the  former. 
But  Kleon  had  never  promised  to  bring  them  home  as  prisoners:  his 
promise  was  disjunctive — that  they  should  be  either  so  brought  home, 
or  slain,  within  twenty  days.  No  sentence  throughout  the  whole  of 
Thucydides  astonishes  me  so  much  as  that  in  which  he  stigmatizes 
such  an  expectation  as  "insane."  Here  are  4'.20  Lacedaemonian  hop- 
lites,  without  any  other  description  of  troops  to  aid  them — without  the 
dlity  of  being  re-enforced — without  any  regular  fortification — 


PREJUDICE  OF  THUCYDIDES.  661 

without  any  narrow  pass  such  as  that  of  Thermopylae — without  either 
a  sufficient  or  a  certain  supply  of  food — cooped  up  in  a  small  open 
island  less  than  two  miles  in  length.  Against  them  are  brought  10,000 
troops  of  divers  arms,  including  800  fresh  hoplites  from  Athens,  and 
marshaled  by  Demosthenes,  a  man  alike  enterprising  and  experience.!. 
For  the  talents  as  well  as  the  presence  and  preparations  of  Demos- 
thenes are  a  part  of  the  data  of  the  case,  and  the  personal  compe- 
tence of  Kleon  to  command  alone  is  foreign  to  the  calculation.  Now 
if,  under  such  circumstances,  Kleon  engaged  that  this  forlorn  com- 
pany of  brave  men  should  be  either  slain  or  taken  prisoners,  how 
could  he  be  looked  upon,  I  will  not  say  as  indulging  in  an  insane 
boast,  but  even  as  overstepping  a  cautious  and  mistrustful  esti- 
mate of  probability  ?  Even  to  doubt  of  this  result,  much  more  to 
pronounce  such  an  opinion  as  that  of  Thucydides,  implies  an  idea  not 
onl}'  of  superhuman  power  in  the  Lacedaemonian  hoplites,  but  a  dis- 
graceful incapacit\T  on  the  part  of  Demosthenes  and  the  assailants. 
The  interval  of  twenty  days,  named  by  Kleon,  was  not  extravagantly 
narrow,  considering  the  distance  of  Athens  from  Pylus.  For  the 
attack  of  this  petty  island  could  not  possibly  occupy  more  than  one 
or  two  days  at  the  utmost,  though  the  blockade  of  it  might  by  various 
accidents  have  been  prolonged,  or  might  even,  by  some  terrible  storm, 
be  altogether  broken  off.  If,  then,  we  carefully  consider  this  promise, 
made  by  Kleon  to  the  assembly,  we  shall  find  that  so  far  from  deserv- 
ing the  sentence  pronounced  upon  it  by  Thucydides.  of  being  a  mad 
boast  which  came  true  by  accident — it  was  a  reasonable  and  even  a 
modest  anticipation  of  the  future:  reserving  the  only  really  doubtful 
point  in  the  case — whether  the  garriscn  of  the  island  would  be  ulti- 
mately slain  or  made  prisoners.  Demosthenes,  had  he  been  present 
at  Athens  instead  of  being  at  Pylus,  would  willingly  have  set  his  .seal 
to  the  engagement  taken- by  Kleon. 

I  repeat  with  reluctance,  though  not  without  belief,  the  statement 
made  by  one  of  the  biographers  of  Thucydides — that  Kleon  was  tho 
cause  of  the  banishment  of  the  latter  as  a  general,  and  has  therefore 
received  from  him  harder  measure  than  was  due  in  his  capacity  of 
historian.  But  though  this  sentiment  is  not  probably  without  influ- 
ence in  dictating  the  unaccountable  judgment  which  1  have  just  been 
criticising — as  well  as  other  opinions  relative  to  Kleon,  on  which  I 
shall  say  more  in  a  future  chapter — I  nevertheless  look  upon  that 
judgment  not  as  peculiar  to  Thucydides,  but  as  common  to  him  with 
Nikias  and  those  whom  we  must  call,  for  want  of  a  better  name,  the 
oligarchical  party  of  the  time  at  Athens.  And  it  gives  us  some 
measure  of  the  prejudice  and  narrowness  of  vision  which  prevailed 
among  that  party  at  the  present  memorable  crisis;  so  pointedly  con- 
trasting with  the  clearsighted  and  resolute  calculations,  and  the  judi 
cious  conduct  in  action,  of  Kleon,  who,  when  forced  against  his  will 
into  the  post  of  general,  did  the  very  best  which  could  be  done  in  his 
situation — he  selected  Demosthenes  as  colleague  and  heartily  seconded 


662  SEVENTH  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 

his  operations.  Though  the  military  attack  of  Sphakteria,  one  of  the 
ablest  specimens  of  generalship  in  the  whole  war,  and  distinguish  d 
not  less  by  the  dexterous  employment  of  different  descriptions  of 
troops  than  by  care  to  spare  the  lives  of  the  assailants — belongs  alto- 
gether to  Demosthenes  ;  yet  if  Kleon  bur  not  been  competenl  to 
stand  up  in  the  Athenian  assembly  and  defy  those  gloomy  predictions 
which  we  Bee  attested  in  Thucydides,  Demosthenes  would  never 
have  been  re-enforced  nor  placed  in  condition  to  land  on  the  island. 
The  glory  of  the  enterprise,  therefore,  belongs  jointly  to  both.  Kleon, 
far  from  stealing  away  the  laurels  of  Demosthenes  (as  Aristophanes 
represents  in  his  comedy  of  the  Knights),  was  really  the  means  of 
placing  them  on  his  head,  though  he  at  the  same  time  deservedly 
shared  them.  It  has  hitherto  been  the  practice  to  look  at  Kleon  only 
from  the  point  of  view  of  bis  opponents,  through  whose  testimony 
we  know  him.  But  the  real  fact  is  that  this  history  of  the  events  of 
Sphakteria,  when  properly  surveyed,  is  a  standing  disgrace  to  those 
opponents,  and  no  inconsiderable  honor  to  him;  exhibiting  them  as 
alike  destitute  of  political  foresight  and  of  straightforward  patriotism 
— as  sacrificing  the  opportunities  of  war,  along  with  the  lives  of  their 
fellow-citizens  and  soldiers,  for  the  purpose  of  ruining  a  political 
enemy.  It  was  the  duty  of  Nikias,  as  Strategus,  to  propose,  and 
undertake  in  person  if  necessary,  the  reduction  of  Sphakteria.  If  he 
thought  the  enterprise  dangerous,  that  was  a  good  reason  for  assigning 
to  it  a  larger  military  force,  as  we  shall  find  him  afterward  reasoning 
about  the  Sicilian  expedition — but  not  for  letting  it  slip  or  throwing 
it  off  upon  others. 

The  return  of  Kleon  and  Demosthenes  to  Athens,  within  the  twenty 
days  promised,  bringing  with  them  nearly  300  Lacedaemonian  pris- 
oners, must  have  been  by  far  the  most  triumphant  and  exhilarating 
event  which  bad  occurred  to  the  Athenians  throughout  the  whole  war. 
It  at  once  changed  the  prospects,  position,  and  feelings  of  both  the 
contending  parties.  Such  a  number  of  Lacedaemonian  prisoners, 
especially  120  Spartans,  was  a  source  of  almost  stupefaction  to  the 
general  body  of  Greeks,  and  a  prize  of  inestimable  value  to  the, 
captors.  The  return  of  Demosthenes  in  the  preceding  year  from  the 
Ambrakian  Gulf,  when  he  brought  with  him  300  Ambrakian  pano- 
plies, had  probably  been  sufficiently  triumphant.  But  the  entry  inlc 
Peiraeus  on  this  occasion  from  Sphakteria,  with  300  Lacedaemonian 
prisoners,  must  doubtless  have  occasioned  emotions  transcending  all 
former  experience.  It  is  much  to  be  regretted  that  no  description  is 
preserved  to  us  of  the  scene  as  well  as  of  the  elate  manifestations 
of  the  people  when  the  prisoners  were  marched  up  from  Peiraeus 
to  Athens.  We  should  be  curious  also  to  read  some  account  of  the 
first  Athenian  assembly  held  after  this  event — the  overwhelming 
cheers  heaped  upon  Kleon  by  his  joyful  partisans,  who  had  helped  to 
invest  him  with  the  duties  of  general,  in  confidence  that  he  would 
discharge  them  well — contrasted  with  the  silence  or  retractation  of 


POLICY  OF  ATHENS.  GG3 

Nikias  and  the  other  humiliated  political  enemies.  But  all  such 
details  are  unfortunately  denied  to  us — though  they  constitute  the 
Wood  and  animation  of  Grecian  history,  now  lying  before  us  only  in 
its  skeleton. 

The  first  impulse  of  the  Athenians  was  to  regard  the  prisoner.-;  as  a 
guarantee  to  their  territory  against  invasion.  They  resolved  to  keep 
them  securely  guarded  until  the  peace;  but  if  at  any  time  before  that 
event  the  Lacedaemonian  army  should  enter  Attica,  then  to  bring 
forth  the  prisoners,  and  put  them  to  death  in  sight  of  the  invaders. 
They  were  at  the  same  time  full  of  spirits  in  regard  to  the  prosecution 
of  the  war,  and  became  further  confirmed  in  the  hope,  not  merely  of 
preserving  their  power  undiminished,  but  even  of  recovering  much  of 
what  they  had  lost  before  the  Thirty  years'  truce.  Pylus  was  placed 
in  an  improved  state  of  defense,  with  the  adjoining  island  of  Sphak- 
teria doubtless  as  a  subsidiary  occupation.  The  Messenians,  trans- 
ferred thither  from  Naupakfus,  and  overjoyed  to  rind  themselves 
once  more  masters  even  of  an  outlying  rock  of  their  ancestorial  ter- 
ritory, began  with  alacrity  to  overrun  and  ravage  Laconia:  while  the 
ilelots,  shaken  by  the  recent  events,  manifested  inclination  to  desert 
to  them.  The  Lacedaemonian  authorities,  experiencing  evils  before 
unfelt  and  unknown,  became  sensibly  alarmed  lest  such  desertions 
should  spread  through  the  country.  Reluctant  as  they  were  to  afford 
obvious  evidence  of  their  embarrassments,  they  nevertheless  brought 
themselves  (probably  under  the  pressure  of  the  friends  and  relatives 
of  the  Sphakterian  captives)  to  send  to  Athens  several  missions  for 
peace;  but  all  proved  abortive.  AVe  are  not  told  what  they  offered, 
but  it  did  not  come  up  to  the  expectations  which  the  Athenians 
thought  themselves  entitled  to  indulge. 

We  who  now  review  these  facts  with  a  knowledge  of  the  subse- 
quent history,  see  that  the  Athenians  could  have  concluded  a  better 
bargain  with  the  Lacedaemonians  during  the  six  or  eight  months  suc- 
ceeding the  capture  of  Sphakteria,  than  it  was  ever  open  to  them  to 
make  afterward:  and  they  had  reason  to  repent  letting  slip  the  oppor- 
tunity. Perhaps  indeed  Perikles,  had  he  been  still  alive,  might  have 
taken  a  more  prudent  measure  of  the  future,  and  might  have  had 
iscendeney  enough  over  his  countrymen  to  be  able  to  arrest  the  tide 
of  success  at  its  highest  point,  beforesit  began  to  ebb  again. 

But  if  we  put  ourselves  back  into  the  situation  of  Athens  during 
the  autumn  which  succeeded  the  return  of  Kleon  and  Demosthenes 
from  Sph..kteria,  we  shall  easily  enter  into  the  feelings  under  which 
the  war  was  continued.  The  actual  possession  of  the  captives  now 
placed  Athens  in  a  far  better  position  than  she  had  occupied  when 
they  were  only  blocked  up  in  Sphakteria,  aifd  when  the  Lacedaemo- 
nian envoys  first  arrived  to  ask  for  peace.  She  was  now  certain  of 
being  able  to  command  peace  with  Sparta  on  terms  at  least  tolerable, 
whenever  she  chose  to  invite  it — she  had  also  a  fair  certainty  of 
escaping  the  hardship  of  invasion.     Next — and  this  was  perhaps  the 


66±  SEVENTH   YEAR   OF  THE  WAR. 

most  important  feature  of  the  case — the  apprehension  of  Lacedaemo- 
nian prowess  was  now  greatly  lowered,  and  the  prospects  of  succ<  sa 
in  Alliens  considered  as  prodigiously  Unproved,  even  in  t  J  *  <  •  estima- 
tion of  impartial  Greeks;  much  more  in  the  eyes  of  the  Athenians 
themselves.  Moreover,  the  idea  of  a  tide  of  good  fortune— of  the 
favor  of  the  ""'I-  now  begun  and  likely  to  continue— of  future  suc- 
ary  from  past — was  one  which  powerfully  affected 
Grecian  calculations  generally.  Wiry  not  push  the  presenl  good 
fortune  and  try  to  regain  the  most  important  points  lost  before  and 
by  the  Thirty  years'  truce,  especially  in  Megara  and  Boeotia — points 
which  Sparta  could  not  concede  by  negotiation,  since  they  were  not 
in  her  possession?  Though  these  speculations  failed  (as  we  shall  see 
in  the  coming  chapter),  yet  there  was  nothing  unn  asonable  in  acting 
upon  them,  Probably  the  almost  universal  sentiment  of  Athens  was 
at  this  moment  warlike.  Even  Nikias,  humiliated  as  be  must  have 
been  by  the  success  in  Sphakteria,  would  forget  his  usual  caution  in 
the  desire  of  retrieving  his  own  personal  credit  by  some  military 
exploit.  That  Demosthenes,  now  in  full  measure  of  esteem,  would 
be  eager  to  prosecute  the  war,  with  which  his  prospects  of  personal 
glory  were  essentially  associated  (just  as  TLucydides  observes  about 
Brasidias  on  the  Lacedaemonian  side),  can  admit  of  no  doubt.  The 
comedy  of  Aristophanes  called  the  Acharnians  was  acted  about  six 
months  before  the  affair  of  Sphakteria,  when  no  one  coidd  possibly 
look  forward  to  such  an  event — the  comedy  of  the  Knights  about  six 
months  after  it.  Now  there  is  this  remarkable  difference  between 
the  two — that  while  the  former  breathes  the  greatest  sickness  of  war, 
and  presses  in  every  possible  way  the  importance  of  making  peace, 
although  at  that  time  Athens  had  no  opportunity  of  coming  even  to 
a  decent  accommodation — the  latter,  running  down  the  general  char- 
acter of  Kleon  with  unmeasured  scorn  and  ridicule,  talks  in  one  or 
two  places  only  of  the  hardships  of  war,  and  drops  altogether  that 
emphasis  and  repetition  with  winch  peace  had  been  dwelt  upi  n  in 
the  Acharnians — although  coming  out  at  a  moment  when  peace  was 
within  the  reach  of  the  Athenians. 

To  understand  properly/  the  history  of  this  period,  therefore,  we 
must  distinguish  various  occasions  which  are  often  confounded.  At 
the  moment  when  Sphakteria  was  first  blockaded,  and  when  the 
Lacedaemonians  fust  sent  to  solicit  peace,  there  was  a  considerable 
party  at  Alliens  disposed  to  entertain  the  offer.  The  ascendency  of 
Kleon  was  one  of  the  main  causes  why  it  was  rejected.  But  alter 
the  captives  were  brought  home  from  Sphakteria,  the  influence  of 
Kleon,  though  positively  greater  than  it  had  been  before,  was  no 
longer  required  to  procure  the.  dismissal  of  Lacedaemonian  pacific 
and  the  continuance  of  the  war.  The  general  temper  of  Athens 
was  then  warlike,  and  there  were  very  few  to  contend  strenuously 
for  an  opposite  policy.  During  the  ensuing  year,  however,  the 
chauces  of  war  turned  out  mostly  unfavorable  to  Athens,   so  that 


EXPEDITION  OF  NIKIAS.  665 

by  the  end  of  that  year  she  had  become  much  more  disposed  to  peace. 
The  truce  for  one  year  was  then  concluded.  But  even  after  that 
truce  was  expired,  Kleon  still  continued  eager  (and  on  good  grounds, 
as  will  be  shown  hereafter)  for  renewing  the  war  in  Thrace,  at  a  time 
when  a  large  proportion  of  the  Athenian  public  had  grown  weary  of 
it.  He  was  one  of  the  main  causes  of  that  resumption  of  warlike 
operations  which  ended  in  the  battle  of  Amphipolis,  fatal  both  to 
himself  and  to  Brasidas.  There  were  thus  two  distinct  occasions  on 
which  the  personal  influence  and  sanguine  character  of  Kleon  seems 
to  have  been  of  sensible  moment  in  determining  the  Athenian  public 
to  war  instead  of  peace.  But  at  the  moment  which  we  have  now 
reached — that  is,  the  year  immediately  following  the  capture  of 
Sphakteria — the  Athenians  were  sufficiently  warlike  without  him; 
probably  Nikias  himself  as  well  as  the  rest. 

It  was  one  of  the  earliest  proceedings  of  Nikias,  immediately  after 
the  inglorious  exhibition  which  he  had  made  in  reference  to  Sphak- 
teria, to  conduct  an  expedition,  in  conjunction  with  two  colleagues, 
against  the  Corinthian  territory.  He  took  with  him  80  triremes,  2,000 
Athenian  hoplites,  200  horsemen  aboard  of  some  horse-transports,  and 
some  additional  hoplites  from  Miletus,  Andros,  and  Karystus.  Start- 
ing from  Peirams  in  the  evening,  he  arrived  a  little  before  daybreak 
on  a  beach  at  the  foot  of  the  hill  and  village  of  Solygeia,  about  seven 
miles  from  Corinth,  and  two  or  three  miles  south  of  the  Isthmus. 
The  Corinthian  troops,  from  all  the  territory  of  Corinth  within  the 
Isthmus,  were  already  assembled  at  the  Isthmus  itself  to  repel  him; 
for  intelligence  of  the  intended  expedition  had  reached  Corinth  some 
time  before  from  Argos,  with  which  latter  place  the  scheme  of  the 
expedition  may  have  been  in  some  way  connected.  The  Athenians 
having  touched  the  coast  during  the  darkness,  the  Corinthians  were 
only  apprised  of  the  fact  by  fire-signals  from  Solygeia.  Not  being 
able  to  hinder  the  landing,  they  dispatched  forthwith  half  their 
forces,  under  Battus  and  Lykophron,  to  repel  the  invader,  while  the 
remaining  half  were  left  at  the  harbor  of  Kenchreae,  on  the  northern 
side  of  Mount  Oneion,  to  guard  the  port  of  Krommvon  (outside  of 
the  Isthmus)  in  case  it  should  be  attacked  by  sea.  Battus  with  one 
loehus  of  hoplites  threw  himself  into  the  village  of  Solygeia,  which 
was  unfortified,  while  Lykophron  conducted  the  remaining  troops  to 
attack  the  Athenians.  The  battle  was  first  engaged  on  the  Athenian 
right,  almost  immediately  after  its  landing,  on  the  point  called  Cher- 
sonesus.  Here  the  Athenian  hoplites,  together  with  their  Karystian 
allies,  repelled  the  Corinthian  attack,  after  a  stout  and  warmly  dis- 
puted hand-combat  of  spear  and  shield.  Nevertheless  the  Corin- 
thians, retreating  up  to  a  higher  point  of  ground,  returned  to  the 
charge,  and  with  the  aid  uf  a  fresh  loehus  drove  the  Athenians  back 
to  the  shore  and  to  their  ships:  from  hence  the  latter  again  turned, 
and  again  recovered  a  partial  advantage.  The  battle  was  no  less 
severe  on  the  left  wing  of  the  Athenians.     But  here,  after  a  contest 


666  SEVENTH   YEAR  OP  THE  WAR. 

of  some  length,  the  latter  gained  a  more  decided  victory,  greatly  by 
the  aid  o(  their  eavalrv  -^pursuing  the  <  'orinthians,  who  tied  in  some 
disorder  to  a  neighboring  hill  and  there  took  up  a  position.  The  Athe- 
nians were  thus  victorious  throngbonl  the  whole  line,  with  the  loss 
of  about  forty-seven  men,  while  the  Corinthians  had  lost  ~12,  to- 
gether with  the  general  Lykophron,  The  victore  erected  their  irophy, 
stripped  the  dead  bodies  and  buried  their  own  dead.  The  Corinthian 
detachment  lefl  at  Kenchrese  could  not  see  the  battle,  in  consequence 
of  the  interposing  ridge -of  Mount  Onciuin:  hut  it  was  at  last  made 
known  to  them  by  the  dust  of  the  fugitives,  and  they  forthwith 
hastened  to  afford  help.  Re-enforcements  also  came  both  from  Corinth 
and  from  Kenchre.e,  and  as  it  seems  'oo,  from  the  neighboring  Pelo 
ponnesian  cities — so  that  Nikias  thought  it  prudent  to  retire  on  board 
of  his  ships,  and  halt  upon  some  neighboring  islands.  It  was  here  first 
discovered  that  two  of  the  Athenians  slain  had  not  been  picked  up  for 
burial;  upon  which  he  immediately  sent  a  herald  to  solicit  a  truce,  in 
order  to  procure  these  two  missing  bodies.  We  have  here  a  remark- 
able proof  of  the  sanctity  attached  to  that  duty:  for  the  mere  Bending 
of  the  herald  was* tantamount  to  confession  of  defeat. 

From  hence  Nikias  sailed  to  Krommyon,  where  alter  ravaging  the 
neighborhood  for  a  few  hours  he  listed  for  the  night.  On  the  next 
day  be  re-embarked,  sailed  along  the  coast  of  Epidaurus,  upon  which 
he  inflicted  some  damage  in  passing,  and  stopped  at  last  on  the  penin- 
sula of  Meihana,  between  Epidaurus  and  Trcezen.  On  this  peninsula 
he  established  a  permanent  garrison,  drawing  a  fortification  across 
the  narrow  neck  of  land  which  joined  it  to  the  Epidaurian  peninsula. 
This  was  his  last  exploit.  He  then  sailed  home:  but  the  post  at 
Methana  long  remained  as  a  center  for  pillaging  the  neighboring 
regions  of  Epidaurus,  Trcezen,  and  Halieis. 

While  Nikias  was  engaged  in  this  expedition,  Eurymcdon  and 
Sophokles  had  sailed  forward  from  Pylus  with  a  considerable  portion 
of  that  fleet  which  had  been  engaged  in  the  capture  of  Sphakteria,  to 
the  island  of  Korkyra.  It  has  been  already  stated  that  the  democratical 
government  at  Korkyra  had  been  suffering  severe  pressure  and  priva- 
tion from  the  oligarchical  fugitives,  who  had  come  back  into  the 
island  with  a  body  of  barbaric  auxiliaries,  and  established  themselves 
upon  Mount  Istone,  not  far  from  the  city.  Eurymcdon  and  the  Athe- 
nians, joining  the  Korkyraeans  in  the  city,  attacked  and  stormed  the 
post  on  Mount  Istone;  while  the  vanquished,  retiring  first  to  a  lofty 
and  inaccessible  peak,  were  forced  to  surrender  themselves  OB  terms 
to  the  Athenians.  Abandoning  altogether  their  mercenary  auxili- 
aries, they  only  stipulated  that  they  should  themselves  be  sent  to 
Athens,  and  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  Athenian  people.  Eurym- 
edon,  assenting  to  these  terms,  deposited  the  disarmed  prisoners  in 
the  neighboring  islet  of  Ptychia,  under  the  distinct  condition  that  if 
a  single  man  tried  to  escape,  the  whole  capitulation  should  be  null 
and  void. 


CAPTIVES  PUT  TO  DEATH.  667 

Unfortunately  for  these  men,  the  orders  given  to  Eurymedon  car- 
ried him  onward  straight  to  Sicily.  It  was  irksome  therefore  to  him 
to  send  away  a  detachment  of  his  squadron  to  convey  prisoners  to 
Athens;  where  the  honors  01  delivering  them  would  be  reaped,  not 
by  himself,  but  by  the  officer  to  whom  they  might  be  confided.  And 
the  Korkyraeans  in  the  city,  on  their  part,  were  equally  anxious  that 
the  men  should  not  be  sent  to  Athen3.  Their  animosity  against  them 
being  bitter  in  the  extreme,  they  were  afraid  that  the  Athenians  might 
spare  their  lives,  so  that  their  hostility  against  the  island  might  be 
again  resumed.  And  thus  a  mean  jealousy  on  the  part  of  Eurymedon, 
combined  with  revenge  and  insecurity  on  the  part  of  the  victorious 
Korkyraeans,  brought  about  a  cruel  catastrophe,  paralleled  nowhere 
else  in  Greece,  though  too  well  in  keeping  with  the  previous  acts  of 
the  bloody  drama  enacted  in  this  island. 

The  Korkyrsean  leaders,  seem. ugly  not  without  the  privity  of  Eurym- 
edon, sent  across  to  Ptychia  fraudulent  emissaries  under  the  guise 
of  friends  to  the  prisoners.  These  emissaries, — assuring  the  prison- 
ers that  the  Athenian  commanders,  in  spite  of  the  convention  signed, 
were  about  to  hand  them  over  to  the  Korkyraean  people  for  destruc- 
tion,— induced  some  of  them  to  attempt  escape  in  a  boat  prepared  for 
the  purpose.  By  concert,  the  boat  was  seized  in  the  act  of  escaping, 
so  that  the  terms  of  the  capitulation  were  really  violated :  upon  which 
Eurymedon  handed  over  the  prisoners  to  their  enemies  in  the  island, 
who  imprisoned  them  all  together  in  one  vast  building,  under  guard 
of  hoplites.  From  this  building  they  were  drawn  out  in  companies 
of  twenty  men  each,  chained  together  in  couples,  and  compelled  to 
march  between  two  lines  of  hoplites  marshaled  on  each  side  of  the 
road.  Those  who  loitered  in  the  march  were  hurried  on  by  whips 
from  behind:  as  they  advanced,  their  private  enemies  on  both  sides 
singled  them  out,  striking  and  piercing  them  until  at  length  they 
miserably  perished.  Three  successive  companies  were  thus  destroyed 
— ere  the  remaining  prisoners  in  the  interior,  who  thought  merely 
that  their  place  of  detention  was  about  to  be  changed,  suspected  what 
was  passing.  As  soon  as  they  found  it  out,  one  and  all  refused  either 
to  quit  the  building  or  to  permit  any  one  else  to  enter.  They  at  the 
same  time  piteously  implored  the  intervention  of  the  Athenians,  if  it 
were  only  to  kill  them  and  thus  preserve  them  from  the  cruelties  of 
their  merciless  countrymen.  The  latter,  abstaining  from  attempts  to 
force  the  door  of  the  building,  made  an  aperture  in  the  roof,  from 
whence  they  shot  down  arrows,  and  poured  showers  of  tiles  upon  the 
prisoners  within;  who  sought  at  first  to  protect  themselves,  but  at 
length  abandoned  themselves  to  despair,  and  assisted  with  their  own 
hands  in  the  work  of  destruction.  Some  of  them  pierced  their  throats 
with  the  arrows  shot  down  from  the  roof:  others  hung  themselves, 
either  with  cords  from  some  bedding  which  happened  to  be  in  the 
building,  or  with  strips  torn  and  twisted  from  their  own  garments. 
Night  came  on,  but  the  work  of  destruction,  both  from  above  and 


6C8  >1A  T.NT1I    YKAll   OF    THE   WAR. 

within,  was  continued  without  intermission,  do  that  before  morning 
all  these  wretched  men  bad  peri  lied,  either  by  the  hand- of  their 
cin -in ii*s  or  by  their  own.  At  daybreak  the  Korkj  rseans  entered  the 
building,  piled  up  the  Qead  bodies  on  carts,  and  transported  them  oui 
of  the  citj  :  the  exact  Dumber  we  arc  not  told,  bul  seemingly  it  can- 
not have  been  less  than  300.  The  women  who  had  been  taken  at 
Istone  along  with  these  prisoners  were  all  sold  as  slaves. 

Thus  finished  the  bloody  dissensions  in  this  ill  fated  island*  for  the 
oligarchical  party  were  completely  annihilated,  the  democracy  wai 
victorious,  and  there  were  no  farther  violences  throughout  the  whole 
Avar.  It  will  bo  recollected  that  these  deadly  feuds  began  with  the 
return  of  the  oligarchical  prisoners  from  ( lorinth,  bringing  along  with 
them  projects  both  of  treason  and  of  revolution.    They  ended  with  the 

annihilation  of  that  party,  in  the  manner  above  described;  the  inter- 
val being  tilled  by  mutual  atrocities  and  retaliation,  wherein  of  course 
the  victors  had  most  opportunity  of  gratifying  their  vindictive  pas- 
sions. Eurymedon,  after  the  termination  of  these  events,  proceeded 
onward  with  the  Athenian  squadron  to  Sicily.  What  he  did  there 
will  be  described  in  a  future  chapter  devoted  io  Sicilian  affairs  exclu- 
sively. 

The  complete  prostration  of  Ambrakia  during  the  campaign  of  the 
preceding  year  had  left  Anaktorium  without  any  defense  against 
the  Akarnanians  and  Athenian  squadron  from  Naupaktus,  They 
besieged  and  took  it  during  the  course  of  the  present  summer;  expell- 
ing the  Corinthian  proprietors,  and  re-peopling  the  town  and  it« 
territory  with  Akarnanian  settlers  from  all  the  townships  in  the 
country. 

Throughout  the  maritime  empire  of  Athens  matters  continued  per- 
fectly tranquil,  except  that  the  inhabitants  of  Chios,  during  the  course 
of  the  autumn,  incurred  the  suspicion  of  the  Athenians  from  having 
recently  built  a  new  wall  to  their  city,  as  if  it  were  done  with  the 
intention  of  taking  the  first  opportunity  to  revolt.  They  solemnly 
protested  their  innocence  of  any  such  designs,  but  the  Athenians 
"were  not  satisfied  without  exacting  the  destruction  of  the  obnoxious 
"vail.  The  presence  on  the  opposite  continent  of  an  active  baud  of 
Mitylenaean  exiles,  who  captured  both  Rhceteium  and  Antandrus 
during  the  ensuing  spring,  probably  made  the  Athenians  more 
its  and  vigilant  on  the  subject  of  Chios. 

The  Athenian  regular  tribute-gathering  squadron,  circulating 
among  the  maritime  subjects,  captured,  during  the  course  cf  the 
present  autumn,  a  prisoner  of  some  importance  and  singularity.  It 
was  a  Persian  ambassador,  Artaphernes,  seized  at  Eion  on  the  Stry- 
in  on,  in  his  way  to  Sparta  with  dispatches  from  the  Great  King,  lie 
was  brought  to  Athens,  where  his  dispatches,  which  were  at  some 
length  and  written  in  the  Assyrian  character,  were  translated  and 
public.  The  Great  King  told  the  Lacedaemonians,  in  sub 
stance,  that  he  could  not  comprehend  what  they  meant;  for  that 


SUCCESSION  OF  PERSIAN  KINGS.  669 

among  the  numerous  envoys  whom  they  had  sent,  no  two  told  the 
same  story.  Accordingly  he  desired  them,  if  they  wished  to  make 
themselves  understood,  to  send  some  envoys  with  fresh  and  plain 
instructions  to  accompany  Artaphernes.  Such  was  the  substance  of 
the  dispatch,  conveying  a  remarkable  testimony  as  to  the  march  of 
the  Lacedaemonian  government  in  its  foreign  policy.  Had  any  simi- 
lar testimony  existed  respecting  Alliens,  demonstrating  that  her  for- 
eign policy  was  conducted  with  half  as  much  unsteadiness  and  stu- 
pidity, ample  inferences  would  have  been  drawn  from  it  to  the 
discredit  of  democracy.  But  there  has  been  no  motive  generally  to 
discredit  Lacedaemonian  institutions,  which  inc  uded  kingship  in 
double  measure — two  parallel  lines  of  hereditary  kings;  together 
with  an  entire  exemption  from  ever3rthing  like  popular  discussion. 
The  extreme  defects  in  the  foreign  management  erf  Sparta,  revealed 
by  the  dispatch  of  Artaphernes,  seem  traceable  partly  to  an  habitual 
faithlessness  often  noted  in  the  Lacedremonian  character — partly  to 
the  annual  change  of  Ephors,  so  frequently  bringing  into  power  men 
who  strove  to  undo  what  had  been  done  by  their  predecessors — and 
still  more  to  the  absence  of  everything  like  discussion  or  canvass  of 
public  measures  among  the  citizens.  We  shall  find  more  than  one 
example,  in  the  history  about  to  follow,  of  this  disposition  on  the 
part  of  Ephors  not  merely  to  change  the  policy  of  their  predecessors, 
but  even  to  subvert  treaties  sworn  and  concluded  by  them.  Such 
was  the  habitual  secrecy  of  Spartan  public  business,  that  in  doing 
thi-  they  had  neither  criticism  nor  discussion  to  fear.  Brasidas, 
when  he  started  from  Sparta  on  the  expedition  which  will  be 
described  in  the  coming  chapter,  could  not  trust  the  assurances  of 
the  Lacedaemonian  executive  without  binding  them  by  the  most  sol- 
emn oaths. 

The  Athenians  sent  back  Artaphernes  in  a  trireme  to  Ephesus,  and 
availed  themselves  of  this  opportunity  for  procuring  access  to  the 
Great  King  They  sent  envoys  along  with  him,  with  the  intention 
that  they  should  accompany  him  up  to  Susa;  but  on  reaching  Asia, 
the  news  met  them  that  King  Artaxerxes  had  recently  died.  Under 
such  circumstances,  it  was  not  judged  expedient  to  prosecute  the 
mission,  and  the  Athenians  dropped  their  design. 

Respecting  the  great  monarchy  of  Persia,  during  this  long  interval 
of  fifty-four  years  since  the  repulse  of  Xerxes  from  Greece,  we  have 
little  information  before  us  except  the  names  of  the  successive  kings 
In  the  year  465  B.C.,  Xerxes  was  assassinated  by  Artabanus  and 
Mithridates,  through  one  of  those  plots  of  great  household  officers,  so 
frequent  in  Oriental  palaces.  He  left  two  sons,  or  at  least  two  sons 
pre -cut  and  conspicuous  among  a  greater  number,  Darius  and  Arta- 
xerxes. But  Artabanus  persuaded  Artaxerxes  that  Darius  had  been 
the  murderer  of  Xerxes,  and  thus  prevailed  upon  him  to  revenge  his 
father's  death  by  becoming  an  accomplice  in  killing  his  brother 
Darius:   he   next  tried  to  assassinate  Artaxerxes  himself,   and  to 


G70  EIGHTH    YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 

appropriate  the  crown.  Artaxerxes,  however,  being  apprised  before- 
hand  of  tbe  Bcheme,  either  slew  Artabanus  with  his  own  hand  or 
procured  him  to  be  slain,  and  'hen  reigned  (known  under  the  name 
of  Artaxerxes  Longimanus)  for  forty  years,  down  to  the  period  at 

Which  we  are  now  arrived. 

Mention  1ms  already  been  made  of  the  revolt  of  Egypt  from  tlio 
dominion  of  Artaxerxes,  under  the  Libyan  prince  fnarus,  actively 

aided    by  the    Athenians.      After  a   few  years  of  SUCOess,  this  revolt 

was  crushed  and  Egypl  again  subjugated,  by  the  energy  of  the  Per- 
sian general  Megabyzus — with  severe  loss  to  the  Athenian  forces 
engaged.  Alter  the  peace  of  Kallias,  erroneously  called  the  Kimo- 
nian  peace,  between  the  Athenians  and  the  king  of  Persia,  war  had 
not  been  since  resumed.  We  read  in  Ktesias,  amid  various  anec- 
dotes seemingly  collected  at  the  court  of  Susa,  romantic  adventures 
ascribed  to  IVfegabyzus,  his  wife  Amytis,  nis  mother  Amestris,  and  a 
Greek  physician  of  Kos,  named  Apollonides.  Zopyrus  son  of  Meg- 
abyzus, after  the  death  of  his  father,  deserted  from  Persia  and  came 
as  an  exile  to  Athens. 

At  the  death  of  Artaxerxes  Longimanus,  the  family  violences  inci- 
dent to  a  Persian  succession  were  again  exhibited.  His  son  Xerxes 
succeeded  him,  but  was  assassinated,  after  a  reign  of  a  few  weeks  or 
months.  Another  son,  Sogdianus,  followed,  who  perished  in  like 
manner  after  a  short  interval.  Lastly,  a  third  son.  Ochus  (known 
under  the  name  of  Darius  Nothus),  either  abler  or  more  fortunate, 
kepi  his  crown  and  life  between  nineteen  and  twenty  years.  By  his 
queen  the  savage  Parysatis,  he  was  father  to  Artaxerxes  Mnemon 
and  Cyrus  the  younger,  both  names  of  interest  in  reference  to  Gre- 
cian history,  to  whom  we  shall  hereafter  recur 


CHAPTER  LIII. 

EIGHTH   YEAR   OF   THE   WAR. 

The  eighth  year  of  the  war,  on  which  we  now  touch,  presents 
events  of  a  more  important  and  decisive  character  than  any  of  the 
preceding.  In  reviewing  the  preceding  years  we  observe  that  though 
there  is  much  fighting,  with  hardship  and  privation  inflicted  on  both 
sides,  yet  the  operations  are  mostly  of  a  desultory  character,  not  cal- 
culated to  determine  the  event  of  the  war.  But  the  capture  of 
Sphakteria  and  its  prisoners,  coupled  with  the  surrender  of  the 
whole  Lacedaemonian  fleet,  was  an  event  full  of  consequences  and 
imposing  in  the  eyes  of  all  Greece.  It  stimulated  the  Athenians  to  a 
series  of  operations,  larger  and  more  ambitious  than  anything  which 
they  had  yet  conceived — directed,  not  merely  against  Sparta  in  her 


CAPTURE  OF  KYTHERA.  671 

own  country,  but  also  to  the  reconqucst  of  that  ascendency  in  Megara 
and  Bceotia  which  they  had  lost  on  or  before  the  Thirty  years'  truce. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  intimidated  so  much  both  the  Lacedemonians, 
the  revolted  Chalkidic  allies  of  Athens  in  Thrace,  and  Perdikkaa 
king  of  Macedonia — that  between  them  the  expedition  of  Brasidas, 
which  struck  so  serious  a  blow  at  the  Athenian  empire,  was  con- 
certed. This  year  is  thus  the  turning-point  of  the  war.  If  the  opera- 
tions of  Athens  had  succeeded,  she  would  have  regained  nearly  as 
great  a  power  as  she  enjoyed  before  the  Thirty  years'  truce.  But  it 
happened  that  Sparta,  or  rather  the  Spartan  Brasidas,  proved  suc- 
cessful, gainin»-  enough  to  neutralize  all  the  advantages  derived  by 
Athens  from  the  capture  of  Sphakteria. 

The  first  enterprise  undertaken  by  the  Athenians  in  the  course  of 
the  spring  was  against  the  island  of  Kythera,  on  the  southern  coast 
of  Laconia.  It  was  inhabited  by  Lacedaemonian  Periceki,  and  admin- 
istered by  a  governor  and  garrison  of  hoplites  annually  sent  thither. 
It  was  the  usual  point  of  landing  for  merchantmen  from  Libya  and 
Egypt;  and  as  it  lay  very  near  to  Cape  Malea,  immediately  over 
against  the  Gulf  of  Gythium — the  only  accessible  portion  of  the  gen- 
erally inhospitable  coast  of  Laconia — the  chance  that  it  might  fall 
into  the  hands  of  an  enemy  was  considered  as  so  menacing  to  Sparta, 
that  some  politicians  are  said  to  have  wished  the  island  at  the  bottom 
of  the  sea.  Nikias,  in  conjunction  with  Nikostratus  and  Autokles, 
conducted  thither  a  fleet  of  sixty  triremes,  with  2,000  Athenian 
hoplites,  some  few  horsemen,  and  a  body  of  allies  mainly  Milesians. 

There  were  in  the  island  two  towns — Kythera  and  Skandeia;  the 
former  having  a  lower  town  close  to  the  sea,  fronting  Cape  Malea, 
and  an  upper  town  on  the  hill  above;  the  latter  seemingly  on  the 
south  or  west  coast.  Both  were  attacked  at  the  same  time  by  order 
of  Nikias:  ten  triremes  and  a  body  of  Milesian  hoplites  disembarked 
and  captured  Skandeia;  while  the  Athenians  landed  at  Kythera,  and 
drove  the  inhabitants  out  of  the  lower  town  into  the  upper,  where 
they  speedily  capitulated.  A  certain  party  among  them  had,  indeed, 
secretly  invited  the  coming  of  Nikias,  through  which  intrigue  easy 
terms  were  obtained  for  the  inhabitants.  Some  few  men,  indicated 
by  the  Kytherians  in  intelligence  with  Nikias,  were  carried  away  as 
prisoners  to  Athens;  but  the  remainder  were  left  undisturbed  and 
enrolled  among  the  tributary  allies  under  obligation  to  pay  four  tal- 
ents per  annum;  an  Athenian  garrison  being  placed  at  Kythera  for 
the  protection  of  the  island.  From  hence  Nikias  employed  seven 
days  in  descents  and  inroads  upon  the  coast,  near  Helos,  Asine, 
Aphrodisia,  Kotyrta,  and  elsewhere.  The  Lacedaemonian  force  was 
disseminated  in  petty  garrisons,  which  remained  each  for  the  defense 
of  its  own  separate  post,  without  uniting  to  repel  the  Athenians,  so 
that  there  was  only  one  action,  and  that  of  little  importance,  which 
the  Athenians  deemed  worthy  of  a  trophy. 

In  returning  home  from  Kythera,  Nikias  first  ravaged  the  small 


672  EIGHTH   YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 

Btrip  of  cultivated  land  near  Epidaurus  Limera,  on  the  rocky  eastern 
coast  of  Lacouia,  and  then  attacked  the  JSginetan  Bettlemenl  atThy- 
rea,  the  frontier  atrip  between  Laconia  and  Argolis.  This  town  and 
district  had  been  mad'  over  by  Sparta  to  the  /Eginetans,  at  the  time 
when  they  were  expelled  from  their  own  island  by  Athens  in  the  first 
year  of  the  war.  The  new  inhabitants,  finding  the  town  too  distant 
from  the  sea  for  their  maritime  habits,  were  now  employed  in  eon 
structing  a  fortification  close  on  the  Bhore;  in  which  work  a  Lacedae- 
monian detachment  under  Tantalus,  on  guard  in  that  neighborhood, 
was  assisting  them.  When  the  Athenians  landed,  lioth  .Eginetans 
and  Lacedaemonians  at  once  abandoned  the  new  fortification.  The 
JEginetans,  with  the  commanding  officer  Tantalus,  occupied  the 
uppertown  of  Thyrea;  but  the  Lacedaemonian  troops,  not  thinking 
it  tenable,  refused  to  take  part  in  the  defense,  and  retired  to  the 
neighboring  mountains,  in  spite  of  urgent  entreaty  from  the  JEgiue- 
tans.  Immediately  alter  landing,  the  Athenians  inarched  up  to  the 
town  of  Thyrea,  and  carried  it  by  storm,  burning  or  destroying  every- 
thing within  it.  All  the  ^Eginetans  were  either  killed  or  made  pris- 
oners, and  even  Tantalus,  disabled  by  his  wounds,  became  prisoner 
also.  From  hence  the  armament  returned  to  Alliens,  where  a  vote 
was  taken  as  to  the  disposal  of  the  prisoners.  The  Kytherians 
brought  home  were  distributed  for  safe  custody  among  the  dependent 
island-:  Tantalus  was  retained  along  with  the  prisoners  from  Sphak- 
teria;  but  a  harder  fate  was  reserved  for  the  ^Eginetans.  They  were 
all  put  to  death,  victims  to  the  long-standing  antipathy  between  Ath- 
ens and  iEgina.  This  cruel  act  was  nothing  more  than  a  strict 
application  of  admitted  customs  of  war  in  those  days.  Had  the  Lace- 
daemonians been  the  victors,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  they  would 
have  acted  with  equal  rigor. 

The  occupation  of  Kythera,  in  addition  to  Pylus,  by  an  Athenian 
garrison,  following  so  closely  upon  the  capital  disaster  in  Sphakteria, 
produced  in  the  minds  of  the  Spartans  feelings  of  alarm  and  depres- 
sion  such  as  they  "had  never  before  experienced.  Within  the  course 
of  afew  short  months  their  position  had  completely  changed  from 
superiority  and  aggression  abroad,  to  insult  and  insecurity  at  home. 
They  anticipated  nothing  less  than  incessant  foreign  attacks  on  all 
their  weak  points,  with  every  probability  of  internal  defection,  from 
the  standing  discontent  of  the  Helots.  It  was  not  unknown  to  them 
probably  that  even  Kythera  itself  had  been  lost  partly  through 
betrayal.  The  capture  of  Sphakteria  had  caused  peculiar  emotion 
among  the  Helots,  to  whom  the  Lacedaemonians  had  addressed  both 
appeals  and  promises  of  emancipation,  in  order  to  procure  succor  for 
their  hoplites  while  blockaded  in  the  island.  If  the  ultimate  surren- 
der of  these  hoplites  had  abated  the  terrors  of  Lacedaemonian  prow- 
ess throughout  all  Greece,  such  ell'ect  had  been  produced  to  a  still 
greater  degree  among  the  oppressed  Helots.  A  refuge  at  Pylus,  and 
a  nucleus  which  presented  some  possibility  of  expanding  into  regen- 


ASSASSINATION  OF  TWO  THOUSAND  HELOTS.     673 

erated  Messenia,  were  now  before  their  eyes-  while  the  establishment 

of  an  Athenian  garrison  at  Kythera  opened  a  new  channel  of  com- 
munication witli  the  enemies  of  Sparta,  so  as  to  tempt  all  the  Helots 
of  daring  temper  to  stand  forward  as  liberators  of  their  enslaved  race. 
The  Lacedaemonians,  habitually  cautious  at  all  times,  felt  now  as  if 
the  tide  of  fortune  had  turned  decidedly  against  them,  and  acted 
with  confirmed  mistrust  and  dismay — confining  themselves  to  meas- 
ures strictly  defensive,  but  organizing  a  force  of  400  cavalry,  together 
with  a  body  of  bowmen,  beyond  their  ordinary  establishment. 

The  precautions  which  they  thought  it  necessary  to  take  in  regard 
to  the  Helots  afford  the  best  measure  of  their  apprehensions  at  the 
moment,  and  exhibit,  moreover,  a  refinement  of  fraud  and  cruelty 
rarely  equaled  in  history.  Wishing  to  single  out  from  the  general 
body  such  as  were  most  high-couraged  and  valiant,  the  Ephors  made 
proclamation,  that  those  Helots,  who  conceived  themselves  to  have 
earned  their  liberty  by  distinguished  services  in  war,  might  stand 
forward  to  claim  it.  A  considerable  number  obeyed  the  call — prob- 
ably many  who  had  undergone  imminent  hazards  during  the  preced- 
ing summer  in  order  to  convey  provisions  to  the  blockaded  soldiers 
in  Sphakteria.  After  being  examined  by  the  government,  2,000  of 
them  were  selected  as  fully  worthy  of  emancipation;  which  was 
forthwith  bestowed  upon  them  in  public  ceremonial — with  garlands, 
visits  to  the  temples,  and  the  full  measure  of  religious  solemnity. 
The  government  had  now  made  the  selection  which  it  desired;  pres- 
ently every  man  among  these  newly  enfranchised  Helots  was  made 
away  with — no  one  knew  how.  A  stratagem  at  once  so  perfidious  in 
the  contrivance,  so  murderous  in  the  purpose,  and  so  complete  in  the 
execution,  stands  without  parallel  in  Grecian  history — we  might 
almost  say.  without  a  parallel  in  any  history.  It  implies  a  depravity 
far  greater  than  the  rigorous  execution  of  a  barbarous  customary  law 
against  prisoners  of  war  or  rebels,  even  in  large  numbers.  The 
Ephors  must  have  employed  numerous  instruments,  apart  from  each 
other,  for  the  performance  of  this  bloody  deed.  Yet  it  appears  that 
no  certain  knowledge  could  be  obtained  of  the  details — a  striking 
proof  of  the  mysterious  efficiency  of  this  Council  of  Five,  surpassing 
even  that  of  the  Council  of  Ten  at  Venice — as  well  as  of  the  utter 
absence  of  public  inquiry  or  discussion. 

It  was  while  the  Lacedaemonians  were  in  this  state  of  uneasiness 
at  home  that  envoys  reached  them  from  Perdikkas  of  Macedonia  and 
the  Chalkidians  of  Thrace,  entreating  aid  against  Athens;  who  was 
considered  likely,  in  her  present  tide  of  success,  to  resume  aggressive 
measures  against  them.  There  were,  moreover,  other  parties,  in  the 
neighboring  cities  subject  to  Athens,  who  secretly  favored  the  appli- 
cation, engaging  to  stand  forward  in  open*  revolt  as  soon  as  any 
auxiliary  force  should  arrive  to  warrant  their  incurring  the  hazard. 
Perdikkas  (who  had  on  his  hands  a  dispute  with  his  kinsman  Arrhi- 
b.eus,  prince  of  the  Lynkestae-Macedonians,  which  he  was  anxious  to 
H.  G.  II.— 22 


C74  EIGriTII  TEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 

be  enabled  to  close  successfully)  and  the  Chalkidians  offered  at  the 
same  time  to  provide  the  pay  and  maintenance,  aa  well  as  to  facilitate 

the  Iran-it,  dl' Ihc  troops  who  migbl  be  sent  to  them.  And — what 
was  of  -till  greater  importance  to  the  success  of  the  enterprist — they 
specially  requested  thai  Brasidas  might  be  invested  with  the  com- 
mand. He  bad  now  recovered  from  his  wounds  received  at  Pylus, 
and  his  reputation  For  adventurous  valor,  great  as  it  was  from  posi- 
tive desert,  stood  out  --till  more  conspicuously,  because  not  a  Bingle 
other  Spartan  had  as  yet  distinguished  himself.  His  other  great 
qualities,  apart  from  personal  valor,  bad  not  yet  been  shown,  for  In- 
had  never  been  in  any  supreme  command.  Bui  he  burned  with 
impatience  to  undertake  the  operation  destined  for  him  by  the  envoys; 
although  at  ibis  time  it  must  have  appeared  so  replete  with  difficulty 
and  danger,  that  probably  no  other  Spartan  except  himself  would 
have  entered  upon  it  with  hopes  of  success.  To  raise  up  embarrass- 
ments for  Athens  in  Thrace  was  an  object  of  great  consequence  to 
Sparta,  while  she  also  obtained  an  opportunity  of  sending  away 
another  large  detachment  of  dangerous  Helots.    Seven  hundred  of 

these  latter  were  armed  as  boplites  and  placed  under  the  orders  of 
Brasidas,  but  the  Lacedaemonians  would  not  assign  to  him  any  of 
their  own  proper  forces.  With  the  sanction  of  the  Spartan  nam< — 
with  700  Helot  boplites,  and  with  such  other  boplites  as  be  could 
raise  in  Peloponnesus  by  means  of  the  funds  furnished  from  the 
Chalkidians— Brasidas  prepared  to  undertake  this  expedition,  alike 
adventurous  and  important. 

Had  the  Athenians  entertained  any  suspicion  of  his  designs,  they 
could  easily  have  prevented  him  from  ever  reaching  Thrace.  But 
they  knew  nothing  of  it  until  he  had  actually  joined  Perdikkas.  nor 
did  they  anticipate  any  serious  attack  from  Sparta,  in  this  moment  of 
her  depression — much  less  an  enterprise  far  bolder  than  any  which 
she  had  ever  been  known  to  undertake.  They  were  now  elate  with 
hopes  of  conquests  to  come  on  their  own  pari — their  affairs  being  so 
prosperous  and  promising,  that  parties  favorable  to  their  interests 
began  to  revive,  both  inMegara  and  in  Bceotia;  while  Hippokrates 
and  Demosthenes,  the  two  chief  Strategi  for  the  year,  were  men  of 
energy,  well  qualified  both  to  project  and  execute  military  achieve- 
ments. 

The  first  opportunity  presented  itself  in  regard  to  Megara.  The 
inhabitants  of  that  city  bad  been  greater  sufferers  by  the  war  than  any 
other  persons  in  Greece.  Theyr  had  been  the  chief  cause  of  bringing 
down  the  war  upon  Athens,  and  the  Athenians  revenged  upon  them 
all  the  hardships  which  they  themselves  endured  from  the  Lacedae- 
monian invasion.  Twice  in  every  year  they  laid  waste  the  Megarid, 
which  bordered  upon  their  own  territory;  and  that,  too,  with  such 
destructive  etbeacy  throughout  its  limited  extent  that  they  inter- 
cepted all  subsistence  from  the  lands  near  the  town — at  the  same 
time  keeping  the  harbor  of  Niseea  closely  blocked  up.     Under  such 


ATTEMPT  TO  SURPRISE  NIS.EA  AND  MEGARA.     675 

bad  conditions  the  Megarians  found  much  difficulty  in  supplying 
even  the  primary  wants  of  life.  But  their  case  had  now,  within  the 
last  few  months,  become  still  more  intolerable  by  an  intestine  com- 
motion in  the  city,  ending  in  the  expulsion  of  a  powerful  body  of 
exiles,  who  seized  and  held  possession  of  Pegae,  the  Megarian  port  in 
the  Gulf  of  Corinth.  Probably  imports  from  Pegae  had  been  their 
chief  previous  resource  against  the  destruction  which  came  on  them 
from  the  side  of  Athens;  so  that  it  became  scarcely  possible  to  sus- 
tain themselves,  when  the  exiles  in  Pegae  not  only  deprived  them  of 
this  resource,  but  took  positive  part  in  harassing  them.  These  exiles 
were  oligarchical,  and  the  government  in  Megara  had  now  become 
more  or  less  democratical.  But  the  privations  in  the  city  presently 
reached  such  a  height,  that  several  citizens  began  to  labor  for  a  com- 
promise, whereby  the  exiles  in  Pegae  might  be  readmitted.  It  was 
evident  to  the  leaders  in  Megara  that  the  bulk  of  the  citizens  could 
not  long  sustain  the  pressure  of  enemies  from  both  sides — but  it  was 
also  their  feeling,  that  the  exiles  in  Pegae,  their  bitter  political  rivals, 
were  worse  enemies  than  the  Athenians,  and  that  the  return  of  these 
exiles  would  be  a  sentence  of  death  to  themselves.  To  prevent  this 
counter-revolution,  they  opened  a  secret  correspondence  with  Hippok- 
rates and  Demosthenes,  engaging  to  betray  both  Megara  and  Nisaea 
to  the  Athenians;  though  Nisaea,  the  harbor  of  Megara,  about  one 

Imile  from  the  city,  was  a  separate  fortress,  occupied  by  a  Pelopon- 
nesiau   garrison,    and  by   them   exclusively,  as  well  as  the  Long 
"Walls — for  the  purpose  of  holding  Megara  first  to  the  Lacedaemonian 
i  confederacy. 

The  scheme  for  surprise  was  concerted,  and  what  is  more  remark- 

I  able — in  the  extreme  publicity  of  all  Athenian  affairs,  and  in  a  mat- 

i  ter  to  which  many  persons  must  have  been  privy — was  kept  secret 

I  until  the  instant  of  execution.     A  large  Athenian  force,  4,000  hop- 

lites  and  600  cavalry,  was  appointed  to  march  at  night  bjr  the  high 

road  through  Eleusis  to  Megara;  but  Hippokrates  and  Demosthenes 

themselves  went  on  ship-board  from  Peiraeus  to  the  island  of  Minoa, 

which  was  close  against  Nisaea,  and  had  been  for  some  time  under 

occupation  by  an  Athenian  garrison.     Here  Hippokrates  concealed 

himself  with  600  hoplites,  in  a  hollow  out  of  which  brick  earth  had 

been  dug,  on  the  mainland  opposite  to  Minoa,  and  not  far  from  the 

gate  in  the  Long  Wall  which  opened  near  the  junction  of  that 

ki  wall  with  the  ditch  and  wall  surrounding  Nisaea;  while  Demosthenes, 

!(  with  some  light-armed  Plataeans  and  a  detachment  of  active  young 

Athenians  (called  Peripoli,  and  serving  as  the  movable  guard    of 

Attica)  in  their  first  or  second  year  of  military  service,  placed  him- 

B  self  in  ambush  in  the  sacred  precincts  of  Ares,  still  closer  to  the  same 

ii  gate.  » 

To  procure  that  the  gate  should  be  opened,  was  the  task  of  the  con- 
Pspirators  within.  Amid  the  shifts  to  which  the  Megarians  had  been 
(J  reduced  in  order  to  obtain  supplies  (especially  since  the  blockading 


676  EIGHTH   YEAR  OF  THE  WAR 

force  bad  been  placed  at  Minoa),  predatory  sally  by  night  was  not 
omitted  Some  of  these  conspirators  bad  been  in  the  habit,  before 
the  intrigue  with  Athena  was  projected,  of  carrying  out  a  Bmall 
sculler  boat  by  aighl  upon  a  cart,  through  this  gate,  by  permission 
of  the  Peloponnesian  commander  of  Nisaea  and  the  Lone  Walk. 
The  boat,  when  thue  brought  out,  was  ftre!  carried  down  to  the  shore 
along  the  hollow  of  the  dry  ditch  which  surrounded  the  wall  of  Nissea 
— then  put  to  sea  for  some  nightly  enterprise — and  lastly,  brought 
back  again  along  the  ditch  before  daylight  in  tin- morning;  the  gate 
being  opened,  by  permission,  to  let  it  in.  This  was  the  only  way  by 
which  any  Megarian  vessel  could  get  to  sea,  since  the  Athenians  at 
Minoa  were  complete  masters  of  the  harbor. 

On  the  night  fixed  for  the  surprise,  this  boat  was  carried  out  and 
brought  back  at  the  usual  hour.  Hut  the  moment  that  the  gate  in 
the  Long  Wall  was  opened  to  readmit  it,  Demosthenes  with  his  com- 
rades sprang  forward  to  force  their  way  in;  the  Megarians  along 
with  the  boat  at  the  same  time  setting  upon  and  killing  the  guards, 
in  order  to  facilitate  his  entrance.  This  active  and  determined  hand 
were  successful  in  mastering  the  gate,  and  keeping  it  open,  until  the 
600  hoplites  under  Hippokrates  came  up,  and  got  in  to  the  interior 
space  between  the  Long  Walls,  They  immediately  mounted  the 
walls  on  each  side,  every  man  as  he  came  in,  with  little  thought  of 
order,  to  drive  off  or  destroy  the  Peloponnesian  guards;  who,  taken 
by  surprise,  and  fancying  that  the  Megarians  generally  were  in  eon- 
cert  with  the  enemy  against  them — confirmed  too  in  such  belief  by 
hearing  the  Athenian  herald  proclaim  aloud  that  every  Megarian  who 
chose  might  take  his  post  in  the  line  of  Athenian  hoplites — made  at 
first  some  resistance,  but  were  soon  discouraged  and  fled  into  Nisa  a. 
By  a  little  after  daybreak,  the  Athenians  found  themselves  masters 
of  all  the  line  of  the  Long  Walls,  and  under  the  very  aates  of  Megara 
— as  well  as  re-enforced  by  the  larger  force,  which  having  marched 
by  land  through  Eleusis,  arrived  at  the  concerted  moment. 

Meanwhile  the  Megarians  within  the  city  were  in  the  greatest 
tumult  and  consternation.  But  the  conspirators,  prepared  with  their 
plan,  had  resolved  to  propose  that  the  gates  should  be  thrown  open 
and  that  the  whole  force  of  the  city  should  be  marched  out  to  light 
the  Athenians.  When  once  the  gates  should  be  open,  they  them- 
selves intended  to  take  part  with  the  Athenians  and  facilitate  their 
entrance — and  they  had  rubbed  their  bodies  over  with  oil  in  order  to 
lie  visibly  distinguished  in  the  eyes  of  the  latter.  The  plan  was  only 
frustrated  the  moment  before  it  was  about  to  be  put  in  execution, 
by  the  divulgation  of  one  of  their  own  comrades.  Their  opponents 
in  the  city,  apprised  of  what  was  in  contemplation,  hastened  to  the 
gate,  and  intercepted  the  men  rubbed  with  oil  as  they  were  about  to 
open  it.  Without  betraying  any  knowledge  of  the  momentous 
secret  which  they  had  just  learned,  these  opponents  loudly  protested 
against  opening  the  gate  and  going  out  to  tight  an  enemy  for  whom 


THE  ATHENIANS  ATTACK  NISJEA.  677 

they  had  never  conceived  themselves,  even  in  moments  of  greater 
strength,  to  be  a  match  in  the  open  field.  While  insisting  only  on 
the  public  mischiefs  of  the  measure,  they  at  the  same  time  planted 
themselves  in  arms  against  the  gate,  aud  declared  that  they  would 
perish  before  they  would  allow  it  to  be  opened.  For  such  obstinate 
resistance  the  conspirators  were  not  prepared,  so  that  they  were 
forced  to  abandon  their  design  and  leave  the  gate  closed. 

The  Athenian  generals,  who  were  waiting  in  expectation  that  it 
would  be  opened,  soon  perceived  by  the  delay  that  their  friends 
within  had  been  baffled,  and  immediately  resolved  to  make  sure  of 
Nisaea  which  lay  behind  them ;  an  acquisition,  important  not  less  in 
itself,  than  as  a  probable  means  for  the  mastery  of  Megara.  They 
set  about  the  work  with  the  characteristic  rapidity  of  Athenians. 
Masons  and  tools  in  abundance  being  forthwith  sent  for  from  Athens, 
the  army  distributed  among  themselves  the  wall  of  circumvallation 
round  Nisaea  in  distinct  parts.  First,  the  interior  space  between  the 
Long  Walls  themselves  was  built  across,  so  as  to  cut  off  the  com- 
munication with  Megara;  next,  walls  were  carried  out  from  the  out- 
ride of  both  the  Long  Walls  down  to  the  sea,  so  as  completely  to 
inclose  Nisrea  with  its  fortifications  and  ditch.  The  scattered 
houses,  which  formed  a  sort  of  ornamental  suburb  to  Nisaea,  fur- 
'nished  bricks  for  this  inclosing  circle,  or  were  sometimes  even  made 
to  form  a  part  of  it  as  they  stood,  with  the  parapets  on  their  roofs; 
while  the  trees  were  cut  down  to  supply  material  wherever  palisades 
were  suitable.  In  a  day  and  a  half  the  work  of  circumvallation  was 
; almost  completed,  so  that  the  Peloponnesians  in  Nisaea  saw  before 
them  nothing  but  a  hopeless  state  of  blockade.  Deprived  of  all  com- 
imunication,  they  not  only  fancied  that  the  whole  city  of  Megara  had 
I  joined  the  Athenians,  but  they  were  moreover  without  any  supply 
jof  provisions,  which  had  been  always  furnished  to  them  in  daily 
Iratious  from  the  city.  Despairing  of  speedy  relief  from  Pelopon- 
nesus, they  accepted  easy  terms  of  capitulation  offered  to  them  by 
I  the  Athenian  generals.  After  delivering  up  their  arms,  each  man 
wnong  them  was  to  be  ransomed  for  a  stipulated  price;  we  are  not 
iold  how  much,  but  doubtless  a  moderate  sum.  The  Lacedaemonian 
pommander,  and  such  other  Lacedaemonians  as  might  be  in  Nisaea, 
[were  however  required  to  surrender  themselves  as  prisoners  to  the 
,A.thenians,  to  be  held  at  their  disposal.  On  these  terms  Nisaea  was 
surrendered  to  the  Athenians,  who  cut  off  its  communication  with 
'Megara,  by  keeping  the  intermediate  space  between  the  Long  Walls 
■ffectively  blocked  up — walls,  of  which  they  had  themselves,  in 
I'ormer  days,  been  the  original  authors. 

Such  interruption  of  communication  by  the  Long  Walls  indicated 

j  n  the  minds  of  the  Athenian  generals  a  conviction  that  Megara  was 

iow  out  of  their  reach.     But  the  town  in  its  present  distracted  state 

would  certainly  have  fallen  into  their  hands  had  it  not  been  snatched 

'rom  them  by  the  accidental  neighborhood  aud  energetic  interven- 


G78  EIGHTH    YEAR  OF   THE   WAR. 

tion  of  Brasidas.  That  officer,  occupied  in  the  levy  of  troops  for  his 
Thracian  expedition,  was  near  Corinth  and  Sikyon  when  be  first 
learnt  the  surprise  and  rapture  of  the  Long  Walls.  Partly  from  the 
alarm  which  the  news  excited  among  these  Peloponnesian  towns, 
partly  from  his  ow  n  persona]  influence,  he  Lr>>\  together  a  body  of  ~,?00 
Corinthian  boplites,  600  Bikyonlan,  and  400  Phliasian,  bt  sid(  b  his  ov<  □ 
small  army,  and  marched  with  this  united  force  to  Tripodiskus  in 
the  Megarid,  half-way  between  Megara  and  Pegae,  (in  the  road  over 
Mount  Geraneia;  having  first  dispatched  a  prcsMii£.r  summons  to  the 
Boeotians,  to  request  that  they  would  meet  him  at  that  point  with 
re-enforcements.  He  trusted  by  a  speedy  movemenl  to  preserve' 
Megara,  and  perhaps  oven  Nisaea;  but  on  reaching  Tripodiskue  in 
the  night,  he  learnt  that  the  latter  place  had  already  surrendered 
Alarmed  for  the  safety  of  Megara,  he  proceeded  thither  by  a  niedit- 
march  without  delay.  Taking  with  him  only  a  chosen  hand  of  300 
men,  he  presented  himself,  without  being  expected,  at  the  gat<  oi 
the  city;  entreating  to  be  admitted,  and  offering  to  lend  his  immedtf 
ate  aid  for  the  recovery  of  Nisaea.  One  of  the  two  parties  in  Megara] 
would  have  been  glad  to  comply;  hut  the  other,  knowing  well  that  in 
that  case  the  exiles  from  Pegae  would  he  brought  hack  upon  tin  m,  w  as 
prepared  for  a  strenuous  resistance,  in  which  case  the  Athenian 
force,  still  only  one  mile  off,  would  have  been  introduced  as  auxili- 
aries. Under  these  circumstances  the  two  parties  came  to  a  compro- 
mise and  mutually  agreed  to  refuse  admittance  to  Brasidas.  They 
expected  that  a  battle  would  take  place  between  him  and  the  Atheni- 
ans and  each  calculated  that  Megara  woidd  follow  the  fortunes  of 
the  victor. 

Returning  back  without  success  to  Tripod iskus,  Brasidas  was 
joined  there  early  in  the  morning  by  2,000  Boeotian  boplites  and  600 
cavalry:  for  the  Boeotians  had  been  put  in  motion  by  the  same  news 
as  himself,  and  had  even  commenced  their  march  before  his  mes- 
senger arrived,  with  such  celerity  as  to  have  already  reached  Tlataa. 
The  total  force  under  Brasidas  was  thus  increased  to  6,000  boplites 
and  600  cavalry,  with  whom  he  marched  straight  to  the  neighbor- 
hood of  Megara.  The  Athenian  light  troops,  dispersed  over  the 
plain,  were  surprised  and  driven  in  by  the  Breotian  cavalry;  but  the 
Athenian  cavalry,  coming  to  their  aid,  maintained  a  sharp  action 
with  the  assailants,  wherein,  after  some  loss  on  both  sides,  a  slight 
advantage  remained  on  the  side  of  the'  Athenians.  They  granted  a 
truce  for  the  burial  of  the  Boeotian  officer  of  cavalry,  who  was  -lain 
with  some  others.  After  this  indecisive  cavalry  skirmish,  Brasidas 
advanced  with  his  main  force  into  the  plain  between  Megara  and  thd 
sea.  taking  up  a  position  near  to  the  Athenian  hoplites,  who  were 
drawn  up  in  battle  array  hard  by  Nisaea  and  the  Long  Walls,  lie 
thus  offered  them  battle  if  they  chose  it;  but  each  party  expected 
that  the  other  would  attack:  and  each  was  unwilling  to  begin  the 
attack  on  his  own  side.     Brasidas  was  well  aware  that  if  the  Athens 


REVOLUTION  AT  MEGARA.  679 

ans  refused  to  fight,  Megara  would  be  preserved  from  falling  into 
their  bands — wbicb  loss  it  was  bis  main  object  to  prevent,  and 
which  bad  in  fact  been  prevented  only  by  his  arrival.  If  he  at- 
tacked and  was  beaten,  he  would  forfeit  this  advantage — while  if 
victorious,  he  could  hardly  hope  to  gain  much  more.  The  Athenian 
generals  on  their  side  reflected  that  they  had  already  secured  a 
material  acquisition  in  Nissea,  which  cut  off  Megara  from  their  sea; 
that  the  annv  opposed  to  them  was  not  only  superior  in  number  or 
hoplites,  but  composed  of  contingents  from  many  different  cities,  so 
that  no  one  city  hazarded  much  in  the  action;  while  their  own  force 
was  all  Athenian  and  composed  of  the  best  hoplites  in  Athens,  which 
would  render  a  defeat  severely  ruinous  to  the  city.  They  did  not 
think  it  worth  while  to  encounter  this  risk,  even  for  the  purpose  of 
gaining  possession  of  Megara.  With  such  views  in  the  leaders  on 
both  sides,  the  two  armies  remained  for  some  time  in  position,  each 
waiting  for  the  other  to  attack.  At  length  the  Athenians,  seeing 
that  no  aggressive  movement  was  contemplated  by  their  opponents, 
were  the  first  to  retire  into  Nisaea.  Tims  left  master  of  the  field, 
Brasidas  retired  in  triumph  to  Megara,  the  gates  of  which  were  now 
opened  without  reserve  to  admit  him. 

The  army  of  Brasidas,  having  gained  the  chief  point  for  which  it 
was  collected,  speedily  dispersed — he  himself  resuming  his  prepara- 
tions for  Thrace;  while  the  Athenians  on  their  side  also  returned 
home,  leaving  an  adequate  garrison  for  the  occupation  both  of  Nisaea 
and  of  the  Long  Walls.  But  the  interior  of  Megara  underwent  a 
complete  and  violent  revolution.  While  the  leaders  friendly  to 
Athens,  not  thinking  it  safe  to  remain,  fled  forthwith  and  sought 
shelter  with  the  Athenians — the  opposite  party  opened  communica- 
tion with  the  exiles  at  Pegas  and  readmitted  them  into  the  city;  bind- 
ing them,  however,  by  the  most  solemn  pledges  to  observe  absolute 
amnesty  of  the  past,  and  to  study  nothing  but  the  welfare  of  the 
common  city.  The  new-comers  only  kept  their  pledge  during  the 
interval  which  elapsed  until  they  acquired  power  to  violate  it  with 
effect.  They  soon  got  themselves  placed  in  the  chief  commands  of 
state,  and  found  means  to  turn  the  military  force  to  their  own  pur- 
poses. A  review,  and  examination  of  arms,  of  the  hoplites  in  the 
city,  having  been  ordered,  the  Megarian  lochi  were  so  marshaled 
and  tutored  as  to  enable  the  leaders  to  single  out  such  victims  as 
they  thought  expedient.  They  seized  many  of  their  most  obnoxious 
enemies — some  of  them  suspected  as  accomplices  in  the  recent  con- 
spiracy with  Athens.  The  men  thus  seized  were  subjected  to  the 
forms  of  a  public  trial,  before  that  which  was  called  a  public  assembly; 
wherein  each  voter,  acting  under  military  terror,  was  constrained  to 
give  his  suffrage  openly.  All  were  condemned-to  death  and  executed, 
to  the  number  of  one  hundred.  The  constitution  of  Megara  was  then 
shaped  into  an  oligarchy  of  the  closest  possible  kind,  a  few  of  the 
most  violent  men  taking  complete  possession  of  the  government. 


EIGHTH   TEAR  or  THE   WAR 

But  they  musl  probably  have  conducted  it  with  vigor  and  prudence 
for  their  own  purposes,  since  Tbucydidea  remarks  thai  it  was  rare  tu 
see  a  revolution  accomplished  by  so  small  a  party,  and  yel  bo  durable. 
How  long  il  la-icd,  he  does  qoI  mention.  A  few  months  after  these 
incidents,  the  Megarians  regained  possession  of  their  Long  \\ ;  ils,  by 
capture  from  the  Athenians  (to  whom  indeed  they  could  have  been 
of  no  material  service),  and  leveled  the  whole  line  of  them  to  the 
ground:  but  the  Athenians  .-till  retained  Nisaa.  We  may  remark, 
as  explaining  in  pari  the  durability  of  this  new  government,  that  the 
truce  concluded  at  the  beginning  of  the  ensuing  year  musl  have 
greatly  lightened  the  difficulties  of  any  government,  whether  oligar- 
chical or  democratical,  in  Megara. 

The  S(  heme  tur  surprising  Megara  had  been  both  laid  and  executed 

with  .-kill,  and  only  miscarried  through  an  accident  to  which  such 
schemes  are  always  liable,  as  well  as  by  the  unexpected  celerity  of 
Brasidas.  It  had  moreover  succeeded  so  far  as  to  enable  the  Athe- 
nians to  carry  Nisaea — one  of  the  prists  which  they  had  surrendered 
by  the  Thirty  years'  truce,  aud  of  considerable  positive  value  to 
them,  so  thai  it  counted  on  the  whole  as  a  victory,  leaving  th( 
erais  with  increased  encouragement  to  turn  their  activity  elsewhere. 
Accordingly,  very  soon  after  the  troops  had  been  brought  back  from 
the  Megarid,  Hippokrates  aid  Demosthenes  concerted  a  still  more 
extensive  plan  for  the  invasion  of  Bceotia,  in  conjunction  with 
Kiine  malcontents  in  the   Boeotian  towns,  who  desired  to  break  down 

and  democratize  the  oligarchical  governments — and  especially  through 
the  agencj  of  a  Theban  exile  nami  d  Ptceodorus.     Demosthenes,  with 

forty  trireme-,  was  sent  round  Peloponnesus  to  Naupaktus,  with 
instructions  to>  collect  an  Akarnanian  force — to  sail  into  the  inmost 
recess  of  the  Corinthian  or  Krisssean  Gulf — and  to  occupy  Siphse,  a 
maritime  town  belonging  to  the  Boeotian  Thespiae,  where  intelligences 
had  been  already  established.  On  the  same  day,  determined  before-; 
hand,  Hippokrates  engaged  to  enter  Bceotia,  with  the  main  force  of 
Allien-,  al  the  south-eastern  corner  of  the  territory  near  Tanagra, 
and  to  fortify  Delium.  the  temple  of  Apollo  on  the  coast  of  the 
Euboean  strait;  while  at  the  same  time  it  was  concerted  that  some 
Boeotian  and  Phokian  malcontents  should  make  themselves  masters 
of  Cbaeroneia  on  the  borders  of  Phokis.     Bceotia  would  thus   be 

assailed  on  three  -ides  at  Hie  same  moment,  so  that  the  forces  of  tho 
country  would  be  distract!  d  aud  unable  to  co-operate.  Internal  mo\  e- 
tnents  were  farther  expected  to  take  place  in  some  of  the  cities,  such 
a-  perhaps  to  establish  democratical  governments  and  place  them  at 
once  in  alliance  with  the  A I  In  nians.  " 

Accordingly,  about  the  month  of  August,  Demosthenes  sallied  from 
Athens  to  Naupaktus,  where  he  collected  his  Akarnanian  allies — now 
stronger  and  more  united  an  ever,  since  the  refractory  inhabitants 
of  CEniadse  had  been  at  length  compelled  to  join  their  Akarnanian 
brethren:  moreover  the  neighboring  Agneans  with  their  prince  Salyn- 


DISAPPOINTMENT  OF   ATHENIAN  PLANS.       681 

thius  were  also  brought  into  the  Athenian  alliance.  On  the  appointed 
day,  seemingly  about  the  beginning  of  October,  he  sailed  with  a 
Strong  force  of  these  allies  up  to  Siphae,  in  full  expectation  that  it 
would  be  betrayed  to  him.  But  the  execution  of  this  enterprise  was 
less  happy  than  that  against  Megara.  lu  the  first  place,  there  was  a 
mistake  as  to  the  day  understood  between  Ilippokrates  aud  Demos- 
thenes: in  the  next  place,  the  entire  plot  was  discovered  and  betrayed 
by  a  Phokian  of  Phanoteus  (bordering  on  Chseroneia)  named  Niko- 
machus — communicated  first  to  the  Lacedaemonians,  and  through 
them  to  the  boeotarehs.  Siphae  and  Chseroneia  were  immediately 
placed  in  so  good  a  state  of  defense  that  Demosthenes,  on  arriving  at 
the  former  place,  found  not  only  no  party  within  it  favorable  to 
him,  but  a  formidable  Boeotian  force  which  rendered  attack  unavail- 
ing. Moreover  Hippokrates  had  not  yet  begun  his  march,  so  that 
the  defenders  had  nothing  to  distract  their  attention  from  Siphae. 
Under  these  circumstances,  wdiile  Demosthenes  was  obliged  to  with- 
draw without  striking  a  blow,  and  to  coutent  himself  with  an  unsuc- 
cessful descent  upon  the  territory  of  Sikyon — all  the  expected  inter- 
nal movements  in  Boeotia  were  prevented  from  breaking  out. 

It  was  not  till  after  the  Boeotian  troops,  having  repelled  the  attack 
by  sea.  had  retired  from  Siphae,  that  Hippokrates  commenced  his 
march  from  Athens  to  invade  the  Boeotian  territory  near  Tanagra. 
He  was  probably  encouraged  by  false  promises  from  the  Boeotian 
exiles,  otherwise  it  seems  remarkable  that  he  should  have  persisted 
in  executing  his  part  of  the  scheme  alone,  after  the  known  failure  of 
the  other  part.  It  was  however  executed  in  a  manner  which  implies 
unusual  alacrity  and  confidence.  The  wiiole  military  population  of 
Athens  was  marched  into  Boeotia.  to  the  neighborhood  of  Delium, 
the  eastern  coast-extremity  of  the  territory  belonging  to  the  Boeotian 
town  of  Tanagra;  the  expedition  comprising  all  classes,  not  merely 
citizens,  but  also  metics  or  resident  non-freemen,  and  even  non-resi- 
dent strangers  then  by  accident  at  Athens.  Of  course  this  statement 
must  be  understood  with  the  reserve  of  ample  guards  being  left 
behind  for  the  city;  but  besides  the  really  effective  force  of  7,000 
hoplites,  and  several  hundred  horsemen,  there  appear  to  have  been 
not  less  than  25.000  light-armed,  half-armed,  or  unarmed,  attendants 
accompanying  the  march.  The  number  of  hoplites  is  here  pro- 
digiously great;  brought  together  by  general  and  indiscriminate  proc- 
lamation, not  selected  by  a  special  choice  of  the  Strategi  out  of  the 
names  on  the  muster-roll,  as  was  usually  the  case  for  any  distant 
expedition.  As  to  light-armed,  there  was  at  this  time  no  trained 
force  of  that  description  at  Athens,  except  a  small  body  of  archers. 
No  pains  had  been  taken  to  organize  either  darters  or  dingers:  the 
hoplites,  the  horsemen,  and  the  seamen  constituted  the  whole  effect- 
ive force  of  the  city.  Indeed  it  appears  that  fhe  Boeotians  also  were 
hardly  less  destitute  than  the  Athenians  of  native  darters  and  slingers, 
since  those  which  they  employed  in  the  subsequent  siege  of  Delium 


682  EIGHTH  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 

were  in  great  pari  hired  from  the  Malian  Gulf.  To  employ  at  one 
and  the  same  time  heavj  armed  and  light  armed  was  not  natural  to 
any  Grecian  community,  bu1  waa  a  practice  which  grew  up  with 
experience  and  necessity.  The  Athenian  feeling,  ae  manifested  in  the 
"Pers83"of  .  I ■'. -  t-liylus  a  few  yi iara  after  the  repulse  of  Xerxes,  pro- 
claims exclusive  pride  in  the  spear  and  shield,  w  ith  contempl  for  the 
bow.  It  was  only  during  tins  very  year,  when  alarmed  by  the  Athe- 
nian  occupation   of    Pylua   and    Kylhera,    that    the    I.aeeda'inonians, 

contrary  to  their  previous  custom,  had  begun  to  organize  a  regiment 
of  archers.  The  effective  manner  in  which  Demosthenes  had 
employed  the  light  armed  in  Sphakteria  against  the  Eaeeiheinonian 
hoplites,  was  well  calculated  to  teach  an  instructive  lesson  as  to  the 
value  of  the  fonner  description  of  troops. 

The  Boeotian  Delium,  which  Hippokrates  now  intended  to  occupy 
and  fortify,  was  a  temple  of  Apollo,  strongly  situated,  overhanging 
the  sea  about  five  miles  from  Tanagra,  and'  somewhat  more  than  a 
mile  from  the  border  territory  of  Oropus — a  territory  originally  Boeo- 
tian, but  at  this-  time  dependent  on  Athens,  and  even  partly  incor- 
porated in  the  political  community  of  Athens,  under  the  name  of  the 
Deme  of  Graea.  Oropus  itself  was  about  a  day's  march  from  Athens 
—by the  road  which  led  through  Dekeleiaand  Bphendale,  between 
tbe  mountains  Fames  and  Phelleus.  so  that  as  the  distance  to  be 
traversed  was  so  inconsiderable,  and  the  general  feeling  of  the  time 
was  that  of  confidence,  it  is  probable  that  men  of  all  ages,  arms,  and 
dispositions  crowded  to  join  the  march — in  part  from  mere  curiosity 
and  excitement.  Hippokrates  reached  Delium  on  the  day  after  he 
had  started  from  Athens.  On  the  succeeding  day  he  began  his  work 
of  fortification,  which  was  completed — all  hands  aiding,  and  tools  as 
well  as  workmen  having  been  brought  along  with  the  army  from 
Athens — in  two  days  and  a  half.  Having  dug  a  ditcb  all  round  the 
sacred  ground,  he  threw  up  the  earth  in  a  bank  alongside  of  the 
ditch,  planting  stakes,  throwing  in  fascines,  and  adding  layers  of 
stone  and  brick,  to  keep  the  work  together  and  make  it  into  a  ram- 
part of  tolerable  height  and  firmness.  The  vines  round  tbe  temple, 
together  with  the  stakes  which  served  as  supports  to  them,  were  cut 
to  obtain  wood;  the  houses  adjoining  furnished  bricks  and  stone: 
the  outer  temple  buildings  themselves  also,  on  some  of  tbe  sides, 
served  as  they  stood  to  facilitate  and  strengthen  the  defense.  Hut 
there  was  one  side  on  which  the  annexed  building,  once  a  portico, 
bad  fallen  down:  and  here  the  Athenians  constructed  some  wood  en 
towers  as  a  help  to  the  defenders.  By  the  middle  of  the  fifth  day 
after  leaving  Athens,  the  work  was  so  nearly  completed  that  the 
army  quitted  Delium,  and  began  its  march  homeward  out  of  Bosotiaj 
baiting,  after  it  had  proceeded  about  a  mile  and  a  quarter,  within  the 
Athenian  territory  of  Oropus.  It  was  here  that  the  hoplites  awaited 
the  coming  of  Hippokrates,  who  still  remained  at  Delium  stationing 
the  garrison,  and  giving  his  final  orders  about  future  defense;  while 


MILITARY  GATHERING  AT  TANAGRA.  683 

the  greater  number  of  the  light-armed  and  unarmed,  separating  from 
the  hoplites,  and  seemingly  without  any  anticipation  of  the  coming 
danger,  continued  their  return-march  to  Athens.  The  position  of 
the  hoplites  was  probably  about  the  western  extremity  of  the  plain 
of  Oropus,  on  the  verge  of  the  low  heights  between  that  plain  and 
Delium. 

During  these  five  daj-s,  however,  the  forces  from  all  parts  of 
Boeotia  had  time  to  muster  at  Tanagra.  Their  number  was  just  com- 
pleted as  the  Athenians  were  beginning  tlieir  march  homeward  from 
Delium.  The  contingents  had  arrived,  not  only  from  Thebes  and  its 
dependent  townships  around,  but  also  from  Haliartus,  Koroueia, 
Orchomenus,  Kopae,  and  Thespise :  that  of  Tanagra  joined  on  the 
spot.  The  government  of  the  Boeotian  confederacy  as  this  time  was 
vested  in  eleven  bceotarchs — two  chosen  from  Thebes,  the  rest  in 
unknown  proportion  by  the  other  cities,  immediate  members  of  the 
confederacy — and  in  four  senates  or  councils,  the  constitution  of 
which  is  not  kuown. 

Though  all  the  bceotarchs,  now  assembled  at  Tanagra,  formed  a 
sort  of  council  of  wrar,  yet  the  supreme  command  wras  vested  in 
Pagondas  and  Ariauthides,  the  bceotarchs  from  Thebes — either  in 
Pagadonas,  as  the  senior  of  the  two,  or  perhaps  in  both,  alternating 
with  each  other  day  by  day.  As  the  Athenians  were  evidently  in 
full  retreat,  aud  had  already  passed  the  border,  all  the  other  bceo- 
tarchs, except  Pagondas,  unwilling  to  hazard  a  battle  on  soil  not 
Bceotian,  were  disposed  to  let  them  return  home  without  obstruction. 
Such  reluctance  is  not  surprising,  when  we  reflect  that  the  chances 
of  defeat  were  considerable,  and  that  probably  some  of  these  bceotarchs 
were  afraid  of  the  increased  power  which  a  victory  would  lend  to 
the  oppressive  tendencies  of  Thebes.  But  Pagondas  strenuously 
opposed  this  proposition,  and  carried  the  soldiers  of  the  various 
cities  along  with  him,  even  in  opposition  to  the  sentiments  of  their 
separate  leaders,  in  favor  of  immediately  fighting.  He  called  them 
apart  and  addressed  them  by  separate  divisions,  in  order  that  all 
might  not  quit  their  arms  at  one  and  the  same  moment.  He  char- 
acterized the  sentiment  of  the  other  bceotarchs  as  an  unworthy  mani- 
festation of  weakness,  which,  when  properly  considered,  had  not 
even  the  recommendation  of  superior  prudence.  For  the  Athenians, 
having  just  invaded  the  couutry,  and  built  a  fort  for  the  purpose  of 
continuous  devastation,  were  not  less  enemies  on  one  side  of  the  bor- 
der than  the  other.  Moreover,  they  were  the  most  restless  and 
encroaching  of  all  enemies;  so  that  the  Boeotians  who  had  the  misfor- 
tune to  be  their  neighbors,  could  only  be  secure  against  them  by  the 
most  resolute  promptitude  in  defending  themselves  as  well  as  in 
returning  the  blows  first  given.  If  they  wished  to  protect  their  auton- 
omy and  their  property  against  the  condition  of  slavery  under  which 
their  neighbors  in  Euboea  had  long  suffered,  as  well  as  so  many  other 
portions  of  Greece,  their  only  chance  wTas  to  march  onward  and  beat 


884  eighth  year  or  THE  war. 

these  invaders,  following  the  glorious  example  of  their  fathers  and 

predecessors  in  the  fiela  of   K neia.    The  sacrifices  were  favor 

able  to  an  advancing  movement;  while  Apollo,  "whose  temple  ili<: 
Athenians  had  desecrated  by  converting  it  Into  a  fortified  place, 
Mould  lend  bis  cordial  aid  i<>  the  Boeotian  defense. 

Finding  his  exhortations  favorably  received,  Pagondas  conducted 
the  army  by  a  rapid  march  to  a  position  close  to  the  Athenians.  He 
was  anxious  to  6gh1  them  before  they  should  have  retreated  farther; 
moreover,  the  day  was  nearly  spent— it  was  already  late  in  the  after 
noon. 

Having  reached  a  spot  where  he  was  only  separated  from  the 
Athenians  hy  a  hill,  which  prevented  cither  army  from  Beeing  the. 
other,  he  marshaled  his  troops  in  the  array  proper  for  fighting. 
The  Theban  hoplites,  With  their  dependent  allies,  ranged  in  a  depth 
of  not  less  than  twenty  five  shields,  occupied  the  right  wing:  the 
hoplites  of  HaBartUS,  Koronela,  Kopae,  and  its  neighborhood,  were  in 
the  center:  those  of  Thespise,  Tanagra,  and  Orchomenus,  on  the  left ; 
for  OrChOmenus,  being  the  second  city  in  Bceotia  next  to  Thebes, 
obtained  the  second  post  of  honor  at,  the  opposite  extremity  of  the 
line.  Each  contingent  adopted  its  own  mode  of  marshaling  the  hop- 
lites, and  its  own  depth  of  tiles:  on  this  point  there  was  no  uniformity 
— a  remarkable  proof  of  the  prevalence  of  dissentienl  custom  in 
(ireece,  and  how  much  each  town,  even  among  confederates,  stood 
apart  as  a  separate  unit.  Thucydides  specifies  only  the  prodigious 
depth  of  the  Theban  hoplites;  respecting  the  rest,  he  merely  inti- 
mates that  no  common  rule  Was  followed.  There  is  another  point 
also  which  he  does  not  specify — but  which,  though  we  learn  it  only 
on  the  inferior  authority  of  Diodorus,  appears  both  true  and  impor- 
tant. The  front  ranks  of  the  Theban  heavy  armed  w  ere  filled  by  300 
select  warriors,  of  distinguished  bodily  strength,  valor,  and  discipline, 
who  were  accustomed  to  tight  in  pairs,  each  man  being  attached  to 
his  neighbor  by  a  peculiar  tie  of  intimate  friendship.  These  pairs 
were  termed  theHeniochi  and  Parabatse — charioteers  and  companions; 
a  denomination  probably  handed  down  from  the  Homeric  limes,  w  hen 
the  foremost  heroes  really  combated  in  chariots  in  front  of  the  com- 
mon soldiers,  but  now  preserved  after  it  had  outlived  its  appropriate 
meaning.  This  hand,  composed  of  the  finest  nun  in  the  various 
palaestrae  of  Thebes,  was  in  alter  days  placed  under  peculiar  training 
(for  the  defense  of  the  Kadmeiaor  citadel),  detached  from  the  from 
ranks  of  the  phalanx,  and  organized  into  a  separate  regimenl  under 
the  name  of   the  Sacred   LoChus  or   Hand:  we  shall   See  how  much  it 

contributed  to  the  short-lived  military  ascendency  of  Thebes.  On 
both  hanks  of  this  mass  of  Boeotian  hoplites,  about  7,000  in  total 
number,  were  distributed   1000  cavalry;  500  peltasts,   and  10,000 

light-armed  Or  unarmed.  The  language  of  the  historian  seems  to 
imply  that  the  light-armed  on  the  Boe<  it  ian  side  were  something  more 
effective  than  the  mere  multitude  who  followed  the  Athenians. 


ORDER  OP  BATTLE  OF  ATHENIAN  ARMY.        6Sfi 

Such  was  the  order  in  which  Pagondas  marched  his  army  over  the 
hill,  halting  them  for  a  moment  in  front  and  sigh.1  of  the  Athenians, 
to  see  that  the  ranks  were  even,  before  he  gave  the  word  for  actual 
charge.  Hippokrates,  on  his  side,  apprised  while  still  at  Delium 
that  the  Boeotians  had  moved  from  Tanagra,  first  sent  orders  to  his 
army  to  place  themselves  in  battle  array,  and  presently  arrived  him- 
self to  command  them;  leaving  300  cavalry  at  Delium,  partly  as 
garrison,  partly  for  the  purpose  of  acting  on  the  rear  of  the  Boeotians 
during  the  battle.  The  Athenian  hoplites  were  ranged  eighl  deep 
along  the  whole  line — with  the  cavalry,  and  such  of  the  light-armed 
as  yet  remained,  placed  on  each  Hank.  Hippokrates,  after  arriving 
on  the  spot  and  surveying  the  ground  occupied,  marched  along  the 
front  of  the  line  briefly  encouraging  his  soldiers,  who,  as  the  battle 
was  just  on  the  Oropian  border,  might  fancy  that  they  were  not  in 
their  own  country,  and  that  they  were  therefore  exposed  without 
necessity.  He  too,  in  a  strain  similar  to  that  adopted  by  Pagondas, 
reminded  the  Athenians,  that  on  either  side  of  the  border  they  were 
alike  fighting  for  the  defense  of  Attica,  to  keep  the  Boeotians  out  of 
it;  since  the  Peloponnesians  would  never  dare  to  enter  the  country 
without  the  aid  of  the  Boeotian  horse.  He  farther  called  to  their 
recollection  the  great  name  of  Athens,  and  the  memorable  victory  of 
Myronides  at  (Enophyta,  whereby  their  fathers  had  acquired  posses- 
sion of  all  Bceotia.  But  he  had  scarcely  half  finished  his  progress 
along  the  line,  when  he  was  forced  to  desist  by  the  sound  of  the 
Boeotian  paean.  Pagondas,  after  a  few  additional  sentences  of  encour- 
agement, had  given  the  word  :  the  Boeotian  hoplites  were  seen 
charging  down  the  hill;  and  the  Athenian  hoplites,  not  less  eager, 
advanced  to  meet  them  at  a  running  step. 

At  the  extremity  of  the  line  on  each  side,  the  interposition  of 
ravines  prevented  the  actual  meeting  of  the  armies  :  but  throughout 
all  the  rest  of  the  line,  the  clash  was  formidable  and  the  conduct  of 
both  sides  resolute.  Both  armies,  maintaining  their  ranks  compact 
and  unbroken,  came  to  the  closest  quarters ;  to  the  contact  and  push- 
ing of  shields  against  each  other.  On  the  left  half  of  the  Boeotian 
line,  consisting  of  hoplites  from  Thespiae,  Tanagra,  and  Orcho- 
menus,  the  Athenians  were  victorious.  The  Thespians,  who  resisted 
longest,  even  after  their  comrades  had  given  way,  were  surrounded 
and  sustained  the  most  severe  loss  from  the  Athenians,  who  in  the 
ardor  of  success,  while  wheeling  round  to  encircle  the  enemy, 
became  disordered  and  came  into  conflict  even  with  their  own 
citizens,  not  recognizing  them  at  the  moment  :  some  loss  of  life  was 
the  consequence. 

While  the  left  of  the  Boeotian  line  was  thus  worsted  and  driven  to 
seek  protection  from  the  right,  the  Thebans  on  that  side  gained 
decided  advantage.  Though  the  resolution  and  discipline  of  the 
Athenians  was  noway  inferior,  yet  as  soon  as  the  action  came  to 
close  quarters  and  to  propulsion  with  shield  and  spear,  the  prodig- 


C,SG  EIGHTH  TBAB  OP  THE  WAR. 

ions  depth  of  the  Theban  column  (more  than  triple  of  the  depth  of 
the  Athenians,  twenty-five  againsl  eight)  enabled  them  to  bear  down 
their  enemies  by  mere  superiority  of  weight  and  mass.  Moreover 
the  Tin 'bans  appear  to  have  been  superior  to  the  Athenians  in  gym- 
c  training  and  acquired  bodilj  force,  as  they  were  inferior  both 
in  speech  and  in  intelligence.     'I  lie  chosen  Theban  warriors  in  the 

fmnt  rank  were  especially  superior  :   but  apart  from  such  superiority, 

if  we  assume  Bimple  equality  of  individual  Btrength  and  resolution 
on  both  sides,  it  is  plain  that  when  the  two  opposing  columns  came 
into  conflict,  shield  against  shield — the  comparative  force  of  forward 
pressure  would  decide  the  victory.  This  motive  is  sufficient  to  ex- 
plain the  extraordinary  depth  of  the  Theban  column— which  was 
increased  by  Epaminondas,  half  a  century  afterwards,  at  the  battle 
of  Leuktra,  from  a  depth  of  twenty-five  men  to  the  still  more  aston- 
ishing depth  of  fifty.  We  need  not  suspect  the  correctness  of  the 
text,  with  some  critics — or  suppose  with  others,  that  the  great  depth 
of  the  Theban  tiles  arose  from  the  circumstance  that  the  rear  ranks 
were  to  poor  to  provide  themselves  with  armor.  Even  in  a  depth  of 
eight,  which  was  that  of  the  Athenian  column  in  the  present  engage- 
ment, and  seemingly  the  usual  depth  in  a  battle — the  spears  of  the 
four  rear  ranks  could  hardly  have  protruded  sufficiently  beyond  the 
first  line  to  do  any  mischief.  The  great  use  of  all  the  rank's  behind 
the  first  four,  was  partly  to  take  the  place  of  such  of  the  foremost 
lines  as  might  be  slain — partly,  to  push  forward  the  lines  before 
them  from  behind.  The  greater  the  depth  of  the  files,  the  more 
irresistible  did  this  propelling  force  become.  Hence  the  Thebans  at 
Delium  as  well  as  at  Leuktra,  found  their  account  in  deepening  the 
column  to  so  remarkable  a  degree — a  movement  to  which  we  may 
fairly  presume  that  their  hoplites  were  trained  beforehand. 

The  Thebans  on  the  right  thus  pushed  back  the  troops  on  the  left  of 
the  Athenian  line,  who  retired  at  first  slowly  and  for  a  short  space, 
maintaining  their  order  unbroken — so  that  the  victory  of  the  Athen- 
ians on  their  own  right  would  have  restored  the  battle,  had  not 
Pagondas  detached  from  the  rear  two  squadrons  of  cavalry  ;  who, 
wheeling  unseen  round  the  hill  behind,  suddenby  appeared  to  the 
relief  of  the  Boeotian  left,  and  produced  upon  the  Athenians  on  that 
side,  already  deranged  in  their  ranks  by  the  ardor  of  pursuit,  the 
intimidating  effect  of  a  fresh  army  arriving  to  re-enforce  the  Boeotians. 
And  thus,  even  on  the  right,  the  victorious  portion  of  their  line.  I  lie 
Athenians  lost  courage  and  gave  way  ;  while  on  the  left,  where  they 
were  worsted  from  the  beginning,  they  found  themselves  pressed 
harder  and  harder  by  the  pursuing  Thebans  :  so  that  in  the  end,  the 
whole  Athenian  army  was  broken  and  put  to  flight.  The  garrison  of 
Delium,  re-enforced  by  300  cavalry  whom  Ilippokrates  had  left  there 
to  assail  the  rear  of  the  Boeotians  during  the  action,  either  made  no 
vigorous  movement,  or  were  repelled  by  a  Boeotian  reserve  stationed 
to  watch  them. 


DEFEAT  OF  THE  ATHENIANS.  687 

Flight  having  become  general  among  the  Athenians,  the  different 
parts  of  (heir  army  took  different  directions.  The  right  sought  refuge 
at  Delium,  the  center  fled  to  Oropus,  and  the  left  took  a  direction 
toward  the  high  lands  of  Parnes.  The  pursuit  of  the  Boeotians  was 
vigorous  and  destructive.  They  had  an  efficient  cavalry,  strength 
eneil  by  some  Lokrian  horse  who  had  arrived  even  during  the  action; 
their  peltasts  also,  and  their  light-armed  would  render  valuable  service 
against  retreating  hoplites.  Fortunately  for  the  vanquished,  the  bat- 
tle had  begun  very  late  in  the  afternoon,  leaving  no  long  period  of 
daylight.  This  important  circumstance  saved  the  Athenian  army 
from  almost  total  destruction.  As  it  was,  however,  the  general  Hip- 
pokrates,  together  with  nearly  1000  hoplites,  and  a  considerable 
number  of  light-armed  and  attendants,  were  slain ;  while  the  loss  of 
the  Boeotians,  chiefly  on  their  defeated  left  wing,  was  rather  under 
500  hoplites.  Some  prisoners  seem  to  have  been  made,  but  we  hear 
little  about  them.  Those  who  had  fled  to  Delium  and  Oropus  were 
conveyed  back  by  sea  to  Athens. 

The  victors  retired  to  Tanagra,  after  erecting  their  trophy,  burying 
their  own  dead,  and  despoiling  those  of  their  enemies.  An  abundant 
booty  of  arms  from  the  stript  warriors  long  remained  to  decorate  the 
temples  of  Thebes,  while  the  spoil  in  other  ways  is  said  to  have  been 
considerable,  Pagondas  also  resolved  to  lay  siege  to  the  newly 
established  fortress  of  Delium.  But  before  commencing  operations 
— which  might  perhaps  prove  tedious,  since  the  Athenians  could 
always  re-enforce  the  garrison  by  sea — he  tried  another  means  of 
attaining  the  same  object.  He  dispatched  to  the  Athenians  a  herald 
I — who,  happening  in  his  way  to  meet  the  Athenian  herald  coming  to 
ask  the  ordinary  permission  for  burial  of  the  slain,  warned  him  that 
no  such  request  wTould  be  entertained  until  the  message  of  the  Boeotian 

feneral  had  first  been  communicated,  and  thus  induced  him  to  come 
ack  to  the  Athenian  commanders.  The  Boeotian  herald  was  in- 
structed to  remonstrate  against  the  violation  of  holy  custom  com- 
mitted by  the  Athenians  in  seizing  and  fortifying  the  temple  of 
'Delium:  wherein  their  garrison  was  now  dwelling,  performing 
numerous  functions  which  religion  forbade  to  be  done  in  a  sacred 
place,  and  using  as  their  common  drink  the  water  especially  conse- 
crated to  sacrificial  purposes.  The  Boeotians  therefore  solemnly  sum- 
moned them  in  the  name  of  Apollo  and  the  gods  inmates  along  with 
them,  to  evacuate  the  place,  carrying  away  all  that  belonged  to  them. 
Finally,  the  herald  gave  it  to  be  understood,  that  unless  this  sum 
toons  were  complied  with,  no  permission  would  be  granted  to  bury 
their  dead. 

Answer  was  returned  by  the  Athenian  herald,  who  now  went  to 
the  Boeotian  commanders,  to  the  following  effect:  The  Athenians  did 
not  admit  that  they  had  hitherto  been  guilty  of  any  wrong  in  refer- 
ence to  the  temple,  and  protested  that  they  would  persist  in  respect- 
ing it  for  the  future  as  much  as  possible.     Their  object  in  taking  po§- 


G88  EIGHTH    YEAR   OF  THE  WAR. 

session  of  it  bad  been  no  evil  sentiment  toward  the  holy  place,  but 
the  necessity  of  avenging  the  repeated  Invasions  of  Attica  by  the 
Boeotians.  Possession  of  tin;  territory,  according  to  the  received 
maxims  of  Greece,  always  carried  alone  with  it  possession  of  temples 
therein  situated,  under  obligation  to  fulfil]  all  customary  observances 
to  the  resident  god,  as  far  as  circumstances  permitted.  It  was  upon 
this  maxim  that  the  Boeotians  had  themselves  acted  when  they  took 
-ion  of  their  present  territory,  expelling  the  prior  occupants 
and  appropriating  the  temples:  it  was  upon  the  same  maxim  that  the 
Athenians  would  act  in  retaining  so  much  of  BtBOtia  as  they  hail  now 

conquered,  and  in  conquering  more  of  it,  if  they  could.  Necessity 
compelled  them  10  use  the  consecrated  water— a  necessity  not  origi- 
nating in  the  ambition  of  Athens,  hut  in  prior  Boeotian  aggressions 

upon  Attica — a  necessity  which  they  trusted  that  the  gods  would 
pardon,  since  their  altars  were  allowed  as  a  protection  to  the  invol 
untary  offender,  and  none  hut,  he  u  ho  sinned  without  constraint 
experienced  their  displeasure.  The  Boeotians  were  guilty  of  far 
greater  impiety— in  refusing  to  give  back  the  dead  except  on  certain 
conditions  connected  with  the  holy  ground — than  the  Athenians, 
who  merely  refused  to  turn  the  duty  of  sepulture  into  an  unseemly 
bargain.  "Tell  us  unconditionally,"  concluded  the  Athenian  her- 
ald, "that  we  may  bury  our  dead  under  truce,  pursuant  to  the  max- 
ims of  our  forefathers.  Do  not  tell  us  that  we  may  do  so.  on  condi- 
tion of  going  out  of  Boeotia — for  we  are  no  longer  in  Bceotia — we  are 
in  our  own  territory,  won  by  the  sword." 

The  Boeotian  generals  dismissed  the  herald  with  a  reply  short 
and  decisive:  "If  you  are  in  Bceotia,  you  may  take  away  all  that 
belongs  to  you,  but  only  on  condition  of  going  out  of  it.  If,  on  the 
other  hand,  you  are  in  your  own  territory,  you  can  take  your  own 
resolution  without  asking  us." 

In  this  debate,  curious  as  an  illustration  of  Grecian  manners  and 
feelings,  there  seems  to  have  been  special  pleading  and  evasion  on 
both  sides.  The  final  sentence  of  the  Boeotians  was  good  as  a  reply 
to  the  incidental  argument  raised  by  the  Athenian  herald,  who  had  • 
rested  the  defense  of  Athens  in  regard  to  the  temple  of  I )elium  on 
the  allegation  that  the  territory  was  Athenian,  not  Boeotian — Athe- 
nian by  conquest  and  by  the 'right  of  the  strongest— and  had  con- 
cluded by  affirming  the  same  thing  about  Oropia,  the  district  to 
which  the  battle-field  belonged.  It  was  only  this  same  argument,  of 
actual  superior  force,  which  the  Boeotians  retorted,  when  they  said — 
"  If  the  territory  to  which  your  application  refers  is  yours  by  right  of 
conquest  (i.e.,  if  you  are  de  facto  masters  of  it  and  are  strongest 
within  it) — you  can  of  course  do  what  you  think  best  in  it:  you  need 
not  ask  any  truce  at  our  hands;  you  can  bury  your  dead  without  a 
truce."  The  Boeotians  knew  that  at  this  moment  the  field  of  battle 
was  under  guard  by  a  detachment  of  their  army,  and  that  the  Athe- 
nians could  not  obtain  the  dead  bodies  without  permission.     But 


REMARKS  ON  THE  DEBATE.  689 

since  the  Athenian  herald  had  asserted  the  reverse  as  a  patter  of 
fact,  we  can  hardly  wonder  that  they  resented  the  product  inn  of  such 
an  argument;  meeting  it  by  a  reply  sufficiently  pertinent  in  mere 
diplomatic  fencing. 

But  if  the  Athenian  herald,  instead  of  raising  the  incidental  point 
of  territorial  property,  combined  with  an  incautious  definition  of  that 
which  constituted  territorial  property,  as  a  defense  against  the  alleged 
desecration  of  the  temple  of  Delium — had  confined  himself  to  the 
main  issue — he  would  have  put  the  Boeotians  completely  in  the 
wrong.  According  to  principles  universally  respected  in  Greece,  the 
victor,  if  solicited,  was  held  bound  to  grant  to  the  vanquished a truce 
for  burying  his  dead;  to  grant  and  permit  it  absolutely,  without 
annexing  any  conditions.  On  this,  the  main  point  in  debate,  the 
Boeotians  sinned  against  the  sacred  international  law  of  Greece,  when 
they  exacted  the  evacuation  of  the  temple  at  Delium  as  a  condition 
for  consenting  to  permit  the  burial  of  the  Athenian  dead.  Ulti- 
mately, after  they  had  taken  Delium,  we  shall  find  that  they  did  grant 
it  unconditionally.  We  may  doubt  whether  they  would  have  ever 
persisted  in  refusing  it  if  the  Athenian  herald  had  pressed  this  one 
important  principle  separately  and  exclusively — and  if  he  had  not,  by 
an  unskillful  plea  in  vindication  of  the  right  to  occupy  and  live  at 
Delium,  both  exasperated  their  feelings,  and  furnished  them  with  a 
collateral  issue  as  a  means  of  evading  the  main  demand. 

To  judge  this  curious  debate  with  perfect  impartiality,  we  ought 
to  add,  in  reference  to  the  conduct  of  the  Athenians  in  occupying 
Delium — that  for  an  enemy  to  make  special  choice  of  a  temple,  as  a 
post  to  be  fortified  and  occupied,  was  a  proceeding  certainly  rare, 
perhaps  hardly  admissible,  in  Grecian  warfare.  Nor  does  the  vindi- 
cation offered  by  the  Athenian  herald  meet  the  real  charge  preferred. 
It  is  one  thing  for  an  enemy  of  superior  force  to  overrun  a  country, 
and  to  appropriate  everything  within  it,  sacred  as  well  as  profane:  it 
is  another  thing  for  a  border  enemy,  not  yet  in  sufficient  force  for 
conquering  the  whole,  to  convert  a  temple  of  convenient  site  into  a 
regular  garrisoued  fortress,  and  make  it  a  base  of  operations  against 
the  neighboring  population.  On  this  ground,  the  Boeotians  might 
reasonably  complain  of  the  seizure  of  Delium:  though  I  apprehend 
that  no  impartial  interpreter  of  Grecian  international  custom  would 
have  thought  them  warranted  in  requiring  the  restoration  of  the 
place,  as  a  peremptory  condition  to  their  granting  the  burial-truce 
when  solicited. 

All  negotiation  being  thus  broken  off,  the  Boeotian  generals  pre- 
pared to  lay  siege  to  Delium,  aided  by  2,000  Corinthian  lmplites, 
together  with  some  Megarians  and  the  late  Peloponnesian  garrison  of 
Nistea — who  joined  after  the  news  of  the  battle.  Though  they  sent 
for  darters  and  slingers,  probably  OEtseans  and  ^Etolians,  from  the 
Maliac  Gulf,  yet  their  direct  attacks  were  at  first  all  repelled  by  the 
garrison,  aided  by  an  Athenian  squadron  off  the  coast,  in  spite  of  the 


690  EIGHTH  YEAR  OF  THE   WAR. 

hasty  and  awkward  defenses  by  which  ah the  fori  was  protected. 

At  length  they  contrived  a  singular  piece  of  are-mechanism,  which 
enabled  them  to  master  the  place.  Thej  firsl  aawed  in  twain  a  thick 
beam,  pierced  a  channel  through  it  fqng-ways  from  end  to  end, 
sheathed  most  pari  of  the  channel  with  iron,  and  then  joined  the  two 
halves  accurately  together.  From  the  further  end  of  this  hollowed 
beam  they  suspended  by  chains  a  large  metal  pot,  full  of  pitch, 
brimstone,  and  burning  charcoal;  lastly,  an  iron  tube,  projected 
from  the  end  of  the  interior  channel  of  the  beam,  bo  as  to  come  near 
to  the  pot.  Such  was  the  machine,  which,  constructed  at  some  dis- 
tance, was  brought  on  carts  and  placed  close  to  the  wall,  near  the 
palisading  and  the  wooden  towers.     'The  Boeotians  then  applied  great 

bellows  to  their  o\\  n  end  of  the  beam,  Mow  mg  violently  a  current  of 
air  through  the  interior  channel,  so  as  to  raise  an  intense  lire  in  the 
caldron  at  the  other  end.  The  wooden  portions  of  the  wall,  BOOH 
catching  lire,  became  untenable  for  the  defenders—who  escaped  in 
the  best  way  they  could,  w  ithoui  attempting  further  resistance. 
Two  hundred  of  them  were  made  prisoners,  and  a  few  slain;   hut  the 

greater  number  got  safely  <>n  shipboard.     This  recapture  of  Deliuro 

took  place  on   the  seventeenth  day  after  the  battle,  during  all  which 

interval  the  Athenians  slain  had  remained  on  the  field  unburied. 
Presently  however  arrived  the  Athenian  herald  to  make  fresh  appli- 
cation for  the  burial-truce;  which  was  now  forthwith  granted,  and 
granted  unconditionally. 

Such  was  the  memorable  expedition  and  battle  of  Delium — a  fatal 
discouragement  to  the  feeling  of  confidence  and  hope  which  had  pre- 
viously reigned  at  Athens,  besides  the  painful  immediate  loss  which 
it  inflicted  on  the  city.  Among  the  hoplites  who  look  pari  in  the 
vigorous  charge  and  pushing  of  shields,  the  philosopher  Sokrates  is 
tobe  numbered.  His  bravery,  both  in  the  battle  and  the  retreat,  was 
much  extolled  by  his  friends,  and  doubtless  with  good  reason.  He 
had  before  served  with  credit  in  the  ranks  of  the  hoplites  at  Fotidaa, 

and  he  served  also  at  Ampbipolis;  his  patience  under  hardship,  and 

endurance  of  heat  and  cold,  being  no!  less  remarkable  than  his  per- 
sonal courage.  He  and  his  friend  Laches  were  among  those  hoplites 
who  in  (lie  retreat  from  Delium,  instead  of  flinging  away  their  arms 
and  taking  to  flight,  kept  their  ranks,  their  arms,  and  their  firmness 
of  countenance;  insomuch  that  the  pursuing  cavalry  found  it  dan- 
gerous to  meddle  with  them,  and  turned  to  an  easier  prey  in  the  dis- 
armed fugitives.  Alkibiades  also  served  at  Delium  in  the  cavalry, 
and  stood  by  Sokrates  in  theretreat.  The  latter  was  thus  exposing 
bis  life  at  Delium  nearly  at  the  same  time  when  Aristophanes  was 
exposing  him  to  derision  in  the  comedy  of  the  Clouds,  as  a  dreamer 
alike  morally  worthless  and  physically  incapable. 

Severe  as  the  blow  was  which  the  Athenians  suffered  at  Delium, 
their  disasters  in  Thrace  about  Hie  same  time,  or  toward  the  close  of 
the  same  summer  and  autumn,  were  yet  more  calamitous.     1  have 


RAPID  PROGRESS  THROUGH  THESSALY.        691 

already  mentioned  the  circumstances  which  led  to  the  preparation  of 
a  Lacedaemonian  force  intended  to  act  against  the  Athenians  in 
Thrace,  under  Brasidas,  in  concert  with  the  Chalkidians,  revolted 

subjects  of  Athens,  and  with  Perdikkas  of  Macedou.  Having  Frus- 
trated the  Athenian  designs  against  Megara  (as  described  abovi  I, 
Brasidas  completed  the  levy  of  his  division — 1700  hoplites,  partly 
Helots,  partly  Dorian  Peloponnesians — and  conducted  them,  toward 
the  close  of  the  summer,  to  the  Lacedaemonian  colony  of  Herakleia, 
in  the  Trachinian  territory  near  the  Maliac  Gulf. 

To  reach  Macedonia  and  Thrace,  it  was  necessary  for  him  to  pass 
through  Thessaly,  which  was  no  easy  task;  for  the  war  had  now 
lasted  so  long  that  every  state  in  Greece  had  become  mistrustful  of 
the  transit  of  armed  foreigners.  Moreover,  the  mass  of  the  Thessa- 
lian  population  were  decidedly  friendly  to  Athens,  and  Brasidas  had 
no  sufficient  means  to  force  a  passage;  while,  should  he  wait  to  apply 
for  formal  permission,  there  was  much  doubt  whether  it  would  bo 
granted — and  perfect  certainty  of  such  delay  and  publicity  as  would 
put  the  Athenians  on  their  guard.  But  though  such  was  the  temper 
of  the  Thessalian  people,  yet  the  Thessalian  governments,  all  oli- 
garchical, sympathized  with  Lacedsemon.  The  federal  authority  or 
power  of  the  tagus,  which  bound  together  the  separate  cities,  was 
generally  very  weak.  What  was  of  still  greater  importance,  the 
Macedonian  Perdikkas,  as  well  as  the  Chalkidians,  had  in  every  city 
powerful  guests  and  partisans,  whom  they  prevailed  upon  to  exert 
themselves  actively  in  forwarding  the  passage  of  the  army. 

To  these  men  Brasidas  sent  a  message  at  Pharsalus,  as  soon  as 
he  reached  Herakleia.  Nikonidas  of  Larissa  with  other  Thessalian 
friends  of  Perdikkas,  assembling  at  Melitaea  in  Achaia  Phthiotis, 
undertook  to  escort  hiui  through  Thessaly.  By  their  countenance 
and  support,  combined  with  his  own  boldness,  dexterity,  and  rapid 
movements,  he  was  enabled  to  accomplish  the  seemingly  impossible 
enterprise  of  running  through  the  country,  not  only  without  the  con- 
sent, but  against  the  feeling  of  its  inhabitants — simply  by  such 
celerity  as  to  forestall  opposition.  After  traversing  Achaia  Phthi- 
otis, a  territory  dependent  on  the  Thessalians,  Brasidas  began  his 
march  from  Melitsea  through  Thessaly  itself,  along  with  his  powerful 
native  guides.  Notwithstanding  all  possible  secrecy  and  celerity, 
his  inarch  became  so  far  divulged,  that  a  body  of  volunteers  from 
the  neighborhood,  offended  at  the  proceeding,  and  unfriendly  to 
Nikonidas,  assembled  to  oppose  his  progress  down  the  valley  of  the 
river  Enipeus.  Reproaching  him  with  wrongful  violation  of  an 
independent  territory,  by  the  introduction  of  armed  forces  without 
permission  from  the  general  government,  they  forbade  him  to  proceed 
further.  His  only  chance  of  making  progress  lay  in  disarming  their 
opposition  by  fair  words.  His  guides  excused  themselves  by  saying 
that  the  suddenness  of  his  arrival  had  imposed  upon  them  as  his  guests 
the  obligation  of  conducting  him  through,  without  waiting  to  ask  for 


r,'.t-_>  EIGHTH    YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 

formal  permission:  to  offend  their  countrymen,  however,  was  the 
furthest  thing  from  their  thoughts— and  they  would  renounce  the 
enterprise  if  the  persons  now  assembled  persisted  in  their  requisition. 
The  same  conciliatory  tone  was  adopted  by  Brasidas  himself.  "  He 
protested  his  strong  feeling  ofrespecl  and  friendship  for  Thessaly 
and  it-  inhabitants:  his  arms  were  directed  againsl  the  Athenians, 
not  againsl  them:  nor  was  he  aware  of  any  unfriendly  relation  sub- 
sisting het  ween  the  Thessalians  and  Lacedemonians,  Buch  as  to 
exclude  either  of  them  from  the  territory  of  the  other.  Against  the 
prohibition  of  the  parties  now  before  them,  he  could  not  possibly 
march  forward,  nor  would  he  think  of  attempting  it ;  hut  he  put  it  to 
their  good  feeling  whether  they  ought  to  prohibit  him."  Such  con- 
ciliatory language  was  successful  in  softening  the  opponents  and 
inducing  them  to  disperse.  But  so  afraid  were  his  guides  of  renewed 
opposition  in  other  parts,  that  they  hurried  him  forward  still  more 
rapidly,  and  he  "passed  through  the  country  at  a  running  pace 
without  halting."  Leaving  Melitsea  in  the  morning  he  reached  Phar- 
salus  on  the  same  night,  encamping  on  the  river  Apidanus:  thence  he 
proceeded  on  the  next  day  to  Phakium,  and  on  the  day  afterward 
into  Perrhaebia — a  territory  adjoining  to  and  dependent  on  Thessaly, 
under  the  mountain  range  of  Olympus.  Here  he  was  in  safety,  so 
that  his  Thessalian  guides  left  him;  while  the  Perrhsebians  eon- 
ducted  him  over  the  pass  of  Olympus  (the  same  over  which  the  army 
of  Xerxes  had  marched)  to  Dium  in  .Macedonia,  in  the  territory  of 
Perdikkas,  on  the  northern  edge  of  the  mountain. 

The  Athenians  were  soon  apprised  of  this  stolen  passage,  so  ably 
and  rapidly  executed,  in  a  manner  which  few  other  Greeks,  certainly 
no  other  Lacedaemonian,  would  have  conceived  to  be  possible.  Aware 
of  the  new  enemy  thus  brought  within  reach  of  their  possessions  in 
Thrace,  they  transmitted  orders  thither  for  greater  vigilance,  and  at 
the  same  time  declared  open  war  against  Perdikkas;  but  unfortu- 
nately without  sending  any  efficient  force,  at  a  moment  when  timely 
defensive  intervention  was  imperiously  required. 

Perdikkas  immediately  invited  Brasidas  to  join  him  in  the  attack 
of  Arrhibaeus,  prince  of  the  Macedonians  called  Lynkestae,  or  of  Lyn- 
kus;  a  summons  which  the  Spartan  could  not  decline,  since  Perdik- 
kas provided  half  of  the  pay  and  maintenance  of  the  army — but  which 
he  obeyed  with  reluctance,  anxious  as  he  was  to  commence  opera 
tions  against  the  allies  of  Athens.  Such  reluctance  "was  still  further 
strengthened  by  envoys  from  the  Chalkidians  of  Thrace — who,  as 
/.•  aloiis  enemies  of  Athens,  joined  him  forthwith,  but  discouraged 
any  vigorous  efforts  to  relieve  Perdikkas  from  embarrassing  enemies 
in  the  interior,  in  older  that  the  latter  might  be  under  more  pressing 
motives  to  conciliate  and  assist  them.  Accordingly  Brasidas,  though 
he  joined  Perdikkas  and  marched  along  with  the  Macedonian  army 
toward  the  territory  of  the  Lynkestae,  was  not  only  averse  to  active 
military  operations,  but   even   entertained  with  favor  propositions 


BRASIDAS  MARCHES  AGAINST  AKANTHUS.      693 

from  Arrhibseus — wherein  the  latter  expressed  his  wish  to  become  (lie 
ally  of  Lacedaemon,  and  offered  to  refer  all  his  differences  with  Per- 
dikkas to  the  arbitration  of  the  Spartan  general  himself.  Cotnmuni- 
cating  these  propositions  to  Perdikkas,  Brasidas  invited  him  to  listen 
to  an  equitable  compromise,  admitting  Arrhibseus  into  the  alliance 
of  Lacedfemon.  But  Perdikkas  indignantly  refused:  "he  had  not 
called  in  Brasidas  as  a  judge  to  decide  disputes  between  him  and  his 
enemies,  but  as  an  auxiliary  to  put  them  down  wherever  he  might 
point  them  out;  and  he  protested  against  the  iniquity  of  Brasidas  in 
entering  into  terms  with  Arrhibseus,  while  the  Lacedaemonian  army 
was  half  paid  and  maintained  by  him"  (Perdikkas).  Notwithstand- 
ing such  remonstrance,  and  even  a  hostile  protest,  Brasidas  persisted 
in  his  intended  conference  with  Arrhibams,  and  was  so  far  satisfied 
with  the  propositions  made,  that  he  withdrew  his  troops  without 
inarching  over  the  pass  into  Lynkus.  Too  feeble  to  act  alone,  Per- 
dikkas loudly  complained.  He  even  contracted  his  allowance  for  the 
future,  so  as  to  provide  for  only  one-third  of  the  army  of  Brasidas 
instead  of  one-half. 

To  this  inconvenience,  however,  Brasidas  submitted,  in  haste  to 
begin  his  march  into  Chaikidike,  and  his  operations  jointly  with  the 
Chalkidians,  for  seducing  or  subduing  the  subject-allies  of  Athens. 
His  first  operation  was  against  Akanthus,  on  the  isthmus  of  the  pe- 
ninsula of  Athos,  the  territory  of  which  he  invaded  a  little  before  the 
vintage — probably  about  the  middle  of  September,  when  the  grapes 
were  ripe,  but  still  out,  and  the  whole  crop  of  course  exposed  to  ruin 
at  the  hands  of  an  enemy  superior  in  force.  So  important  was  it  to 
Brasidas  to  have  escaped  the  necessity  of  wasting  another  mouth  in 
conquering  the  Lynkesta3.  There  was  within  the  town  of  Akanthus 
a  party  in  concert  with  the  Chalkidians,  anxious  to  admit  him  and  to 
revolt  openly  from  Athens.  But  the  mass  of  the  citizens  were  averse 
to  this  step.  It  was  only  by  dwelling  on  the  terrible  loss  from  expos- 
ure of  the  crop  without,  that  the  anti-Athenian  party  could  persuade 
them  even  to  grant  the  request  of  Brasidas  to  be  admitted  singly — so 
as  to  explain  his  purposes  formally  before  the  public  assembly,  which 
would  take  its  own  decision  afterward.  "  For  a  Lacedemonian  (says 
Thucydides)  he  was  no  mean  speaker."  If  he  is  to  have  credit  for 
that  which  we  find  written  in  Thucydides,  such  an  epithet  would  be 
less  than  his  desert.  Doubtless  however  the  substance  of  the  speech  is 
genuine:  and  it  is  one  of  the  most  interesting  in  Grecian  history — 
partly  as  a  manifesto  of  professed  Lacedaemonian  policy — partly 
because  it  had  a  great  practical  effect  in  determining,  on  an  occasion 
of  paramount  importance,  a  multitude  which,  though  unfavorably 
inclined  to  him,  was  not  beyond  the  reach  of  argument.  I  i_rive  the 
chief  points  of  the  speech,  without  binding  myself  to  the  words. 

"  Myself  and  my  soldiers  have  been  sent,  Akanthians,  to  realize  the 
purpose  which  we  proclaimed  on  beginning  the  war — that  we  took 
arms  to  liberate  Greece  from  the  Athenians.     Let  no  man  blame  us 


694  EIGHTH    YEAH   OF   THE  WAR. 

for  having  been  long  in  coming,  or  for  the  mistake  which  we  made 
at  the  outsel  in  supposing  that  we  should  quickly  put  down  the 
Athenians  by  operations  against  Attica,  without  exposing  you  to  any 
risk.  Enough,  thai  we  are  now  here  on  the  first  opportunity,  resolved 
to  put  them  down  if  you  will  lend  us  your  aid.  To  find  myself  shut 
out  of  your  town — nay,  to  find  that  I  am  not  heartily  welcomed — 
astonishes  me.  We  Lacedaemonians  undertook  this  long  and  perilous 
march,  in  the  belief  that  we  were  coming  to  friends  eagerly  expect- 
ing us.  It  would  indeed  be  monstrous  if  you  should  now  disappoint 
us,  and  stand  out  against  your  own  freedom  as  well  as  against  that 
of  other  Greeks.  Your  example,  standing  high  as  you  do  both  for 
prudence  and  power,  will  fatally  keep  back  other  Greeks.  It  will 
make  them  suspect  that  I  am  wanting  either  in  power  to  protect  them 
against  Athens,  or  in  honest  purpose.  Now,  in  regard  to  power,  my 
own  present  army  was  one  which  the  Athenians,  though  superior  in 
number,  were  afraid  to  fight  near  Nissea;  nor  are  they  at  all  likely  to 
send  an  equal  force  hither  against  me  by  sea.  And  in  regard  to  my 
purpose,  it  is  not  one  of  mischief,  but  of  liberation — the  Lacedaemo- 
nian authorities  having  pledged  themselves  io  me  by  the  most  solemn 
oaths,  that  every  city  which  joins  me  shall  retain  its  autonomy.  You 
have  therefore  the  best  assurance  both  as  to  my  purposes  and  as  to  my 
power:  you  need  not  apprehend  that  I  am  come  with  factious  designs, 
to  serve  the  views  of  any  particular  men  among  you,  and  to  remodel 
your  established  constitution  to  the  disadvantage  either  of  the  Many 
or  of  the  Few.  That  would  be  worse  than  foreign  subjugation;  and 
by  such  dealing  we  Lacedaemonians  should  be  taking  trouble  to  earn 
hatred  instead  of  gratitude.  We  should  play  the  part  of  unworthy 
traitors,  worse  even  than  that  high-handed  oppression  of  which  we 
accuse  the  Athenians:  we  should  at  once  violate  our  oaths,  and  sin 
against  our  strongest  political  interests.  Perhaps  you  may  say,  that 
though  you  wish  me  well,  you  desire  for  your  parts  to  be  let  alone, 
and  to  stand  aloof  from  a  dangerous  struggle.  You  will  tell  me  to 
cany  my  propositions  elsewhere,  to  those  who  can  safely  embrace 
them,  but  not  to  thrust  my  alliance  upon  any  people  against  their 
own  will.  If  this  should  be  your  language,  I  shall  first  call  yourlocal 
gods  and  heroes  to  witness  that  I  have  come  to  you  with  a  mission 
of  good,  and  have  employed  persuasion  in  vain;  I  shall  then  proceed 
to  ravage  your  territory  and  extort  your  consent,  thinking  myself 
justly  entitled  to  do  so,  on  two  grounds.  First,  that  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians may  not  sustain  actual  damage  from  these  good  wishes  which 
you  profess  toward  me  without  actually  joining — damage  in  the  shape 
of  that  tribute  which  you  annually  send  to  Athens.  Next,  that  the 
Greeks  generally  may  not  be  prevented  by  you  from  becoming  free. 
"It  is  only  on  the  ground  of  common  good  that  we  Lacedaemonians 
can  justify  ourselves  for  liberating  any  city  against  its  own  will.  But 
as  we  arc  conscious  of  desiring  only  extinction  of  the  empire  of  others, 
not  acquisition  of  empire  for  ourselves,  we  should  fail  in  our  duty 


DEBATE  IN  AKANTHIAN  ASSEMBLY.  695 

if  we  suffered  you  to  obstruct  that  liberation  which  we  are  now  car- 
rying to  all.  Consider  well  my  words  then:  take  to  yourselves  the 
glory  of  beginning  the  era  of  emancipation  for  Greece — save  your 
own  properties  from  damage — and  attach  an  ever-honorable  name  to 
the  community  of  Akanthus." 

Nothing  could  be  more  plausible  or  judicious  than  this  language  of 
Brasidas  to  the  Akanthians — nor  had  they  any  means  of  detecting  the 
falsity  of  the  assertion  (which  he  afterward  repeated  in  other  places 
besides)  that  he  had  braved  the  forces  of  Athens  at  Nisaea  with  the 
same  army  as  that  now  on  the  outside  of  the  walls.  Perhaps  the 
simplicity  of  his  speech  and  manner  may  even  have  lent  strength  to 
his  assurances.  As  soon  as  he  had  retired,  the  subject  was  largely 
discussed  in  the  assembly,  with  much  difference  of  opinion  among 
the  speakers,  and  perfect  freedom  on  both  sides:  and  the  decision, 
not  called  for  until  after  a  long  debate,  was  determined  partly  by  the 
fair  promises  of  Brasidas,  partly  by  the  certain  loss  which  the  ruin 
of  the  vine-crop  would  entail.  The  votes  of  the  citizens  present 
being  taken  secretly,  a  majority  resolved  to  accede  to  the  proposi- 
tions of  Brasidas  and  revolt  from  Athens.  Exacting  the  renewal  of 
his  pledge  and  that  of  the  Lacedsemonian  authorities,  for  the  pre- 
servation of  full  autonomy  to  every  city  which  should  join  him,  they 
received  his  army  into  the  town.  The  neighboring  city  of  Stageirus 
(a  colony  of  Andros,  as  Akanthus  also  was)  soon  followed  the  ex- 
ample. 

There  are  few  acts  in  history  wherein  Grecian  political  reason  and 
morality  appear  to  greater  advantage  than  in  this  proceeding  of  the 
Akanthians.  The  habit  of  fair,  free,  and  pacific  discussion — the 
established  respect  to  the  vote  of  the  majority — the  care  to  protect 
individual  independence  of  judgment  by  secret  suffrage — the  delib- 
erate estimate  of  reasons  on  both  sides  by  each  individual  citizen — 
all  these  main  laws  and  conditions  of  healthy  political  action  appear 
as  a  part  of  the  confirmed  character  of  the  Akanthians.  We  shall 
not  find  Brasidas  entering  other  towns  in  a  way  so  creditable  or  so 
harmonious. 

But  there  is  another  inference  which  the  scene  just  described  irre- 
sistibly suggests.  It  affords  the  clearest  proof  that  the  Akanthians 
had  little  to  complain  of  as  subject-allies  of  Athens,  and  that  they 
would  have  continued  in  that  capacity,  if  left  to  their  own  choice 
without  the  fear  of  having  their  crop  destroyed.  Such  is  the  pro- 
nounced feeling  of  the  mass  of  the  citizens:  the  party  who  desire 
otherwise  are  in  a  decided  minority.  It  is  only  the  combined  effect 
of  severe  impending  loss  and  of  tempting  assurances  held  out  by  the 
worthiest  representative  whom  Sparta  ever  sent  out,  which  induces 
them  to  revolt  from  Athens.  Nor  even  then  i«  the  resolution  taken 
without  long  opposition,  and  a  large  dissentient  minority,  in  a  case 
where  secret  suffrage  insured  free  and  genuine  expression  of  pref- 
erence from  every  individual.     Now  it  is  impossible  that  the  scene 


G96  EIGHTH   YEAR   OF  THE  WAR. 

in  Akantlius  at  this  critical  moment  could  li  ive  been  of  such  a  char- 
acter, bad  the  empire  of  Athens  been  practically  odions  and  burden- 
some to  the  subject-allies,  aa  it  ie  commonly  depicted.  Sad 
been  the  fad — baa  the  Akanthians  fell  thai  the  imperial  ascem 
of  Athens  oppressed  them  with  hardship  or  humiliation  from  which 
their  neighbors,  t  he  revolted  ( >halkidians  in  <  Hynthus  and  risen  hen  , 
were  exempt— they  would  have  bailed  the  advent  of  Brasidas  with 
thai  cordiality  which  he  himself  expected  and  was  surprised  not  to 

find.  'The  seiiM-  of  present  grievance,  alu  ays  acute  and  often  e.\e<  B8- 
ive,  would  have  stood  out  as  their  prominent  impulse.  They  would 
have  needed  neither  intimidation  nor  cajolery  to  induce  them  to 
throw  open  their  gates  to  the  liberator — who,  in  his  speech  within 
the  town,  finds  no  actual  suffering  to  appeal  to,  but  is  obliged  to  gain 
over  an  audience,  evidently  unwilling,  by  alternate  threats  and 
promises. 

As  in  Akantlius,  so  in  most  of  the  other  Thracian  subjects  of 
Athens — the  hulk  of  the  citizens,  though  strongly  solicited  by  the 
Chalkidians,  manifest  no  spontaneous  disposition  to  revolt  from 
Athens.  We  shall  find  the  party  who  introduce  Brasidas  to  be  B  com 
spiring  minority,  who  not  only  do  not  consult  the  majority  before- 
hand, but  act  in  such  a  manner  as  to  leave  no  tree  option  to  the 
majority  afterward,  whether  they  will  ratify  or  reject;  bringing 
in  a  foreign  force  to  overawe  them  and  compromise  them  without 
their  own  consent  in  hostility  against  Athens.  Now  that  which 
makes  the  events  of  Akantlius  so  important  as  an  evidence,  is,  that 
the  majority  is  not  thus  entrapped  and  compressed,  hut  pronounces 
its  judgment  freely  after  ample  discussion.  The  grounds  of  that 
judgment  are  clearly  set  forth  to  us,  so  as  to  show,  that  hatred  of 
Athens,  if  even  it  exists  at  all,  is  in  no  way  a  strong  or  d<  termining 
feeling.  Had  there  existed  any  such  strong  feeling  among  the  sub- 
ject-allies of  Athens  in  the  Chalkidic  peninsula,  there  was  no  Athe- 
nian force  now  present  to  hinder  them  all  from  opening  their  gates  to 
the  liberator  Brasidas  by  spontaneous  majorities;  as  he  himself,  en- 
couraged by  the  sanguine  promises  of  the  Chalkidians,  evidently 
expected  that  they  would  do.     But  nothing  of  this  kind  happened. 

That  which  I  before,  remarked  in  recounting  the  revolt  of  Mityi 
lene,  a  privileged  ally  of  Athens,  is  now  confirmed  in  the  revolt  of 
Akantlius,  a  tributary,  and  subject-ally.  The  circumstances  of  both 
prove  that  imperial  Athens  neither  inspired  hatred  nor  occasioned 
painful  grievance  to  the  population  of  her  subject-cities  generally. 
The  movements  against  her  arose  from  parly  minorities,  of  the  same 
character  as  that  Platsean  party  which  introduced  the  Theban  assail- 
ants into  Plataea  at  the  commencement  of  the  Peloponnesian  war. 
There  are  of  course  differences  of  sentiment  between  one  town  and 
another;  but  the  conduct  of  the  towns  generally  demonstrates  that 
the  Athenian  empire  Was  not  felt  by  them  to  be  such  a  scheme  of 
plunder  and  oppression  as  Mr.  Mitford  and  others  would  have  us 


PLAN  FOR  THE  SURPRISE  OP  AMPHIPOLIS.       607 

believe.  It  is  indeed  true  that  Athens  managed  her  empire  with  ref- 
erence to  her  own  feelings  and  interest,  and  that  her  hold  was  rather 
upon  the  prudence  than  upon  the  affection  of  her  allies;  except  in  so 
far  as  those  among  them  who  were  democratically  governed,  sym- 
pathized with  her  democracy.  It  is  also  true  that  restrictions  in  any , 
form  on  the  autonomy  of  each  separate  city  were  offensive  to  the 
political  instincts  of  the  Greeks:  moreover  Athens  took  less  and  less 
pains  to  disguise  or  soften  the  real  character  of  her  empire,  as  one 
resting  simply  on  established  fact  and  superior  force.  But  this  is  a 
different  thing  from  the  endurance  of  practical  hardship  and  oppres- 
sion, which,  had  it  been  real,  would  have  inspired  strong  positive 
hatred  among  the  subject-allies — such  Brasidas  expected  to  find  uni- 
versal in  Thrace,  but  did  not  really  find,  in  spite  of  the  easy  opening 
which  his  presence  afforded. 

The  acquisition  of  Akanthus  and  Stagcirus  enabled  Brasidas  in  no 
very  long  time  to  extend  his  conquests;  to  enter  Argilus,  and  from 
thence  to  make  the  capital  acquisition  of  Amphipolis. 

Argilus  was  situated  between  Stageirus  and  the  river  Strymon, 
along  the  western  bank  of  which  river  its  territory  extended.  Along 
the  eastern  bank  of  the  same  river — south  of  the  lake  which  it  forms 
under  the  name  of  Kerkinitis,  and  north  of  the  town  of  Eion  at  its 
mouth — was  situated  the  town  and  territory  of  Amphipolis,  com- 
municating with  the  lands  of  Argilus  by  the  important  bridge  there 
situated.  The  Argiliaus  were  colonists  from  Andros,  like  Akanthus 
and  Stageirus.  The  adhesion  of  those  two  cities  to  Brasidas  gave 
him  opportunity  to  cultivate  intelligences  in  Argilus,  wherein  there 
had  existed  a  standing  discontent  against  Athens,  ever  since  the 
foundation  of  the  neighboring  city  of  Amphipolis.  The  latter  city 
had  been  established  by  the  Athenian  Agnon,  at  the  head  of  a  numer- 
ous body  of  colonists,  on  a  spot  belonging  to  the  Edonian  Thracians 
called  Ennea  Hodoi  or  Nine  Ways,  about  five  years  prior  to  the  com- 
mencement of  the  war  (B.C.  437),  after  two  previous  attempts  to  colo- 
nize it — one  by  Histheus  and  Aristagoras  at  the  period  of  the  Ionic 
revolt,  and  a  second  by  the  Athenians  about  46o  B.C. — both  of  which 
lamentably  failed.  So  valuable  howTever  was  the  site,  from  its  vicin- 
ity to  the  gold  and  silver  mines  near  Mount  Parrgaeus  and  to  large 
forests  of  ship-timber,  as  well  as  for  command  of  the  Strymon,  and 
for  commerce  with  the  interior  of  Thrace  and  Macedonia,  that  the 
Athenians  had  sent  a  second  expedition  under  Agnon,  who  founded 
the  city  and  gave  it  the  name  of  Amphipolis.  The  resident  settlers 
there,  however,  were  only  in  small  proportion  Athenian  citizens;  the 
rest  of  mixed  origin,  some  of  them  Argilian — a  considerable  number 
Chalkidians.  The  Athenian  general  EukJ.es  was  governor  in  the 
town,  though  seemingly  with  no  paid  force  under  his  command. 
His  colleague  Thucydides  the  historian  was  in  command  of  a  small 
fieet  on  the  coast. 

Among  these  mixed  inhabitants  a  conspiracy  was  organized  to 


698  EIGHTH   YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 

betray  the  town  to  Brasidas.  The  inhabitants  of  Argilus  as  well  as 
the  Chalkidians  each  tampered  with  those  of  the  same  race  who 
resided  in  Amphipolis;  while  the  influence  of  Perdikkas,  not  [neon 
siderable  in  consequence  of  the  commerce  of  the  place  with  Mace- 
donia, was  also  employed  to  increase  the  number  of  partisans.  Of 
all  the  instigators,  however,  the  most  strenuous  as  well  as  the  most 
useful  were  the  inhabitants  of  Argilus.  Amphipolis,  together  with 
the  Athenians  as  its  founders,  had  been  odious  to  them  from  its  com- 
mencement. Its  foundation  had  doubtless  abridged  their  commerce 
and  importance  as  masters  of  the  lower  course  of  the  Btrymon.  They 
had  been  long  laying  snares  against  the  city,  and  the  arrival  of 
Brasidas  now  presented  to  them  an  unexpected  chance  of  success.  It 
was  they  who  encouraged  him  to  attempt  the  surprise,  deferring 
proclamation  of  their  own  defection  from  Athens  until  they  could 
make  it  subservient  to  his  conquest  of  Amphipolis. 

Starting  with  his  army  from  Arne  in  the  Chalkidic  peninsula, 
Brasidas  arrived  in  the  afternoon  at  Anion  and  Bromiskus,  near  the 
channel  whereby  the  lake  Bolbe  is  connected  with  the  sea.  From 
hence,  after  his  men  had  supped,  he  began  his  night  march  to 
Amphipolis,  on  a  cold  and  snowy  night  of  November  or  the  begin- 
ning of  December.  He  reached  Argilus  in  the  middle  of  the  night, 
where  the  leaders  at  once  admitted  him,  proclaiming  their  revolt  from 
Athens.  With  their  aid  and  guidance,  he  then  hastened  forward 
without  delay  to  the  bridge  across  the  Strymon,  which  he  reached 
before  break  of  day.  It  was  guarded  only  by  a  feeble  picket — the 
town  of  Amphipolis  itself  being  situated  on  the  hill  at  some  little 
distance  higher  up  the  river;  so  that  Brasidas,  preceded  by  the 
Argilian  conspirators,  surprised  and  overpowered  the  guard  without 
difficulty.  Thus  master  of  this  important  communication,  he  crossed 
with  his  army  forthwith  into  the  territory  of  Amphipolis,  where  his 
arrival  spread  the  utmost  dismay  and  terror.  The  governor  Eukles, 
the  magistrates,  and  the  citizens,  were  all  found  wholly  unprepared: 
the  lands  belonging  to  the  city  were  occupied  by  residents  with  their 
families  and  property  around  them,  calculating  upon  undisturbed 
security,  as  if  there  had  been  no  enemy  within  reach.  Such  of  these 
as  were  close  to  the  city  succeeded  in  running  thither  with  their  fam 
dies,  though  leaving  their  property  exposed — but  the  more  distant 
became  in  person  as  well  as  in  property  at  the  mercy  of  the  invader. 
Even  within  the  town,  filled  with  the  friends  and  relatives  of  these 
victims  without,  indescribable  confusion  reigned,  of  which  the,  con- 
spirators within  tried  to  avail  themselves  in  order  to  get  the  gates 
thrown  open.  And  so  complete  was  the  disorganization,  that  if 
Brasidas  had  marched  up  without  delay  to  the  gates  and  assaulted 
the  town,  many  persons  supposed  that  he  would  have  carried  it  at 
once.  Such  a  risk,  however,  was  too  great  even  for  his  boldness— 
the  rather  as  repulse  would  hav<  been  probably  his  ruin.  Moreover, 
confiding  in  the  assurances  of  the  conspirators  that  the  gates  would  bp 


SURRENDER  OF  AMPHIPOLIS  699 

tbrowr.  open,  he  thought  it  safer  to  seize  as  many  persons  as  he  could 
from  the  out-citizens,  as  a  means  of  working  upon  the  sentiments  of 
those  within  the  walls.  Lastly,  this  process  of  seizure  and  plunder, 
being  probably  more  to  the  state  of  his  own  soldiers,  could  not  well 
be  hindered. 

But  he  waited  in  vain  for  the  opening  of  the  gates.  The  conspira- 
tors in  the  city,  in  spite  of  the  complete  success  of  their  surprise  and 
the  universal  dismay  around  them,  found  themselves  unable  to  carry 
the  majority  along  with  them.  As  in  Akanthus,  so  in  Amphipolis, 
those  who  really  hated  Athens  and  wished  to  revolt  were  only  a 
party  minority.  The  greater  number  of  citizens,  at  this  critical 
moment,  stood  by  Eukles  and  the  few  native  Athenians  around  him 
in  resolving  upon  defense,  and  in  sending  off  an  express  to  Thucyd 
ides  at  Thasos  (the  historian),  the  colleague  of  Eukles,  as  general  in 
the  region  of  Thrace,  for  immediate  aid.  This  step,  of  course, 
immediately  communicated  to  Brasidas  from  within,  determined  him 
to  make  every  effort  for  enticing  the  Amphipolitans  to  surrender 
before  the  re-enforcement  should  arrive;  the  rather  as  he  was  apprised 
that  Thucydides,  being  a  large  proprietor  and  worker  of  gold  mines 
in  the  neighboring  region,  possessed  extensive  personal  influence 
among  the  Thracian  tribes,  and  would  be  able  to  bring  them  together 
for  the  relief  of  the  place,  in  conjunction  with  his  own  Athenian 
squadron.  He,  therefore,  sent  in  propositions  for  surrender  on  the 
most  favorable  terms — guaranteeing  to  every  citizen  who  chose  to 
remain,  Amphipolitan  or  even  Athenian,  continued  residence  with 
undisturbed  property  and  equal  political  rights — and  granting  to  every 
one  who  chose  to  depart,  five  days  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  away 
his  effects. 

Such  easy  conditions,  when  made  known  in  the  city,  produced 
presently  a  sensible  change  of  opiuion  among  the  citizens — proving 
acceptable  both  to  Athenians  and  Amphipolitans,  though  on  different 
grounds.  The  properties  of  the  citizens  without,  as  well  as  many  of 
their  relatives,  were  all  in  the  hands  of  Brasidas.  No  one  counted 
upon  the  speedy  arrival  of  re-enforcement — and  even  if  it  did  arrive, 
the  city  might  be  preserved,  but  the  citizens  without  would  still  be 
either  slain  or  made  captive:  a  murderous  battle  would  ensue,  and 
perhaps  after  all,  Brasidas,  assisted  by  the  party  within,  might  prove 
victorious.  The  Athenian  citizens  in  Amphipolis,  knowing  them- 
selves to  be  exposed  to  peculiar  danger,  were  perfectly  well  pleased 
with  his  offer,  as  extricating  them  from  a  critical  position  and  pro- 
curing for  them  the  means  of  escape,  with  comparatively  little  loss; 
while  the  non- Athenian  citizens,  partakers  in  the  same  relief  from 
peril,  felt  little  reluctance  in  accepting  a  capitulation  which  preserved 
both  their  rights  and  their  properties  inviolate,  and  merely  seveied 
them  from  Athens — toward  which  city  they  felt,  not  hatred,  but  indif- 
ference. Above  all,  the  friends  and  relatives  of  the  citizens  exposed  in 
the  out-region  were  strenuous  in  urging  on  the  capitulation,  so  that 


700  EIGIITn   YEAR  OF  THE  "WAR. 

the  conspirators  soon  became  bold  enough  to  proclaim  themselves 
openly — insisting  upon  the  moderation  of  Brasidas  and  the  prudence 
01  admitting  him.  Eukles  found  thai  the  lone  of  opinion,  even 
1  his  own  Athenians,  was  gradually  turned  again s1  him.  He 
could  not  prevenl  the  acceptance  of  the  terms,  and  the  admission  of 

the  enemy  into  the  city,  on  that  same  day. 

No  such  resolution  would  have  been  adopted  had  the  citizens  been 
aware  how  near  at  hand  Thucydides  and  his  forces  were.  The  mes- 
sage dispatched  early  in  the  morning  from  Amphipolis  found  him  at 
Thasos  with  seven  triremes;  with  which  he  instantly  put  to  sea,  so  as 
to  reach  Eion  at  the  mouth  of  the  Strymon,  within  three  miles  of 
Amphipolis,  on  the  same  evening.  lie  hoped  to  be  in  time  for  sav- 
ing Amphipolis :  hut  the  place  had  surrendered  a  few  hours  before. 
He  arrived,  indeed,  only  just  in  time  to  preserve  Eion;  for  parties  in 
that  town  were  already  beginning  to  concert  the  admission  of 
Brasidas,  who  would  probably  have  entered  it  at  daybreak  the  next 
morning.  Thucydides,  putting  the  place  m  a  condition  of  defense, 
successfully  repelled  an  attack  which  Brasidas  made  both  by  land 
and  by  boats  on  the  river.  lie  at  the  same  time  received  and  provided 
for  the  Athenian  citizens  who  were  retiring  from  Amphipolis. 

The  capture  of  this  city,  perhaps  the  most  important  of  all  the 
foreign  possessions  of  Athens — and  the  opening  of  the  bridge  over 
the  Strymon,  by  which  even  all  her  eastern  allies  became  approach- 
able by  land — occasioned  prodigious  emotion  throughout  all  the  Gre- 
cian world.  The  dismay  felt  at  Athens  was  greater  than  had  been 
ever  before  experienced.  Hope  and  joy  prevailed  among  her  ene- 
mies, while  excitement  and  new  aspirations  became  widely  spread 
among  her  subjectallies.  The  bloody  defeat  at  Delium,  and  the  unex- 
pected conquests  of  Brasidas,  now  again  lowered  the  prestige  of  Athe- 
nian success,  sixteen  months  after  it  had  been  so  powerfully  exalted 
by  the  capture  of  Sphakteria.  The  loss  of  reputation,  which  Sparta 
bad  then  incurred,  was  now  compensated  by  a  reaction  against  the 
unfounded  terrors  since  conceived  about  the  probable  career  of  her 
enemy.  It  was  not  merely  the  loss  of  Amphipolis,  serious  as  that 
was,  which  distressed  the  Athenians;  but  also  their  insecurity  respect, 
ing  the  maintenance  of  their  whole  empire.  They  knew  not  which 
of  their  subject-allies  might  next  revolt,  in  contemplation  of  aid  from 
Brasidas,  facilitated  by  the  newly-acquired  Strymonian  bridge.  And 
as  the  proceedings  of  that  general  counted  in  part  to  the  credit  of  his 
country,  it  was  believed  that  Sparta,  now  for  the  first  time  shaking 
off  her  languor,  had  taken  to  herself  the  rapidity  and  enterprise  once 
regarded  as  the  exclusive  characteristic  of  Athens. 

But  besides  all  these  chances  of  evil  to  the  Athenians,  there  was 
another  yet  more  threatening — the  personal  ascendency  and  position 
of  Brasidas  himself.  It  was  not  merely  the  boldness,  the  fertility  of 
aggressive  resource,  the  quick  movements,  the  power  of  stimulating 
the  minds  of  soldiers; — which  lent  efficiency  to  that  general;  but  also 


CONQUESTS  OF  BRASIDAS.  701 

his  incorruptible  probity,  bis  good  faith,  his  moderation,  his  absti- 
nence from  party-cruelty  or  corruption,  and  from  all  intermeddling 
with  the  internal  constitutions  of  the  different  cities — in  strict  adher- 
ence to  that  manifesto  whereby  Sparta  bad  proclaimed  herself  the 
liberator  of  Greece.  Such  talents  and  such  official  worth  bad  never 
before  been  seen  combined.  Set  off  as  they  were  by  the  full  brilliancy 
of  successes,  such  as  were  deemed  incredible  before  they  actually 
occurred,  they  inspired  a  degree  of  confidence,  and  turned  a  tide  of 
opinion,  toward  this  eminent  man,  which  rendered  him  personally 
one  of  the  first  powers  in  Greece.  Numerous  solicitations  were 
transmitted  to  him  at  Amphipolis  from  parties  among  the  sub- 
ject-allies of  Athens,  in  their  present  temper  of  large  hopes  from  him 
and  diminished  fear  of  the  Athenians.  The  anti-Athenian  party  in 
each  was  impatient  to  revolt,  the  rest  of  the  population  less  re- 
strained by  fear. 

Of  those  who  indulged  in  these  sanguine  calculations,  many  had 
yet  to  learn  by  painful  experience  that  Athens  was  still  but  little  abated 
in  power.  Still  her  inaction  during  this  important  autumn  had  been 
such  as  may  well  explain  their  mistake.  It  might  have  been  antici- 
pated that  on  hearing  the  alarming  news  of  the  junction  of  Brasidas 
with  the  Chalkidians  and  Perdikkas  so  close  upon  their  dependent 
allies,  they  would  forthwith  have  sent  a  competent  force  to  Thrace — 
which,  if  dispatched  at  that  time,  would  probably  have  obviated  all 
the  subsequent  disasters.  So  they  would  have  acted  at  any  other 
time — and  perhaps  even  then,  if  Perikles  had  been  alive.  But  the 
news  arrived  just  at  the  period  when  Athens  was  engaged  in  the 
expedition  against  Boeotia,  which  ended  very  shortly  in  the  ruinous 
defeat  of  Delium.  Under  the  discouragement  arising  from  the  death 
of  the  Strategus  Hippokrates  and  1000  citizens,  the  idea  of  a  fresh 
expedition  to  Thrace  would  probably  have  been  intolerable  to  Athe- 
nian hoplites.  The  hardships  of  a  winter  service  in  Thrace,  as  experi- 
enced a  few  years  before  in  the  blockade  of  Potidaea,  would  proba- 
bly also  aggravate  their  reluctance.  In  Grecian  history,  we  must 
steadfastly  keep  in  mind  that  we  are  reading  about  citizen  soldiers, 
not  about  professional  soldiers ;  and  that  the  temper  of  the  time, 
whether  of  confidence  or  dismay,  modifies  to  an  unspeakable  degree 
all  the  calculations  of  military  and  political  prudence.  Even  after 
the  rapid  success  of  Brasidas,  not  merely  at  Akanthus  and  Stageirus, 
but  even  at  Amphipolis,  they  sent  only  a  few  inadequate  guards  to 
the  points  most  threatened — thus  leaving  to  their  enterprising  enemy 
the  whole  remaining  winter  for  his  operations,  without  hindrance. 
"Without  depreciating  the  merits  of  Brasidas,  we  may  see  that  his 
extraordinary  success  was  in  great  part  owing  to  the  no  less  extra- 
ordinary depression  which  at  that  time  pervaded  the  Athenian  pub- 
He;  a  feeling  encouraged  by  Nikias  and  other  leading  men  of  the 
same  party,  who  were  building  upon  it  their  hopes  of  getting  the 
Lacedaemonian  proposals  for  peace  accepted. 


702  EIGHTH   YEAR  OF  THE  WAR 

Tint,  while  we  thus  notice  the  short  comings  of  Athens  in  not  send- 
ing timelj  forces  against  Brasidas,  we  must  at  the  same  time  admit, 
that  the  mosl  serious  and  irreparable  loss  which  she  sustained— that 
of  Amphipolis-  was  Hie  fault  of  her  officers  more  than  her  own. 
Eukles  and  the  historian  Thucydides,  the  two  joint  Athenian  com- 
manders in  Thrace,  to  whom  was  confided  the  defense  of  that  im- 
portant town,  had  means  amply  sufficient  to  place  it  beyond  all  risk 
of  capture,  had  they  employed  the  most  ordinary  vigilance  and  pre- 
caution beforehand.  That  Thucydides  became  an  exile  immediately 
aft<  r  this  event,  and  remained  SO  for  twenty  years,  is  certain  from  his 
own  statement.  And  we  hear,  upon  what  in  this  case  is  quite  suffl- 
cieil  authority,  that  the  Athenians  condemned  him  (probably  Eukles 
a]  so)  to  banishment,  on  the  proposition  of  Kleon. 

In  considering  this  sentence,  historians  commonly  treat  Thucy- 
dides as  an  innocent  man,  and  find  nothing  to  condemn  except  the 
calumnies  of  the  demagogue,  followed  by  the  injustice  of  the  people. 
But  this  view  of  the  case  cannot  be  sustained,  when  we  bring 
together  all  the  facts  even  as  indicted  by  Thucydides  himself. 

At  the  moment  when  Brasidas  surprised  Ampbjpolis,  Thucydides 
was  at  Thasos;  and  the  event  is  always  discussed  as  if  he  was  there 
by  necessity  or  duty — as  if  Thasos  was  his  special  mission.  Now  we 
know  from  his  own  statement  that  his  command  was  not  special  or 
confined  to  Thasos.  He  was  sent  as  joint  commander  along  with 
Eukles  generally  to  Thrace,  and  especially  to  Amphipolis.  Both  of 
them  were  jointly  and  severally  responsible  for  the  proper  defense  of 
Amphipolis,  with  the  Athenian  empire  and  interests  in  that  quarter. 
Such  nomination  of  two  or  more  officers,  co-ordinate  and  jointly 
responsible,  was  the  usual  habit  of  Athens,  wherever  the  scale  or  the 
ana  of  military  operations  was  considerable — instead  of  one  supreme 
responsible  commander,  with  subordinate  officers  acting  under  him 
and  responsible  to  him.  If,  then,  Thucydides  "  was  stationed  at 
Thasos"  (to  use  the  phrase  of  Dr.  Thirlwall),  this  was  because  he 
chose  to  station  himself  there,  in  the  exercise  of  his  own  discretion. 

Accordingly,  the  question  which  we  have  to  put  is,  not  whether 
Thucydides  did  all  that  could  be  done,  after  he  received  the  alarming 
express  at  Thasos  (which  is  the  part  of  the  case  that  he  sets  promi- 
nently before  us),  but  whether  he  and  Eukles  jointly  took  the  best 
general  measures  for  the  security  of  the  Athenian  empire  in  Thrace — 
especially  for  Amphipolis,  the  first  jewel  of  her  empire. 

They  suffer  Athens  to  be  robbed  of  that  jewel — and  how?  Had 
they  a  difficult  position  to  defend?  Were  they  overwhelmed  by  a 
superior  force?  Were  they  distracted  by  simultaneous  revolts  in  dif- 
ferent places,  or  assailed  by  enemies  unknown  or  unforeseen?  Not 
one  of  these  grounds  for  acquittal  can  be  pleaded.  First,  their  posi- 
tion was  of  all  others  the  most  defensible.  They  had  only  to  keep 
the  bridge  over  the  Strymon  adequately  watched  and  guarded — or  *,o 
retain  the  Athenian  squadron  at  Eion— and  Amphipolis  was  safe. 


CONDUCT   OF  THUCYDIDES.  703 

Eithei  one  or  the  other  of  these  precautions  would  have  sufficed: 
b.oth  together  would  have  sufficed  so  amply,  as  probably  to  prevent. 
the  scheme  of  attack  from  being  formed.  Next,  the  force  under 
Brasidas  was  iu  no  way  superior — not  even  adequate  to  the  capture 
of  the  inferior  place  Eiou,  when  properly  guarded — much  less  to  that 
of  Amphipolis.  Lastly,  there  were  no  simultaneous  revolts  to  dis- 
tract attention,  nor  unknown  enemies  to  confound  a  well-laid  scheme 
of  defense.  There  was  but  one  enemy,  iu  one  quarter,  having  one 
road  by  which  to  approach;  an  enemy  of  surpassing  merit  indeed, 
and  eminently  dangerous  to  Athens — but  without  any  chance  of  suc- 
cess, except  from  the  short-comings  of  the  Athenian  officers. 

Now  Thucydides  and  Eukles  both  knew  that  Brasidas  had  pre- 
vailed upon  Akanthus  and  Stageirus  to  revolt,  and  that  too  in  such 
a  way  as  to  extend  his  own  personal  influence  materially.  They 
knew  that  the  population  of  Argil  us  was  of  Andrian  origin,  like  that 
of  Akanthus  and  Stageirus,  and  therefore  peculiarly  likely  to  be 
tempted  by  the  example  of  those  two  towns.  Lastly,  they  knew  (and 
Thucydides  himself  tells  us)  that  this  Argiliau  population — whose 
territory  bordered  on  the  Strymon  and  the  western  foot  of  the 
bridge,  and  who  had  many  connections  in  Amphipolis — had  been  long 
disaffected  to  Athens,  and  especially  to  the  Athenian  possession  of 
that  city.  Yet  having  such  foreknowledge,  ample  warning  for  the 
the  necessity  of  vigilant  defense,  Thucydides  and  Eukles  withdraw, 
or  omit,  both  the  two  precautions  upon  which  the  security  of  Amphi- 
polis rested — precautions  both  of  them  obvious,  either  of  them  suffi- 
cient. The  one  leaves  the  bridge  under  a  feeble  guard,  and  is  caught 
so  unprepared  in  every  way,  that  one  might  suppose  Athens  to  be  in 
profound  peace;  the  other  is  found  with  his  squadron,  not  at  Eion, 
but  at  Thasos — an  island  out  of  all  possible  danger,  either  from 
Brasidas  (who  had  no  ships)  or  any  other  enemy.  The  arrival  of 
Brasidas  comes  on  both  of  them  like  a  clap  of  thunder.  Nothing 
more  is  required  than  this  plain  fact,  under  the  circumstances,  to 
prove  their  improvidence  as  commanders. 

The  presence  of  Thucydides  on  the  station  of  Thrace  was  impor- 
tant to  Athens,  partly  because  he  possessed  valuable  family-connec- 
tions, mining-property,  and  commanding  influence  among  the  con- 
tinental population  round  Amphipolis.  This  was  one  main  reason 
why  he  was  named.  The  Athenian  people  confide  much  in  his  pri- 
vate influence,  over  and  above  the  public  force  under  his  command 
— looking  to  him  even  more  than  to  his  colleague  Eukles  for  the  con- 
tinued security  of  the  town:  instead  of  which  they  find  that  not  even 
their  own  squadron  under  him  is  at  hand  near  the  vulnerable  point 
at  the  moment  when  the  enemy  comes.  Of  the  two,  perhaps,  the 
conduct  of  Eukles  admits  of  conceivable  explanation  more  easily 
than  that  of  Thucydides.  For  it  seems  that  Eukles  had  no  paid 
force  in  Amphipolis;  no  other  force  than  the  citizen  hoplites,  partly 
Athenian,  partly  of  other  lineage.     Doubtless  these  men  found  it 


704  EIGHTH   YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 

irksome  to  keep  guard  through  the  winter  on  the  Strymoniaa  bridge. 
Euklea  might  fancy,  that  by  enforcing  a  large  perpetual  guard,  lie 
ran  the  risk  of  making  Athene  unpopular.  Moreover,  Btrict  con- 
stancy of  watch,  nighl  after  night,  when  no  actual  danger  comes, 
with  an  unpaid  citizen  force — is  not  easy  to  maintain.  This  is  an 
insufficient  excuse,  but  it  is  better  than  anything  which  can  be 
offered  on  behalf  of  Thucydides;  who  had  with  him  a  paid  Athenian 
and  might  just  as  well  have  kept  it  at  Eion  as  at  Thasos.  We 
may  be  sure  that  the  absence  of  Thucydides  with  his  fleet,  at  Thasos, 
was  one  essential  condition  in  the  plot  laid  by  Brasklas  with  the 
Argilians, 

To  say,  with  Dr.  Thirhvall,  that  "human  prudence  and  activity 
could  not  have  accomplished  more  than  Thucydides  did  under  the 
same  circumstances" — is  true  as  a  matter  of  fact,  and  creditable  as 
far  as  it  goes.  But  it  is  wholly  inadmissible  as  a  justification,  and 
meets  only  one  part  of  the  case.  An  officer  in  command  is  respon- 
Bible  not  only  for  doing  most  "under  the  circumstances,"  but  also 
for  the  circumstances  themselves,  insofar  as  they  are  under  his  con- 
trol. Now  nothing  is  more  under  his  control  than  the  position 
which  he  choses  to  occupy.  If  Che  Emperor  Napoleon,  or  the  Duke 
of  Wellington,  had  lost  by  surprise  of  an  enemy  not  very  numerous, 
a  post  of  supreme  importance  which  they  thought  adequately  pro- 
tected, would  they  be  satisfied  to  hear  from  the  responsible  officer  in 
command — "  Having  no  idea  that  the  enemy  would  attempt  any  sur- 
prise, I  thought  that  I  might  keep  my  force  hal  f  a  day's  journey  off  from 
the  post  exposed,  at  another  post  which  it  was  physically  impossible 
for  the  enemy  to  reach.  But  the  moment  I  was  informed  that  the 
surprise  had  occurred,  I  hastened  to  the  scene,  did  all  that  human 
prudence  and  activity  could  do  to  repel  the  enemy;  and  though  I 
found  that  he  had  already  mastered  the  capital  post  of  all,  yet  I  beat 
him  back  from  a  second  post  which  he  was  on  the  point  of  mastering 
also?"  Does  any  one  imagine  that  these  illustrious  chiefs,  smarting 
Under  the  loss  of  an  inestimable  position  which  alters  the  whole 
prospects  of  a  campaign,  would  be  satisfied  with  such  a  report,  and 
would  dismiss  the  officer  with  praises  for  his  vigor  and  bravery 
"under  the  circumstances?"  They  would  assuredly  reply  that  he 
had  done  right  iu  coming  back — that  his  conduct  after  coming  back 
had  been  that  of  a  brave  man — and  that  there  was  no  impeachment 
on  his  courage.  But  they  would  at  the  same  time  add,  that  his  want 
of  judgment  and  foresight,  in  omitting  to  place  the  valuable  position 
really  exposed  under  sufficient  guard  beforehand,  and  leaving  it  thus 
open  to  the  enemy,  while  he  himself  was  absent  in  another  place 
which  was  out  of  danger — and  his  easy  faith  that  there  would  be  no 
dangerous  surprise,  at  a  time  when  the  character  of  the  enemy's 
officer,  as  well  as  the  disaffection  of  the  neighbors  (Argilus),  plainly 
indicated  that  there  would  be,  if  the  least  opening  were  afforded — 
that  these  were  defects  meriting  serious  reproof,  and  disqualifying 


BANISHMENT  OF  THUCYDIDES.  705 

trim  from  any  future  command  of  trust  and  responsibility.  Nor  can 
we  doubt  that  the  whole  feeling  of  the  respective  armies,  who  would 
have  to  pay  with  their  best  blood  the  unhappy  miscalculation  of  this 
officer  would  go  along  with  such  a  sentence;  without  at  all  suspecting 
themselves  to  be  guilty  of  injustice,  or  of  "directing  the  irritation 
produced  by  the  loss  against  au  innocent  object." 

The  vehement  leather-seller  in  the  Pnyx  at  Athens,  when  he 
brought  forward  what  are  called  "his  calumnies"  against  Thucy- 
dides  and  Eukles,  ;is  having  caused  through  culpable  omission  a 
fatal  and  irreparable  loss  to  their  country,  might  perhaps  state  his 
case  with  greater  loudness  and  acrimony.  But  it  maybe  doubled 
whether  he  would  say  anything  more  really  galling,  than  would  be 
contained  in  the  dignified  rebuke  of  an  esteemed  modern  general,  to 
a  subordinate  officer  under  similar  circumstances.  In  my  judgment, 
not  only  the  accusation  against  these  two  officers  (I  assume  Eukles  to 
have  been  included)  was  called  for  on  the  fairest  presumptive  grounds 
— which  would  be  sufficient  as  a  justification  of  the  leather-seller 
Kleou— but  the  positive  verdict  of  guilty  against  them  was  fully 
merited.  Whether  the  banishment  inflicted  was  a  greater  penalty 
than  the  case  warranted,  I  will  not  take  upon  me  to  pronounce. 
Every  age  has  its  own  standard  of  feeling  for  measuring  what  is  a 
proper  intensity  of  punishment:  penalties  which  our  grandfathers 
thought  right  and  meet,  would  in  the  present  day  appear  intolerably 
rigorous.  But  when  I  consider  the  immense  value  of  Amphipolis  to 
Athens,  combined  with  the  conduct  whereby  it  was  lost,  I  cannot 
think  that  there  was  a  single  Athenian  or  a  single  Greek,  who  would 
deem  the  penalty  of  banishment  too  severe. 

It  is  painful  to  find  such  strong  grounds  of  official  censure  against 
a  man  who  as  an  historian  has  earned  the  lasting  admiration  of  pos- 
terity— my  own  among  the  first  and  warmest.  But  in  criticizing  the 
conduct  of  Thucydides  the  officer,  we  are  bound  in  justice  to  forget 
Thucydides  the  historian.  He  was  not  known  in  the  latter  character, 
at  the  time  when  this  sentence  was  passed.  Perhaps  he  never  would 
have  been  so  known  (like  the  Neapolitan  historian  Codetta),  if 
exile  had  not  thrown  him  out  of  the  active  duties  and  hopes  of  a 
citizen. 

It  may  be  doubted  whether  he  ever  went  home  from  Eion  to 
encounter  the  grief,  wrath,  and  alarm,  so  strongly  felt  at  Athens 
after  the  loss  of  Amphipolis.  Condemned,  either  with  or  without 
appearance,  he  remained  in  banishment  for  twenty  years;  not  return- 
ing to  Athens  until  after  the  conclusion  of  the  Peloponnesian  war. 
Of  this  long  exile  much  is  said  to  have  been  spent  on  his  property  in 
Thrace;  yet  he  also  visited  most  parts  of  Greece — enemies  of  Athens 
as  well  as  neutral  states.  However  much  we  may  deplore  such  a 
misfortune  on  his  account,  mankind  in  general  has,  and  ever  will 
have,  the  strongest  reason  to  rejoice  at  it.  To  this  compulsory  leis- 
ure we  owe  the  completion,  or  rather  the  near  approach  to  comple- 
H.  G.  II.— 23. 


706  EIGHTH   YEAR   OF  THE  WAR 

tion,  of  his  history.  And  the  opportunities  which  an  exile  enjoyed 
of  personally  consulting  neutrals  and  enemies,  contributed  much  to 
form  that  impartial,  comprehensive,  Pan-hellenic,  spirit,  which 
reigns  generally  (hroughoul  hi<  immortal  work. 

Meanwhile  Brasidas,  installed  in  Amphipolis  aboul  the  beginning 
of  December  484  B.C.,  employed  his  increased  power  only  the  more 
vigorously  against  Alliens.  His  flrsl  care  was  to  reconstitute  Am 
phipolis— a  task  wherein  the  Macedonian  Perdikkas,  whose  intrigues 
had  contributed  to  the  capture,  came  and  personally  assisted.  That 
city  went  through  a  partial  s<  cession  and  r<  novation  of  inhabitants; 
being  now-  moreover  cut  off  from  the  port  of  Eion  and  the  mouth  of 
the  river,  which  remained  in  the  hands  of  the  Athenians.  Many 
new  arrangements  must  have  been  required,  as  well  for  its  internal 
polity  as  for  its  external  defense.  Brasidas  took  measures  for  build- 
ing ships  of  war,  in  the  lake  above  the  city,  in  order  to  force  the 
lower  pari  of  the  river:  hut  his  most  important  step  was  to  construct 
a  palisade  work,  connecting  the  walls  of  the  city  with  the  bridge. 
He  thus  made  himself  permanently  master  of  the  crossing  of  the 
Strymon,  so  as  to  shut  the  door  by  which  he  himself  had  entered. 
and  at  the  same  time  to  keep  an  easy  communication  with  Argilus 
and  the  western  hank  of  the  Strymon.  He  also  made  some  acquisi- 
tion-- on  the  eastern  side  of  the  river.  Pittakus,  prince  of  the  neigh- 
boring Edonian  Thracian  township  of  Myrkinus,  had  been  recently 
assassinated  by  his  wife  Brauro  and  by  some  personal  enemies,  lie 
had  probably  been  the  ally  of  Athens,  and  his  assassins  now  sought 
to  strengthen  themselves  by  courting  the  alliance  of  the  new  con- 
queror of  Amphipolis.  The  Thasian  continental  colonies  of  Galepsus 
and  (Esyme  also  declared  their  adhesion  to  him. 

While  he  sent  to  Laceda?mon,  communicating  his  excellent  posi- 
tion as  well  as  his  large  hopes,  he  at  the  same  time,  without  waiting 
for  the  answer,  began  acting  for  himself,  with  all  the  allies  whom 
he  could  get  togther.  He  marched  first  against  the  peninsula  called 
Akte — the  narrow  tongue  of  land  which  stretches  out  from  the 
neighborhood  of  Akanthus  to  the  mighty  headland  called  Mount 
Athos — near  thirty  miles  long,  and  between  four  and  five  miles  for 
the  most  part  in  breadth.  The  long,  rugged,  woody  ridge — covering 
this  peninsula  so  as  to  leave  but  narrow  spaces  for  dwelling,  or  cul- 
tivation, or  feeding  of  cattle — was  at  this  time  occupied  by  many 
distinct  petty  communities,  some  of  them  divided  in  race  and  lan- 
guage.  Sane,  a  colony  from  Andres,  was  situated  in  the  interior 
gulf  (called  the  Singitic  Gulf)  between  Athos  and  the  Sithonian  pen- 
insula, near  the  Xerxeian  canal.  The  rest  of  the  Akte  was  distribu- 
ted among  Bisaltians.  Krestonians  and  Edonians,  all  fractions  of  the 
Thracian  name — Pelasgians  or  Tyrrhenians,  of  the  race  which  had 
once  occupied  Lemnosand  Imbros— and  someChalkidians.  Some  of 
these  little  communities  spoke  habitually  two  languages.  Thyssus, 
Kleone,  Olophyxus,  and  others,  all  submitted  on  the  arrival  of  Bras- 


SURPRISE  OF  TORONE.  707 

idas;  but  Sane  and  Dion  held  out,  nor  could  he  bring  them  to  terms 
even  by  ravaging  their  territory. 

He  next  marched  into  the  Sithonian  peninsula,  to  attack  Torone, 
situated  near  the  southern  extremity  of  thai  peninsula — opposite  to 
Cape  Kanastrseum,  the  extreme  headland  of  the  peninsula  of  Pal- 
fene. 

Torone  was  inhabited  by  a  Chalkidic  population,  but  had  not  par- 
taken in  the  revolt  of  the  neighboring  Chalkidians  against  Athens. 
A  small  Athenian  garrison  had  been  sent  there,  probably  since  the 
recent  dangers,  and  were  now  defending  it,  as  well  as  repairing  the 
town-wall  in  various  parts  where  it  had  been  so  neglected  as  to  crum- 
ble down.  They  occupied  as  a  sort  of  distinct  citadel  the  outlying 
cape  called  Lekythus,  joining  by  a  narrow  isthmus  the  hill  on  which 
the  city  stood,  and  forming  a  port  wherein  lav  two  Athenian  triremes 
as  guardships.  A  small  party  in  Torone,  without  privity  or  even 
suspicion  of  the  rest,  entered  into  correspondence  with  Brasidas,  and 
engaged  to  provide  for  him  the  means  of  entering  and  mastering  the 
town.  Accordingly  he  advanced  by  a  night-march  to  the  temple  of 
the  Dioskuri  (Ivastor  and  Pollux)  within  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  of 
the  town-gates,  which  he  reached  a  little  before  daybreak;  sending 
forward  100  peltasts  to  be  still  nearer,  and  to  rush  upon  the  gate  at 
the  instant  when  signal  was  made  from  within.  His  Toronaean  par- 
tisans, some  of  whom  were  already  concealed  on  the  spot  awaiting 
his  arrival,  made  their  final  arrangements  with  him,  and  then  returned 
into  the  town — conducting  with  them  seven  determined  men  from 
his  army,  armed  only  with  daggers,  and  having  Lysistratus  of  Olyn- 
thus  as  their  chief.  Twenty  nmn  had  been  originally  named  for  this 
service,  but  the  danger  appeared  so  extreme,  that  only  seven  of  them 
were  bold  enough  to  go.  This  forlorn  hope,  enabled  to  creep  in, 
through  a  small  aperture  in  the  wall  toward  the  sea,  were  conducted 
silently  up  to  the  topmost  watch-tower  on  the  city  hill,  where  they 
surprised  and  slew  the  guards,  and  set  open  a  neighboring  postern 
gate,  looking  toward  Cape  Kanastroeum,  as  well  as  the  great  gate 
leading  toward  the  agora.  They  then  brought  in  the  peltasts  from 
without,  who,  impatient  with  the  delay,  had  gradually  stolen  close 
under  the  walls,  Some  of  these  peltasts  kept  possession  of  the  great 
gate,  others  were  led  round  to  the  postern  at  the  top,  while  the  fire- 
signal  was  forthwith  lighted  to  invite  Brasidas  himself.  He  and  his 
men  hastened  forward  toward  the  city  at  their  utmost  speed  and 
with  loud  shouts — a  terror-striking  notice  of  his  presence  to  the 
unprepared  citizens.  Admission  was  easy  through  the  open  gates, 
but  some  also  clambered  up  by  means  of  beams  or  a  sort  of  scaf- 
folding, which  was  lying  close  to  the  wall  as  a  help  to  the  workmen 
repairing  it.  And  while  the  assailants  were  thus  active  in  every  di- 
rection, Brasidas  himself  conducted  a  portion  of  them  to  assure  him- 
self of  the  high  and  commanding  parts  of  the  city. 

So  completely  were  the  Toronseans  surprised  and  thunderstruck. 


708  EIGHTH    YEAR  OF  THE   WAR. 

thai  hardly  any  attempt  was  made  to  resist.  Even  the  fifty  Athenian 
hoplites  who  occupied  the  agora,  beingfound  still  asleep,  were  partly 
slain,  and  partly  compelled  toseek  refuge  in  the  separately  garrisoned 
cape  of  Lekythus,  whither  they  were  followed  by  a  portion  of  the 
Toronsean  population  ;  some  from  attachmenl  to  Athens,  others  from 
sheer  terror.  To  these  fugitives  Brasidas  addressed  a  proclamation 
inviting-  them  to  return,  and  promising  them  perfect  security  for 
person,  property,  and  political  rights  ;  'while  al  the  same  time  he  Bent 
a  herald  with  a  formal  summons  to  the  Athenians  in  Lekythus, 
requiring  them  to  quit  the  place  as  belonging  to  the  Chalkidians,  but 
permitting  them  to  carry  away  their  property.  They  refusi  d  to  evac- 
uate the  place,  but  solicited  a  truce  of  one  day  for  the  purpose  of 
burying  their  slain.  Brasidas  granted  them  two  days,  which  were 
employed  botli  by  them  and  by  him,  iu  preparations  for  the  defense 
and  attack  of  Lekythus  ;  each  party  fortifying  the  houses  on  or  near 
the  connecting  isthmus. 

In  the  meantime  he  convened  a  general  assembly  of  the  Torona>an 
population,  whom  he  addressed  in  the  same  conciliating  and  (quit- 
able  language  as  he  had  employed  elsewhere.  "He  had  not  come  to 
harm  either  the  city  or  any  individual  citizen.  Those  who  had  let 
him  in,  ought  not  to  beregarded  as  bad  men  ortraitors — forthey  had 
acted  wTith  a  view  to  the  benefit  and  the  liberation  of  their  city,  not 
in  order  to  enslave  it,  or  to  acquire  profit  for  themselves.  On  the 
other  hand,  he  did  not  think  the  worse  of  those  who  had  gone  over 
to  Lekythus,  for  their  liking  toward  Athens:  he  wished  them  to  come 
back  freely,  and  he  was  sure  that  the  more  they  knew  the  Lacedae- 
monians, the  better  they  would  esteem  them.  He  was  prepared  to  for- 
give and  forget  previous  hostility  ;  but  while  he  invited  all  of  them  to 
live  for  the  future  as  cordial  friends  and  fellow-citzens — he  should 
also  for  the  future  hold  each  man  responsible  for  his  conduct,  either  as 
friend  or  as  enemy." 

On  the  expiration  of  the  Two  days'  truce,  Brasidas  attacked  the 
Athenian  garrison  in  Lekythus,  promising  a  recompense  of  thirty 
minaa  to  the  soldier  who  should  first  force  his  way  into  it.  Notwith- 
standing very  poor  means  of  defense — partly  a  wooden  palisade, 
partly  houses  with  battlements  on  the  roof — this  garrison  repelled 
him  for  one-  whole  day.  On  the  next  morning  he  brought  up  a 
machine,  for  the  same  purpose  as  that  which  the  Boeotians  had 
employed  at  Delium,  to  set  fire  to  the  wood-work.  The  Athenians  on 
their  side,  seeing  this  fire  machine  approaching,  put  up,  on  a  building 
in  front  of  their  position,  a  wooden  platform,  upon  which  many  of 
them  mounted,  with  casks  of  water  and  large  stones  to  break  it  or 
to  extinguish  the  flames.  At  last,  the  weight  accumulated  becoming 
greater  than  the  supports  could  bear,  it  broke  down  with  a  prodigious 
noise  ;  so  that  all  the  persons  and  things  upon  it  rolled  down  in  con- 
fusion. Some  of  these  men  were  hurt,  yet  the  injury  was  not  in 
reality  serious, — had  not  the  noise,  the  cries,  and  the  strangeness  of  th« 


PERSONAL  ABILITY  OF  BRASIDAS.  709 

incident  alarmed  those  behind,  who  could  not  see  precisely  what  had 
occurred,  to  such  a  degree  that  they  believed  the  enemy  to  have 
already  forced  the  defenses.  Many  of  them  accordingly  took  to 
flight,  while  those  who  remained  were  insufficient  to  prolong  the 
resistance  successfully;  so  that  Brasidas,  perceiving  the  disorder  and 
diminished  number  of  the  defenders,  relinquished  his  fire-machine 
and  again  renewed  his  attempt  to  carry  the  place  by  assault,  which  ' 
now  fully  succeeded.  A  considerable  portion  of  the  Athenians  and 
others  in  the  fort  escaped  across  the  narrow  gulf  to  the  peninsula  of 
Pallene,  by  means  of  two  triremes  and  some  merchant-vessels  at  hand : 
but  every  man  found  in  it  was  put  to  death.  Brasidas,  thus  master 
of  the  fort,  and  considering  that  he  owed  his  success  to  the  sudden 
rupture  of  the  Athenian  scaffolding,  regarded  this  incident  as  a  divine 
interposition,  and  presented  the  thirty  minae  (which  he  had  promised 
as  a  reward  to  the  first  man  who  broke  in)  to  the  goddess  Athene  for 
her  temple  at  Lekythus.  He,  moreover,  consecrated  to  her  the  entire 
cape  of  Lekythus  ;  not  only  demolishing  the  defenses,  but  also  dis- 
mantling the  private  residences  which  it  contained,  so  that  nothing 
remained  except  the  temple,  with  its  ministers  and  appurtenances. 

What  proportion  of  the  Toronseans  who  had  taken  refuge  at  Leky- 
thus, had  been  induced  to  return  by  the  proclamation  of  Brasidas, 
alike  generous  and  politic — we  are  not  informed.  His  language  and 
conduct  were  admirably  calculated  to  set  this  little  community  again 
in  harmonious  movement,  and  to  obliterate  the  memory  of  past  feuds. 
And  above  all,  it  inspired  a  strong  sentiment  of  attachment  and  grati- 
tude toward  himself  personally — a  sentiment  which  gained  strength 
with  every  successive  incident  in  which  he  was  engaged,  and  which 
enabled  him  to  exercise  a  greater  ascendency  than  could  ever  be 
acquired  by  Sparta,  and  in  some  respects  greater  than  had  ever  been 
possessed  by  Athens.  It  is  this  remarkable  development  of  com- 
manding individuality,  animated  throughout  by  straightforward 
public  purposes,  and  binding  together  so  many  little  communities 
who  had  few  other  feelings  in  common — which  lends  to  the  short 
career  of  this  eminent  man,  a  romantic,  and  even  an  heroic,  interest. 

During  the  remainder  of  the  winter  Brasidas  employed  himself  in 
setting  in  order  the  acquisitions  already  made,  and  in  laying  plans 
for  farther  conquests  in  the  spring.  But  the  beginning  of  spring — or 
the  close  of  the  eighth  year,  and  beginning  of  the  ninth  year,  of  the 
war,  as  Thucydides  reckons — brought  with  it  a  new  train  of  events, 
which  will  be  recounted  in  the  following  chapter. 


710  TRUCE  FUR   ONE   YEAR. 


CHAPTER  LIV. 

TRUCE  FOR  ONE  TEAR,  —  RENEWAL  OF  WAR  AND   BATTLE    OF  AMPHIP- 
OLIS.—  PEACE  OF  NIK.IA8. 

The  eighth  year  of  the  war.  described  in  the  last  chapter,   had 

opened  v.  ith  Banguine  hopes  for  Alliens,  and  with  dark  promise  lor 
Sparta,  chiefly  in  consequence  of  the  memorable  capture  of  Bphak- 
teria  toward  the  end  of  the  preceding  summer.  It  included,  not  to 
mention  other  events,  two  considerable  and  important  enterprl 
the  part  of  Athens — againsl  Megara  and  against  Bceotia  ;  tin-  former 
plan,  partially  successful — the  latter,  not  merely  unsuccessful,  but 
attended  with' a  ruinous  defeat.  Lastly,  the  losses  in  Thrace  follow- 
ing close  upon  the  defeat  at  Delium,  together  with  the  unbounded 
expectations  everywhere  entertained  from  the  future  career  of  Brasi- 
das,  had  again  seriously  lowered  the  impression  entertained  of  Athe- 
nian power.  The  jrear  thus  closed  amid  humiliations  the  more 
painful  to  Athens,  as  contrasted  with  the  glowing  hopes  with  which 
it  had  begun. 

It  was  now  that  Athens  felt  the  full  value  of  those  prisoners  whom 
she  had  taken  at  Sphakteria.  With  those  prisoners,  as  Kleonand  his 
supporters  had  said  truly,  she  might  be  sure  of  making  peace  when* 
ever  she  desired  it.  Having  such  a  certainty  to  fall  back  upon,  she 
had  played  a  bold  game,  and  aimed  at  larger  acquisitions  during  the 
past  year.  Tins  speculation,  though  not  in  itself  unreasonable,  had 
failed :  moreover,  a  new  phenomenon,  alike  unexpected  by  all,  had 
occurred,  when  Brasidas  broke  open  and  cut  up  her  empire  in  Thrace. 
Still,  so  great  was  the  anxiety  of  the  Spartans  to  regain  their  cap- 
tives, who  had  powerful  friends  and  relatives  at  home,  that  they 
considered  the  victories  of  Brasidas  chiefly  as  a  stepping-stone 
toward  that  object,  and  as  a  means  of  prevailing  upon  Athens  to 
make  peace.  To  his  animated  representations  sent  home  from 
Amphipolis,  setting  forth  the  prospects  of  still  farther  success  and 
entreating  re-enforcements — they  had  returned  a  discouraging  reply, 
dictated  in  no  small  degree  by  the  miserable  jealousy  of  some  of  their 
chief  men;  who,  feeling  themselves  cast  into  the  shade,  and  looking 
upon  his  splendid  career  as  an  eccentric  movement  breaking  loose 
from  Spartan  routine,  were  thus  on  personal  as  well  as  political 
grounds  disposed  to  labor  for  peace.  Such  collateral  motives,  work- 
ing upon  the  caution  usiial  with  Sparta,  determined  her  to  make 
use  of  the  present  fortune  and  realized  conquests  of  Brasidas.  as  a 
basis  for  negotiation  and  recovery  of  the  prisoners  ;  without  open- 
ing the  chance  of  ulterior  enterprises,  winch,  though  they  might 
perhaps  end  in  results  yet  more  triumphant,  would  unavoidably  put 
in  risk  that  which  was  now  secure.     The  history  of  the  Athenians 


KING  PLEISTOANAX  AT  SPARTA.  71 1 

during  the  past  year  might,  indeed,  serve  as  a  warning  to  deter  the 
Spartans  from  playing  an  adventurous  game. 

Ever  since  the  capture  of  Sphakteria,  the  Lacedaemonians  had  heen 
attempting,  directly  or  indirectly,  negotiations  for  peace  and  the 
recovery  of  the  prisoners.  Their  pacific  dispositions  were  especially 
instigated  hy  King  Pleistoanax,  whose  peculiar  circumstances  gave 
him  a  strong  motive  to  bring  the  war  to  a  close,  lie  had  been 
banished  from  Sparta,  fourteen  years  before  the  commencement  of 
the  war,  and  a  little  before  the  Thirty  years'  truce,  under  the  charge 
of  having  taken  bribes  from  the  Athenians  on  occasion  of  invading 
Attica.  For  more  than  eighteen  years  he  lived  in  banishment  close 
to  the  temple  of  Zeus  Dykaeus  in  Arcadia;  in  such  constant  fear  of 
the  Lacedaemonians  that  his  dwelling-house  was  half  within  the  con- 
secrated ground.  But  he  never  lost  the  hope  of  procuring  restoration, 
through  the  medium  of  the  Pythian  priestess  at  Delphi,  whom  he  and 
his  brother  Aristokles  kept  in  their  pay.  To  every  sacred  legation 
which  went  from  Sparta  to  Delphi,' she  repeated  the  same  imperative 
injunction — "  They  must  bring  back  the  seed  of  (Herakles)  the  demi- 
god son  of  Zeus  from  foreign  land  to  their  own ;  if  they  did  not,  it 
would  be  their  fate  to  plow  with  a  silver  plowshare."  The  command 
of  the  god,  thus  incessantly  repeated,  and  backed  by  the  influence  of 
those  friends  who  supported  Pleistoanax  at  home,  at  length  produced 
an  entire  change  of  sentiment  at  Sparta.  In  the  fourth  or  fifth  year 
of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  the  exile  was  recalled;  and  not  merely 
recalled,  but  welcomed  with  unbounded  honors — received  with  the 
same  sacrifices  and  choric  shows  as  those  which  were  said  to  have 
been  offered  to  the  primitive  kings,  on  the  first  settlement  of  Sparta. 

As  in  the  case  of  Kleomenes  and  Demaratus,  however,  it  was  not 
long  before  the  previous  intrigue  came  to  be  detected,  or  at  least  gen- 
erally suspected  and  believed;  to  the  great  discredit  of  Pleistoanax, 
though  he  could  not  be  again  banished.  Every  successive  public 
calamity  which  befell  the  state — the  miscarriages  of  Alkidas,  the 
defeat  of  Eurylochus  in  Amphilochia,  and  above  all,  the  unpre- 
cedented humiliation  in  Sphakteria — were  imputed  to  the  displeasure 
of  the  gods  in  consequence  of  the  impious  treachery  of  Pleis- 
toanax. Suffering  under  such  an  imputation,  this  king  was  most 
eager  to  exchange  the  hazards  of  war  for  the  secure  march  of  peace, 
so  that  he  was  thus  personally  interested  in  opening  every  door  for 
negotiation  with  Athens,  and  in  restoring  himself  to  credit  by  regain- 
ing the  prisoners. 

After  the  battle  of  Delium,  the  pacific  dispositions  of  Nikias,  Laches, 
and  the  philo-Laconian  party,  began  to  fincl  increasing  favor  at 
Athens;  while  the  unforeseen  losses  in  Thrace,  coming  thick  upon 
each  other — each  successive  triumph  of  BrasicVas  apparently  increas- 
ing his  means  of  achieving  more — tended  to  convert  the  discourage- 
ment of  the  Athenians  into  positive  alarm.  Negotiations  appear  to 
have  been  in  progress  throughout  great  part  of  the  winter.     The  con 


712  TRUCE  FOR  ONE  YEAR 

liimal  hope  thai  these  might  be  brought  to  a  close,  combined  with 
tin-  impolitic  aversion  of  Nikias  and  his  friends  to  energetic  military 
action,  help  to  explain  the  unwonted  apathy  of  Alliens  under  the 
pressure  <>f  such  disgraces.  Bui  bo  much  did  her  courage  flag, 
toward  the  close  of  the  winter,  thai  she  came  to  look  upon  a  trutie  as 
her  only  means  of  preservation  against  the  victorious  progress  <>f 
Bra  tdas.  What  the  tone  of  Eicon  now  was,  we  are  not  directly 
informed.  He  would  probably  still  continue  opposed  to  the  proposi- 
tions of  peace,  at  least  indirectly,  by  insisting  on  terms  more  favorable 
than  could  be  obtained.  On  this  point  his  political  counsels  would 
lie  wrong;  but  on  another  point  they  would  be  much  sounder  and 
more  judicious  than  those  of  his  rival  Nikias:  for  he  would  recom- 
mend a  strenuous  prosecution  of  hostilities  by  Athenian  force  against 
Brasidas  in  Thrace.  At  the  present  moment  this  was  the  most  unrent 
political  necessity  of  Athens,  whether  she  entertained  or  rejected  the 
views  of  peace.  And  the  policy  of  Nikias.  who  cradled  up  the  exist- 
ing depression  of  the  citizens  by  encouraging  them  to  rely  on  the 
pacific  inclinations  of  Sparta,  was  ill-judged  and  disastrous  in  its 
results,  as  the  future  will  hereafter  show. 

Attempts  were  made  by  the  peace  party  both  at  Athens  and  Sparta 
to  negotiate  at  first  for  a  definitive  peace.  But  the  conditions  of  such 
a  peace  were  not  easy  to  determine,  so  as  to  satisfy  both  parties — and 
became  more  and  more  difficult,  with  every  success  of  Brasidas. 
At  length  the  Athenians,  eager  above  all  things  to  arrest  bis  progress, 
sent  to  Sparta  to  propose  a  truce  for  one  year— desiring  the  Spartans 
to  send  to  Athens  envoys  with  full  powers  to  settle  the  terms:  the 
truce  would  allow  time  and  tranquillity  for  settling  the  conditions  of 
a  definitive  treaty.  The  proposition  of  the  truce  for  one  year, 
together  with  the  first  two  articles  ready  prepared,  came  from  Athens, 
as  indeed  we  might  have  presiimed  even  without  proof;  since  the 
interest  of  Sparta  was  rather  against  it,  as  allowing  to  the  Athenians 
the  fullest  leisure  for  making  preparations  against  farther  losses  in 
Thrace.  But  her  main  desire  was.  not  so  much  to  put  herself  in  con- 
dition to  make  the  best  possible  peace,  as  to  insure  some  peace  which 
Would  liberate  her  captives.  She  calculated  that  when  once  the 
Athenians  had  tasted  the  sweets  of  peace  for  one  year,  they  would 
not  again  voluntarily  impose  upon  themselves  the  rigorous  obligations 
of  war. 

In  the  month  of  March,  423  B.C. ,  on  the  fourteenth  day  of  the  month 
Elaphebolion  at  Athens,  and  on  the  twelfth  day  of  the  month  Geras- 
tiusat  Sparta,  a  truce  for  one  year  was  concluded  and  sworn,  between 
Athens  on  one  side,  and  Sparta,  Corinth,  Sikyon,  Epidaurus,  and 
Megara  on  the  other.  The  Spartans,  instead  of  merely  dispatching 
plenipotentiaries  to  Athens  as  the  Athenians  had  desired,  went  a  Step 
farther.  In  concurrence  with  the  Athenian  envoys,  they  drew  up  a 
form  of  truce,  approved  by  themselves  and  their  allies,  in  such  man- 
ner that  it  only  required  to  be  adopted  and  ratified  by  the  Athenians 


CONDITIONS  OF  THE  TRUCE.  713 

Tne  general  principle  of  the  trace  was  uti  possidetis,  and  the  condi- 
tions were  in  substance  as  follows: — 

1.  Respecting  the  temple  at  Delphi,  every  Gree!»  shall  have  tha 
right  to  make  use  of  it  honestly  and  without  fear,  pursuant  to  tha 
customs  of  his  particular  city. — The  main  purpose  of  this  stipu* 
lation,  prepared  and  sent  verbatim  from  Athens,  was  to  allow 
Athenian  visitors  to  go  thither,  which  had  been  impossible  during 
the  war,  in  consequence  of  the  hostility  of  the  Boeotians  and  Phoki- 
ans.  The  Delphian  authorities  also  were  in  the  interest  of  Sparta, 
and  doubtless  the  Athenians  received  no  formal  invitation  to  the 
Pythian  games.  But  the  Boeotians  and  Phokians  were  no  parties  to 
the  truce:  accordingly  the  Lacedaemonians,  while  accepting  the 
article  and  proclaiming  the  general  liberty  in  principle,  do  not 
pledge  themselves  to  enforce  it  by  arms  as  far  as  the  Boeotians  and 
Phokians  are  concerned,  but  only  to  try  and  persuade  them  by 
amicable  representations.  The  liberty  of  sacrificing  at  Delphi  was 
at  this  moment  the  more  welcome  to  the  Athenians,  as  they  seem  to 
have  fancied  themselves  under  the  displeasure  of  Apollo. 

2.  All  the  contracting  parties  will  inquire  out  and  punish,  each 
according  to  its  own  laws,  such  persons  as  may  violate  the  propertj 
of  the  Delphian  god. — This  article  also  is  prepared  at  Athens,  for 
the  purpose  seemingly  of  conciliatim;'  the  favor  of  Apollo  and  the 
Delphians.  The  Lacedaemonians  accept  the  article  literally,  of 
course. 

3.  The  Athenian  garrisons  at  Pylus,  Kythera,  Nisaea,  and  Minoa, 
and  Methana  in  the  neighborhood  of  Troezen,  are  to  remain  as  at 
present.  No  communication  to  take  place  between  Kythera  and  any 
portion  of  the  main  land  belonging  to  the  Lacedaemonian  alliance. 
The  soldiers  occupying  Pylus  shall  confine  themselves  within  the 
space  between  Buphras  and  Tomeus ;  those  in  Nisaea  and  Minoa,  within 
the  road  which  leads  from  the  chapel  of  the  hero  Nisus  to  the  temple 
of  Poseidon — without  aujr  communication  with  the  population  beyond 
that  limit.  In  like  manner  the  Athenians  in  the  peninsula  of 
Methana  near  Troezen,  and  the  inhabitants  of  the  latter  city,  shall 
observe  the  special  convention  concluded  between  them  respecting 
boundaries. 

4.  The  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies  shall  make  use  of  the  sea 
for  trading-purposes,  on  their  own  coasts,  but  shall  not  have  liberty 
to  sail  in  any  ship  of  war,  nor  in  any  rowed  merchant-vessel  of 
tonnage  equal  to  500  talents.  [All  war-ships  were  generally  impelled 
by  oar:  they  sometimes  used  sails,  but  never  when  wanted  for  fight- 
ing. Merchant-vessels  seem  generally  to  have  sailed,  but  were  some- 
times rowed:  the  limitation  of  size  is  added,  to  insure  that  the 
Lacedaemonians  shall  not,  under  color  of  rherchantmen,  get  up  a 
warlike  navy.] 

5.  There  shall  be  free  communication  by  sea  as  well  as  by  land, 
between  Peloponnesus  and  Athens  for  herald  or  embassy,  with  suit- 


714  TRUCE  FOR   ONE  YEAR 

able  at  tor  dants,  to  treat  for  a  definitive  peace  or  for  the  adjustment  of 
differences. 

0.  Neither  side  shall  receive  deserters  from  the  other,  whether  free 
or  slave.  [This  article  was  alike  important  to  both  parties.  Alliens 
bad  to  tear  the  revolt  of  her  subject-allies — Sparta  the  desertion  of 
Helots.] 

7.  Disputes  shall  be  amicably  settled,  by  both  parties,  according  to 
their  established  laws  and  customs. 

Such  was  the  substance  of  the  treaty  prepared  at  Sparta — seem- 
ingly in  concert  with  Athenian  envoys — and  sent  by  the  Spartans  to 
Alliens  for  approval,  with  the  following  addition—"  If  there  be  any 
provision  which  occurs  to  you,  more  honorable  or  just  than  these, 
come  tn  Lapedssmon  and  tell  us:  for  neither  the  Spartans  nor  their 
allies  will  resist  any  jusl  suggestions.  But  let  those  who  come  bring 
with  them  full  powers  to  conclude — in  the  same  manner  as  you 
desire  of  us.     The  truce  shall  be  for  one  year." 

By  the  resolution  which  Laches  proposed  in  the  Athenian  public 
assembly,  ratifying  the  truce,  the  people  farther  decreed  that  nego- 
tiations  should  be  opened  for  a  definitive  treaty,  and  directed  the 
Btrategi  to  propose  to  the  next  ensuing  assembly,  a  scheme  and 
principles  for  conducting  the  negotiations.  But  at  the  very  moment 
when  the  envoys  between  Sparta  and  Athens  were  bringing  the  truce 
to  final  adoption,  events  happened  in  Thrace  which  threatened  to 
cancel  it  altogether.  Two  days  after  the  important  fourteenth  of 
Elapheboliou,  but  before  the  truce  could  be  made  known  in  Thrace, 
Skione  revolted  from  Athens  to  Brasidas. 

Skione  was  a  town  calling  itself  Achaean,  one  of  the  numerous 
colonies  which,  in  the  want  of  an  acknowledged  mother-city,  traced 
its  origin  to  warriors  returning  from  Troy.  It  was  situated  in 
the  peninsula  of  Pallene  (the  westernmost  of  those  three  narrow 
tongues  of  land  into  which  (halkidike  branches  out);  conterminous 
with  the  Eretriau  colony  Mende.  The  Skionseans,  not  without  con- 
siderable dissent  among  themselves,  proclaimed  their  revolt,  from 
Athens,  under  concert  with  Brasidas.  He  immediately  crossed  the 
Gulf  into  Pallene,  himself  in  a  little  boat,  but  with  a  trireme  close  aj 
his  side;  calculating  that  she  would  protect  him  against  any  small 
Athenian  vessel — while  any  Athenian  trireme  winch  he  might 
encounter  would  attack  his  trireme,  paying  no  attention  to  the  little 
boat  in  which  he  himself  was.  The  revolt  of  Skione  was,  from  the 
position  of  the  town,  a  more  striking  defiance  of  Athens  than  any  of 
the  preceding  events.  For  the  isthmus  connecting  Pallene  with  the 
main-land  was  occupied  by  the  town  of  Potidae — a  town  assigned  at 
the  period  of  its  capture,  >i-\cn  years  before,  to  Athenian  settlers. 
though  probably  containing  some  other  residents  besides.  Moreover 
the  isthmus  was  so  narrow  that  the  wall  of  Potidae  barred  it  across 
completely  from  sea  to  sea.  Pallene  was  therefore  a  quasi-island,  nol 
open  to  the  aid  of  land  force  from  the  continent,  like  the  towns 


ADMIRATION  OF  BRASIDAS  AT  SKIONK  715 

previously  acquired  by  Brasidas.  The  Skiomeans  thus  put  them- 
selves, without  any  foreign  aid,  into  conflict  against  tlie  whole  force 
of  Athens,  bringing  into  question  her  empire  not  merely  over  conti- 
nental towns  but  over  islands. 

Even  to  Brasidas  himself',  their  revolt  appeared  a  step  of  astonish- 
ing boldness.  On  being  received  into  the  city,  he  convened  a  public 
assembly,  and  addressed  to  them  the  same  language  which  he  had 
employed  at  Akanthus  and  Torone;  disavowing  all  party  preferences 
as  well  as  all  interference  with  the  internal  politics  of  the  town,  and 
exhorting  them  only  to  unanimous  elforts  against  the  common 
enemy.  He  bestowed  upon  them  at  the  same  time  the  warmest 
praise  for  their  courage.  "They,  though  exposed  to  all  the  hazards 
of  islanders,  had  stood  forward  of  their  own  accord  to  procure  free- 
dom, without  waiting  like  cowards  to  be  driven  on  by  a  foreign  force 
toward  what  was  clearly  their  own  good.  He  considered  them  capa- 
ble of  any  measure  of  future  heroism,  if  the  danger  now  impending 
from  Athens  should  be  averted — and  he  should  assign  to  them  the 
ver}r  first  post  of  honor  among  the  faithful   allies  of  Lacedasmon." 

This  generous,  straightforward,  and  animating  tone  of  exhortation 
— appealing  to  the  strongest  political  instinct  of  the  Greek  mind,  the 
love  of  complete  city-autonomy,  and  coming  from  the  lips  of  one 
whose  whole  conduct  had  hitherto  been  conformable  to  it — had  proved 
highly  efficacious  in  all  the  previous  towns.  But  in  Skione  it  roused 
the  population  to  the  highest  pitch  of  enthusiasm.  It  worked  even 
upon  the  feelings  of  the  dissentient  minority,  bringing  them  round 
to  partake  heartily  in  the  movement.  It  produced  a  unanimous  and 
exalted  confidence  which  made  them  look  forward  cheerfully  to  all 
the  desperate  chances  in  which  they  had  engaged  themselves;  and 
it  produced  at  the  same  time,  in  still  more  unbounded  manifestation, 
the  same  personal  attachment  and  admiration  as  Brasidas  inspired 
elsewhere.  The  Skionaaans  not  only  voted  to  him  publicly  a  golden 
crown,  as  the  liberator  of  Greece,  but  when  it  was  placed  on  his  head, 
the  burst  of  individual  sentiment  and  sympathy  was  the  strongest  of 
which  the  Grecian  bosom  was  capable.  "  They  crowded  round  him 
individually,  and  encircled  his  head  with  tillets,  like  a  victorious 
athlete,"  says  the  historian.  This  remarkable  incident  illustrates 
what  I  observed  before — that  the  achievements,  the  self-relying 
march,  the  straightforward  politics,  and  probity  of  this  illustrious 
man — who  in  character  was  more  Athenian  than  Spartan,  yet  with 
the  good  qualities  of  Athens  predominant — inspired  a  personal 
emotion  toward  him  such  as  rarely  found  its  wTay  into  Grecian 
political  life.  The  sympathy  and  admiration  felt  in  Greece  toward 
a  victorious  athlete  was  not  merely  an  intense  sentiment  in  the 
Grecian  mind,  but  was  perhaps,  of  all  others'the  most  wide-spread 
and  Pan-hellenic.  It  was  connected  with  the  religion,  the  taste,  and 
the  love  of  recreation  common  to  the  whole  nation — while  politics 
tended  rather  to  disunite  the  separate  cities:  it  was  farther  a  senti- 


710  TRUCE  FOR  ONE  YEAS. 

ttent  at  once  familiar  and  exclusively  personal.  Of  its  exaggerated 
intensity  throughout  Greece  the  philosophers  often  complained,  not 
withoni  good  reason.  But  Thucydides  cannot  convey  a  more  lively 
idea  of  the  enthusiasm  and  unanimity  with  winch  Brasidas  was 
welcomed  a1  Bkione,  just  after  the  desperate  resolution  taken  by  the 
citizens,  than  by  using  this  simile. 

The  Lacedaemonian  commander  knew  well  how  much  the  utmost 
resolution  of  the  Skionaeans  was  needed,  and  how  speedily  their 
insular  position  would  draw  upon  them  the  vigorous  invasion  of 
Athens,  lie  accordingly  brought  across  to  Pallene  a  considerable 
portion  of  his  army,  not  merely  with  a  view  to  the  defense  of  Skione, 
hut  also  with  the  intention  of  surprising  both  Mende  and  Potidsea,  in 
both  which  places  there  were  small  parties  of  conspirators  prepared 
to  open  the  gates. 

It  was  in  this  position  that  he  was  found  by  the  commissioners  who 
came  to  announce  formally  the  conclusion  of  the  truce  for  one  year, 
and  to  enforce  its  provisions:  Athenaeus  from  Sparta — one  of  the 
three  Spartans  who  had  sworn  to  the  treaty;  Aristonymus,  from 
Athens.  The  face  of  affairs  was  materially  altered  by  this  com- 
munication; much  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  newly-acquired  allies  of 
Sparta  in  Thrace,  who  accepted  the  truce  forthwith — but  to  the  great 
chagrin  of  Brasidas,  whose  career  was  thus  suddenly  arrested.  Yet 
he  could  not  openly  refuse  obedience,  and  his  army  was  accordingly 
transferred  from  the  peninsula  of  Pallene  to  Torone. 

The  case  of  Skione  however,  immediately  raised  an  ohstruction, 
doubtless  very  agreeable  to  him.  The  commissioners,  who  had  come 
in  an  Athenian  trireme,  had  heard  nothing  of  therevoltof  that  place, 
and  Aristonymus  was  astonished  to  find  the  enemy  in  Pallene.  But 
on  inquiring  into  the  case,  he  discovered  that  the  Skiona-ans  had  not 
revolted  until  two  days  after  the  day  fixed  for  the  commencement  of 
the  truce.  Accordingly,  while  sanctioning  the  truce  for  till  the  other 
cities  in  Thrace,  he  refused  to  comprehend  Skione  in  it,  sending 
immediate  news  home  to  Athens.  Brasidas,  protesting  loudly 
against  this  proceeding,  refused  on  his  part  to  abandon  Skione,  which 
was  peculiarly  endeared  to  him  by  the  recent  scenes;  and  even 
obtained  the  countenance  of  the  Lacedaemonian  commissioners,  by 
falsely  asseverating  that  the  city  had  revolted  before  the  day  nam<  d 
in  the  truce. 

Violent  was  the  burst  of  indignation  when  the  news  sent  home  by 
Aristonymus  reached  Athens.  It  was  nowise  softened,  when  the 
Lacedaemonians,  acting  upon  the  version  of  the  case  sent  to  them  by 
Brasidas  and  Athenaeus,  dispatched  an  embassy  thither  to  claim  pro- 
tection for  Skione — or  at  any  rate  to  procure  the  adjustment  of  the 
dispute  by  arbitration  or  pacific  decision.  Having  the  terms  of  the 
treaty  on  their  side,  the  Athenians  were  least  of  all  disposed  to  relax 
from  their  rights  in  favor  of  the  first  revolting  islanders.     They 


WAR  CONTINUES  IN  THRACE.  717 

resolved  at  once  to  undertake  an  expedition  for  the  reconquesl  of 
Skione;  and  further,  on  the  proposition  of  Kleon,  to  put  to  death  all 

the  adult  male  inhabitants  of  that  place  as  soon  as  it  should  have  been 
reconquered.  At  the  same  time,  they  showed  no  disposition  to  throw 
up  the  truce  generally.  The  state  of  feeling  on  both  sides  tended  to 
this  result — that  while  the  war  continued  in  Thrace,  it  was  suspended 
everywhere  else. 

Fresh  intelligence  soon  arrived — carrying  exasperation  at  Athens 
yet  further — of  the  revolt  of  Mende,  the  adjoining  town  to  Skione. 
Those  Mendseans,  who  had  laid  their  measures  for  secretly  intro- 
ducing Brasidas,  were  at  first  baffled  by  the  arrival  of  the  truce-com- 
missioners. But  they  saw  that  he  retained  his  hold  on  Skione.  in 
spite  of  the  provisions  of  the  truce;  and  they  ascertained  that  he  was 
willing  still  to  protect  them  if  they  revolted,  though  he  could  not  be 
an  accomplice,  as  originally  projected,  in  the  surprise  of  the  town. 
Being  moreover  only  a  small  party,  with  the  sentiment  of  the  popu- 
lation against  them — they  were  afraid,  if  they  now  relinquished  their 
scheme,  of  being  detected  and  punished  for  the  partial  steps  already 
taken,  when  the  Athenians  should  come  against  Skione.  They  there- 
fore thought  it  on  the  whole  the  least  dangerous  course  to  persevere. 
They  proclaimed  their  revolt  from  Athens,  constraining  the  reluctant 
citizens  to  obey  them.  The  government  seems  before  to  have  been 
democratical,  but  they  now  found  means  to  bring  about  an  oligarchical 
revolution  along  with  the  revolt.  Brasidas  immediately  accepted 
their  adhesion,  and  willingly  undertook  to  protect  them;  professing 
to  think  that  he  had  a  right  to  do  so,  because  they  had  revolted 
openly  after  the  truce  had  been  proclaimed.  But  the  truce  upon  this 
point  was  clear — which  he  himself  virtually  admitted,  by  setting  up 
as  justification  certain  alleged  matters  in  which  the  Athenians  had 
themselves  violated  it.  He  immediately  made  preparation  for  the 
defense  both  of  Mende  and  Skione  against  the  attack  which  was  now 
rendered  more  certain  than  before;  conveying  the  women  and  child- 
ren of  those  two  towns  across  to  the  Chalkidic  Olynthus,  and  sending 
thither  as  garrison  500  Peloponnesian  hoplites  with  300  Chalkidic 
peltasts;  the  commander  of  which  force,  Polydamidas,  took  posses- 
sion of  the  acropolis  with  his  own  troops  separately. 

Brasidas  then  withdrew  himself  with  the  greater  part  of  his  army, 
to  accompany  Perdikkas  on  an  expedition  into  the  interior  against 
Arrhibseus  and  the  Lynkestse.  On  what  ground,  after  having  before 
entered  into  terms  with  Arrhibseus,  he  now  became  his  active  enemy, 
we  are  left  to  conjecture.  Probably  his  relations  with  Perdikkas, 
whose  alliance  was  of  essential  importance,  were  such  that  this  step 
was  forced  upon  him  against  his  will;  or  he  may  really  have  thought 
that  the  force  under  Polydamidas  was  adequate  to  the  defense  of 
Mende  and  Skione — an  idea  which  the  unaccountable  backwardness  of 
Athens  for  the  last  six  or  eight  months  might  well  foster?     Had  he 


718  TRUCE  FOR  ONE  YEAR. 

even  remained,  indeed,  lie  could  hardly  have  Baved  them,  consider 
ing  the  situation  of  Pallene  and  the  superiority  of  Athens  at  sea:  but 

his  absence  made  their  ruin  certain. 

While  Brasidas  was  thus  engaged  far  in  the  interior,  the  Athenian 
armamenl  under  Nikias  and  Nikostratus  reached  Potidsa;  fifty 
triremes,  ten  of  them  Chian — loot)  hoplites  and  000  bowmen  from 
Athens — looo  mercenary  Thracians~with  some  peltasts  from  Me- 
thone  and  other  towns  in  the  neighborhood.  From  Fotidaa  they 
proceeded  by  sea  to  Cape  Poseidonium,  near  which  they  landed  for 
the  purpose  of  attacking  Mende.     Polydamidas,  the  Peloponnesian 

commander  in   the    town,  took  post  with    his   force  of  700   hoplites. 

including  300  Skionseans,  upon  an  eminence  near  the  city,  strong  and 
difficult  of  approach:  upon  which  the  Athenian  generals  divided 
■their  forces;  Nikias,  with  sixty  Athenian  chosen  hoplites,  120  Me 
thonean  peltasts,  and  all  the  bowmen,  tried  to  march  up  the  hill  by  a 
side  path  and  thus  turn  the  position — while  Nikostratus  with  the 
main  army  attacked  it  in  front.  But  such  were  the  extreme  dif- 
ficulties of  the  ground  that  both  were  repulsed:  Nikias  was  himself 
wounded,  and  the  division  of  Nikostratus  was  thrown  into  great  dis- 
order, narrowly  escaping  a  destructive  defeat.  The  Mendajans,  how- 
ever,  evacuated  the  position  in  the  night  and  retired  into  the  city; 
while  the  Athenians,  sailing  round  on  the  morrow  to  the  suburb  on 
the  side  of  Skione,  ravaged  the:  neighboring  land;  Nikias  on  the 
ensuing  day  carried  his  devastations  still  further,  even  to  the  border 
of  the  Skionaean  territory. 

But  dissensions  so  serious  bad  already  commenced  within  the 
walls,  that  the  Skioiuean  auxiliaries,  becoming  mistrustful  of  their 
situation,  took  advantage  of  the  night  to  return  home.  The  revolt 
of  Mende  had  been  brought  about  against  the  will  of  the  citizens,  by 
the  intrigues  and  for  the  benefit  of  an  oligarchical  faction.  Moreover, 
it  does  not  appear  that  Brasidas  personally  visited  the  town,  as  he 
had  visited  Skione  and  the  other  revolted  towns.  Had  he  come,  his 
personal  influence  might  have  done  much  to  soothe  the  offended 
citizens,  and  create  some  disposition  to  adopt  the  revolt  as  a  fact 
accomplished,  after  they  had  once  been  compromised  with  Athens. 
But  his  animating  words  had  not  been  heard,  and  the  Peloponnesian 
troops,  whom  he  had  sent  to  Mende,  were  mere  instruments  to  sus- 
tain the  newly-erected  oligarchy,  and  keep  out  the  Athenians.  The 
feelings  of  the  citizens  generally  toward  them  were  soon  unequivo- 
cally displayed.  Nikostratus  with  half  of  the  Athenian  force  was 
planted  before  the  gate  of  Mende  which  opened  toward  Potidaea.  In 
the  neighborhood  of  that  gate,  within  the  city,  was  the  place  of  arms 
and  the  chief  station  both  of  the  Peloponnesians  and  of  the  citizens. 
Polydamidas,  intending  to  make  a  sally  forth,  was  marshaling  both 
of  them  in  battle  order,  when  one  of  the  Mendaean  Demos,  manifest- 
ing with  angry  vehemence  a  sentiment  common  to  most  of  them, 
told  him  "that  he  would  not  sally  forth,  and  did  not  choose  to  tak« 


SIEGE  AND  BLOCKADE  OF  SKIONE.  719 

part  in  the  contest."  Polydamidas  seized  hold  of  the  man  to  punish 
him,  when  the  mass  of  the  armed  Demos,  taking  part  with  their  com- 
rade, made  a  sudden  rush  upon  the  Peloponnesians.  The  latter, 
unprepared  for  such  an  onset,  sustained  at  lirst  some  loss,  and  were 
soon  forced  to  retreat  into  the  acropolis — the  rather  as  they  saw  Borne 
of  the  Mendseans  open  the  gates  to  the  besiegers  without,  which 
induced  them  to  suspect  a  preconcerted  betrayal.  No  such  concert 
however  existed;  though  the  besieging  generals,  when  they  sawT  the 
gates  thus  suddenly  opened,  soon  comprehended  the  real  position  of 
affairs.  But  they  found  it  impossible  to  restrain  their  soldiers,  who 
pushed  in  forthwith,  from  plundering  the  town:  and  they  had  even 
some  difficulty  in  saving  the  lives  of  the  citizens. 

Mende  being  thus  taken,  the  Athenian  generals  desired  the  body 
of  the  citizens  to  resume  the  former  government,  leaving  it  to  them 
to  single  out  and  punish  the  authors  of  the  late  revolt.  What  use 
was  made  of  this  permission,  we  are  not  told:  but  probably  most  of 
the  authors  had  already  escaped  into  the  acropolis  along  with  Poly- 
damidas. Having  erected  a  wall  of  circumvallation,  round  the 
acropolis,  joining  the  sea  at  both  ends — and  left  a  force  to  guard  it — 
the  Athenians  moved  away  to  begin  the  siege  at  Skione,  where  they 
found  both  the  citizens  and  the  Peloponnesian  garrison  posted  on  a 
strong  hill,  not  far  from  the  wTalls.  As  it  wras  impossible  to  surround 
the  town  without  being  masters  of  this  hill,  the  Athenians  attacked 
it  at  once  and  were  more  fortunate  than  they  had  been  before  Mende; 
for  they  carried  it  by  assault,  compelling  the  offenders  to  take  refuge 
in  the  town.  After  erecting  their  trophy,  they  commenced  the  wall 
of  circumvallation.  Before  it  was  finished,  the  garrison  who  had 
been  shut  up  in  the  acropolis  of  Mende  got  into  Skione  at  night,  hav- 
ing broken  out  by  a  sudden  sally  where  the  blockading  wall  around 
them  joined  the  sea.  But  this  did  not  hinder  Nikias  from  prosecuting 
his  operations,  so  that  Skione  was  in  no  long  time  completely 
inclosed,  and  a  division  placed  to  guard  the  wall  of  circumvallation 

Such  was  the  state  of  affairs  which  Brasidas  found  on  returning 
from  the  inland  Macedonia.  Unable  either  to  recover  Mende  or  to 
relieve  Skione,  he  was  forced  to  confine  himself  to  the  protection  of 
Torone.  Nikias,  however,  without  attacking  Torone,  returned  soon 
afterward  with  his  ai-mament  to  Athens,  leaving  Skione  under 
blockade. 

The  march  of  Brasidas  into  Macedonia  had  been  unfortunate  in 
every  way.  Nothing  but  his  extraordinary  gallantry  rescued  him 
from  utter  ruin.  The  joint  force  of  himself  and  Perdikkas  consisted 
of  3000  Grecian  hoplites — Peloponnesian,  Akanthiau,  and  Chalkidian 
— with  1000  Macedonian  and  Chalkidian  horse — and  a  considerable 
number  of  non-Hellenic  auxiliaries.  As  soon^is  they  had  got  beyond 
the  mountain-pass  into  the  territory  of  the  Lynkestae,  they  were  met 
by  Arrhibaeus,  and  a  battle  ensued,  in  which  that  prince  was  com- 
pletely worsted.    They  halted  here  a  few  days,  awaiting — before  they 


720  TRUCE  FOR  ONE  YEAR. 

pushed  forward  to  attack  the  villages  in  the  territory  of  Anhibaus 
— the  arrival  of  a  body  of  [llyrian  mercenaries,  with  whom  Perdikkas 
had  concluded  a  bargain.  At  length  Perdikkas  became  impatienl  to 
.advance  without  them,  while  Brasidas,  <>n  the  contrary,  apprehen- 
sive of  the  fate  of  M<  nde  during  bis  absence,  was  benl  on  returning 
back.  The  dissension  between  them  becoming  aggravated,  they  parted 
company  and  occupied  separate  encampments  at  some  distance  from 

each  other — when  both  received  unexpected  intelligence  which  made 

Perdikkas  as  anxious  to  retreat  as  Brasidas.  The  [llyrians,  having 
broken  their  compact,  had  joined  Arrhibu'iis,  and  were  now  in  full 
march  to  attack  the  invaders.  The  untold  number  of  these  barbari- 
ans was  reported  as  overwhelming,  while  such  was  their  reputation 

for  ferocity  as  well  as  for  valor,  that  the  Macedonian  anny  of  Per 
dikkas,  seized  with  a  sudden  panic,  broke  up  in  the  night,  and  lied 
without  orders,  hurrying  Perdikkas  himself  along  with  them,  and 
not  even  sending  uotice  to  Brasidas,  with  whom  nothing  had  been 
concerted  about  the  retreat.  In  the  morning  the  latter  found  Arrhi- 
ba;us  and  the  lllyrians  close  upon  him:  the  Macedonians  being 
already  far  advanced  in  their  journey  homeward. 

The  contrast  between  the  man  of  Hellas  and  of  Macedonia — gene- 
ral as  well  as  soldiers — was  never  more  strikingly  exhibited  than  on 
this  critical  occasion.  The  soldiers  of  Brasidas,  though  surprised  as 
well  as  deserted,  lost  neither  their  courage  nor  their  discipline;  the 
commander  preserved  not  only  his  presence  of  mind,  but  his  full 
authority.  His  hoplites  were  directed  to  form  in  a  hollow  square  or 
oblong,  with  the  light-armed  and  attendants  in  the  center,  for  the 
retreating  march.  Youthful  soldiers  were  posted  either  in  the  outer 
ranks,  or  in  convenient  stations,  to  run  out  swiftly  and  repel  the 
assailing  enemy;  while  Brasidas  himself,  with  800  chosen  men, 
formed  the  rear-guard. 

The  short  harangue  which  (according  to  a  custom  universal  with 
Grecian  generals)  he  addressed  to  his  troops  immediately  before  the 
enemy  approached,  is  in  many  respects  remarkable.  Though  some 
were  Akanthians,  some  C'halkidians,  some  Helots,  he  designates  all 
by  the  honorable  title  of  "  Peloponnesians."  Reassuring  them 
against  the  desertion  of  their  allies,  as  well  as  against  the  superior 
numbers  of  the  advancing  enemy — he  invokes  their  native,  homebred 
courage.  "  Ye  do  not  require  the  presence  of  allies  to  inspire  you 
with  bravery — nor  do  ye  fear  superior  numbers  of  an  enemy;  for  ye 
belong  not  to  those  political  communities  in  which  the  larger  num 
her  governs  the  smaller,  but  to  those  in  which  a  few  men  rule  sub- 
jects more  numerous  than  themselves — having  acquired  their  power 
by  no  other  means  than  by  superiority  in  battle."  Next,  Brasidas 
tried  to  dissipate  the  prestige  of  the  Illyrian  name.  His  army  had 
already  vanquished  the  Lynkeslae,  and  these  other  barbarians  were 
noway  better.  A  nearer  acquaintance  would  soon  show  that  they 
were  only  formidable  from  the  noise,  the  gestures,  the  clashing  of 


GRECIAN  AND  BARBARIAN.  721 

arms  and  the  accompaniments  of  their  onset;  and  that  they  were 
incapable  of  sustaining  the  reality  of  close  combat,  hand  to  hand. 
"They  have  no  regular  order  (said  he)  such  as  to  impress  them  with 
shame"  for  deserting  their  post.  Flight  and  attack  are  with  them  in 
equally  honorable  esteem,  so  that  there  is  nothing  to  test  the  really 
courageous  man:  their  battle,  wherein  every  man  fights  as  he  chooses, 
is  just  the  thing  to  furnish  each  with  a  decent  pretense  for  running 
away." — "  Repel  ye  their  onset  whenever  it  comes,  and  so  soon  as 
opportunity  offers,  resume  your  retreat  in  rank  and  order.  Ye  will 
soon  arrive  in  a  place  of  safety;  and  ye  will  be  convinced  that  such 
crowds,  when  their  enemy  has  stood  to  defy  the  first  onset,  keep 
aloof  with  empty  menace  and  a  parade  of  courage  which  never 
strikes — while  if  their  enemy  gives  way.  they  show  themselves  smart 
and  bold  in  running  after  him  where  there  is  no  danger." 

The  superiority  of  disciplined  and  regimented  force  over  disorderly 
numbers,  even  with  equal  individual  courage,  is  now  a  truth  so 
familiar,  that  we  require  an  effort  of  imagination  to  put  ourselves 
back  into  the  fifth  century  before  the  Christian  era,  when  this  truth 
was  recognized  only  among  the  Hellenic  communities;  when  the 
practice  of  all  their  neighbors,  Illyrians,  Thracians,  Asiatics,  Epirots, 
and  even  Macedonians — implied  ignorance  or  contradiction  of  it.  In 
respect  to  the  Epirots,  the  dilfereuce  between  their  military  habits 
and  those  of  the  Greeks  has  been  already  noticed — having  been  point- 
edly manifested  in  the  memorable  joint  attack  on  the  Akarnanian 
town  of  Stratus,  in  the  second  year  of  the  war.  Both  Epirots  and 
Macedonians,  however,  are  a  step  nearer  to  the  Greeks  than  either 
Thracians,  or  these  Illyrian  barbarians  against  whom  Brasidas  was 
now  about  to  contend,  and  in  whose  case  the  contrast  comes  out  yet 
more  forcibly.  It  is  not  merely  the  contrast  between  two  modes  of 
fighting  which  the  Lacedaemouiau  commander  impresses  upon  his 
soldiers.  He  gives  what  may  be  called  a  moral  theory  of  the  princi- 
ples on  which  that  contrast  is  founded ;  a  theory  of  large  range,  and 
going  to  the  basis  of  Grecian  social  life,  in  peace  as  well  as  in  war. 
The  sentiment,  in  each  individual  man's  bosom,  of  a  certain  place 
which  he  has  to  fill  and  duties  which  he  has  to  perform — combined 
with  fear  of  the  .displeasure  of  his  neighbors  as  well  as  of  his  own 
self-reproach  if  he  shrinks  back — but  at  the  same  time  essentially 
bound  up  with  the  feeling,  that  his  neighbors  are  under  correspond- 
ing obligations  toward  him — this  sentiment,  which  Brasidas  invokes 
as  the  settled  military  creed  of  his  soldiers  in  their  ranks,  was  not  less 
the  regulating  principle  of  their  intercourse  in  peace  as  citizens  of  the 
same  community.  Simple  as  the  principle  may  seem,  it  would  have 
found  no  response  in  the  army  of  Xerxes,  or  of  the  Thracian  Sitalkes 
or  of  the  Gaul  Brennus.  The  Persian  soldier  rushes  to  death  by 
order  of  the  Great  King,  perhaps  under  terror  of  a  whip  which  the 
Great  King  commands  to  be  administered  to  him.  The  Illyrian  or 
the  Gaul  scorns  such  a  stimulus,  and  obeys  only  the  instigation  of 


773  TRUCE  FOR  ONE  YEAR. 

his  own  pugnacity,  or  vengeance,  or  love  of  blood,  or  love  of  booty 
— l>ut  recedes  as  soon  as  thai  individual  sentiment  is  either  satisfied, 
or  <>\  ercome  by  fear.  It  is  the  Greek  soldier  alone  w  l»o  feels  himself 
bound  to  his  comrades  by  ties  reciprocal  and  indissoluble — who  obeys 
neither  the  will  of  a  king,  nor  his  own  individual  impulse,  bull  a  com- 
mon and  imperative  sentiment  of  obligation — whose  honor  or  Bhame 
is  attached  to  his  own  place  in  the  ranks,  never  to  be  abandoned  nor 
overstepped.  Such  conceptions  of  military  duty,  established  in  the 
minds  of  these  soldiers  whom  Brasidae  addressed,  will  come  to  lie 
farther  illustrated  when  we  describe  the  memorable  Retreat  of  the 
Ten  Thousand.  At.  present  1  merely  indicate  them  as  forming  a  part 
of  that  general  scheme  of  morality,  social  and  political  as  well  as 
military,  wherein  the  Greeks  stood  exalted  above  the  nations  who 
surrounded  them. 

But  there  is  another  point  in  the  speech  of  Brasidas  which  deserves 
notice:  he  tells  his  soldiers — "Courage  is  your  homebred  property: 
for  ye  belong  to  communities  wherein  the  small  number  governs  the 

larger,  Simply  by  reason  of  superior  prowess  in  themselves  and  con- 
quest by  their  ancestors.''  First,  it  is  remarkable  that  a  large  pro- 
portion of  the  Peleponnesian  soldiers,  whom  Brasidas  thus  addresses, 
consisted  of  lleiot. — the  conquered  race,  not  the  conquerors:  yet  bo 
easily  does  the  military  or  regimental  pride  supplant  the  sympathies 
of  race,  that  these  men  would  feel  flattered  by  being  addressed  as  if 
they  were  themselves  sprung  from  the  race  which  had  enslaved  their 
ancestors.  Next,  we  here  see  the  right  of  the  strongest  invoked  as 
the  legitimate  source  of  power,  and  as  an  honorable  and  ennobling 
recollection  by  an  officer  of  Dorian  race,  oligarchical  politics,  unper 
verted  intellect,  and  estimable  character.  We  shall  accordingly  be 
prepared,  when  we  find  a  similar  principle  hereafter  laid  down  by 
the  Athenian  envoys  at  Mel os,  to  disallow  the  explanation  of  those 
who  treat  it  merely  as  a  theory  invented  by  demagogues  and  sophists 
— upon  one  or  other  of  whom  it  is  common  to  throw  the  blame  of  all 
that  is  objectionable  in  Grecian  politics  or  morality. 

Having  finished  his  harangue,  Brasidas  gave  orders  for  retreat.  As 
soon  as  his  march  began,  the  Illyrians  rushed  upon  him  with  all  the 
confidence  and  shouts  of  pursuers  against  a  flying  .enemy,  believing 
that  they  should  completely  destroy  his  army.  But  wherevei  they 
approached  near,  the  young  soldiers  specially  stationed  for  the  pur- 
pose turned  upon  and  beat  them  back  with  severe  loss;  while  Bra- 
sidas himself  with  liis  rear-guard  of  300  was  present  everywhere 
rendering  vigorous  aid.  When  the  Lynkestae  and  Illyrians  attacked, 
the  army  hailed  and  repelled  them,  after  which  it  resumed  its  retreat- 
ing march.  The  barbarians  found  themselves  so  rudely  handled,  and 
with  such  unwonted  vigor — for  they  probably  had  had  no  previous 
experience  of  Grecian  troops — that  after  a  few  trials  they  desisted  from 
meddling  with  the  army  in  its  retreat  along  the  plain.  They  ran  forward 
rapidly,  partly  in  order  to  overtake  the  Macedonians  under  Perdik- 


BREACH  BETWEEN  BRASIDAS  AND  PERDIKKAS.     723 

kas,  who  bad  fled  before — partly  to  occupy  tbe  narrow  pass,  with 
high  hills  on  each  side,  which  formed  the  entrance  into  Lynkestis, 
and  which  lay  in  the  road  of  Brasidas.  When  the  latter  approached 
this  narrow  pass,  he  saw  the  barbarians  masters  of  it.  Several  of 
them  were  already  on  the  summits,  and  more  were  ascending  to 
re-enforce  them ;  while  a  portion  of  them  were  moving  down  upon 
his  rear.  Brasidas 'immediately  gave  orders  to  his  chosen  300,  to 
charge  up  the  most  assailable  of  the  two  hills,  with  their  best  speed, 
before  it  became  more  numerously  occupied — not  staying  to  preserve 
compact  ranks.  This  unexpected  and  vigorous  movement  discon- 
certed the  barbarians,  who  tied,  abandoning  the  eminence  to  the 
Greeks,  and  leaving  their  own  men  in  the  pass  exposed  on  one  of 
their  flanks.  The  retreating  army,  thus  master  of  one  of  the  side 
hills,  was  enabled  to  force  its  way  through  the  middle  pass,  and  to 
drive  away  the  Lynkestian  and  Illyrian  occupants.  Having  got 
through  this  narrow  outlet,  Brasidas  found  himself  on  the  higher 
ground.  His  enemies  did  not  dare  to  attack  him  farther:  so  that  he 
was  enabled  to  reach,  even  in  that  day's  march,  the  first  town  or 
village  in  the  kingdom  of  Perdikkas,  called  Arnissa.  So  incensed 
were  his  soldiers  with  the  Macedonian  subjects  of  Perdikkas,  who 
had  fled  on  the  first  news  of  danger  without  giving  them  any  notice 
— that  they  seized  and  appropriated  all  the  articles  of  baggage,  not 
inconsiderable  in  number,  which  happened  to  have  been  dropped  iu 
the  disorder  of  a  nocturnal  flight.  They  even  unharnessed  and  slew 
the  oxen  out  of  the  baggage  carts. 

Perdikkas  keenly  resented  this  behavior  of  the  troops  of  Brasidas, 
following  as  it  did  immediately  upon  his  own  quarrel  with  that  gene- 
ral, and  upon  the  mortification  of  his  repulse  from  Lynkestis.  From 
this  moment  he  broke  off  his  alliance  with  the  Peloponuesian,  and 
opened  negotiations  with  Nikias,  then  engaged  in  constructing  the 
wall  of  blockade  round  Skione.  Such  was  the  general  faithlessness 
of  this  prince,  however,  that  Nikias  required  as  a  condition  of  the 
alliance,  some  manifest  proof  of  the  sincerity  of  his  intentions;  and 
Perdikkas  was  soon  enabled  to  afford  a  proof  of  considerable  import- 
ance. 

The  relation  between  Athens  and  Peloponnesus,  since  the  con- 
clusion of  the  truce  in  the  preceding  March,  had  settled  into  a 
curious  combination.  la  Thrace,  war  was  prosecuted  by  mutual 
understanding,  and  with  unabated  vigor;  but  everywhere  else  the 
truce  was  observed.  The  main  purpose  of  the  truce,  however,  that 
of  giving  time  for  discussion  preliminary  to  a  definite  peace,  was 
completely  frustrated.  The  decree  of  the  Athenian  people  (which 
stands  included  in  their  vote  sanctioning  the  truce),  for  sending  and 
receiving  envoys  to  negotiate  such  a  peace,  seems  never  to  have  been 
executed. 

Instead  of  this,  the  Lacedaemonians  dispatched  a  considerable  re- 
enforcement  by  land  to  join  Brasidas;  probably  at  his  own  request, 


724  TRUCE  FOK  ONE  YEA«R. 

and  also  instigated  by  bearing  of  the  Athenian  armament  now  under 
Nikias  in  Pallene.     Bui  [scbagoras,  the  commander  of  there-enforc* 
ment,  on  reaching  the  borders  ofThessaly,  found  all  farther  pro 

impracticable,  .-11111   was  pelled   to  send  back  his  troops.     For 

Perdikkas,  by  whose  powerful  influence  alone  Brasidas  bad  been 
enabled  to  pass  through  Thessaly,  now  directed  his  Thessalian 
guests  to  keep  the  new  comers  oiT;  which  was  far  more  easilj  exe 
cuted,  and  was  gratifying  to  the  feelingB  of  Perdikkas  himself,  as 
well  as  an  essentia]  service  to  the  Athenians, 
[scbagoras  however — with  a  few  companions  but  without  his  army 
le  his  way  to  Brasidas,  having  been  particularly  directed  by 
Hie  Lacedaemonians  to  inspect  and  report  upon  the  state  of  affairs. 
He  numbered  among  his  companions  a  few  selecl  Spartans  of  the 
military  age,  intended  to  be  placed  as  harmosts  or  governors  in  the 
cities  reduced  by  Brasidas.     This  was  among  the  first  violations, 

apparently  often  repeated  afterwards,  of  the  ancient  Spartan  custom 

— thai  none  excepl  elderly  men.  above  the  military  age  should  he 
named  to  such  posts.  Indeed  Brasidas  himself  was  an  illustrious 
di  p.irlure  from  the  ancient  rule.  This  mission  of  these  officers  was 
intended  to  guard  against  the  appointment  of  any  but  Spartans  to 
such  posts — tor  there  were  no  Spartans  in  the  army  of  Brasidas.    One 

of  the  new-comers,  Kleandas.  was  made  governor  of  Amphipolis — 
another.  Pasitclidas,  of  Toronc.  It  i-  probable  that  these  inspecting 
commissioners  may  have  contributed  to  fetter  the  activity  of 
Brasidas.  Moreover  the  newly-declared  hostility  of  Perdikkas, 
together  with  disappointment  in  the  non-arrival  of  the  fresh  troops 
intended  to  join  him,  much  abridged  his  means.  We  hear  of  only 
one  exploit  performed  by  him  at  this  time— and  that  too,  more  than 
six  months  after  the  retreat  from  Macedonia— about  January  or 
February,  422  B.c.  Having  established  intelligence  with  some 
parties  in  the  town  of  Potidsea,  in  the  view  of  surprising  it,  he  con- 
trived to  bring  up  his  army  in  the  nighl  to  the  foot  of  the  walls,  and 
even  to  plant  hi-  scaling-ladders,  without  being  discovered.  The 
sentinel  carrying  and  ringing  the  lull  had  just  passed  by  on  the  wall, 
leaving  for'  a  short  interval  an  unguarded  space  (the  practice 
apparently  being,  to  pass  this  bell  round  along  the  walls  from  one 
sentinel  to  another  throughout  the  night) — when  some  of  the  soldiers 
of  Brisidas  took  advantage  of  the  moment  to  try  and  mount.  But 
befi  !••  they  could  reach  the  top  of  the  wall,  the  sentinel  came  back, 
alarm  was  given,  and  the  assailants  were  compelled  to  retreat. 

In  the  absi  ace  of  actual  war  between  the  ascendent  powers  in  and 
near  Peloponnesus,  during  the  course  of  the  summer,  Thucydidea 
mention-  to  us  some  incidents  which  perhaps  he  would  have  omitted 
had  'here  been  great  warlike  operations  to  describe.  The  great 
de  of  Here,  between  Mykenae  and  Argos  (nearer  to  the  former, 
and  in  early  times  more  intimately  connected  with  it,  but  now 
an  appcudage  of  the  latter;   Mykenae  itself  having  been  subjected 


WAR  IN  ARCADIA.  725 

and  almost  depopulated  by  the  Argeians) — enjoyed  an  ancient  Pan- 
hellenic  reputation.  Tlie  catalogue  of  its  priestesses,  Beemingly  with 
a  statue  or  bust  of  each,  was  preserved  or  imagined  through  centu- 
ries of  past  time,  real  and  mythical,  beginning  with  the  goddess  her- 
self  or  her  immediate  nominees.  Chrysis,  an  old  woman  who  had 
been  priestess  there  for  fifty-six  years,  happened  to  fall  asleep  in  the 
temple  with  a  burning  lamp  near  to  her  head;  the  fillet  encircling 
her  head  took  fire,  and  though  she  herself  escaped  unhurt,  the  tern 
pie  itself,  very  ancient  and  perhaps  built  of  wood,  was  consumed. 
From  fear  of  the  wrath  of  the  Argeians,  Chrysis  fled  to  Phlius,  ana 
subsequently  thought  it  necessary  to  seek  protection  as  a  suppliant 
in  the  temple  ol"  Athene  Alea  at  Tegea:  Phacinis  was  appointed 
priestess  in  her  place.  The  temple  was  rebuilt  on  an  adjoining  spot 
by  Eupolemus  of  Argos,  continuing  as  much  as  possible  the  antiqui- 
ties and  traditions  of  the  former,  but  with  greater  splendor  and 
magnitude.  Pausanias  the  traveller,  who  describes  this  second 
edifice  as  a  visitor  near  600  years  afterward,  saw  near  it  the  remnant 
of  the  old  temple  which  had  been  burnt. 

We  hear  farther  of  a  war  in  Arcadia,  between  the  two  important 
cities  of  Mantineia  and  Tegea — each  attended  by  its  Arcadian  allies, 
partly  free,  partly  subject.  In  a  battle  fought  between  them  at 
Laodikion,  the  victory  was  disputed.  Each  party  erected  a  trophy 
— each  sent  spoils  to  the  temple  of  Delphi.  We  shall  have  occasion 
soon  to  speak  farther  of  these  Arcadian  dissensions. 

The  Boeotians  had  been  no  parties  to  the  truce  sworn  between 
Sparta  and  Athens  in  the  preceding  month  of  March.  But  they  seem 
to  have  followed  the  example  of  Sparta  in  abstaining  from  hostilities 
de facto:  and  we  may  conclude  that  they  acceded  to  the  request  of 
Sparta  so  far  as  to  allow  the  transit  of  Athenian  visitors  and  sacred 
envoys  through  Bceotia  to  the  Delpian  temple.  The  only  actual  inci- 
dent which  we  hear  of  in  Bceotia  during  this  interval,  is  one  which 
illustrates  forcibly  the  harsh  and  ungenerous  ascendency  of  the  The- 
bans  over  some  of  the  inferior  Boeotian  cities.  The  Thebans  des- 
troyed the  walls  of  Thespia?,  and  condemned  the  city  to  remain  un- 
fortified, on  the  charge  of  atticising  tendencies.  How  far  this  sus- 
picion was  well-founded,  we  have  no  means  of  judging-  But  the 
Thespians,  far  from  being  dangerous  at  this  moment,  were  altogether 
helpless — having  lost  the  flower  of  their  military  force  at  the  battle 
of  Delium,  where  their  station  was  on  the  defeated  wing.  It  was 
this  very  helplessness,  brought  upon  them  by  their  services  to  The- 
bes against  Athens,  which  now  both  impelled  and  enabled  the  The- 
bans to  enforce  the  rigorous  sentence  above-mentioned. 

But  the  month  of  March  (or  the  Attic  Elaphebolion)  422  B.C. — 
the  time  prescribed  for  expiration  of  the  Otie  year's  truce — had  now 
arrived.  It  has  already  been  mentioned  that  this  truce  had  never 
been  more  than  partially  observed.  Brasidas  in  Thrace  had  disre- 
garded it  from  the  beginning.      Both  the  contracting  powers  had 


726  TRUCE   FOR  ONE  YEAR 

tacitly  acquiesced  in  the  anomalous  condition,  of  war  in  Thrace 
coupled  with  peace  else"w  here.  Either  of  them  had  thus  an  excellent 
pretext  for  breaking  the  truci  altogether;  and  as  neither  acted  upon 
this  pretext,  we  plainly  Bee  thai   the  paramount  feeling  and  asceu 

dent   parties,  among   both,  tended   to    peace  (if  their  own  accord,  at 

that  time.  There  was  nothing  except  the  interest  of  Brasidas,  and 
of  those  revolted  subjects  of  Athens  to  whom  he  had  bound  himself, 
■which  kept  alive  the  war  in  Thrace.  Under  such  a  state  of  feeling, 
the  oath  taken  to  maintain  the  truce  st ill  seemed  imperative  on  both 
parties— always  excepting  Thracian  affairs.     Moreover  the  Athenians 

were   to  a   certain   degree   soothed    by    their    success  at    Mende    and 

Bkione,  and  by  their  acquisition  of  Perdikkasas  an  ally,  during  the 

summer  and  autumn  of  433  B.C.  Rut  the  state  of  sentiment  between 
tin  contracting  partic  a  was  not  such  as  to  make  it  possible  to  treat 
for  anv  longer  peace,  or  to  conclude  any  new  agreement;   though 

neither  were  disposed  to  depart  from  that  which  had  been  already 
concluded. 

The  mere  occurrence  of  the  last  day  of  the  truce  made  no  practical 
difference  at  first  in  this  condition  of  'things.  The  truce  had  expired  : 
cither  party  might  renew  hostilities;  but  neither  actually  did  renew 
them.  To  the  Athenians  there  was  this  additional  motive  for  abstain- 
ing from  hostilities  for  a  few  months  longer:  the  great  Pythian  fes- 
tival would  be  celebrated  at  Delphi  in  July  or  the  beginning  of 
August,  and  as  they  had  been  excluded  from  that  holy  spot  during 
all  the  interval  between  the  beginning  of  the  war  and  the  conclusion 
of  the  One  year's  truce,  their  pious  feelings  seem  now  to  have  taken 
a  peculiar  longing  toward  the  visits,  pilgrimages,  and  festivals  con- 
nected with  it.  Though  the  truce  therefore  had  really  ceased,  no 
actual  warfare  took  place  until  the  Pythian  games  were  over. 

But  though  the  actions  of  Athens  remained  unaltered,  the  talk  at 
Athens  became  very  different.  Kleon  and  his  supporters  renewed 
their  instances  to  obtain  a  vigorous  prosecution  of  the  war,  and 
renewed  them  with  great  additional  strength  of  argument;  the  ques- 
tion being  now  open  to  considerations  of  political  prudence,  without 
any  binding  obligation. 

"At  this  time  (observes  Thucydides) the  great  enemies  of  peace 
were,  Brasidas  on  one  side,  and  Kleon  on  the  other:  the  former, 
because  he  was  in  full  success  and  rendered  illustrious  by  the  war — 
the  latter  because  bethought  that,  if  peace  were  concluded,  he  should 
be  detected  in  his  dishonest  politics,  and  be  less  easily  credited  in  his 
criminations  of  others."  As  to  Brasidas,  the  remark  of  the  historian 
is  indisputable.  It  would  be  wonderful  indeed,  if  he,  in  whom  so 
many  splendid  qualities  were  brought  out  by  the  war,  and  who  had 
moreover  contracted  obligations  with  the  Thracian  towns  which 
gave  him  hopes  and  fears  of  his  own,  entirely  apart  from  Laeed.-einoii 
—it  would  be  wonderful  if  the  war  and  its  continuance  were  not  in 
his  view  the  paramount  object.     In  truth  his  position  in  Thrace  con- 


KLEON  AN  OPPONENT  OF  PEACE.  727 

stituted  an  insurmountable  obstacle  to  any  solid  or  steady  peace, 
independently  of  She  dispositions  of  Kleon. 

But  the  coloring  which  Thucydides  gives  to  Kleon's  support  of  the 
war  is  open  to  much  greater  comment.  First,  we  may  well  raise  the 
question,  whether  Kleon  had  any  real  interest  in  war — whether  his 
personal  or  party  consequence  in  the  city  was  at  all  enhanced  by  it. 
He  had  himself  no  talent  or  competence  for  warlike  operations — 
which  tended  infallibly  to  place  ascendency  in  the  bands  of  others, 
and  to  throw  him  into  the  shade.  As  to  his  power  of  carrying  on 
dishonest  intrigues  with  success,  that  must  depend  on  the  extent  of 
his  political  ascendency.  Matter  of  crimination  against  others 
(assuming  him  to  be  careless  of  truth  or  falsehood)  could  hardly  be 
wanting  either  in  war  or  peace.  And  if  the  war  brought  forward 
unsuccessful  generals  open  to  his  accusations,  it  would  also  throw  up 
successful  generals,  who  would  certainly  outshine  him  and  would 
probably  put  him  down.  In  the  life  which  Plutarch  has  given  us  of 
Phokion,  a  plain  and  straightforward  military  man,  we  read  that 
one  of  the  frequent  and  criminative  speakers  of  Athens  (of  character 
analogous  to  that  which  is  ascribed  to  Kleon)  expressed  his  surprise 
on  hearing  Phokion  dissuade  the  Athenians  from  embarking  in  a  new 
war:  "  Yes  (said  Phokion),  I  think  it  right  to  dissuade  them:  though 
I  know  well,  that  if  there  be  war,  I  shall  have  command  over  you — 
if  there  be  peace,  you  will  have  command  over  me."  This  is  surely 
a  more  rational  estimate  of  the  way  in  which  war  affects  the  compar- 
ative importance  of  the  orator  and  the  military  officer,  than  that 
which  Thucydides  pronounces  in  reference  to  the  interests  of  Kleon. 
Moreover,  when  we  come  to  follow  the  political  history  of  Syracuse, 
we  shall  find  the  demagogue  Athenagoras  ultra-pacific,  and  the  aris 
tocrat  Hermokrates  far  more  warlike.  The  former  is  afraid,  not 
without  reason,  that  war  will  raise  into  consequence  energetic  mili- 
tary leaders  dangerous  to  the  popular  constitution.  We  may  add, 
that  Kleon  himself  had  not  been  always  warlike.  He  commenced 
his  political  career  as  an  opponent  of  Perikles,  when  the  latter  was 
strenuously  maintaining  the  necessity  and  prudence  of  beginning  the 
Peloponnesian  war. 

But  further — if  we  should  even  grant  that  Kleon  had  a  separate 
party-interest  in  promoting  the  war — it  will  still  remain  to  be  consid- 
ered, whether  at  this  particular  crisis,  the  employment  of  energetic 
warlike  measures  in  Thrace  was  not  really  the  sound  and  prudent 
policy  for  Athens.  Taking  Perikles  as  the  best  judge  of  policy,  we 
shalf  find  him  at  the  outset  of  the  war  inculcating  emphatically  two 
important  points — 1.  To  stand  vigorously  upon  the  defensive,  main- 
taining unimpaired  their  maritime  empire,  "keeping  their  subject- 
allies  well  in  hand,"  submitting  patiently  even  to  see  Attica  ravaged; 
2.  To  abstain  from  trying  to  enlarge  their  empire  or  to  make  new 
conquests  during  the  war. — Consistently  with  this  well-defined  plan 
of  action,  Perikles,  had  he  lived,  would  have  taken  care  to  interfere 


728  TRUCE  FOR  ONE  YEAR. 

vigorously  and  betimes  to  prevent  Brasidas  from  making  hi 
quests.  Had  such  interfeience  been  either  impossible  or  accidental]} 
frustrated,  he  would  have  thought  do  efforts  too  great  to  recover 
them.  To  maintain  undiminished  the  integrity  of  the  empire,  as  well 
as  that  impression  of  Athenian  force  upon  which  the  empire  rested, 
was  liis  cardinal  principle.  Now  it  is  impossible  to  deny  that  in  n  i 
erence  to  Thrace,  Kleon  adhered  more  closely  than  his  rival  Nikias 
to  the  policy  of  Perikles.  It  was  to  Nikias,  more  than  to  Kleon, 
that  the  fatal  mistake  made  by  Athens  in  not  interfering  speedily 
alter  Brasidas  first  broke  into  Thrace  is  to  be  imputed.  It  was  Nikias 
and  his  partisans,  desirous  of  peace  at  almost  any  price,  and  knowing 
that  the  Lacedaemonians  also  desired  it — who  encouraged  the  Athe- 
nians, at  a  moment  of  great  public  depression  of  spirit,  to  leave  Bra- 
sidas unopposed  in  Thrace,  and  rely  on  the  chance  of  negotiation 
with  Sparta  for  arresting  his  progress.  The  peace-party  at  Athens 
carried  their  point  of  the  truce  for  a  year,  with  the  promise,  and  for 
the  express  purpose,  of  cheeking  the  further  conquests  of  Brasidas; 
also  with  the  further  promise  of  maturing  that  truce  into  a  perma- 
nent peace,  and  obtaining  under  the  peace  even  the  restoration  of 
Amphipolis. 

Such  was  the  policy  of  Nikias  and  his  party,  the  friends  of  peace, 
and  opponents  of  Kleon.  And  the  promises  which  they  thus  held 
out  might  perhaps  appear  plausible  in  March,  B.C.  423,  at  the  moment 
when  the  truce  for  one  year  was  concluded.  But  subsequent  events 
had  frustrated  them  in  the  most  glaring  manner,  and  had  even  shown 
the  best  reason  for  believing  that  no  such  expectations  could  possibly 
be  realized,  while  Brasidas  was  in  unbroken  and  unopposed  action. 
For  the  Lacedaemonians,  though  seemingly  sincere  in  concluding  the 
truce  on  the  basis  of  uti  possidetis,  and  desiring  to  extend  it  to  Thrace 
as  well  as  elsewhere,  had  been  unable  to  enforce  the  observance  of  it 
upon  Brasidas,  or  to  restrain  him  even  from  making  new  acquisitions 
— so  that  Athens  never  obtained  the  benefit  of  the  truce  exactly  in 
that  region  where  she  most  stood  in  need  of  it.  Only  by  the  dispatch 
of  her  armament  to  Skione  and  Mende  had  she  maintained  herself  in 
possession  even  of  Pallene. 

Now  what  was  the  lesson  to  be  derived  from  this  experience,  when 
the  Athenians  came  to  discuss  their  future  policy,  after  the  truce  was 
at  an  end?  The  great  object  of  all  parties  at  Athens  wyas  to  recover 
the  lost  possessions  in  Thrace — especially  Amphipolis.  Nikias,  still 
urging  negotiations  for  peace,  continued  to  hold  out  hopes  that  the 
Lacedaemonians  would  be  willing  to  restore  that  place,  as  the  price 
of  their  captives  now  at  Athens.  His  connection  with  Sparta  would 
enable  him  to  announce  her  professions  even  upon  authority.  But 
to  this  Kleon  might  make,  and  doubtless  did  make,  a  complete  reply, 
grounded  upon  the  most  recent  experience: — "  If  the  Lacedaemonians 
consent  to  the  restitution  of  Amphipolis  (he  would  say),  it  will 
probably  be  only  with  the  view  of  finding  some  means  to  escape  per- 


NIKIAS  AND  KLEON.  729 

formance,  and  yet  to  get  back  their  prisoners.    But  granting  that 

they  are  perfectly  sincere,  they  will  never  be  able  to  control  Brasidas, 
and  I  host'  parties  in  Thrace  who  are  bound  up  with  him  by  com 
munity  of  feeling  and  interest;  so  thai  after  all.  you  will  give  them 
back  their  prisoners,  on  the  faith  of  an  equivalent  beyond  their  power 
to  realize.  Look  at  what  has  happened  during  the  truce!  So  dif- 
ferent are  the  views  and  obligations  of  Brasidas  in  Thrace  from  those 
of  the  Lacedaemonians,  that  he  would  not  even  obey  their  order  when 
they  directed  him  to  stand  as  he  was,  and  to  desist  from  further  con- 
quest. Much  less  will  he  obey  them  when  they  direct  him  to  sur- 
render what  he  has  already  got:  least  of  all,  if  they  enjoin  the 
surreuder  of  Amphipolis,  his  grand  acquisition  and  his  central  point 
for  all  future  effort.  Depend  upon  it,  if  you  desire  to  regain  Amphip- 
olis, you  will  only  regain  it  by  energetic  employment  of  force,  as 
has  happened  with  Skione  and  Mende.  And  you  ought  to  put  forth 
your  strength  for  this  purpose  immediately,  while  the  Lacedaemonian 
prisoners  are  yet  in  your  hands,  instead  of  waiting  until  after  vou 
shall  have  been  deluded  into  giving  them  up,  thereby  losing  all  your 
hold  upon  Lacedsemon. " 

Such  anticipations  were  fully  verified  by  the  result:  for  subsequent 
history  will  show  that  the  Lacedaemonians  when  they  had  bound  them- 
selves by  treaty  to  give  up  Amphipolis,  either  would  not,  or  could 
not,  enforce  performance  of  their  stipulation,  even  after  the  death  of 
Brasidas.  Much  less  could  they  have  done  so  during  his  life,  when 
there  was  his  great  personal  influence,  strenuous  will,  and  hopes  of 
future  conquest,  to  serve  as  increased  obstruction  to  them.  Such 
anticipations  were  also  plainly  suggested  by  the  recent  past:  so  that 
in  putting  them  into  the  mouth  of  Kleon,  we  are  only  supposing 
him  to  read  the  lesson  open  before  his  eyes. 

Now  since  the  war-policy  of  Kleon,  taken  at  this  moment  after  the 
expiration  of  the  One  year's  truce,  may  be  thus  shown  to  be  not  only 
more  comformable  to  the  genius  of  Perikles,  but  also  founded  on  a 
juster  estimate  of  events  both  past  and  future,  than  the  peace-policy 
of  Nikias,  what  are  we  to  say  to  the  historian,  who,  without  refut- 
ing such  presumptions,  every  one  of  which  is  deduced  from  his 
own  narrative — nay,  without  even  indicating  their  existence — 
merely  tells  us  that  "  Kleon  opposed  the  peace  in  order  that  he 
might  cloak  dishonest  intrigues  and  find  matter  for  plausible  crimi- 
nation"? We  cannot  but  say  of  this  criticism,  with  profound  regret 
that  such  words  must  be  pronounced  respecting  any  judgment  of 
Thucydides,  that  it  is  harsh  aud  unfair  toward  Kleon,  and  careless 
in  regard  to  truth  and  the  instruction  of  his  readers.  It  breathes  not 
that  same  spirit  of  honorable  impartiality  which  pervades  his  general 
history.  It  is  an  interpolation  by  the  offlceirwhose  improvidence  had 
occasioned  to  his  countrymen  the  fatal  loss  of  Amphipolis,  retaliating 
upon  the  citizen  who  justly  accused  him.  It  is  conceived  in  the  same 
tone  as  his  unaccountable  judgment  in  the  matter  of  Sphakteria. 


730  TRUCE  FOR  ONE  YEAR. 

Rejecting  on  this  occasion  the  judgment  of  Thucydides,  wo  may 
confidently  affirm  thai  Kleon  hail  rational  public  grounds  for  urging 
hi-  countrymen  in  undertake  w  ith  energy  the  reccmquesl  of  Amphip- 
oiis.  Demagogue  ami  leather-aelle-r  though  he  was.  he  stands  here 
honorably  distinguished,  as  well  from  the  (lameness  and  inaction  of 
MUias.  who  grasped  at  peace  wiih  hasty  credulity,  through  sickness 

of  the  efforts  of   war,  as   from  the   restless  movement,  anil   novelties, 

not  merely  unprofitable,  hut  ruinous,  which  we  shall  presently  find 
springing  tip  under  the  auspices  of  Alkii>iad<  s.  Perikles  had  said  to 
his  countrymen,  at  a  time  when  they  were  enduring- all  the  miseries 
of  pestilence,  and  wire  m  a  state  of  despondency  even  greater  than 
that  which  prevailed  in  B.C.  12'J — "  You  hold  your  empire  and  your 
proud  position  by  the  condition  of  being  willing  to  encounter  cost, 
fatigue,  and  danger:  abstain  from  all  views  of  enlarging  the  empire, 
but  think  no  effort  too  great  to  maintain  it  unimpaired.— To  lose 
what  we  have  once  not,  is  more  disgraceful  than  to  fail  in  attempts  at. 

acquisition."    The  very  same  language  was  probably  held  by  Kleon 

when  exhorting  his  countrymen  to  an  expedition  for  the  reconquot 
of  Amphipolis.  Bui  whin  uttered  by  him,  it  would  have  a  very 
different  effect  from  that  which  it  had  formely  produced  when  held 
by  Perikles — and  different  also  from  that  which  it  would  now  have 
produced  if  held  by  Nikias.  The  entire  peace  party  would  n  puiliate 
it  when  it  came  from  Kleon — partly  out  of  dislike  to  the  speaker, 
partly  from  conviction,  doubtless  felt  by  every  one,  that  an  ex- 
pedition against  Brasidas  would  be  a  hazardous  and  painful  service 
to  all  concerned  iu  it,  general  as  well  as  soldiers — partly  also  from 
a  persuasion,  sincerely  entertained  at  the  time  though  afterward 
proved  to  be  illusory  by  the  result,  that  Amphipolis  might  really  be 
got  back  through  peace  with  the  Lacediemonians. 

If  Kleon,  in  proposing  the  expedition,  originally  proposed  himself 
as  the  commander,  a  new  ground  of  objection,  and  a  very  forcible 
ground,  would  thus  be  furnished.  Since  everything  which  Kleon 
does  is  understood  to  be  a  manifestation  of  some  vicious  or  silly 
attribute,  we  are  told  that  this  was  an  instance  of  his  absurd  pre- 
sumption, arising  out  of  the  success  of  Pylus,  and  persuading  him 
that  he  was  the  only  general  who  could  put  down  Brasidas.  But  if 
the  success  at  Pylus  had  really  tilled  him  with  such  overweening 
military  conceit,  it  is  most  unaccountable  that  he  should  not  have 
procured  for  himself  some  command  during  the  year  which  imme- 
diately succeeded  the  affair  at  Sphakteria — the  eighth  year  of  the 
war:  a  season  of  most  active  warlike  enterprise,  when  his  pre- 
sumption and  influence  arising  out  of  the  Sphakterian  victory  must 
have  been  fresh  ami  glowing.  As  he  obtained  no  command  during 
this  immediately  succeeding  period,  we  may  fairly  doubt  whether 
he  ever  really  conceived  such  excessive  personal  presumption  of  his 
own  talents  for  war,  and  w  lather  Lie  did  not  retain  after  the  affair  of 
Sphakteria  the  same  character  which  he  had  manifested  iu  that  affair 


KLEON  AS  GENERAL.  731 

^—reluctance  to  engage  in  military  expeditions  himself,  and  a  dis- 
position to  see  them  commanded  as  well  as  carried  on  by  others.  It 
is  by  no  means  certain  that  Kleon,  in  proposing  the  expedition  against 
Amphipolis,  originally  proposed  to  take  the  command  of  it  himself : 
I  think  it  at  least  equally  probable  that  his  original  wish  was  to 
induce  Nikias  or  the  Strategi  to  take  the  command  of  it,  as  in  the 
case  of  Sphakteria.  Nikias  doubtless  opposed  the  expedition  as  much 
as  he  could.  When  it  was  determined  by  the  people,  in  spite  of  his 
opposition,  he  would  peremptorily  decline  the  command  for  himself, 
and  would  do  all  he  could  to  force  it  upon  Kleon,  or  at  least  would 
be  better  pleased  to  see  it  under  his  command  than  under  that  of  any 
one  else.  He  would  be  not  less  glad  to  exonerate  himself  from  a 
dangerous  service,  than  to  see  his  rival  entangled  in  it.  And  he 
would  have  before  him  the  same  alternative  which  he  and  his  friends 
had  contemplated  with  so  much  satisfaction  in  the  affair  of  Sphak- 
teria; either  the  expedition  would  succeed,  in  which  case  Amphip- 
olis would  be  taken — or  it  would  fail,  and  the  consequence  would  be 
the  ruin  of  Kleon.  The  last  of  the  two  was  really  the  more  probable 
at  Amphipolis — as  Nikias  had  erroneously  imagined  it  to  be  at  Sphak- 
teria. 

It  is  easy  to  see,  however,  that  an  expedition  proposed  under  these 
circumstances  by  Kleon,  though  it  might  command  a  majority  in  the 
public  assembly,  would  have  a  large  proportion  of  the  citizens  unfa- 
vorable to  it,  and  even  wishing  that  it  might  fail.  Moreover,  Kleon 
had  neither  talents  nor  experience  for  commanding  an  army;  so  that 
the  being  engaged  under  his  command  in  fighting  against  the  ablest 
officer  of  the  time,  could  inspire  no  confidence  to  any  man  in  putting 
on  his  armor.  From  all  these  circumstances  united,  political  as  well 
as  military,  we  are  not  surprised  to  hear  that  the  hoplites  whom  he 
took  out  with  him  went  with  much  reluctance.  An  ignorant  general 
with  unwilling  soldiers,  many  of  them  politically  disliking  him, 
stood  little  chance  of  wresting  Amphipolis  from  Brasidas.  But  had 
Nikias  or  the  Strategi  done  their  duty  and  carried  the  entire  force  of 
the  city  under  competent  command  to  the  same  object,  the  issue  would 
probably  have  been  different  as  to  gain  and  loss — certainly  very  dif- 
ferent as  to  dishonor. 

Kleon  started  from  Peirasus,  apparently  toward  the  beginning  of 
August,  with  1200  Athenian,  Lemnian,  and  Imbrian  hoplites,  and 
300  horsemen — troops  of  excellent  quality  and  condition;  besides  an 
auxiliary  force  of  allies  (number  not  exactly  known)  and  thirty 
triremes.  This  armament  was  not  of  magnitude  at  all  equal  to  the 
taking  of  Amphipolis;  for  Brasidas  had  equal  numbers,  besides  all 
the  advantages  of  the  position.  But  it  was^a  part  of  the  scheme  of 
Kleon,  on  arriving  at  Eion,  to  procure  Macedonian  and  Thracian 
re-enforcements  before  he  commenced  his  attack.  He  first  halted  in 
his  voyage  near  Skione,  from  which  place  he  took  away  such  of  the 
hoplites  as  could  be  spared  from  the  blockade.    He  next  sailed  across 


732  TRUCE   FOR  ONE   YEAR. 

the  ( lulf  from  Pallene  to  the  Sithonian  peninsula,  to  a  place  called  the 
Harhor  of  the  Kolophonians  near  Torone.  Saving  here  learnt  that 
neither  Brasidas  himself  nor  any  considerable  Peloponnesian  garrison 
were  presenl  in  Torone,  he  landed  his  forces,  and  marched  to  attack 
the  town— sending  ten  trireme-  at  the  same  time  round  a  promontory 
which  separated  the  harhor  of  the  Kolophonians  from  Torone  io 
assail  the  latter  place  from  seaward. 

It  happened  thai  Brasidas,  desiring  to  enlarge  the  fortified  circle  of 
Torone,  had  broken  down  a  portion  of  the  old  wall  and  employed 
the  materials  in  building  a  new  and  larger  wall  inclosing  the  proas- 
teion  or  suburb.  This  new  wall  appeals  to  have  been  still  incom 
plete  and  in  an  imperfect  state  of  defense.  Pasitelidas,  the  Pclopon 
nesian  commander,  resisted  the  attack  of  the  Athenians  as  long  as  be 

could;  hut  when  already  beginning  to  give  way,  he  saw  the  ten  Athe 
nian  triremes  sailing  into  the  harbor,  which  was  hardly  guarded  at  ail. 
Abandoning  the  defense  of  the  suburb,  he  hastened"  to  repel  these 
new  assailants,  but  came  too  late,  so  thai  the  town  was  entered  from 
both  sides  at  once.  Brasidas,  who  was  not  far  off,  rendered  aid  with 
the  utmost  celerity,  but  was  yet  at  five  miles'  distance  from  the  citj  . 
when  he  learnt  the  capture  and  was  obliged  to  retire  unsuccessfully. 
Pasitelidas,  the  commander,  with  the  Peloponnesian  garrison  and 
the  Toronsean  male  population,  were  dispatched  as  prisoners  to 
Athens;  while  the  Toromean  women  and  children,  by  a  fate  but  loo 
common  in  those  days,  were  sold  as  slaves. 

Aiter  this  not  unimportant  success,  Kleon  sailed  round  the  prom- 
ontory of  Athos  to  Eion  at  the  mouth  of  the  Strymon,  within  three 
miles  of  Amphipolis.  From  hence,  in  execution  of  his  original 
scheme,  he  sent  envoys  to  Ferdikkas,  urging  him  to  lend  effective 
aid  as  the  ally  of  Athens  in  the  attack  of  Amphipolis  with  his  whole 
Paces;  and  to  Folles,  the  king  of  the  Thracian  Odomantes,  inviting 
him  also  to  come  with  as  many  Thracian  mercenaries  as  could  be 
levied.  The  Edonians,  the  Thracian  tribe  nearest  to  Amphipolis, 
took  part  with  Brasidas.  The  local  influence  of  the  banished  Thueyd- 
ides  would  no  longer  be  at  the  service  of  Athens— much  less  at  the 
service  of  Kleon.  Awaiting  the  expected  re-enforcements,  Kleon 
employed  himself,  first  in  an  attack  upon  Stageirus  in  the  Btrymonic 
Gulf,  which  was  repulsed;  next  upon  Galepsus,  on  the  coast  opposite 
the  island  of  Thasos,  which  was  successful.  But  the  re-enforcements 
did  not,  at  once  arrive,  and  being  too  weak  to  attack  Amphipolis 
without  them,  he  was  obliged  to  remain  inactive  at  Eion;  while 
Brasidas  on  his  side  made  no  movement  out  of  Amphipolis.  but  COI 
tented  himself  with  keeping  constant  watch  over  the  forces  of  Kleon, 
the  view  of  which  he  commanded  from  his  station  on  the  hill  of 
Kerdylion,  on  the  western  bank  of  the  river,  communicating  with 
Amphipolis  by  the  bridge.  Home  days  elapsed  in  such  inaction  on 
both  sides.  But  the  Athenian  hoplites,  becoming  impatient  of  doing 
nothing,  soon  began  to  give  vent  to  those  feelings  of  dislike  which 


SITE  OF  AMPHIPOLIS.  733 

they  had  brought  out  from  Athens  against  their  general,  "whose 
Ignorance  and  cowardice  (says  the  historian)  they  contrasted  with  the 
skill  anil  bravery  of  his  opponent."  Athenian  hoplitcs,  if  they  felt 
such  a  sentiment,  were  not  likely  to  refrain  from  manifesting  it.  And 
Kleon  was  presently  made  aware  of  the  fact  in  a  manner  sufficiently 
painful  to  force  him  against  his  will  into  some  movement;  which, 
however,  he  did  not  intend  to  be  anything  else  than  a  march  for  the 
purpose  of  surveying  the  ground  all  round  the  city,  and  a  demonstra- 
tion to  escape  the  appearance  of  doing  nothing — being  aware  that  it 
was  impossible  to  attack  the  place  with  any  effect  before  his  re-en- 
forcements arrived. 

To  comprehend  the  important  incidents  which  followed,  it  is  nec- 
essary to  say  a  few  words  on  the  topography  of  Amphipolis,  as  far 
as  we  can  understand  it  on  the  imperfect  evidence  before  us.  That 
city  was  placed  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Strymon,  on  a  conspicuous 
hill  around  which  the  river  makes  a  bend,  first  in  a  south-westerly 
direction,  then,  after  a  short  course  to  the  southward,  back  in  a 
south-easterly  direction.  Amphipolis  had  for  its  only  artificial  forti- 
fication one  long  wall,  which  began  near  the  point  north-east  of  the 
town  where  the  river  narrows  again  into  a  channel,  after  passing 
through  the  lake  Kerkinitis — ascended  along  the  eastern  side  of  the 
hill,  crossing  the  ridge  which  connects  it  with  Mount  Paugseus — and 
then  descended  so  as  to  touch  the  river  again  at  another  point  south 
of  the  town — thus  being,  as  it  were,  a  string  to  the  highly-bent  bow 
formed  by  the  river.  On  three  sides,  north,  west,  and  south,  the 
city  was  defended  only  by  the  Strymon.  It  was  thus  visible  without 
any  intervening  wall  to  spectators  from  the  side  of  the  sea  (south),  as 
well  as  from  the  side  of  the  continent  (or  west  and  north).  At  some 
little  distance  below  the  point  where  the  wall  touched  the  river  south 
of  the  city,  was  the  bridge,  a  communication  of  great  importance  for 
the  whole  country,  which  connected  the  territory  of  Amphipolis  with 
that  of  Argilus.  On  the  western  or  right  bank  of  the  river,  border- 
ing it  and  forming  an  outer  bend  corresponding  to  the  bend  of  the 
river,  was  situated  Mount  Kerdylium.  In  fact  the  course  of  the 
Strymon  is  here  determined  bjT  these  two  steep  eminences,  Kerdylium 
on  the  west  and  the  hill  of  Amphipolis  on  the  east,  between  which  it- 
flows.  At  the  time  when  Brasidas  first  took  the  place,  the  bridge 
was  totally  unconnected  with  the  long  city  wall.  But  during  the 
intervening  eighteen  months  he  had  erected  a  palisade  work  (prob- 
ably an  earthen  bank  topped  with  a  palisade)  connecting  the  two. 
By  means  of  this  palisade  the  bridge  was  thus  at  the  time  of  Kleon's 
expedition  comprehended  within  the  foitifications  of  the  city;  so 
that  Brasidas,  while  keeping  watch  on  Mount  Kerdylium,  could  pass 
over  whenever  he  chose  into  the  city  without'impediment. 

In  the  march  which  Kleon  now  undertook,  he  went  up  to  the  top 
of  the  ridge  (which  runs  nearly  in  an  easterly  direction  from  Amphip- 
olis to  Mount  Pangseus)  in  order  to  survey  the  city  and  its  adjoining 


734  TRUCE  FOR  ONE  YEAR 

ground  on  the  northern  and  north-cistern  side,  which  lie  had  not 
y\  seen;  that  is,  the  side  toward  the  lake,  and  toward  Thrace  - 
which  was  nol   visible   from   the  lower   ground   near    Ellon.     The 

road  which  he  was  to  lake  from  Lion  lay  at  a  small  distance  east- 
ward of  the  city  long  wall,  and  froin  the  palisade  which  con- 
nected thai  wall  with  the  bridge.  But  he  bad  no  expectation  of 
being  attacked  in  his  march — the  rather  as  Brasidas  with  the  larger 
portion  of  his  tone  was  visible  on  Mount  Kerdylium,  Moreover  the 
gates  of  Amphipolis  were  all  shut — not  a  man  was  on  the  wall— nor 
were  many  symptoms  of  movement  to  be  detected.  Asthere  was  do 
evidence  before  him  of  intention  to  attack,  lie  took  no  precautions, 
and  marched  in  careless   and  disorderly  array.      Having  reached  the 

top  of  the  ridge,  and  posted  his  army  on  the  strong  eminence  fronting 
the  highest  portion  of  the  Long  Wall,  be  surveyed  at  leisure  the  lake 
before  him,  and  the  side  of  the  city  which  lay  toward  Thrace — or 
toward  Myrkinus,  Drabeskus,  etc — thus  viewing  all  the  descending 
portion  of  the  Long  "Wall  northward  toward  the  Strymon.  The  per- 
fect quiescence  of  the  city  imposed  upon  and  even  astonished  him, 
1:  seemed  altogether  undefended,  and  he  almost  fancied  that  if  he 
had  brought  battering  engines,  he  could  have  taken  it  forthwith. 
Impressed  with  the  belief  that  there  was  no  enemy  prepared  to  light, 
he  took  his  time  to  survey  the  ground;  while  his  soldiers  became 
more  and  more  relaxed  am!  careless  in  their  trim — some  even  advanc- 
ing close  up  to  the  walls  and  gates. 

But  this  state  of  affairs  was  soon  materially  changed.  Brasidas, 
knowing  that  the  Athenian  hoplites  would  not  long  endure  the  tedium 
of  absolute  inaction,  calculated  that  by  affecting  exteme  backward- 
ness and  apparent  fear,  he  should  seduce  Kleon  into  some  incautious 
movement,  of  which  advantage  might  be  taken.  His  station  on  Mount 
Kerdylium  enabled  him  to  watch  the  march  of  the  Athenian  army 
from  Eion,  and  when  he  saw  them  pass  up  along  the  road  outside 
of  the  long  wall  of  Amphipolis,  he  immediately  crossed  the  river  with 
his  forces  and  entered  the  town.  But  it  was  not  his  intention  to 
march  out  and  offer  them  open  battle.  For  his  army,  though  equal 
in  number  to  theirs,  was  extremely  inferior  inarms  and  equipment; 
in  which  points  the  Athenian  force  now  present  was  so  admirably  pro- 
vided, that  his  own  men  would  not  think  themselves  a  match  for  it, 
if  the  two  armies  faced  each  other  in  open  field.  He  relied  altogether 
on  the  effect  of  sudden  sally  and  well-timed  surprise,  when  the  Athe- 
nians should  have  been  thrown  into  a  feeling  of  contemptuous  secur- 
ity by  an  exaggerated  show  of  impotence  in  their  enemy. 

Having  offered  the  battle  sacrifice  at  the  temple  of  Athene,  Brasi- 
lia- called  his  men  together  to  address  to  them  the  usual  encourage- 
ments prior  to  an  engagement.  After  appealing  to  the  Dorian  pride  of 
his  Peloponnesians,  accustomed  to  triumph  over  Ionians,  he  explained 
to  them  his  design  of  relying  upon  a  bold  and  sudden  movement  with 
comparatively  small  numbers,  against  the  Athenian  army  when  not 


KLEON  TRIES  TO   EFFECT  HIS  RETREAT.       735 

prepared  for  it — when  their  courage  was  not  wound  up  to  battle  pitch 
— and  when,  after  carelessly  mounting  the  hill  to  survey  the  ground, 
they  were  thinking  only  of  quietly  returning  to  quarters.  He  him- 
self at  the  proper  moment  would  rush  out  from  one  gate,  and  be  fore- 
most in  conflict  with  the  enemy.  Klearidas,  with  that  bravery  which 
became  him  as  a  Spartan,  would  follow  the  example  by  sallying  out 
from  another  gate;  and  the  enemy,  taken  thus  unawares,  would  prob- 
ably make  little  resistance.  For  the  Amphipolitans,  this  day  and 
their  own  behavior  would  determine  whether  they  were  to  be  allies  of 
Lacedaemon,  or  slaves  of  Athens — perhaps  sold  into  captivity,  or  even 
put  to  death,  as  a  punishment  for  their  recent  revolt. 

These  preparations,  however,  could  not  be  completed  in  secrecy. 
Brasidas  and  his  army  were  perfectly  visible  while  descending  the  hill 
of  Kerdvlium,  crossing  the  bridge  and  entering  Amphipolis,  to  the 
Athenian  scouts  without.  Moreover,  so  conspicuous  was  the  interior 
of  the  city  to  spectators  without,  that  the  temple  of  Athene,  and  Bra- 
sidas with  its  ministers  around  him  performing  the  ceremony  of  sacri- 
fice, was  distinctly  recognized.  The  fact  was  made  known  to  Kleon 
as  he  stood  on  the  high  ridge  taking  his  survey,  while  at  the  same 
time  those  who  had  gone  near  to  the  gates  reported  that  the  feet  of 
many  horses  and  men  were  beginning  to  be  seen  under  them,  as  if 
preparing  for  a  sally.  He  himself  went  close  to  the  gate,  and  satis- 
fled  himself  of  the  circumstance :  we  must  recollect  that  there  was  no 
defender  on  the  walls,  nor  any  danger  from  missiles.  Anxious  to 
avoid  coming  to  any  real  engagement  before  his  re-enforcements 
should  arrive,  he  at  once  gave  orders  for  retreat,  which  he  thought 
might  be  accomplished  before  the  attack  from  within  could  be  fully 
organized.  For  he  imagined  that  a  considerable  number  of  troops 
would  be  marched  out,  and  ranged  in  battle  order,  before  the  attack 
was  actually  begun — not  dreaming  that  the  sally  would  be  instanta- 
neous, made  with  a  mere  handful  of  men.  Orders  having  been  pro- 
claimed to  wheel  to  the  left,  and  retreat  in  column  on  the  left  flank 
toward  Eion,  Kleon,  who  was  himself  on  the  top  of  the  hill  with  the 
right  wing,  waited  only  to  see  his  left  and  center  actually  in  march 
on  the  road  to  Eion,  and  then  directed  his  right  also  to  wheel  to  the 
left  and  follow  them. 

The  whole  Athenian  army  were  thus  in  full  retreat,  marching  in 
a  direction  nearly  parallel  to  the  Long  Wall  of  Amphipolis,  with 
their  right  or  unshielded  side  exposed  to  the  enemy — when  Brasidas, 
looking  over  the  southernmost  gates  of  the  Long  Wall  with nis*mall 
detachment  ready  marshaled  near  him,  burst  out  into  contemptuous 
exclamations  on  the  disorder  of  their  array.  "These  men  will  not 
stand  us:  I  see  it  by  the  quivering  of  their  spears  and  of  their  heads. 
Men  who  reel  about  in  that  way  never  stand  an  assailing  enemy. 
Open  the  gates  for  me  instantly,  and  let  us  sally  out  with  confi- 
dence." 

With  that,  both  the  gate  of  the  Long  Wall  nearest  to  the  palisade, 


736  TRUCE  FOR  ONE  YEAR. 

and  the  adjoining  gate  of  the  palisade  itself,  were  suddenly  thrown 
open,  and  Brasidas  with  his  150  clioseu  soldiers  issued  through  them 
to  attack  the  retreating  Athenians.  Running  rapidly  down  the 
straight  road  which  joined  laterally  the  mad  toward  Eion  along 
which  the  Athenians  wen-  marching,  be  charged  their  central  divis- 
ion on  the  righl  flank.  Their  left  wing  had  already  got  beyond  him 
on  the  road  inward  Eion.  Taken  completely  unprepared,  conscious 
of  their  own  disorderly  array,  and  astounded  at  the  boldness  of  their 
enemy— the  Athenians  of  the  center  were  seized  with  panic,  made 
not  the  least  resistance,  and  presently  tied.  Even  the  Athenian  left, 
though  not  attacked  at  all,  instead  of  halting  to  lend  assistance, 
shared  the  panic  and  tied  in  disorder.  Having  thus  disorganized  this 
part  of  the  army,  Brasidas  passed  along  the  line  to  press  his  attack 
on  the  Athenian  right:  but  in  this  movement  he  was  mortally 
wounded  and  carried  off  the  field  unobserved  by  his  enemies. 
Meanwhile  Klearidas,  sallying  forth  from  the  Thracian  gate,  had 
attacked  the  Athenian  right  on  the  ridge  opposite  to  him,  immedi- 
ately alter  it  began  its  retreat.  But  the  soldiers  on  the  Athenian 
right  had  probably  seen  the  previous  movement  of  Brasidas  against 
the  other  division,  and  though  astonished  at  the  sudden  danger,  had 
thus  a  moment's  warning,  before  they  were  themselves  assailed,  to 
halt  and  form  on  the  hill.  Klearidas  here  found  aconsiderable  resist- 
ance, in  spite  of  the  desertion  of  Kleon;  who,  more  astounded  than 
any  man  in  his  army  by  a  catastrophe  so  unlooked  for,  lost  his  pres- 
ence of  mind  and  fled  at  once;  but  was  overtaken  by  a  Thracian 
peltast  from  Myrkinus,  and  slain.  His  soldiers  on  the  right  wing, 
however,  repelled  two  or  three  attacks  in  front  from  Klearidas,  and 
maintained  their  ground,  until  at  length  the  Chalkidian  cavalry  and 
the  peltasts  from  Myrkinus,  having  come  forth  out  of  the  gates, 
assailed  them  with  missiles  in  Hank  and  rear  so  as  to  throw  them  into 
disorder.  The  whole  Athenian  army  was  thus  put  to  flight;  the  left 
hurrying  to  Eion,  the  men  of  the  right  dispersing  and  seeking  safety 
among  the  hilly  grounds  of  Pan gams  in  their  rear.  Their  sufferings 
and  loss  in  the  retreat,  from  the  hands  of  the  pursuing  peltasts  and 
cavalry,  were  most  severe.  When  they  at  last  again  mustered  at 
Eion,  not  only  the  commander  Kleon,  but  600  Athenian  hoplites, 
half  of  the  force  sent  out,  were  found  missing. 

So  admirably  had  the  attack  been  concerted,  and  so  entire  was  its 
success,  that  only  seven  men  perished  on  the  side  of  the  victors.  But 
of  those  seven,  one  was  the  gallant  Brasidas  himself,  who  being 
carried  into  Amphipolis,  lived  just  long  enough  to  learn  the  complete 
victory  of  his  troops  and  then  expired.  Great  and  bitter  was  the 
sorrow  which  his  death  occasioned  throughout  Thrace,  especially 
among  the  Amphipolitans.  He  received,  by  special  decree,  the  dis- 
tinguished honor  of  interment  within  their  city — the  universal  habit 
being  to  inter  even  the  most  eminent  deceased  persons  in  a  suburb 
without  the  walls.    All  the  allies  attended  his  funeral,  in  arms  and  with 


REMARKS  ON  THE  BATTLE  OF  AMPHIPOLIfi.     737 

military  honors.     His  tomb  was  encircled  by  a  railing,  and  the  space 

immediately  fronting  it  was  consecrated  as  the  great  agora  of  the  city, 
which  was  remodeled  accordingly.  He  was  also  proclaimed  (Ekist  or 
Founder  of  Amphipolis,  and  as  such,  received  heroic  worship  with 
annual  games  and  sacrifices  to  his  honor.  The  Athenian  Agnon,  the 
real  founder  and  originally  recognized  ffikist  of  the  city,  was  stripped 
of  all  his  commemorative  honors  and  expunged  from  the  remem- 
brance of  the  people;  the  buildings,  which  served  as  visible  memento 
of  his  name,  being  destroyed.  Full  of  hatred  as  the  Amphipolitans 
now  were  toward  Athens — and  not  merely  of  hatred,  but  of  fear, 
since  the  loss  which  they  had  just  sustained  of  their  saviour  and  pro- 
tector— they  felt  repugnance  to  the  idea  of  rendering  farther  worship 
to  an  Athenian  (Ekist.  It  was  inconvenient  to  keep  up  such  a 
religious  link  with  Athens,  now  that  they  were  forced  to  look 
anxiously  to  Lacedaemon  for  assistance.  Klearidas,  as  governor  of 
Amphipolis,  superintended  those  numerous  alterations  in  the  city 
which  this  important  change  required,  together  with  the  erection  of 
the  trophy,  just  at  the  spot  where  Brasidas  had  first  charged  the 
Athenians;  while  the  remaining  armament  of  Athens,  having  obtained 
the  usual  truce  and  buried  their  dead,  returned  home  without  farther 
operations. 

There  are  few  battles  recorded  in  history  wherein  the  disparity  and 
contrast  of  the  two  generals  opposed  has  been  so  manifest — consummate 
skill  and  courage  on  the  one  side  against  ignorance  and  panic  on  the 
other.  On  the  singular  ability  and  courage  of  Brasidas  there  can  be 
but  one  verdict  of  unqualified  admiration.  But  the  criticism  passed 
by  Thucydides  on  Kleon,  here  as  elsewhere,  cannot  be  adopted 
without  reserves.  He  tells  us  that  Kleon  undertook  his  march,  from 
Eion  up  to  the  hill  in  front  of  Amphipolis,  in  the  same  rash  and  con- 
fident spirit  with  which  he  had  embarked  on  the  enterprise  against 
Pylus — in  the  blind  confidence  that  no  one  would  resist  him.  "Now 
I  have  already,  in  a  former  chapter,  shown  grounds  for  concluding 
that  the  anticipations  of  Kleon  respecting  the  capture  of  Sphakteria, 
far  from  being  marked  by  any  spirit  of  unmeasured  presump- 
tion, were  sober  and  judicious — realized  to  the  letter  without  any 
unlooked-for  aid  from  fortune.  The  remarks  here  made  by  Thucyd- 
ides on  that  affair  are  not  more  reasonable  than  the  judgment  on 
it  in  his  former  chapter;  for  it  is  not  true  (as  he  here  implies)  that 
Kleon  expected  no  resistance,  in  Sphakteria — he  calculated  on  resist- 
ance, but  knew  that  he  had  force  sufficient  to  overcome  it.  His 
fault  even  at  Amphipolis,  great  as  that  fault  was,  did  not  consist  in 
rashness  and  presumption.  This  charge  at  least  is  rebutted  by  the 
circumstance,  that  he  himself  wished  to  make  no  aggressive  move- 
ment until  his  re-enforcements  should  arrive — and  that  he  was  only 
constrained,  against  his  own  will,  to  abandon  his  intended  temporary 
inactivity  during  that  interval,  by  the  angry  murmurs  of  his  soldiers, 
who  reproached  him  with  ignorance  and  backwardness — the  latter 
H.  G.  11—24 


738  TRUCE  FOR  ONE  YEAH. 

quality  being  the  reverse  of  that  with  which  he  is  branded  by  Thu- 
cydides. 

\\  lien  Kleon  was  thus  driven  to  do  something,  his  march  up  to  the 
top  of  the  lull,  for  tin-  purpose  of  reconnoitering  the  ground,  was  not 
in  itself  ill-judged,  h  might  have  been  accomplished  in  perfect 
safety  if  he  bad  kepi  bis  army  in  orderly  array,  prepared  for  contin- 
gencies. Hut  lie  Buffered  himself  t<>  be  outgeneraled  and  over- 
reached by  thai  simulated  consciousness  of  impotence  and  unwilling- 
ness to  fight  which  Brasidas  took  care  bo  present  to  him.  Among 
all  military  stratagems,  this  lias  perhaps  been  the  most  frequently 
practiced  with  success  against  inexperienced  generals;  \\  ho  are  thrown 
off  their  guard  and  induced  to  aeglect  precaution,  not  because  they 
are  naturally  more  rash  or  presumptuous  than  ordinary  men,  hut 
because  nothing  except,  either  a   high    older   of  intellect,  or  special 

practice  and  training,  will  enable  a  man  to  keep  steadily  presenl  to 
his  mind  liabilities  even  real  and  serious,  when  there  is  no  discernible 
evidence  to  suggesl  their  approach — much  more  when  there  &  posi- 
tive evidence,  artfully  laid  out  by  a  superior  enemy,  to  create  belief 
in  their  absence.  A  fault  substantially  the  same  had  been  committed 
by  Thucydides  himself  and  his  colleague  Eukles  a  year  and  a  half 
before,  when  they  suffered  Brasidas  to  surprise  the  Strvnionian 
bridge  and  Amphipolis;  not  even  taking  common  precautions,  nor 
thinking  it  u<  c<  ssary  to  keep  the  fleet  at  Eion.  They  were  not  men 
peculiarly  rash  and  presumptuous,  but  ignorant  and  unpracticed,  in 
a  military  sense;  incapable  of  keeping  before  them  dangerous  con- 
tingencies which  they  perfectly  knew,  simply  because  there  was  no 
present  evidence  of  approaching  explosion. 

This  military  incompetence,  which  made  Kleon  fall  into  the  trap 
laid  for  him  by  Brasidas,  also  made  him  take  wrong  measures  against 
the  danger,  when  he  unexpectedly  discovered  at  last  that  the  enemy 
within  were  preparing  to  attack  him.  His  fatal  error  consisted  in 
giving  instant  order  for  retreat,  under  the  vain  hope  that  he  could 
get  away  before  the  enemy's  attack  could  be  brought  to  bear.  An 
abler  officer,  before  he  commenced  the  retreating  march  so  close  to 
the  hostile  walls,  would  have  taken  care  to  marshal  his  men  in 
proper  array,  to  warn  and  address  them  with  the  usual  harangue, 
and  to  wind  up  their  courage  to  the  fighting-point.  Up  to  that 
moment  they  had  no  idea  of  beina;  called  upon  to  fight;  and  the 
courage  of  Grecian  hoplitcs — taken  thus  unawares  while  hurrying  to 
get  away  in  disorder  visible  both  to  themselves  and  their  enemies, 
without  any  of  the  usual  preliminaries  of  battle — was  but  too  apt  to 
prove  deficient.  To  turn  the  right  or  unshielded  flank  to  the  enemy 
Avas  unavoidable,  from  the  direction  of  the  retreating  movement;  nor 
is  it  reasonable  to  blame  Kleon  for  this,  as  some  historians  have 
done — or  for  causing  his  right  wing  to  move  too  soon  in  following 
the  lead  of  the  left,  as  Dr.  Arnold  seems  to  think.  The  grand  fault 
seems  to  have  consisted  in  not  waiting  to  marshal  his  men  and  pre- 


FAULTS  OF  KLEON.  739 

pare  them  for  standing  fight  during  their  retreat.  Let  us  add,  however 
—and  the  remark,  if  it  serves  to  explain  Kleon's  idea  of  being  able  to 
get  away  before  he  was  actually  assailed,  counts  as  a  double  compli- 
ment to  the  judgment  as  well  as  boldness  of  Brasidas — that  no  other 
Lacedaemonian  general  of  that  day  (perhaps  not  even  Demosthenes, 
the  most  enterprising  general  of  Athens)  would  have  ventured  upon 
an  attack  with  so  very  smali  a  band,  relying  altogether  upon  the  panic 
produced  by  his  sudden  movement. 

But  the  absence  of  military  knowledge  and  precaution  is  not  the 
worst  of  Kleon's  faults  on  this  occasion.  His  want  of  courage  at  the 
moment  of  conflict  is  yet  more  lamentable,  and  divests  his  end  of 
that  personal  sympathy  which  would  otherwise  have  accompanied 
it.  A  commander  who  has  been  out-generaled  is  under  a  double 
force  of  obligation  to  exert  and  expose  himself  to  the  uttermost,  in 
order  to  retrieve  the  consequences  of  his  own  mistakes.  He  will 
thus  at  least  preserve  his  own  personal  honor,  whatever  censure  he 
may  deserve  on  the  score  of  deficient  knowledge  and  judgment. 

What  is  said  about  the  disgraceful  flight  of  Kleon  himself  must  be 
applied,  with  hardly  less  severity  of  criticism,  to  the  Athenian  hop- 
lites  under  him.  They  behaved  in  a  manner  altogether  unworthy  of 
the  reputation  of  their  city;  especially  the  left  wing,  which  seems  to 
have  broken  and  run  away  without  waiting  to  be  attacked.  And 
when  we  read  in  Thucydides  that  the  men  who  thus  disgraced  them- 
selves were  among  the  best  and  the  best-armed  hoplites  in  Athens — 
that  they  came  out  unwillingly  under  Kleon — that  they  began  their 
scornful  murmurs  against  him  before  he  had  committed  any  error, 
despising  him  for  backwardness  when  he  was  yet  not  strong  enough 
to  attempt  anything  serious,  and  was  only  manifesting  a  reasonable 
prudence  in  awaiting  the  arrival  of  expected  re-enforcements — when 
we  read  this,  we  shall  be  led  to  compare  the  expedition  against 
Amphipolis  with  former  artifices  respecting  the  attack  of  Sphakteria, 
and  to  discern  other  causes  for  its  failure  besides  the  military  incom- 
petence of  the  commander.  These  hoplites  brought  out  with  them 
from  Athens  the  feelings  prevalent  among  the  political  adversaries  of 
Kleon.  The  expedition  was  proposed  and  carried  by  him,  contrary 
to  the  wishes  of  these  adversaries.  They  could  not  prevent  it,  but 
their  opposition  enfeebled  it  from  the  beginning,  kept  within  too 
narrow  limits  the  force  assigned,  and  was  one  main  reason  which 
frustrated  its  success. 

Had  Perikles  been  alive,  Amphipolis  might  perhaps  still  have  been 
lost,  since  its  capture  was  the  fault  of  the  officers  employed  to  defend 
it.  But  if  lost,  it  would  probably  have  been  attacked  and  recovered 
with  the  same  energy  as  the  revolted  Samos  had  been;  with  the  full 
force,  and  the  best  generals,  that  Athens  couM  furnish.  With  such 
an  armament  under  good  officers,  there  was  nothing  at  all  impracti- 
cable in  the  reconquest  of  the  place;  especially  as  at  that  time  it  had 
no  defense  on  three  sides  except  the  Strymon,  and  might  thus  be 


7!D  TRUCK  FOR  ONE   FEAR 

approached  by  Athenian  ships  on  thai  navigable  river.  The  arma 
men)  of  Eicon,  even  if  Lis  re  enforcements  bad  arrived,  was  hardly 
sufficient  for  the  purpose.  Bui  Perikles  would  have  been  able  to 
concentrate  upon  ii  the  whole  strength  of  the  city,  without  being 
para  I  \  zed  by  the  contentions  of  political  part]  He  would  have  seen 
as  chail)  as  Kleon  that  the  place  could  only  be  recovered  by  force, 
and  thai  its  recovery  was  the  most  important  object  to  which  Athens 
could  devote  her  energies. 

It  was  thus  thai  the  Athenians,  partly  from  political  intrigue, 
partly  from  the  incompetence  of  Kleon,  underwent  a  disastrous 
defeat  instead  of  carrying  Amphipolis.  But  the  death  of  Brasidas 
converted  their  defeat  into  a  substantial  victory.  There  remained 
no  Spartan,  like  or  second  to  that  eminent  man,  either  as  a  soldier  or 
a  conciliating  politician;  none  who  could  replace  him  in  the  con- 
fidence ami  affection  of  the  allies  of  Alliens  in  Thrace;  none  who 
could  prosecute  those  enterprising  plans  against  Athens  on  her 
unshielded  side,  which  he  had  firs'  shown  to  be  practicable.  With 
him  the  fears  of  Athens,  and  the  hopes  of  Sparta,  in  respect  to  the 
future,  alike  disappeared.  The  Athenian  generals  Phormio  and 
Demosthenes  had  both  of  them  acquired  among  the  Akarnanians  an 
influence  personal  to  themselves,  apart  from  their  post  and  from 
their  country.  But  the  career  of  Brasidas  exhibited  an  extent  of 
personal  ascendency  and  admiration,  obtained  as  well  as  deserved, 
such  as  had  never  before  been  paralleled  by  any  military  chieftain  in 
Greece:  and  Plato  might  well  select  him  as  the  most  suitable  histori- 
cal counterpart  to  the  heroic  Achilles.  All  the  achivements  of  Bra- 
sidas were  his  own  individually,  with  nothing  more  than  bare 
encouragement,  sometimes  even  without  encouragement,  from  his 
country.  And  when  we  recollect  the  strict  and  narrow  routine  in 
which  as  a  Spartan  he  had  been  educated,  so  fatal  to  the  develop- 
ment of  everything  like  original  thought  or  impulse,  and  so  com- 
pletely estranged  from  all  experience  of  party  or  political  discussion — 
we  are  amazed  at  his  resource  and  flexibility  of  character,  his  power 
of  adapting  himself  to  new  circumstances  and  new  persons,  and  his 
felicitous  dexterity  in  making  himself  the  rallying-point  of  opposite 
political  parties  in  each  of  the  various  cities  which  he  acquired.  The 
combination  "of  every  sort  of  practical  excellence" — valor,  intelli- 
gence, probity,  and  gentleness  of  dealing — which  his  character  pre- 
sented, was  never  forgotten  among  the  subject-allies  of  Athens;  and 
procured  for  other  Spartan  officers  in  subsequent  years  favorable 
presumptions,  which  their  conduct  was  seldom  found  to  realize.  At 
the  time  when  Brasidas  perished,  in  the  flower  of  his  age,  he  was 
unquestionably  the  first  man  in  Greece.  And  though  it  is  not 
given  to  us  to  predict  what  he  would  have  become  had  he  lived,  we 
may  be  sure  that  the  future  course  of  the  war  would  have  been  sensibly 
modified,  perhaps  even  to  the  advantage  of  Athens,  since  she  might 


FOREIGN  POLICY  OF  KLEOK  741 

have  had  sufficient  occupation  at  home  to  keep  her  from  undertaking 
her  disastrous  enterprise  in  Sicily. 

Thucydides  seems  to  take  pleasure  in  setting  forth  the  gallant 
exploits  of  Brasidas,  from  the  first  at  Methone  to  the  last  at  Amphipolis 
— not  less  than  the  dark  side  of  Kleon;  both,  though  in  differenl 
senses,  the  causes  of  his  banishment.  He  never  mentions  the  latter 
except  in  connection  with  some  proceeding  represented  as  unwise  or 
discreditable.  The  barbarities  which  the  offended  majesty  of  empire 
thought  itself  entitled  to  practice  in  ancient  times  against  dependen- 
cies revolted  and  reconquered,  reached  their  maximum  in  the  propo- 
sitions against  Mitylene  and  Skione:  both  of  them  are  ascribed  to 
Kleon  by  name  as  their  author.  But  when  we  come  to  the  slaughter 
of  the  Melians — equally  barbarous,  and  worse  in  respect  to  grounds 
of  excuse,  inasmuch  as  the  Melians  had  never  been  subjects  of 
Athens — we  find  Thucydides  mentioning  the  deed  without  naming 
the  proposers. 

Respecting  the  foreign  policy  of  Kleon,  the  facts  already  narrated 
will  enable  the  reader  to  form  an  idea  of  it  as  compared  with  that  of 
his  opponents.  I  have  shown  grounds  for  believing  that  Thucydides 
has  forgotten  his  usual  impartiality  in  criticising  this  personal  enemy; 
that  in  regard  to  Sphakteria,  Kleon  was  really  one  main  and  indis- 
pensable cause  of  procuring  for  his  country  the  greatest  advantage 
which  she  obtained  throughout  the  whole  war;  and  that  in  regard  to 
his  judgment,  as  advocating  the  prosecution  of  war,  three  different 
times  must  be  distinguished — 1.  After  the  first  blockade  of  the  hop- 
lites  in  Sphakteria — 2.  After  the  capture  of  the  island — 3.  After  the 
expiration  of  the  One-year  truce.  On  the  earliest  of  those  three  occa- 
sions, he  was  wrong,  for  he  seems  to  have  shut  the  door  on  all 
possibilities  of  negotiation,  by  his  manner  of  dealing  with  the  Lace- 
daemonian  envoys.  On  the  second  occasion,  he  had  fair  and  plausi- 
.ble  grounds  to  offer  on  behalf  of  his  opinion,  though  it  turned  out 
unfortunate:  moreover,  at  that  time,  all  Athens  was  warlike,  and 
Kleon  is  not  to  be  treated  as  the  peculiar  adviser  of  that  policy.  On 
the  third  and  last  occasion,  after  the  expiration  of  the  truce,  the 
political  counsel  of  Kleon  was  right,  judicious,  and  truly  Periklean 
— much  surpassing  in  wisdom  that  of  his  opponents.  We  shall  see  in 
the  coming  chapters  how  those  opponents  managed  the  affairs  of  the 
state  after  his  death — how  Nikias  threw  away  the  interests  of  Athens 
in  the  enforcement  of  the  conditions  of  peace — how  Nikias  and  Alki- 
biades  together  shipwrecked  the  power  of  their  country  on  the  shores 
of  Syracuse.  And  when  we  judge  the  demagogue  Kleon  in  this  com- 
parison, we  shall  find  ground  for  remarking  that  Thucydides  is 
reserved  and  even  indulgent  toward  the  errors  and  vices  of  other 
statesmen — harsh  only  toward  those  of  his  accuser. 

As  to  the  internal  policy  of  Kleon,  and  his  conduct  as  a  politician 
in  Athenian  constitutional  life,  we  have  but  little  trustworthy  evi- 


742  TRUCE  FOR  ONE  YEAH. 

denes.  There  exists,  indeed,  a  portrait  » >f  him  drawn  in  colors  broad 
ami  glaring — mosl  impressive  to  the  imagination,  and  hardly  efface- 
able  from  the  memory  ;  theportrail  in  the  "Knights"  of  Aristophanes. 
It  is  through  this  representation  thai  Qeon  has  been  transmitted  to 
posterity,  crucified  by  a  poet  who  "admits  himself  to  have  a  personal 
grudge  against  him,  just  aa  he  has  been  commemorated  in  the  prose 
of  an  historian  whose  banishment  he  had  proposed,  <>f  all  the  pro- 
ductions of  Aristophanes,  so  replete  with  comic  genius  throughout, 
the  "  Knights"  is  the  most  consummate  and  irresistibh — the  most 
distinct  in  its  character,  symmetry,  and  purpose;  Looked  at  with  a 
view  to  the  object  of  its  author,  both  in  reference  to  the  audience  and 
to  Kleon.  it  deserves  the  greatest  possible  admiration,  and  we  are  not 
surprised  to  learn  that  it  obtained  the  firsl  prize,  It  displays  the  maxi- 
mum  of  that  which  wit  combined  with  malice  can  achieve,  in  cover- 
ing an  enemy  with  ridicule,  contempt,  and  odium.  Dean  Swift 
could  have  desin  d  nothing  worse,  even  for  Ditton  and  Whiston.  The 
old  man  Demos  of  Pnyx,  introduced  on  the  stage  as  personifying  the 
Athenian  peoph — Kleon.  brought  on  as  his  newly-bought  Paphlago- 

nian  slave,  who  by  coaxing,  lying,  impudent  and   false  denunciation 

of  others,  has  gained  his  master's  car,  and  heaps  ill-usage  upon  even- 
one  else,  while  he  enriches  himself — the  Knights  or  chief  members 
of  what  we  may  call  the  Athenian  aristocracy,  forming  the  chorus  of 
the  piece  asKleou's  pronounced  enemies — the  sausage-seller  from  the 
market  place,  who  instigated  byNikiasand  Demosthenes  along  with 
these  Knights,  overdoes  Kleon  in  all  his  own  low  arts,  and  supplants 
him  in  the  favor  of  Demos — all  this,  exhibited  with  inimitable  vivac- 
ity of  expression,  forms  the  masterpiece  and  glory  of  libelous  comedy. 
The  effect  produced  upon  the  Athenian  audience  when  this  piece 
was  represented  at  the  Lenaean  festival  (January,  b.c.  424,  about  six 
months  after  the  capture  of  Sphakteria),  with  Kleon  himself  and 
most  of  the  real  Knights  present,  must  have  been  intense  beyond 
what  we  can  now  easily  imagine.  That  Kleon  could  maintain  him- 
self after  this  humiliating  exposure,  is  no  small  proof  of  his  mental 
vigor  and  ability.  It  does  not  seem  to  have  impaired  his  influence — 
at  leasl  not  permanently.  For  not  only  do  we  see  him  the  most 
effective  opponentof  peace  during  the  next  two  years,  but  there  is 
ground  for  believing  that  the  poet  himself  found  it  convenient  to 
soften  his  tone  toward  this  powerful  enemy. 

So  ready  are  most  writers  to  find  Kleon  guilty,  that  they  are  satis- 
fied with  Aristophanes  as  a  witness  against  him;  though  no  other 
public  man,  of  any  age  or  nation,  has  ever  been  condemned  upon  such 
evidence.  No  man  thinks  of  judging  Sir  Robert  Walpole,  or  Mr. 
Fox,  or  Mirabeau,  from  the  numerous  lampoons  put  in  circulation 
againsl  them.  No  man  will  take  measure  of  a  political  Englishman 
from  Punch,  or  of  a  Frenchman  from  the  Charivari.  The  unrivali  d 
comic  merit  of  the  "  Knights"  of  Aristophanes  is  only  one  reason  the 
more  for  distrusting  the  resemblance  of  its  picture  to  the  real  Kleon. 


KLEON'S  IMPUTED  VICES.  743 

We  have  means  too  of  testing  the  candor  and  accuracy  of  Aristoph- 
anes hy  his  delineation  of  Sokrates,  whom  he  introduced  in  the 
comedy  of  "  Clouds"  in  the  year  after  that  of  the  "Knighta."  As  a 
comedy,  the  "Clouds"  stands  second  only  to  the  "Knights:"  as  a 
picture  of  Sokrates,  it  is  little  better  than  pure  fancy:  it  is  not  even 
a  caricature,  but  a  totally  different  person.  Wi;  may,  indeed,  per- 
ceive single  features  of  resemblance;  the  bare  feet,  and  the  argumen- 
tative subtlety,  belong  to  both:  but  the  entire  portrait  is  such,  thai  it' 
it  bore  a  different  name,  no  one  would  think  of  comparing  it  with 
Sokrates,  whom  we  know  well  from  other  sources.  With  such  an 
analogy  before  us,  not  to  mention  what  we  know  generally  of  the 
portraits  of  Perikles  by  these  authors,  we  are  not  warranted  in  treat- 
ing the  portrait  of  Kleon  as  a  likeness,  except  on  points  where  there 
is  corroborative  evidence.  And  we  may  add,  that  some  of  the  hits 
against  him,  where  we  can  accidentally  test  their  pertiuence,  are 
decidedly  not  founded  in  fact — as,  for  example,  where  the  poet  accuses 
Kleon  of  having  deliberately  and  cunningly  robbed  Demosthenes  of 
his  laurels  in  the  enterprise  against  Sphakteria. 

In  the  prose  of  Thucydides,  we  find  Kleon  described  as  a  dishonest 
politician — a  wrongful  accuser  of  others — the  most  violent  of  all  the 
citizens.  Throughout  the  verse  of  Aristophanes,  these  same  charges 
are  set  forth  witli  his  characteristic  emphasis,  but  others  are  also 
superadded — Kleon  practices  the  basest  artifices  and  deceptions  to 
gain  favor  with  the  people,  steals  the  public  money,  receives  bribes, 
and  extorts  compositions  from  private  persons  by  wholesale,  and 
thus  enriches  himself  under  pretense  of  zeal  for  the  public  treasury. 
In  the  comedy  of  the  "  Acharuians,"  represented  one  year  earlier  than 
the  "  Knights,"  the  poet  alludes  with  great  delight  to  a  sum  of  five 
talents,  which  Kleon  had  been  compelled  "to  disgorge:"  a  present 
tendered  to  him  by  the  insular  subjects  of  Athens  (if  we  may  believe 
Theopompus)  for  the  purpose  of  procuring  a  remission  of  their  trib- 
ute, and  which  the  Knights,  whose  evasions  of  military  service  he 
had  exposed,  compelled  him  to  relinquish. 

But  when  we  put  together  the  different  heads  of  indictment  accu- 
mulated by  Aristophanes,  it  will  be  found  that  they  are  not  easily 
reconcilable  one  with  the  other.  For  an  Athenian,  whose  temper 
led  him  to  violent  crimination  of  others,  at  the  inevitable  price  of 
multiplying  and  exasperating  personal  enemies,  would  find  it  pecul- 
iarly dangerous,  if  not  impossible,  to  carry  on  peculation  for  his  own 
account.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  he  took  the  latter  turn,  he  would 
be  inclined  to  purchase  connivance  from  others  even  by  winking  at 
real  guilt  on  their  part,  far  from  making  himself  conspicuous  as  a 
calumniator  of  innocence.  We  must  therefore  discuss  the  side  of 
the  indictment  which  is  indicated  in  Thucydides;  not  Kleon  as 
truckling  to  the  people  and  cheating  for  his  own  pecuniary  profit 
(which  is  certainly  not  the  character  implied  in  his  speech  about  the 
Mitylenseans  as  given  to  us  by  the  historian),  but  Kleon  as  a  man  of 


744  TRUCE  FOR  ONE  YEAR. 

violent  temper  and  fierce  political  antipathies — a  bitter  Bpeaker — and 
sometimes  dishonesl  in  bis  calumnies  againsl  adversaries.  These  are 
lalities  which,  in  all  countriesof  tree  debate,  go  to  form  what 
is  called  a  great  opposition  speaker.  It  was  thus  that  the  elder  Cato 
— ''the  universal  biter,  whom  Persephone  was  afraid  even  to  admit 
into  Hades  after  his  di  aili"— was  characterized  at  Rome,  even  1>\  the 
admission  of  bis  admirers  to  some  extent,  and  in  a  still  stronger  man- 
ner ii\  those  who  were  unfriendly  to  him,  as  Thucydides  was  to 
Kleon.  I))  Cato  such  a  temper  was  not  inconsistent  with  a  high  sense 
of  public  duty.  And  Plutarch  recounts  an  anecdote  respecting  Kleon, 
that  on  first" beginning  his  political  career,  he  called  his  friends 
together,  and  dissolved  his  intimacy  with  them,  conceiving  that  pri- 
vate friendships  would  distract  bini  from  bis  paramount  duty  to  the 
commonwealth. 

.Moreover,  the  reputation  of  Kleon,  as  a  frequent  and  unmeasured 
accuser  of  others,  may  be  explained  partly  by  a  passage  of  his  enemy 
Aristophanes:  a  passage  the  nunc  deserving  of  confidence  as  a  just 
representation  of  fact,  since  it  appears  in  a  comedy  (the  "Frogs") 
represented  (405  B.C.)  fifteen  years  after  the  death  of  Kleon,  and  five 
years  after  that  of  Hyperbolus,  when  the  poet  had  less  motive  for 
misrepresentations  against  either.  In  the  "Frogs,"  the  scene  is  laid 
in  Hades,  whither  the  god  Dionysus  goes,  in  the  attire  of  llerakles 
and  along  with  bis  slave  Xanthias,  lor  the  purpose  of  bringing  up 
again  to  earth  the  deceased  poel  Euripides.  Among  the  incidents, 
Xanthias  in  the  attire  which  his  master  had  worn,  is  represented  as 
acting  with  violence  and  insult  toward  two  hostesses  of  eating- 
houses;  consuming  their  substance,  robbing  them,  refusing  to  pay 
when  called  upon,  and  even  threatening  their  lives  with  a  drawn 
sword.  Upon  which  the  women,  having  no  other  redress  left, 
announce  their  resolution  of  calling,  the  one  upon  her  protector 
Kleon,  the  other  on  Hyperbolus,  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  the 
offender  to  justice  before  the  dikastery.  This  passage  shows  us  (if 
inferences  on  comic  evidence  are  to  lie  held  as  admissible)  that  Kleon 
and  Hyperbolus  became  involved  in  accusations  partly  by  helping 
poor- persons,  who  bad  been  wronged,  to  obtain  justice  before  the 
dikastery.  A  rich  man  who  had  suffered  injury  might  purchase  of 
Antipho  or  some  other  rhetor,  advice  and  aid  as  to  the  conduct  of  bis 
complaint.  But  a  poor  man  or  woman  would  think  themselves  happy 
to  obtain  the  gratuitous  suggestion,  and  sometimes  the  auxiliary 
speech,  of  Kleon  or  Hyperbolus,  who  would  thus  extend  their  own 
popularity,  by  means  very  similar  to  those  practiced  by  the  leading 
men  in  Home. 

Hut  besides  lending  aid  to  others,  doubtless  Kleon  was  often  also  a 
prosecutor,  in  his  own  name,  of  official  delinquents,  real  or  alleged. 
That  some  one  should  undertake  Ibis  duly, was  indispensable  for  the 
protection  of  the  city;  otherwise  the  responsibility  to  which  official 
persons  were  subjected  after  their  term  of  office  would  have  been 


KLEON  AND  ARISTOPHANES.  745 

merely  nomin  J :  and  we  have  proof  enough  that  the  general  public 
morality  of  tLsse  official  persons,  acting  individually,  was  by  no 
means  high.  But  the  duty  was  at  the  same  time  one  which  most 
persons  would  and  did  slum.  The  prosecutor,  while  obnoxious  to 
general  dislike,  gained  nothing  even  by  the  most  complete  success; 
and  if  he  failed  so  much  as  not  to  procure  a  minority  of  votes  among 
the  dikasts,  equal  to  one-fifth  of  the  numbers  present,  he  was  con- 
demned to  pay  a  fine  of  1000  drachmas.  What  was  still  more  serious, 
he  drew  upon  himself  a  formidable  mass  of  private  hatred,  from  the 
friends,  partisans,  and  the  political  club  of  the  accused  party — 
extremely  menacing  to  his  own  future  security  and  comfort,  in  a 
community  like  Athens.  There  was  therefore  little  motive  to  accept, 
and  great  motive  to  decline,  the  task  of  prosecuting  on  public 
grounds.  A  prudent  politician  at  Athens  would  undertake  it  occa- 
sionally, and  against  special  rivals:  but  he  would  carefully  guard 
himself  against  the  reputation  of  doing  it  frequently  or  by  inclination 
— and  the  orators  constantly  do  so  guard  themselves,  in  those  speeches 
which  yet  remain. 

It  is  this  reputation  which  Thucydides  fastens  upon  Kleon,  and 
which,  like  Cato  the  censor  at  Rome,  he  probably  merited;  from 
native  acrimony  of  temper,  from  a  powerful  talent  for  invective,  and 
from  his  position  both  inferior  and  hostile  to  the  Athenian  knights  or 
aristocracy,  who  overshadowed  him  by  their  family  importance.  But 
in  what  proportion  of  cases  his  accusations  were  just  or  calumnious — ■ 
the  real  question  upon  which  a  candid  judgment  turns — we  have  no 
means  of  deciding,  either  in  his  case  or  in  that  of  Cato.  "To  lash  the 
wicked  (observes  Aristophanes  himself)  is  not  only  no  blame,  but  is 
even  a  matter  of  honor  to  the  good."  It  has  not  been  common  to 
allow  to  Kleon  the  benefit  of  this  observation,  though  he  is  much 
more  entitled  to  it  than  Aristophanes.  For  the  attacks  of  a  poetical 
libeller  admit  neither  of  defense  nor  retaliation ;  whereas  a  prosecutor 
before  the  dikastery  found  his  opponent  prepared  to  reply  or  even  to 
retort — and  was  obliged  to  specify  his  charge,  as  well  as  to  furnish 
proof  of  it — so  that  there  was  a  fair  chance  for  the  innocent  man  not 
to  be  confounded  with  the  guilty. 

The  quarrel  of  Kleon  with  Aristophanes  is  said  to  have  arisen  out 
of  an  accusation  which  he  brought  against  that  poet  in  the  senate  of 
Five  Hundred,  on  the  subject  of  his  second  comedy,  the  "Babylo- 
nians," exhibited  B.C.  426  at  the  festival  of  the  urban  Dionysia  in  the 
month  of  March.  At  that  season  many  strangers  were  present  at 
Athens;  especially  many  visitors  and  deputies  from  the  subject-allies, 
who  were  bringing  their  annual  tribute.  And  as  the  "Babylonians  " 
(now  lost),  like  so  many  other  productions  6f  Aristophanes,  was  full 
of  slashing  ridicule  not  only  against  individual  citizens,  but  against 
the  functionaries  and  institutions  of  the  city,  Kleon  instituted  acom- 
plaint  against  it  in  the  senate,  as  an  exposure  dangerous  to  the  public 
security  before  strangers  and  allies.    We  have  to  recollect  that  Athens 


746  TRUCE  FOR  ONE  YEAR. 

was  then  in  the  midst  of  an  embarrassing  war — that  the  fidelity  of 
her  subject-allies  was  much  doubted — thai  Lesbos,  the  greaftesl  of 
her  allies,  had  been  reconquered  only  in  the  preceding  year,  after  a 
revolt  both  troublesome  and  perilous  to  the  Athenians.  I'ndcr  such 
circumstances,  Kleon  might  see  plausible  reason  for  thinking  that  a 
political  comedy  of  the  Aristophanic  vein  and  talent  tended  to  degrade 

the  city  in  the  eves  of  strangers.  e\en  granting  that  it  was  innocuous 

when  confined  to  the  citizens  themselves.  Tin-  poel  complains  that 
Kleim  summoned  ban  before  the  senate,  with  terrible  threats  and 

ealuniii\  :  but  it  does  nut  appear  that  any  penalty  was  intlieted.  Nor 
hull  ed,  had  the  senate  competence  to  find  him  guilty  or  punish  him, 
exei  pit  to  the  extent  of  a  small  tine.  They  could  only  bring  him  to 
trial  before  the  dikastery,  which  in  this  ease  plainly  was  not  done. 
He  himself,  however,  seems  to  have  felt  the  justice  of  the  warning: 
for  we  find  that  three  out  of  his  four  next  following  plays,  before  the 
pi  aoeof  Nikias(the  "Acharnians."  the  "Knights."  and  the  "Wasps"), 
were  represented  at  the  Lemean  festival,  in  the  month  of  January  a 
season  when  no  strangers  nor  allies  were  present.  Kleon  was  doubt- 
less much  incensed  with  the  play  of  the  "  Knights,"  and  seems  to 
have  annoyed  the  poel  either  b\  bringing  an  indictment  against  him 
for  exercising  freeman's  rights  without  being  duly  qualified  (since 
none  but  citizens  were  allowed  to  appear  and  act  in  the  dramatic 
exhibitions),  or  by  some  other  means  which  are  not  clearly  explained. 
We  cannot  make  out  in  what  may  the  poet  met  him,  though  it 
appears  that  finding  less  public  sympathy  than  he  thought  himself 
entitled  to,  he  made  an  apology  without  intending  to  be  bound  by  it. 
Certain  it  is,  that  his  remaining  plays  subsequent  to  the  "  Knights," 
though  containing  some  few  bitter  jests  against  Kleon,  manifest  no 
second  deliberate  plan  of  attack  against  him. 

The  battleof  Amphipolis  removed  at  oncethe  two  most  pronounced 
individual  opponents  of  peace,  Kleon  and  Brasidas.  Athens,  too,  was 
more  than  ever  discouraged  and  averse  to  prolonged  fighting;  for  the 
number  of  hoplites  slain  at  Amphipolis  doubtless  filled  the  city  with 
mourning,  besides  the  unparalleled  disgrace  now  tarnishing  Athenian 
soldiership.  The  peace-party  under  the  auspices  of  Nikias  and 
Laches,  relieved  at  once  from  the  internal  opposition  of  Kleon,  as 
well  as  from  the  foreign  enterprise  of  Brasidas,  were  enabled  to 
resume  their  negotiations  with  Sparta  in  a  spirit  promising  success. 
BdOg  Pleistoanax,  and  the  Spartan  ephors  of  the  year,  were  on  their 
side  equally  bent  on  terminating  the  war.  and  the  deputies  of  all  the 
allies  were  convoked  at  Sparta  for  discussion  with  the  envoys  of 
Athens.  Such  discussion  was  continued  during  the  whole  autumn 
and  winter  after  the  battle  of  Amphipolis,  without  any  actual  hostil- 
ities on  either  side.  At  first  the  pretentions  advanced  were  found 
very  conflicting;  but  at  length,  after  several  debates,  it  was  agreed  to 
t real  upon  the  basis  of  each  party  surrendering  what  had  been 
acquired  by  war.     The  Athenians  insisted  at  first  on  the   restoration 


PEACE  OF  NIKIAS  CONCLUDED.  747 

of  Plataea;  but  the  Thebans  replied  that  Plahea  was  theirs  neither  by- 
force  nor  by  treason — but  by  voluntary  capitulation  and  surrender  of 
the  inhabitants.  This  distinction  seems  to  our  ideas  somewhat 
remarkable,  since  the  capitulation  of  a  besieged  town  is  not  less  the 
result  of  force  than  capture  by  storm.  iiut  it  was  adopted  in  the 
present  treaty;  ami  under  it  the  Athenians,  while  foregoing  their 
demand  of  Plataea,  were  enabled  to  retain  Nistca.  which  they  had 
acquired  from  the  Megarians,  and  Anaktorium  and  Sodium  which 
the}'  had  taken  from  Corinth.  To  insure  accommodating  temper  on 
the  part  of  Athens,  the  Spartans  held  out  the  threat  of  invading 
Attica  in  the  spring,  and  of  establishing  a  permanent  fortification  in 
the  territory:  and  they  even  sent  round  proclamation  to  their  allies, 
enjoining  all  the  details  requisite  for  this  step.  Since  Attica  had 
now  been  exempt  from  invasion  tor  three  years,  the  Athenians  were 
probably  not  insensible  to  this  threat  of  renewal  under  a  permanent 
form. 

At  the  beginning  of  spring — about  the  end  of  March,  421  B.C. — 
shortly  after  the  urban  Dionysia  at  Athens — the  important  treaty  was 
concluded  for  the  term  of  fifty  years.  The  following  were  its  prin- 
cipal conditions: — 

1.  All  shall  have  full  liberty  to  visit  all  the  public  temples  of 
Greece — for  purposes  of  private  sacrifice,  consultation  of  oracle,  or 
visit  to  the  festivals.  Everyman  shall  be  undisturbed  both  in  going 
and  coining. — [The  value  of  this  article  will  be  felt  when  we  recollect 
that  the  Athenians  and  their  allies  had  been  unable  to  visit  either  the 
Olympic  or  the  Pythian  festival  since  the  beginning  of  the  war]. 

2.  The  Delphiaus  shall  enjoy  full  autonomy  and  mastery  of  their 
temple  and  their  territory. — [This  article  was  intended  to  exclude  the 
ancient  claim  of  the  Phokian  confederacy  to  the  management  of  the 
temple;  a  claim  which  the  Athenians  had  once  supported,  before  the 
Thirty  years' truce:  but  they  had  now  little  interest  in  the  matter, 
since  the  Phokians  were  in  the  ranks  of  their  enemies.] 

3.  There  shall  be  peace  for  fifty  years  between  Athens  and  Sparta 
with  their  respective  allies,  with  abstinence  from  mischief  either  overt 
or  fraudulent,  by  land  as  well  as  by  sea. 

4.  Neither  party  shall  invade  for  purposes  of  mischief  the  territory 
of  the  other — not  by  any  artifice  or  under  any  pretense. 

Should  any  subject  of  difference  arise,  it  shall  be  settled  by  equit- 
able means,  and  by  oaths  tendered  and  taken,  in  form  to  be  hereafter 
agreed  on. 

5.  The  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies  shall  restore  Amphipolis  to 
the  Athenians. 

They  shall  farther  relinquish  to  tiie  Athenians  Argilaus,  Stageirus, 
Acanthus,  Skolus,  Olynthus,  and  Spartolus*  But  these  cities  shall 
remain  autonomous,  on  condition  of  paying  tribute  to  Athens  accord- 
ing to  the  assessment  of  Aristeides.  Any  citizen  of  these  cities  (Am* 
phipolis  as  well  as  the  others)  who  may  choose  to  quit  them  shall  be  at 


748  TRUCE  FOR  ONE  YEAR. 

liberty  to  do  so,  and  to  carry  away  his  property.  Nor  shall  the  cities 
in  counted  hereafter  either  aa  allies  of  Athens  or  of  Sparta,  unless 
Athens  Bhall  induce  them  by  amicable  persuasions  to  becomi   hei 

allies,  which  she  is  at  liberty  to  do  Lf  she  can. 

The  inhabitants  of  Mekyberna,  Sane,  and  Binge,  shall  dwell  hide 
pendently  in  their  respective  cities,  jusl  as  much  as  the  Olynthians 

and  Acanthians.  —  [These  were   towns  which  adhered    to  Athens  and 

were  still  numbered  as  her  allies ;  though  they  were  near  enough  to 
be  molested  by  Olynthus  and  Akanthus,  against  which  this  clause 
w;h  intended  to  Insure  them.  | 
The  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies  shall  restore  Panaktum  to  the 

Athenians. 

6.  The  Athenians  shall  restore  to  Sparta  Koryphasiiun,  Kythera, 
Met  hone,  Pteleum,  Atalante — with  all  the  captives  in  their  hands 
from  Sparta  or  her  allies.  They  shall  farther  release  all  Spartans  or 
allies  of  Sparta  now  blocked  up  in  Skionc. 

7.  The  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies  shall  give  back  all  the  cap- 
tive- in  their  hands,  from  Athens  or  her  allies. 

8.  Respecting  Skionc.  Torone,  Sermylus,  or  any  other  town  in 
the  possession  of  Athens — the  Athenians  may  take  their  own 
measures. 

9.  Oaths  shall  be  exchanged  between  the  contracting  parties  accord- 
ing to  the  solemnities  held  most  binding  in  each  city  respectively, 
and  in  the  following  words — "1  will  adhere  to  this  convention  and 
truce  sincerely  and  without  fraud."  The  oaths  shall  be  annually 
renewed,  and  the  terms  of  peace  shall  be  inscribed  on  columns  at 
Olympia,  Delphi,  and  the  Isthmus,  as  well  as  at  Sparta  and  Athens. 

10.  Should  any  matter  have  been  forgotten  in  the  present  conven- 
tion, the  Athenians  and  Lacedaemonians  may  alter  it  by  mutual 
understanding  and  consent,  without  being  held  to  violate  their 
oaths. 

These  oaths  were  accordingly  exchanged.  They  were  taken  by 
seventeen  principal  Athenians,  and  as  many  Spartans,  on  behalf  of 
their  respective  countries — on  the  36th  day  of  the  month  Artcmisius 
at  Sparta,  and  on  the  24th  day  of  Elapheboliou  at  Athens,  imme- 
diately after  the  urban  Dionysia;  Pleistolas  being  Ephor  eponymus 
at  Sparta,  and  Alkseus  Archon  eponymus  at  Alliens.  Among  the 
Lacedaemonians  swearing  are  included  the  two  kings,  Agis  and  Pleis- 
toanax — the  Ephor  Pleistolas  (and  perhaps  other  ephors,  but  this  we 
do  not  know) — and  Tellis,  the  father  of  Brasidas.  Among  the  Athe- 
nians sworn  are  comprised  Nikias,  Laches,  Agnon,  Lamachus,  and 
Demosthenes. 

Such  was  the  peace  (commonly  known  by  the  name  of  the  peace  of 
Jsikias)  concluded  in  the  beginning  of  the  eleventh  spring  of  the  war, 
which  had  just  lasted  ten  lull  years.  Its  conditions  being  put  to  the 
vote  at  Sparta  in  the  assembly  of  deputies  from  the  Lacedaemonian 
allies,  the  majority  accepted  them;    which,  according  to  the  con- 


NEGOTIATIONS  FOR  PEACE.  749 

ditioa  adopted  and  sworn  to  by  every  member  of  the  confederacy, 
made  it  binding  upon  all.  There  was,  indeed,  a  special  reserve 
allowed  to  any  particular  state  in  case  of  religious  scruple,  arising 
out  of  the  fear  of  offending  some  of  their  gods  or  heroes.  Saving 
this  reserve,  the  peace  had  been  formally  acceded  to  by  the  decision 
of  the  confederates.  But  it  soon  appeared  how  little  the  vote  of  the 
majority  was  worth,  even  though  enforced  by  the  strong  pressure  of 
Lacedsemon  herself — when  the  more  powerful  members  were  among 
the  dissentient  minority.  The  Boeotians,  Megarians  and  Corinthians 
all  refused  to  accept  it. 

The  Corinthians  were  displeased  because  they  did  not  recover 
Sollium  and  Anaktorium;  the  Megarians,  because  they  did  not  regain 
Nisa?a;  the  Boeotians,  because  they  were  required  to  surrender 
Panaktum.  In  spite  of  the  urgent  solicitations  of  Sparta,  the  dep- 
uties of  all  these  powerful  states  not  only  denounced  the  peace  as 
unjust,  and  voted  against  it  in  the  general  assembly  of  allies — but 
refused  to  accept  it  when  the  vote  was  carried,  and  went  home  to 
their  respective  cities  for  instructions. 

Such  were  the  conditions,  and  such  the  accompanying  circum- 
stances, of  the  peace  of  Nikias,  which  terminated,  or  professed  to 
terminate,  the  great  Peloponnesian  War,  after  a  duration  of  ten 
years.  Its  consequences  and  fruits  in  many  respects,  such  as  were 
not  anticipated  by  either  of  the  concluding  parties,  will  be  seen  in 
the  following  chapters. 


CHAPTER  LV 

FF.OM    THE    PEACE   OF    NIKIAS    TO    THE    OLYMPIC    FESTIVAL    OF 
OLYMPIAD    90. 

My  last  chapter  terminated  with  the  peace  called  the  Peace  of 
Nikias,  concluded  in  March,  421  B.C.,  between  Athens  and  the  Spar- 
tan confederacy,  for  fifty  years. 

This  peace — negotiated  during  the  autumn  and  winter  succeeding 
the  defeat  of  the  Athenians  at  Amphipolis,  wherein  both  Kleon  and 
Brasidas  were  slain — resulted  partly  from  the  extraordinary  anxiety 
of  the  Spartans  to  recover  their  captives  who  had  been  taken  at 
Sphakteria,  partly  from  the  discouragement  of  the  Athenians,  leading 
them  to  listen  to  the  peace  party  who  acted  with  Nikias.  The  gen- 
eral principle  adopted  for  the  peace  was,  t lie  restitution  by  both 
parties  of  what  had  been  acquired  by  war — yet  excluding  such  places 
as  had  been  surrendered  by  capitulation:  according  to  which  reserve, 
the  Athenians,  while  prevented  from  recovering  Platsea,  continued 
to  hold  Nissea,  the  harbor  of  Megara.  The  Lacedaemonians  engaged 
to  restore  Amphipolis  to  Athens,  and  to  relinquish  their  connection 


750  FROM  THE  PEACE  OF  NIKIAS. 

with  the  revolted  allies  of  Athens  in  Thrace — that  is,  Argilus,  Sta 
gf  irus,  Akantlms,  Skolufi,  Olynthus,  ami  Bpartolus.  These  six  cities, 
however,  were  not  to  he  enrolled  as  allies  of  Athens  unless  they  chose 
voluntarily  to  become  so — bul  only  to  pay  regularly  to  Athens  the 
tribute  originally  assessed  by  Aristeides,  as  a  sort  of  recompense  for 
the  protection  of  the  iEgean  sea  againsl  private  war  or  piracy.  Any 
inhabitant  of  Amphipolis  or  the  other  cities,  who  chose  to  leave  them, 
was  at  liberty  to  do  so  and  to  carry  away  his  property.  Farther,  the 
Lacedainonians  covenanted  to  restore  Panaktum  to  Athens,  together 
with  all  the  Athenian  prisoners  in  their  possession.  As  to  Bkione, 
Torone,  and  Sermylus,  the  Athenians  were  declared  free  to  take 
their  own  measures.  On  their  part,  they  engaged  to  release  all  cap- 
tives in  their  hands,  cither  of  Sparta  or  her  allies;  to  restore  Pylus, 
Kythera,  Methone,  Pteleon,  and  Atalante;  and  to  liberate  all"  the 
Peloponnesian  or  Brasidean  soldiers  now  under  blockade  in  Bkione. 
Provision  was  also  made,  by  special  articles,  that  all  Greeks  should 
have  free  access  to  the  sacred  pan-Hellenic  festivals,  either  by  land 
or  sea;  and  that  the  autonomy  of  the  Delphian  temple  should  be 
guaranteed. 

The  contracting  parties  swore  to  abstain  in  future  from  all  injury 
to  each  other,  and  to  settle  by  amicable  decision  any  dispute  which 
might  arise. 

Lastly,  it  was  provided  that  if  any  matter  should  afterward  occur 
as  having  been  forgotten,  the  Athenians  and  Lacedaemonians  might 
ny  mutual  consent  amend  the  treaty  as  they  thought  fit.  So  pre- 
pared, the  oaths  were  interchanged  between  seventeen  principal 
Athenians  and  as  many  principal  Lacedaemonians. 

Earnestly  bent  as  Sparta  herself  was  upon  the  peace — and  ratified 
as  it  had  been  by  the  vote  of  a  majority  among  her  confederates — 
still  there  was  a  powerful  minority  wrho  not  only  refused  their  assent, 
but  strenuously  protested  against  its  conditions.  The  Corinthians 
were  discontented  because  they  did  not  receive  back  Sollium  and 
Anaktorium;  the  Megarians,  because  they  did  not  regain  Nisosa;  the 
Boeotians,  because  Panaktum  was  to  be  restored  to  Athens:  the 
Eleians  also,  on  some  other  ground  which  we  do  not  distinctly  know. 
All  of  them,  moreover,  took  common  offense  at  the  article  which 
provided  that  Athens  and  Sparta  might  by  mutual  consent,  and 
without  consulting  the  allies,  amend  the  treaty  in  any  way  that  they 
thought  proper.  Though  the  peace  wras  sworn,  therefore,  the  most 
powerful  members  of  the  Spartan  confederacy  remained  all  recusant. 
So  strong  wras  the  interest  of  the  Spartans  themselves,  however, 
that  having  obtained  the  favorable  vote  of  the  majority,  they  resolve  d 
to  carry  the  peace  through,  even  at  the  risk  of  breaking  up  the  con- 
federacy. Besides  the  earnest  desire  of  recovering  their  captives 
from  the  Athenians,  they  were  farther  alarmed  by  the  fact  that  tbeir 
truce  for  thirty  years  concluded  with  Argos  was  just  now  expiring. 
They  had,  indeed,  made  application  to  Argos  for  renewing  it,  through 


AMPHIPOLIS  IS  NOT  RESTORED  TO  ATHENS.     751 

Lichas  the  Spartan  proxenus  of  that  city.  But  the  Argeians  had 
refused,  except  upon  the  inadmissible  condition  that  the  border  terri- 
tory of  Kynuria  should  be  ceded  to  them:  there  was  reason  to  fear, 
therefore,  that  this  new  and  powerful  force  might  be  thrown  into  the 
scale  of  Athens,  if  war  were  allowed  to  continue. 

Accordingly,  no  sooner  had  the  peace  been  sworn  than  the  Spar- 
tans proceeded  to  execute  its  provisions.  Lots  being  drawn  to  deter- 
mine whether  Sparta  or  Athens  should  be  the  first  to  make  the 
cessions  required,  the  Athenians  drew  the  favorable  lot: — an  advan- 
tage so  very  great,  under  the  circumstances,  that  Theophrastus 
affirmed  Nikias  to  have  gained  the  point  by  bribery.  There  is  no 
ground  for  believing  such  alleged  bribery;  the  rather,  as  we  shall 
presently  find  Nikias  gratuitously  throwing  awTay  most  of  the  benefit 
which  the  lucky  lot  conferred. 

The  Spartans  began  their  compliance  by  forthwith  releasing  all 
the  Athenian  prisoners  in  their  hands,  and  dispatching  Ischagoras 
with  two  others  to  Amphipolis  and  the  Thracian  towns.  These 
envoys  were  directed  to  proclaim  the  peace  as  well  as  to  enforce  its 
observance  upon  the  Thracian  towns,  and  especially  to  command 
Klearidas,  the  Spartan  commander  in  Amphipolis,  that  he  should 
surrender  the  town  to  the  Athenians.  But  on  arriving  in  Thrace, 
Ischagoras  met  with  nothing  but  unanimous  opposition;  and  so 
energetic  were  the  remonstrances  of  the  Chalkidians,  both  in  Amphip- 
olis and  out  of  it,  that  even  Klearidas  refused  obedience  to  his  own 
government,  pretending  that  he  was  not  strong  enough  to  surrender 
the  place  against  the  resistance  of  the  Chalkidians.  Thus  completely 
baffled,  the  envoys  returned  to  Sparta,  whither  Klearidas  thought  it 
prudent  to  accompany  them,  partly  to  explain  his  own  conduct, 
partly  in  hopes  of  being  able  to  procure  some  modification  of  the 
terms.  But  he  found  this  impossible.  He  was  sent  back  to  Amphip- 
olis with  peremptory  orders  to  surrender  the  place  to  the  Athenians, 
if  it  could  possibly  be  done:  if  that  should  prove  beyond  his  force, 
then  to  come  away,  and  bring  home  every  Peloponnesian  soldier  in 
the  garrison.  Perhaps  the  surrender  was  really  impracticable  to  a 
force  no  greater  than  that  which  Klearidas  commanded,  since  the 
reluctance  of  the  population  was  doubtless  obstinate.  At  any  rate, 
he  represented  it  to  be  impracticable:  the  troops  accordingly  came 
home,  but  the  Athenians  still  remained  excluded  from  Amphipolis, 
and  all  the  stipulations  of  the  peace  respecting  the  Thracian  towns 
remained  unperformed.  Nor  was  this  all.  The  envoys  from  the 
recusant  minority  (Corinthians  and  others),  after  having  gone  home 
for  instructions,  had  now  come  back  to  Sparta  with  increased  repug- 
nance and  protest  against  the  injustice  of  the  peace,  so  that  all  the 
efforts  of  the  Spartans  to  bring  them  to  compliance  were  fruitless. 

The  Spartans  were  now  in  serious  embarrassment.  Not  having 
executed  their  portion  of  the  treaty,  they  could  not  demand  that 
Athens  should  execute  hers:  and  they  were  threatened  with  the 


752  FROM  THE  PEACE  OF  NIKIAS. 

double  -misfortune  of  forfeiting  the  confidence  of  their  allies  without 
acquiring  any  of  the  advantages  of  the  treaty.  In  this  dilemma  they 
determined  to  enter  into  closer  relations,  ami  separate  relations,  with 
Athens,  at  all  hazard  of  offending  their  allies.  Of  the  enmity  of 
Argos,  if  unaided  by  Athens,  they  had  little  apprehension;  while  the 
moment  was  now  favorable  for  alliance  with  Athens,  from  the  decided 

pacific  tendencies  reigning  on  both  sides,  as  well  as  from  the  known 
philo-Laconian  sentiment  of  the  leaders  Nikias  and  Laches.  The 
Athenian  envoys  had  remained  at  Sparta  ever  since  the  swearing  of 
the  peace— awaiting  the  fulfillment  of  the  conditions;  Nikias  or 
Laches,  one  or  both,  being  very  probably  among  them.  When  they 
saw  that  Sparta  was  unable  to  fulfill  her  bond,  so  that  the  treaty 
seemed  likely  to  be  canceled,  they  would  doubtless  encourage,  and 
perhaps  may  even  have  suggested,  the  idea  of  a  separate  alliance 
between  Sparta  and  Athens,  as  the  only  expedient  for  covering  the 
deficiency;  promising  that  under  that  alliance  the  Spartan  captives 
should  be  restored.  Accordingly  a  treaty  was  concluded  between 
the  two,  for  fifty  years — not  merely  of  peace,  but  of  defensive  alli- 
ance. Each  party  pledged  itself  to  assist  in  repelling  any  invaders 
of  the  territory  of  the  other,  to  treat  them  as  enemies,  and  not  to 
conclude  peace  with  them  without  the  consent  of  the  other.  This 
was  the  single  provision  of  the  alliance — with  one  addition,  however, 
of  no  mean  importance,  for  the  security  of  Laeechemon.  The  Athe- 
nians engaged  to  lend  their  best  and  most  energetic  aid  in  putting 
down  any  rising  of  the  Helots  which  might  occur  in  Laconia.  Such 
a  provision  indicates  powerfully  the  uneasiness  felt  by  tin'  Lacedae- 
monians respecting  their  serf -population.  But  at  thepresenl  moment 
it  was  of  peculiar  value  to  them,  since  it  bound  the  Athenians  to 
restrain,  if  not  to  withdraw,  the  Messenian  garrison  of  Pylus,  planted 
there  by  themselves  for  the  express  purpose  of  provoking  the  Helots 
to  revolt. 

An  alliance  with  stipulations  so  few  and  simple  took  no  long  time 
to  discuss.  It  was  concluded  very  speedily  after  the  return  of  the 
envoys  from  Amphipolis — probably  not  more  than  a  month  or  two 
after  the  former  peace.  It  was  sworn  to  by  the  same  individuals  on 
both  sides:  wTith  similar  declaration  that  the  oath  should  be  annually 
renewed — and  also  with  similar  proviso  that  Sparta  and  Athens  might 
by  mutual  consent  either  enlarge  or  contract  the  terms,  without  vio- 
lating the  oath.  Moreover,  the  treaty  was  directed  to  be  inscribe  d  on 
two  columns;  one  to  be  set  up  in  the  temple  of  Apollo  at  Amyklac, 
the  other  in  the  temple  of  Athene  in  the  acropolis  of  Athens. 

The  most  important  result  of  "this  new  alliance  was  something  not 
specified  in  its  provisions,  but  understood,  we  may  be  well  assured. 
between  the  Spartan  Ephors  and  Kikias  at  the  time  when  it  was 
concluded.  All  the  Spartan  captives  at  Athens  were  forthwith 
restored. 

Isothing  can  demonstrate  more  powerfully  the  pacific  and  acquies- 


ALLIANCE  BETWEEN  SPARTA  AND  ATHENS.*  753 

cent  feeling  now  reigning  at  Athens,  as  well  as  the  strong  philo- 
Laeoman  inclinations  of  her  leading  men  (at  this  momenl  A.lkibiades 
was  competing  with  Nikias  for  the  favor  of  Sparta,  as  will  be  staled 
presently),  than  the  terms  of  this  alliance,  which  bound  Athens  to 
assist  in  keeping  down  th  Helots— and  the  still  more  important  after 
proceeding,  of  restoring  the  Spartan  captives.  Athens  thus  parted 
irrevocably  with  her  best  card,  and  promised  to  renounce  her  second 
best — without  obtaining  the  smallest  equivalent  beyond  what  was 
contained  in  the  oath  of  Sparta  to  become  her  ally.  For  the  last 
three  years  and  a  half,  ever  since  the  capture  of  Sphakteria,  the  pos- 
session of  these  captives  had  placed  her  in  a  position  of  decided 
advantage  in  regard  to  her  chief  enemy — advantage,  however,  which 
had  to  a  certain  extent  been  countervailed  by  subsequent  losses. 
This  state  of  things  was  fairly  enough  represented  by  the  treaty  of 
peace  deliberately  discussed  during  the  winter,  and  sworn  to  at  the 
commencement  of  spring;  whereby  a  string  of  concessions,  reciprocal 
and  balancing,  had  been  imposed  on  both  parties.  Moreover,  Athens 
had  been  lucky  enough  in  drawing  lots  to  find  herself  enabled  to  wait 
for  the  actual  falfillment  of  such  concessions  b}r  the  Spartans,  before 
she  consummated  her  own.  Now  the  Spartans  had  not  as  yet  real- 
ized any  one  of  their  promised  concessions:  nay  more— in  trying  to 
do  so.  they  had  displayed  such  a  want  either  of  power  or  of  will,  as 
made  it  plain  that  nothing  short  of  the  most  stringent  necessity 
would  convert  their  promises  into  realities.  Yet  under  these  marked 
indications,  Nikias  persuades  his  countrymen  to  conclude  a  second 
treaty  which  practically  annuls  the  first,  and  which  insures  to  the 
Spartans  gratuitously  all  the  main  benefits  of  the  first,  with  little  or 
none  of  the  correlative  sacrifices.  The  alliance  of  Sparta  could 
hardly  be  said  to  count  as  a  consideration:  for  such  alliance  was  at 
this  moment  (under  the  uncertain  relations  with  Argos)  not  less  valu- 
able to  Sparta  herself  than  to  Athens.  There  can  be  little  doubt  that 
if  the  game  of  Athens  had  now  been  played  with  prudence,  she 
might  have  recovered  Amphipolis  in  exchange  for  the  captives:  for 
the  inability  of  Klearidas  to  make  over  the  place,  even  if  we  grant  it 
to  have  been  a  real  fact  and  not  merely  simulated,  might  have  been 
removed  by  decisive  co-operation  on  the  part  of  Sparta  with  an  Athe. 
nian  armament  sent  to  occupj'  the  place.  In  fact,  that  which  Athens 
was  now  induced  to  grant  was  precisely  the  original  proposition 
transmitted  to  her  by  the  Lacedaemonians  four  years  before,  when 
the  hoplites  were  first  inclosed  in  Sphakteria,  but  before  the  actual 
capture.  They  then  tendered  no  equivalent,  but  merely  said,  through 
their  envoys,  "Give  us  the  men  in  the  island,  and  accept,  in 
exchange,  peace,  together  with  our  alliance."  Ac  that  moment  there 
were  some  plausible  reasons  in  favor'of  granting  the  proposition:  but 
even  then,  the  case  of  Kleon  against  it  was' also  plausible  and  power, 
ful,  when  he  contended  that  Athens  was  entitled  to  make  a  better 
bargain.     But  now,  there  were  no  reasons  in  its  favor,  and  a  strong 


754  FROM   THE   PEACE  OF  NIKIAS. 

concurrence  of  reasons  againsl  it.  Alliance  with  the  Spartans  u  as  of 
no  greai  value  to  Athens:  peace  was  of  materia]  importance  to  her — 
inn  peace  had  been  already  sworn  toon  both  sides,  alter  deliberate 
discussion,  and  required  now  only  to  be  carried  into  execution. 
Thai  equal  reciprocity  of  concession,  which  presented  the  besl  chance 
of  permanent  result,  had  been  agreed  on;  and  fortune  had  procured 
for  her  the  privilege  of  receiving  the  purchase-mpriey  before  she 
handed  over  the  goods.  Why  renounce  bo  advantageous  a  position, 
accepting  in  exchange  a  hollow  and  ban-on  alliance,  under  the  obli- 
gation oi  handing  over  her  most  precious  merchandise  upon  credit— 
and  upon  credit  as  delusive  in  promise  as  it  afterward  proved  unpro- 
ductive in  reality?  The  alliance  in  fact  prevented  the  peace  from 
being  fulfilled:  it,  became  (as  Thucydides  himself  admits)  no  peace, 
but  a  simple  suspension  of  direct  hostilities. 

Thucydides  states  en  more  than  one  occasion  — and  it  was  the  sen* 
timent  of  Nikias  himself — that  at  the  moment  of  concluding  the 

peace  which  bears  his  name,  the  position  of  Sparta  was  one  of  disad- 
vantage and  dishonor  in  reference  to  Alliens.  He  alludes  chiefly  to  the 
captives  in  the  hands  of  the  latter — for  as  to  other  matters,  the  defeats 
of  Delium  and  Amphipolis,  with  the  serious  losses  in  Thrace,  would 
more  than  countervail  the  acquisitions  of  Nisaea,  1'ylus.  Kythera,  and 
Methone.  Yet  so  inconsiderate  and  short-sighted  were  the  philo- 
Laconian  leanings  of  Nikias  and  the  men  who  now  commanded  con- 
fidence at  Athens,  that  they  threw  away  this  advantage— suffered 
Athens  to  be  cheated  of  all  those  hopes  which  they  had  themselves 
held  out  as  the  inducement  for  peace  -and  nevertheless  yielded  gra- 
tuitously to  Sparta  all  the  main  points  which  she  desired.  Most 
certainly,  there  was  never  any  public  recommendation  of  Kleon  (an 
far  as  our  information  goes)  so  ruinously  impolitic  as  this  alliance 
with  Sparta  and  surrender  of  the  captives,  wherein  both  Nikia-  and 
Alkibiades concurred.  Probably  the  Spartan  Ephors amused  Xikias, 
and  he  amused  the  Athenian  assembly,  with  fallacious  assurances  of 
certain  obedience  in  Thrace,  under  alleged  peremptory  orders  given 
to  Klearidas.  And  now  that  the  vehement  leather  dresser,  with  his 
criminative  eloquence,  had  passed  away — replaced  only  by  an  inferior 
successor,  the  lamp-maker  Hyperbolus — and  leaving  the  Athenian 
public  under  the  undisputed  guidance  of  citizens  eminent  for  birth 
and  station,  descended  from  gods  and  heroes — there  remained  no  one 
to  expose  effectively  the  futility  of  such  assurances,  or  to  enforce  the 
lesson  of  simple  and  obvious  prudence — "  Wait,  as  you  are  entitled 
to  wait,  until  the  Spartans  have  performed  the'  onerous  part  of  their 
bargain,  before  you  perform  the  onerous  part  of  yours.  Or  if  you 
choose  to  relax  in  regard  to  some  of  the  concessions  which  they  have 
sworn  to  make,  at  any  rate  stick  to  the  capital  point  of  all,  and  lay 
before  them  the  peremptory  alternative — Amphipolis  in  exchange  for 
the  captives." 
The  Athenians  were  not  long  in  finding  out  how  completely  they 


STATES  RECUSANT  TO  THE  PEACE.     755 

had  forfeited  the  advantage  of  their  position,  and  their  chief  means 
of  enforcement,  by  giving  up  the  captives;  which  imparted  a  freedom 
of  action  to  Sparta  such  as  she  had  never  enjoyed  since  the  first 
blockade  of  Sphakteria.  Yet  it  seems  that  under  the  present  Ephors 
Sparta  was  not  guilty  of  any  deliberate  or  positive  act  which  could 
be  called  a  breach  of  faith.  She  gave  orders  to  Klearidas  to  surren 
der  Amphipolis,  if  he  could;  if  not,  to  evacuate  it,  and  bring  the 
Peloponnesiau  troops  home.  Of  course  the  place  was  not  surrendered 
to  the  Athenians,  but  evacuated;  and  she  then  considered  that  she 
had  discharged  her  duty  to  Athens,  as  far  as  Amphipolis  was  con- 
cerned, though  she  had  sworn  to  restore  it,  and  her  oath  remained 
unperformed.  The  other  Thraciau  towns  were  equally  deaf  to  her 
persuasions,  and  equally  obstinate  in  their  hostility  to  Athens.  So 
also  were  the  Boeotians,  Corinthians,  Megarians,  and  Eleians;  but  the 
Boeotians,  while  refusing  to  become  parties  to  the  truce  along  with 
Sparta,  concluded  for  themselves  a  separate  convention  or  armistice 
with  Athens,  terminable  at  ten  days'  notice  on  either  side. 

In  this  state  of  things,  though  ostensible  relations  of  peace  and 
free  reciprocity  of  intercourse  between  Athens  and  Peloponnesus 
were  established,  the  discontent  of  the  Athenians,  and  the  remon- 
strances of  their  envoys  at  Sparta,  soon  became  serious.  The  Lace 
diemoniaus  had  sworn  for  themselves  and  their  allies,  yet  the  most 
powerful  among  these  allies,  and  those  whose  enmity  was  most 
important  to  Athens,  continued  still  recusant.  Neither  Panaktum, 
nor  the  Athenian  prisoners  in  Boeotia,  were  yet  restored  to  Athens; 
nor  had  the  Thracian  cities  yet  submitted  to  the  peace.  In  reply  to 
the  remonstrances  of  the  Athenian  envoys,  the  Lacedaemonians  af- 
firmed that  they  had  already  surrendered  all  the  Athenian  prisoners 
in  their  own  hands,  aud  had  withdrawn  their  troops  from  Thrace, 
which  was  (they  said)  all  the  intervention  in  their  power,  since  they 
were  not  masters  of  Amphipolis,  nor  capable  of  constraining  the 
Thracian  cities  against  their  will.  As  to  the  Boeotians  aud  Corinthi- 
ans, the  Lacedaemonians  went  so  far  as  to  profess  readiness  to  take 
arms  along  with  Athens,  for  the  purpose  of  constraining  them  to  ac- 
cept the  peace,  and  even  spoke  about  naming  a  day,  after  which 
these  recusant  states  should  be  proclaimed  as  joint  enemies,  both  by 
Sparta  aud  Athens.  But  their  propositions  were  always  confined  to 
vague  words,  nor  would  they  consent  to  bind  themselves  by  any 
written  or  peremptory  instrument.  Nevertheless,  so  great  was  their 
confidence  either  in  the  sufficiency  of  these  assurances,  or  in  the 
facility  of  Nikias,  that  they  ventured  to  require  from  Athens  the  sur- 
render of  Pylus — or  at  least  the  withdrawal  of  the  Messeuian  garrison 
with  the  Helot  deserters  from  that  place — leaving  iu  it  uone  but  na- 
tive Athenian  soldiers,  until  further  progress*  should  be  made  in  the 
peace.  But  the  feeling  of  the  Athenians  was  now  seriously  altered, 
and  they  received  this  demand  with  marked  coldness.  None  of  the 
stipulations  of  the  treaty  in  tneir  favor  had  yet  been  performed—' 


756  FROM  THE  PEACE  OF  NIKIAS. 

none  even  seemed  in  course  of  being  performed;  so  tbat  they 
now  began  to  suspeel  Sparta  of  dishonesty  and  deceit,  and  deeply 
ted  their  inconsiderate  surrender  of  the  captives.  Their  remon 
strances  at  Sparta,  often  repeated  during  the  course  of  the  summer, 
produced  no  positive  effect:  nevertheless  they  Buffered  themselves  to- 
be  persuaded  io  remove  the  Messenians  and  Helots  from  Pylus  to 
Kephellania,  replacing  them  by  an  Athenian  garrison. 

The  Athenians  bad  doubtless  good  reason  to  complain  of  Sparta. 
Bui  the  persons  of  whom  they  bad  still  better  reason  to  complain 
were  Nikias  and  their  own  pbilo-Laconian  leaders,  who  bad  first 
accepted  from  Sparta  promises  doubtful  as  to  execution,  and  next — 
though  favored  by  the  lot  in  regard  to  priority  of  cession,  and  thus 
acquiring  proof  that  Sparta  either  would  nol  or  could  not  perform 
ber  promises — renounced  all  these  advantages,  and  procured  for 
Sparta  almosl  gratuitously  the  only  boon  for  which  she  seriously  cared. 
The  many  critics  on  Grecian  history  who  think  no  term  too  harsh  for 
the  d<  magogue  Eicon,  ought  in  fairness  to  contrast  his  political  coun- 
sel with  that  of  his  rivals,  and  see  which  of  the  two  betokens  greater 
forethought  in  the  management  of  the  foreign  relations  of  Athens. 
Amphipolis  had  been  once  lost  by  the  improvident  watch  of  Thucy- 
dides  and  Eukles:  it  was  now  again  lost  by  the  improvident  conces- 
sions of  Nikias. 

So  much  was  the  Peloponnesian  alliance  unhinged  by  the  number 
of  states  which  had  refused  the  peace,  and  80  greatly  was  the  ascend- 
ency of  Sparta  for  the  time  impaired,  that  new  combinations  were 
now  springing  up  in  the  peninsula.  It  has  already  been  mentioned 
that  the  truce  lid  ween  Argos  and  Sparta  was  just  now  expiring: 
Argos  therefore  was  free,  with  ber  old  pretensions  to  the  headship  of 
Peloponnesus,  backed  by  an  undiminished  fullness  of  wealth,  power, 
and  population.  Having  taken  no  direct  part  in  the  late  exhausting 
Avar,  she  bad  even  earned  money  by  lending  occasional  aid  on  both 
sides;  while  her  military  force  was  just  now  further  strengthened  by 
a  Step  of  very  considerable  importance.  She  had  recently  set  apart 
a  body  of  a  thousand  select  hoplites,  composed  of  young  men  of 
wealth  and  station,  to  receive  constant  military  training  at  the  public 
expense,  and  to  be  enrolled  as  a  separate  regiment  by  themselves, 
apart  from  the  other  citizens.  To  a  democratical  government  like 
Argos  such  an  institution  was  internally  dangerous,  and  pregnant 
with  mischief,  which  will  be  hereafter  described.  Put  at  the  present 
moment  the  democratical  leaders  of  Argos  seem  to  have  thought  only 
of  the  foreign  relations  of  their  city,  now  thai  ber  truce  with  Sparta 
was  expiring,  and  that  the  disorganized  slate  of  the  Spartan  confed- 
eracy opened  new  chances  to  her  ambition  of  regaining  something 
like  headship  in  Peloponnesus. 

The  discontent  of  tin-  recusant  Peloponnesian  allies  was  now  in- 
ducing  them  to  turn  their  attention  toward  Argos  as  a  new  chief. 
They  had  mistrusted  Sparta,  even  before  the  peace,  well  knowing 


INTRIGUES  OF  THE  CORINTHIANS.  757 

that  she  had  separate  interests  from  the  confederacy,  arising  from 
desire  to  get  back  her  captives.  In  the  terms  of  peace,  it  seen 
if  Sparta  and  Athens  alone  were  regarded,  the  interests  of  the  remain- 
ing allies,  especially  those  in  Thrace,  being  put  out  of  sight.  Moreover 
that  article  iu  the  treaty  of  peace  whereby  it  was  provided  thai  At  hens 
and  Sparta  might  by  mutual  consent  add  or  strike  out  any  article  that 
they  choose,  without  consulting  the  allies,  excited  general  alarm,  as 
if  Sparta  were  meditating  some  treason  in  conjunction  with  Athens 
against  the  confederacy.  And  the  alarm,  once  roused,  was  still  far- 
ther aggravated  by  the  separate  treaty  of  alliance  between  Sparta  and 
Athens,  which  followed  so  closely  afterward,  as  well  as  by  the  res- 
toration of  the  Spartan  captives. 

Such  general  displeasure  among  the  Peloponnesian  states  at  the 
unexpected  combination  of  Athenians  and  Lacedaemonians,  strength- 
ened in  the  case  of  each  particular  state  by  private  interests  of  its  own, 
first  manifested  itself  openly  through  the  Corinthians.  On  retiring 
from  the  conferences  at  Sparta — where  the  recent  alliance  between 
the  Athenians  and  Spartans  had  just  been  made  known,  and  where 
the  latter  had  vainly  endeavored  to  prevail  upon  their  allies  to  accept 
the  peace — the  Corinthians  went  straight  to  Argos  to  communicate 
what  had  passed,  and  to  solicit  interference.  They  suggested  to  the 
leading  men  in  that  city,  that  it  was  now  the  duty  of  Argos  to  step 
forward  as  savior  of  Peloponnesus,  which  the  Lacedaemonians  were 
openly  betraying  to  the  common  enemy — and  to  invite  for  that  pur- 
pose, into  alliance  for  reciprocal  defense,  every  autonomous  Hellenic 
state  which  would  bind  itself  to  give  and  receive  amicable  satisfaction 
in  all  points  of  difference.  They  affirmed  that  many  cities,  from 
hatred  of  Sparta,  would  gladly  comply  with  such  invitation;  especially 
if  a  board  of  commissioners  in  small  number  were  named,  with  full 
powers  to  admit  all  suitable  applicants;  so  that,  in  case  of  rejection, 
there  might  at  least  be  no  exposure  before  the  public  assembly  in  the 
Argeian  democracy,  This  suggestion — privately  made  by  the  Cor- 
inthians, who  returned  home  immediately  afterward — was  eagerly 
adopted  both  by  leaders  and  people  at  Argos,  as  promising  to  realize 
their  long-cherished  pretensions  to  headship.  Twelve  commissioners 
were  accordingly  appointed,  with  power  to  admit  any  new  allies 
whom  they  might  think  eligible,  except  Athens  and  Sparta.  With 
either  of  those  two  cities  no  treaty  was  allowed  without  the  formal 
sanction  of  the  public  assembly. 

Meanwhile  the  Corinthians,  though  they  had  been  the  first  to  set 
the  Argeians  in  motion,  nevertheless  thought  it  right,  before  enrolling 
themselves  publicly  in  the  new  alliance,  to  invite  a  congress  of  Pelo 
ponnesian  malcontents  to  Corinth.  It  was  fheJSIantineians  who  made 
the  first  application  to  Argos  under  the  notice  just  issued.  And  here 
we  are  admitted  to  a  partial  view  of  the  relations  among  the  second- 
ary and  interior  states  of  Peloponnesus.  Mantineia  and  Tegea,  being 
conterminous  as  well  as  the  two  most  considerable  states  in  Arcadia, 


758  FROM  THE  PEACE  OF  NIKIAS. 

were  in  perpetual  rivalry,  which  had  shown  itself,  only  a  year  and  a 
half  before,  in  a  bloody,  but  Indecisive  battle.  Tegea,  situated  on 
the  frontiers  of  Laconia  and  oligarcbically  governed,  was  tenaciously 
attached  to  Sparta;  while  for  thai  very  reason,  as  well  as  from  the 
democratical  character  of  her  government,  Mantineiawas  lees  bo — 
though  she  was  Still  enrolled  in,  and  acted  as  a  member  of,  the  Pelo- 
ponnesian  confederacy.  She  had  recently  conquered  for  herself  a 
little  empire  in  her  own  neighborhood,  composed  of  village  districts 
in  Arcadia,  reckoned  as  her  subject-allies,  and  comrades  in  her  ranks 
at  the  last  battle  with  Tegea.  This  conquest  had  been  made  even 
during  the  continuance  of  the  war  with  Athens — a  period  when  the 
lesser  states  of  Peloponnesus  generally,  and  even  subject  states  as 
against  their  own  imperial  states,  were  under  the  guarantee  of  the 
confederacy,  to  which  they  were  required  to  render  their  unpaid 
service  against  the  common  enemy — so  that  she  was  apprehensive  of 
Lacedaemonian  interference  at  the  request  and  for  the  emancipation 
of  these  subjects,  who  lay  moreover  near  to  the  borders  of  Laconia. 
Such  interference  would  probably  have  been  invoked  earlier;  only 
that  Sparta  had  been  under  pressing  embarrassments — and  farther, 
had  assembled  no  general  muster  of  the  confederacy  against  Athens — 
ever  since  the  disaster  in  Spbakteria.  But  now  she  had  her  hands 
free,  together  with  a  good  pretext  as  well  as  motive  for  interference. 

To  maintain  the  autonomy  of  all  the  little  states,  and  prevent  any 
of  them  from  being  mediatized  or  grouped  into  aggregations  under 
the  ascendency  of  the  greater,  had  been  the  general  policy  of  Sparta — 
especially  since  her  own  influence  as  general  leader  was  increased  by 
insuring  to  every  lesser  state  a  substantitive  vote  at  the  meetings 
of  the  confederacy.  Moreover  the  rivalry  of  Tegea  would  probably 
operate  here  as  an  auxiliary  motive  against  Mautineia.  Under  such 
apprehensions,  the  Mantineians  hastened  to  court  the  alliance  and  pro- 
tection of  Argos,  with  whom  they  enjoyed  the  additional  sympathy 
of  a  common  democracy.  Such  revolt  from  Sparta  (for  so  it  was 
considered)  excited  great  sensation  throughout  Peloponnesus,  together 
with  considerable  disposition,  amidst  the  discontent  then  prevalent, 
to  follow  the  example. 

In  particular,  it  contributed  much  to  enhance  the  importance  of 
the  congress  at  Corinth;  whither  the  Lacedemonians  thought  it  neces- 
sary to  send  special  envoys  to  counteract  the  intrigues  going  on  against 
them.  Their  envoy  addressed  to  the  Corinthians  strenuous  remon- 
strance, and  even  reproach,  for  the  leading  part  which  they  bad  taki  o 
in  stirring  up  dissension  among  the  old  confederates,  and  organizing 
a  new  confederacy  under  the  presidency  of  Argos.  "They  (the  Cor- 
inthians) were  thus  aggravating  the  original  guilt  and  perjury  which 
they  had  committed  by  setting  at  nought  the  formal  vote  of  a  majority 
of  the  confederacy,  and  refusing  to  accept  the  peaces — for  it  was  the 
sworn  and  fundamental  maxim  of  the  confederacy,  that  the  decision 
of  the  majority  should  be  binding  on  all,  except  in  such  cases  as 


BCEOTIANS  AND  MEGARIANS.  759 

involved  some  offense  to  Gods  or  Heroes."  Encouraged  by  the  pres- 
ence of  many  sympathizing  deputies — Boeotian,  Megarian,  t'halkidian 
from  Thrace,  etc. — the  Corinthians  replied  with  firmness.  But  they 
did  not  think  it  good  policy  to  proclaim  their  real  ground  for  reject- 
ing the  peace — viz.  that  it  had  not  procured  for  themselves  the 
restoration  of  Sollium  and  Anaktorium:  since,  first,  this  was  a  ques- 
tion iu  which  their  allies  present  had  no  interest — next,  it  did  not 
furnish  any  valid  excuse  for  their  resistance  to  the  vote  of  the  majority. 
Accordingly,  they  took  their  stand  upon  a  pretense  at  once  generous 
and  religious — upon  that  reserve  for  religious  scruples,  which  the 
Lacedaemonian  envoy  had  himself  admitted,  and  which  of  course  was 
to  be  construed  by  each  member  with  reference  to  his  own  pious  feel- 
ing. "It  was  a  religious  impediment  (the  Corinthians  contended) 
which  prevented  us  from  acceding  to  the  peace  with  Athens,  not- 
withstanding the  vote  of  the  majority;  for  we  had  previously 
exchanged  oaths  ourselves  apart  from  the  confederacy,  with  the 
Chalkidiaus  of  Thrace  at  the  time  when  they  revolted  from  Athens, 
and  we  should  have  infringed  those  separate  oaths,  had  we  accepted 
a  treaty  of  peace  in  which  these  Chalkidiaus  were  abandoned.  As 
for  alliance  with  Argos,  wre  consider  ourselves  free  to  adopt  any 
resolution  which  we  may  deem  suitable,  after  consultation  with  our 
friends  here  present."  With  this  unsatisfactory  answer  the  Lace- 
daemonian envoys  were  compelled  to  return  home.  Yet  some  Argeian 
envoys,  wdio  were  also  present  in  the  assembly  for  the  purpose  of  urg- 
ing the  Corinthians  to  realize  forthwith  the  hopes  of  alliance  winch 
they  had  held  out  to  Argos,  were  still  unable  on  their  side  to  obtain 
a  decided  affirmative — being  requested  to  come  again  at  the  next 
conference. 

Though  the  Corinthians  had  themselves  originated  the  idea  of  the 
new  Argeian  confederacy,  and  compromised  Argos  in  an  open  proc- 
lamation, yet  they  now  hesitated  about  the  execution  of  their  own 
scheme.  They  were  restrained  in  part,  doubtless,  by  the  bitterness 
of  Lacedaemonian  reproof — for  the  open  consummation  of  this 
revolt,  apart  from  its  grave  political  consequences,  shocked  a  train 
of  very  old  feelings — but  still  more  by  the  discovery  that  their  friends, 
who  agreed  with  them  in  rejecting  the  peace,  decidedly  refused  all 
open  revolt  from  Sparta  and  all  alliance  with  Argos.  In  this  cate- 
gory were  the  Boeotians  and  Megarians.  Both  of  these  states — left 
to  their  own  impression  and  judgment  by  the  Lacedasmonians,  who 
did  not  address  to  them  any  distinct  appeal  as  they  had  done  to  the 
Corinthians — spontaneously  turned  away  from  Argos,  not  less  from 
aversion  toward  the  Argeian  democracy  than  from  sympathy  with 
the  oligarchy  at  Sparta.  They  were  linked  together  by  communion 
of  interest,  not  merely  as  being  both  neighbors  and  intense  ene- 
mies of  Attica,  but  as  each  having  a  body  of  democratical  exiles  who 
might  perhaps  find  encouragement  at  Argos.  Discouraged  by  the 
resistance  of  these  two  important  allies,  the  Corinthians  hung  back 


700  FROM  THE  PEACE  OF  NIKIAS. 

from  visiting  Argos,  until  they  were  pushed  forward  by  a  now  acci- 
dental impulse  theapplicati fthe  Eleians;  who,  eagerly  embrac- 
ing the  new  project,  sen!  envoys  flrsl  to  conclude  alliance  with  the 
(  orinthiaus,  and  uexl  to  go  od  and  enroll  Elia  as  an  ally  of  Argos. 
This  incident  so  confirmed  the  Corinthians  in  their  previous  scheme, 
tha4  iln\  speedily  went  to  Argos,  along  with  the  Chalkidians  of 
Thrace,  to  join  the  new  confederacy. 

The  conduct  of  Elis,  like  thai  of  IMantineia,  in  thus  revolting  from 
Sparta,  bad  been  dictated  by  private  grounds  of  quarrel,  arising  oul 
Of  relations  with  their  dependent  ally  Lepreuni.  The  Lepreates  bad 
become  dependent  on  Ellis  some  tune  before  the  beginning  of  Ihe 
Peloponnesian  war,  in  consideration  of  aid  lent  by  the  Eleians  to 
extricate  them  from  a  dangerous  war  against  some  Arcadian  ene- 
mies. To  purchase  Mich  aid,  they  had  engaged  to  cede  to  the  Eleians 
had'  their  territory;  but  had  liceii  left  jn  residence  and  occupation  of 
it,  under  the  stipulation  of  paying  one  talent  yearly  as  tribute  to  the 
Olympian  Zeus — in  other  words,  to  the  Eleians  as  Ids  stewards. 
When  the  Peloponnesian  war  began,  and  the  Lacedemonians  began 
to  call  for  tiie  unpaid  service  of  the  Peloponnesian  cities  generally, 
small  as  well  as  great,  against  Athens,  the  Lepreates  were,  by  the 
standing  agreement  of  the  confederacy,  exempted  for  Ihe  lime  from 
continuing  to  pay  their  tribute  to  Elis.  Such  cm  million  ceased  with 
the  war;  at  the  close  of  which.  Elis  became  entitled,  under  the  same 
agreement,  to  resume  the  suspended  tribute.  She  accordingly 
required  that  the  payment  should  then  be  recommenced:  but  the 
Lepreates  refused,  and  when  she  proceeded  to  apply  force,  threw 
themselves  on  the  protection  of  Sparta,  by  whose  decision  the  Ele- 
ians themselves  at  first  agreed  to  abide,  having  the  general  agreement 
of  the  confederacy  decidedly  in  their  favor.  But  it  presently 
appeared  that  Sparta  was  more  disposed  to  carry  out  her  general  sys- 
tem of  favoring  the  autonomy  of  the  lesser  states,  than  to  enforce  the 
positive  agreement  of  the  confederacy.  Accordingly,  the  Eleians, 
accusing  her  of  unjust  bias,  renounced  her  authority  as  arbitrator, 
and  sent  a  military  force  to  occupy  Lepreum.  Nevertheless,  the 
Spartans  persisted  in  their  adjudication,  pronounced  Lepreum  to  be 
autonomous,  and  sent  a  body  of  their  own  hoplites  to  defend  it 
against  the  Eleians.  The  latter  loudly  protested  against  this  proceed- 
ing, and  denounced  the  Lacedaemonians  as  having  robbed  them  of 
one  of  their  dependencies,  contrary  to  that  agreement  which  had 
been  adopted  by  the  general  confederacy  when  the  war  began — to 
the  effect  that  each  imperial  city  should  receive  back  at  the  end  of 
the  war  all  the  dependencies  which  it  possessed  at  the  beginning,  on 
condition  of  waiving  its  title  to  tribute  and  military  service  from  them 
so  long  as  the  war  lasted.  After  fruitless  remonstrances  with 
Sparta,  the  Eleians  eagerly  embraced  the  opportunity  now  offered  of 
revolting  from  her,  and  of  joining  the  new  league  with  Corinth  and 
Argos. 


CORINTHIAN  APPLICATION  TO  ATHENS.        761 

That  new  league,  including  Argos,  Corinth,  Elis,  and  Mantineia. 
had  now  acquired  such  strength  and  confidence,  that  the  Argeians 
and  Corinthians  proceeded  on  a  joint  embassy  to  Tegea  to  obtain 
tlie  junction  of  that  city — seemingly  the  most  powerful  in  Pelopon- 
nesus  next  to  Sparta  and  Argos.  What  grounds  they  had  for  expect- 
ing success,  we  are  not  told.  The  mere  fact  of  Mantineia  having 
joined  Argos,  seemed  likely  to  deter  Tegea,  as  the  rival  Arcadian 
power,  from  doing  the  same:  and  so  it  proved — for  the  Tegeans 
decidedly  refused  the  proposal,  not  without  strenuous  protestations 
that  they  would  stand  by  Sparta  in  everything.  The  Corinthian* 
were  greatly  disheartened  by  this  repulse,  which  they  had  by  no 
means  expected — having  been  so  far  misled  by  general  expressions 
of  discontent  against  Sparta  as  to  believe  that  they  could  transfer 
nearly  the  whole  body  of  confederates  to  Argos.  But  they  now 
began  to  despair  of  all  further  extension  of  Argeian  headship,  and 
even  to  regard  their  own  position  insecure  on  the  side  of  Athens, 
with  whom  they  were  not  at  peace,  while  by  joining  Argos  they  had 
forfeited  their  claim  upon  Sparta  and  all  her  confederacy,  including 
Bceotia  and  Megara.  In  this  embarrassment  they  betook  themselves 
to  the  Boeotians,  whom  they  again  entreated  to  join  them  in  the 
Argeian  alliance:  a  request  already  once  refused,  and  not  likely  to 
be  now  granted — but  intended  to  usher  in  a  different  request  pre- 
ferred at  the  same  time.  The  Boeotians  were  entreated  to  accompany 
the  Corinthians  to  Athens,  and  obtain  for  them  from  the  Athenians 
an  armistice  terminable  at  ten  days'  notice,  such  as  that  which  they 
had  contracted  for  themselves.  In  case  of  refusal,  they  were  fur- 
ther entreated  to  throw  up  their  own  agreement,  and  to  conclude  no 
other  without  the  concurrence  of  the  Corinthians.  So  far  the  Boeo- 
tians complied  as  to  go  to  Athens  with  the  Corinthians,  and  back 
their  application  for  an  armistice — which  the  Athenians  declined  to 
grant,  saying  that  the  Corinthians  were  already  included  in  the  gen- 
eral peace,  if  they  were  allies  of  Sparta.  On  receiving  this  answer, 
the  Corinthians  entreated  the  Boeotians,  putting  it  as  a  matter  of  obli- 
gation, to  renounce  their  own  armistice,  and  make  common  cause  as 
to  all  future  compact.  But  this  request  was  steadily  refused.  The 
Boeotians  maintained  their  ten  days's  armistice;  and  the  Corinthians 
were  obliged  to  acquiesce  in  their  existing  conditions  of  peace  de  facto, 
though  not  guaranteed  by  any  pledge  of  Athens. 

Meanwhile  the  Lacedaemonians  were  not  unmindful  of  the  affront 
which  they  had  sustained  by  the  revolt  of  Mantineia  and  Elis.  At 
the  request  of  a  party  among  the  Parrhasii,  the  Arcadian  subjects  of 
Mantineia,  they  marched  under  king  Pleistoanax  into  that  territory, 
and  compelled  the  Mantineians  to  evacuate  the  fort  which  they  had 
erected  within  it;  which  the  latter  were  unable  to  defend,  though 
they  received  a  body  of  Argeian  troops  to  guard  their  city,  and  were 
thus  enabled  to  march  their  whole  force  to  the  threatened  spot. 
Besides  liberating  the  Arcadian  subjects  of  Mantineia,  the  Lacedae- 


762  FROM  THE  PEACE  OP  NIKIAS. 

monians  also  planted  an  additional  body  of  Helots  and  Neodamodes 
at  Lcprcum.  as  a  defense  and  means  of  observation  on  the  frontiers 
of  101  is.  These  were  the  Brasidean  soldiers,  whom  Klearidas  had 
now  brought  hack  from  Thrace.  The  Helots  among  them  had  been 
manumitted  as  a  reward,  and  allowed  to  reside  where  they  chOse; 
But  as  they  had  imbibed  lessons  of  bravery  under  their  distinguished 
commanders,  their  presence  would  undoubtedly  be  dangerous  among 
the  serfs  of  Laconia:  hence  the  disposition  of  the  Lacedaemonians  to 
plant  them  out.  We  may  recollect  that  not  very  long  before,  they 
had  caused  2,000  of  the  most  soldierly  Helots  to  be  secretly  assas>in- 
ated,  without  any  ground  of  suspicion  against  these  victims  person- 
ally, but  simply  from  tear  of  the  whole  body,  aud  of  course  greater 
fear  of  the  bravest. 

It  was  not  only  against  danger  from  the  returning  Brasidean  Helots 
that  the  Lacedaemonians  had  to  guard,  but  also  against  danger- (real 
or  supposed)  from  their  own  Spartan  captives,  liberated  by  Athens  at 
the  conclusion  of  the  recent  alliance.  Though  the  surrender  of 
Sphakteria  had  been  untarnished  by  any  real  cowardice  or  military 
incompetence,  nevertheless,  tinder  the  inexorable  customs  and  tone 
of  opinion  at  Sparta,  these  men  would  be  looked  upon  as  more  ot 
less  degraded;  or  at  least  there  would  be  enough  to  make  them 
fancy  that  they  were  so  looked  upon,  and  thus  become  discontented. 
Some  of  them  were  already  in  the  exercise  of  various  functions, 
when  the  BphorSj  contracting  suspicions  of  their  designs,  condemned 
them  all  to  temporary  disqualification  for  any  official  post;  placing 
the  whole  of  their  property  under  trust-management,  and  interdicting 
them,  like  minors,  from  every  act  either  of  purchase  or  sale.  This 
species  of  disfranchisement  lasted  for  a  considerable  time;  but  the 
sufferers  were  at  length  relieved  from  it — the  danger  being  supposed 
to  be  over.  The  nature  of  the  interdict  confirms  what  we  know 
directly  from  Thucydides,  that  many  of  these  captives  were  among 
the  first  and  wealthiest  families  in  the  state ;  and  ihe  Ephors  may 
have  apprehended  that  they  would  employ  their  wealth  in  acquiring 
partisans  and  organizing  revolt  among  the  Helots.  We  have  no  facts 
to  enable  us  to  appreciate  the  situation  j  but  the  ungenerous  spirit  of 
the  regulation,  as  applied  to  brave  warriors  recently  come  home  from 
a  long  imprisonment  (justly  pointed  out  by  modern  historians),  would 
not  weigh  much  with  the  Ephors  under  any  symptoms  of  public 
danger. 

Of  the  proceedings  of  the  Athenians  during  this  summer  we  hear 
nothing,  except  that  the  town  of  Skione  at  length  surrendered  to 
them  after  a  long-continued  blockade,  and  that  they  put  to  death  the 
male  population  of  military  age — si  lling  the  women  and  children  into 
slavery.  The  odium  of  having  proposed  this  cruel  resolution  two 
years  and  a  half  before  belongs  to  Kleon;  that  of  executing  it,  nearly 
a  year  after  his  death,  to  the  leaders  who  succeeded  him,  and  to  his 
countrymen  generally.    The  reader  will,  however,  now  be  sufficiently 


NEW  EPHORS  HOSTILE  TO  ATHENS.  703 

accustomed  to  the  Greek  laws  of  war  not  to  be  surprised  at  such 
treatment  against  subjects  revolted  and  reconquered.  Skione  and  its 
territory  was  made  over  to  the  Plataean  refugees.  The  native  popu- 
lation of  Delos,  also,  who  had  been  removed  from  that  sacred  spot 
during  the  preceding  year,  under  the  impression  that  they  were  too 
impure  for  the  discharge  of  the  sacerdotal  functions — were  now- 
restored  to  their  island.  The  subsequent  defeat  at  AmpMpolis  had 
created  a  belief  in  Athens  that  this  removal  had  offended  the  gods — 
under  which  impression,  confirmed  by  the  Delphian  oracle,  the  Athe- 
nians now  showed  their  repentance  by  restoring  the  Delian  exiles. 
They  further  lost  the  towns  of  Thyssus  on  the  peninsula  of  A  thus, 
ami  Mekyberna  on  the  Sithonian  Gulf,  which  were  captured  by  the 
Chalkidians  of  Thrace. 

Meanwhile  the  political  relations  throughout  the  powerful  Grecian 
states  remained  all  provisional  and  undetermined.  The  alliance  si  ill 
subsisted  between  Sparta  and  Athens,  yet  with  continual  complaints 
on  the  part  of  the  latter  that  the  prior  treaty  remained  unfulfilled. 
The  members  of  the  Spartan  confederacy  were  discontented ;  some 
had  seceded,  and  others  seemed  likely  to  do  the  same;  while  Argos, 
ambitious  to  supplant  Sparta,  was  trying  to  put  herself  at  the  head 
of  a  new  confederacy,  though  as  yet  with  very  partial  success.  Hith- 
erto, however,  the  authorities  of  Sparta — King  Pleistoanax  as  well  as 
the  Ephors  of  the  year — had  been  sincerely  desirous  to  maintain  the 
Athenian  alliance,  so  far  as  it  could  be  done  without  sacrifice,  and 
without  the  real  employment  of  force  against  recusants,  of  which 
they  had  merely  talked  in  order  to  amuse  the  Athenians.  Moreover, 
the  prodigious  advantage  which  they  had  gained  by  recovering  the 
prisoners,  doubtless  making  them  very  popular  at  home,  would 
attach  them  the  more  firmly  to  their  own  measure.  But  at  the  close 
of  the  summer  (seemingly  about  the  end  of  September  or  beginning  of 
October,  b.c.  421)  the  year  of  these  Ephors  expired,  and  new  Ephors 
were  nominated  for  the  ensuing  year.  Under  the  existing  state  of 
things  this  was  an  important  revolution:  for  out  of  the  five  new 
Ephors,  two  (Kleobulus  and  Xenares)  were  decidedly  hostile  to  peace 
with  Athens,  and  the  remaining  three  apparently  indifferent.  And 
we  may  here  remark  that,  this  fluctuation  and  instability  of  public 
policy,  which  is  often  denounced  as  if  it  were  the  peculiar  attribute 
of  a  democracy,  occurs  quite  as  much  under  the  constitutional  mon- 
archy of  Sparta — the  least  popular  government  in  Greece,  in  princi- 
ple and  detail. 

The  new  Ephors  convened  a  special  congress  at  Sparta  for  the  set- 
tlement of  the  pending  differences,  at  which,  among  the  rest,  Athe- 
nian, Boeotian,  and  Corinthian  envoys  were  <all  present.  But,  after 
prolonged  debates,  no  approach  was  made  to  agreement;  so  that  the 
congress  was  on  the  point  of  breaking  up,  when  Kleobulus  and 
Xenares,  together  with  many  of  their  partisans,  originated,  in  con- 
cert with  the  Boeotian  and  Corinthian  deputies,  a  series  of  private 


764  FROM   THE  PEACE  OF  NIKIAS. 

underhand  maneuvers  for  the  dissolution  of  the  Athenian  alliance. 
This  was  to  be  effected  bj  bringing  aboul  a  separate  alliance  between 
Argos  and  Sparta,  which  the  Spartans  sincerely  desiri  d,  and  would 
grasp  at  it  in  preference  (so  these  Ephors  affirmed),  even  if  il 
them  the  breach  of  their  new  tie  with  Athens.  The  Boeotians  were 
urged,  firsl  to  become  allies  of  Argos  themselves,  and  then  to  bring 
Argos  into  alliance  with  Sparta.  But  it  was  further  essential  that 
they  should  give  up  Panaktum  to  Sparta,  so  thai  il  mighl  be  tendi  n  d 
to  the  Athenians  in  exchange  for  Pylos — for  Sparta  could  not  easily 
go  to  war  with  them  \\  bile  they  remained  masters  of  the  latter. 

Sueli  were  the    plans  which  Rdeobulus  and    Xenares    laid  with  the 

Corinthian  and  Boeotian  deputies,  and  which  the  latter  went  home 
prepared  to  execute.     Chance  seemed  to  favor  the  purpoeeal  once: 

for  on  their  road  home  they  were  accosted  by  two  Argeians,  senators 
iii  their  own  city,  who  expressed  an  earnest  anxiety  to  bring  about 
alliance  between  the  Boeotians  and  Argos.     The  Boeotian  deputies, 

warmly  encouraging  this  idea,  urged  the  Argeians  to  .-end  envoys  to 
Thebes  as  solicitors  of  the  alliance;  and  communicated  to  the  Boeo- 
tarchs,  on  their  arrival  at  home,  both  the  plans  laid  by  the  Spartan 
Ephors  and  the  wishes  of  these  Argeians.  The  Boeotarchs  also 
entered  heartily  into  the  entire  scheme;  receiving  theArgeian  envoys 
with  marked  favor,  and  promising,  as  soon  as  they  should  have 
obtained  the  requisite  sanction,  to  send  envoysof  their  own  and  ask 
for  alliance  with  Argos. 

That  sanction  was  to  be  obtained  from  "the  Four  Senates  of  the 
Boeotians" — bodies  of  the  constitution  of  which  nothing  is  known. 
But  they  were  usually  found  so  passive  and  acquiescent,  that  the 
Boeotarchs,  reckoning  upon  their  assent  as  a  matter  of  course,  even 
without  any  full  exposition  of  reasons,  laid  all  their  plans  accordingly. 
They  proposed  to  these  four  Senates  a  resolution  in  general  terms, 
empowering  themselves  in  the  name  of  the  Boeotian  federation  to 
exchange  oaths  of  alliance  with  any  Grecian  city  which  might  be  will- 
ing to  contract  on  terms  mutually  beneficial.  Their  particular  object 
v,  as  (as  they  stated)  to  form  alliance  with  the  Corinthians,  Megarians, 
and  Chalkidians  of  Thrace — for  mutual  defense,  and  for  wai  as  well 
as  peace  with  others  only  by  common  consent.  To  this  specific 
object  they  anticipated  no  resistance  on  the  part  of  the  Senate-,  inas- 
much as  "their  connection  with  Corinth  had  always  been  intimate, 
while  the  position  of  the  four  parties  named  was  the  same — all  being 
recusants  of  the  recent  peace.  But  the  resolution  was  advisedly 
e<  uched  in  the  most  comprehensive  terms,  in  order  that  it  might 
authorize  them  to  proceed  further  afterward,  and  conclude  alliance  on 
tin-  part  of  the  Boeotians  and  Megarians  with  Argos;  that  ulterior  pur 
l  ose  in  in.'.;'  however  for  the  present  kept  back,  because  alliance  with 
Argos  was  a  novelty  which  might  surprise  and  alarm  the  Senate-. 
The  maneuver,  skillfully  contrived  for  entrapping  these  bodies  into 
an  approval  of  measures  which  they  never  coutemplated,  illustrates 


BCETIANS  RAZE  PANAKTUM.  765 

the  manner  in  which  an  oligarchical  executive  could  elude  the  checks 
devised  to  control  its  proceedings.  But  the  Bceotarchs,  to  their  as- 
tonishment, found  themselves  defeated  at  the  outset:  for  the  Senates 
would  not  even  hear  of  alliance  with  Corinth — so  much  did  thej  fear 
to  offend  Sparta  by  any  special  connection  with  a  city  which  had 
revolted  from  her.  Nor  did  the  Bceotarchs  think  it  safe  to  divulge 
their  communications  with  Kleobulus  and  Xenares,  or  to  acquaint 
the  Senates  that  the  whole  plan  originated  with  a  powerful  party  in 
Sparta  herself.  Accordingly,  under  this  formal  refusal  on  the  part 
of  the  Senates,  no  farther  proceedings  could  be  taken.  The  Corin- 
thian and  Chalkidian  envoys  left  Thebes,  while  the  promise  of  send- 
ing Boeotian  envoys  to  Argos  remained  unexecuted. 

But  the  anti- Athenian  Ephors  at  Sparta,  though  baffled  in  their 
schemes  for  arriving  at  the  Argeian  alliance  through  the  agency  of 
the  Boeotians,  did  not  the  less  persist  in  their  views  upon  Panaktum. 
That  place — a  frontier  fortress  in  the  mountainous  range  between 
Attica  and  Bceotia,  apparently  on  the  Boeotian  side  of  Phyle,  and  on 
or  near  the  direct  road  from  Athens  to  Thebes  which  Ted  through 
Phyle — had  been  an  Athenian  possession,  until  six  months  before 
the  peace,  when  it  had  been  treacherously  betrayed  to  the  Boeotians. 
A  special  provision  of  the  treaty  between  Athens  and  Sparta  pre- 
scribed that  it  should  be  restored  to  Athens;  and  Lacedaemonian 
envoys  were  now  sent  on  an  express  mission  to  Bceotia,  to  request 
from  the  Boeotians  the  delivery  of  Panaktum  as  well  as  of  their 
Athenian  captives,  in  order  that  by  tendering  these  to  Athens,  she 
might  be  induced  to  surrender  Pylus.  The  Boeotians  refused  com- 
pliance with  this  request,  except  on  condition  that  Sparta  should 
enter  into  special  alliance  with  them  as  she  had  done  with  the  Athe- 
nians. Now  the  Spartans  stood  pledged  by  their  covenant  with  the 
latter  (either  by  its  terms  or  by  its  recognized  import)  not  to  enter 
into  any  new  alliance  without  their  consent.  But  they  were  eagerly 
bent  upon  getting  possession  of  Panaktum — while  the  prospect  of 
breach  with  Athens,  far  from  being  a  deterring  motive,  was  exactly 
that  which  Kleobulus  and  Xenares  desired.  Under  these  feelings, 
the  Lacedaemonians  consented  to  and  swore  the  special  alliance  with 
Bceotia.  But  the  Boeotians,  instead  of  handing  over  Panaktum  for 
surrender  as  they  had  promised,  immediately  razed  the  fortress  to 
the  ground ;  under  pretense  of  some  ancient  oaths  which  had  been 
exchanged  between  their  ancestors  and  the  Athenians,  to  the  effect 
that  the  district  round  it  should  always  remain  without  resident 
inhabitants — as  a  neutral  strip  of  borderland,  and  under  common 
pasture. 

These  negotiations,  after  having  been  in  progress  throughout  the 
winter,  ended  in  the  accomplishment  of  the  alliance  and  the  destruc- 
tion of  Panaktum  at  the  beginning  of  spring  or  about  the  middle  of 
March.  And  while  the  Lacedaemonian  Ephors  thus  seemed  to  be 
carrying  their  point  on  the  side  of  Bceotia,  thej'  were  agreeably  sur- 


76G  F$m  THE  PEACE  OF  NIKIAS. 

prised  by  an  unexpected  encouragempnl  to  their  views  from  another 
quarter.  An  embassy  arrived  at  Sparta  from  Argos,  to  solicit 
renewal  of  the  peace  just  expiring.  The  Argeiana  found  that  they 
made  no  progress  in  the  enlargement  of  their  newly  formed  coqfed 
eracy,  while  their  recent  disappointment  with  the  Boeotians  made 
them  despair  of  realizing  theu:  ambitious  projects  of  Peloponnesian 
headship.  Bu1  when  they  learnt  that  the  Lacedaemonians  had  con- 
cluded  a  separate  alliance  with  the  Bceotians,  and  thai  Panaktum 
had  been  razed,  their  disappointment  was  converted  into  positive 
alarm  for  the  future.  Naturally  inferring  that  this  new  alliance 
would  not  have  been  concluded  except  in  conceit  with  Athens,  they 
interpreted  the  whole  proceeding  as  indicating  that  Sparta  had  pre- 
vailed upon  the  Boeotians  to  accept  the  peace  with  Athens — the 
destruction  of  panaktum  being  conceived  as  a  compromise  to  obvi- 
ate disputes  respecting  possession,.  Under  sueh  a  persuasion — no 
way  unreasonable  in  itself,  when  the  two  contracting  governments* 
both  oligarchical  and  both  secret,  furnished  no  collateral  evidence  to 
explain  their  real  intent — the  Argeians  saw  themselves  excluded 
lie in  alliance  not  merely  with  Boeotia,  Sparta,  and  Tegea,  but  also 
with  Athens;  which  latter  city  they  had  hitherto  regarded  as  a  sure 
resort  in  case  of  hostility  with  Sparta.  Without  a  moment's  delay, 
they  dispatched  Eustrophus  and  JEson — two  Argeians  much  es- 
teemed at  Sparta,  and  perhaps  proxeni  of  that  city — to  press  for  a 
renewal  of  their  expiring  truce  with  the  Spartans,  and  to  obtain  the 
best  terms  they  could. 

To  the  Lacedaemonian  Ephors  this  application  was  eminently 
acceptable — the  very  event  which  they  had  been  maneuvering  under- 
hand to  bring  about.  Negotiations  were  opened,  in  which  the  Arge- 
ian  envoys  at  first  proposed  that  the  disputed  possession  of  Thyrea 
should  be  referred  to  arbitration.  But  they  found  their  demand  met 
by  a  peremptory  negative— the  Lacedaiinonians  refusing  to  enter 
upon  such  a  discussion,  and  insisting  upon  simple  renewal  of  the 
peace  now  at  an  end.  At  last  the  Argeian  envoys,  eagerly  bent 
upon  keeping  the  question  respecting  Thyrea  open  in  some  way  or 
other,  prevailed  upon  the  Lacedemonians  to  assent  to  the  following 
singular  agreement.  Peace  was  concluded  between  Athens  and 
Sparta  for  fifty  years;  but  if  at  any  moment  within  that  interval, 
excluding  either  periods  of  epidemic  or  periods  of  war,  it  should  suit 
the  views  of  either  party  to  provoke  a  combat  by  chosen  champions 
of  equal  number  for  the  purpose  of  determining  the  right  to  Thyrea, 
there  was  to  be  full  liberty  of  doing  so;  the  combat  to  take  place 
within  the  territory  of  Thyrea  itself,  and  the  victors  to  be  inter- 
dicted from  pursuing  the  vanquished  beyond  the  undisputed  border 
of  either  territory.  It  will  be  recollected,  lhat,  about  120  years 
before  this  date,  there  had  been  a  combat  of  this  sort  by  300  cham- 
pions on  each  side,  in  which,  after  desperate  valor  on  both  sides, 
the  victory  as  well  as  the  disputed  right  stiM  remained  undetermined. 


ENVOYS  BADLY  RECEIVED  AT  ATHENS.        767 

The  proposition  made  by  the  Argeians  was  a  revival  of  this  old 
practice  of  judicial  combat:  nevertheless,  such  was  the  alteration 
which  the  Greek  mind  had  undergone  during  the  interval,  that  it 
now  appeared  a  perfect  absurdity — even  in  the  eyes  of  the  Lacedae- 
monians, the  most  old-fashioned  people  in  Greece.  Yet  since  they 
hazarded  nothing,  practically,  by  so  vague  a  concession,  and  were 
supremely  anxious  to  make  their  relations  smooth  with  Argos,  in 
contemplation  of  a  breach  with  Athens,  they  at  last  agreed  to  tin; 
condition,  drew  up  the  treaty,  and  placed  it  in  the  hands  of  the 
envoys  to  carry  back  to  Argos.  Formal  acceptance  and  ratification, 
by  the  Argeiau  public  assembly,  was  necessary  to  give  it  validity. 
should  this  be  granted,  the  envoys  were  invited  to  return  to  Sparta 
at  the  festival  of  the  Hyakinthia,  and  there  go  through  the  solemnity 
of  the  oaths. 

Amidst  such  strange  crossing  of  purposes  and  interests,  the  Spar- 
tan Ephors  seemed  now  to  have  carried  all  their  points — friendship 
with  Argos,  breach  with  Athens,  and  yet  the  means  (through  the 
possession  of  Panaktum)  of  procuring  from  Athens  the  cession  of 
Pylus.  But  they  were  not  yet  on  firm  ground.  For  when  their 
deputies,  Andromedes  and  twro  colleagues,  arrived  in  Boeotia  for  the 
purpose  of  going  on  to  Athens  and  prosecuting  the  negotiations 
about  Panaktum  (at  the  time  when  Eustrophus  and  ^Eson  were  car- 
rying on  their  negotiation  at  Sparta),  they  discovered  for  the  first 
time  that  the  Boeotians,  instead  of  performing  their  promise  to  hand 
over  Panaktum,  had  razed  it  to  the  ground.  This  was  a  serious 
blow  to  their  chance  of  success  at  Athens:  nevertheless  Andromedes 
proceeded  thither,  taking  with  him  all  the  Athenian  captives  in 
Bceotia.  These  he  restored  at  Athens,  at  the  same  time  announcing 
the  demolition  of  Panaktum  as  a  fact:  Panaktum  as  well  as  the 
prisoners  were  thus  restored  (he  pretended) — for  the  Athenians  would 
not  now  find  a  single  enemy  in  the  place:  and  he  claimed  the  cession 
of  Pylus  in  exchange. 

But  he  soon  found  that  the  final  term  of  Athenian  compliance  had 
been  reached.  It  was  probably  on  this  occasion  that  the  separate 
alliance  concluded  between  Sparta  and  the  Boeotians  first  became 
discovered  at  Athens;  since  not  only  were  the  proceedings  of  these 
oligarchical  governments  habitually  secret,  but  there  was  a  peculiar 
motive  for  keeping  such  alliance  concealed  until  the  discussion  about 
Panaktum  and  Pylus  had  been  brought  to  a  close.  Both  the  alli- 
ance and  the  demolition  of  Panaktum  excited  among  the  Athenians 
the  strongest  marks  of  disgust  and  anger;  aggravated  probably 
rather  than  softened  by  the  quibble  of  Andromedes— that  demolition 
of  the  fort,  being  tantamount  to  restitution  and^precludiug  any  further 
tenancy  by  the  enemy,  was  a  substantial  satisfaction  of  the  treaty; 
and  aggravated  still  further  by  the  recollection  of  all  the  other 
unperformed  items  in  the  treaty.  A  whole  year  had  now  elapsed 
amidst  frequent  notes  and  protocols  (to  employ  a  modern  phrase): 


768  FROM   THE  PEACE  OF  NIKIAS. 

nevertheless  not  one  of  the  conditions  favorable  to  Athens  had  yet 
been  executed  (except  the  restitution  <>f  her  captives,  seemingly  not 
many  in  number) — while  she  on  her  side  had  made  to  Sparta  the 
capital  cession  on  which  almost  everything  hinged.  A  long  train 
of  accumulated  indignation,  brought  to  a  head  by  this  mission  of 
Andromedes,  discharged  itself  in  the  harshest  dismissal  and  rebuke 
of  himself  and  his  colleagues. 

Even  NiUius,  Laches,  and  the  other  leading  Athenians,  to  whose 
improvident  facility  and  misjudgmenl  the  embarrassment  of  the 
moment  was  owing,  were  probably  not  much  behind  the  general 
public  in  exclamation  against  Spartan  perfidy — if  it  were  only  to 
divert  attention  from  their  own  mistake.  But  there  was  one  of 
them — Alkibiades  son  of  Kleinias — who  took  this  opportunity  of  put- 
ting himself  at  the  head  of  the  vehement  anti-Laconian  sentiment 
which  now  agitated  the  Ekklesia,  and  giving  to  it  a  substantive 
aim. 

The  present  is  the  first  occasion  on  which  we  hear  of  this  remark- 
able man  as  taking  a  prominent  part  in  public  life.  He  was  now 
about  thirty-one  or  thirty-two  years  old,  which  in  Greece  was  consid- 
ered an  early  age  for  a  man  to  exercise  important  command.  But 
such  was  the  splendor,  wealth,  and  antiquity  of  his  family,  of  ^Eakid 
lineage  through  the  heroes  Eurysakes  and  Ajax — and  such  the  effect 
of  that  lineage  upon  the  democratical  public  of  Athens — that  he 
stepped  speedily  and  easily  into  a  conspicuous  station.  Belonging 
also  through  his  mother  Deinomachc  to  the  gens  of  the  Alkmaeonidse, 
he  was  related  to  Perikles,  who  became  his  guardian  when  he  was 
left  an  orphan  at  about  five  years  old,  along  with  his  younger 
brother  Kleinias.  It  was  at  that  time  that  their  father  Kleinias  was 
slain  at  the  battle  of  Koroueia,  having  already  served  with  honor  in 
a  trireme  of  his  own  at  the  sea-fight  of  Artemisium  against  the  Per- 
sians. A  Spartan  nurse  named  Amykla  was  provided  for  the  young 
Alkibiades,  and  a  slave  named  Zopyrus  chosen  by  his  distinguished 
guardian  to  watch  over  him.  But  even  his  boyhood  was  utterly 
ungovernable,  and  Athens  was  full  of  his  freaks  and  enormities, 
to  the  unavailing  regret  of  Perikles  and  his  brother  Ariphron.  His 
violent  passions,  love  of  enjoyment,  ambition  of  pre-eminence,  and 
insolence  toward  others,  were  manifested  at  an  early  age,  and  never 
deserted  him  throughout  his  life.  His  finished  beauty  of  person, 
both  as  boy,  youth,  and  mature  man,  caused  him  to  be  much  run 
after  by  women — and  even  by  women  of  generally  reserved  habits. 
Moreover,  even  before  the  age  when  such  temptations  were  usually 
presented,  the  beauty  of  his  earlier  youth,  while  going  through  the 
ordinary  gymnastic  training,  procured  for  him  assiduous  caresses, 
compliments,  and  solicitations  of  every  sort,  from  the  leading  Athe- 
nians who  frequented  the  public  palaestrae.  These  men  not  only 
endured  his  petulance,  but  were  even  flattered  when  he  would  con- 
descend to  bestow  it  upon  them.     Amidst  such  universal  admiration 


ALKIBIADES.  769 

and  indulgence — amidst  corrupting  influences  exercised  from  so 
many  quarters  and  from  so  early  an  age,  combined  withgreal  wealth 
and  the  highest  position — it  was  not  likely  that  either  self-restraint  or 
regard  for  the  welfare  of  others  would  ever  acquire  development!  in 
the  mind  of  Alkibiades.  The  anecdotes  which  till  his  biography 
reveal  the  utter  absence  of  both  these  constituent  elements  of  moral- 
ity; and  though,  in  regard  to  the  particular  stories,  allowance  must 
doubtless  be  made  for  scandal  and  exaggeration,  yet  the  general  type 
of  character  stands  plainly  marked  and  sufficiently  established  in  all. 
A  dissolute  life,  and  an  immoderate  love  of  pleasure  in  all  its 
forms,  is  what  we  might  naturally  expect  from  a  young  man  so  cir- 
cumstanced, and  it  appears  that  with  him  these  tastes  were  indulged 
with  an  offensive  publicity  which  destroyed  the  comfort  of  his  wife 
Hipparete,  daughter  of  Hippouikus  who  was  slain  at  the  battle  of 
Delium.  She  had  brought  him  a  large  dowry  of  ten  talents:  when 
she  sought  a  divorce,  as  the  law  of  Athens  permitted,  Alkibiades  vio- 
lently interposed  to  prevent  her  from  obtaining  the  benefit  of  the 
law,  and  brought  her  back  by  force  to  his  house  even  from  the  pres- 
ence of  the  magistrate.  It  is  this  violence  of  selfish  passion,  and 
reckless  disregard  of  social  obligation  towards  every  one,  which 
forms  the  peculiar  characteristic  of  Alkibiades.  He  strikes  the 
schoolmaster  whose  house  lie  happens  to  find  unprovided  with  a  copy 
of  Homer — lie  strikes  Taureas,  a  rival  choregus,  in  the  public  theater, 
while  the  representation  is  going  on — he  strikes  Hipponikus  (who 
afterward  became  his  father-in-law),  out  of  a  wager  of  mere  wanton- 
ness, afterward  appeasing  him  by  an  ample  apology — he  protects  the 
Thasian  poet  Hegemon,  against  whom  an  indictment  had  been  form- 
ally lodged  before  the  archon,  by  effacing  it  with  his  own  hand  from 
the  list  put  up  in  the  public  edifice,  called  Metroon;  defying  both 
magistrate  and  accuser  to  press  the  cause  on  for  trial.  Nor  does  it 
appear  that  any  injured  person  ever  dared  to  bring  Alkibiades  to 
trial  before  the  dikastery,  though  we  read  with  amazemenf  the  tissue 
of  lawlessness  which  marked  his  private  life — a  combination  of  inso- 
lence and  ostentation  with  occasional  mean  deceit  when  it  suited  his 
purpose.  But  amid  the  perfect  legal,  judicial,  and  constitutional 
equality,  which  reigned  among  the  citizens  of  Athens,  there  still  re- 
mained great  social  inequalities  betwreen  one  man  and  another, 
handed  down  from  the  times  preceding  the  democracy:  inequalities 
which  the  democratical  institutions  limited  in  their  practical  mis- 
chiefs, but  never  either  effaced  or  discredited — and  which  were  re- 
cognized as  modifying  elements  in  the  current,  unconscious  vein  of 
sentiment  and  criticism,  by  those  whom  they  injured  as  well  as  by 
those  whom  they  favored.  In  the  speech  which  Thucydides  ascribes 
to  Alkibiades  before  the  Athenian  public  assembly,  we  find  the  inso- 
lence of  wealth  and  high  social  position  not  only  admitted  as  a  tact, 
but  vindicated  as  a  just  morality;  and  the  history  of  his  life,  as  well 
as  many  other  facts  in  Athenian  society,  show  that  if  not  approved, 
H.  G.  II.— 25 


770  FROM  THE  PEACE  OF   X1KIAS. 

it  was  al  least  tolerated  in  practice  to  a  serious  extent,  iu  spite  of  the 
restraints  of  the  democracy. 

Amid  Buch  unprincipled  exorbitances  of  behavior,  Alkibiades  stood 
distinguished  for  personal  bravery.  He  served  as  a  hoplite  in  the 
army  under  Phonnion  at  the  siege  of  Potidsea  in  482  b.c.  Though 
then  hardly  twenty  years  of  age,  he  was  among  the  mosl  forward 
soldiers  in  the  battle,  received  a  severe  wound,  and  was  in  great  dan- 
ger; owing  his  life  only  to  the  exertions  of  Sokrates,  who  served  in 
the  ranks  along  with  him.  Eight  years  afterward,  AJkibiade 
served  with  credit  in  the  cavalry  at  the  battle  of  Delium,  and  had  the 
opportunity  of  requiting  his  obligation  to  Sokrates  by  protecting  him 
against  the  Boeotian  pursuers.  As  a  rich  young  man,  also,  choregy 
and  hierarchy  became  incumbent  upon  him:  expensive  duties,  which 
(as  we  might  expect)  he  discharged  not  merely  with  sufficiency,  but 
with  ostentation.  In  fact  expenditure  of  this  sort,  though  compul- 
sion up  to  a  certain  point  upon  all  rich  men,  was  so  fully  repaid,  to 
all  those  who  bad  the  least  ambition,  in  the  Bhape  of  popularity  and 
influence,  that  most  of  them  spontaneously  went  beyond  t  lie  requisite 
minimum  for  the  purpose  pf  showing  themselves  off.  The  first  ap- 
pearance of  Alkibiades  in  public  life  is  said  to  have  been  as  a  donor, 
for  some  special  purpose,  in  the  Ekklesia,  when  various  citizens  were 
handing  in  their  contributions:  and  the  loud  applause  which  bis  sub- 
scription provoked  was  at  that  time  so  novel  and  exciting  to  him, 
that  he  suffered  a  lame  quail  which  he  carried  in  his  bosom  to  es- 
cape. Tins  incident  excited  mirth  and  sympathy  among  the  citizens 
present:  the  bird  was  caught  and  restored  to  him  by  Antiochus,  who 
from  that  time  forward  acquired  his  favor,  and  in  after  days  became 
his  pilot  and  confidential  lieutenant. 

To  a  young  man  like  Alkibiades,  thirsting  for  power  and  pre-emi- 
nence, a  certain  measure  of  rhetorical  facility  and  persuasive  power 
was  indispensable.  With  a  view  to  this  acquisition,  he  frequented 
the  society  of  various  sophistical  and  rhetorical  teachers — Prodikus, 
Protagoras,  and  others;  but  most  of  all,  that  of  Sokrates.  His  inti- 
macy with  Sokrates  has  become  celebrated  on  many  grounds,  and  is 
commemorated  both  by  Plato  and  Xenophon,  though  unfortunately 
with  less  instruction  than  we  could  desire.  "We  may  readily  believe 
Xenophon,  when  he  tells  us  that  Alkibiades  (like  the  oligarchical 
Kritias,  of  whom  Ave  shall  have  much  to  say  hereafter)  was  attracted 
to  Sokrates  by  his  unrivalled  skill  of  dialectical  conversation — his 
suggestive  influence  over  the  minds  of  his  hearers,  in  eliciting  new 
thoughts  and  combinations — his  mastery  of  apposite  and  homely  il- 
lustrations— his  power  of  seeing  far  beforehand  the  end  of  a  long 
cross-examination — his  ironical  affectation  of  ignorance,  whereby  the 
humiliation  of  opponents  was  rendered  only  the  more  complete,  when 
they  were  convicted  of  inconsistency  and  contradiction  out  of  their 
own  answers.  The  exhibitions  of  such  ingenuity  were  in  themselves 
highly  interesting,  and  stimulating  to  the  mental  activity  of  listeners, 


THE  SOPHISTS  AT  ATHENS.  771 

while  the  faculty  itself  was  one  of  peculiar  value  to  those  who  pro- 
posed to  take  the  lead  in  public  debate;  with  which  view  both  these 
ambitious  young  men  tried  to  catch  the  knack  of  Sokrates,  and  to 
copy  his  formidable  string  of  interrogations.  Both  of  them  doubt- 
less involuntarily  respected  the  poor,  self-sutlicing.  honest,  temperate, 
and  brave  citizen,  in  whom  this  eminent  talent  resided;  especially 
Alkibiades,  who  not  only  owed  his  life  to  the  generous  valor  of  Sok- 
rates atPotidaea,  but  had  also  learnt  in  that  service  to  admire  the 
iron  physical  frame  of  the  philosopher  in  his  armor,  enduring  hun- 
ger, cold,  and  hardship.  _  But  we  are  not  to  suppose  that  cither  of 
them  came  to  Sokrates  with  the  purpose  of  hearing  and  obeying  his 
precepts  on  matters  of  duty,  or  receiving  from  him  a  new  plan  of 
life.  They  came  partly  to  gratify  an  intellectual  appetite,  partly  to 
acquire  a  stock  of  words  and  ideas,  with  facility  of  argumentative 
handling,  suitable  for  their  after-purpose  as  public  speakers.  Sub- 
jects moral,  political,  and  intellectual,  served  as  the  theme  sometimes 
of  discourse,  sometimes  of  discussion,  in  the  society  of  all  these 
sophists — Prodikus,  and  Protagoras  not  less  than  Sokrates;  for  in  the 
Athenian  sense  of  the  word,  Sokrates  was  a  sophist  as  well  as  the 
others:  and  to  the  rich  youths  of  Athens,  like  Alkibiades  and  Kritias, 
such  society  was  highly  useful.  It  imparted  a  nobler  aim  to  their 
ambition,  including  mental  accomplishments  as  well  as  political  suc- 
cess: it  enlarged  the  range  of  their  understandings,  and  opened  to 
them  as  ample  a  vein  of  literature  and  criticism  as  the  age  afforded, 
it  accustomed  them  to  canvass  human  conduct,  with  the  causes  and 
obstructions  of  human  well-being,  both  public  and  private: — it  even 
suggested  to  them  indirectly  lessons  of  duty  and  prudence  from 
which  their  social  position  tended  to  estrange  them,  and  which  they 
would  hardly  have  submitted  to  hear  except  from  the  lips  of  one 
whom  they  intellectually  admired.  In  learning  to  talk,  they  were 
forced  to  learn  more  or  less  to  think,  and  familiarized  with  the  differ- 
ence between  truth  and  error:  nor  would  au  eloquent  lecturer  fail  to 
enlist  their  feelings  in  the  great  topics  of  morals  and  politics.  Their 
thirst  for  mental  stimulus  and  rhetorical  accomplishments  had  thus, 
as  far  as  it  went,  a  moralizing  effect,  though  this  was  rarely  their 
purpose  in  the  pursuit. 

Alkibiades,  full  of  impulse  and  ambition  of  every  kind,  enjoyed 
the  conversation  of  all  the  eminent  talkers  and  lecturers  to  be  found 
in  Athens,  that  of  Sokrates  most  of  all  and  most  frequently.  The 
philosopher  became  greatly  attached  to  him,  and  doubtless  lost  no 
opportunity  of  inculcating  on  him  salutary  lessons,  as  far  as  could 
be  done  without  disgusting  the  pride  of  a  haughty  and  spoilt  youth 
who  was  looking  forward  to  the  celebrity  of  public  life.  But  un- 
happily his  lessons  never  produced  any  serious  effect,  and  ultimately 
became  even  distasteful  to  the  pupil.  The  whole  life  of  Alkibiades 
attests  how  faintly  the  sentiment  of  obligation,  public  or  private, 
ever  got  footing  in  his  mind — how  much  the  ends  which  he  pursued 


772  FROM   THE   PEACE  OF  KIKIAS. 

wen  dictated  by  overbearing  vanity  and  love  of  aggrandizement. 
In  the  later*part  of  life,  Sokrates  was  marked  out  to  public  hatred  by 
bis  enemies,  as  having  been  the  teacher  of  Alkibiades  and  Kritias. 
And  if  we  could  be  so  unjusl  as  to  judge  of  the  morality  of  the 
teacher  by  thai  of  these  two  pupils,  we  should  certainly  rank  him 
among  the  worst  of  the  Athenian  sophists. 

At  the  age  of  thirty-one  or  thirty-two,  the  earliest  at  which  it  was 
permitted  to  look  forward  to  an  ascendent  position  in  public  life, 
Alkibiades  came  forward  with  a  reputation  stained  by  private  enor- 
mities, and  with  a  number  of  enemies  created  by  his  insolent  de- 
meanor.  But  this  did  not  hinder  him  from  stepping  into  thai  posi- 
tion to  which  his  rank,  connections,  and  club-partisans,  afforded  him 
introduction;  nor  was  lie  slow  in  displaying  Ids  extraordinary  energy, 
decision,  and  capacity  of  command.  From  the  beginning  to  the  end 
of  his  eventful  political  life,  he  showed  a  combination  of  boldness  in 
design,  resource  in  contrivance,  and  vigor  in  execution — not  sur- 
passed  by  any  one  of  his  contemporary  Greeks:  and  what  distin- 
guished him  from  all,  was  his  extraordinary  flexibility  of  character, 
and  consummate  power  of  adapting  himself  to  new  habits,  new  ne- 
cessities, and  new  persons,  whenever  circumstances  required.  Like 
Themistokles — whom  he  resembled  as  well  in  ability  and  vigor  as  iu 
want  of  public  principle  and  in  recklessness  about  means — Alkibi- 
ades was  essentially  a  man  of  action.  Eloquence  was  iu  him  a  sec- 
ondary quality  .subordinate  to  action  ;  and  though  he  possessed  enough 
of  it  for  his  purposes,  his  speeches  were  distinguished  only  for  per- 
tinence of  matter,  often  imperfectly  expressed,  at  least  according  to 
the  high  standard  of  Ail, en-.  But  his  career  affords  a  memorable 
example  of  splendid  qualities  both  for  action  and  command,  ruined 
and  turned  into  instruments  of  mischief  by  the  utter  want  of  moral- 
ity, public  and  private.  A  strong  tide  of  individual  hatred  was  thus 
roused  against  him,  as  well  from  meddling  citizens  whom  he  had  in- 
sulted, as  from  rich  men  whom  his  ruinous  ostentation  outshone. 
For  his  exorbitant  voluntary  expenditure  in  the  public  festivals, 
transcending  the  largest  measure  of  private  fortune,  satisfied  discern- 
ing men  that  he  would  reimburse  himself  by  plundering  the  public, 
and  even,  if  opportunity  offered,  by  overthrowing  the  constitution  to 
make  himself  master  of  the  persons  and  properties  of  his  fellow-citi- 
zens. He  never  inspired  confidence  or  esteem  to  any  one;  and  soon- 
er or  later,  among  a  public  like  that  of  Athens,  so  much  accumulated 
odium  and  suspicion  was  sure  to  bring  a  public  man  to  rain,  in  spite 
of  the  strongest  admiration  for  his  capacity.  lie  was  always  the  ob- 
ject of  very  conflicting  sentiments:  "the  Athenians  desired  him, 
hated  .him,  but  still  wished  to  have  him" — was  said  in  the  latter 
years  of  his  life  by  a  contemporary  poet — while  we  find  also  another 
pithy  precept  delivered  in  regard  to  him — "  You  ought  not  to  keep  a 
lion's  whelp  in  your  city  at  all;  but  if  you  choose  to  keep  him,  you 
must  submit  yourself  to  his  behavior."    Athens  had  to  feel  the  force 


ALKIBIADES  COURTS  SPARTA.  773 

of  his  energy,  as  an  exile  and  enemy;  but  the  great  barm  which  he 
did  to  her  was,  in  bis  capacity  of  adviser — awakening  in  bis  country- 
men the  same  thirst  for  showy,  rapacious,  uncertain  perilous  aggran- 
dizement which  dictated  his  own  personal  actions. 

Mentioning  Alkibiades  now  for  the  first  time,  I  have  somewhat 
anticipated  on  future  chapters,  in  order  to  present  a  general  idea  of 
his  character,  hereafter  to  he  illustrated.  But  at  the  moment  which 
we  have  now  reached  (March,  420  B.c.)the  lion's  whelp  was  yet 
young,  and  bad  neither  acquired  his  entire  strength,  nor  disclosed 
his  full-grown  claws. 

He  began  to  put  himself  forward  as  a  party  leader,  seemingly  not 
long  before  the  peace  of  Nikias.  The  political  traditions  hereditary 
in  his  family,  as  in  that  of  his  relation  Perikles,  were  democratieal : 
his  grandfather  Alkibiades  bad  been  vehement  in  his  opposition  to 
the  Peisistratids,  and  had  even  afterward  publicly  renounced  an  es- 
tablished connection  of  hospitality  with  the  Lacedaemonian  govern- 
ment, from  strong  antipathy  to  them  on  political  grounds.  But  Al- 
kibiades himself,  in  commencing  political  life,  departed  from  this 
family  tradition,  and  presented  himself  as  a  partisan  of  oligarchical 
and  philo-Laconian  sentiment — doubtless  far  more  consonant  to  his 
natural  temper  than  the  democratieal.  He  thus  started  in  the  same 
general  party  with  Nikias,  and  with  Thessalus  son  of  Kimon,  who 
afterward  became  bis  bitter  opponents.  And  it  was  in  part  proba- 
bly to  put  himself  on  a  par  with  them,  that  he  took  the  marked  step 
of  trying  to  revive  the  ancient  family  tie  of  hospitality  with  Sparta, 
which  bis  grandfather  had  broken  off. 

To  promote  this  object,  be  displayed  peculiar  solicitude  for  the 
good  treatment  of  the  Spartan  captives,  during  their  detention  at 
Athens.  Many  of  them  being  of  high  family  at  Sparta,  he  naturally 
calculated  upon  their  gratitude,  as  well  as  upon  the  favorable  sym- 
pathies of  their  countrymen,  whenever  they  should  be  restored.  He 
advocated  both  the  peace  and  the  alliance  with  Sparta,  and  the  re- 
storation of  her  captives.  Indeed  he  not  only  advocated  these  meas- 
ures, but  tendered  bis  services,  and  was  eager  to  be  employed,  as  the 
agent  of  Sparta,  for  carrying  them  through  at  Athens.  From  such 
selfish  hopes  in  regard  to  Sparta,  and  especially  from  the  expectation 
of  acquiring,  through  the  agency  of  the  restored  captives,  the  title  of 
Proxenus  of  Sparta — Alkibiades  thus  became  a  partisan  of  the  blind 
and  gratuitous  philo-Laconian  concessions  of  Nikias.  But  the  cap- 
tives on  their  return  were  either  unable,  or  unwilling,  to  carry  the 
point  which  he  wished;  while  the  authorities  at  Sparta  rejected  all 
his  advances — not  without  a  contemptuous  sneer  at  the  idea  of  con- 
fiding important  political  interests  to  the  care  of  a  youth  chiefly 
known  for  ostentation,  profligacy,  and  insolence.  That  the  Spartans 
should  thus  judge,  is  no  way  astonishing,  considering  their  extreme 
reverence  both  for  old  age  and  for  strict  discipline.  They  naturally 
preferred  Nikias  and  Laches,  whose  prudence  would  commend^  if  it 


774  FROM  THE  PEACE  OF  KTKIAS. 

did  not  originally  suggest,  their  mistrust  of  the  new  claimant.  Nor 
had  Alkibiades  yet  Shown  the  mighty  movement  of  which  he  was 
capable.  Bui  liiis  contemptuous  refusal  from  the  Spartans  stung 
him  so  to  the  quick,  that,  making  an  entire  revolution  in  his  political 
course,  he  immediately  threw  himself  into  anti-Laconian  politics 
with  uu  energy  and  ability  which  he  was  not  before  known  to  pos- 
sess. 

The  moment  was  favorable,  since  the  recent  death  of  Kleon,  for  a 
new  political  ieadex  to  espouse  this  side;  and  was  rendered  still  more 
favorable  by  the  conduct  of  the  Lacedaemonians.  Month  after  month 
passed,  remonstrance  alter  remonstrance  was  addressed,  yet  not  one 
of  the  restitutions  prescribed  by  the  treaty  in  favor  of  Athens  had 
yet  been  accomplished.  Alkibiades  had  therefore  ample  pretext  for 
altering  his  tone  respecting  the  Spartans — and  for  denouncing  them 
as  deceivers  who  had  broken  their  solemn  oaths,  abusing  the  gener- 
ous confidence  of  Athens.  Under  his  present  antipathies,  his  atten- 
tion naturally  turned  to  Argos,  in  which  city  he  possessed  some 
powerful  friends  and  family  guests.  The  condition  of  that  city,  dis- 
engaged by  the  expiration  of  the  peace  with  Sparta,  opened  a  possi- 
bility of  connection  with  Athens — a  policy  now  strongly  recommended 
by  Alkibiades,  who  insisted  that  Sparta  was  playing  false  with  the 
Athenians,  merely  in  order  to  keep  their  hands  tied  until  she  had 
attacked  and  put  down  Argos  separately.  This  particular  argument 
had  less  force  when  it  was  seen  that  Argos  acquired  new  and  power- 
ful allies — Mantineia,  Elis,  and  Corinth;  but  on  the  other  hand,  such 
acquisition  rendered  Argos  positively  more  valuable  as  an  ally  to  the 
Athenians. 

It  was  not  so  much  however  the  inclination  toward  Argos,  but  the 
growing  wrath  against  Sparta,  which  furthered  the  philo-Argeian 
plans  of  Alkibiades.  And  when  the  Lacedaemonian  envoy  Andro- 
medes  arrived  at  Athens  from  Bceotia,  tendering  to  the  Athenians  the 
mere  ruins  of  Panaktum  in  exchange  for  Pylus, — when  it  further 
became  known  that  the  Spartans  had  already  concluded  a  special  alli- 
ance with  the  Boeotians  without  consulting  Athens — the  unmeasured 
expression  of  displeasure  in  the  Athenian  Ekklesia  showed  Alkibiades 
that  the  time  was  now  come  for  bringing  on  a  substantive  decision. 
While  he  lent  his  own  voice  to  strengthen  the  discontent  against 
Sparta,  he  at  the  same  time  dispatched  a  private  intimation  to  his 
correspondents  at  Argos,  exhorting  them,  under  assurances  of  success 
and  promise  of  his  own  strenuous  aid,  to  send  without  delay  an  em- 
bassy to  Athens  in  conjunction  with  the  Mantineians  and  Eleians, 
requesting  to  be  admitted  as  Athenian  allies.  The  Argeians  received 
this  intimation  at  the  very  moment  when  their  citizens  Eustrophus 
and  ^Eson  were  negotiating  at  Sparta  for  the  renewal  of  the  peace; 
having  been  sent  thither  under  great  uneasiness  lest  Argos  should  be 
left  without  allies,  to  contend  single-handed  against  the  Lacedfcmo- 
nians.     But  no  sooner  was  the  unexpected  chance  held  out  to  them 


SPARTAN  ENVOYS  TO  ATHENS.  775 

of  alliance  with  Athens — a  former  friend,  a  democracy  like  their 
own,  an  imperial  state  at  sea,  yet  not  interfering  with  their  own  pri- 
macy in  Peloponnesus— than  they  became  careless  of  Eustrophus  and 
zEson,  and  dispatched  forthwith  to  Alliens  the  embassy  advised.  It 
was  a  joint  embassy,  Argeian,  Eleian  and  Mantineian.  The  alliance 
between  these  three  cities  had  already  been  rendered  more  intimate, 
by  a  second  treaty  concluded  since  that  treaty  to  which  Corinth  was 
a  party — though  Corinth  had  refused  all  concern  in  the  second. 

But  the  Spartans  had  been  already  alarmed  by  the  harsh  repulse  of 
their  envoy  Andromedes,  and  probably  warned  by  reports  from 
Nikias  and  their  other  Athenian  friends  of  the  crisis  impending 
respecting  alliance  between  Athens  and  Argos.  Accordingly  they 
sent  off  without  a  moment's  delay  three  citizens  extremely  popular  at 
Athens — Philocharidas,  Leon,  and  Endius;  with  full  powers  to  settle 
all  matters  of  difference.  The  envoys  were  instructed  to  deprecate 
all  alliance  of  Athens  with  Argos — to  explain  that  the  alliance  of 
Sparta  with  Boeotia  had  been  concluded  without  any  purpose  or  pos- 
sibility of  evil  to  Athens — and  at  the  same  time  to  renew  the  demand 
that  Pylus  should  be  restored  to  them  in  exchange  for  the  demolished 
Panaktum.  Such  was  still  the  contideuce  of  the  Lacedaemonians  in 
the  strength  of  assent  at  Athens,  that  they  did  not  yet  despair  of 
obtaining  an  affirmative,  even  to  this  very  unequal  proposition.  And 
when  the  three  envoys,  under  the  introduction  and  advice  of  Nikias, 
had  their  first  interview  with  the  Athenian  senate,  preparatory  to  an 
audience  bofore  the  public  assembly,  the  impression  which  they 
made,  on  stating  that  they  came  with  lull  powers  of  settlement,  was 
highly  favorable.  It  was  indeed  so  favorable,  that  Alkibiades  became 
alarmed  lest,  if  they  made  the  same  statement  in  the  public  assembly, 
holding  out  the  prospect  of  some  trifling  concessions,  the  philo-Laco- 
nian  party  might  determine  public  feeling  to  accept  a  compromise, 
and  thus  preclude  all  idea  of  alliance  with  Argos. 

To  obviate  such  a  defeat  of  Ins  plans,  he  resorted  to  a  singular 
manceuver.  One  of  the  Lacedaemonian  envoys,  Endius,  was  his  pri- 
vate guest,  by  an  ancient  and  particular  intimacy  subsisting  between 
their  two  families.  This  probably  assisted  in  procuring  for  him  a 
secret  interview  with  the  envoys,  and  enabled  him  to  address  them 
with  greater  effect,  on  the  day  before  the  meeting  of  the  public 
assembly,  and  without  the  knowledge  of  Nikias.  He  accosted  them 
in  the  tone  of  a  friend  of  Sparta,  anxious  that  their  proposition  should 
succeed;  but  he  intimated  that  they  would  find  the  public  assembly 
turbulent  and  angry,  very  different  from  the  tranquil  demeanor  of  the 
senate;  so  that  if  they  proclaimed  themselves  to  have  come  with  full 
powers  of  settlement,  the  people  would  burst  out  with  fury,  to  act 
upon  their  fears  and  bully  them  into  extravagant  concessions.  He 
therefore  strongly  urged  them  to  declare  that  they  had  come,  not  with 
any  full  powers  of  settlement,  but  merely  to  explain,  discuss,  and 
report :  the  people  would  then  find  that  they  could  gain  nothing  by 


776  FROM  THE   l'EA(  E  OE  nikias. 

intimidation — explanations  would  be  beard,  and  disputed  points  be 
discussed  witb  temper— while  he  (Alkibiades)  would  speak  emphati- 
cally in  their  favor.  He  would  advise,  and  felt  confident  that  he 
could  persuade,  the  Athenians  to  restore  Pylus— a  Btep  which  his 
opposition  had  hitherto  been  the  chiel  means  of  preventing.  He 
gave  them  his  solemn  pledge— confirmed  by  an  oath,  according  to 
Plutarch — that  he  would  adopt  this  conduct,  if  they  would  act  upon 
his  counsel.   The  envoys  were  much  struck  with  the  apparent  sagacity 

of   tin  and  still    D  hi.  m   l.i   find   that    the  man 

from  whom  the}-  anticipated  tin  mosl  formidable  opposition  was  pre- 
pared to  speak  in  their  favor.  His  language  obtained  with  them, 
bly,  the  more  ready  admission  and  confidence,  inasmuch  a-  he 
hail  volunteer!  d  hi-  services  i>>  become  the  political  agent  of  Sparta, 
only  a  few  months  before;  and  he  appeared  now  to  he  .-imply  resum- 
ing that  policy.  Theywere  sure  of  the  support  of  Nikias  and  his 
party,  under  all  circumstances:  if.  by  complying  with  the  recommen- 
dation of  Alkibiades,  they  could  gain  his  strenuous  advocacy  and 
influence  also,  they  fancied  that  their  cause  was  sure  of  success. 
Accordingly,  they  agreed  to  act  upon  his  suggestion,  not  only  with- 
out consulting,  but  without  even  warning,  Nikias — which  was  exact- 
ly what  Alkibiades  desired,  and  had  probably  required  them  to 
promise. 

Next  day.  the  public  assembly  met,  and  the  envoys  were  introduced; 
upon  which  Alkibiades  himself,  in  a  tone  of  peculiar  mildness,  put 
the  question  to  them,  upon  what  footing  they  came?  what  powers 
they  brought  with  them?  They  immediately  declared  that  they  had 
brought  no  full  powers  for  treating  and  settlement,  but  only  came  to 
explain  and  discuss.  Nothing  could  exceed  the  astonishment  with 
which  their  declaration  was  heard.  The  senators  present,  to  whom 
these  envoys  a  day  or  two  before  had  publicly  declared  the  distinct 
contrary;  the  assembled  people,  who,  made  aware  of  that  previous 
affirmation,  had  come  prepared  to  hear  the  ultimatum  of  Sparta  from 
their  lips;  lastly,  most  of  all,  Nikias  himself — their  confidential  agent 
and  probably  their  host  at  Athens — who  had  doubtless  announced 
them  as  plenipotentiaries,  and  concerted  with  them  the  management 
of  their  case  before  the  assembly — all  were  alike  astounded,  and  none 
knew  what  to  make  of  the  words  just  heard.  But  the  indignation  of 
the  people  equaled  their  astonishment.  There  was  an  unanimous 
burst  of  wrath  against  the  standing  faithlessness  and  duplicity  of 
Lacedaemonians;  never  saying  the  same  thing  two  days  together.  To 
crown  the  whole,  Alkibiades  himself  affected  u,  share  all  the  surprise 
of  the  multitude,  and  was  even  the  louih  st  of  them  all  in  invectives 
against  the  envoys;  denouncing  Lacedaemonian  perfidy  and  evil  de- 
signs in  language  far  more  bitter  than  he  had  ever  employed  before. 
Nor  was  this  all:  he  took  advantage  of  the  vehement  acclamation 
Which  welcomed  his  iuvectives  to  propose  that  the  Argeian  envoys 


EMBARRASSMENT   OF  NIKIAS.  777 

should  he  called  in  and  the  alliance  with  Argos  coacluded  forthwith. 
And  this  would  certainly  have  been  done,  if  a  remarkable  phenome- 
non— an  earthquake — had  not  occurred   to  prevent  it;    causing  the 

assembly  to  be  adjourned  to  the  next  day,  pursuant  to  a  religious 
scruple  then  recognized  as  paramount. 

This  remarkable  anecdote  comes  in  all  its  main  circumstances  from 
Thucydides.  It  illustrates  forcibly  that  unprincipled  character  which 
will  be  found  to  attach  to  Alkibiades  through  life,  and  presents  in- 
deed an  unblushing  combination  of  impudence  and  fraud,  which  we 
cannot  better  describe  than  by  saying  that  it  is  exactly  in  the  vein  of 
Fielding's  Jouahan  Wild.  In  depicting  Kleon  and  Hyperbolus,  his- 
torians vie  with  each  other  in  strong  language  to  mark  the  impudence 
which  is  said  to  have  been  their  peculiar  characteristic.  Now  we 
have  no  particular  facts  before  us  to  measure  the  amount  of  truth  in 
this,  though  as  a  general  charge  it  is  sufficiently  credible.  But  we 
may  affirm,  with  full  assurance,  that  none  of  the  much-decried  dema- 
gogues of  Athens — not  one  of  those  sellers  of  leather,  lamps,  sheep, 
ropes,  pollard,  and  other  commodities,  upon  whom  Aristophanes 
heaps  so  many  excellent  jokes — ever  surpassed,  if  they  ever  equaled, 
the  impudence  of  this  descendant  of  iEakus  and  Zeus  in  his  manner 
of  overreaching  and  disgracing  the  Lacedaemonian  envoys.  These 
latter,  it  must  be  added,  display  a  carelessness  of  public  faith  and  con- 
sistency— a  facility  in  publicly  unsaying  what  they  have  just  before 
publicly  said — and  a  treachery  toward  their  own  confidential  agent — 
which  is  truly  surprising,  and  goes  far  to  justify  the  general  charge 
of  habitual  duplicity  so  often  alleged  against  the  Lacedaemonian  char- 
acter. 

The  disgraced  envoys  would  doubtless' quit  Athens  immediately: 
but  this  opportune  earthquake  gave  Nikias  a  few  hours  to  recover 
from  his  unexpected  overthrow.  In  the  assembly  of  the  next  day,  he 
still  contended  that  the  friendship  of  Sparta  was  preferable  to  that  of 
Argos,  and  insisted  on  the  prudence  of  postponing  all  consummation 
of  engagement  wdth  the  latter  until  the  real  intentions  of  Sparta, 
now  so  contradictory  and  inexplicable,  should  be  made  clear.  He 
contended  that  the  position  of  Athens,  in  regard  to  the  peace  and 
alliance,  was  that  of  superior  honor  and  advantage — the  position  of 
Sparta,  one  of  comparative  disgrace:  Athens  had  thus  a  greater  inter- 
est than  Sparta  in  maintaining  what  had  been  concluded.  But  he  at 
the  same  time  admitted  that  a  distinct  and  peremptory  explanation 
must  be  exacted  from  Sparta  as  to  her  intentions,  and  he  request*  d 
the  people  to  send  himself  with  some  other  colleagues  to  demand  it. 
The  Lacedaemonians  should  be  apprised  that  Argeian  envoys  were 
already  present  in  Athens  with  propositions,  and  that  the  Athenians 
might  already  have  concluded  this  alliance*  if  they  could  have  per- 
mitted themselves  to  do  wrong  to  the  existing  alliance  with  Sparta. 
But  the  Lacedaemonians,  if  their  intentions  were  honorable,  must 


778  FROM  THE  PEACE  OF  NIKIAS. 

show  it  forthwith — 1.  By  restoring  Panaktum,  not  demolished,  but 
standing.  2.  By  restoring  Amphipolis  also.  3.  By  renouncing  their 
special  alliance  with  the  Boeotians,  unless  the  Boeotians  on  their  side 
chose  to  become  parties  to  the  pi  ace  with  Athens. 

The  Athenian  assembly,  acquiescing  in  the  recommendation  of 
Nikias,  invested  liim  with  die  commission  which  he  required;  a  re- 
markable proof,  after  the  overpowering  defeat  of  the  preceding  day, 
how  strong  was  the  hold  which  he  still  retained  upon  them,  and  how 
sincere  their  desire  to  keep  on  the  best  terms  with  Sparta.  This  was 
a  last  chance  granted  to  Nikias  and  his  policy — a  perfectly  fair 
chance,  since  all  that  was  asked  of  Sparta  was  just — but  it  forced  him 
to  bring  matters  to  a  decisive  issue  with  her,  and  shut  out  all  further 
evasion.  1  lis  mission  to  Sparta  failed  altogether:  the  influence  of 
Kleobulus  and  Xenares,  the  anti  Athenian  Ephors,  was  found  pre- 
dominant, so  that  not  one  of  his  demands  was  complied  with.  And 
even  when  he  formally  announced  that  unless  Sparta  renounced  her 
special  alliance  with  the  Boeotians  or  compelled  the  Boeotians  to 
accept  the  peace  with  Athens,  the  Athenians  would  immediately  con- 
tract alliance  with  Argos — the  menace  produced  no  effect.  He  could 
only  obtain,  and  that,  too,  as  a  personal  favor  to  himself,  that  the 
oaths  as  they  stood  should  be  formally  renewed;  an  empty  concession, 
which  covered  but  faintly  the  humiliation  of  his  retreat  to  Athens. 
The  Athenian  assembly  listened  to  his  report  with  strong  indignation 
against  the  Lacedremonians,  and  with  marked  displeasure  even 
against  himself,  as  the  great  author  and  voucher  of  this  unperformed 
treaty;  while  Alkibiades  was  permitted  to  introduce  the  envoys 
(already  at  hand  in  the  city)  from  Argos,  Mantineia,  and  Elis,  with 
whom  a  pact  was  at  once  concluded. 

The  words  of  this  convention,  which  Thucydides  gives  us  doubt- 
less from  the  record  on  the  public  column,  comprise  two  engagements 
— one  for  peace,  another  for  alliance. 

The  Athenians,  Argeians,  Mantineians,  and  Elefans  have  con- 
cluded a  treaty  of  peace  by  sea  and  by  land,  without  fraud  or  mis- 
chief, each  for  themselves  and  for  the  allies  over  whom  each 
exercise  empire.  [The  express  terms  in  which  these  states  announce 
themselves  as  imperial  states  and  their  allies  as  dependencies,  desen  e 
notice.  No  such  words  appear  in  the  treaty  between  Athens  and 
Lacedsemon.  I  have  already  mentioned  that  the  main  ground  of  dis- 
content on  the  part  of  Mantineia  and  Elis  toward  Sparta,  wa 
nected  with  their  imperial  power.] 

Neither  of  them  shall  bear  arms  against  the  other  for  purpose  of 
damage. 

The  Athenians,  Argeians.  Mantineians,  and  Eleians  shall  be  allies 
with  each  other  for  one  hundred  years.  If  any  enemy  shall  invade 
Attica,  the  three  contracting  cities  shall  lend  the  most  vigorous  aid  in 
their  power  at  the  invitation  of  Athens.  Should  the  forces  of  the 
invading  city  damage  Attica  and  then  retire,  the  three  will  proclaim 


CONDITIONS  OF  TIIE  ALLIANCE.  779 

that  city  their  enemy  and  attack  it;  neither  of  the  four  shall  in  that 
case  suspend  the  war,  without  consent  of  the  others. 

Reciprocal  obligations  are  imposed  upon  Athens,  in  case  Argos, 
Mantineia,  or  Elis,  shad  be  attacked. 

Neither  of  the  four  contracting  powers  shall  grant  passage  to 
troops  through  their  own  territory  or  the  territory  of  allies  over  whom 
they  may  at  the  time  be  exercising  command  either  by  land  or  sea, 
unless  upon  joint  resolution. 

In  case  auxiliary  troops  shall  he  required  and  sent  under  this  treaty, 
the  city  sending  shall  furnish  their  maintenance  for  the  space  of 
thirty  days,  from  the  day  of  their  entrance  upon  the  territory  of  the 
city  requiring.  Should  their  services  be  needed  for  a  longer  period,  the 
city  requiring  shall  furnish  their  maintenance,  at  the  rate  of  three 
iEginyean  oboli  for  each  hoplite,  light-armed  or  archer,  and  of  one 
iEginoean  drachma  or  six  oboli  for  each  horseman,  per  day.  The  city 
requiring  shall  possess  the  command,  so  long  as  the  service  required 
shall  be  in  her  territory.  But  if  any  expedition  shall  be  undertaken 
by  joint  resolution,  then  the  command  shall  be  shared  equally 
between  all. 

Such  were  the  substantive  conditions  of  the  new  alliance.  Pro- 
vision was  then  made  for  the  oaths — by  whom?  where?  when?  in 
what  words?  how  often?  they  were  to  be  taken.  Athens  was  to  swear 
on  behalf  of  herself  and  her  allies;  but  Argos,  Elis,  and  Mantineia, 
with  their  respective  allies,  were  to  swear  by  separate  cities.  The 
oaths  were  to  be  renewed  every  four  years;  by  Athens,  within 
thirty  days  before  each  Olympic  festival,  at  Argos,  Elis,  and  Man- 
tineia; by  these  three  cities,  at  Athens,  ten  days  before  each  fes- 
tival of  the  greater  Panathensea.  "  The  words  of  the  treaty  of  peace 
and  alliance,  and  the  oaths  sworn,  shall  be  engraven  on  stone 
columns,  and  put  up  in  the  temples  of  each  of  the  four  cities — and 
also  upon  a  brazen  column,  to  be  put  up  by  joint  cost,  at  Olympia, 
for  the  festival  now  approaching." 

"  The  four  cities  may  by  joint  consent  make  any  change  they 
please  in  the  provisions  of  this  treaty,  without  violating  their  oaths." 

The  conclusion  of  this  new  treaty  introduced  a  greater  degree  of 
complication  into  the  grouping  and  association  of  the  Grecian  cities 
than  had  ever  before  been  known.  The  ancient  Spartan  confederacy, 
and  the  Athenian  empire,  still  subsisted.  A  peace  had  been  con- 
cluded between  them,  ratified  by  the  formal  vote  of  the  majority 
of  the  confederates,  yet  not  accepted  by  several*  of  the  minority. 
Not  merely  peace,  but  also  special  alliance  had  been  concluded 
between  Athens  and  Sparta;  and  a  special  alliance  between  Sparta 
and  Bceotia.  Corinth,  member  of  the  Spartan  confederacy,  was  also 
member  of  a  defensive  alliance  with  Argos,  Mantineia,  and  Elis; 
which  three  states  had  concluded  a  more  intimate  alliance,  first  with 
each  other  (without  Corinth),  and  now  recently  with  Athens.  Yet 
both  Athens  and  Sparta  still  retained  the  alliance  concluded  between 


780  FROM  THE  PEACE  OF  NTKIAS. 

themselves,  without  formal  rupture  on  cither  side,  though  Athens  still 
complained  thai  the  treaty  had  not  been  fulfilled.  No  relations 
whatever  subsisted  between  Argos  and  Sparta.  Between  Athens  and 
Bceotia  then-  was  an  armistice  terminable  at  ten  days'  notice. 
Lastly,  Corinth  could  not  be  prevailed  upon,  in  spite  of  repeated 
solicitation  from  the  Argeians,  to  join  the  new  alliance  of  Athens 
with  Argos:  80  that  no  relations  subsisted  between  Corinth  and 
Alliens;  while  the  Corinthians  began,  though  faintly,  to  resume  their 
former  tendencies  toward  Sparta. 

The  alliance  between  Athens  and  Argos,  of  which  particulars  have 
just  been  given,  was  concluded  not  long  before  the  Olympic  festival 
of  the  90lh  Olympiad  or  420  i;.c. ;  the  festival  being  about  the  begin- 
ning of  July,  the  treaty  might  be  iu  May.  That  festival  was  memor- 
able, on  more  than  one  ground.  It  was  the  first  which  had  been 
celebrated  since  the  conclusion  of  the  peace,  the  leading  clause  of 
which  had  been  expressly  introduced  to  guarantee  to  all  Greeks  free 
access  to  the  great  Panhellenic  temples,  with  liberty  of  sacrificing, 
■consulting  the  oracle,  and  witnessing  the  matches.  For  the  last 
eleven  years,  including  two  Olympic  festivals,  Athens  herself,  and 
apparently  all  the  numerous  allies  of'  Athens,  had  been  excluded  from 
sending  their  solemn  legations  or  Theories,  and  from  attending  as  spec- 
tators, at  the  Olympic  games.  Now  that  such  exclusion  was  removed, 
and  that  the  Eleian  heralds  (who  came  to  announce  the  approaching 
games  and  proclaim  the  truce  connected  with  them)  again  trod  the 
soil  of  Attica,  the  visit  of  the  Athenians  was  felt  both,  by  themselves 
and  by  others  as  a  novelty.  No  small  curiosity  was  entertained  to 
see  what  figure  the  Theory  of  Athens  would  make  as  to  show  and 
splendor.  Nor  were  there  wanting  spiteful  rumors,  that  Athens  had 
been  so  much  impoverished  by  the  war,  as  to  be  prevented  from 
appearing  with  appropriate  magnificence  at  the  altar  and  in  the 
presence  of  Olympic  Zeus. 

Alkibiades  took  pride  in  silencing  these  surmises,  as  well  as  in 
glorifying  his  own  name  and  person,  by  a  display  more  imposing 
than  had  ever  been  previously  beheld.  He  had  already  distinguished 
himself  in  the  local  festivals  and  liturgies  of  Athens  by  an  ostenta- 
tion surpassing  Athenian  rivals:  but  he  now  felt  himself  standing 
forward  as  the  champion  and  leader  of  Athens  before  Greece.  He  had 
discredited  his  political  rival  Nikias,  given  a  new  direction  to  the 
politics  of  Athens  by  the  Argeian  alliance,  and  was  about  to  com- 
mence a  series  of  intra-Peloponnesian  operations  against  the  Lacedae- 
monians. On  all  these  grounds  he  determined  thai  his  first  appearance 
on  the  plain  of  Olympia  should  impose  upon  all  beholders.  The 
Athenian  Theory,  of  which  he  was  a  member,  was  set  out  with  first- 
rate  splendor,  and  with  the  amplest  show  of  golden  ewers,  censers, 
etc.,  for  the  public  sacrifice  and  procession.  Bui  when  the  chariot- 
races  came  on,  Alkibiades  himself  appeared  as  competitor  at  his 
own  cost — not  merely   with  one  well-equipped  chariot  and  four, 


PRODIGIOUS  DISPLAY  OF  ALKIBIADES.         781 

which  the  richest  Greeks  had  hitherto  counted  as  an  extraordinary- 
personal  glory,  but  with  the  prodigous  number  of  seven  distinct 
chariots,  each  with  a  team  of  four  horses.  And  so  superior  was 
their  quality,  that  one  of  his  chariots  gained  a  first  prize,  and  another 
a  second  prize,  so  that  Alkibiades  was  I  wire  crowned  with  sprigs  of 
the  sacred  olive-tree,  and  twice  proclaimed  by  the  herald.  Anot'ier 
of  his  seven  chariots  also  came  in  fourth:  but  no  crown  or  proclama- 
tion (it  seems)  was  awarded  to  any  after  the  second  in  order.  We 
must  recollect  that  he  had  competitors  from  all  parts  of  Greece  to 
contend  against — not  merely  private  men,  hut  even  despots  and  gov- 
ernments. Nor  was  this  all.  The  tent  which  the  Athenian  Theors 
provided  for  their  countrymen  visitors  to  the  games,  was  handsomely 
adorned;  but  a  separate  tent  which  Alkibiades  himself  provided  for 
a  public  banquet  to  celebrate  his  triumph,  together  with  the  banquet 
itself,  was  set  forth  on  a  scale  still  more  stately  and  expensive.  The 
rich  allies  of  Athens — Ephesus,  Chios,  and  Lesbos — are  said  to  have 
lent  him  their  aid  in  enhancing  this  display.  It  is  highly  probable 
that  they  would  be  glad  to  cultivate  his  favor,  as  he  had  now  become 
one  of  the  first  men  in  Athens,  and  was  in  an  ascendent  course.  But 
we  must  farther  recollect  that  they,  as  well  as  Athens,  had  been 
excluded  from  the  Olympic  festival,  so  that  their  own  feelings  on 
first  returning  might  well  prompt  them  to  take  a  genuine  interest  in 
this  imposing  reappearance  of  the  Ionic  race  at  the  common  sanctu- 
ary of  Hellas. 

Five  years  afterward,  on  an  important  discussion  which  will  be 
hereafter  discribed,  Alkibiades  maintained  publicly  before  the  Athe- 
nian assemby  that  his  unparalleled  Olympic  display  had  produced 
an  effect  upon  the  Grecian  mind  highly  beneficial  to  Athens;  dissi- 
pating the  suspicions  entertained  that  she  was  ruined  by  the  war,  and 
establishing  beyond  dispute  her  vast  wealth  and  power.  He  was 
doubtless  right  to  a  considerable  extent;  though  not  sufficient  to  repel 
the  charge  from  himself  (which  it  was  his  purpose  to  do)  both  of 
overweening  personal  vanity,  and  of  that  reckless  expenditure  which 
he  would  be  compelled  to  try  and  overtake  by  peculation  or  violence 
at  the  public  cost.  All  the  unfavorable  impressions  suggested  to 
prudent  Athenians  by  his  previous  life  were  aggravated  by  such  a 
stupendous  display;  much  more,  of  course,  the  jealousy  and  hatred 
of  personal  competitors.  And  this  feeling  was  not  the  less  real, 
though  as  a  political  man  he  was  now  in  the  full  tide  of  public  favor. 

If  the  festival  of  the  90th  Olympiad  was  peculiarly  distinguished 
by  the  reappearance  of  Athenians  and  those  connected  with  them,  it 
was  marked  by  a  farther  novelty  yel  more  striking — the  exclusion  of 
the  Lacedaemonians.  Such  exclusion  was  the  consequence  of  the 
new  political  interests  of  the  Eleians,  combined  with  their  increased 
consciousness  of  force  arising  out  of  the  reecnl  alliance  with  Argos, 
Athens,  and  Mantineia.  It  has  already  been  mentioned  that  sinoe  the 
peace  with  Athens,  the  Lacedasmonians  acting  as  arbitrators  in  the 


;s-J  FROM   THE  PEACE  OF  NIKIAS 

if  Lepreum, which  the  Eleiana  claimed  as  their  dependency,  bad 
declared  it  to  he  autonomous  and  had  sent  a  body  of  troops  to  defend 
it.  Probably  the  Eleians  had  recently  renewed  their  attacks  upon 
the  district,  since  the  junction  •with  their  i  for  the  Lacedae- 

monians bad  detached  thither  a  fresh  bodj  "l  1000  hoplites  imme- 
diately prior  to  the  Olympic  festival.     Oul  of  the  mission  of  this 

detachmenl  the  sentence  of  exclusion  arose.  The  Eleians  were 
privileged  administrators  of  the  festival,  regulating  the  details  of  the 
c<  n  mony  itself,  and  formally  proclaiming  by  heralds  the  commence- 

of  the  Olympic  truce,  during  which  all  violation  of  tin-  Eleian 
territory  by  an  armed  force  was  a  sin  against  the  majesty  of  Zeus. 
On  the  present  occasion  they  affirmed  that  the  Lacedaemonians  had 
sent  the  1000  hoplites  into  Lepreum,  and  had  captured  a  fort  called 
Phyrkus,  both  Eleian  possessions — after  the  proclamation  of  the 
truce.  They  accordingly  imposed  upon  Sparta  the  line  prescribed  by 
tlic  "Olympian  law,''  of  two  minse  for  each  man — 2000  mime  in  all; 
;i  paxt  to  Zeus  Olympius,  a  pan  to  the  Eh ians  themselves.  During 
the  interval  between  the  proclamation  of  the  truce  and  the  com- 
mencement of  the  festival,  the  Lacedaemonians  scut  to  remonstrate 
agamsl  this  line,  which  they  alleged  to  have  been  unjustly  imp 
inasmuch  as  the  heralds  had  not  yet  proclaimed  the  truce  al  Sparta 
when  the  hoplites  reached  Lepreum.    The  Eleians  replied  that  the 

truce  had  already  at  that  time  been  proclaimed  among  themselves 
(for  they  always'  proclaimed  it  first  at  home,  before  their  heralds 
crossed  the  border,-),  so  that  they  were  interdicted  from  all  military  oper- 
ations; of  which  the  Lacedaemonian  hoplites  had  taken  advantage  in 
commit  their  last  aggressions.  To  which  the  Lacedaemonians  rejoined 
that  the  behavior  of  the  Eleians  themselves  contradicted  their  own  alle- 
gation; for  they  had  sent  the  Eleian  heralds  to  Sparta  to  proclaim  the 
truce  after  they  knew  of  the  sending  of  the  hoplites — thus  showing 
that  they  did  not  consider  the  truce  to  Lave  been  already  violated. 
The  Lacedaemonians  added  that  after  the  herald  reached  Sparta,  they 
had  taken  no  farther  military  measures.  How  the  truth  stood  in  this 
disputed  question  we  have  no  means  of  deciding.  But  the  Eleians 
rejected  the  explanation,  though  offering,  if  the  Lacedaemonians 
would  restore  to  them  Lepreum,  to  forego  such  part  of  the  fine  as 
would  accrue  to  themselves,  and  to  pay  out  of  their  own  treasury  on 
Ik  half  of  the  Lacedaemonians  the  portion  which  belonged  to  the  god. 
This  new  proposition,  being  alike  refused,  was  again  modified  by  the 
Eleians.  They  intimated  that  they  would  be  satisfied  if  the  Lacedae- 
monians, instead  of  paying  the  line  at  once,  would  publicly,  on  the 
altar  at  Olympia,  in  presence  of  the  assembled  Greeks,  take  an  oath 
to  pay  it  at  a  future  date.  But  the  Lacedaemonians  would  not  listen 
to  the  proposition  either  of  payment  or  of  promise.  Accordingly, 
the  Eleians,  as  judges  under  the  Olympic  law,  interdicted  them  from 
the  temple  of  Olympic  Zeus,  from  the  privilege  of  sacrificing  there, 
aud  from  attendance  and  competition  at  the  games;  that   is,  from 


ALARM  LEST  THE  SPARTANS  COME  WITH  ARMS.     783 

attendance  in  the  form  of  sacred  legation  called  Theory,  occupying  a 
formal  aud  recognized  place  at  the  solemnity. 

As  all  the  other  Grecian  states  (with  the  single  exception  of 
Lepreum)  were  present  by  their  Theories  as  well  as  by  individual 
spectators,  so  the  Spartan  Theory  "  shone  by  its  absence"  in  a  man 
ner  painfully  and  insultingly  conspicuous.  So  extreme,  indeed,  was 
the  affront  put  upon  the  Lacedaemonians,  connected  as  they  were 
with  Olympia  by  a  tie  ancient,  peculiar,  and  never  yet  broken — so 

Eointed  the  evidence  of  that  comparative  degradation  into  which  they 
ad  fallen,  through  the  peace  with  Athens  coming  at  the  back  of  the 
Sphakterian  disaster — that  they  were  supposed  likely  to  set  the  exclu- 
sion at  defiance;  and  to  escort  their  Theors  into  the  temple  at  Olym- 
pia for  sacrifice,  under  the  protection  of  an  armed  force.  The  Elei- 
ans  even  thought  it  necessary  to  put  their  younger  hoplites  under 
arms,  and  to  summon  to  their  aid  1000  hoplites  from  Martiueia,  as 
well  as  the  same  number  from  Argos,  for  the  purpose  of  repelling 
this  probable  attack;  while  a  detachment  of  Athenian  cavalry  were 
stationed  at  Argos  during  the  festival,  to  lend  assistance  in  case  of 
need.  The  alarm  prevalent  among  the  spectators  of  the  festival  was 
most  serious,  and  became  considerably  aggravated  by  an  incident 
which  occurred  after  the  chariot-racing.  Lichas,  a  Lacedaemonian  of 
great  wealth  and  consequence,  had  a  chariot  running  in  the  lists, 
which  he  was  obliged  to  enter,  not  in  his  own  name,  but  in  the  name 
of  the  Boeotian  federation.  The  sentence  of  exclusion  hindered  him 
from  taking  any  ostensible  part,  but  it  did  not  hinder  him  from  being 
present  as  a  spectator;  and  when  he  saw  his  chariot  proclaimed  vic- 
torious under  the  title  of  Boeotian,  his  impatience  to  make  himself 
known  became  uncontrollable.  He  stepped  into  the  midst  of  the 
lists,  and  placed  a  chaplet  on  the  head  of  the  charioteer,  thus  adver- 
tising himself  as  the  master.  This  was  a  flagrant  indecorum,  and 
known  violation  of  the  order  of  the  festival:  accordingly,  the  official 
attendants  with  their  staffs  interfered  at  once  in  performance  of  their 
duty,  chastising  and  driving  him  back  to  his  place  with  blows. 
Hence  arose  an  increased  apprehension  of  armed  Lacedaemonian 
interference.  None  such  took  place,  however:  the  Lacedaemonians, 
for  the  first  and  last  time  in  their  history,  offered  their  Olympic  sac- 
rifice at  home,  and  the  festival  passed  off  without  any  interruption. 
The  boldness  of  the  Eleians  in  putting  this  affront  upon  the  most 
powerful  state  in  Greece  is  so  astonishing  that  we  can  hardly  be  mis- 
taken in  supposing  their  proceeding  to  have  been  suggested  bj  Alki- 
biades,  and  encouraged  by  the  armed  aid  from  the  allies.  He  was  at 
this  moment  not  less  ostentatious  in  humiliating  Sparta  than  in  show- 
ing off  Athens. 

Of  the  depressed  influence  and  estimation  of  Sparta,  a  farther 
proof  was  soon  afforded  by  the  fate  of  her  colony,  the  Trachinian 
Herakleia,  established  near  Thermopylae  in  the  third  year  of  the  war. 
That  colony — though  at  first  comprising  a  numerous  body  of  settlers, 


784  FROM  THE  FESTIVAL   OF   OLYMPIAD. 

in  consequence  of  the  genera]  trusl  in  Lacedaemonian  power,  and 
though  always  under  the  government  of  a  Lacedaemonian  harmost 
bad  never  prospered.  Ii  had  been  pei  ecuted  from  the  beginning  by 
the  neighboring  tribes,  and  administered  with  harshness  as  well  as 
peculation  by  its  governors.  The  establishment  of  the  town  had  been 
regarded  from  the  beginning  by  the  neighbors,  especially  the  Thes- 
salians,  as  an  invasion  of  their  territory;  and  their  hostilities,  always 
vexatious,  had.  in  the  winter  succeeding  the  Olympic  festival  just 
described,  been  carried  to  a  greater  poinl  of  violence  than  ever. 
They  had  defeated  the   Herakleots   in  a  ruinous  battle,  and  slain 

Xenares  the  Laci  d.enu  nii.ni  governor.      But  though  the  place  was  BO 

reduced  as  to  be  unable  to  maintain  itself  withoul  foreign  aid,  Sparta 
was  too  much  embarrassed  by  Peloponnesian  enemies  and  waverers 
to  he  able  in  succor  it;  and  the  Boeotians,  observing  her  inability, 
became  apprehensive  that  the  interference  of  Athens  would  lie 
invoked.  Accordingly  they  thought  it  prudent  to  occupy  Herakleia 
with  a  body  of  Boeotian  troops;  dismissing  the  Lacedaemonian 
governor  Hegesippidas  for  alleged  misconduct.  IS'or  could  the  Lace- 
daemonians prevent  this  proceeding,  though  it  occasioned  them  to 
make  indignant  remonstrance. 


CHAPTER  LVI. 

FROM  THE  FESTIVAL   OF    OLYMFIAD    90,    DOWN     TO   THE   BATTLE   OF 
MANTIXEIA. 

Shortly  after  the  remarkable  events  of  the  Olympic  festival 
described  in  my  last  chapter,  the  Argeians  and  their  allies  sent  afresh 
embassy  to  invite  the  Corinthians  to  join  them.  They  thought  it  a 
promising  opportunity,  after  the  affront  ]U8t  put  upon  Sparta,  to 
prevail  upon  the  Corinthians  to  desert  her:  but  Spartan  envoys  wen: 
present  also,  and  though  the  discussions  were  much  protracted,  no 
new  resolution  wasadopted.  An  earthquake — possibly  an  earthquake 
not  real,  but  simulated  for  convenience — abruptly  terminated  tkk 
congress.  The  Corinthians — though  seemingly  distrusting  Argoa 
now  that  she  was  united  with  Athens,  and  leaning  rather  toward 
Sparta — were  unwilling  to  pronounce  themselves  in  favor  of  one  so 
us  to  make  an  enemy  of  the  other. 

In  spite  of  this  first  failure,  the  new  alliance  of  Alliens  and  Argos 
manifested  its  fruits  vigorously  in  the  ensuing  spring.  I'nderthe 
inspirations  of  Alkibiades,  Athens  was  aboul  ipi   the  n&w 

experiment  of  seeking  to  obtain  intra-Peloponnesian  followers  and 
influence.  At  the  beginning  of  the  war  she  had  been  maritime  defen- 
sive,   and  simply    conservative,   under  the    guidance   of  Periklea 


NEW  POLICY   OF   ATHENS.  785 

Afler  the  events  of  Sphakteria,  she  made  use  of  thai  great  advantage 
to  aim  at  the  recovery  of  Megara  and  Bosotia,  which  she  had  before 
been  compelled  to  abandon  by  the  Thirty  Years'  truce— at  the  recom 
mendation  of  Kleon.  In  this  attempt  she  employed  the  eighth  y>  ir 
of  the  war,  but  with  signal  ill  success;  while  Brasidas  during  that 
period  broke  open  the  gates  of  her  maritime  empire,  and  robbed  hi  r 
of  many  important  dependencies.  The  grand  objectof  Athens  then 
became,  to  recover  these  lost  dependencies,  especially  Amphipolis: 
Nikias  and  his  partisans  sought  to  effect  such  recovery  by  making 
peace,  while  Kleon  and  his  supporters  insisted  that  it  could  never  be 
achieved  except  by  military  efforts.  The  expedition  under  Kleon 
against  Amphipolis  had  failed — the  peace  concluded  by  Nikias 
had  failed  also:  Athens  had  surrendered  her  capital  advantage  with- 
out regaining  Amphipolis;  and  if  she  wished  to  regain  it,  there  was 
no  alternative  except  to  repeat  the  attempt  which  lad  failed  under 
Kleon.  And  this  perhaps  she  might  have  done  (as  we  shall  find  her 
projecting  to  do  in  the  course  of  about  four  years  forward),  it'  it  had 
not  been,  first,  that  the  Athenian  mind  was  now  probably  sick  and 
disheartened  about  Amphipolis,  iu  consequence  of  the  prodigious 
disgrace  so  recently  undergone  there ;  next,  that  Alkibiades,  the  new- 
chief  adviser  or  prime  minister  of  Athens  (if  we  may  be  allowed  to 
use  an  inaccurate  expression,  -which  yet  suggests  the  reality  of  the 
ease),  was  prompted  by  his  personal  impulses  to  turn  the  stream  of 
Athenian  ardor  into  a  different  channel.  Full  of  antipathy  to  Sparta, 
he  regarded  the  interior  of  Peloponnesus  as  her  most  vulnerable 
point,  especially  in  the  present  disjointed  relations  of  its  component 
cities.  Moreover,  his  personal  thirst  for  glory  was  better  gratified 
amid  the  center  of  Grecian  life  than  by  undertaking  an  expedition 
into  a  distant  and  barbarous  region :  lastly,  he  probably  recollected 
with  discomfort  the  hardships  and  extreme  cold  (insupportable  to  all 
except  the  iron  frame  of  Sokrates)  which  he  had  himself  endured  at 
the  blockade  of  Potidaea  twelve  years  before,  and  which  any  arma- 
ment destined  to  conquer  Amphipolis  would  have  to  go  through 
again.  It  was  under  these  impressions  that  he  now  began  to  press 
bis  intra-Peloponnesian  operations  against  Lacedsemon,  with  the 
view  of  organizing  a  counter-alliance  under  Argos  sufficient  to  keep 
her  in  check,  and  at  any  rate  to  nullify  her  power  of  carrying  inva- 
sion beyond  the  isthmus.  All  this  was  to  be  done  without  ostensibly 
breaking  the  peace  and  alliance  between  Athens  and  Lacedaemon, 
which  stood  in  conspicuous  letters  on  pillars  erected  in  both  cities. 

Coming  to  Argos  at  the  head  of  a  few  Athenian  hoplites  and  bow- 
men, and  re-enforced  by  Peloponnesian  allies,  Alkibiades  exhibited 
the  spectacle  of  an  Athenian  general  traversing  the  interior  of  the 
peninsula,  and  imposing  his  own  arrangements  in  various  quarters 
— a  spectacle  at  that  moment  new  and  striking.  He  first  turned  his 
attention  to  the  Achsean  towms  in  the  north-west,  where  he  persuaded 
the  inhabitants  of  Patrye  to  ally  themselves  with  Athens,  and  even  to 

■••        -   < 


786  FROM  TI1E  FESTIVAL  OF  OLYMPIAD. 

undertake  the  labor  of  connecting  their  town  with  the  Bea  by  means 

of  long  walls,  bo  as  to  place  themselves  within  the  protection  of 
Athens  from  seaward,  lie  farther  projected  the  erection  of  a  fori  and 
the  formation  of  a  naval  station  at  the  extreme  point  of  Cape  Rbium, 
just  at  the  narrow  entrance  of  the  Corinthian  Gnlf;  whereby  the 

Athenians,  who  already    possessed    Hie   opposite  shore    by   means  of 

Naupaktue,  would  have  become  masters  of  the  commerce  of  the 

Gulf.      But  the  Corinthians  and  Sikyonians.  to  whom  this  would  have 

been  a  serious  mischief,  dispatched  force-  enough  to  prevent  the 
consummation  of  the  scheme — and  probably  also  to  hinder  the  erec 
tion  of  the  walls  at  Patraa.  Yet  the  march  of  Alkibiades  doubtless 
strengthened  the  anti-Laconian  interest  throughout  the  Achaean  coast. 

He  then  returned  to  take  part  with  tin-  Argeians  in  a  war  against 
Epidaurus.  To  acquire  possession  of  this  city  would  much  facilitate 
the  communication  between  Athens  and  AxgOS,  since  it  was  not  only 
immediately  opposite  to  the  island  of  yEgina,  now  occupied  bj  the 
Athenians, 'imi  also  opened  to  the  latter  an  access  by  land,  dispens- 
ing with  the  labor  of  circumnavigating  Cape  Skyllseum  (the  south- 
eastern point  of  the  Argeian  and  Epidaurian  peninsula)  whenever 
they  sent  forces  to  Argos.  Moreover,  the  territory  of  Epidaurus 
bordered  to  the  north  on  that  of  Corinth,  so  thai  the  possession  of  it 
would  bean  additional  guarantee  for  the  neutrality  of  the  Corinthians. 
Accordingly  it  was  resolved  to  attack  Epidaurus,  for  which  a  pre- 
text was  easily  found.     As  presiding  and  administering  state  of  the 

temple  of  Apollo  PythaeUS  (situated  within  the  wall-  of  ArgOS),  the 
Argeians  enjoyed  a  sort  of-  religious  supremacy  over  Epidaurus  and 
other  neighboring  cities — seemingly  the  remnant  of  that  extensive 
supremacy,  political  as  well  as  religious,  which  in  early  times  had 
been  theirs.  The  Kpidaurians  owed  to  this  temple  certain  sacrifices 
and  other  ceremonial  obligations — one  of  which,  arising  out  of  some 
circumstance  which  we  cannot  understand,  was  now  din;  and  unper 
formed:  at  least  so  the  Argeians  alleged.  Such  default  imposed  upon 
them  the  duty  of  getting  together  a  military  force  to  attack  the 
Epidaurians  and  enforce  the  obligation. 

Their  invading  march,  however,  was  for  a  time  suspended  by  the 
news  that  king  Agis,  with  the  full  force  of  Laceda-mon  and  her  allies, 
had  advanced  as  far  as  Leuktra,  one  of  the  border  towns  of  Laconia 
on  the  north-west,  toward  Mount  Lykseum  and  the  Arcadian  Parr- 
hasii.  What  this  movement  meant,  was  known  only  to  Agis  himself, 
who  did  not  even  explain  the  purpose  to  his  own  soldiers  or  officers, 
or  allies.  But  the  sacrifice  constantly  offered  before  passing  the 
border  was  found  so  unfavorable  that  he  abandoned  his  march  \'<>r 
the  present  and  returned  home.  The  month  Karneius,  a  period  of 
truce  as  well  as  religious  festival  among  the  Dorian  slates,  being  now 
at  hand,  he  directed  the  allies  to  hold  themselves  prepared  for  an 
outmarch  as  soon  as  that  month  had  expired. 

On  being  informed  that  Agis  had  dismissed  his  troops,  the  Argei- 


THE  ARGEIAN  CALENDAR.  787 

ans  prepared  to  execute  their  invasion  of  Epidaurus.  The  day  on 
which  they  se1  out  was  already  the  26th  of  the  month  preceding  the 
Karneiau  mouth,  so  that  there  remained  only  three  days  before  the 
commencement  of  that  latter  month  with  its  lmlv  truce,  binding 

upon  the  religious  feelings  of  the  Dorian  stairs  generally,  to  which 
Argos,  Sparta,  aud  Epidaurus  all  belonged.  But  the  Argeians  made 
use  of  that  very  peculiarity  of  the  season, which  was  accounted  likely 
to  keep  them  at  home,  to  facilitate  their  scheme,  bj  playing  a  trick 
with  the  calendar,  and  proclaiming  one  of  those  arbitrary  interfer- 
ences with  the  reckouing  of  time  which  the  Greeks  occasionally  em- 
ployed to  correct  the  ever-recurrini;'  confusion  of  their  lunar  - 
Having  begun  their  march  on  the  26fchof  themonth  before  Earn*  ius, 
the  Argeians  called  each  succeeding  day  si  ill  the  26th,  thus  disal- 
lowing the  lapse  of  time,  and  pretending  that  the  Karneiau  month 
had  not  yet  commenced.  This  proceeding  was  further  facilitated  by 
the  circumstance  that  their  allies  of  Athens,  Elis,  and  Mantineia, 
not  being  Dorians,  were  under  no  obligation  to  observe  the  Karneiau 
truce.  Accordingly  the  army  marched  from  Argos  into  the  territory 
of  Epidaurus,  and  spent  seemingly  a  fortnight  or  three  weeks  in  lay- 
ing it  waste;  all  this  time  being  really,  according  to  the  reckoning  of 
the  other  Dorian  states,  part  of  the  Karneiau  truce,  which  the  Argei- 
ans, adopting  their  own  arbitrary  computation  of  time,  professed  not 
to  be  violating.  The  Epidaurians,  unable  to  meet  them  single-handed 
in  the  field,  invoked  the  aid  of  their  allies,  who  however  had  already 
been  summoned  by  Sparta  for  the  succeeding  month,  and  did  not 
choose,  any  more  than  the  Spartans,  to  move  during  the  Karneiau 
month  itself.  Some  allies  however,  perhaps  the  Corinthians,  came 
as  far  as  the  Epidaurian  border,  hut  did  not  feel  themselves  strong 
enough  to  lend  aid  by  entering  the  territory'  alone. 

Meanwnile  the  Athenians  had  convoked  another  congress  of  depu- 
ties at  Mantineia,  for  the  purpose  of  discussing  propositions  of  peace: 
perhaps  this  may  have  been  a  point  carried  by  Nikias  at  Athens,  in 
spite  of  Alkibiades.  What  other  deputies  attended,  we  are  not  told: 
but  Euphamidas,  coming  as  envoy  from  Corinth,  animadverted,  even 
at  the  opening  of  the  debates,  upon  the  inconsistency  of  assembling 
a  peace  congress  while  war  was  actually  raging  in  the  Epidaurian 
territory.  So  much  were  the  Athenian  deputies  struck  with  this 
observation,  that  they  departed,  persuaded  the  Argeians  to  retire 
from  Epidaurus,  and  then  came  back  to  resume  negotiations.  Still, 
however,  the  pretensions  of  both  parties  were  found  irreconcilable, 
aud  the  congress  broke  up;  upon  which  the  Argeians  again  returned 
to  renew  their  devastations  in  Epidaurus,  while  the  Lacedaemonians, 
immediately  on  the  expiration  of  the  Karneian  month,  marched  out 
again,  as  far  as  their  border  town  of  KaryaS,  but  were  again  arrested 
and  forced  to  return  by  unfavorable  border-sacrifices.  Intimation  of 
their  out-march,  however,  was  transmitted  to  Athens;  upon  which 
Alkibiades,  at  the  head  of  1000  Athenian  hopliles,  was  sent  to  join 


788  FRn.M   THE  FESTIVAL  OF  OLYMPIAD. 

the  Argeians.  But  before  he  arrived  the  Lacedemonian  army  had 
already  disbanded:  so  that  hi-  services  were  no  longer  required, 
and  the  Argeians  carried  their  ravages  over  one-third  of  the  territory 
of  Epidaurus  before  they  at  length  evacuated  it. 

The  Epidaurians  wen'  re-enforced  aboul  the  end  of  September  by 
a  detachment  of  800  Lacedaemonian  hoplites  under  Agesippidas,  sent 
by  sea  without  the  knowledge  of  the  Athenians.  Oi  this  the  Argei- 
ans preferred  loud  complaints  at  Athens.  They  had  good  reason  to 
condemn  the  negligence  of  the  Athenians  as  allies,  for  not  having 
kepi  better  naval  watch  at  their  neighboring  station  of  vEgina,  and 
for  having  allowed  this  enemy  to  enter  the  harbor  of  Epidaurus. 
But  they  took  another  ground  of  complaint  somewhat  remarkable. 
In  the  alliance  between  Athens,  Argos,  Wis,  and  Mantineia,  it  had 
hi  n  stipulated  that  neither  of  the  four  should  suffer  the  passage  of 
troops  through  its  territory  without  the  joint  consent  of  all.  Now 
the  N  a  was  accounted  a  part  of  the  territory  of  Athens:  so  that  the 
Athenians  had  violated  this  article  of  the  treaty  by  permitting  the 
Lacedaemonians  to  send  troops  by  sea  to  Epidaurus.  And  the  Argei- 
ans now  required  Athens,  in  compensation  for  this  wrong,  to  carry 
back  the  Mc-scnians  and  Helots  from  Kephallenia  to  Pylus,  and 
allow  them  to  ravage  Laconia.  The  Athenians,  under  the  persua- 
sion Alkibiades,  complied  with  their  requisition;  inscribing,  at  Hie 
foot  of  the  pillar  on  which  their  alliance  with  Sparta  stood  recorded, 
that  the  Lacedaemonians  had  not  observed  their  oaths.  Neverthe- 
less they  still  abstained  from  formally  throwing  up  their  treaty 
with  Lacedsemon,  or  breaking  it  in  any  other  way.  The  relations 
between  Athens  and  Sparta  thus  remained,  in  name — peace  ami 
alliance — so  far  as  concerns  direct  operations  against  each  other's 
territory;  in  reality — hostile  action  as  well  as  hostile  maneuvering, 
against  each  other,  as  allies  respectively  of  third  parties. 

The  Argeians,  after  having  prolonged  their  incursions  on  the  Epi- 
daurian  territory  throughout  all  the  autumn,  made  in  the  winter  an 
unavailing  attempt  to  take  thetowm  itself  by  stcrm.  Though  there  was 
no  considerable  action,  but  merely  a  succession  of  desultory  attacks, 
in  some  of  which  Hie  Epidaurians  even  had  the  advantage,  yet  they 
still  suffered  serious  hardship,  and  pressed  their  case  forcibly  on  the 
sympathy  of  Sparta.  Thus  importuned,  and  mortified  as  well  as 
alarmed  by  the  increasing  defection  or  coldness  which  they  now 
experienced  throughout  Peloponnesus,  the  Lacedaemonians  deter 
mini  d,  during  the  course  of  the  ensuing  summer,  to  put  forth  their 
strength  vigorously,  and  win  back  their  lost  ground. 

Toward  the  month  of  June  (b.c.  418),  they  marched  with  their 
full  force,  freemen  as  well  as  Helots,  under  King  Agis,  against 
Argos.  The  Tegeans  and  other  Arcadian  allies  joined  them  on  the 
march,  while  their  other  allies  near  the  Isthmus— Btt'otians.  Mega- 
rians,  Corinthians,  Sikyonians,  Philasians,  etc. — were  directed  to 
ible  at  Phlius.     The  number  of  these  latter  allies  was  very  con- 


APPROACH  OF  THE  INVADERS  TO  ARGOS.  789 

siclerable— for  we  hear  of  5,000  Boeotian  hoplites,  and  2,000  Corin- 
thian: the  Boeotians  had  with  them  also  5,000  light-armed,  500  horse- 
men, and  500  foot-soldiers,  who  ran  alongside  of  the  horsemen.  The 
numbers  of  the  rest,  or  of  Spartans  themselves,  we  do  not  know;  nor 
probably  did  Thucydides  himself  know:  for  we  find  him  remarking 
elsewhere  the  impenetrable  concealment  of  the  Lacedaemonians  on 
all  public  affairs,  in  reference  to  the  numbers  al  the  subsequent 
battle  of  Mantineia.  Such  muster  of  the  Lacedaemonian  alliance 
was  no  secret  to  the  Argeians,  who  marching  firsl  to  Mantineia,  and 
there  taking  up  the  force  of  that  city  as  well  as  3,000  Elian  hoplites 
who  came  to  join  them,  met  the  Lacedaemonians  in  their  march  at 
Methydrium  in  Arcadia.  The  two  armies  being  posted  on  opposite 
hills,  the  Argeians  had  resolved  to  attack  Agis  the  next  day,  so  as  to 
prevent  him  from  joining  his  allies  at  Phlius.  But  he  eluded  this 
separate  encounter  by  decamping  in  the  night,  reached  Phlius,  and 
operated  his  junction  in  safety.  We  do  not  hear  that  there  was  in 
the  Lacedaemonian  army  any  commander  of  lochus,  who,  copying  the 
unreasonable  punctilio  of  Amompharetus  before  the  battle  of  Plataea, 
refused  to  obey  the  order  of  retreat  before  the  enemy,  to  the  immi- 
nent risk  of  the  whole  army.  And  the  fact  that  no  similar  incident 
occurred  now,  may  be  held  to  prove  that  the  Lacedaemonians  had 
acquired  greater  familiarity  with  the  exigencies  of  actual  warfare. 

As  soon  as  the  Lacedaemonian  retreat  was  known  in  the  morning, 
the  Argeians  left  their  position  also,  and  marched  with  their  allies, 
first  to  Argos  itself,  next  to  Nemea,  on  the  ordinary  road  from 
Corinth  and  Phlius  to  Argos,  by  which  they  imagined  that  the 
invaders  would  approach.  But  Agis  acted  differently.  Distributing 
his  force  into  three  divisions,  he  himself  with  the  Lacedaemonians  and 
Arcadians,  taking  a  short  but  very  rugged  and  difficult  road,  crossed 
the  ridge  of  the  mountains  and  descended  straight  into  the  plain  near 
Argos.  The  Corinthians,  Pellenians,  and  Phliasians  were  directed 
to  follow  another  mountain  road,  which  entered  the  same  plain  upon 
a  different  point:  while  the  Boeotians,  Corinthians,  and  Sikyonians 
followed  the  longer,  more  even,  and  more  ordinary  route,  by  Nemea. 
This  route,  though  apparently  frequented  and  convenient,  led  for  a 
considerable  distance  along  a  narrow  ravine  called  the  Tretus,  bounded 
on  each  side  by  mountains.  The  united  army  under  Agis  was  much 
superior  in  number  to  the  Argeians:  but  if  all  had  marched  in  one 
line  by  the  frequented  route  through  the  narrow  Tretus,  their  superi- 
ority of  number  would  have  been  of  little  use,  whilst  the  Argeians 
woiild  have  had  a  position  highly  favorable  to  their  defense.  By 
dividing  his  force,  and  takingt  he  mountain  road  with  his  own  divis- 
ion, Agis  got  into  the  plain  of  Argos  in  the* rear  of  the  Axgeian  posi- 
tion at  Nemea.  He  anticipated  that  when  the  Argeians  saw  him 
devastating  their  properties  near  the  city,  they  would  forthwith  quit 
the  advantageous  ground  near  Nemea  to  come  and  attack  him  in  the 
plain:  the  Boeotian  division  would  thus  find  the  road  by  Nemea  and 


790  FROM  THE  FESTIVAL  OF  OLYMPIAD. 

the  Trrlns  open,  and  would  lie  able  to  march  without  resistance  into 
the  plain  of  ArgOS,  where  their  numerous  cavalry  would  act  with 
effect  against  the  Argeians  engaged  in  attacking  Agia  This  triple 
march  was  executed.  Agie  with  his  division,  and  the  Corinthians 
with  theirs,  got  across  the  mountains  into  the  Argeian  plain  during 
tlic  night;  while  the  Argeians,  bearing  a1  daybreak  that  he  was  near 
their  city,  ravaging  Saminthus  and  other  places,  left  their  position  at 
Nemea  to  come  down  to  the  plain  and  attack  him.  In  their  march 
they  had  a  partial  skirmish  with  the  Corinthian  division,  which,  hav- 
ing reached  a  high  ground  immediately  above  the  Argeian  plain,  was 
found  nearly  in  the  road.  But  this  affair  was  indecisive,  and  they 
Soon  found  themselves  in  the  plain  near  to  Agis  and  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians, who  lay  between  them  and  their  city. 

On  both  sides  the  armies  were  marshaled,  and  order  taken  for 
battle.  But  the  situation  of  the  Argeians  was  in  reality  little  less 
than  desperate:  for  while  they  had  Agis  and  his  division  in  their 
front,  the  Corinthian  detachment  was  near  enough  to  lake  them 
in  Hank,  and  the  Boeotians  marching  along  the  undefended  road 
through  the  Tretus  would  attack  them  in  the  rear.  The  Boeotian 
cavalry,  too,  would  act  with  full  effect  upon  them  in  the  plain,  since 
neither  Argos,  Elis,  nor  Mantineia  seem  to  have  possessed  any  horse- 
men: a  description  of  force  which  ought  to  have  been  sent  from 
Athens,  though  from  some  cause  which  does  not  appear,  the  Athe- 
nian contingent  had  not  yet  arrived.  Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  a  posi- 
tion so  very  critical,  both  the  Argeians  and  their  altics  were  elate 
with  confidence  and  impatience  for  battle;  thinking  only  of  the 
division  of  Agis  immediately  in  their  front  which  appeared  to  be 
inclosed  between  them  and  their  city — and  taking  no  heed  to  the 
other  formidable  enemies  in  their  flank  and  rear.  But  the  Argeian 
generals  were  better  aware  than  their  soldiers  of  the  real  danger:  and 
just  as  the  two  armies  were  about  to  charge,  Alkiphron,  proxenus  of 
the  Lacedaemonians  at  Argos,  accompanied  Thrasyllus,  one  of  the 
five  generals  of  the  Argeians,  to  a  separate  parley  with  Agis,  without 
consultation  or  privity  on  the  part  of  their  own  army.  They  exhorted 
Agis  not  to  force  on  a  battle,  assuring  him  that  the  Argeians  were 
ready  both  to  give  and  receive  equitable  satisfaction,  in  all  matters 
of  complaint  which  the  Lacedaemonians  might  urge  against  them — 
and  to  conclude  a  just  peace  for  the  future.  Agis,  at  once  acquies- 
cing in  the  proposal,  granted  them  a  truce  of  four  months  to  accom- 
plish what  they  had  promised.  He  on  his  part  also  took  this  step 
without  consulting  either  his  army  or  his  allies,  simply  addressing  a 
few  words  of  confidential  talk  to  one  of  the  official  Spartans  near  him. 
Immediately  he  gave  the  order  for  retreat,  and  the  army,  instead  of 
being  led  to  battle,  was  conducted  out  of  the  Argeian  territory, 
through  the  Nemean  road  whereby  the  Boeotians  had  just  been  enter- 
ing. But  it  required  all  the  habitual  discipline  of  Lacedaemonian 
soldiers  to  make  them  obey  this  order  of  the  Spartan  king,  alike 


ARRIVAL  OF  ALKIBIADES.  791 

unexpected  and  unwelcome.  For  the  army  were  fully  sensible  both 
of  the  prodigious  advantages  of  their  position,  and  of  the  overwhelm- 
ing strength  of  the  invading  force,  so  that  all  the  three  divisions 
were  loud  in  their  denunciations  of  Agis,  and  penetrated  with  shame 

at  the  thoughts  of  so  disgraceful  a  retreat.  And  when  they  all  saw 
themselves  in  one  united  body  at  Nemea,  previous  to  breaking  up 
and  going  home — so  as  to  have  before  their  eyes  their  own  full  num- 
bers and  the  complete  equipment  of  one  of  the  finest  Hellenic  armies 
which  had  ever  been  assembled — the  Argeian  body  of  allies,  before 
whom  they  were  now  retiring,  appeared  contemptible  in  the  com- 
parison, and  they  separated  with  yet  warmer  and  more  universal 
indignation  against  the  king  who  had  betrayed  their  cause. 

On  returning  home,  Agis  incurred  not  less  blame  from  the  Spartan 
authorities  than  from  his  own  army,  for  having  thrown  away  so  admi- 
rable an  opportunity  of  subduing  Argos.  This  was  assuredly  no  more 
than  he  deserved:  but  we  read,  with  no  small  astonishment,  that  the 
Argeians  and  their  allies  on  returning  were  even  more  exasperated 
against Thrasyllus,  whom  they  accused  of  having  traitorously  thrown 
away  a  certain  victory.  They  had  indeed  good  ground,  in  the  received 
practice,  to  censure  him  for  having  concluded  a  truce  without  taking 
the  sense  of  the  people.  It  was  their  custom,  on  returning  from  a 
march,  to  hold  a  public  court-martial  before  entering  the  city,  a1  a 
place  called  the  Charadrus  or  winter  torrent  near  the  walls,  lor  the 
purpose  of  adjudicating  on  offenses  and  faults  committed  in  tho 
army.  Such  was  their  wrath  on  this  occasion  against  Thrasyllus 
that  they  would  scarcely  be  prevailed  upon  even  to  put  him  upon  his 
trial,  but  began  to  stone  him.  He  was  forced  to  seek  personal  safety 
at  the  altar;  upon  which  the  soldiers  tried  him,  and  he  Avas  con- 
demned to  have  his  property  confiscated, 

Very  shortly  afterward  the  expected  Athenian  contingent  arrived, 
which  probably  ought  to  have  come  earlier:  1000  hoplites,  with  300 
horsemen,  under  Laches  and  Nikostratus.  Alkibiades  came  as 
ambassador,  probably  serving  as  a  soldier  also  among  the  horsemen. 
The  Argeians,  notwithstanding  their  displeasure  against  Thrasyllus, 
nevertheless  felt  themselves  pledged  to  observe  the  truce  which  he 
had  concluded,  and  their  magistrates  accordingly  desired  the  newly- 
arrived  Athenians  to  depart.  Nor  was  Alkibiades  even  permitted  to 
approach  and  address  the  public  assembly,  until  the  Mantineian  and 
Eleian  allies  insisted  that  thus  much  at  least  should  not  be  refused. 
An  assembly  was  therefore  convened,  in  which  these  allies  took  part, 
along  with  the  Argeians.  Alkibiades  contended  strenuously  that  the 
recent  truce  with  the  Lacedaemonians  was  null  and  void;  since  it  had 
been  contracted  without  the  privity  of  all  the  allies,  distinctly  at  vari- 
ance with  the  terms  of  the  alliance.  He  therefore  called  upon  them 
to  resume  military  operations  forthwith,  in  conjunction  with  the  re- 
enforcement  now  seasonably  arrived.  His  speech  so  persuaded  the 
assembly,  that  the  Mantineians  and  Eleians  consented  at  once  to  join 


792  FROM  THE  FESTIVAL  OF  OLYMPIAD. 

him  in  an  expedition  against  the  Arcadian  town  of  Orchomenus;  the 
Argeians,  also,  though  at  first  reluctant,  very  speedily  followed  them 
thither.  Orchomenus  was  a  place  important  to  acquire,  not  merely 
because  its  territory  joined  that  of  Mantineia  on  the  northward,  but 
because  the  Lacedaemonians  had  deposited  therein  the  hostages  which 
they  had  taken  from  Arcadian  townships  and  villages  as  guarantee 
for  fidelity.  Its  walls  were,  however,  in  bad  condition,  and  itsinhab- 
itants,  after  a  short  resistance,  capitulated.  They  agreed  to  become 
allies  of  Mantineia — to  furnish  hostages  for  faithful  adhesion  to  such 
alliance — and  to  deliver  up  the  hostages  deposited  with  them  by 
Sparta. 

Encouraged  by  first  success,  the  allies  debated  what  they  should 
next  undertake.  The  Eleians  contended  strenuously  for  a  march 
against  Lepreum,  while  the  Mantineians  were  anxious  to  attack  their 
enemy  and  neighbor  Tegea.  The  Argeians  and  Athenians  preferred 
the  latter — incomparably  the  more  important  enterprise  of  the  two: 
but  such  was  the  disgust  of  the  Eleians  at  the  rejection  of  their  prop- 
osition, that  they  abandoned  the  army  altogether,  and  went  home. 
Notwithstanding  their  desertion,  however,  the  remaining  allies  con- 
tinued together  at  Mantineia  organizing  their  attack  upon  Tegea,  in 
which  city  they  had  a  strong  favorable  party,  who  had  actually  laid 
their  plans,  and  were  on  the  point  of  proclaiming  the  revolt  of  the 
city  from  Sparta,  when  the  philo-Laconian  Tegeans  just  saved  them- 
selves by  dispatching  an  urgent  message  to  Sparta  and  receiving  the 
most  rapid  succor.  The  Lacedaemonians,  filled  with  indignation  at  the 
news  of  the  surrender  of  Orchomenus,  vented  anew  all  their  displeas- 
ure against  Agis,  whom  they  now  threatened  with  the  severe  punish- 
ment of  demolishing  his  house  and  fining  him  in  the  sum  of  100,000 
drachmae  or  about  27$  Attic  talents.  He  urgently  entreated  that  an 
opportunity  might  be  afforded  to  him  of  redeeming  by  some  brave 
deed  the  ill  name  which  he  had  incurred:  if  he  failed  in  doing  so, 
then  they  might  inflict  upon  him  what  penalty  they  chose.  The 
penalty  was  accordingly  withdrawn:  but  a  restriction,  new  to  the 
Spartan  constitution,  was  now  placed  upon  the  authority  of  the  king. 
It  had  been,  before,  a  part  of  his  prerogative  to  lead  out  the  army 
single-handed  and  on  his  own  authority;  but  a  council  of  Ten  was 
now  named,  without  whose  concurrence  he  was  interdicted  from 
exercising  such  power. 

To  the  great,  good  fortune  of  Agis,  the  pressing  message  now 
arrived  announcing  imminent  revolt  of  Tegea — the  most  important 
ally  of  Sparta,  and  close  upon  her  border.  Such  was  the  alarm  occa- 
sioned by  this  news,  that  the  whole  military  population  instantly 
started  off  to  relieve  the  place,  Agis  at  their  head — the  most  rapid 
movement  ever  known  to  have  been  made  by  Lacedaemonian  soldiers. 
When  they  arrived  at  Orestheium  in  Arcadia  in  their  way,  perhaps 
hearing  that  the  danger  was  somewhat  less  pressing,  they"  sent  back 
to  Sparta  one-sixth  part  of  the  forces,  for  home  defense — the  oldest 


NEW  POSITION  OF  THE  ARGEIANS.  793 

as  well  as  the  youngest  men.  The  remainder  marched  forward  to 
Tegea,  where  they  were  speedily  join'd  by  their  Arcadian  allies. 
They  farther  sent  messages  to  the  Corinthians  and  Boeotians,  as  well 
as  to  the  Phokians,  and  Lokriaus,  invoking  the  immediate  presence 
of  these  contingents  in  the  territory  of  Mantineia.  The  arrival  of 
such  re-enforcements,  however,  even  with  all  possible  zeal  on  the 
part  of  the  cities  contributing,  could  not  be  looked  for  without  some 
lapse  of  time ;  the  rather  as  it  appears  that  they  could  not  get  into 
the  territory  of  Mantineia  except  by  passing  through  that  of  Argos — 
which  could  not  be  safely  attempted  until  they  had  all  formed  a 
junction.  Accordingly  Agis,  impatient  to  redeem  his  reputation, 
marched  at  once  with  the  Lacedaemonians  and  the  Arcadian  allies 
present  into  the  territory  of  Mantineia,  and  took  up  a  position  near 
the  Herakleiou  or  temple  of  Herakles,  from  whence  he  began  to  ravage 
the  neighboring  lands.  The  Argeians  and  their  allies  presently  came 
forth  from  Mantineia,  planted  themselves  near  him,  but  on  very 
rugged  and  impracticable  ground — and  thus  offered  him  battle. 
Nothing  daunted  by  the  difficulties  of  the  position,  he  marshaled 
his  army  and  led  it  up  to  attack  them.  His  rashness  on  the  present 
occasion  might  have  produced  as  much  mischief  as  his  inconsiderate 
concession  to  Thrasyllus  near  Argos,  had  not  an  ancient  Spartan 
called  out  to  him  that  he  was  now  merely  proceeding  "to  heal  mis- 
chief by  mischief."  So  forcibly  was  Agis  impressed  either  with  this 
timely  admonition,  or  by  the  closer  view  of  the  position  which  he 
had  undertaken  to  assault,  that  he  suddenly  halted  the  army,  and 
gave  orders  for  retreat — though  actually  within  distance  no  greater 
than  the  cast  of  a  javelin,  from  the  enemy. 

His  march  was  now  inteuded  to  draw  the  Argeians  away  from  the 
difficult  ground  which  they  occupied.  On  the  frontier  between 
Mantineia  and  Tegea — both  situated  on  a  lofty  but  inclosed  plain, 
drained  only  by  katabothra  or  natural  subterranean  channels  in  the 
mountains — was  situated  a  head  of  water,  the  regular  efflux  of  which 
seems  to  have  been  kept  up  by  joint  operations  of  both  cities  for  their 
mutual  benefit.  Thither  Agis  now  conducted  his  army,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  turning  the  water  toward  the  side  of  Mantineia,  where  it 
would  occasion  serious  damage ;  calculating  that  the  Mantineians  and 
their  allies  would  certainly  descend  from  their  position  to  hinder  it. 
No  stratagem,  however,  was  necessary  to  induce  the  latter  to  adopt 
this  resolution.  For  so  soon  as  they  saw  the  Lacedaemonians,  after 
advancing  to  the  foot  of  the  hill,  first  suddenly  halt — next  retreat — 
and  lastly  disappear — their  surprise  was  very  great;  and  this  surprise 
was  soon  converted  into  contemptuous  confidence  and  impatience  to 
pursue  the  flying  enemy.  The  generals,  not  sharing  such  confidence, 
hesitated  at  first  to  quit  their  secure  position :  upon  which  the  troops 
became  clamorous,  and  loudly  denounced  them  for  treason  in  letting 
the  Lacedaemonians  quietly  escape  a  second  time,  as  they  had  before 
done  near  Argos.     These  generals  would  probably  not  be  the  same 


794  FROM  THE  FESTIVAL  OF  OLYMPIAD. 

with  those  who  had  incurred,  a  short  time  before,  so  much  unde- 
served censure  for  their  convention  with  Agis:  but  the  murmurs  on 
the  present  occasion,  bardlj  less  unreasonable,  drove  them,  not  withoul 
considerable  shame  and  confusion  to  give  orders  for  advance.  They 
abandoned  the  hill,  inarched  down  into  the  plain  so  as  to  approach 
the  Lacedaemonians,  and  employed  the  next  day  in  arranging  tbem- 
in  good  battle  order,  so  as  to  be  ready  to  light  at  a  moment's 
notice. 

Meanwhile  it  appears  that  Agis  had  found  himself  disappointed  in 

his  operations  upon  the  water.  lie  had  either  not  done  so  much 
damage,  or  not  spread  so  much  terror,  as  he  had  expected:  and  he 
accordingly  desisted,  putting  himself  again  in  march  to  resume  his 
position  at  the  Herakleion,  and  supposing  that  bis  enemies  still 
retained  their  position  on  the  hill.  Bui  in  the  course  of  his  march  he 
came  suddenly  upon  the  Argeian  and  allied  army  where  he  was  not 
in  the  least  prepared  to  see  them.  They  were  not  only  in  the  plain, 
but  already  drawn  up  in  perfect  order  of  battle.  The  Mantineians 
occupied  the  right  wing,  the  post  of  honor,  because  the  ground  was 
in  their  territory:  next  to  them  stood  their  dependent  Arcadian  allies: 
then  the  chosen  Thousand  regiment  of  Argos,  i  itia  ns  of  wealth  and 
family  trained  in  arms  at  the  cost  of  the  stale:  alongside  of  them,  the 
remaining  Argeian  hoplites  with  their  dependent  allies  of  Kleona3 
and  Ornear.  last  of  all,  on  the  left  wing,  stood  the  Athenians,  their 
hoplites  as  well  as  their  horsemen. 

It  was  with  the  greatest  surprise  that  Agis  and  his  army  beheld 
this  unexpected  apparition.  To  any  other  Greeks  than  Lacedaemo- 
nians, the  sudden  presentation  of  a  formidable  enemy  would  have 
occasioned  a  feeling  of  dismay  from  which  they  would  have  found  it 
difficult  to  recover;  and  even  the  Lacedemonians,  on  this  occasion, 
underwent  a  momentary  shock  unparalleled  in  their  previous  expe- 
rience. But  they  now  felt  the  full  advantage  of  their  rigorous  train- 
ing and  habit  of  military  obedience,  as  well  as  of  that  subordination 
of  officers  which  was  peculiar  to  themselves  in  Greece.  In  other 
Grecian  armies  orders  were  proclaimed  to  the  troops  in  a  loud  voice 
by  a  herald,  who  received  them  personally  from  the  general:  each 
taxis  or  company,  indeed,  had  its  own  taxiarch,  but  the  latter  did  not 
receive  his  orders  separately  from  the  general,  and  seems  to  have  had 
no  personal  responsibility  for  the  execution  of  them  by  his  soldiers. 
Subordinate  and  responsible  military  authority  was  not  recognized. 
Among  the  Lacedemonians,  on  the  contrary,  there  was  a  regular 
gradation  of  military  and  responsible  authority — "commanders  of 
commanders" — each  of  whom  had  his  special  duty  in  insuring  tlnj 
execution  of  orders.  Every  order  emanated  from  the  Spartan  king 
when  he  was  present,  and  was  given  to  the  Polemarchs  (each  com- 
manding a  Mora,  the  largest  military  division),  who  intimated  it  to 
the  Lochagi,  or  colonels  of  the  respective  Lochi.  These  again  gave 
command  to  each  Pentekonter,  or  captain  of  a  Pentekosty;  lastly,  he 


BATTLE  OF  MANTINEIA.  795 

to  the  Enomotarch,  who  commanded  the  lowect  subdivision  called  an 
Enomoty.  The  soldier  thus  received  no  immediate  orders  except 
from  the  Enomotarch,  who  was  in  the  firsl  instance  responsible  for 
liis  Enomoty;  but  the  Pentekonter  and  the  Lochage  were  responsible 
also  each  for  Ins  larger  division;  the  pentekosty  including  four  eno- 
moties,  and  the  lochus  four  pentekosties — at  least  so  the  numbers 
stood  on  this  occasion.  All  the  various  military  maneuvers  were 
familiar  to  the  Lacedaemonians  from  their  unremitting  drill,  so  that 
their  armies  enjoyed  the  advantage  of  readier  obedience  along  with 
more  S3'stematic  command.  Accordingly,  though  thus  taken  by  sur- 
prise, and  called  on  now  for  the  first  time  in  their  lives  to  form  in 
the  presence  of  an  enemy,  they  only  manifested  the  greater  prompti- 
tude and  anxious  haste  in  obeying  the  orders  of  Agis,  transmitted 
through  the  regular  series  of  officers.  The  battle  array  was  attained, 
with  regularity  as  well  as  with  speed. 

The  extreme  left  of  the  Lacedaemonian  line  belonged  by  ancient 
privilege  to  the  Skiritae;  mountaineers  of  the  border  district  of  Laco- 
nia  skirting  the  Arcadian  Parrhasii,  seemingly  east  of  the  Burotas 
near  its  earliest  and  highest  course.  These  men,  originally  Arcadians, 
now  constituted  a  variety  of  Laconian  Periceki,  with  peculiar  duties 
as  well  as  peculiar  privileges.  Numbered  among  the  bravest  and 
most  active  men  iu  Peloponnesus,  they  generally  formed  the  vanguard 
in  an  advancing  march;  and  the  Spartans  stand  accused  of  having 
exposed  them  to  danger  as  well  as  toil  with  unbecoming  recklessness. 
Next  to  the  Skiritae.  who  were  600  in  number,  stood  the  enfranchised 
Helots,  recently  returned  from  serving  with  Brasidas  in  Thrace,  and 
the  Noodamodes,  both  probably  summoned  home  from  Lepreum, 
where  we  were  told  before  that  they  had  been  planted.  After  them, 
in  the  center  of  the  entire  line,  came  the  Lacedaemonian  lochi,  seven 
in  number,  with  the  Arcadian  dependent  allies,  Heraean  and  Maena- 
liau,  near  them.  Lastly,  in  the  right  wing,  stood  the  Tegeans,  with 
a  small  division  of  Laceda?monians  occupying  the  extreme  right,  as 
the  post  of  honor.  On  each  flank  there  were  some  Lacedaemonian 
horsemen. 

Thucydides,  with  a  frankness  which  enhances  the  value  of  his  tes- 
timony wherever  he  gives  it  positively,  informs  us  that  he  cannot 
pretend  to  set  down  the  number  of  either  army.  It  is  evident  that 
this  silence  is  not  for  want  of  having  inquired — but  none  of  the 
answers  which  he  received  appeared  to  him  trustworthy:  the  extreme 
secrecy  of  Lacedaemonian  politics  admitted  of  no  certainty  about 
their  numbers,  while  the  empty  numerical  boasts  of  other  Greeks 
served  only  to  mislead.  In  the  absence  of  assured  information  about 
aggregate  number,  the  historian  gives  us  some  general  information 
accessible  to  every  inquirer,  and  some  i'aCts  visible  to  a  spectator. 
From  his  language  it  is  conjectured,  with  some  probability,  by  Dr. 
Thirl  wall  and  others,  that  he  was  himself  present  at  the  battle, 
though  in  what  capacity,  we  cannot  determine,  as  he  was  an  exile 


796  FROM  THE  FESTIVAL  OF  OLYMPIAD. 

from  hi-;  country.  First  lie  states  that  the  Lacedaemonian  army 
appeared  more  numerous  than  that  of  the  enemy.  Next  lie  tells  us, 
that  independent  of  the  Skiritae  on  the  left,  who  were  tioti  in  number 
— the  remaining  Lacedaemonian  front,  to  the  extremity  of  their  right 

wing,  consisted  of  1  is  nun;  each  eiioniotx   ha\  ing  four  men  in  front. 

In  respect  to  depth,  the  different  enomoties  were  not  all  equal;  hut 

for  the  most  part,  the  tile-  were  eight  deep.  There  were  seven  lochi 
in  all  (apart  from  the  Skiritae);  each  lochus  comprised  four  pente- 
kostiet — each   pentekosty  contained   four  enomoties.      multiplying 

448  by  8,  ami  adding  the  600  Skiritae,  this  would  make  a  total  of 
4184  hoplites,  besides  a  few  horsemen  on  each  flank.  Respecting 
light-armed,  nothing  is  said.  I  have  no  confidence  in  such  an  cli- 
mate— hut  the  total  is  smaller  than  we  should  have  expected,  con- 
sidering that  the  Lacedaemonians  had  marched  out  from  Sparta  with 
their  entire  force  on  a  pressing  emergency,  and  that  they  had  only 
sent  home  one-sixth  of  their  total,  their  oldest  and  youngest  soldiers. 

It  does  not  appear  that  the  generals  on  the  Argeian  side  made  any 
attempt  to  charge  while  the  Lacedaemonian  battle-array  was  yet  in- 
complete. It  was  necessary  for  them,  according  to  Grecian  practice, 
to  wind  up  the  courage  of  their  troops  by  some  words  of  exhortation 
and  encouragement ;  and  before  these  were  finished,  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians may  probably  have  attained  their  order.  The  Mantineian 
officers  reminded  their  countrymen  that  the  coming  battle  would 
decide  whether  Mantineia  should  continue  to  he  a  free  and  imperial 
city,  with  Arcadian  dependencies  of  her  own.  as  -he  now  was — or 
or  should  again  he  degraded  into  a  dependency  of  Lacedaemon.  The 
Argeian  leaders  dwelt  upon  the  opportunity  which  Argos  now  had  of 
recovering  her  lost  ascendency  in  Peloponnesus,  and  of  revenging 
herself  upon  her  worst  enemy  and  neighbor.  The  Athenian  troops 
were  exhorted  to  show  themselves  worthy  of  the  many  brave  allies 
with  whom  they  were  now  associated,  as  well  as  to  protect  their  own 
territory  and  empire  by  vanquishing  their  army  in  Peloponnesus. 

It  illustrates  forcibly  the  peculiarity  of  Lacedaemonian  character, 
that  to  them  no  similar  words  of  encouragement  were  addressed 
either  by  Agis  or  any  of  the  officers.  -'They  knew-  (says  the  his- 
torian) that  long  practice  beforehand,  in  the  business  of  war,  was  a 
better  preservative  than  line  speeches  on  the  spur  of  the  moment." 
As  .imoug  professional  soldiers,  bravery  was  assumed  as  a  thing  of 
course,  without  any  special  exhortation:  but  mutual  suggestions 
were  heard  among  them  with  a  view  to  get  their  order  of  battle  and 
position  perfect,  which  at  first  it  probably  was  not,  from  the  sudden 
and  hurried  manner  in  which  they  had  been  constrained  to  form. 
Moreover,  various  war-songs,  perhaps  those  of  Tyrtaeus,  were  chanted 
in  the  ranks.  At  length  the  word  was  given  to  attack:  the  numerous 
pipers  in  attendance  (an  hereditary  caste  at  Sparta)  began  to  play, 
while  the  slow,  solemn,  and  equable  march  of  the  troops  adjusted 
itself  to  the  time  given  by  these  instruments  without  any  break  or 


MOVEMENT  ORDERED  BY  AGIS.  797 

wavering  in  the  line.  A  striking  contrast  to  this  deliberate  pace 
was  presented  by  the  enemy;  who,  having  no  pipers  or  other  musical 
instruments,  rushed  forward  to  the  charge  with  a  step  vehement  and 
even  furious,  fresh  from  the  exhortations  just  addressed  to  them. 

It  was  the  natural  tendency  of  all  Grecian  armies,  when  coming 
into  conflict,  to  march  not  exactly  straightforward,  but  somewhat 
aslant  toward  the  right.  The  soldiers  on  the  extreme  right  of  both 
armies  set  the  example  of  such  inclination,  in  order  to  avoid  expos- 
ing their  own  unshielded  side;  while  for  the  same  reason  every  man 
along  the  line  took  care  to  keep  close  to  the  shield  of  his  right-hand 
neighbor.  We  see  from  hence  that,  with  equal  numbers,  the  right 
was  not  merely  the  post  of  honor,  but  also  of  comparative  safety. 
So  it  proved  on  the  present  occasion;  even  the  Lacedaemonian  disci- 
pline being  no  way  exempt  from  this  cause  of  disturbance.  Though 
the  Lacedaemonian  front,  from  their  superior  numbers,  was  more 
extended  than  that  of  the  enemy,  still  their  right  files  did  not  think 
themselves  safe  without  slanting  still  farther  to  the  right,  and  thus 
outflanked  very  greatly  the  Athenians  on  the  opposite  left  wing; 
while  on  the  opposite  side  the  Mantineians  who  formed  the  right 
wing,  from  the  same  disposition  to  keep  the  left  shoulder  forward, 
outflanked,  though  not  in  so  great  a  degree,  the  Skiritae  and  Braside- 
ians  on  the  Lacedaemonian  left.  King  Agis,  whose  post  was  with 
the  Lochi  in  the  center,  saw  plainly  that  when  the  armies  closed,  his 
left  would  be  certainly  taken  in  flank  and  perhaps  even  in  the  rear. 
Accordingly  he  thought  it  necessary  to  alter  his  dispositions  even  at 
this  critical  moment,  which  he  relied  upon  being  able  to  accomplish 
through  the  exact  discipline,  practiced  evolutions,  and  slow  march 
of  his  soldiers. 

The  natural  mode  of  meeting  the  impending  danger  would  have 
been  to  bring  round  a  division  from  the  extreme  right,  where  it  could 
well  be  spared,  to  the  extreme  left  against  the  advancing  Mantineians. 
But  the  ancient  privilege  of  the  Skiritae,  who  always  fought  by  them- 
selves on  the  extreme  left,  forbade  such  an  order.  Accordingly, 
Agis  gave  signal  to  the  Brasideians  and  Skiritae  to  make  a  flank 
movement  on  the  left  so  as  to  get  on  equal  front  with  the  Mantine- 
ians; while  in  order  to  fill  up  the  vacancy  thus  created  in  his  line,  he 
sent  orders  to  the  two  polemarchs  Aristokles  and  Hipponoidas,  who 
had  their  Lochi  on  the  extreme  right  of  the  line,  to  move  to  the  rear 
and  take  post  on  the  right  of  the  Brasideians,  so  as  again  to  close  up 
the  line.  But  these  two  polemarchs,  who  had  the  safest  and  most 
victorious  place  in  the  line,  chose  to  keep  it,  disobeying  his  express 
orders:  so  that  Agis,  when  he  saw  that  they  did  not  move,  was  forced 
to  send  a  second  order  countermanding  the^  flank  movement  of  the 
Skiritae,  and  directing  them  to  fall  in  upon  the  center,  back  into 
their  former  place.  But  it  had  now  become  too  late  to  execute  this 
second  command  before  the  hostile  armies  closed:  and  the  Skiritce 
and  Brasideians  were  thus  assailed  wThile  in  disorder  and  cut  off  from 


798  FROM  THE  FESTIVAL  OF  OLYMPIAD. 

their  own  center.  The  Mantineians  finding  them  in  this  condition, 
defeated  and  drove  them  hack;  while  the  chosen  Thousand  of  Argos, 
breaking  in  by  the  vacanl  space  between  the  Brasideians  and  the 
Lacedaemonian  center,  took  them  on  the  right  flank  and  completed 
tin  ir  discomfiture.  They  were  routed  and  pursued  even  to  the 
Lacedaemonian  baggaj  in  the  rear;  Bome  of  the  elder  troops 

who  guarded  the  wagons  being  slain,  and  the  whole  Lacedaemonian 
let'i  wini:-  altogether  dispersi  d. 

But  the  victorious  Manteneians  and  their  comrades  thinking  only 
of  what  was  immediately  before  them,  wasted  thus  a  precious  time 
when  their  aid  was  urgently  Deeded  elsewhere.  .Matters  passed  very 
differently  on  the  Lacedaemonian  center  and  right;  where  Agis,  with 
his  body-guard  of  300  <  liosen  youths  called  Hippeis,  and  with  the 
Spartan  Lochi,  found  himself  in  fronl  conflict  with  the  center  and 
lefl  of  the  enemy — with  the  Argeians,  their  elderly  troops  and  the 
so-called  Five  Lochi — with  the  Kleonseans  and  Orneates,  dependent 

allies  of  ArgOS — and  with  the  Athenians.  Over  all  these  troops  they 
were  completely  victorious,  after  a  short  resistance — indeed  on  some 
points  with  no  resistance  at  all.  So  formidable  was  the  aspect  and 
name  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  that  the  opposing  troops  gave  way 
without  crossing  spears,  ami  even  with  a  panic  so  headlong,  that  they 
trod  down  each  other  in  anxiety  to  escape.  While  thus  defeated  in 
front,  they  were  taken  in  flank  by  tin-  Tegeans  and  Lacedaemonians 
on  the  right  of  Agis's  army,  and  the  Athenians  here  incurred  serious 
hazard  of  being  all  cut  to  pieces,  had  they  not  been  effectively  aided 
by  their  own  cavalry  close  at  hand.  Moreover  Agis,  having  decidedly 
beaten  and  driven  them  hack,  was  less  anxious  to  pursue  them  than 
to  return  to  the  rescue  of  Lis  own  defeated  left  wing;  so  that  even 
the  Athenians,  who  were  exposed  both  in  flank  aid  front,  were 
enabled  to  effect  their  retreat  in  safety.  The  Mantineians  and  the 
Argeian  Thousand,  though  victorious  on  their  pari  of  the  line,  yet 
seeing  the  remainder  of  their  army  in  disorderly  flight,  had  little  de- 
position to  renew  the  combat  againsl  Agis  and  the  conquering  Lace- 
daemonians. They  sought  only  to  effect  their  retreat,  which  how- 
ever could  not  be  done  without  severe  loss,  especially  on  the  part  of 
the  Mantineians — and  which  Agis  might  have  prevented  altogether, 
had  not  the  Lacedaemonian  system,  enforced  on  this  occasion  by  the 
counsels  of  an  ancient  Spartan  named  Pharax,  enjoined  abstinence 
from  prolonged  pursuit  against  a  defeated  enemy.  Tliere  fell  in  this 
battle  700  men  of  the  Argeians,  Kleonacans,  and  Orneates;  200 
Athenians,  together  with  both  the  generals  Laches  and  Nikostratus; 
and  200  Mantineians.  The  loss  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  though  never 
certainly  known,  from  tin;  habitual  secrecy  of  their  public  proceed- 
ings, was  estimated  at  about  300  men.  They  Stripped  the  enemy's 
dead,  spreading  out  to  view  the  arms  thus  acquired,  and  selecting 
some  for  a  trophy;  then  picked  up  their  own  dead  and  carried  them 
away  for  burial  at  Tegea,  granting  the  customary  burial-truce  to  the 


EFFECTS  OF  THE  VICTORY.  799 

defeated  enemy.  Pleistoanax,  the  other  Spartan  king,  had  advanced 
as  far  as  Tegea  with  a  re-enforcement  composed  of  the  elder  and 
younger  citizens;  but  on  hearing  of  the  victory,  he  returned  home. 

Such  was  the  important  battle  of  Mantineia,  fought  in  the  month 
of  June,  418  B.C.  Its  effect  throughout  Greece  was  prodigious.  The 
numbers  engaged  on  both  sides  weie  very  considerable  for  a  Grecian 
army  of  that  day,  though  seemingly  not  so  large  as  at  the  battle  of 
Delium  five  years  before:  the  number  and  grandeur  of  the  states 
whose  troops  were  engaged  was  however  greater  than  at  Delium. 
But  what  gave  peculiar  value  to  the  battle  was,  that  it  wiped  off  at 
once  the  pre-existing  stain  upon  the  honor  of  Sparta.  The  disaster  in 
Sphakteria,  disappointing  all  previous  expectation,  had  drawn  upon 
her  the  imputation  of  something  like  cowardice;  and  there  were 
other  proceedings  which,  with  far  better  reason,  caused  her  to 
be  stigmatized  as  stupid  and  backward.  But  the  victory  of  Man- 
tineia silenced  all  such  disparaging  criticism,  and  replaced  Sparta  in 
her  old  position  of  military  pre-eminence  before  the  eyes  of  Greece. 
It  worked  so  much  the  more  powerfully  because  it  was  entirely  the 
fruit  of  Lacedaemonian  courage,  with  little  aid  from  that  peculiar 
skill  and  tactics  which  was  generally  seen  concomitant,  but  had  in 
the  present  case  been  found  comparatively  wanting.  The  maneuver 
of  Agis,  in  itself  not  ill-conceived,  for  the  purpose  of  extending  his 
left  wing,  had  failed  through  the  disobedience  of  the  two  refractory 
polemarchs;  but  in  such  a  case  the  shame  of  failure  falls  more  or  less 
upon  all  parties  concerned;  nor  could  either  general  or  soldiers  be 
considered  to  have  displayed  at  Mantineia  any  of  that  professional 
aptitude  which  caused  the  Lacedaemonians  to  be  styled  "artists  in 
warlike  affairs."  So  much  the  more  conspicuously  did  Lacedaemon- 
ian courage  stand  out  to  view.  After  the  left  wing  had  been  broken, 
and  when  the  Argeian  Thousand  had  penetrated  into  the  vacant 
space  between  the  left  and  center,  so  that  they  might  have  taken  the 
center  in  flank,  and  ought  to  have  done  so  had  they  been  well-advised 
— the  troops  in  the  center,  instead  of  being  daunted  as  most  Grecian 
soldiers  would  have  been,  had  marched  forward  against  the  enemies 
in  their  front,  and  gained  a  complete  victory.  The  consequences  of 
the  battle  were  thus  immense  in  re-establishing  the  reputation  of  the 
Lacedaemonians,  and  in  exalting  them  again  to  their  ancient  dignity 
of  chiefs  of  Peloponnesus. 

We  are  not  surprised  to  hear  that  the  two  polemarchs,  Aristokles 
and  Hipponoidas,  whose  disobedience  had  well-nigh  caused  the  ruin 
of  the  army,  were  tried  and  condemned  to  banishment  as  cowards  on 
their  return  to  Sparta. 

Looking  at  the  battle  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  other  side,  we 
may  remark  that  the  defeat  was  greatly  occasioned  by  the  selfish 
caprice  of  the  Eleians  in  withdrawing  their  3,000  men  immediately 
before  the  battle,  because  the  other  allies,  instead  of  marching  against 
Lepreum,   preferred  to  attempt  the  far  more  important  town  of 


800  FROM  THE  FESTIVAL  OF  OLYMPIAD. 

Tegea:  an  additional  illustration  of  the  remark  of  Perikles  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war,  that  numerous  and  equal  allies  could  never  be 
kept  in  harmonious  co-operation.  Shortly  after  the  defeat,  the  3,000 
Eleians  came  back  to  the  aid  oi  Mantineia — probably  regretting  their 
previous  untoward  departure — together  with  a  re-enforcement  of  1000 
Athenians.  Moreover,  the  Earneian  month  began — a  season  which 
the  Lacedaemonians  kepi  rigidly  holy;  even  dispatching  messengers 
to  countermand  their  extra-Peloponnesian  allies,  whom  they  had 
invoked  prior  to  the  late  battle — and  remaining  themselves  within 
their  own  territory,  so  that  the  field  was  for  the  moment  left  clear 
for  the  operation's  of  a  defeated  enemy.  Accordingly,  the  Epidau- 
rians,  though  they  had  made  an  inroad  into  the  territory  of  Argos 
during  the  absence  of  the  Argeian  main  force  at  the  time  of  the  late 
battle,  and  had  gained  a  partial  success — now  found  their  own  terri- 
tory overrun  by  the  united  Eleians,  Mantineians,  and  Athenians, 
who  were  bold  enough  even  to  commence  a  wall  of  circumvallafion 
round  the  town  of  Epidaurus  itself.  The  entire  work  was  distributed 
bet  ween  them  to  be  accomplished;  but  the  superior  activity  and  per- 
severance of  the  Athenians  were  here  displayed  in  a  conspicuous 
manner.  For  while  the  portion  of  work  committed  to  them  (the 
fortification  of  the  cape  on  which  the  Heraeum  or  temple  of  Here 
was  situated)  was  indefatigably  prosecuted  and  speedily  brought  to 
completion — their  allies,  both  Eleians  and  Mantineians,  abandoned 
the  tasks  respectively  allotted  to  them,  in  impatience  and  disgust. 
The  idea  of  circumvallation  being  for  this  reason  relinquished,  a 
joint  garrison  was  left  in  the  new  fort  at  Cape  Heraeum,  after  which 
the  allies  evacuated  the  Epidaurian  territory. 

So  far  the  Lacedaemonians  appeared  to  have  derived  little  positive 
benefit  from  their  late  victory :  but  the  fruits  of  it  were  soon  mani- 
fested in  the  very  center  of  their  enemy's  force — at  Argos.  A  mate- 
rial change  had  taken  place  since  the  battle  in  the  political  tendencies 
of  that  city.  There  had  been  within  it  always  an  opposition  party — 
philo-Laconian  and  anti-democratical:  and  the  effect  of  the  defeat  at 
Mantineia  had  been  to  strengthen  this  party  as  much  as  it  depressed 
their  opponents.  The  democratical  leaders — who,  in  conjunction 
with  Athens  and  Alkibiades,  had  aspired  to  maintain  an  ascendency 
in  Peloponnesus  hostile  and  equal,  if  not  superior,  to  Sparta — now 
found  their  calculations  overthrown  and  exchanged  for  the  discour- 
aging necessities  of  self-defense  against  a  victorious  enemy.  And 
while  these  leaders  thus  lost  general  influence  by  so  complete  a  defeat 
of  their  foreign  policy,  the  ordinary  democratical  soldiers  of  Argos 
brought  back  with  them  from  the  field  of  Mantineia,  nothing  but 
humiliation  and  terror  of  the  Lacdsemonian  arms.  But  the  chosen 
Argeian  Thousand  regiment  returned  with  very  different  feelings. 
Vic*orious  over  the  left  wing  of  their  enemies,  they  had  not  been 
seriously  obstructed  in  their  retreat  even  by  tne  Lacedaemonian  cen- 
ter.  They  had  thus  reaped  positive  glory,  and  doubtless  felt  contempt 


OLIGARCHICAL  CONSPIRACY.  SOI 

for  their  beaten  fellow-citizens.  Now  it  has  been  already  mentioned 
that  these  Thousand  were  men  of  rich  families,  and  the  best  military 
Bge,  se1  apart  by  the  Argeian  democracy  to  receive  permanent  train- 
ing at  the  public  expense,  just  at  a  time  when  the  ambitious  views  of 
Argos  first  began  to  dawu,  after  the  peace  of  Nikias.  So  long  as 
Argos  was  likely  to  become  or  continue  the  imperial  state  of  Pelo- 
ponnesus, these  Thousand  wealthy  men  would  probably  find  their 
dignity  sufficiently  consulted  in  upholding  her  as  such,  and  would 
thus  acquiesce  in  the  democratical  government.  But  when  the  defeat 
of  Mautineia  reduced  Argos  to  her  own  limits,  and  threw  her  upon 
the  defensive,  there  was  nothing  to  counterbalance  their  natural  oli- 
garchical sentiments,  so  that  they  became  decided  opponents  of  the 
democratical  government  in  its  distress.  The  oligarchical  party  in 
Argos,  thus  encouraged  and  re-enforced,  entered  into  a  conspiracy 
with  the  Lacedaemonians  to  bring  the  city  into  alliance  with  Sparta 
as  well  as  to  overthrow  the  democracy, 

As  the  first  step  towTards  the  execution  of  this  scheme,  the  Lace- 
daemonians, about  the  end  of  September,  marched  out  their  full  forces 
as  far  as  Tegea,  thus  threatening  invasion,  and  inspiring  terror  at 
Argos.  From  Tegea  they  sent  forward  as  envoy  Lichas,  proxenus 
of  the  Argeians  at  Sparta,  with  two  alternative  propositions:  one  for 
peace,  which  he  was  instructed  to  tender  and  prevail  upon  the  Arge- 
ians  to  accept,  if  he  could;  another,  in  case  they  refused,  of  a  menac- 
ing character.  It  was  the  scheme  of  the  oligarchical  faction  first  to 
bring  the  city  into  alliance  with  Lacedaemon  and  dissolve  the  con- 
nection with  Athens,  before  they  attempted  any  innovation  in  the 
government.  The  arrival  of  Lichas  was  the  signal  for  them  to  mani- 
fest themselves  by  strenuously  pressing  the  acceptance  of  his  pacific 
proposition.  But  they  had  to  contend  against  a  strong  resistance; 
since  Alkibiades,  still  in  Argos,  employed  his  utmost  energy  to  defeat 
their  views.  Nothing  but  the  presence  of  the  Lacedaemonian  army  at 
Tegea,  and  the  general  despondency  of  the  people,  at  length  enabled 
them  to  carry  their  point,  and  to  procure  acceptance  of  the  proposed 
treaty ;  which,  being  already  adopted  by  the  Ekklesia  at  Sparta,  was 
sent  ready  prepared  to  Argos — and  there  sanctioned  without  altera- 
tion.    The  conditions  were  substantially  as  follows: — 

"The  Argeians  shall  restore  the  boys  whom  they  have  received  as 
hostages  from  Orchomenus,  and  the  men  hostages  from  the  Maen- 
alii.  They  shall  restore  to  the  Lacedaemonians  the  men  now  in 
Mantineia,  whom  the  Lacedaemonians  had  placed  as  hostages  for  safe 
custody  in  Orchomenus,  and  whom  the  Argeians  and  Alantineians 
have  carried  away  from  that  place.  They  shall  evacuate  Epidaurus, 
and  raze  the  fort  recently  erected  near  it.  The  Athenians,  unless 
they  also  forthwith  evacuate  Epidaurus,  shall  be  proclaimed  as  ene- 
mies to  Lacedaemon  as  well  as  to  Argos,  and  to  the  allies  of  both. 
The  Lacedaemonians  shall  restore  all  the  hostages  whom  they  now 
have  in  keeping,  from  whatever  place  they  may  have  been  taken. 
H.  G.  II.— 26 


802  FROM  THE  FESTIVAL  OF  OLYMPIAD. 

Respecting  the  sacrifice  alleged  to  be  duo  to  Apollo  by  the  Epidau- 
rians,  the  Axgeians  will  consent  to  tender  to  them  an  oath,  which  if 
they  swear,  they  shall  clear  themselves.     Every cityin  Peloponnesus, 

small  or  ureal,  Bhall  be  autonomous  and  at  liberty  to  maintain  its 
own  ancient  constitution.  If  any  extra  Pelopomnesian  city  shall 
come  against  Peloponnesus  with  mischievous  projects.  Lacedaemon 
and  A.Tg0S  will  take  joint  counsel  against  it,  in  the  manner  most 
equitable  for  the  interest  of  the  Peloponnesians  generally.  The  extra- 
Poloponnesian  allies  of  Sparta  shall  be  in  the  same  position  with 
reference  to  this  treaty  as  the  allies  of  Lacedaemon  and  Argos  in  Pelo- 
ponnesus— and  shall  hold  their  own  in  the  same  manner.  The 
Argeians  shall  show  this  treaty  to  their  allies,  who  shall  be  admitted 
to  subscribe  to  it,  if  they  think  lit.  But  if  the  allies  desire  anything 
different,  the  Argeians  shall  semi  them  home  about  their  business." 

Such  was  the  agreement  sent  ready  prepared  by  the  Lacedaemon- 
ians to  Argos,  and  there  literally  accepted.  It  presented  a  recipro- 
city little  more  than  nominal,  imposing  one  obligation  of  no  impor- 
ts  upon  Sparta;  though  it  answered  the  purpose  of  the  latter  by 

substantially  dissolving  the  alliance  of  Argos  with  its  three  confed- 
erates. 

But  this  treaty  was  meant  by  the  oligarchical  party  in  Argos  only 
as  preface  to  a  series  of  ulterior  measures,  As  soon  as  it  was  con- 
cluded, the  menacing  army  of  Sparta  was  withdrawn  from  Tegea, 
and  was  exchanged  for  free  and  peaceful  intercommunication  between 
the  Lacedaemonians  and  Argeians.  Probably  Alkibades  at  the  same 
time  retired,  while  the  renewed  visits  and  hospitalities  of  Lacedae- 
monians at  Argos  strengthened  the  interest  of  their  party  more  than 
ever.  They  were  soon  powerful  enough  to  persuade  the  Argeian 
assembly  formally  to  renounce  the  alliance  with  Athens,  Elis,  and 
Mantineia — and  to  conclude  a  special  alliance  with  Sparta,  on  the  fol- 
lowing terms: — 

"There  shall  be  peace  and  alliance  for  fifty  years  between  the 
Lacedaemonians  and  the  Argeians — upon  equal  terms — each  giving 
amicable  satisfaction,  according  to  its  established  constitution,  to  all 
complaints  preferred  by  the  other.  On  the  same  condition,  also,  the 
other  Peloponnesian  cities  shall  partake  in  this  peace  and  alliance — 
holding  their  own  territory,  laws,  and  separate  constitution.  All  extra- 
Peloponnesian  allies  of  Sparta  shall  be  put  upon  the  same  footing  as 
the  Lacedaemonians  themselves.  The  allies  of  Argos  shall  also  be  put 
upon  the  same  footing  as  Argos  herself,  holding  their  own  territory 
undisturbed.  Should  occasion  arise  for  common  military  operations 
on  any  point,  the  Lacedaemonians  and  Argeians  shall  take  counsel 
together,  determining  in  the  most  equitable  manner  they  can  for  the 
interest  of  their  allies.  If  any  one  of  the  cities  hereunto  belonging, 
either  in  or  out  of  Peloponnesus,  shall  have  disputes  either  about 
boundaries  or  other  topics,  she  shall  be  held  bound  to  enter  upon, 
amicable  adjustment.     If  any  allied  ci'.y  shall  quarrel  with  another 


REVOLUTION  AT  ARGOS.  803 

allied  city,  the  matter  shall  be  referred  to  some  third  city  satisfactory 
to  both.  Each  city  shall  render  justice  to  her  own  citizens  according 
to  ner  own  ancient  constitution." 

It  will  be  observed  that  in  this  treaty  of  alliance  the  disputed  ques- 
tion of  headship  is  compromised  or  evaded.  Lacedaemon  and  Argos 
are  both  put  upon  an  equal  footing,  in  respect  to  taking  joint  counsel 
for  the  general  body  of  allies:  they  two  alone  are  to  decide,  without 
consulting  the  other  allies,  though  binding  themselves  to  have  regard 
to  the  interests  of  the  latter.  The  policy  of  Lacedaemon  also  per- 
vades the  treaty — that  of  insuring  autonomy  to  all  the  lesser  states  of 
Peloponnesus,  and  thus  breaking  up  the  empire  of  Elis,  Mantiueia, 
or  any  other  larger  state  which  might  have  dependencies.  And 
accordingly  the  Mantineians,  finding  themselves  abandoned  by  Argos, 
were  constrained  to  make  their  submission  to  Sparta,  enrolling  them- 
selves again  as  her  allies,  renouncing  all  command  over  their  Arca- 
dian subjects,  and  delivering  up  the  hostages  of  these  latter — 
according  to  the  stipulation  in  the  treaty  between  Lacedaemon  and 
Argos  The  Lacedaemonians  do  not  seem  to  have  meddled  further 
with  Elis.  Being  already  possessed  of  Lepreum  (through  the  Brasi- 
deian  settlers  planted  there),  they  perhaps  did  not  wish  again  to  pro- 
voke the  Eleians,  from  fear  of  being  excluded  a  second  time  from  the 
Olympic  festival. 

Meanwhile  the  conclusion  of  the  alliance  with  Lacedaemon  (about 
November  or  December,  418  B.C.)  had  still  further  depressed  the 
popular  leaders  at  Argos.  The  oligarchical  faction,  and  the  chosen 
regiment  of  the  Thousand,  all  men  of  wealth  and  family,  as  well  as 
bound  together  by  their  common  military  training,  now  saw  their 
way  clearly  to  the  dissolution  of  the  democracy  by  force,  and  to  the 
accomplishment  of  a  revolution.  Instigated  by  such  ambitious 
views,  and  flattered  by  the  idea  of  admitted  headship  jointly  with 
Sparta,  they  espoused  the  new  policy  of  the  city  with  extreme  vehe- 
mence, and  began  immediately  to  multiply  occasions  of  collision 
with  Athens.  Joint  Lacedaemonian  and  Argeian  envoys  were  dis- 
patched to  Thrace  and  Macedonia.  With  the  Chalkidians  of  Thrace, 
the  revolted  subjects  of  Athens,  the  old  alliance  was  renewed,  and 
even  new  engagements  concluded;  while  Perdikkas  of  Macedonia 
was  urged  to  renounce  his  covenants  with  Athens,  and  join  the  new 
confederacy.  In  that  quarter  the  influence  of  Argos  was  considera- 
ble; for  the  Macedonian  princes  prized  very  highly  their  ancient 
descent  from  Argos,  which  constituted  them  brethren  of  the  Hellenic 
family.  Accordingly  Perdikkas  consented  to  the  demand  and  con- 
cluded the  new  treaty ;  insisting,  however,  with  his  habitual  dupli- 
city, that  the  step  should  for  the  moment  be  kept  secret  from  Athens. 
In  further  pursuance  of  the  new  tone  of  hostility  to  that  city,  joint 
envoys  were  also  sent  thither,  to  require  that  the  Athenians  should 
quit  Peloponnesus,  and  especially  that  they  should  evacuate  the  fort 
recently  erected  near  Epidaurus.     It  seems  to  have  been  held  jointly 


804  FROM    THE   FESTIVAL  OF  OLYMPIAD. 

by  Argcians,  Mantineians,  Eleians,  and  Athenians;  and  as  the  latter 
were  only  a  minority  of  the  whole,  the  Athenians  in  the  city  judged 
it  prudent  to  seud  Demosthenes  to  bring  them  away.  That  genera] 
mil  only  effected  the  retreat,  bul  also  contrived  a  stratagem  which 
gave  to  ii  the  air  almost  of  an  advantage.  On  bis  Oral  arrival  in  the 
fort,  he  proclaimed  a  gymnastic  match  outside  of  the  gates  for  the 
amusement  of  the  whole  garrison,  contriving  to  keep  hack  the  Athe- 
nians within  until  all  the  rest  had  marched  oul ;  then  hastily  abutting 
the  gates,  he  remained  master  of  the  place.  Having  no  intention, 
however,  of  keeping  it.  he  made  it  over  presently  to  the  Epidaurians 
themselves,  with  whom  he  renewed  the  truce  to  which  they  had  been 
parties  jointly  with  the  Lacedemonians  five  years  before,  two  years 
before  the  peace  of  Nikias. 

The  mode  of  proceeding  here  resorted  to  by  Athens,  in  respect  to 
the  surrender  of  the  fort,  seems  to  have  been  dictated  by  a  desire 
to  manifest  her  displeasure  against  1  lie  Argcians.  This  was  exactly 
what  the  Argeian  leaders  and  oligarchical  party,  on  their  side,  most 
desired;  the  breach  with  Athens  had  become  irreparable,  and  their 
plans  were  now  matured  for  violently  subverting  their  own  democ- 
racy. They  concerted  with  Sparta  a  joint  military  expedition,  of 
lOOt)  hoplites  from  each  city  (the  first  joint  expedition  under  the  new 
alliance),  against  Sikyon,  for  the  purpose  of  introducing  more  thor- 
ough-paced oligarchy  into  the  already  oligarchical  Sikyonian  govern- 
ment. It  is  possible  that  there  may  have  been  some  democratieal 
opposition  gradually  acquiring  strength  at  Sikyon:  yet  that  city 
seems  to  have  been,  as  far  sis  we  know,  always  oligarchical  in  policy, 
and  passively  faithful  to  Sparta.  Probably,  therefore,  that  joint 
enterprise  against  Sikyon  was  nothing  more  than  a  pretext  to  cover 
the  introduction  of  1000  Lacedaemonian  hoplites  into  Argos,  whither 
the  joint  detachment  immediately  returned,  after  the  business  at 
Sikyon  had  been  accomplished.  Tims  re-enforced,  the  oligarchical 
leaders  and  the  chosen  Thousand  at  Argos  put  down  by  force  the 
democratieal  constitution  in  that  city,  slew  the  democratieal  leaders, 
and  established  themselves  in  complete  possession  of  the  govern- 
ment. 

This  revolution  (accomplished  about  February  B.C.  417) — the  result 
of  the  victory  of  Mantineia  and  the  consummation  of  a  train  of  policy 
laid  by  Sparta — raised  her  ascendency  in  Peloponnesus  to  a  higher 
and  more  undisputed  point  than  it  had  ever  before  attained.  The 
towns  in  Achaia  were  as  yet  not  sufficiently  oligarchical  for  her  pur- 
pose— perhaps  since  the  march  of  Alkibiades  thither  two  years  before 
— accordingly  she  now  remodeled  their  governments  in  conformity 
with  her  own  views.  The  new  rulers  of  Argos  were  subservient  to 
her,  not  merely  from  oligarchical  sympathy,  but  from  need  of  her 
aid  to  keep  down  internal  rising  against  themselves:  so  that  there 
was  neither  enemy,  nor  even  neutral,  to  counterwork  her  or  to  favor 
Athens,  throughout  the  whole  peninsula. 


THE  DEMOCRACY  AT  ARGOS  IS  SUBVERTED.    805 

But  the  Spartan  ascendency  at  Argos  was  not  destined  to  last, 
Though  there  were  many  cities  in  Greece,  in  which  oligarchies  long 
maintained  themselves  unshaken,  through  adherence  to  a  traditional 
routine,  and  by  being  usually  in  the  hands  of  men  accustomed  to 
govern — yet  an  oligarchy  erected  by  force  upon  the  ruins  of  a  democ- 
racy was  rarely  of  long  duration.  The  angry  discontent  of  the 
people,  put  down  by  temporary  intimidation,  usually  revived,  and 
threatened  the  security  of  the  rulers  enough  to  make  them  suspicious 
and  probably  cruel.  Such  cruelty,  moreover,  was  not  their  only 
fault:  they  found  their  emancipation  from  democratical  restraints 
too  tempting  to  be  able  to  control  either  their  lust  or  their  rapacity. 
With  the  population  of  Argos — comparatively  coarse  and  brutal  in 
all  ranks,  and  more  like  Korkyra  than  like  Athens — such  abuse  was 
pretty  sure  to  be  speedy  as  well  as  flagrant.  Especially  the  chosen 
regiment  of  the  Thousand — men  in  the  vigor  of  their  age,  and  proud 
of  their  military  prowess  as  well  as  of  their  wealthier  station — con- 
strued the  new  oligarchical  government  which  they  had  helped  to 
erect  as  a  period  of  individual  license  to  themselves.  The  behavior 
and  fate  of  their  chief,  Bryas,  illustrates  the  general  demeanor  of  the 
troop.  After  many  other  outrages  against  persons  of  poorer  condi- 
tion, he  one  day  met  in  the  streets  a  wedding  procession,  in  which 
the  person  of  the  bride  captivated  his  fancy.  He  caused  her  to  be 
violently  torn  from  her  company,  carried  her  to  his  house,  and  pos- 
sessed himself  of  her  by  force.  But  in  the  middle  of  the  night,  this 
high-spirited  woman  revenged  herself  for  the  outrage  by  putting  out 
the  eyes  of  the  ravisher  while  he  was  fast  asleep :  a  terrible  revenge, 
which  the  pointed  clasp-pins  of  the  feminine  attire  sometimes  enabled 
women  to  take  upon  those  who  wronged  them.  Having  contrived 
to  make  her  escape,  she  found  concealment  among  her  friends,  as 
well  as  protection  among  the  people  generally,  against  the  indignant 
efforts  of  the  chosen  Thousand  to  avenge  their  leader. 

From  incidents  such  as  this,  and  from  the  multitude  of  petty 
insults  which  so  flagitious  an  outrage  implies  as  co-existent,  we  are 
not  surprised  to  learn  that  the  Demos  of  Argos  soon  recovered  their 
lost  courage,  and  resolved  upon  an  effort  to  put  down  their  oligarchi- 
cal oppressors.  They  waited  for  the  moment  when  the  festival 
called  the  Gymnopsedise  was  in  course  of  being  solemnized  at  Sparta 
— a  festival  at  which  the  choric  performances  of  men  and  boys  were 
so  interwoven  with  Spartan  religion  as  well  as  bodily  training,  that 
the  Lacedaemonians  would  make  no  military  movement  until  they 
were  finished.  At  this  critical  moment,  the  Argeian  Demos  rose  in 
insurrection ;  and  after  a  sharp  contest,  gained  a  victory  over  the 
oligarchy,  some  of  whom  were  slain,  while  pthers  only  saved  them- 
selves by  flight.  Even  at  the  first  instant  of  danger,  pressing  mes- 
sages had  been  sent  to  Sparta  for  aid.  But  the  Lacedaemonians  at 
first  peremptorily  refused  to  move  during  the  period  of  their  festival: 
nor  was  it  until  messenger  after  messenger  had  arrived  to  set  forth 


806  FROM  THE  FESTIVAL  OF  OLYMPIAD. 

the  pressing  necessity  of  their  friends,  that  they  reluctantly  put  aside 
their  festival  to  march  toward  Argos.  They  were  too  late:  the 
precious  moment  bad  already  passed  by.  They  were  met  at  Tegea 
by  an  intimation  that  their  friends  were  overthrown,  and  Argos  in 
poss  -ion  of  the  victorious  people.  Nevertheless,  various  exiles  who 
had  escaped  still  promised  ihem  success,  urgently  entreating  them  to 
proceed;  bul  the  Lacedaemonians  refused  to  comply,  returned  to 
Sparta,  and  resumed  their  intermitted  festival. 

Thus  was  the  oligarchy  of  Argos  overthrown — after  a  continuance 
of  about  four  months,  from  February  to  June,  417  B.C. — and  the 
chosen  Thousand  regiment  either  dissolved  or  destroyed.  The  move- 
ment excited  great  sympathy  in  several  Peloponnesian  cities,  who 
were  becoming  jealous  of  the  exorbitant  preponderance  of  Sparta. 
Nevertheless  the  Argeian  Demos,  though  victorious  within  the  city, 
felt  so  much  distrust  of  being  able  to  maintain  themselves,  that  they 
sent  envoys  to  Sparta  to  plead  their  cause  and  to  entreat  favorable 
treatment:  a  proceeding  which  proves  the  insurrection  to  have  be<  n 
spontaneous,  not  fomented  by  Athens.  But  the  envoys  of  the 
expelled  oligarchs  were  there  to  confront  them,  and  the  Lacedemo- 
nians, after  a  lengthened  discussion,  adjudging  the  Demos  to  have 
been  guilty  of  wrong,  proclaimed  the  resolution  of  sending  forces  to 
put  them  down.  Still,  the  habitual  tardiness  of  Lacedaemonian  habits 
prevented  any  immediate  or  separate  movement.  Their  allies  were 
to  be  summoned,  none  being  very  zealous  in  the  cause, — and  least  of 
all  at  this  moment,  when  the  period  of  harvest  was  at  hand :  so  that 
about  three  months  intervened  before  any  actnal  force  was  brought 
together. 

This  important  interval  was  turned  to  account  by  the  Argeian 
Demos,  who,  being  plainly  warned  that  they  were  to  look  on  Sparta 
only  as  an  enemy,  immediately  renewed  their  alliance  with  Athens. 
Regarding  her  as  their  main  refuge,  they  commenced  the  building  of 
long  walls  to  connect  their  city  with  the  sea,  in  order  that  the  road 
might  always  be  open  for  supplies  and  re-enforcement  from  Athens 
in  case  they  should  be  confined  to  their  walls  by  a  superior  Spartan 
force.  The  whole  Argeian  population — men  and  women,  free  and 
slave — set  about  the  work  with  the  utmost  ardor;  while  Alkibiades 
brought  assistance  from  Athens — especially  skilled  masons  and  car- 
penters, of  whom  they  stood  in  much  need.  The  step  may  probably 
have  been  suggested  by  himself,  as  it  was  the  same  which,  two  years 
before,  he  had  urged  upon  the  inhabitants  of  Patrae.  But  the  con- 
struction of  walls  adequate  for  defense,  along  the  line  of  four  miles 
and  a  half  between  Argos  and  the  sea,  required  a  long  time.  More- 
over, the  oligarchical  party  within  the  town,  as  well  as  the  exiles 
without — a  party  defeated  but  not  annihilated — strenuously  urged  the 
Lacedaemonians  to  put  an  end  to  the  work,  and  even  promised  them 
a  counter-revolutionary  movement  in  the  town  as  soon  as  they  drew 
near  to  assist — the  same  intrigue  which  had  been  entered  into  by  the 


ALLIANCE  BETWEEN  ATHENS  AND  ARGOS.    807 

oligarchical  party  at  Athens  forty  years  before,  when  the  walls  down 
to  Peirseus  were  in  course  of  erection.  Accordingly,  about  the  end  of 
September  (417  B.C.),  king  Agis  conducted  an  army  of  Lacedaemo- 
nians and  allies  against  Argos,  drove  the  population  within  the  city, 
and  destroyed  so  much  of  the  Long  Walls  as  had  been  already  raised. 
But  the  oligarchical  party  within  were  not  able  to  realize  their 
engagements  of  rising  in  arms,  so  that  he  was  obliged  to  retire  aftet 
merely  ravaging  the  territory  and  taking  the  town  of  Hysie,  where 
lie  put  to  death  all  the  freemen  who  fell  into  his  hands.  After  his 
departure,  the  Argeians  retaliated  these  ravages  upon  the  neighbor- 
ing territory  of  Phlius,  where  the  exiles  from  Argos  chiefly  resided. 

The  close  neighborhood  of  such  exiles — together  with  the  declared 
countenance  of  Sparta,  and  the  continued  schemes  of  the  oligarchical 
party  within  the  walls — kept  the  Argeian  democracy  in  perpetual 
uneasiness  and  alarm  throughout  the  winter,  in  spite  of  their  recent 
victory  and  the  suppression  of  the  dangerous  regiment  of  a  Thousand. 
To  relieve  them  in  part  from  embarrassment,  Alkibiades  was  dis- 
patched thither  early  in  the  spring  with  an  Athenian  armament  and 
twenty  triremes.  His  friends  and  guests  appear  to  have  been  now  in 
ascendency,  as  leaders  of  the  democratical  government;  and  in  con- 
cert with  them,  he  selected  300  marked  oligarchical  persons,  whom 
he  carried  away  and  deposited  in  various  Athenian  islands,  as  hos- 
tages for  the  quiescence  of  the  party  (b.c.  416).  Another  ravaging 
march  was  also  undertaken  by  the  Argeians  into  the  territory  of 
Phlius,  wherein,  however,  they  sustained  nothing  but  loss.  And  again 
about  the  end  of  September,  the  Lacedemonians  gave  the  word  for  a 
second  expedition  against  Argos.  But  having  marched  as  far  as  the 
borders,  they  found  the  sacrifices  (always  offered  previous  to  leaving 
their  own  territor}T)  so  unfavorable  that  they  returned  back  and  dis 
banded  their  forces.  The  Argeian  oligarchical  party,  in  spite  of  the 
hostages  recently  taken  from  them,  had  been  on  the  watch  for  this 
Lacedemonian  force,  and  had  projected  a  rising;  or  at  least  were 
suspected  of  doing  so — to  such  a  degree  that  some  of  them  were 
seized  and  imprisoned  by  the  government,  while  others  made  their 
escape.  Later  in  the  same  winter,  however,  the  Lacedemonians 
became  more  fortunate  with  their  border  sacrifices — entered  the 
Argeian  territory  in  conjunction  with  their  allies  (except  the  Corin- 
thians, who  refused  to  take  part) — and  established  the  Argeian  oligarch- 
ical exiles  at  Ornee;  from  which  town  these  latter  were  again 
speedily  expelled,  after  the  retirement  of  the  Lacedemonian  army,  by 
the  Argeian  democracy  with  the  aid  of  an  Athenian  re-enforcement. 

To  maintain  the  renewed  democratical  government  of  Argos, 
against  enemies  both  internal  and  external,  was  an  important  policy 
to  Athens,  as  affording  the  basis,  which  might  afterward  be  extended, 
of  an  anti-Laconian  party  in  Peloponnesus.  But  at  the  present  time 
the  Argeian  alliance  was  a  drain  and  an  exhaustion  rather  than  a 
source  of  strength  to  Athens;  very  different  from  the  splendid  hopes 


808  FROM  THE  FESTIVAL  OF  OLYMPIAD. 

which  it  had  presented  prior  to  the  battle  of  Mantineia — hope  of 
supplanting  Sparta  in  her  ascendency  within  the  [sthmus.  It  is 
remarkable,  that  in  spite  of  the  complete  alienation  of  feeling  between 
Athens  and  Sparta— and  continued  reciprocal  hostilities,  in  an  indi- 
rect manner,  so  long  as  each  was  acting  as  ally  of  some  third  party — 
nevertheless,  neither  the  one  nor  the  oilier  would  formally  renounce 
the  sworn  alliance,  nor  obliterate  the  record  inscribed  on  its  stone 
column.  Both  parties  shrank  from  proclaiming  the  real  truth,  1 1 
each  half  year  brought  them  a  step  nearer  to  it  in  fact.  Thus,  during 
the  course  of  the  present  summer  (416  B.C.),  the  Athenian  and  Mes- 
senian  garrison  at  Pylus  became  more  active  than  ever  in  their  incur- 
sions on  Laconia,  and  brought  home  large  booty;  upon  which  the 
Lacedaemonians,  though  still  not  renouncing  the  alliance,  publicly 
proclaimed  their  willingness  to  grant  what  we  may  call  letters  of 
marque,  to  any  one,  for  privateering  against  Athenian  commerce. 
The  Corinthians  also,  on  private  grounds  of  quarrel,  commenced 
hostilities  against  the  Athenians.  Vet  still  Sparta  and  her  allies 
remained  in  a  state  of  formal  peace  with  Alliens:  the  Athenians 
resisted  all  the  repeated  solicitations  of  the  Argeiaus  to  induce  them 
to  make  a  landing  on  any  part  of  Laconia  and  commit  devastation. 
Nor  was  the  license  of  free  intercourse  for  individuals  as  yet  sus- 
pended. We  cannot  doubt  that  the  Athenians  were  invited  to  the 
Olympic  festival  of  41b'  B.C.  (the  91st  Olympiad),  and  sent  thither 
their  solemn  legation  along  with  those  of  Sparta  and  other  Dorian 
Greeks. 

Now  that  they  had  again  become  allies  of  Argos,  the  Athenians 
probably  found  out,  more  fully  than  they  had  before  known,  the 
intrigue  carried  on  hy  the  former  Argeian  government  with  the  Mace- 
donian Perdikkas.  The  effects  of  these  intrigues,  however,  had  made 
themselves  felt  even  earlier  in  the  conduct  of  that  prince,  who.  hav- 
ing as  an  ally  of  Athens  engaged  to  co-operate  with  an  Athenian 
expedition  projected  under  Nikias  for  the  spring  or  summer  of  417 
B.C.  against  the  Chalkidians  of  Thrace  and  Amphipolis — now  with 
drew  his  concurrence,  receded  from  the  alliance  of  Athens,  and  frus- 
trated the  whole  scheme  of  expedition.  The  Athenians  accordingly 
placed  the  ports  of  Macedonia  under  naval  blockade,  proclaiming 
Perdikkas  an  enemy. 

Nearly  five  years  had  elapsed  since  the  defeat  of  Kleon  without 
any  fresh  attempt  to  recover  Amphipolis:  the  project  just  alluded  to 
appears  to  have  been  the  first.  The  proceedings  of  the  Athenians 
with  regard  to  this  important  town  afford  ample  proof  of  thai  want 
of  wisdom  on  the  pari  of  their  leading  men  Nikias  and  Alkibiades, 
and  of  erroneous  tendencies  on  the  pari  of  the  body  of  the  citizens, 
which  we  shall  gradually  find  conducting  their  empire  to  ruin. 
Among  all  their  possessions  out  of  Attica,  there  was  none  so  valuable 
as  Amphipolis:  the  center  of  a  great  commercial  and  mining  region 
^•situated  on  a  large  river  and  lake  which  the  Athenian  navy  could 


AMPHIPOLIS.  809 

readily  command — and  claimed  by  them  with  reasonable  justice, 
since  it  was  their  original  colony,  planted  by  their  wisest  statesman 
Perikles.  It  had  been  lost  only  through  unpardonable  negligence  on 
the  part  of  their  generals;  and  when  lost,  we  should  have  expected 
to  see  the  chief  energies  of  Athens  directed  to  the  recovery  of  it;  the 
more  so  as,  if  once  recovered,  it  admitted  of  being  made  sure  and 
retained  as  a  future  possession.  Kleon  is  the  only  leading  man  who 
at  once  proclaims  to  his  countrymen  the  important  truth  that  it  never 
can  be  recovered  except  by  force.  He  strenuously  urges  his  country- 
men to  make  the  requisite  military  effort,  and  prevails  upon  them  in 
part  to  do  so,  but  the  attempt  disgracefully  fails — partly  through  his 
own  incompetence  as  commander,  whether  his  undertaking  of  that 
duty  was  a  matter  of  choice  or  of  constraint — partly  through  the 
strong  opposition  and  antipathy  against  him  from  so  large  a  portion 
of  his  fellow-citizens  which  rendered  the  military  force  not  hearty  in 
the  enterprise.  Next,  Nikias,  Laches,  and  Alkibiades,  all  concur  in 
making  peace  and  alliance  with  the  Lacedasmonians,  under  express 
promise  and  purpose  to  procure  the  restoration  of  Amphipolis.  But 
after  a  series  of  diplomatic  proceeding  which  display  as  much  silly 
credulity  in  Nikias  as  selfish  deceit  in  Alkibiades,  the  result  becomes 
evident,  as  Kleon  had  insisted,  that  peace  will  not  restore  to  them 
Amphipolis,  and  that  it  can  only  be  regained  by  force.  The  fatal 
defect  of  Nikias  is  now  conspicuously  seen:  his  inertness  of  character 
and  incapacity  of  decided  or  energetic  effort.  "When  he  discovered 
that  he  had  been  out-maneuvered  by  the  Lacedaemonian  diplomacy, 
and  had  fatally  misadvised  his  countrymen  into  making  important 
cessions  on  the  faith  of  equivalents  to  come,  we  might  have  expected 
to  find  him  spurred  on  by  indignant  repentance  for  this  mistake,  and 
putting  forth  his  own  strongest  efforts,  as  well  as  those  of  his  country, 
in  order  to  recover  those  portions  of  her  empire  which  the  peace  had 
promised,  but  did  not  restore.  Instead  of  which  he  exhibits  no 
effective  movement,  while  Alkibiades  begins  to  display  the  defects  of 
his  political  character,  yet  more  dangerous  than  those  of  Nikias — the 
passion  for  showy,  precarious,  boundless,  and  even  perilous  novel- 
ties. It  is  only  in  the  year  417  B.C.,  after  the  defeat  of  Mantineia 
had  put  an  end  to  the  political  speculations  of  Alkibiades  in  the 
interior  of  Peloponnesus,  that  Nikias  projects  an  expedition  against 
Amphipolis;  and  even  then  it  is  projected  only  contingent  upon  the 
aid  of  Perdikkas,  a  prince  of  notorious  perfidy.  It  was"  not  by  any 
half  exertions  of  force  that  the  place  could  be  regained,  as  the  defeat 
of  Kleon  had  sufficiently  proved.  We  obtain  from  these  proceedings 
a  fair  measure  of  the  foreign  politics  of  Athens  at  this  time,  during 
what  is  called  the  peace  of  Nikias,  preparing  us  for  that  melancholy 
catastrophe  which  will  be  developed  in  the  coming  chapters — where 
she  is  brought  near  to  ruin  by  the  defects  of  Nikias  and  Alkibiades 
combined:  for  by  singular  misfortune  she  does  not  reap  the  benefit 
of  the  good  qualities  of  either. 


8J0  PROM  THE  FESTIVAL  OF  OLYMPIAD. 

It  was  in  one  of  the  three  years  between  -i'.'0-4ic  ts.c,  though  wo 
do  not  know  in  which,  that  the  rote  of  ostracism  toot  place,  arising 
oat  of  the  contention  between  Nikias  and  Alkibiades.  The  political 
antipathy  between  the  two  having  reached  a  point  of  great  violence, 
it  was  proposed  thai  a  vote  of  ostracism  should  be  taken,  and  this 
proposition  (probably  made  by  the  partisans  of  Nikias,  since  Alkibi- 
ades  was  the  person  mosl  likely  to  be  reputed  dangerous)  was  adopted 
by  the  people.  Hyperbolus  the  lamp-maker,  son  of  Chremes,  ;i 
speakei  of  considerable  influence  in  the  public  assembly,  sinuously 
supported  it,  bating  N'ikias  not  less  than  Alkibiades.  Hyperbolus  is 
named  by  Aristophanes  as  having  succeeded  Kleon  in  the  mastership 
of  the  rostrum  in  the  Pnyx:  if  this  were  true,  his  supposed  dema- 
gogic pre-eminence  would'  commence  about  September  422  B.C.,  the 
period  of  the  death  of  Kleon.  Long  before  that  time,  however,  be 
had  been  among  the  chief  butts  of  the  eomic  authors,  who  ascribe  to 
him  the  same  baseness,  dishonesty,  impudence,  and  malignity  in 
accusation,  as  that  which  they  fasten  upon  Kleon,  though  in  language 
which  seems  to  imply  an  inferior  idea  of  his  power.  And  it  nia\  he 
doubted  whether  Hyperbolus  ever  succeeded  to  the  same  influence  as 
had  been  enjoyed  by  Kleon,  when  we  observe  that  Thucydides  does 
not  name  him  in  any  of  the  important  debates  which  took  place  at 
and  after  the  peace  of  Nikias.  Thucydides  only  mentions  him  once 
— in  411  B.C.,  while  he  was  in  banishment  under  sentence  of  ostra- 
cism, and  resident  at  Sainos.  He  terms  him,  "one  Hyperbolus,  a 
person  of  bad  character,  who  had  been  ostracized,  not  from  fear  of 
dangerous  excess  of  dignity  and  power,  but  through  his  wickedness 
and  his  being  felt  as  a  disgrace  to  the  city."  This  sentence  of 
Thucydides  is  really  the  only  evidence  against  Hyperbolus:  for  it  is 
not  less  unjust  in  his  case  than  in  that  of  Kleon  to  cite  the  jests  and 
libels  of  comedj' as  if  they  were  so  much  authentic  fact  and  trust- 
worthy criticism.  It  was  at  Samos  thai  Hyperbolus  was  slain  by  the 
oligarchical  conspirators  who  were  aiming  to  overthrow  the  democracy 
at  Athens.  We  have  no  particular  facts  respecting  him  to  enable  us 
to  test  the  general  character  given  by  Thucydides. 

At  the  time  when  the  resolution  was  adopted  at  Athens,  to  take  a 
vote  of  ostracism  suggested  by  the  political  dissension  between  Nikias 
and  Alkibiades,  aboul  twenty-four  years  had  elapsed  since  a  similar 
vote  had  been  resorted  to;  the  lasi  example  having  been  that  of  Peri- 
kles  and  Thucydides  son  of  Milesias,  the  latter  of  whom  was  ostra 
cized  about  442  b.c.  The  democratical  constitution  had  1< 
sufficiently  confirmed  to  lessen  materially  the  necessity  for  ostracism 
as  a  safeguard  againsl  individual  usurpers:  moreover  there  was  now 
full  confidence  in  the  numerous  Dikastcries  as  competent  to  dial  with 
the  greatest  of  such  criminals  thus  abating  the  necessity  at  con- 
ceived in  men's  minds,  not  less  than  the  real  necessity,  for  such  pre- 
cautionary intervention.  Under  such  a  state  of  things,  altered  reality 
as  well  as  altered  feeling,  we  are  not  surprised  to  find  that  the  vote 


SIEGE  OF  MELOS.  811 

of  ostracism  now  invoked,  though  we  do  not  know  the  circumstances 
which  immediately  preceded  it,  ended  in  an  abuse,  or  rather  in  a  sort 
of  parody,  of  the  ancient  preventive.  At  a  moment  of  extreme  heat 
of  party- dispute,  the  friends  of  Alkibiades  probably  accepted  the 
challenge  of  Nikias  and  concurred  in  supporting  a  vote  of  ostracism: 
each  hoping  to  get  rid  of  the  opponent.  The  vote  was  accordingly 
decreed,  but  before  it  actually  took  place,  the  partisans  of  both 
changed  their  views,  preferring  to  let  the  political  dissension  proceed 
without  closing  it  by  separating  the  combatants.  But  the  ostracizing 
vote,  haviug  been  formally  pronounced,  could  not  now  be  prevented 
from  taking  place:  it  was  always  however  perfectly  general  in  its 
form,  admitting  of  any  citizen  "being  selected  for  temporary  banish- 
ment. Accordingly  the  two  opposing  parties,  each  doubtless  includ- 
ing various  clubs  or  Hetaeries,  and  according  to  some  accounts,  the 
friends  of  Phaeax  also,  united  to  turn  the  vote  against  some  one  else. 
They  fixed  upon  a  man  whom  all  of  them  jointly  disliked — Hyper- 
bolus.  By  thus  concurring,  they  obtained  a  sufficient  number  of 
votes  against  him  to  pass  the  sentence  which  sent  him  into  temporary 
banishment.  But  such  a  result  was  in  no  one's  contemplation  when 
the  vote  was  decreed  to  take  place,  and  Plutarch  even  represents  the 
people  as  clapping  their  hands  at  it  as  a  good  joke.  It  was  presently 
recognized  by  every  one,  seemingly  even  by  the  enemies  of  Hyper- 
bolus,  as  a  gross  abuse  of  the  ostracism.  And  the  language  of 
Thucydides  himself  distinctly  implies  this:  for  if  we  even  grant  that 
Hyperbolus  fully  deserved  the  censure  which  that  historian  bestows, 
no  one  could  treat  his  presence  as  dangerous  to  the  commonwealth; 
nor  was  the  ostracism  introduced  to  meet  low  dishonesty  or  wicked- 
ness. It  was,  even  befoi-e,  passing  out  of  the  political  morality  of 
Athens;  and  this  sentence  consummated  its  extinction,  so  that  we 
never  hear  of  it  as  employed  afterward.  It  had  been  extremely  valua- 
ble in  earlier  days,  as  a  security  to  the  growing  democracy  against 
individual  usurpation  of  power,  and  against  dangerous  exaggeration 
of  rivalry  between  individual  leaders :  but  the  democracy  was  now 
strong  enough  to  dispense  with  such  exceptional  protection.  Yet  if 
Alkibiades  had  returned  as  victor  from  Syracuse,  it  is  highly  proba- 
ble that  the  Athenians  would  have  had  no  other  means  than  the  pre- 
cautionary antidote  of  ostracism  to  save  themselves  from  him  as 
despot. 

It  was  in  the  beginning  of  summer  416  B.C.,  that  the  Athenians 
undertook  the  siege  and  conquest  of  the  Dorian  island  of  Melos — one 
of  the  Cyclades,  and  the  only  one,  except  Thera,  which  was  not 
already  included  in  their  empire.  Melos  and  Thera  were  both  ancient 
colonies  of  Lacedsemon,  with  whom  they  had  strong  sympathies  of 
lineage.  They  had  never  joined  the  confederacy  of  Delos,  nor  been 
in  any  way  connected  with  Athens:  but  at  the  same  time,  neither  had 
they  ever  taken  part  in  the  recent  war  against  her,  nor  given  her  any 
ground  of  complaint,  until  she  landed  and  attacked  them  in  the  sixth 


812  FROM  THE  FESTIVAL  OF  OLYMPIAD. 

year  of  the  recent  war.  She  now  renewed  her  attempt,  sending 
against  the  island  a  considerable  force  under  Kleomedea  and  Tisias: 
thirty  Athenian  triremes,  with  six  Chian,  and  two  Lesbian — 1200 
Athenian  hoplites,  and  1500  hoplites,  from  the  allies — with  300  bow- 
men and  twenty  horse-bowmen.  These  officers,  after  disembarking 
their  forces,  and  taking  position,  sent  envoys  into  the  city  summon- 
ing the  government  to  surrender,  and  to  become  a  subject-ally  of 
Alliens. 

It  was  a  practice  frequent,  if  not  universal,  in  Greece — even  in 
governments  not  professedly  democratical — to  discuss  propositions  for 
peaee  or  war  before  the  assembly  of  the  people.  But  on  the  present 
occasion  the  Melian  leaders  departed  from  this  practice,  admitting  the 
envoys  only  to  a  private  conversation  with  tin  ir  executive  council. 
Of  1  he  conversation  which  passed,  Thucydides  professes  to  give  a 
detailed  and  elaborate  account— at  surprising  length,  considering  his 
general  brevity.  He  sets  down  thirteen  distinct  observations,  with 
as  many  replies,  interchanged  between  the  Athenian  envoys  and  the 
Melians;  no  one  of  them  separately  long,  and  some  very  short — hut 
the  dialogue  carried  on  is  dramatic  and  very  impressive.  There  is 
indeed  every  reason  for  concluding  that  what  we  here  read  in  Thucyd 
ides  is  in  far  larger  proportion  Ids  own,  and  in  smaller  prop 
authentic  report,  than  any  of  the  other  speeches  which  he  pn 
to  set  down.  For  this  was  not  a  public  harangue,  in  respeel  to 
which  he  might  have  had  the  opportunity  of  consulting  the  recollec- 
tion of  many  different  persons:  it  was  a  private  conversation,  when  in 
three  or  four  Athenians,  and  perhaps  ten  or  a  dozen  Melians,  may 
have  taken  part.  Now  as  all  the  Melian  prisoners  of  military  age, 
and  certainly  all  those  leading  citizens  then  in  the  town  who  had  con 
ducted  this  interview,  were  slain  immediately  after  the  capture  of  the 
town,  there  remained  only  the  Athenian  envoys  through  whose  report 
Thucydides  could  possibly  have  heard  what  really  passed.  That  he 
did  hear  either  from  or  through  them,  the  general  character  of  vdiat 
passed,  I  make  no  doubt:  but  there  is  no  ground  for  believing  that 
he  received  from  them  anything  like  the  consecutive  stream  of  debate, 
which,  together  with  part  of  the  illustrative  reasoning,  we  must  refer 
to  his  dramatic  genius  and  arrangement. 

The  Athenian  begins  by  restricting  the  subject  of  discussion  to  the 
mutual  interests  of  both  parties  in  the  peculiar  circumstances  in  which 
they  now  stand:  in  spite  of  the  disposition  of  the  Melians  to  enlarge 
the  range  of  topics,  by  introducing  considerations  of  justice  and  ap- 
pealing to  the  sentiment  of  impartial  critics.  He  will  not  multiply 
words  to  demonstrate  the  jusl  origin  of  the  Athenian  empire,  erected 
on  the  expulsion  of  the  Persians — or  to  set  forth  injury  suffered,  as 
t  for  the  present  expedition.  Nor  will  he  listen  to  any  plea  on 
the  part  of  the  Melians,  that  they,  though  colonists  of  Sparta,  have 
never  fought  alongside  of  her  or  done  Athens  wrong.  He  presses 
upon  them  to  aim  at  what  is  attainable  under  existing  circumstances, 


DIALOGUE   AT  MELOS.  813 

since  they  know  as  well  as  lie,  that  justice  in  the  reasoning  of  man- 
kind is  settled  according  to  equal  compulsion  on  both  sides  ;  the 
strong  doing  what  their  power  allows,  and  the  weak  submitting 
to  it.  To  this  the  Melians  reply,  that  (omitting  all  appeal 
to  justice  and  speaking  only  of  what  was  expedient)  they  hold  it  to  be 
even  expedient  for  Athens  not  to  break  down  the  common  moral 
sanction  of  mankind,  but  to  permit  that  equity  and  justice  shall  still 
remain  as  a  refuge  for  men  in  trouble,  with  some  indulgence  even 
toward  those  who  maybe  unable  to  make  out  a  case  of  full  and 
strict  right.  Most  of  all  was  this  the  interest  of  Athens  herself, 
inasmuch  as  her  ruin,  if  it  ever  occurred,  would  be  awful  both  as 
punishment  to  herself  and  as  a  lesson  to  others.  "We  are  not 
afraid  of  that  (rejoined  the  Athenian)  even  if  our  empire  should 
be  overthrown.  It  is  not  imperial  cities  like  Sparta  who  deal 
harshly  with  the  conquered.  Moreover  our  present  contest  is 
not  undertaken  against  Sparta  —  it  is  a  contest  to  determine 
whether  subjects  shall  by  their  own  attack  prevail  over  their 
rulers.  This  is  a  risk  for  us  to  judge  of:  in  the  meantime  let  us 
remind  you  that  we  come  here  for  the  advantage  of  our  own  empire, 
and  that  we  are  now  speaking  with  a  view  to  your  safety — wishing 
to  get  you  under  our  empire  without  trouble  to  ourselves,  and  to 
preserve  you  for  the  mutal  benefit  of  both  of  us." — "Cannot  you 
leave  us  alone,  and  let  us  be  your  friends  instead  of  enemies,  but 
neither  allies  of  you  nor  of  Sparta?" — said  the  Melians.  "  No  (is  the 
reply) — your  friendship  does  us  more  harm  than  your  enmity:  your 
friendship  is  a  proof  of  our  weakness,  in  the  eyes  of  our  subject- 
allies — your  enmity  will  give  a  demonstration  of  our  power." — "But 
do  your  subjects  really  take  such  a  measure  of  equity,  as  to  put  us, 
who  have  no  sort  of  connection  with  you,  on  the  same  footing  with 
themselves,  most  of  whom  are  your  own  colonists,  while  many  of 
them  have  even  revolted  from  you  and  been  reconquered?" — "They 
do:  for  they  think  that  both  one  and  the  other  have  fair  ground  for 
claiming  independence,  and  that  if  you  are  left  independent,  this 
arises  only  from  your  power  and  from  our  fear  to  attack  you.  So 
that  your  submission  will  not  only  enlarge  our  empire,  but  strengthen 
our  security  throughout  the  whole;  especially  as  you  are  islanders, 
and  feeble  islanders  too,  while  we  are  lords  of  the  sea." — "But 
surely  that  very  circumstance  is  in  other  ways  a  protection  to  you, 
as  evincing  your  moderation:  for  if  you  attack  us,  you  will  at  once 
alarm  all  neutrals,  and  convert  them  into  enemies." — "We  are  in 
little  fear  of  continental  cities,  who  are  out  of  our  reach  and  not  likely 
to  take  part  against  us — but  only  of  islanders;  either  yet  unincor- 
porated in  our  empire,  like  you,  or  already  in  our  empire  and  dis- 
contented with  the  restraint  which  it  imposes.  It  is  such  islanders 
who  by  their  ill-judged  obstinacy  are  likely,  with  their  eyes  open, 
to  bring  both  us  and  themselves  into  peril." — "  We  know  well  (said 
the  Melians,  after  some  other  observations  had  been  interchanged} 


814  FROM  THE  FESTIVAL  OF  OLYMPIAD. 

how  terrible  it  is  to  contend  againsl  your  superior  power  and  your 
good  fortune;  nevertheless  we  trusl  thai  in  poinl  of  fortune  we  shall 
receive  fair  treatment  from  the  Gods,  since  we  stand  upon  grounds 
of  righl  against  injustice — and  as  to  our  inferior  power  we  trust 
thai  the  deficiency  will  be  made  up  by  our  ally  Sparta,  whose 
kindred  rare  will  compel  her  from  very  shame  to  aid  us." — "We 
too  (replied  the  Athenians)  think  that  we  shall  not  be  worse  off  than 
others  in  regard  to  the  divine  favor.  For  we  neither  advance  any 
claim,  nor  do  any  act,  overpassing  that  which  men  believe  in  regard 
to  the  (Sods,  and  wish  in  regard  to  themselves.  What  we  believe 
about  the  Gods  is  the  same  as  that  which  we  see  to  he  the  practice  of 
men:  the  impulse  of  nature  inclines  them  of  necessity  to  rule  over 
what  is  inferior  in  force  to  themselves.  This  is  the  principle  on 
which  we  now  proceed — not  having  been  the  first  either  to  lay  it 
down  or  to  follow  it,  hut  finding  it  established  and  likely  to  con- 
tinue forever  —  and  knowing  well  too  that  you  or  others  in  our 
position  would  do  as  much.  As  for  your  expectations  from  the 
Lacedaemonians,  founded  on  the  disgrace  of  their  remaining  deaf  to 
your  call,  we  congratulate  you  on  your  innocent  simplicity,  but  we 
at  the  same  time  deprecate  such  foolishness.  For  the  Lacedae- 
monians are  indeed  most  studious  of  excellence  in  regard  to  them- 
selves and  their  own  national  customs.  But  looking  at  their  beha- 
vior toward  others,  we  affirm  roundly,  and  can  prove  by  many 
examples  of  their  history,  that  they  are  of  all  men  the  most  conspic- 
uous in  construing  what  is  pleasing  as  if  it  were  honorable,  and  what 
is  expedient  as  if  it  were  just.  Now  that  is  not  the  state  of  mind 
which  you  require,  to  square  with  your  desperate  calculations  of 
safety." 

After  various  other  observations  interchanged  in  a  similar  tenor, 
the  Athenian  envoys,  strenuously  urging  upon  the  Melians  to  neon 
sider  the  matter  more  cautiously  among  themselves,  withdrew,  and 
after  a  certain  interval,  were  recalled  by  the  Melian  council  to  hear 
the  following  words — "We  hold  to  the  same  opinion,  as  at  first, 
men  of  Athens.  We  shall  not  surrender  the  independence  of  a  city 
which  has  already  stood  for  700  years:  we  shall  yet  make  an  effort 
to  save  ourselves — relying  on  that  favorable  fortune  which  the  Gods 
have  hitherto  vouchsafed  to  us,  as  well  as  upon  aid  from  men,  and 
especially  from  the  Laceda?monians.  We  request  that  we  may  be 
considered  as  your  friends,  but  as  hostile  to  neither  party;  and  that 
you  will  leave  the  island  after  concluding  such  a  truce  as  may  be 
mutually  acceptable." — "Well  (said  the  Athenian  envoys),  you 
alone  seem  to  consider  future  contingencies  as  clearer  than  the  facts 
before  your  eyes,  and  to  look  at  an  uncertain  distance  through  your 
own  wishes,  as  if  it  were  present  reality.  You  have  staked  your  all 
upon  the  Lacedaemonians,  upon  fortune,  and  upon  fond  hopes;  and 
with  your  all  you  will  come  to  ruin." 

The  siege  was  forthwith  commenced.     A  wrall  of  circumvallation, 


VENUS  OF  MILO.    'Louvre). 


CAPTURE  OF  MELOS.  815 

distributed  in  portions  among  the  different  allies  of  Athens,  was 
constructed  round  the  town;  which  was  left  under  full  blockade 
both  by  sea  and  land,  while  the  rest  of  the  armament  retired  home. 
The  town  remained  blocked  up  for  several  mouths.  During  the  course 
of  that  time  the  besieged  made  two  successful  sallies,  which  afforded 
them  some  temporary  relief,  and  forced  the  Athenians  to  send  an 
additional  detachment  under  Philokrates.  At  length  the  provisions 
within  were  exhausted;  plots  for  betrayal  commenced  among  the 
Melians  themselves,  so  that  they  were  constrained  to  surrender  at 
discretion.  The  Athenians  resolved  to  put  to  death  all  the  men  of 
military  age,  and  to  sell  the  women  and  children  as  slaves.  Who 
the  proposer  of  this  barbarous  resolution  was,  Thucydides  does  not 
say;  but  Plutarch  and  others  inform  us  that  Alkibiades  was  strenu- 
ous in  supporting  it.  Five  hundred  Athenian  settlers  were  subse- 
quently sent  thither,  to  form  a  new  community;  apparently  not  as 
kleruchs,  or  out-citizens  of  Athens,  but  as  new  Melians. 

Taking  the  proceedings  of  the  Athenians  toward  Melos  from  the 
beginning  to  the  end,  they  form  one  of  the  grossest  and  most  inex- 
cusable pieces  of  cruelty  combined  with  injustice  which  Grecian 
history  presents  to  us.  In  appreciating  the  cruelty  of  such  whole- 
sale executions,  we  ought  to  recollect  that  the  laws  of  war  placed  the 
prisoner  altogether  at  the  disposal  of  his  conqueror,  and  that  an 
Athenian  garrison,  if  captured  by  the  Corinthians  in  Naupaktus, 
Nissea,  or  elsewhere,  would  assuredly  have  undergone  the  same  fate, 
unless  in  so  far  as  they  might  be  kept  for  exchange.  But  the  treat- 
ment of  the  Melians  goes  beyond  all  rigor  of  the  laws  of  war;  for 
they  had  never  been  at  war  with  Athens,  nor  had  they  done  anything 
to  incur  her  enmity.  Moreover  the  acquisition  of  the  island  was 
of  no  material  value  to  Athens;  not  sufficient  to  pay  the  expenses 
of  the  armament  emploj^ed  in  its  capture.  And  while  the  gain  was 
thus  in  every  sense  slender,  the  shock  to  Grecian  feeling  by  the 
whole  proceeding  seems  to  have  occasioned  serious  mischief  to 
Athens.  Far  from  tending  to  strengthen  her  entire  empire,  by 
sweeping  in  this  small  insular  population  who  had  hitherto  been 
neutral  and  harmless,  it  raised  nothing  but  odium  against  her,  and 
was  treasured  up  in  after-times  as  among  the  first  of  her  misdeeds. 

To  gratify  her  pride  of  empire,  by  a  new  conquest — easy  to  effect, 
though  of  small  value — was  doubtless  her  chief  motive;  probably  also 
strengthened  by  pique  against  Sparta,  between  whom  and  herself  a 
thoroughly  hostile  feeling  subsisted — and  by  a  desire  to  humiliate 
Sparta  through  the  Melians.  This  passion  for  new  acquisition,  super* 
scding  the  more  reasonable  hopes  of  recovering  the  lost  portions  of 
her  empire,  will  be  seen  in  the  coming  chapters  breaking  out  with 
still  »iore  fatal  predominance. 

Both  these  two  points,  it  will  be  observed,  are  prominently  marked 
in  the  dialogue  set  forth  by  Thucydides.  I  have  already  stated  that 
this  dialogue  can  hardly  represent  what  actually  passed,  except  as  to 


816  FROM  THE  FESTIVAL  OF   OLYMPIAD. 

a  few  general  points,  which  the  historian  has  followed  out  into  deduc- 
tions and  illustrations,  thus  dramatizing  the  given  situation  in  a  pow- 
erful and  characteristic  manner.  The  language  put  into  the  month 
of  the  Athenian  envoys  is  that  of  pirates  and  robbers;  as  Dionysius 
of  Halikarnassus  long  ago  remarked,  intimating  his  suspicion  that 
Thucydides  had  so  Bel  out  tin-  ease  for  the  purpose  of  discrediting  the 
country  which  had  sent  him  into  exile  Whatever  may  be  thought 
of  this  suspicion,  we  may  at  least  affirm  that  the  arguments  which  he 
here  ascribes  to  At  hens  arc  not  in  harmony  even  with  the  defects  of  the 
Athenian  character.  Athenian  speakers  are  more  open  to  the  charge 
of  equivocal  wording,  multiplication  of  false  pretenses,  softening 
down  the  bad  points  of  their  ease,  putting  an  amiable  name  upon 
vicious  acts,  employing  what  is  properly  called  sophistry  where  their 
purpose  needs  it.  'Mow  the  language  of  the  envoy  at,  Melos,  which 
has  been  sometimes  cited  as  illustrating  the  immorality  of  the  class  or 
profession  (falsely  called  a  school)  named  Sophists  at  Athens,  is  above 
all  things  remarkable  for  a  sort  of  audacious  frankness — a  disdain  not 
merely  of  sophistry  in  the  modern  sense  of  the  word,  hut  even  ot 
such  plausible  excuse  as  might  have  been  offered.  It  has  been 
strangely  argued  as  if  "t7i,e  good  old  plan,  That  they  should  take  who 
have  the  power,  And  they  should  keep  who  can" — had  been  first  discov- 
ered and  openly  promulgated  by  Athenian  sophists:  whereas  the  true 
purpose  and  value  of  sophists,  even  in  the  modern  and  worst  sense 
of  the  word  (putting  aside  the  perversion  of  applying  that  sense 
to  the  persons  called  Sophists  at  Athens),  is,  to  furnish  plausible 
matter  of  deceptive  justification— so  that  the  strong  man  may  be 
enabled  to  act  upon  this  "good  old  plan  as  much  as  he  pleases, 
but  without  avowing  it,  and  while  professing  fair  dealing  or  just 
retaliation  for  some  imaginary  wrong.  The  wolf  in  iEsop's  fable  (of 
the  Wolf  and  the  Lamb)  speaks  like  a  sophist;  the  Athenian  envoy 
at  Melos  speaks  in  a  manner  totally  unlike  a  sophist,  either  in  the 
Athenian  sense  or  in  the  modern  sense  of  the  word;  we  may  add, 
unlike  an  Athenian  at  all,  as  Dionysius  has  observed. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  and  practice,  it  is  true  that  stronger  states,  in 
Greece  and  in  the  contemporary  world,  did  habitually  tend,  as  they 
have  tended  throughout  the  course  of  history  down  to  the  present  day, 
to  enlarge  their  power  at  the  expense  of  the  weaker.  Every  territory 
in  Greece,  expect  Attica  and  Arcadia,  had  been  seized  by  conquerors 
who  dispossessed  or  enslaved  Ahe  prior  inhabitants.  We  find  Brasi- 
das  reminding  his  soldiers  of  the  good  sword  of  their  forefathers, 
which  had  established  dominion  over  men  far  more  numerous  than 
themselves,  as  matter  of  pride  and  glory:  and  when  we  come  to  the 
times  of  Philip  and  Alexander  of  Macedon,  we  shall  see  the  lust  of 
conquest  reaching  a  pitch  never  witnessed  among  free  Greeks.  Of 
right  thus  founded  on  simple  superiority  of  force,  there  were  abundant 
examples  to  be  quoted,  as  parallels  to  the  Athenian  conqnest  of  Melos: 
but  that  which  is  unparalleled  is  the  mode  adopted  by  the  Athenian 


REMARKS  ON  THE  DIALOGUE.  817 

envoy  r^f  justifying  it,  or  rather  of  setting:  aside  all  justification,  look- 
ing at  the  actual  slate  of  civilization  in  Greece.  A  barbarous  invadel 
casts  bis  sword  into  the  scale  in  lieu  of  argument:  a  civilized  con- 
querer  is  bound  by  received  international  morality  to  furnish  some 
justification — a  good  plea  if  he  can — a  false  plea,  or  sham  plea,  if  he 
has  no  better.  But  the  Athenian  envoy  neither  copies  the  cotemptu- 
ous  silence  of  the  barbarian  nor  the  smooth  lying  of  the  civilized 
invader.  Though  coming  from  the  most  cultivated  city  in  Greece, 
where  the  vices  prevalent  were  those  of  refinement  and  not  of  bar- 
barism, he  disdains  the  conventional  arts  of  civilized  diplomacy 
more  than  would  have  been  done  by  an  envoy  even  of  Argos  or  Kor- 
kyra.  He  even  disdains  to  mention — what  might  have  been  said 
with  perfect  truth  as  matter  of  fact,  whatever  may  be  thought  of  its 
sufficiency  as  a  justification — that  the  Melians  had  enjoyed  for  the 
last  fifty  years  the  security  of  the  iEgean  waters  at  the  cost  of  Athens 
and  her  allies,  without  any  payment  of  their  own. 

So  at  least  he  is  made  to  do  in  the  Thucydidean  dramatic  fragment 
— Mr)\ov"A\Ga6ic,  (The  Capture  of  Melos) — if  we  may  parody  the  title 
of  the  lost  tragedy  of  Phrynichus — "  The  Capture  of  Miletus."  And 
I  think  a  comprehensive  view  of  the  history  of  Thucydides  will  sug- 
gest to  us  the  explanation  of  this  drama,  with  its  powerful  and  trag- 
ical effect.  The  capture  of  Melos  comes  immediately  before  the  great 
Athenian  expedition  against  Syracuse,  which  was  resolved  upon  three 
or  four  months  afterward,  and  dispatched  during  the  course  of  the 
following  summer.  That  expedition  was  the  gigantic  effort  of 
Athens,  which  ended  in  the  most  ruinous  catastrophe  known  to 
ancient  history.  From  such  a  blow  it  was  impossible  for  Athens  to 
recover.  Though  crippled,  indeed,  she  struggled  against  its  effects 
with  surprising  energy;  but  her  fortune  went  on,  in  the  main,  declin- 
ing— j'et  with  occasional  moments  of  apparent  restoration — until  her 
complete  prostration  and  subjugation  by  Lysander.  Now  Thucyd- 
ides, just  before  he  gets  upon  the  plane  of  this  descending  progress, 
makes  a  halt,  to  illustrate  the  sentiment  of  Athenian  power  in  its 
most  exaggerated,  insolent,  and  cruel  manifestation,  by  his  dramatic 
fragment  of  the  envoys  at  Melos.  It  will  be  recollected  that  Herod- 
otus, when  about  to  describe  the  forward  march  of  Xerxes  into 
Greece,  destined  to  terminate  in  such  fatal  humiliation — impresses 
his  readers  with  an  elaborate  idea  of  the  monarch's  insolence  and 
superhuman  pride  by  various  conversations  between  him  and  the 
courtiers  about  him,  as  well  as  by  other  anecdotes,  combined  with  the 
overwhelming  specifications  of  the  muster  at  Doriskus.  Such  moral 
contrasts  and  juxtapositions,  especially  that  of  ruinous  reverse  fol- 
lowing upon  overweening  good  fortune,  w>ere highly  interesting  to  the 
Greek  miud.  And  Thucydides — having  before  him  an  act  of  great 
injustice  and  cruelty  on  the  part  of  Athens,  committed  exactly  at 
this  point  of  time — has  availed  himself  of  the  form  of  dialogue,  for 
once  in  his  history,  to  bring  out  the  <.<*»ntiments  of  a  disdainful  and 


818  SICILIAN  AFFAIRS. 

confident  conqueror  in  dramatic  antithesis.  They  are,  however,  trie 
own  sentiments,  conceived  as  suitable  bo  the  situation;  not  those  of 

the  Athenian  envoy — still  less,  those  of  the  Athenian  public— last  of 
all.  those  of  that  much  calumniated  class  of  men,  the  Athenian 
sophists. 


CHAPTER  LVII. 

SICILIAN     AFFAIRS     AFTER     THE     EXTINCTION     OF     THE      GELONIAN 

DYNASTY. 

In  the  preceding  chapters,  1  have  brought  down  the  general  his- 
tory of  the  Peloponnesian  war  to  the  time  immediately  preceding  the 

memorable  Athenian  expedition  against  Syracuse,  which  changed 
the  whole  face  of  the  war.  At  this  period,  and  for  some  time  to  come, 
the  history  of  the  Peloponnesian  Greeks  becomes  intimately  blended 
with  that  of  the  Sicilian  Greeks.  But  hitherto  the  connection 
between  the  two  has  been  merely  occasional,  and  of  little  reciprocal 
effect;  so  that  I  have  thought  it  for  the  convenience  of  the  leader  to 
keep  the  two  streams  entirely  separate,  omitting  the  proceedings  of 
Athens  in  Sicily  during  the  first  ten  years  of  the  war.  I  now  pro* 
ceed  to  fill  up  this  blank;  to  recount  as  much  as  can  be  made  out  of 
Sicilian  events  during  the  interval  between  461-416  B.C.;  and  to 
assign  the  successive  steps  whereby  the  Athenians  entangled  them- 
selves in  ambitious  projects  against  Syracuse,  until  they  at  length 
came  to  stake  the  larger  portion  of  their  force  upon  that  fatal  hazard. 

The  extinction  of  the  Gelonian  dynasty  at  Syracuse,  followed  by 
the  expulsion  or  retirement  of  all  the  other  despots  throughout  the 
island,  left  the  various  Grecian  cities  to  reorganize  themselves  in  lice 
and  self-constituted  governments.  Unfortunately  our  memorials 
respecting  this  revolution  are  miserably  scanty;  but  there  is  enough 
to  indicate  that  it  was  something  much  more  than  a  change  from 
single-headed  to  popular  government.  It  included,  farther,  trans- 
fers on  the  largest  scale  both  of  inhabitants  and  of  properly.  The 
preceding  despots  had  sent  many  old  citizens  into  exile,  transplanted 
others  from  one  part  of  Sicily  to  another,  and  provided  settlements 
for  numerous  immigrants  and  mercenaries  devoted  to  their  inter*  Bt 
Of  these  proceedings  much  was  reversed,  when  the  dynasties  were 
overthrown,  so  that  the  personal  and  proprietary  revolution  was 
more  complicated  and  perplexing  than  the  political.  After  a  period 
of  severe  commotion,  an  accommodation  was  concluded,  whereby 
the  adherents  of  the  expelled  dynasty  were  planted  partly  in  the 
territory  of  Messene,  partly  in  the  re-established  city  of  Kamariua, 
in  the  eastern  portion  of  the  southern)  coast,  bordering  on   Syracuse. 

But  though  peace  was  thus  re-eslablished,  these  large  mutations  of 


SICILY  AFTER  THE  DESPOTS.  819 

inhabitants,  first  begun  by  the  despots — and  the  incoherent  mixture 
of  races,  religious  institutions,  dialects,  etc.,  which  was  brought 
about  unavoidably  during  the  process — left  throughout  Sicily  a  feel- 
ing of  local  instability,  very  different  from  the  long  traditional  ten- 
ures in  Peloponnesus  and  Attica,  and  numbered  by  foreign  enemies 
among  the  elements  of  its  weakness.  The  wonder,  indeed,  rather  is, 
that  such  real  and  powerful  causes  of  disorder  were  soon  so  effica- 
ciously controlled  by  the  popular  governments,  that  the  half-century 
now  approaching  was  decidedly  the  most  prosperous  and  undis- 
turbed period  in  the  history  of  the  island. 

The  southern  coast  of  Sicily  was  occupied  (beginning  from  the 
westward)  by  Selinus,  Agrigeutum,  Gela,  and  Kamarina.  Then 
came  Syracuse,  possessing  the  south-eastern  cape,  and  the  southern 
portion  of  the  eastern  coast:  next,  on  the  eastern  coast,  Leontini, 
Katana,  and  Naxos:  Messene,  on  the  strait  adjoining  Italy.  The 
center  of  the  island,  and  even  much  of  the  northern  coast,  was  occu- 
pied by  the  non-Hellenic  Sikels  and  Sikans;  on  this  coast,  Himera 
was  the  only  Grecian  city.  Between  Himera  and  Cape  Lilybaeum, 
the  western  corner  of  the  island  was  occupied  by  the  non-Hellenic 
cities  of  Egesta  and  Eryx,  and  by  the  Carthaginian  seaports,  of 
which  Pauormus  (Palermo)  was  the  principal. 

Of  these  various  Grecian  cities,  all  independent,  Syracuse  was  the 
first  in  power,  Agrigentum  the  second.  The  causes  above  noticed, 
disturbing  the  first  commencement  of  popular  governments  in  all  of 
them,  were  most  powerfully  operative  at  Syracuse.  We  do  not 
know  the  particulars  of  the  democratical  constitution  which  wTas 
there  established,  but  its  stability  was  threatened  by  more  than  one 
ambitious  pretender,  eager  to  seize  the  scepter  of  Gelo  and  Hiero. 
The  most  prominent  among  these  pretenders  was  Tyndarion,  who 
employed  a  considerable  fortune  in  distributing  largesses  and  pro- 
curing partisans  among  the  poor.  His  political  designs  were  at 
length  so  openly  manifested,  that  he  was  brought  to  trial,  con- 
demned, and  put  to  death;  yet  not  without  an  abortive  insurrection 
of  his  partisans  to  rescue  him.  After  several  leading  citizens  had 
tried  and  failed  in  a  similar  manner,  the  people  thought  it  expedient 
to  pass  a  law  similar  to  the  Athenian  ostracism,  authorizing  the 
infliction  of  temporary  preventive  banishment.  Under  this  law 
several  powerful  citizens  were  actually  and  speedily  banished;  and 
such  was  the  abuse  of  the  new  engine  by  the  political  parties  in  the 
city,  that  men  of  conspicuous  position  are  said  to  have  become 
afraid  of  meddling  with  public  affairs.  Thus  put  in  practice,  the 
institution  is  said  to  have  given  rise  to  new  political  contentions  not 
less  violent  than  those  which  it  checked,  insomuch  that  the  Syracu- 
sans  found  themselves  obliged  to  repeal  the  law  not  long  after  its 
introduction.  We  should  have  been  glad  to  learn  some  particulars 
concerning  this  political  experiment,  beyond  the  meager  abstract 
fiven  by  Diodorus — and  especially  to  know  the  precautionary  secu- 


820  SICILIAN  AFFAIRS. 

rities  by  which  the  application  of  the  ostracizing  sentence  was 
restrained   al    Syracuse.      Perhaps    no   care   was    taken    to  copy   the 

checks  and  formalities  provided  by  Kleisthenes  at  Athens.  Yet 
under  all  circumstances,  the  institution,  though  tutelary  if  reserved 
for  its  proper  emergencies,  was  eminently  open  to  abuse,  so  that  we 
have  no  reason  to  wonder  that  abuse  occurred,  especially  at  a  period 
(i I  meat  violence  and  discord.  The  wonder  rather  is,  that  it  was  so 
little  abused  al  Athens. 

Although  the  ostracism  (or  pelalism)  at  Syracuse  was  speedily  dis- 
continued, it  may  probably  have  left  a  salutary  impression  behind, 
as  far  as  we  can  judge  from  the  fact  that  new  pretenders  to  despot- 
ism are  not  hereafter  mentioned.  The  republic  increases  in  wealth 
ami  manifests  an  energetic  action  in  foreign  affairs.  The  Syracusan 
admiral  Phaylluswas  dispatched  with  a  powerful  fleet  to  repress  the 
piracies  of  the  Tyrrhenian  maritime  towns,  and  after  ravaging  the 
island  of  Elba,  returned  home,  under  the  suspicion  of  having  been 
boughl  olf  by  bribes  from  the  enemy;  on  which  accusation  he  was 
tried  and  banished — a  second  fleet  of  sixty  triremes  under  Apclles 
1  i  ing  sent  to  the  same  regions.  The  new  admiral  not  only  plun- 
der (1  many  parts  of  the  Tyrrhenian  coast,  but  also  carried  his  rav- 
;  ges  into  the  island  of  Corsica  (at  that  time  a  Tyrrhenian  possession), 
and  reduced  the  island  of  Elba  completely.  His  return  was  signal- 
ized by  a  large  number  of  captives  and  a  rich  booty. 

Meanwhile  the  great  antecedent  revolutions,  among  the  Grecian 
cities  in  Sicily-,  had  raised  a  new  spirit  among  the  Sikels  of  the 
interior,  and  inspired  the  Sikel  prince  Duketius,  a  man  of  spirit  and 
ability,  with  large  ideas  of  aggrandizement.  Many  exiled  Greeks 
1  aving  probably  sought  service  with  him,  it  was  either  by  their  sug- 
gi  lion,  or  from  having  himself  caught  the  spirit  of  Hellenic  improve- 
ment, that  he  commenced  the  plan  of  bringing  the  pretty  Sikel  com- 
munities into  something  like  city-lifc  and  collective  co-operation. 
Having  acquired  glory  by  the  capture  of  the  Grecian  town  of 
Morgantina,  he  induced  all  the  Sikel  communities  (with  the  exception 
of  Hybla)  to  enter  into  a  sort  of  federative  compact.  Next,  in  order 
to  obtain  a  central  point  for  the  new  organization,  he  transferred  his 
own  little  town  from  the  hill  top,  called  Men&,  down  to  a  convenient 
spot  of  the  neighboring  plain,  near  to  the  sacred  precinct  of  the  gods 
(ailed  Paliki.  As  the  veneration  paid  to  these  gods,  determined  iu 
part  by  the  striking  volcanic  manifestations  in  the  neighborhood, 
r<  ndefed  this  plain  a  suitable  point  of  attraction  for  Sikels  generally, 
Duketius  was  enabled  to  establish  a  considerable  new  city  of  Palike, 
with  walls  of  large  circumference,  and  an  ample  range  of  adjacent 
[and  which  he  distribiiti  d  among  a  numerous  Sikel  population,  prob- 
ably7 with  some  Greeks  intermingled. 

The  powerful  position  which  Duketius  had  thus  acquired  is 
attested  by  the  aggressive  character  of  his  measures,  intended  gradu- 
ally is  recover  a  portion  5,1  least  of  that  ground  which  the  Greeks  had 


EXPLOITS  OF  DUKETIUS.  821 

appropriated  at  the  expense  of  the  indigenous  population.  The 
Sikel  town  of  Ennesia  had  been  seized  by  the  Hieronian  Greeks  ex- 
pelled from  ^Etna,  and  had  received  from  them  the  name  of  iEtna: 
Duketius  now  found  means  to  reconquer  it,  after  ensnaring  by 
stratagem  the  leading  magistrate.  He  was  next  bold  enough  to  in- 
vade the  territory  of  the  Agri.^entines,  and  to  besiege  one  of  their 
country  garrisons  called  Motyum.  We  are  impressed  with  a  high 
idea  of  his  power  when  we  learn  that  the  Agrigentines,  while  march- 
ing to  relieve  the  place,  thought  it  necessary  to  invoke  aid  from  the 
Syracusans,  who  sent  to  them  a  force  under  Bolkon.  Over  this 
united  force  Duketius  gained  a  victory — in  consequence  of  the  treason 
or  cowardice  of  Bolkon,  as  the  Syracusans  believed — insomuch  that 
they  condemned  him  to  death.  In  the  succeeding  year,  however,  the 
good  fortune  of  the  Sikel  prince  changed.  The  united  army  of  these 
two  powerful  cities  raised  the  blockade  of  Motyum,  completely 
defeated  him  in  the  field,  and  dispersed  all  his  forces.  Finding  him- 
self deserted  by  his  comrades  and  even  on  the  point  of  being  betrayed, 
he  took  the  desperate  resolution  of  casting  himself  upon  the  mercy 
of  the  Syracusans.  He  rode  off  by  flight  to  the  gates  of  Syracuse, 
entered  the  city  unknown,  and  sat  down  as  a  suppliant  on  the  altar 
in  the  agora,  surrendering  himself  together  with  all  his  territory.  A 
spectacle  thus  unexpected  brought  together  a  crowd  of  Syracuse 
citizens,  exciting  in  them  the  strongest  emotions:  and  when  the 
magistrates  convened  the  assembly  for  the  purpose  of  deciding  his 
fate,  the  voice  of  mercy  was  found  paramount,  in  spite  of  the  con- 
trary recommendations  of  some  of  the  political  leaders.  The  most 
respected  among  the  elder  citizens  earnestly  recommending  mild 
treatment  toward  a  foe  thus  fallen  and  suppliant,  coupled  with 
scrupulous  regard  not  to  bring  upon  the  city  the  avenging  hand  of 
Nemesis — found  their  appeal  to  the  generous  sentiment  of  the  people 
welcomed  by  one  unanimous  cry  of  ' '  Save  the  suppliant. "  Duketius, 
withdrawn  from  the  altar,  was  sent  off  to  Corinth  under  his  engage- 
ment to  live  there  quietly  for  the  future:  the  Syracusans  providing 
for  his  comfortable  maintenance. 

Amidst  the  cruelty  habitual  in  ancient  warfare,  this  remarkable 
incident  excites  mingled  surprise  and  admiration.  Doubtless  the 
lenient  impulse  of  the  people  mainly  arose  from  their  seeing  Duke- 
tius actually  before  them  in  suppliant  posture  at  their  altar,  instead 
of  being  called  upon  to  determine  his  fate  in  his  absence — just  as  the 
Athenian  people  were  in  like  manner  moved  by  the  actual  sight  of 
the  captive  Dorieus,  and  induced  to  spare  his  life,  on  an  occasion 
which  will  be  hereafter  recounted.  If  in  some  instances  the  assembled 
people,  obeying  the  usual  vehemence  of  multitudinous  sentiment, 
carried  severities  to  excess,  so,  in  other  case's,  as  well  as  in  this,  the 
appeal  to  their  humane  impulses  will  be  found  to  have  triumphed 
over  prudential  regard  for  future  security.  Such  was  the  fruit  which 
the  Syracusans  reacted  for  sparing  Duketius,  who,  after  residing  a 


822  SICILIAN  AFFAIRS. 

year  or  two  at  Corinth,  violated  his  parole.  Pretending  to  have 
received  an  order  from  the  oracle,  lie  assembled  a  number  of  colonists, 
whom  he  conducted  into  Sicily  to  found  a  city  at  Kale  Akte  on  the 
northern  coast  belonging  to  the  Sikels.  We  cannot  doubt  that  when 
the  Syracueans  Found  in  v.  hat  manner  their  lenity  was  requited,  the 
speakers  who  had  recommended  severe  treatment  would  take  great 
credit  on  the  score  of  superior  foresight. 

But  the  return  of  this  energetic  enemy  was  not  the  only  mischief 
which  the  Syracusans  Buffered.  Their  resolution  to  spare  Duketius 
had  been  adopted  without  the  concurrence  of  the  Agrigentines,  who 
had  helped  to  conquer  him;  and  the  latter,  when  they  saw  him  again 
in  the  island  and  again  formidable,  were  so  indignant  that  they 
declared  war  against  Syracuse.  A  standing  jealousy  prevailed  be- 
tween these  two  great  cities,  the  first  and  second  powers  in  Sicily. 
War  actually  broke  out  between  them,  wherein  other  Greek  cities 
took  part.  After  lasting  some  time,  with  various  acts  of  hostility, 
and  especially  a  serious  defeat  of  the  Agrigentines  at  the  river 
Himera,  these  latter  solicited  and  obtained  peace.  The  discord  be- 
tween the  two  cities  however  had  left  leisure  to  Duketius  to  found 
the  city  of  Kale  Akte,  and  to  make  some  progress  in  re-establishing 
his  ascendency  over  the  Sikels,  in  which  operation  he  was  ovei  taken 
by  death.  He  probably  left  no  successor  to  carry  on  his  plans,  so 
that  the  Syracusans.  pressing  their  attacks  vigorously,  reduced  many 
of  the  Sikel  townships  in  the  island — regaining  his  former  conquest, 
Morgantine,  and  subduing  even  the  strong  position  and  town  called 
Trinakia,  after  a  brave  and  desperate  resistance  on  the  part  of  the 
inhabitants 

By  this  large  accession  both  of  subjects  and  of  tribute,  combined 
with  her  recent  victory  over  Agrigentum,  Syracuse  was  elevated  to 
the  height  of  power,  and  began  to  indulge  schemes  for  extending  her 
ascendency  throughout  the  island :  with  which  view  her  horsemen 
were  doubled  in  number,  and  one  hundred  new  triremes  were  con- 
structed. Whether  any,  or  what  steps  were  taken  to  realize  her 
designs,  our  historian  does  not  tell  us.  But  the  position  of  Sicily 
remains  the  same  at  the  beginning  of  the  Peloponnesian  war:  Syra- 
cuse, the  first  city  as  to  powder — indulging  in  ambitious  dreams,  if 
not  in  ambitious  aggressions;  Agrigentum,  a  jealous  second,  and 
almost  a  rival;  the  remaining  Grecian  states  maintaining  their  inde- 
pendence, yet  not  without  mistrust  and  apprehension. 

Though  the  particular  phenomena  of  this  period,  however,  have 
not  come  to  our  knowledge,  we  see  enough  to  prove  that  it  was  one 
of  great  prosperity  for  Sicily.  The  wealth,  commerce,  and  public 
monuments  of  Agrigentum,  especially,  appear  to  have  even  sur- 
passed those  of  the  Syracusans.  Her  trade  with  Carthage  and  the  Afri- 
can coast  was  both  extensive  and  profitable;  for  at  this  time  neither 
the  vine  nor  the  olive  were  much  cultivated  in  Libya,  and  the  Car- 
thaginians derived  their  wine  and  oil  from  the  southern  territory  of 


GENERAL  PROSPERITY  IN  SICILY.  823 

Sicily,  particularly  that  of  Agrigentum.  The  temples  of  the  city, 
among  which  that  of  Olympic  Zeus  stood  foremost,  were  on  the 
grandest  scale  of  magnificence,  surpassing  everything  of  the  kind  in 
Sicily.  The  population  of  the  city,  free  as  well  as  slave,  was  very 
great:  the  number  of  rich  men,  keeping  chariots,  and  competing  for 
Hie  prize  at  the  Olympic  games,  was  renowned — not  less  than  the 
accumulation  of  works  of  art,  statues  and  pictures,  with  manifold 
insignia  of  ornament  and  luxury.  All  this  is  particularly  brought  to 
our  notice,  because  of  the  frightful  catastrophe  which  desolated 
Agrigentum  in  406  B.C.  from  the  hands  of  the  Carthaginians.  It  was 
in  the  interval  which  we  are  now  describing,  that  such  prosperity  was 
accumulated;  doubtless  not  in  Agrigentum  alone,  but  more  or  less 
throughout  all  the  Grecian  cities  of  the  island. 

Nor  was  it  only  in  material  prosperity  that  they  were  distinguished. 
At  this  time,  the  intellectual  movement  in  some  of  the  Italian  and 
Sicilian  towns  was  very  considerable.  The  inconsiderable  town  of 
Eleain  the  Gulf  of  Poseidonia  nourished  two  of  the  greatest  specula- 
tive philosophers  in  Greece — Parmenides  and  Zeno.  Empedokles  of 
Agrigentum  was  hardly  less  eminent  in  the  same  department,  yet 
combining  with  it  a  political  and  practical  efficiency.  The  popular 
character  of  the  Sicilian  governments  stimulated  the  cultivation  of 
rhetorical  studies,  wherein  not  only  Empedokles  and  Polus  at  Agri- 
gentum, but  Tisias  and  Korax  at  Syracuse,  and  still  more,  Gorgias  at 
Leontini,  acquired  great  reputation.  The  constitution  established 
at  Agrigentum  after  the  dispossession  of  the  Theronian  dynasty  was 
at  first  not  thoroughly  democratical,  the  principal  authority  residing 
in  a  large  Senate  of  One  Thousand  members.  We  are  told  even  that 
an  ambitious  club  of  citizens  were  aiming  at  the  re-establishment  of 
a  despotism,  when  Empedokles,  availing  himself  of  wealth  and  high 
position,  took  the  lead  in  a  popular  opposition;  so  as  not  only  to 
defeat  this  intrigue,  but  also  to  put  down  the  Senate  of  One  Thou- 
sand and  render  the  government  completely  democratical.  His  in- 
fluence over  the  people  was  enhanced  by  the  vein  of  mysticism,  and 
pretense  to  miraculous  or  divine  endowments,  which  accompanied 
his  philosophical  speculations,  in  a  manner  similar  to  Pythagoras. 
The  same  combination  of  rhetoric  with  metaphysical  speculation 
appears  also  in  Gorgias  of  Leontini;  whose  celebrity  as  a  teacher 
throughout  Greece  was  both  greater  and  earlier  than  that  of  any  one 
else.  It  was  a  similar  demand  for  popular  speaking  in  the  assembly 
and  the  judicatures  which  gave  encouragement  to  the  rhetorical 
teachers  Tisias  and  Korax  at  Syracuse. 

In  such  state  of  material  prosperity,  popular  politics,  and  intellec- 
tual activity,  the  Sicilian  towns  were  found  at  the  breaking  out  of 
the  great  struggle  between  Athens  and  the  Peloponnesian  confeder- 
acy in  431  B.C.  In  that  struggle  the  Italian  and  Sicilian  Greeks  had 
no  direct  concern,  nor  anything  to  fear  from  the  ambition  of  Athens; 
who,  though  she  had  founded  Thurii  in  443  B.C.,  appears  to  have 


824  SICILIAN  AFFAIRS. 

never  aimed  at  any  political  ascendency  even  over  thai  town — much 
less  anywhere  else  on  the  const.  But  the  Sicilian  Greeks,  thougb 
'forming  a  system  apart  in  their  own  island,  from  which  it  suited  the 
dominant  policy  oi  Syracuse  to  exclude  all  foreign  interference — 
were  ye1  connected  by  sympathy,  and  on  one  side  even  by  alii  and 

•willi  the  two  main  streams  of  Hellenic  politics.      Among  the  allies  of 

Sparta  were  numbered  all  or  most  of  the  Dorian  cities  of  Sicily — 
Syracuse,  Kamarina,  Gela,  Agrigentum,  Selinus,  perhaps  Bimera 
and  Messene — together  with  Lokri  and  Tarentum  in  Italy:  among 
the  allies  of  Athens,  perhaps,  the  Chalkidic  or  Ionic  Rhegium  in 
Italy.  Whether  the  Ionic  cities  in  Sicily — Naxos,  Katana,  and 
Leontini  —  were  at  this  time  united  With  Athens  by  any  special 
treaty,  is  very  doubtful.  But  if  we  examine  the  state  of  politics 
prior  to  the  breaking  out  of  the  war,  it  will  be  found  that  the  con 
nection  of  the  Sicilian  cities  on  both  sides  with  Central  Greece  was 
rather  one  of  sympathy  and  tendency,  than  of  pronounced  obligation 
and  action.  The  Dorian  Sicilians,  though  doubtless  sharing  the 
antipathy  of  the  Peloponncsian  Dorians  to  Athens,  had  never  been 
called  upon  for  any  co-operation  with  Sparta;  nor  had  the  Ionic 
Sicilians  yet  learned  to  look  to  Athens  for  protection  against,  their 
powerful  neighbor,  Syracuse. 

It  was  the  memorable  quarrel  between  Corinth  and  Korkyra,  and 
the  intervention  of  Athens  in  that  quarrel  (B.C.  433-432),  which 
brought  the  Sicilian  parties  one  step  nearer  to  co-operation  in  the 
Peloponncsian  quarrel,  in  two  different  ways;  first,  by  exciting  the 
most  violent  anti-Athenian  war-spirit  in  Corinth,  with  whom  the 
Sicilian  Dorians  held  their  chief  commerce  and  sympathy — next,  by 
providing  a  basis  for  the  action  of  Athenian  maritime  force  in  Italy 
and  Sicily,  which  would  have  been  impracticable  without  an  estab- 
lished footing  in  Korkyra.  But  Plutarch  (whom  most  historians  have 
followed)  is  mistaken,  and  is  contradicted  by  Thucydides,  when  he 
ascribes  to  the  Athenians  at  this  time  ambitious  projects  in  Sicily  of 
the  nature  of  those  which  they  came  to  conceive  seven  or  eight  years 
afterward.  At  the  outbreak,  and  for  some  years  before  the  out- 
break, of  the  war,  the  policy  of  Athens  was  purely  conservative,  and 
that  of  her  enemies  aggressive,  as  I  have  shown  in  a  former  chapter. 
At  that  moment  Sparta  and  Corinth  anticipated  large  assistance  from 
the  Sicilian  Dorians,  in  ships  of  war,  in  money,  and  in  provisions; 
while  the  value  of  Korkyra  as  an  ally  of  Athens  consisted  in  afford- 
ing facilities  for  obstructing  such  re-enforcements,  farmore  than  from 
any  anticipated  conquests. 

In  the  spring  of  431  B.C.,  the  Spartans,  then  organizing  their  first 
invasion  of  Attica  and  full  of  hope  thai  Athens  would  be  crushed  in 
one  or  two  campaigns,  contemplated  the  building  of  a  vast  Heel  of 
500  ships  of  war  among  the  confederacy.  A  considerable  portion  of 
this  charge  was  imposed  upon  the  Italian  and  Sicilian  Dorians 
a  contribution  in  mousy  besides;  with  instructions  to  refrain  from 


THE  DORIANS  ATTACK  THE  IONIANS.         825 

any  immediate  declaration  against  Athens  until  their  fleet  should  be 
ready.  Of  such  expected  succor,  indeed,  little  was  ever  realized  in 
anyway;  in  ships,  nothing  at  all.  But  the  expectations  and  orders 
of  Sparta  show  that  here,  as  elsewhere,  she  was  then  on  the  offen- 
sive, and  Athens  only  on  the  defensive.  Probably  the  Corinthians 
had  encouraged  the  expectation  of  ample  re-enforcements  from  Syra- 
cuse and  the  neighboring  towns — a  hope  which  must  have  con- 
tributed largely  to  the  confidence  with  which  they  began  the  strug- 
gle. What  were  the  causes  which  prevented  it  from  being  realized 
we  are  not  distinctly  told:  and  we  find  Hermokrates  the  Syracusan 
reproaching  his  countrymen  fifteen  years  afterward  (immediately 
before  the  great  Athenian  expedition  against  Syracuse)  with  their 
antecedent  apathy.  But  it  is  easy  to  see  that  as  the  Sicilian  Greeks 
had  no  direct  interest  in  the  contest — neither  wrongs  to  avenge,  nor 
dangers  to  apprehend,  from  Athens — nor  any  habit  of  obeying  requi- 
sitions from  Sparta,  so  they  might  naturally  content  themselves  with 
expressions  of  sympathy  and  promises  of  aid  in  case  of  need,  without 
taxing  themselves  to  the  enormous  extent  which  it  pleased  Sparta  to 
impose,  for  purposes  both  aggressive  and  purely  Peloponnesian. 
Perhaps  the  leading  men  in  Syracuse,  from  attachment  to  Corinth, 
may  have  sought  to  act  upon  the  order.  But  no  similar  motive 
would  be  found  operative  either  at  Agrigentum  or  at  Gela  or  Seli- 
nus. 

Though  the  order  was  not  executed,  however,  there  can  be  little 
doubt  that  it  was  publicly  announced  and  threatened,  thus  becoming 
known  to  the  Ionic  cities  in  Sicily  as  well  as  to  Athens;  and  that  it 
weighed  materially  in  determining  the  latter  afterward  to  assist 
those  cities,  when  they  sent  to  invoke  her  aid.  Instead  of  dispatch- 
ing their  forces  to  Peloponnesus,  where  they  had  nothing  to  gain,  the 
Sicilian  Dorians  preferred  attacking  the  Ionic  cities  in  their  own 
island,  whose  territory  they  might  have  reasonable  hopes  of  conquer- 
ing and  appropriating — Naxos,  Katana,  and  Leontini.  These  cities 
doubtless  sympathized  with  Athens  in  her  struggle  against  Sparta; 
yet,  far  from  being  strong  enough  to  assist  her  or  to  threaten  their 
Dorian  neighbors,  they  were  unable  to  defend  themselves  without 
Athenian  aid.  They  were  assisted  by  the  Dorian  city  of  Kamarina, 
which  was  afraid  of  her  powerful  border  city  Syracuse — and  by 
Rhegium  in  Italy;  while  Lokri  in  Italy,  the  bitter  enemy  of  Rhegium, 
sided  with  Syracuse  against  them.  In  the  fifth  summer  of  the  war, 
finding  themselves  blockaded  by  sea  and  confined  to  their  walls,  they 
sent  to  Athens,  both  to  entreat  succor  as  allies  and  Ionians — and  to 
represent  that  if  Syracuse  succeeded  in  crushing  them,  she  and  the 
other  Doriaus  in  Sicily  would  forthwith  s*end  over  the  positive  aid 
which  the  Pelopounesians  had  so  long  been  invoking.  The  eminent 
rhetor  Gorgias  of  Leontini,  whose  peculiar  style  of  speaking  is  said 
to  have  been  new  to  the  Athenian  assembly,  and  to  have  produced  a 
powerful  effect,  was  at  the  head  of  this  embassy.     It  is  certain  that 


&M  SU  11.1AN    AFFAIRS. 

this  rhetor  procured  for  himself  numerous  pupils  and  large  trains  do! 
merely  in  Athens,  but  in  many  other  towns  of  Central  Greece,  though 
it  is  exaggeration  to  ascribe  to  his  pleading  the  success  of  the  present 
application. 

Now  the  Athenians  had  a  real  interest  as  will  in  protecting 
these  tonic  Sicilians  from  being  conquered  by  tin-  Dorians  in  the 

island,  as  in  obstructing  the  transport  of  Sicilian  corn  to  Pelopon- 
nesus: and  they  sent  twenty  triremes  under  Laches  and  Chaiu'adcs, 
— with  instructions,  while  accomplishing  these  objects,  to  ascertain 
the  possibility  of  going  beyond  the  defensive,  and  making  conquests. 

Taking  station  at  Rhegium.  Laches  did  something  towards  rescuing 
the  Ionic  cities  in  part  from  their   maritime  blockade,  and  even 

undertook  an  abortive'  expedition  against  the  I.ipari  isles,  which  were 
iu  alliance  with  Syracuse.  Throughout  the  ensuing  year,  ho  pressed 
the  war  in  the  neighborhood  of  Rhegium  and  Messene,  Ids  colleague 
Charceades  being  slain.  Attacking  My  he  in  the  Afessenian  territory, 
he  was  fortunate  enough  to  gain  so  decisive  an  advantage  over  the 
troops  of  Messene,  that  that  city  itself  capitulated  to  him,  gav<  1 1  -i 
age-,  and  enrolled  itself  as  ally  of  Athens  and  the  Ionic  cities.  He 
atso  contracted  an  alliance  with  the  11011  Hellenic  city  of  EgestA,  in 
the  north-west  portion  of  Sicily,  and  he  invaded  the  territory  of 
Lokri,  capturing  one  of  the  country  fort-  on  the  river  llalex:  after 
which,  in  a  second  debarkation,  he  defeated  a  Lokrian  detachment 
under  Froxeuus.  But  he  was  unsuccessful  in  an  expedition  into  the 
interior  of  Sicily  against  Inessus.  This  was  a  native  Sikel  township, 
held  in  coercion  by  a  Syracusan  garrison  in  the  acropolis;  which  the 
Athenians  vainly  attempted  to  storm,  being  repulsed  with  loss. 
Laches  concluded  his  operations  in  the  autumn  by  an  ineffective  incur- 
sion on  the  territory  of  Himera  and  on  the  Lipari  isles.  On  returning 
to  Rhegium  at  the  beginning  of  the  ensuing  year  £b.c.  425),  he  found 
Pythodorus  already  arrived  from  Athens  to  supersede  him. 

That  officer  had  come  as  the  forerunner  of  a  more  considerable 
expedition,  intended  to  arrive  in  the  spring  under  Furymedon  and 
Sophokles,  who  were  to  command  in  conjunction  with  himself.  The 
Ionic  cities  in  Sicily,  finding  the  squadron  under  Laches  insufficient 
to  renderthem  a  match  for  their  enemies  at  sea,  had  been  emboldened 
to  send  a  second  embassy  to  Athens  with  request  for  farther  re-en- 
forcements— at  the  same  time  making  Increased  efforts  to  enlarge 
their  own  naval  force.  It  happened  that  at  this  moment  the  Athen- 
ians had  no  special  employment  elsewhere  for  their  tleet.  which  they 
desired  to  keep  in  constant  practice.  They  accordingly  resolved  to 
send  to  Sicily  forty  additional  triremes  ia  full  hopes  of  bringing  the 
contest  to  a  speedy  close. 

Early  in  the  ensuing  spring,  Furymedon  and  Sophokles  started 
from  Athens  for  Sicily  in  command  of  this  squadron,  with  instruc- 
tions to  afford  relief  at  Korkyra  in  their  way.  and  with  Demosthenes 
on  board  to  act  on  the  coast  of  Peloponnesus.   It  was  this  tleet  w  hich, 


ATHENIANS  IN  SICILY.  827 

in  conjunction  with  the  land  forces  under  the  command  of  Kleon, 
making-  a  descent  almost  by  accident  on  the  Laconian  coast  at  Pylus, 
achieved  for  Athens  the  most  signal  success  of  the  whole  war — the 
capture  of  the  Lacedaemonian  hoplites  in  Sphakteria.  But  the  fleet 
was  so  loug  occupied,  lirst  in  the  blockade  of  that  island,  next  in 
operations  at  Korkyra,  that  it  did  not  reach  Sicily  until  about  the 
month  of  September. 

Such  delay,  eminently  advantageous  for  Athens  generally,  was 
fatal  to  her  hopes  of  success  in  Sicily  during  the  whole  summer.  For 
Pythodorus,  acting  only  with  the  fleet  previously  commanded  by 
Laches  at  Rhegium,  was  not  merely  defeated  in  a  descent  upon 
Lokri,  but  experienced  a  more  irreparable  loss  by  the  revolt  of  Mes- 
eene ;  which  had  surrendered  to  Laches  a  few  months  before,  and  which, 
together  with  Rhegium,  had  given  to  the  Athenians  the  command  of 
the  strait.  Apprised  of  the  coming  Athenian  fleet,  the  Syraerosans 
were  anxious  to  deprive  them  of  this  important  base  of  operations 
against  the  island;  and  a  fleet  of  twenty  sail — half  Syracusan,  half 
Lokrian — was  enabled  by  the  concurrence  of  a  party  in  Messene,  to 
seize  the  town.  It  would  appear  that  the  Athenian  fleet  was  then  at 
Rhegium,  but  that  town  was  at  the  same  time  threatened  by  the 
entrance  of  the  entire  land  force  of  Lokri,  together  with  a  body  of 
Rhegine  exiles:  these  latter  were  even  not  without  hopes  of  obtain- 
ing admission  by  means  of  a  favorable  party  in  the  town.  Though 
such  hopes  were  disappointed,  yet  the  diversion  prevented  all  succor 
from  Rhegium  to  Messene.  The  latter  town  now  served  as  a  harbor 
for  the  fleet  hostile  to  Athens,  which  was  speedily  re-enforced  to  more 
than  thirty  sail,  and  began  maritime  operations  forthwith,  in  hopes 
of  crushing  the  Athenians  and  capturing  Rhegium,  before  Euryme- 
don  should  arrive.  But  the  Athenians,  though  they  had  only  sixteen 
triremes  together  wdth  eight  others  from  Rhegium,  gained  a  decided 
victory — in  an  action  brought  on  accidentally  for  the  possession  of 
a  merchantman  sailing  through  the  strait.  They  put  the  enemy's 
ships  to  flight,  and  drove  them  to  seek  refuge,  some  under  protection 
of  the  Syracusan  land-force  at  cape  Pelorus  near  Messene,  others 
under  the  Lokrian  force  near  Rhegium — each  as  they  best  could,  with 
the  loss  of  one  trireme.  This  defeat  so  broke  up  the  scheme  of  Lok- 
rian operations  against  the  latter  place,  that  their  land-force  retired 
from  the  Rhegine  territory,  while  the  whole  defeated  squadron  was 
reunited  on  the  opposite  coast  under  cape  Pelorus.  Here  the  ships 
were  moored  close  on  shore  under  the  protection  of  the  land  force, 
when  the  Athenians  and  Rheginescame  up  to  attack  them;  but  with- 
out success,  and  even  with  the  loss  of  one  trireme  which  the  men  on 
shore  contrived  to  seize  and  detain  by  a  grappling  iron ;  her  crew  escap- 
ing b}r  swimming  to  the  vessels  of  their  comrades.  Having  repulsed 
the  enemy,  the  Syracusans  got  aboard,  and  rowed  close  along  shore, 
partly  aided  by  tow-ropes,  to  the  harbor  of  Messene,  in  which  transit 
they  were  again  attacked,  but  the  Athenians  were  a  second  time 


828  SICILIAN  AFFAIRS. 

beaten  off  with  the  loss  of  another  ship.    Their  superior  seamanship 
was  n\'  no  avail  in  i his  along  shore  fighting. 

The  Athenian  fleet  was  qow  suddenly  withdrawn  in  order  to  pre- 
vent an  intended  moveraenl  in  Kamarina,  where  a  philo-Syracusan 
party  umhr  Archias  threatened  revolt:  au<i  the  Messenian  forces, 
thus  left  free,  invaded  the  territory  of  their  neighbor  the  Chalkidic 
city  of  Naxos,  sending  their  Hi  et  round  to  the  mouth  of  the  Akesines 
near  that  city.  They  were  ravaging  the  lands,  and  were  preparing 
to  storm  the  town,  when  a  considerable  body  of  the  indigenous  Sikels 
was  seen  descending  the  neighboring  hills  in  succor  the]  upon 

which,  the  latter,  elate  with  the  sighl  ami  mistaking  the  n<  v.  comers 
fur  their  Grecian  brethren  from  Leontini,  rushed  out  of  the  gates  and 
made  a  vigorous  sally  at  a  momenl  when  their  enemies  were  un 
pared.  The  Messenians  were  completely  defeated,  with  the  loss  of 
no  less  than  1000  men,  and  with  a  still  greater  loss  sustained  in  their 
retreat  home  from  the  pursuit  of  the  Sikels.  Their  fleet  wenl  back 
als  to  Messene,  from  whence  such  of  the  ships  as  were  not  ,M< 
returned  homo.  So  much  was  the  city  weakened  by  its  recenl  defeat, 
that  a  Lokrian  garrison  was  sent  for  its  protection  under  Dem< 
while  the  Leontines  andNaxines,  together  with  the  Athenian  squad- 
ron on  returning  from  Kamarina,  attacked  it  by  land  and  sea  in  this 
moment  of  distress.  A  well-timed  sally  of  the  Messenians  and  Lok- 
rians,  however,  dispersed  the  Leontine  land-force,  bu1  the  Athenian 
force,  landing  from  their  ships,  attacked  the  assailants  while  in  the 
disorder  of  pursuit,  and  drove  them  back  within  the  walls.  The  scheme 
against  Messene  however,  had  now  become  impracticable,  so  that  the 
Athenians  crossed  the  strait  to  Rhegium. 

Thus  indecisive  was  the  result  of  operations  in  Sicily,  during  the 
first  half  of  the  seventh  year  of  the  Peloponnesian  war:  nor  does  it 
appear  that  the  Athenians  undertook  anything  considerable  during 
the  atumnal  half,  though  the  full  fleet  under  Eurymedon  had  then 
joined  Pythodorus.  Yet  while  the  presence  of  solargean  Athenian 
fleet  at  Rhegium  would  produce  considerable  effect  upon  tin 
cusan  mind — the  triumphant  promise  of  Athenian  affairs,  and  the 
astonishing  humiliation  of  Sparta,  during  the  months  immediately 
following  the  capture  of  Sphakteria,  probably  struck  much  deeper. 
In  the  spring  of  the  eighth  year  of  the  war.  Athens  was  not  only  in 

ion  of  the  Spartan  prisoners,  hut  also  of  Pylusand  Kythi 
that  a  rising  among  the  Helots  appeared  noway  improbable.   Sh 
in   the  full  swing  of  hope,  while  her  discouraged  enemies  were  ail 
thrown  on  the  defensive.  Hence  the  Sicilian  Dorians,  intimidated  by 
a  state  of  affairs  so  different  from  that  in  which  they  had  begun  the 
war  three  years  before,  were  now  eager  to  bring  aboul  a  pacifii 
in    their  island.     The  Dorian  city  of    Kamarina.  which  had  hitherto 
acted  along  with  the  Ionic  or  Chalkidic  cities,  was  the  first  to  make 
a  separate  accommodation  with  its  neighboring  city  of  Gela;  at  which 


SPEECH  OF  HERMOKRATES.  829 

latter  place  deputies  were  invited  to  attend  from  all  the  eiiies  in  the 
island,  with  a  view  to  the  conclusion  of  peace. 

This  congress  met  in  the  spring  of  424  B.C.,  when  Syracuse,  the 
most  powerful  city  in  Sicily,  took  the  lead  in  urging  Hie  common 
interest  which  all  had  in  the  conclusion  of  peace.  The  Syra- 
cusan  Hermokrates,  chief  adviser  of  this  policy  in  his  native  city, 
now  appeared  to  vindicate  and  enforce  it  in  the  congress.  He  was  a 
well-born,  brave,  and  able  man,  superior  to  all  pecuniary  corruption, 
anil  clear-sighted  in  regard  to  the  foreign  interests  of  his  country; 
but  at  the  same  time  of  pronounced  oligarchical  sentiments,  mis- 
trusted by  the  people,  seemingly  with  good  reason,  in  regard  to  their 
internal  constitution.  The  speech  which  Thucydides  places  in  his 
mouth,  on  the  present  occasion,  sets  forth  emphatically  the  necessity 
of  keeping  Sicily  at  all  cost  free  from  foreign  intervention,  and  of 
settling  at  home  all  differences  which  might  arise  between  the  vari- 
ous Sicilian  cities.  Hermokrates  impresses  upon  his  hearers  that  the 
aggressive  schemes  of  Athens,  now  the  greatest  power  in  Greece, 
were  directed  against  all  Sicily,  and  threatened  all  cities  alike, 
Ionians  not  less  than  Dorians.  If  they  enfeebled  one  another  by 
internal  quarrels,  and  then  invited  the  Athenians  as  arbitrators,  the 
result  would  be  ruin  and  slavery  to  all.  The  Athenians  were  but 
too  ready  to  encroach  everywhere  even  without  invitation:  they  had 
now  come,  with  a  zeal  outrunning  all  obligation,  under  pretense  of 
aiding  the  Chalkidic  cities  who  had  never  aided  them — but  in  the 
real  hope  of  achieving  conquest  for  themselves.  The  Chalkidic 
cities  must  not  rely  upon  their  Ionic  kindred  for  security  against 
evil  designs  on  the  part  of  Athens:  as  Sicilians,  they  had  a  para- 
mount interest  in  upholding  the  independence  of  the  island.  If  pos- 
sible, they  ought  to  maintain  undisturbed  peace;  but  if  that  were 
impossible,  it  was  essential  at  least  to  confine  the  war  to  Sicily, 
apart  from  any  foreign  intruders.  Complaints  should  be  exchanged, 
and  injuries  redressed,  by  all.  in  a  spirit  of  mutual  forbearance;  of 
which  Syracuse — the  first  city  in  the  island  and  best  able  to  sustain 
the  brunt  of  war — was  prepared  to  set  the  example;  without  that 
foolish  over-valuation  of  favorable  chances  so  ruinous  even  to  first- 
rate  powers,  and  with  full  sense  of  the  uncertainty  of  the  future. 
Let  them  all  feel  that  they  were  neighbors,  inhabitants  of  the  same 
island,  and  called  by  the  common  name  of  Sikeliots;  and  let  them 
all  with  one  accord  repel  the  intrusion  of  aliens  in  their  affairs, 
whether  as  open  assailants  or  as  treacherous  mediators. 

This  harangue  from  Hermokrates  and  the  earnest  dispositions  of 
Syracuse  for  peace,  found  general  sympathy  among  the  Sicilian 
cities,  Ionic  as  well  as  Doric.  All  of  them  doubtless  suffered  by  the 
war,  and  the  Ionic  cities,  who  had  solicited  the  intervention  of  the 
Athenians  as  protectors  against  Syracuse,  conceived  from  the  evident 
uneasiness  of  the  latter  a  fair  assurance  of  her  pacific  demeanor  for 


tf30  SICILIAN   AFFAIRS. 

the  future.  Accordingly  the  peace  was  accepted  by  nil  the  belliger- 
enl  parties,  each  retaining  what  they  possessed,  except  that  t lie 
Byracusans  agreed  to  cede  Morgantine  to  Kamarina,  on  receipt  of  a 
fixed  sum  of  money.  The  [onic  cities  stipulated  thai  Athens  Bhould 
be  included  in  the  pacification;  a  condition  agreed  to  by  all,  except 
the  Epizephyrian  Lokrians.  They  next  acquainted  Eurymedon  and 
his  colleagues  with  the  terms;  inviting  them  to  accede  to  the  pacifi- 
cation in  the  name  of  Athens,  and  then  to  withdraw  their  fleet  from 
Sicily.  These  generals  had  no  choice  but  to  close  with  the  proposi- 
tion. Athens  thus  was  placed  on  terms  of  peace  with  all  the  Sicilian 
cities;  with  liberty  of  access  reciprocally  I'm- any  single  ship  of  war, 
Tint  not  for  any  larger  force,  to  cross  the  sea  between  Sicily  and 
Peloponnesus.     Eurymedon  then  sailed  with  his  fleel  home. 

On  reaching  Athens,  however,  lie  and  his  colleagues  were  re- 
ceived by  the  people  with  much  displeasure.  lie  himself  was  lined, 
and  his  colleagues  Sophokles  and  Pythodorus  banished,  on  the 
charge  of  having  been  bribed  to  quit  Sicily,  at  a  time  when  the  fleet 
(so  the  Athenians  believed)  was  strong  enough  to  have  made  impor- 
tant conquests.  Why  the  three  colleagues  were  differently  treated, 
we  are  not  informed.  This  sentence  was  harsh  and  unmerited;  for 
it  does  not  seem  that  Eurymedon  had  it  in  his  power  to  prevent  the 
Ionic  cities  from  concluding  peace — while  it  is  certain  that  without 
them  he  could  have  achieved  nothing  serious.  All  that  seems  unex- 
plained, in  his  conduct  as  recounted  by  Thueydides,  is — that  his 
arrival  at  Rheirium  with  the  entire  fleet  in  September,  425  B.C.,  does 
not  seem  to  have  been  attended  with  any  increased  vigor  or  success 
in  the  prosecution  of  the  war.  But  the  Athenians  (besides  an  undue 
depreciation  of  the  Sicilian  cities  which  we  shall  find  fatally  mislead- 
ing them  hereafter)  were  at  this  moment  at  the  maximum  of  extrava- 
gant hopes,  counting  upon  new  triumphs  everywhere,  impatient  of 
disappointment,  and  careless  of  proportion  between  the  means  in- 
trusted to,  and  the  objects  expected  from,  their  commanders.  Such 
unmeasured  confidence  was  painfully  corrected  in  the  course  of  a 
few  months,  by  the  battle  of  Delium  aud  the  losses  in  Thrace.  But 
at  the  present  moment,  it  was  probably  not'  less  astonishing  than 
grievous  to  the  three  generals,  who  had  all  left  Athens  prior  to  the 
success  in  Sphakteria. 

The  Ionic  cities  in  Sicily  were  soon  made  to  feel  that  they  had 
been  premature  in  sending  away  the  Athenians.  Dispute  between 
Leontini  and  Syracuse,  the  same  cause  which  had  occasioned  the 
invocation  of  Athens  three  years  before,  broke  out  afresh  soon  after 
the  pacification  of  Gela.  The  democratical  government  of  Leontini 
came  to  the  resolution  of  strengthening  their  city  by  the  enrollment 
of  many  new  citizens;  and  a  redivision  of  the  territorial  property  of 
the  state  was  projected  in  order  to  provide  lots  of  land  for  these  new- 
comers. But  the  aristocracy  of  the  town,  upon  whom  the  necessity 
would  thus  be  imposed  of  parting  with  a  portion  of  their  lands, 


PH^AX  IN  SICILY.  831 

forestalled  the  project,  seemingly  before  it  was  even  formally 
decided,  by  entering  into  a  treasonable  correspondence  with  Syra- 
cuse, bringing  in  a  Syracusan  army,  and  expelling  the  Demos. 
While  these  exiles  found  shelter  as  they  could  in  other  cities,  the  rich 
Leontines  deserted  and  dismantled  their  own  city,  transferred  their 
residence  to  Syracuse,  and  were  enrolled  as  Syracusan  citizens.  To 
them  the  operation  was  exceedingly  profitable,  since  they  became 
masters  of  the  properties  of  the  exiled  Demos  in  addition  to  their 
own.  Presently,  however,  some  of  them,  dissatisfied  with  their 
residence  in  Syracuse,  returned  to  the  abandoned  city,  and  fitted  up 
a  portion  of  it  called  Phokeis,  together  with  a  neighboring  strong 
post  called  Brikinnies.  Here,  after  being  joined  by  a  considerable 
number  of  the  exiled  Demos,  they  contrived  to  hold  out  for  some 
time  against  the  efforts  of  the  Syracusans  to  expel  them  from  their 
fortifications. 

The  new  enrollment  of  citizens,  projected  by  the  Leontine  democ- 
racy, seems  to  date  during  the  year  succeeding  the  pacification  of 
Gela,  and  was  probably  intended  to  place  the  city  in  a  more  defensi- 
ble position  in  case  of  renewed  attacks  from  Syracuse — thus  com- 
pensating for  the  departure  of  the  Athenian  auxiliaries.  The  Leontine 
Demos,  in  exile  and  suffering,  doubtless  bitterly  repenting  that  they 
had  concurred  in  dismissing  these  auxiliaries,  sent  envoys  to  Athens 
with  complaints,  and  renewed  prayers  for  help. 

But  Athens  was  then  too  much  pressed  to  attend  to  their  call.  Her 
defeat  at  Delium  and  her  losses  in  Thrace  had  been  followed  by  the 
truce  for  one  year,  and  even  during  that  truce,  she  had  been  called 
upon  for  strenuous  efforts  in  Thrace  to  check  the  progress  of  Bras- 
idas.  After  the  expiration  of  the  truce,  she  sent  Pha^ax  and  two 
colleagues  to  Sicily  (b.c.  422)  with  the  modest  force  of  two  triremes. 
He  was  directed  to  try  and  organize  an  auti-Syracusan  party  in  the 
island,  for  the  purpose  of  re-establishing  the  Leontine  Demos.  In 
passing  along  the  coast  of  Italy,  he  concluded  amicable  relations  with 
some  of  the  Grecian  cities,  especially  with  Lokri,  which  had  hitherto 
stood  aloof  from  Athens:  and  his  first  addresses  in  Sicily  appeared 
to  promise  success.  His  representations  of  danger  from  Syracusan 
ambition  were  well  received  both  at  Kamarina  and  Agrigentum. 
For  on  the  one  hand,  that  universal  terror  of  Athens  which  had  die- 
tated  the  pacification  of  Gela  had  now  disappeared;  while  on  the 
other  hand  the  proceeding  of  Syracuse  in  regard  to  Leontini  was  well 
calculated  to  excite  alarm.  We  see  by  that  proceeding  that  sympathy 
between  democracies  in  different  towns  was  not  universal:  the  Syra- 
cusan democracy  had  joined  with  the  Leontine  aristocracy  to  expel 
the  Demos — just  as  the  despot  Gelon  had  combined  with  the  aris- 
tocracy of  Megara  and  Euboea,  sixty  years  before,  and  had  sold  the 
Demos  of  those  towns  into  slavery.  The  birthplace  of  the  famous 
rhetor  Gorgias  was  struck  out  of  the  list  of  inhabited  cities;  its  tem- 
ples were  deserted;  and  its  territory  had  become  a  part  of  Syracuse. 


832  SICILIAN  AFFAIRS. 

All  these  were  circumstances  so  powerfully  affecting  Grecian  imagi- 
nation that  the  Kamarinaeans,  neighbors  of  Syracuse  on  the  other 
.side,  might  well  fear  lot  the  like  unjust  conquest,  expulsion,  and 
absorption,  should  soon  overtake  them.  Agrigentum,  though  with- 
out any  similar  fear,  was  disposed,  from  policy  and  jealousy  of  Syra- 
cond  the  views  of  Phseax.  But  when  the  latter  proceeded 
to  Gela,  in  order  to  procure  the  adhesion  of  that  city  in  addition  to 
the  other  two,  he  found  himself  met  by  so  resolute  an  opposition 
that  his  whole  scheme  was  frustrated,  nor  did  he  think  it  advisable 
even  to  open  his  case  at  Selinus  or  Ilimera.  In  returning,  he  crossed 
the  interior  of  the  island  through  the  territory  of  the  Sikels  to  Katana, 
passing  in  his  way  by  Brikinnies,  where  the  Leontine  Demos  were 
still  maintaining  a  precarious  existence.  Having  encouraged  them 
to  hold  out  by  assurances  of  aid,  he  proceeded  on  his  homeward 
voyage.  In  the  strait  qf  Messina  he  struck  upon  some  vessels  con- 
veying a  body  of  expelled  Lokrians  from  Messene  to  Lokri.  The 
Lokrians  had  got  possession  of  Messene  after  the  pacification  of  Gela, 
by  means  of  an  internal  sedition;  but  after  holding  it  some  time,  they 
were  now  driven  out  by  a  second  revolution.  Phseax,  being  under 
agreement  with  Lokri,  passed  by  these  vessels  without  any  act  of 
hostility. 

The  Leontine  exiles  at  Brikinnies,  however,  received  no  benefit 
from  his  assurances,  and  appear  soon  afterward  to  have  been  com- 
pletely expelled.  Nevertheless  Athens  was  noway  disposed,  for  a 
considerable  time,  to  operations  in  Sicily.  A  few  months  after  the 
visit  of  Phaeax  to  that  island,  came  the  peace  of  Nikias.  The  conse- 
quences of  that  peace  occupied  her  whole  attention  in  Peloponnesus, 
while  the  ambition  of  Alkibiades  carried  her  on  for  three  years  in 
intra-Peloponnesian  projects  and  co-operation  with  Argos  against 
Sparta.  It  was  only  in  the  year  417  B.C.,  when  these  projects  had 
proved  abortive,  that  she  had  leisure  to  turn  her  attention  elsewhere. 
During  that  year,  Nikias  had  contemplated  an  expedition  against 
Amphipolis  in  conjunction  with  Perdikkas,  whose  desertion  frus- 
trated the  scheme.  The  year  416  B.C.  was  that  in  which  Melos  was 
besieged  and  taken. 

Meanwhile  the  Syracusans  had  cleared  and  appropriated  all  the 
territory  of  Leontini,  which  city  dow  existed  only  in  the  talk  and 
hopes  of  its  exiles.  Of  these  latter  a  portion  seem  to  have  continued 
at  Athens  pressing  their  entreaties  for  aid;  which  began  to  obtain 
some  attention  about  the  year  417  B.C.,  when  another  incident  hap- 
pened to  strengthen  their  chance  of  success.  A  quarrel  broke  out 
between  the  neighboring  cities  of  Selinus  (Hellenic)  and  Egesta  (non- 
Hellenic)  in  the  western  corner  of  Sicily;  partly  about  a  piece  of  land 
on  the  river  which  divided  the  two  territories,  partly  about  some 
alleged  wrong  in  cases  of  internuptial  connection.  The  Selinuntines, 
not  satisfied  with  their  own  strength,  obtained  assistance  from  the 
Syracusans  their  allies,  and  thus   reduced  Egesta  to  considerable 


PROMISES  OF  THE  EGEST^EANS.  833 

straits  by  land  as  well  as  by  sea.  Now  tbe  Egestoeans  bad  allied 
themselves  with  Laches  ten  years  before,  during  the  first  expedition 
sent  by  the  Athenians  to  Sicily;  upon  the  strength  of  which  alliance 
they  sent  to  Athens,  to  solicit  her  intervention  for  their  defense,  after 
having  in  vain  applied  both  to  Agrigcntum  and  to  Carthage.  It  may 
seem  singular  that  Carthage  did  not  at  this  time  readily  embrace  the 
pretext  for  interference — considering  that  ten  years  afterward  she 
interfered  with  such  destructive  effect  against  Selinus.  At  this  time, 
however,  the  fear  of  Athens  and  her  formidable  navy  appears  to 
have  been  felt  even  at  Carthage,  thus  protecting  the  Sicilian  Greeks 
against  the  most  dangerous  of  their  neighbors. 

The  Egestiean  envoys  reached  Athens  in  the  spring  of  416  B.C.,  at 
a  time  when  the  Athenians  had  no  immediate  project  to  occupj^  their 
thoughts,  except  the  enterprise  against  Melos,  which  could  not  be 
either  long  or  doubtful.  Though  urgent  in  setting  forth  the  necessi- 
ties of  their  position,  they  at  the  same  time  did  not  appear  like  the 
Leontines,  as  mere  helpless  suppliants,  addressing  themselves  to 
Athenian  compassion.  They  rested  their  appeal  chiefly  on  grounds 
of  policy.  The  Syracusans,  having  already  extinguished  one  ally  of 
Athens  (Leontini),  were  now  hard  pressing  upon  a  second  (Egesta), 
and  would  thus  successively  subdue  them  all:  as  soon  as  this  was 
completed,  there  would  be  nothing  left  in  Sicily  except  an  omnipo- 
tent Dorian  combination,  allied  to  Peloponnesus  both  by  race  and 
descent,  and  sure  to  lend  effective  aid  in  putting  down  Athens  herself. 
It  was  therefore  essential  for  Athens  to  forestall  this  coming  danger 
by  interfering  forthwith  to  uphold  her  remaining  allies  against  the 
encroachments  of  Syracuse.  If  she  would  send  a  naval  expedition 
adequate  to  the  rescue  of  Egesta,  the  Egestseans  themselves  engaged 
to  provide  ample  funds  for  the  prosecution  of  the  war. 

Such  representations  from  the  envoys,  and  fears  of  Syracusan 
aggrandizement  as  a  source  of  strength  to  Peloponnesus,  worked 
along  with  the  prayers  of  the  Leontines  in  rekindling  the  appetite  of 
Athens  for  extending  her  power  in  Sicily.  The  impression  made 
upon  the  Athenian  public,  favorable  from  the  first,  was  wound  up  to  a 
still  higher  pitch  by  renewed  discussion.  The  envoys  were  repeatedly 
heard  in  the  public  assembly,  together  with  those  citizens  who  sup- 
ported their  propositions.  At  the  head  of  these  was  Alkibiades,  who 
aspired  to  the  command  of  the  intended  expedition,  tempting  alike 
to  his  love  of  glory,  of  adventure,  and  of  personal  gain.  But  it  is 
plain  from  these  renewed  discussions  that  at  first  the  disposition  of 
the  people  was  by  no  means  decided,  much  less  unanimous;  and  that 
a  considerable  party  sustained  Nikias  in  a  prudential  opposition. 
Even  at  last,  the  resolution  adopted  was  not  one  of  positive  consent, 
but  a  mean  term  such  as  perhaps  Nikias*  himself  could  not  resist. 
Special  envoys  were  dispatched  to  Egesta — partly  to  ascertain  the 
means  of  the  town  to  fulfill  its  assurance  of  defraying  the  costs  of 
H.  G.  II.— 27 


834  SICILIAN  AFFAIRS. 

war — partly  to  make  investigations  on  the  spot,  and  report  upon  the 
general  state  of  affairs. 

Perhaps  the  commissioners  dispatched  were  men  themselves  not 
unfriendly  to  the  enterprise;  nor  is  it  impossible  that  some  of  them 
may  have  been  individually  bribed  by  the  Egestseans: — at  least  such 
a  supposition  is  not  forbidden  by  the  average  state  of  Athenian  public 
morality.  But  the  must  honest  or  even  suspicious  men  could  hardly 
be  prepared  for  the  deep  laid  stratagems  put  in  practice  to  delude 
them  on  their  arrival  at  Egesta.  They  were  conducted  to  the  rich 
temple  of  Aphrodite  on  Mount  Eryx,  where  the  plate  and  donatives 
were  exhibited  before  them;  abundant  in  number,  and  striking  to  the 
eve,  vet  composed  mostly  of  silver-gilt  vessels,  which,  though  falsely 
passed  off  as  solid  gold,  were  in  reality  of  little  pecuniary  value. 
Moreover,  the  Egestsean  citizens  were  profuse  in  their  hospitalities 
and  entertainments  both  to  the  commissioners  and  to  the  crews  of  the 
triremes. 

They  collected  together  all  the  gold  and  silver  vessels,  dishes  and 
goblets-,  of  Egesta,  which  they  farther  enlarged  by  borrowing  addi- 
tional ornaments  of  the  same  kind  from  the  neighboring  cities,  Hel- 
lenic as  well  as  Carthaginian.  At  each  successive  entertainment  every 
Egestsean  host  exhibited  all  this  large  stock  of  plate  as  his  own  prop- 
erty— the  same  stock  being  transferred  from  house  to  house  for  the 
occasion.  A  false  appearance  was  thus  created  of  the  large  number 
of  wealthy  men  in  Egesta;  and  the  Athenian  seamen,  while  their 
hearts  were  won  by  the  caresses,  saw  with  amazement  this  prodigious 
display  of  gold  and  silver,  and  were  thoroughly  duped  by  fraud.  To 
complete  the  illusion,  by  resting  it  on  a  basis  of  reality  and  prompt 
payment,  sixty  talents  of  uncoined  silver  were  at  once  produced  as 
ready  for  the  operations  of  war.  With  this  sum  in  hand,  the  Athenian 
commissioners,  after  finishing  their  examination,  and  the  Egestsean 
envoys  also,  returned  to  Athens,  which  they  reached  in  the  spring  of 
415  B.C.,  about  three  months  after  the  capture  of  Melos. 

The  Athenian  assembly  being  presently  convened  to  hear  their 
report,  the  deluded  commissioners  drew  a  magnificent  picture  of  the 
wealth,  public  and  private,  which  they  had  actually  seen  and  touched 
at  Egesta,  and  presented  the  sixty  talents  (one  month's  pay  for  a  fleet 
of  sixty  triremes)  as  a  small  installment  out  of  the  vast  stock  remain- 
ing behind.  While  they  thus  officially  certified  the  capacity  of  the 
Egestseans  to  perform  their  promise  of  defraying  the  cost  of  the  war, 
the  seamen  of  their  trireme,  addressing  the  assembly  in  their  character 
of  citizens — beyond  all  suspicion  of  being  bribed — overflowing  with 
sympathy  for  the  town  in  which  they  had  just  been  so  cordially  wel- 
comed— and  full  of  wonder  at  the  display  of  wealth  which  they  had 
witnessed — would  probably  contribute  still  more  effectually  to  kindle 
the  sympathies  of  their  countrymen.  Accordingly  when  the  Egestsean 
envoys  again  renewed  their  petitions  and  representations,  confidently 
appealing  to  the  scrutiny  which  they  had  undergone — when  the  dis- 


EMBARRASSMENT  OF  NIKIAS.  835 

tress  of  the  suppliant  Leontines  was  again  depicted — the  Athenian 
assembly  no  longer  delayed  coming  to  a  final  decision.  They  deter- 
mined to  send  forthwith  sixty  triremes  to  Sicily,  under  three  generals 
with  full  powers — Nikias,  Alkibiades,  and  Lamachus;  for  the  purpose, 
first,  of  relieving  Egesta;  next,  as  soon  as  that  primary  object  should 
have  been  accomplished,  of  re-establishing  the  city  of  Leontini;  lastly, 
of  furthering  the  views  of  Athens  in  Sicily,  by  any  other  means  which 
they  might  find  practicable.  Such  resolution  being  passed,  a  fresh 
assembly  was  appointed  for  the  fifth  day  following,  to  settle  the 
details. 

We  cannot  doubt  that  this  assembly,  in  which  the  reports  from 
Egesta  were  first  delivered,  was  one  of  unqualified  triumph  to  Alkibi- 
ades and  those  who  had  from  the  first  advocated  the  expedition — as 
well  as  of  embarrassment  and  humiliation  to  Nikias,  who  had  opposed 
it.  He  was  probably  more  astonished  than  any  one  else  at  the  state- 
ments of  the  commissioners  and  seamen,  because  he  did  not  believe  in 
the  point  which  they  went  to  establish.  Yet  he  could  not  venture  to 
contradict  eye-witnesses  speaking  in  evident  good  faith — and  as  the 
assembly  went  heartily  along  with  them,  he  labored  under  great  diffi- 
culty in  repeating  his  objections  to  a  scheme  now  so  much  strengthened 
in  public  favor.  Accordingly,  his  speech  was  probably  hesitating  and 
ineffective;  the  more  so,  as  his  opponents,  far  from  wishing  to  make 
good  any  personal  triumph  against  himself,  were  forward  in  proposing 
his  name  first  on  the  list  of  generals,  in  spite  of  his  own  declared 
repugnance.  But  when  the  assembly  broke  up,  he  became  fearfully 
impressed  with  the  perilous  resolution  which  it  had  adopted,  and  at 
the  same  time  conscious  that  he  had  not  done  justice  to  his  own  case 
against  it.  He  therefore  resolved  to  avail  himself  of  the  next  assem- 
bly four  days  afterward,  for  the  purpose  of  reopening  the  debate, 
and  again  denouncing  the  intended  expedition.  Properly  speaking, 
the  Athenians  might  have  declined  to  hear  him  on  this  subject. 
Indeed,  the  question  which  he  raised  could  not  be  put  without  ille- 
gality; the  principle  of  the  measure  had  been  already  determined, 
and  it  remained  only  to  arrange  the  details,  for  which  special  purpose 
the  coming  assembly  had  been  appointed.  But  he  was  heard,  and 
with  perfect  patience ;  and  his  harangue,  a  valuable  sample  both  of 
the  man  and  of  the  time,  is  set  forth  at  length  by  Thucydides.  I  give 
here  the  chief  points  of  it,  not  confining  myself  to  the  exact  expres- 
sions. 

"  Though  we  are  met  to-day,  Athenians,  to  settle  the  particulars  of 
the  expedition  already  pronounced  against  Sicily,  yet  I  think  we  ought 
to  take  farther  counsel  whether  it  be  well  to  send  that  expedition  at 
all;  nor  ought  we  thus  hastily  to  plunge,  at  the  instance  of  aliens,  into 
a  dangerous  war  no  way  belonging  to  us.  To  myself  personally, 
indeed,  your  resolution  has  offered  an  honorable  appointment,  and 
for  my  own  bodily  danger  I  care  as  little  as  any  man:  yet  no  consid- 
erations of  personal  dignity  have  ever  before  prevented  me,  nor  shull 


836  SICILIAN  AFFAIRS. 

now  prevent  me,  from  giving  you  my  honest  opinion,  however  it 
may  clash  with  your  habitual  judgments.  I  tell  you,  then,  that  in  your 
desire  to  go  to  Sicily,  you  leave  many  enemies  here  behind  you,  and 
that  you  will  bring  upon  yourselves  new  enemies  from  thence  to  help 
them.  Perhaps  you  fancy  that  your  truce  with  Sparta  is  an  adequate 
protection.  In  name,  indeed  (though  only  in  name,  thanks  to  the 
intrigues  of  parties  both  here  and  there),  that  truce  may  stand,  so  long 
as  your  power  remains  unimpaired;  but  on  jour  first  serious  reverses, 
the  enemy  will  eagerly  take  the  opportunity  of  assailing  you.  Some 
of  your  most  powerful  enemies  have  never  even  accepted  the  truce; 
and  if  you  divide  your  force  as  you  now  propose,  they  will  probably 
set  upon  you  at  once  along  with  the  Sicilians,  whom  they  would  have 
been  too  happy  to  procure  as  co-operating  allies  at  the  beginning  of 
the  war.  Recollect  that  your  Chalkidian  subjects  in  Thrace  are  still 
in  revolt,  and  have  never  yet  been  conquered:  other  continental  sub- 
jects, too,  are  not  much  to  be  trusted;  and  you  are  going  to  redress 
injuries  offered  to  Egesta,  before  you  have  yet  thought  of  redressing 
your  own.  Now  your  conquests  in  Thrace,  if  you  make  any,  can  be 
maintained;  but  Sicily  is  so  distant  and  the  people  so  powerful, 
that  you  will  never  be  able  to  maintain  permanent  ascendency;  and 
it  is  absurd  to  undertake  an  expedition  wherein  conquest  cannot  be 
permanent,  while  failure  will  be  destructive.  The  Egestaeans  alarm 
you  by  the  prospect  of  Syracusan  aggrandizement.  But  to  me  it 
seems  that  the  Sicilian  Greeks,  even  if  they  become  subjects  of  Syra- 
cuse, will  be  less  dangerous  to  you  than  they  are  at  present:  for  as 
matters  stand  now,  they  might  possibly  send  aid  to  Peloponnesus, 
from  desire  on  the  part  of  each  to  gain  the  favor  of  Lacedsemon — but 
imperial  Syracuse  would  have  no  motive  to  endanger  her  own  empire 
fos  the  purpose  of  putting  down  yours.  You  are  now  full  of  con- 
fidence, because  you  have  come  out  of  the  war  better  than  you  at 
first  feared.  But  do  not  trust  the  Spartans:  they,  the  most  sensitive 
of  all  men  to  the  reputation  of  superiority,  are  lying  in  wait  to  play 
you  a  trick  in  order  to  repair  their  own  dishonor:  their  oligarchical 
machinations  against  you  demand  all  your  vigilance,  and  leave  you 
no  leisure  to  think  of  these  foreigners  at  Egesta.  Having  just  recov- 
ered ourselves  somewhat  from  the  pressure  of  disease  and  war,  we 
ought  to  reserve  this  newly  acquired  strength  for  our  own  purpose, 
instead  of  wasting  it  upon  the  treacherous  assurances  of  desperate 
exiles  from  Sicily." 

Nikias  then  continued,  doubtless  turning  toward  Alkibiades:  "  If 
any  man,  delighted  to  be  named  to  the  command,  though  still  too 
young  for  it,  exhorts  you  to  this  expedition  in  his  own  selfish  interests, 
looking  to  admiration  for  his  ostentation  in  chariot-racing,  and  to  profit 
from  his  command  as  a  means  of  making  good  his  extravagances — do 
not  let  such  a  man  gain  celebrity  for  himself  at  the  hazard  of  the  entire 
city.  Be  persuaded  that  such  persons  are  alike  unprincipled  in  regard 
to  the  public  property  and  wasteful  as  to  their  own — and  that  thia 


REPLY  OF  ALKIBIADES.  837 

aiatter  is  too  serious  for  the  rash  counsels  of  youth.  I  tremhle  when 
I  see  before  me  this  band  sitting,  by  previous  concert,  close  to  their 
leader  in  the  assembly — and  I  in  my  turn  exhort  the  elderly  men, 
who  are  near  them,  not  to  be  shamed  out  of  their  opposition  by  the 
fear  of  being  called  cowards.  Let  them  leave  to  these  men  the  ruin- 
ous appetite  for  what  is  not  within  reach:  in  the  conviction  that  few 
plans  ever  succeeded  from  passionate  desire — many,  from  deliberate 
foresight.  Let  them  vote  against  the  expedition — maintaining  undis- 
turbed our  present  relations  with  the  Sicilian  cities,  and  desiring  the 
Egestfeans  to  close  the  war  against  Selinus,  as  they  have  begun  it, 
without  the  aid  of  Athens.  Nor  be  thou  afraid,  Prytanis  (Mr.  Presi- 
dent) to  submit  this  momentous  question  again  to  the  decision  of  the 
assembly, — seeing  that  breacli  of  the  law  in  the  presence  of  so  many 
witnessses,  cannot  expose  thee  to  impeachment,  while  thou  wilt  afford 
opportunity  for  the  correction  of  a  perilous  misjudgment." 

Such  were  the  principal  points  in  the  speech  of  Nikias  on  this  mem-, 
orable  occasion.  It  was  heard  witli  attention,  and  probably  made 
some  impression ;  since  it  completely  re-opened  the  entire  debate,  in. 
spite  of  the  formal  illegality.  Immediately  after  he  sat  down,  while 
his  words  were  yet  fresh  in  the  ears  of  the  audience,  Alkibia- 
des  rose  to  reply.  The  speech  just  made,  bringing  the  expedition 
again  into  question,  endangered  his  dearest  hopes  both  of  fame  and  of 
pecuniary  acquisition.  Opposed  to  Nikias  both  in  personal  charac- 
ter and  in  political  tendencies,  he  had  pushed  his  rivalry  to  such  a 
degree  of  bitterness,  that  at  one  moment  a  vote  of  ostracism  had  been 
on  the  point  of  deciding  between  them.  That  vote  had  indeed  been 
turned  aside  by  joint  consent,  and  discharged  upon  Hyperbolus;  yet 
the  hostile  feeling  still  continued  on  both  sides,  and  Nikias  had  just 
manifested  it  by  a  parliamentary  attack  of  the  most  galling  character 
— all  the  more  galling  because  it  was  strictly  accurate  and  wrell- 
deserved.  Provoked  as  well  as  alarmed,  Alkibiades  started  up  forth- 
with— his  impatience  breaking  loose  from  the  formalities  of  an  exor- 
dium. 

"  Athenians,  I  both  have  better  title  than  others  to  the  post  of  com- 
mander (for  the  taunts  of  Nikias  force  me  to  begin  here)  and  I  account 
myself  fully  worthy  of  it.  Those  very  matters,  with  which  he 
reproaches  me,  are  sources  not  merely  of  glory  to  my  ancestors  and 
myself,  but  of  positive  advantage  to  my  country.  For  the  Greeks,  on 
witnessing  my  splendid  Theory  at  Olympia,  were  induced  to  rate  the 
power  of  Athens  even  above  the  reality,  having  before  regarded  it  as 
broken  down  by  the  war;  when  I  sent  into  the  lists  seven  chariots, 
being  more  than  any  private  individual  had  ever  sent  before — win- 
ning the  first  prize,  coming  in  also  second  and  fourth,  and  performing 
all  the  accessories  in  a  manner  suitable  to  an  Olympic  victor}^.  Cus- 
tom attaches  honor  to  such  exploits,  but  the  power  of  the  performers 
is  at  the  same  time  brought  home  to  the  feelings  of  spectators.  My 
exhibitions  at  Athens,  too,  choregic  and  others,  are  naturally  viewed 


838  SICILIAN   AFFAIRS. 

with  jealousy  by  my  rivals  here;  but  in  the  eyes  of  strangers  they 
are  evidences  of  power.  Such  so-called  folly  is  by  uo  means  use- 
when  a  man  at  his  own  cosl  serves  the  city  as  well  ae  himself. 
Nor  is  it  unjust,  when  a  man  bas  an  exalted  opinion  of  himself,  that 
be  should  not  conduct  bimself  towards  others  as  if  be  were  their 
equal;  for  the  man  in  misfortune  finds  do  one  to  bears  share  of  it, 
Just  as,  when  wcarc  in  distress,  we  find  no  one  to  speak  to  us — in 
like  manner  let  a  man  Lay  his  account  to  bear  the  insolence  of  the 
prosperous;  or  else  lei  him  give  equal  dealing  to  the  low,  and  then 
claim  to  receive  it  from  the  high.  I  know  well  that  such  exalted  per- 
sonages, and  all  who  have  in  any  way  attained  eminence,  have  been 
during  their  lifetime  unpopular,  chiefly  in  societj  with  their  equals, 

and  to  certain  extent  with  Others  also;  while  after  their  decease,  they 
have  left  such  a  reputation  as  lo  make  people  claim  kindred  with 
them  falsely — and  to  induce  their  country  to  I. nasi  of  them,  not  as 
though  they  were  aliens  or  wrong-doers,  hut  as  her  own  citizens  and 
as  men  who  did  her  honor.  It  is  this  glory  which  1  desire;  and  in 
pursuit  of  which  I  incur  such  reproaches  for  my  private  conduct. 
Vet  look  at  my  public  conduct,  and  see  whether  it  will  not  bear  com- 
parison with  that  of  any  other  citizen.  I  brought  together  the  most 
powerful  stales  in  Peloponnesus  without  any  serious  cost  or  hazard 
to  you,  and  made  the  Lacedaemonians  peril  their  all  at  Mantineia  on 
the  fortune  of  one  day:  a  pi  til  so  great,  that,  though  victorious,  they 
have  not  even  yet  regained  their  steady  belief  in  their  own  strength. 

"Thus  did  my  youth,  and  my  so-called  monstrous  folly,  find  suit- 
able words  to  address  the  Peloponn*  sian  powers,  and  earnestness  to 
give  them  confidence  and  obtain  their  co-operation.  Be  not  now, 
therefore,  afraid  of  this  youth  of  mine:  but  so  long  as  I  possess  it  in 
full  vigor,  and  so  long  as  Nikias  retains  his  reputation  for  good  for- 
tune, turn  us  each  to  accounl  in  our  own  way." 

Having  thus  vindicated  himself  personally,  Alkibiadcs  went  on  to 
deprecate  any  change  of  the  public  resolution  already  taken.  The 
Sicilian  cities  die  said)  were  not  so  formidable  as  was  represented. 
Their  population  was  numerous  indeed,  but  fluctuating,  turbulent, 
often  on  the  move,  and  without  local  attachment.  No  man  there  con- 
sidered himself  as  a  permanent  resident  nor  cared  to  defend  the  city 
in  which  be  dwelt;  nor  were  there  arms  or  organization  for  such  a 
purpose.  The  native  Sikels,  detesting  Syracuse,  v,  ould  willingly  lend 
their  aid  to  her  assailants.  As  lo  the  Peloponnesians,  powerful  as 
they  were,  they  had  never  yet  been  more  without  hope  of  damaging 
Athens,  than  they  were  now:  they  were  no1  more  desperate  enemies 
now.  than  they  had  been  in  former  days,  they  might  invade  Attica 
by  land,  whet  her  the  Athenians  sailed  to  Sicily  or  not;  '"it  they  could 
do  no  mischief  by  sea,  for  Athens  would  Still  have  in  reserve  a.  navy 
sufficient  to  restrain  them.  What  valid  ground  was  there,  therefore,  to 
evade  performing  obligations  which  Athens  had  sworn  to  her  Sici- 
lian allies?     To  be  sure  they  could  bring  no  help  to  Attica  in  return: 


SECOND   SPEECn  OP  NIKIAS.  839 

— but  Athens  did  not  want  them  on  her  own  side  of  the  water — she 
wanted  them  in  Sicily,  to  prevent  her  Sicilian  enemies  from  coming 
over  to  attack  her.  She  had  originally  acquired  her  empire  by  a  readi- 
ness to  interfere  wherever  she  was  invited;  nor  would  she  have  made 
any  progress,  if  she  had  been  backward  or  prudish  in  scrutinizing 
such  invitations.  She  could  not  now  set  limits  to  the  extent  of  her 
imperial  sway;  she  was  under  a  necessity  not  merely  to  retain  her  pre- 
sent subjects,  but  to  lay  snares  for  new  subjects — on  pain  of  falling 
into  dependence  herself  if  she  ceased  to  be  imperial.  Let  her  then 
persist  in  the  resolution  adopted,  and  strike  terror  into  the  Pelopon- 
nesians  by  undertaking  this  great  expedition.  She  would  probably 
conquer  all  Sicily;  at  least  she  would  humble  Syracuse:  in  case  even 
of  failure,  she  could  always  bring  back  her  troops,  from  her  unques- 
tionable superiority  at  sea.  The  stationary  and  inactive  policy  recom- 
mended by  Nikias  was  not  less  at  variance  with  the  temper,  than  witli 
the  position  of  Athens,  and  would  be  ruinous  to  her  if  pursued.  Her 
military  organization  would  decline,  and  her  energies  would  be  wasted 
in  internal  rub  aud  conflict,  instead  of  that  aspiring  readiness  of 
enterprise,  which,  having  become  ingrafted  upon  her  laws  and  habits, 
could  not  be  now  renounced,  even  if  bad  in  itself,  without  speedy 
destruction. 

Such  was  substantially  the  reply  of  Alkibiades  to  Nikias.  The  de- 
bate was  now  completely  reopened,  so  that  several  speakers  addressed 
the  assembly  on  both  sides;  more,  however,  decidedly,  in  favor  of 
the  expedition  than  against  it.  The  alarmed  Egestoeans  and  Leon- 
tines  renewed  their  supplications,  appealing  to  the  plighted  faith  of 
the  city:  probably  also,  those  Athenians  who  had  visited  Egesta 
stood  forward  again  to  protest  against  what  they  would  call  the 
ungenerous  doubts  and  insinuations  of  Nikias.  By  all  these  ap- 
peals, after  considerable  debate,  the  assembly  was  so  powerfully 
moved  that  their  determination  to  send  the  fleet  became  more  intense 
than  ever;  and  Nikias,  perceiving  that  farther  direct  opposition  was 
useless,  altered  his  tactics.  He  now  attempted  a  maneuver,  designed 
indirectly  to  disgust  his  countrymen  with  the  plan,  by  enlarging 
upon  its  dangers  and  difficulties,  and  insisting  upon  a  prodigious 
force  as  indispensable  to  surmount  them.  Nor  was  he  without  hopes 
that  they  might  be  sufficiently  disheartened  by  such  prospective 
hardships  to  throw  up  the  scheme  altogether.  At  any  rate,  if  they 
persisted,  he  himself  as  commander  would  thus  be  enabled  to  execute 
jt  with  completeness  and  confidence. 

Accepting  the  expedition,  therefore,  as  the  pronounced  fiat  of  the 
people,  he  reminded  them  that  the  cities  which  they  were  about  to 
attack,  especially  Syracuse  and  Selinus,  were  powerful,  populous, 
free — well  prepared  in  every  way  with  hoplites,  horsemen,  light- 
armed  troops,  ships  of  war,  plenty  of  horses  to  mount  their  cavalry, 
and  abundant  corn  at  home.  At  best,  Athens  could  hope  for  no 
other  allies  in  Sicily  except  Naxus  and  Katana,  from  their  kindred 


840  SICILIAN'   AFFAIRS. 

with  the  Lcontincs.  It  was  no  mere  fleet)  therefore,  which  could 
cope  with  enemies  like  these  on  their  own  soil.  The  fleet,  indeed, 
must  be  prodigiously  great,  for  the  purpose  nol  merely  of  maritime 
combat,  bul  01  keeping  open  communication  at  sea,  and  insuring  the 
importation  of  subsistence.  But  there  must  besides  be  a  large  force 
of  hoplites,  bowmen,  and  dingers — a  large  stock  of  provisions  in 
transports — and  above  all.  an  abundant  amount  of  money,  for  the 
funds  promised  by  the  Egestoeans  would  be  found  mere  empty 
delusion.  The  army  must  be  not  simply  a  match  for  the  enemy's 
regular  hoplites  and  powerful  cavalry,  but  also  independent  of 
foreign  aid  from  the  first  day  of  their  landing.  If  not,  in  case  of  the 
least  reverse,  they  would  find  everywhere  nothing  but  active  enemies, 
without  a  single  friend.  "I  know  (he  concluded)  that  there  are 
many  dangers  against  which  we  must  take  precaution,  and  many 
more  in  which  we  must  trust  to  good  fortune,  serious  as  it  is  for  mere 
men  to  do  so.  But  I  choose  to  leave  as  little  as  possible  in  the 
power  of  fortune,  and  to  have  in  hand  all  means  of  reasonable 
security  at  the  time  when  I  leave  Athens.  Looking  merely  to  the 
interests  of  the  commonwealth,  this  is  the  most  assured  course; 
while  to  us  who  are  to  form  the  armament  it  is  indispensable  for 
preservation.  If  any  man  thinks  differently,  I  resign  to  him  the 
command." 

The  effect  of  this  second  speech  of  Nikias  on  the  assembly,  coming 
as  it  did  after  a  long  and  contentious  debate,  was  much  greater  than 
that  which  had  been  produced  by  his  first.  But  it  was  an  effect 
totally  opposite  to  that  which  he  himself  had  anticipated  and  in- 
tended. Far  from  being  discouraged  or  alienated  from  the  expedi- 
tion by  those  impediments  which  he  had  studiously  magnified,  the 
people  only  attached  themselves  to  it  with  yet  greater  obstinacy. 
The  difficulties  which  stood  in  the  way  of  Sicilian  conquest  served 
but  to  endear  it  to  them  the  more,  calling  forth  increased  ardor  and 
eagerness  for  personal  exertion  in  the  cause.  The  people  not  only 
accepted,  without  hesitation  or  deduction,  the  estimate  which  Nikias 
had  laid  before  them  of  risk  and  cost,  but  warmly  extolled  his  frank- 
ness not  less  than  his  sagacity,  as  the  only  means  of  making  success 
certain.  They  were  ready  to  grant  without  reserve  everything  which 
he  asked,  with  an  enthusiasm  and  unanimity  such  as  was  rarely 
seen  to  reign  in  an  Athenian  assembly.  In  fact,  the  second  speech  of 
Nikias  had  brought  the  two  dissentient  veins  of  the  assembly  into  a 
confluence  and  harmony,  all  the  more  welcome  because  unexpected. 
While  his  partisans  seconded  it  as  the  besl  way  bf  neutralizing  the 

Eopular  madness,  his  opponents — Alkibiades,  the  Egestseans,  and  the 
eontines — caught  at  it  with  acclamation,  as  realizing  more  than 
they  had  hoped  for,  and  more  than  they  could  ever  have  ventured  to 
propose.  If  Alkibiades  had  demanded  an  armament  on  so  vast  a 
scale,  the  people  would  have  turned  a  deaf  ear.  But  such  was  their 
/espect  for  Nikias — on  the  united  grounds  of  prudence,  good  for- 


EXCITEMENT  IN  THE  CITY.  841 

tune,  piety,  and  favor  with  the  gods — that  his  opposition  to  their 
favorite  scheme  had  really  made  them  uneasy;  and  when  he  made 
the  same  demand,  they  were  delighted  to  purchase  his  concurrence 
by  adopting  all  such  conditions  as  he  imposed. 

It  was  thus  that  Nikias,  quite  contrary  to  his  own  purpose,  not 
only  imparted  to  the  enterprise  a  gigantic  magnitude  which  its  pro- 
jectors had  never  contemplated,  but  threw  into  it  the  whole  soul  of 
Athens,  and  roused  a  burst  of  ardor  beyond  all  former  example. 
Every  man  present,  old  as  well  as  young,  rich  and  poor,  of  all  classes 
and  professions,  was  eager  to  put  down  his  name  for  personal  service. 
Some  were  tempted  by  the  love  of  gain;  others  by  the  curiosity  of 
seeing  so  distant  a  region ;  others  again  by  the  pride  and  supposed 
safety  of  enlisting  in  so  irresistible  an  armament.  So  overpowering 
was  the  popular  voice  in  calling  for  the  execution  of  the  scheme, 
that  the  small  minority  who  retained  their  objections  were  afraid  to 
hold  up  their  hands,  for  fear  of  incurring  the  suspicion  of  want  of 
patriotism.  When  the  excitement  had  somewhat  subsided,  an  orator 
named  Demostratus,  coming  forward  as  spokesman  of  this  senti- 
ment, urged  Nikias  to  declare  at  once,  without  farther  evasion,  what 
force  he  required  from  the  people.  Disappointed  as  Nikias  was,  yet 
being  left  without  any  alternative,  he  sadly  responded  to  the  appeal; 
saying  that  he  would  take  farther  counsel  with  his  colleagues,  but 
that,  speaking  on  his  first  impression,  he  thought  the  triremes 
required  must  be  not  less  than  one  hundred,  nor  the  hoplites  less 
than  5,000 — Athenians  and  allies  together.  There  must  farther  be  a 
proportional  equipment  of  other  forces  and  accompaniments,  espe- 
cially Kretan  bowmen  and  slingers.  Enormous  as  this  requisition 
was,  the  vote  of  the  people  not  only  sanctioned  it  without  delay,  but 
even  went  beyond  it.  They  conferred  upon  the  generals  full  power 
to  fix  both  the  numbers  of  the  armament  and  every  other  matter 
relating  to  the  expedition,  just  as  they  might  think  best  for  the 
interest  of  Athens. 

Pursuant  to  this  momentous  resolution,  the  enrollment  and  prep- 
aration of  the  forces  wTas  immediately  begun.  Messages  were  sent 
to  summon  sufficient  triremes  from  the  nautical  allies,  as  well  as  to 
invite  hoplites  from  Argos  and  Mantineia,  and  to  hire  bowmen  and 
slingers  elsewhere.  For  three  months  the  generals  were  busily 
engaged  in  this  proceeding,  while  the  city  was  in  a  state  of  alertness 
and  bustle — fatally  interrupted,  however,  by  an  incident  which  I 
shall  recount  in  the  next  chapter. 

Considering  the  prodigious  consequences  which  turned  on  the 
expedition  of  Athens  against  Sicily,  it  is  worth  while  to  bestow  a 
few  reflections  on  the  preliminary  proceedings  of  the  Athenian 
people.  Those  who  are  accustomed  to  Impute  all  the  misfortunes 
of  Athens  to  the  hurry,  passion,  and  ignorance  of  democracy  will 
not  find  the  charge  borne  out  by  the  facts  which  we  have  been  just 
considering.     The  supplicatious  of  Egestseans  and  Leontines,  for- 


M-2  SICILIAN  AFFAIRS. 

warded  to  Athens  abo/ril  the  spring  or  summer  of  416  B.C.,  underg 
careful  and  repeated  discussion  in  the  public  assembly.  The}  a. 
flrsl  meet  with  considerable  opposition,  bul  the  repeated  debatej 
gradually  kindle  both  t h<  sympathies  and  the  ambition  of  the  people. 
Still,  however,  do  decisive  step  is  taken  without  more  ample  and 
correct  information  from  the  spot,  and  special  commissioners  are 
sent  to  Egesta  for  the  purpose.  These  men  bring  back  a  decisive 
report,  triumphantly  certifying  all  that  the  Egi  tseans  had  promised. 
We  cannot  at  all  wonder  that  the  people  never  suspected  t he  deep- 
laid  fraud  whereby  their  commissioners  had  been  duped. 

Upon  the  result  of  that,  mission  from  Egesta,  the  two  parties  for 
and  against  the  projected  expedition  had  evidently  joined  issue 
when  the  commissioners  returned,  bearing  testimony  so  decisive  in 
favor  of  the  former,  the  party,  thus  strengthened,  thought  itself  war- 
ranted in  calling  for  a  decision  immediately,  after  all  the  previous 
Nevertheless,  the  measure  still  had  to  surmount  the 
renewed  and  hearty  opposition  of  Nikias,  before  it  In  came  finally 
ratified.  It  was  this  long  ami  frequent  debate,  with  opposition  often 
repeated  but  always  eutreasoned,  which,  working  gradually  deeper 
and  deeper  conviction  in  the  minds  of  the  people,  brought  them  all 
into  hearty  unanimity  to  support  it,  and  made  them  cling  to  it  with 
that  tenacity  which  the  coming  chapters  will  demonstrate.  In  so  far 
as  the  expedition  was  an  (nor,  it  certainly  was  not  error  arising  either 
from  hurry,  or  want  of  dis<  uSsion,  or  want  of  inquiry.  Never  in 
Grecian  history  was  any  measure  more  carefully  weighed  before- 
hand, or  more  deliberately  and  unanimously  resolved. 

The  position  of  Nikias  in  reference  to  the  measure  is  remarkable. 
As  a  dissuasive  and  warning  counselor,  he  took  a  right  view  of  it; 
but  in  that  capacity  he  could  not  carry  the  people  along  with  him. 
Yet  such  wras  their  steady  esteem  for  him  personally,  and  their 
reluctance  to  proceed  in  the  enter] >rise  without  him,  that  they  eagerly 
embraced  any  conditions  which  he  thought  proper  to  impose.  And 
the  conditions  which  he  named  had  the  effect  of  exaggerating  the 
enterprise  into  stick  gigantic  magnitude  as  no  one  in  Athens  had  ever 
contemplated;  thus  casting  into  it  so  prodigious  a  proportion  of  the 
blood  of  Athens,  that  its  discomfiture  would  be  equivalent  to  the 
rain  of  the  commonwealth.  This  was  the  first  mischief  occasioned 
by  Nikias,  when,  after  being  forced  to  relinquish  his  direct  opposi- 
tion, he  resorted  to  the  indirect  maneuver  of  demanding  more  than  he 
thought  the  people  would  be  willing  to  grant.  It  will  be  found  only 
t  among  a  sad  series  of  other  mistakes — fatal  to  his  country  as 
well  as  to  himself. 

Giving  to  Nikias,  however,  for  the  present,  full  credit  for  the 
wisdom  of  his  dissuasive  counsel  and  his  skepticism  about  the  reports 
from  Egestar,  we  cannot  but  notice  the  opposite  quality  in  Alkibiades. 
JTis  speech  is  not  merely  full  of  overweening  insolence  as  a  manifes- 
tation of  individual  character,  but  of  rash  and  ruinous  instigations  in 


RASH  POLICY   OF  ALKIBIADES.  843 

regard  to  the  foreign  policy  of  his  country.  The  arguments  whereby 
he  enforces  the  expedition  against  Syracuse  are  indeed  more  mis- 
chievous in  their  tendency  than  the  expedition  itself,  for  the  failure 
of  which  Alkibiades  is  not  to  be  held  responsible.  It  might  have 
succeeded  iu  its  special  object,  had  it  been  properly  conducted;  but 
even  if  it  had  succeeded,  the  remark  of  iN'ikias  is  not  the  less  just, 
that  Athens  was  aiming  at  an  unmeasured  breadth  of  empire,  which 
it  would  be  altogether  impossible  for  her  to  preserve.  When  we 
recollect  the  true  political  wisdom  with  which  Perikles  had  advised 
his  countrymen  to  maintain  strenuously  their  existing  empire,  but 
by  no  means  to  grasp  at  any  new  acquisitions  while  they  had  power- 
ful enemies  in  Pelopennesus — we  shall  appreciate  by  contrast  the 
feverish  system  of  never-ending  aggression  inculcated  by  Alkibiades, 
and  the  destructive  principles  which  he  lays  down  that  Athens  must 
forever  be  engaged  in  new  conquests,  on  pain  of  forfeiting  her  exist- 
ing empire,  and  tearing  herself  to  pieces  by  internal  discord.  Even 
granting  the  necessity  for  Athens  to  employ  her  military  and  naval 
force  (as  Nikias  had  truly  observed),  Amphipolis  and  the  revolted 
subjects  in  Thrace  were  still  unsubdued;  and  the  first  employment 
of  Athenian  force  ought  to  be  directed  against  them,  instead  of  being 
wasted  in  distant  hazards  and  treacherous  novelties,  creating  for 
Athens  a  position  in  which  she  could  never  permanently  maintain 
herself.  The  parallel  which  Alkibiades  draws,  between  the  enter- 
prising spirit  whereby  the  Athenian  empire  had  been  first  acquired, 
and  the  undefined  speculations  which  he  was  himself  recommending — 
is  altogether  fallacious.  The  Athenian  empire  took  its  rise  from 
Athenian  enterprise,  working  in  concert  with  a  serious  alarm  and 
necessity  on  the  part  of  all  the  Grecian  cities  in  or  round  the  iEgean 
Sea.  Athens  rendered  an  essential  service  by  keeping  off  the  Per- 
sians, and  preserving  that  sea  in  a  better  condition  than  it  had  ever 
been  in  before:  her  empire  had  begun  by  being  a  voluntary  confed- 
eracy, and  had  only  passed  by  degrees  into  constraint;  while  the 
local  situation  of  all  her  subjects  was  sufficiently  near  to  be  within 
the  reach  of  her  controlling  navy.  Her  new  career  of  aggression  in 
Sicily  was  in  all  these  respects  different.  Nor  is  it  less  surprising  to 
find  Alkibiades  asserting  that  the  multiplication  of  subjects  in  that 
distant  island,  employing  a  large  portion  of  the  Athenian  naval  force 
to  watch  them,  would  impart  new  stability  to  the  pre-existing  Athe- 
nian empire.  How  strange  also  to  read  the  terms  in  which  he  makes 
light  of  enemies  both  in  Peloponnesus  and  in  Sicily;  the  Sicilian  war 
being  a  new  enterprise  hardly  less  in  magnitude  and  hazard  than  the 
Peloponnesian  ! — so  notice  the  honor  which  he  claims  to  himself  for 
his  operations  in  Peloponnesus  and  tho  battle  of  Mantineia,  which 
had  ended  in  complete  failure,  and  in  restoring  Sparta  to  the  maxi- 
mum of  her  credit  as  it  had  stood  before  the  events  of  Sphakteria> 
There  is  in  fact  no  speech  in  Thucydides  so  replete  with  rash,  mis-, 
guiding,  and  fallacious  counsels  as  this  harangue  of  Alkibiades. 


$-14  SICILIAN  AFFAIRS. 

As  a  man  of  action,  Alkibiades  was  always  brave,  vigorous,  and 
full  of  resource;  as  a  politician  and  adviser,  he  was  especially  mis- 
chievous in  his  country,  because  he  addressed  himself  exactly  to 
their  weak  point,  and  exaggerated  their  sanguine  and  enterprising 
temper  into  a  temerity  which  overlooked  all  permanent  calculation. 
The  Athenians  had  now  contracted  the  belief  that  they,  as  lords  of 
the  sea,  were  entitled  to  dominion  ami  receipt  of  tribute  from  all 
islands  -a  belief  which  they  had  not  only  acted  upon,  but  openly 
professed,  in  their  attack  upon  Melos  during  the  preceding  autumn. 
As  Sicily  was  an  island,  it  seemed  to  fall  naturally  under  this  cate- 
gory of  "subjects:  for  we  ou <j,ht  not  t<>  wonder,  amidst  the  inaccurate 
geographical  data  current  in  that  day.  that  they  were  ignorant  how 
much  lamer  Sicily  was  than  the  largest  island  in  the  Jfegean.  Yet 
they  seem  to  have,  been  aware  that  it  was  a  prodigious  conquest  to 
Btruggle  for;  as  we  may  judge  from  the  fact,  that  the  object  was 
one  kepi  back  rather  than  openly  avowed,  and  that  they  acceded  to 
all  the  immense  preparations  demanded  by  Nikias.  Moreover  we 
shall  see  presently  that  even  the  armament  which  was  dispatched  bad 
conceived  nothing  beyond  vague  and  hesitating  ideas  of  something 
great  to  be  achieved  in  Sicily.  But  if  the  Athenian  public  were  rash 
and  ignorant,  in  contemplating  the  conquest  of  Sicily,  much  more 
extravagant  were  the  views  of  Alkibiades:  though  I  cannot  bring 
myself  to  believe  that  even  he  (as  be  afterward  asserted)  really 
looked  beyond  Sicily  to  the  conquest  of  Carthage  and  her  empire. 
It  was  not'  merely  ambition  which  he  desired  to  gratify,  lie  was  not 
less  eager  for  the"  immense  private  gains  which  would  be  consequent 
upon  success,  in  order  to  supply  those  deficiencies  which  his  profli- 
gate expenditure  had  occasioned. 

When  we  recollect  how  loudly  the  charges  have  been  preferred 
against  Kleon — of  pr-esurnption,  of  rash  policy,  and  of  selfish  motive, 
in  reference  to  Sphakteria,  to  the  prosecution  of  the  war  generally, 
and  to  Ampbipolisj.and  when  we  compare  these  proceedings  with 
the  conduct  of  Alkibiades  as  here  described— we  shall  see  how  much 
more  forcibly  such  cbarges  attach  to  the  latter  than  the  former.  It 
will  be  seen  "that  the  vices  of  Alkibiades,  and  the  defects  of  Nikias, 
were  the  cause  of  fat-  greater  ruin  to  Athens  than  either  Kleon  or 
llyperbolus,  even  if  we  regard  the  two  latter  with  the  eyes  of  their 
worst  enemies. 


END  OF  VOL.  IL 


. 


University  of  California  Library 
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